

WAR COMES TO NEGROS ORIENTAL

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Apr 9th 1945~~

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NEGROS ORIENTAL
BOWS TO THE SON OF HEAVEN

CHAPTER I

WAR COMES TO NEGROS ORIENTAL

Unprepared

Peaceful is morning in the shrine garden;
World conditions, it is hoped, also will be peaceful.

On the morning of December 8, 1941 Negros Oriental was at peace with the world. The capital city of Dumaguete was awakened as usual that Monday morning by the daylight whistle of the SS Fanny returning from the Mindanao port of Iligan and now enroute to Manila. The Fanny was the largest and fastest inter-island steamer to call at Dumaguete. Only the worst of typhoons could interrupt its clock-like arrivals from Manila every Saturday night at 10:00 P.M. and its return trip the following Monday morning at 6:00 A.M. Upon this vessel more than on any other ship the merchants, dealers, and agents of the town depended for their weekly supplies of merchandise and other goods - boxes of canned food products from America - American made cigarettes - cases of Carnation, Alpine, Milk Maid, Elin, and other brands of milk - cloth, socks, cheap under garments, shirts, and ties from China, Japan, and America - bicycles from Japan - shoes from Filipino and Japanese owned factories in Manila - matches from the Philippine Match Company, also located in Manila - margarine from the International Oil Factory of Manila - rattan furniture from Manila factories - Singer sewing machines for the local agency - Ford and Chevrolet cars for the two local dealers - tractors and other farm machinery from the International Harvester Co. for local haciendas - electric refrigerators and radios from the General Electric Co. in Manila - pianos from Manila or the States - films from Hollywood via Manila and Cebu for the three local theaters. In fact, the Fanny always brought a varied and strange assortment of merchandise; so interesting indeed was its cargo that crowds never tired of watching the steamer unloaded. Oriental Negros, a sugar, coconut, and hemp producing province without a single factory of its own, was totally dependent upon the outside manufacturing world for all of its manufactured and canned goods.

The chief interest of the Americans who gathered at the pantalan on warm noon-

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light nights to watch was to count the number of mail bags unloaded. From ten to fifteen meant only local or Manila mail; twenty five or more meant that a U. S. steamer had arrived in Manila in time for the Panay; so the next morning the American community usually gathered at the Post Office for the distribution of the letters and the second class reading matter which would include Time and Life, Harpers, the Atlantic, the Readers Digest, professional and other magazines, also newspapers both from the States and from Manila. One "Old Timer", an ex-Spanish-war veteran who had not been off the Island since 1898 always took with him a small white sack to carry home his collection of mail which included his home town paper and a copy of the weekly New York Sunday Times.

On its return trip the Panay was loaded mainly with Manila board passengers, coconuts and hemp for Manila exporters and chickens, eggs, bananas and other fruits for Manila markets.

Little did those who saw the ship's cargo from Manila unloaded on that night of December 6 realize that this would be the last trip south of the faithful Panay, that this vessel which had weathered so many typhoons would be sunk by Japanese bombs during its final and last attempt to reach the shore of Negros a few weeks later. On this final journey it had been loaded not with mail and merchandise but with guns and ammunition badly needed by the 78th Negros regiment - a regiment still on paper - a regiment without arms or ammunition - a regiment never organized because the Panay failed to get through.

On Monday morning December 6 the Panay left Zamboanga as usual at 7:00 A.M. But the scene at the pier was not as usual. Passengers were hesitating to board the ship; others who had not planned to go to Manila were arriving breathlessly, having in the last hour decided to go to bring back a wife or other close relative who might happen to be in Manila - some were fathers with children in Manila schools. Captain Sumed was not his usual self, for he well understood what war with Japan would mean to a sea captain. Those on board the Panay, like the citizens of Zamboanga, had been informed by the 5:45 A.M. Manila News Broadcast that Pearl Harbor had been bombed and that the Philippines was in the path of the worst war typhoon in the history of the Pacific.

Elsewhere in Zamboanga, as the morning wore on, groups gathered in front of stores and in barber shops to discuss the meaning of it all. Students went to their classes,

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Dunagute being a student town with a private University, a private Academy, and a Provincial High School, but little was accomplished in the classroom. Special news broadcasts from Manila kept the town informed of the coming storm. Soon it was announced that Davao, Mindanao, and the army air field at Tarlac, Luzon, had been attacked by a large wave of Japanese planes.

The following day it was learned that the attack on Pearl Harbor was believed to be worse than at first feared. Air attacks on the Philippines bases continued. It was now realized that no town was safe from air attacks; citizens of the town began to prepare to evacuate to safer areas. Telegrams from parents and relatives of students began to pour in demanding that children be sent home. Already students had begun to leave on their own initiative. During the night a plane was reported approaching Dunagute which caused a near panic. The plane changed its course before reaching the town.

The third day of the war brought the news of a Japanese attempted landing in northern Luzon. At 2:15 those who were listening to KZMH Manila were suddenly informed of a raid on the city - they could hear the sound of an explosion, a woman's scream, a man's voice saying, "Be calm". Then without further explanation a record was played, "God Bless America." All was silent - not a single Manila station was on the air until 4:30 at which time the first words heard was an announcement that eight doctors as well as all available nurses were needed at once and should report to the Red Cross Headquarters.

News from outside the Philippines was even worse, for on this same day came the report of the sinking of "The Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse". This on top of the Pearl Harbor disaster was enough to explode the myth that in a war with the Japanese Japan would be quickly bottled up by the American, British, and Dutch navies and that "the Japanese life line to French Indo-China would be quickly cut off - - American planes from the Philippines could attack the Japanese convoys from the east. Planes from the Netherlands East Indies could harry them from the south. British planes from Singapore and the Malay states could attack from the west, while other British planes from Burma could blast Japanese troops in Indo-China - - American, British, and Netherlands submarines, scores of them, would send torpedoes crashing into their slow ships and swift allied destroyers would hang on the flanks of the convoys like wolves."

This according to an American magazine dated Nov. 18, 1941 (the last of reach the Philippines for nearly a long month) was the way the U.S. navy was supposed to fight Japan.¹ The author of this encouraging article was a Pulitzer Prize winner for his news despatches from the Orient and had been for fourteen years a New York Times expert on Far East affairs. After the third day of the war it was known in the Philippines that the war was not going as the experts had planned it.

Before the end of the first week the Japanese had succeeded in landing troops at Legaspi, southern Luzon, and at Aparri, northern Luzon. At Lingayen American and Filipino troops had repulsed an attempted landing by a heroic stand; later on our troops were to be driven back by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. With superior air power the Japanese in fourteen major air raids had struck devastating air blows at our air fields and at our planes on the ground. Great success was achieved in these first surprise attacks.

At the close of the first week it was revealed that Japan had struck in force against an unprepared country and that unless aid came from America at once the Philippines was in grave danger. However, morale was still high because everywhere Army officers, American and Filipino, and all classes of society believed that aid from America, like Blucher at Waterloo, would arrive before the coming of the night.

Little did those in the Philippines, even the most intelligent Americans, realize at that time how really unprepared was America herself. Had the soldiers at Bataan been fully aware of this, they would not have watched the skies and the waters of the Pacific in vain for American planes and for American ships which never arrived.

No-one in the Philippines was prepared for what happened. Corregidor and Singapore were considered impregnable. It was believed that the Japanese navy would prove no match for the American navy and that a war with Japan would be largely a naval encounter to take place somewhere between Hawaii and Japan. It had been proved that larger numbers of superior American planes could be flown from California to the Philippines via Hawaii, Midway, Wake, and Guam. The few vessels of Admiral Hart riding proudly upon the waves of Manila Bay were a symbol of American might. American aviators in Manila were as overconfident as the people themselves. One young flier in a Manila Bar expressed his displeasure at being in the Philippines rather than in China. Said he, "There will be no fighting in the Philippines. We will attack Japan (1) Hallett Fred, Look "How the U. S. Navy will Fight Japan," (Nov. 18, 1941), 20-21

itself from China bases.* American army planes and bombers flying over Manila were extremely reassuring that Japan would not dare attack the Islands. However, these planes were for offensive not defensive action and within a surprisingly short time they were shot out of the air or destroyed on the ground. Guam and Wake were soon taken, and Japan had complete air superiority. With such superiority the defense of the Philippines became a hopeless fight.

The people of the country were misled, like those of the United States, by American optimism and by our magazine experts who had predicted an easy war against Japan - by their articles in entertaining magazines under such titles as, "Japan's Weakness", "Japan Risks Destruction". In the August 1940 issue of *Variety* readers were assured by one of these experts (Hansen W. Baldwin) that "we have nothing to fear in the air from Japan, who is a weak power..." Other writers proclaimed that Japan with her army bogged down in China would be an easy prey - that as a result of the China war there were great shortages of everything - that the Japanese people were discouraged because of their great hardships and sacrifices and that they were everywhere asking (James R. Young, *Reader's Digest*, July 1941) "why should the war continue?" How could Japan take on another opponent? The U.S. could simply starve her into submission by cutting off vital raw and war materials. So it was believed prior to December 1941. Over-confident and badly underestimating the war strength of Japan, the people of the Philippines were sadly unprepared mentally and psychologically for what would happen when war actually came to the Islands.

The people not only had great faith in Admiral Hart and the American navy and air force but they were equally confident that the new Philippine army (General Mac Arthur's school boys as the Japanese called them) under General Mac Arthur, fighting for their home land, would be able to checkmate a force larger than Japan would be able to spare for the Philippines. It is true that a sizeable army was being built up in the Philippines, but it was an army practically without planes, without arms and without ammunition, without anti-tank guns or tanks themselves, and still more important, without anti-aircraft guns or coastal guns. The guns they did have were, for the most part, old U.S. discarded 1903 weapons.

This inadequate defense of the Philippines, this absolute unpreparedness for a war that was almost sure to come, can be understood only when one realizes that the United States herself was badly unprepared. It cannot be said that there had been

no warning regardint the situation, for now and then an article of gloom did appear in an outstanding magazine, but they were articles one did not care to read at the time. For instance, in the August 1940 issue of the Atlantic, T.B. Thomas warned that while the President had appealed for a billion dollar appropriation and had called upon Congress for haste, orders already under way could not be finished before June 1942; - that gauges and dies and special tools and machines had still to be assembled before these "vast and nebulous" preparations for 1942 could be undertaken. Mr. Thomas further pointed out that the American National Guard was in May 1940 without one of the weapons most needed to defeat itself against weapons of modern war, having no anti-tank guns, no 37 mm anti-aircraft guns and no modern type field artillery. He quoted Major General Haskell of the New York National Guard as saying, "in my command --- we have not received a single anti-tank weapon of any kind, not a single 30 cal machine gun, not a single 81 mm mortar, and not a single 90 mm mortar. We now have two tanks in the State of New York and 18 anti-aircraft guns. We have no 37 mm anti-aircraft guns for our present anti-aircraft regiments, nor have we any 30 cal machine guns for our infantry".

If the New York National Guard as late as 1940 had to be contented with left-over 1918 army rifles, is it any wonder that our step-child army in the Philippines was still using 1908 army discards in December 1941?

Another startling article appeared in the August 1941 Readers Digest condensed from the United States News, entitled "What would we fight with". This enlightening article revealed that our army and navy had in August 1941 only 6000 planes including trainers, fighters and bombers, - that our army still possessed inadequate supplies of all modern weapons from anti-tank guns to airplanes and tanks and "it will remain inadequately supplied for many months to come." The article further pointed out that neither our army or navy had foreseen the developments that would come from Hitler's new type of warfare, that "the navy had not foreseen what the airplane would do to warships. The army had not foreseen any number of developments". The whole organization of our army, its weapons and tactical conceptions had become obsolete.

Still later in 1941 Life published an article on army life in the new camps entitled, "What the Soldiers Complain about". One of the complaints was that the men felt the training was out of date and old-fashioned. "We came here to learn how to fight a blitzkrieg - instead we get close order drill." Another complaint came from

the Junior officers who said that their senior officers had not bothered to keep up with modern military tactics. A third and general complaint was of the lack of equipment and ammunition - "Most of the men have never shot a trench mortar, and get to shoot a springfield rifle rarely".

That this situation was true was borne out by Senator Harry F. Byrd in an article in the November 1941 Readers Digest entitled "The Failure of our National Defense Program". Said the Senator "Judged by any standard our National Defense Program is a failure. As of September 1940, our fighting force had only 56 four-engined heavy bombers. In the year that has elapsed since we have produced less than 200 others --- The army's present lack of equipment is notorious. Two years after the war began --- we do not have one full division trained and equipped to fight. Every training camp is woefully lacking in equipment for training purposes --- Wooden guns and trucks camouflaged as tanks --- no ammunition --- On September 1, the entire regular army had only 55 - 105 mm howitzers (the old 75 mm being useless because of the new German guns)." Concluded the Senator, "This nation is at present in no condition to fight a war abroad --- Not at any time to date have the American people been told the whole truth --- They have been lulled into a false sense of security - the very illusion which was so disastrous to France."

The people of the Philippines, including the Americans living in the Islands, certainly had been lulled into a sense of false security. The fate of France was to be their fate.

THE NEW ORDER

During the months of June and July the Japanese had found conditions in Negros Oriental as they would have them. All the provincial officials had returned to their posts and the majority of municipal officials as well. Evacuees by the thousands had gone back to their Dumaguete or sea coast town homes. A stunned and bewildered people had been relieved to find the Japanese so desirous of being friends and far less terrible than had been expected. It had been a relief to have it over with, to be relieved of the fear of invasion, of dive bombers, of shells from the sea, of bombs from the sky. The people still had their homes and somehow they would live. Perhaps the stories about the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in China and other conquered areas had been committéd. The Dumaguete manager of the Philippine National Bank had had evacuated near Sanjay where he had buried in the hills a large sum of money. Through fifth columnists he was captured, tortured, and forced to reveal the hiding place of the money, then he was stabbed and buried in the same hole from which the money had been removed. Between Sison and Zamboanga quite a farmer was killed when he tried to run away from a Japanese patrol which wanted to use him for forced labor to float a beached launch. Houses of Filipino evacuees were entered and looted on the pretext that their inhabitants were unfriendly to the Japanese because they had not returned to their homes. Cattle, sheeps, pigs, and chickens were stolen as needed. Hospital equipment, good steel instruments were taken from the Presbyterian Mission Hospital, renamed by the Japanese, Dumaguete Hospital, and practically taken over by them. The main assembly hall of Silliman University, once the town's public forum, was now used as a garage and bodega for stolen automobiles and other loot awaiting transportation to Japan. The University itself and all its faculty homes were looted, its fine library totally destroyed in a vain attempt to wipe out all traces of Western culture, its shop and Press gutted of all machinery for scrap iron, its science laboratory equipment destroyed.

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THE NEW ORDER

In the beginning it was the American and Chinese property owners who suffered the most. After all, they were foreigners and had no place in the New Order of the Philippines for the Filipinos. The masses of the common people were forced to bow to sentries who stood with fixed bayonettes on streets corners and that sometimes poor people who did not understand the new order of bowing were slapped. It was true that a public "red light" district had been established in the Provincial Capitol for the special benefit of the Japanese in the history of Davao, a University and student town where common decency had never tolerated such an institution. It was true that other Filipino girls were not molested. It was true that the proud patriotic, and dignified Filipino leaders of the people were now making fools of themselves in their anxiety to please and to cooperate with the new rulers of the land. Even the Governor could do and say only what he was told to do and say. Moreover wherever he went and say only what he did he had first to consult his Japanese advisor, a former clerk and manager of a small Japanese Bazaar, a man before whom, prior to May 26 no Davaoans had ever bowed or bothered to include on any "must invite" social list. Yes, it was a new order, with former Japanese fishermen and carpenters setting up stores, selling loot stolen mainly from Chinese stores, forming coops purchasing associations, the coops to be paid for in fake money. Worshipers of the Sun Goddess now walked the streets of Davao as though they owned the land. From all appearances it would seem that they did. Not only was American properties taken over (three coconut plantations, one branch store, the property of Silliman University) and their doors closed with Imperial seals of ownership, but Chinese and Filipino property as well was taken over as desired, the owners frankly told that such belonged to the Japanese by right of conquest.

For example: The provincial transportation system was taken over without regard for the rights of the former owners of the corporation, the passenger and freight trucks being run by the Japanese on stolen gasoline. Fares had to be paid in silver coins, and all the income went to support the Japanese occupation forces. The salaries of the Filipino drivers and conductors were paid in worthless Japanese paper money.

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The funds of the Philippine national banks were confiscated as well as the funds in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer. In the future government officials would be paid in Japanese paper money admitted by all to be worthless but inflation was prevented of Japanese price fixing and the power of the military to force its acceptance by unwilling merchants.

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THE NEW ORDER

Also the Visayan Electrical Co. a Filipino owned public utility company, was taken over by the enemy with almost prohibitive rates for the Dumaguete public. Here too the employees were paid in worthless paper without date or serial number. Likewise the local Filipino owned ice plant was taken over. It is true that only a few owners were involved and not the public in general, but this was not the owners idea of what co-prosperity should be. Nor did the people understand why they should be charged a ten peso residence tax when under the old government the tax had been only fifty centavos or 1/20th the amount.

The group to suffer the most were the prosperous Chinese merchants of the town. They were all forced back into the town as fellow orientals who should welcome the New Order. They were allowed to continue their business after the first days of looting during which the Japanese had taken what sugar and other food supplies they wanted, but they had to conduct their business on Japanese terms and to share their profits with the Japanese. Soldiers entered the stores and bought what they wanted on their own terms and paid often as low as one peso for a pair of shoes.

Throughout the Province the Chinese were forced to register and then to organize a society to further Japanese co-operation. Their leaders were told, "You are in our hands- your lives- your money, ours- You must help us carry out our program." The Chinese of Oriental Negros Province alone were assessed 500,000 pesos to be paid in genuine money as their contribution to the New Order. The two outstanding Chinese leaders of the community were put in jail and held as a reason for the payment of the money.

While all this was going on, "brother" Filipinos were meekly bowing and submitting to the New Order and listening with curiosity to the Japanese explanations of the New Order and the meaning of Co-Prosperity and Asia for the Asiatics. However, actions and deeds spoke louder than words. The Japanese could destroy the Silliman University library and how science equipment, but they could not destroy the things for which Silliman had stood.

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Now they could no longer listen to their own radios or get news other than that in rigidly censored Manila or Cebu paper, now did they dare to express their opinions openly, for in each group there might be a Japanese fifth columnist. The Filipino people for 40 years who had enjoyed absolute freedom of speech, of the Press, of Assembly, and the right to petition or criticize their government and the government of the United States suddenly found all such freedom null and void. They were slaves of a new economic order which told them what they must produce and at what prices they could sell their labor and their products- all this that they might take their rightful place in the new Co-prosperity Sphere, in the new Asia for the Asiatics.

Just how one Asiatic felt about the New Philippines was expressed a letter sent from his mountain hide-out. This writer was one of the leading Filipino druggists of Dunaquete.

Dear Bob,

This letter had no address because our whereabouts is a secret. The Japs after looting our drug-store and our house are still not content with their dastardly deeds and are still trying to locate us--Just how much is my actual loss I cannot ascertain until after the war. Our furniture, piano and all the things movable in our house were stolen by the Japs. Most probably my two cars were also stolen. Well, let them enjoy the short time they are there. The day of reckoning is fast approaching and May God speed the day.----

Rotarily yours,
Simoy

The Japanese found Negros Oriental an island paradise, an island conquered without resistance, an island to be exploited at will. They soon succeeded in getting, as has been pointed out, the guns of most of the civilians and those of many of the soldiers. They almost succeeded but not quite. Here and there in the hills was a soldier with a gun, who had not surrendered. Here and there in the hills was a civilian evacuee with a hidden gun, who in spite of all the attractive Japanese appeals had not returned to the lowlands. In time the Japanese confiscated his property and all personal belongings left behind, but that was their mistake, for they would later be made to pay for it.

June and July were the harvest months for the Japanese. Their time was spent in organizing the government according to their liking in getting forced contributions from the Chinese, in looting all the American homes and the homes of the Filipino evacuees who had not returned- in taking

Over all property of value, even Filipino owned property.

In spite of flattering remarks about being brothers and the new prosperity order one Japanese officer showed his true colors when he frankly told the Filipino owner of a confiscated motor launch, after this owner had asked about his rights and what guarantee he would have of payment since no receipt was given for the boat, "Guarantee- "hy we cannot even guarantee your life. All Your property, even your life belongs to us." At last the wolf had begun to show his teeth to little red Riding Hood.

By August most of the people had seen enough of the New Order not to like it. They still failed to see where they came in on the "Co" in Co-Prosperity and it was in August that the guerrillas began to strike.

BEGINNING OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE DUMAGUETE AREA

As early as June 25 Victor Jorales, destined to be one of Negroes Oriental's most famous guerrilla leaders, entered Dumaguete with two companions and from a garage in back of the main Japanese headquarters he stole ten pistols (surrendered civilian guns). Not satisfied with this he repeated the trick a few nights later, getting more pistols and all the ammunition his men could carry. Soon he had twelve armed faithful followers, and from that time on he began to play hide-and seek with the Japanese.

On August 22 one of his men was captured and placed in the Provincial jail. That same night Vic entered the town, broke into the jail, and freed his men as well as all the other prisoners who wished to leave. The next night with his twelve men he entered the small town of Alibulan, 5 kilometers north of Dumaguete, where he disarmed the local puppet police force of all their guns, 4 shotguns and 4 revolvers. Vic was only a Silliman University school boy when the war broke out, but from this time on he was an important person and was very much wanted by the Japanese. Early in October after learning where his headquarters were, a large force of the enemy went to the locality (barrio Maningao). The men of Jorales were able to ambush and kill six Japanese before being forced to flee. The Japanese then burned 22 houses and killed 8 civilians in revenge - a score that Jorales would later more than settle.

Destined to be equally famous as a guerrilla leader was another school boy, a Silliman University College of Engineering Sophomore, Federico Ricad. By August 17 he had a group of six men organized as he himself later wrote "for one purpose - to fight the Japs. This was because the enemy had shown striking examples of intense and brutal treatment of families of disbanded soldiers who did not surrender, and the only possible way to protect ourselves was to group together. On that date (Aug. 17) I brought my men with me to Malabo to see Mr. Bell."

On August 18 with only three rifles, this group went to the town of Becong, south of Dumaguete, where they stayed all night with a friendly Filipino. This house was soon after burned by the Japanese and the owner killed for giving shelter to armed soldiers. Learning that one of the chief Filipino collaborators and enemy agents, T. Lejato, had gone south with four Japanese, Ricad and his men went further south from Becong to ambush them on their way back to Dumaguete. Picking out a good place, the boys waited their chance which came late in the afternoon of August 20. The four Japanese were killed and Lejato, although able

to escape, was seriously wounded.

This was the beginning of a group which would grow in number, in daring and in fame, and would cause the Japanese endless trouble. This group after their encounter with the enemy and their agent returned to the vicinity of Ayugutan where they began to ambush the enemy along the highway. On September 11 two enemy loaded trucks were fired upon; one was forced into a ditch and upset and twelve Japanese were killed. To prevent the enemy from returning in force, bridges were burned with the result that the now dangerous highway to the north could no longer be used. Other ex-soldiers with guns soon joined the group. Also hidden guns were located, the most valuable one being an automatic rifle.

A third group to win renown in the Dumaguete area was headed by Sgt. David Cirilo. After the disbandment of the Constabulary unit under Major Sebarre, Sgt. Cirilo with two corporals and four privates evacuated in the hills of Simlan. This small group remained intact and became the nucleus of the Sergeant's later organization. On September 12 two of this group were captured and murdered by the Japanese. The next day Cirilo began to recruit other constabulary soldiers and civilians; soon he had a force of twelve men with rifles, four with shotguns, and two men with bolos. From that time on he was very active in guerrilla warfare.

South of Dumaguete there was no guerrilla resistance prior to the ambushing of Majato near Dauin by Lt. Rided on the evening of August 29. The next morning the Japanese went to Siaton in an armed truck to get the family of the wounded man and some of his furniture. That was the last time the enemy went as far south as Siaton.

On July 9 forty-eight Japanese had set up a garrison in Tolong, but they occupied the town only until August 15. However, while there they did a good job of looting and for good measure they burned the public school books. When the garrison returned to Dumaguete, they left one Japanese civilian, a former resident of the town, to govern the place and to keep peace and order. This was a big task for one lone Japanese, and on the night of September 13 he was killed by Guerrillas.

When the Japanese first entered Tolong, they followed the usual pattern of occupying the town, establishing themselves in the local Elementary School building. They then called for the Mayor who in turn ordered all the other officials back to their posts. The Chief of Police of the town, Benbinoto Mascardo, returned to his work on July 10. He himself was not disarmed, but his policemen were forced to give

up their revolvers and were given shotguns instead. Both the mayor and the chief were extremely loyal and both were secretly working against the Japanese. As the enemy had arrived with a complete list of all gun owners in the area, it was impossible to conceal these weapons. Orders were sent out for all gun owners to report and to turn in their guns. However, they were not surrendered.

All the while that the Chief of Police Mascardo was working with the Japanese and was enjoying their confidence, he was secretly making plans to annihilate them. A secret organization was formed in the town. Furthermore Mascardo was in contact with Major Ansejo and Lt. Oracion at Busay and with the soldiers in the hills. He went into the hills as the Japanese were led to believe, to persuade the soldiers to come in and to surrender. His real purpose, however, was to organize these men into a guerilla band. Plans were made to attack on the night of August 19, and all that prevented this from being carried out was the sudden evacuation of the town by the Japanese on August 18, the garrison being recalled to re-enforce the main garrison in Dumaguete. The next plan was to wait for the enemy to return, but when after a month the enemy had not gone back to Tolong, the guerillas took over the town on September 13.

The Japanese garrison in Dumaguete was too small to cope with the guerilla movement which by September had spontaneously broken out from Vallehermoso in the north to Tolong in the south. The enemy were now bottled up in two towns - Bas and Dumaguete. Bridges in the north had been destroyed and land communication had thus been made impossible. The road south from Dumaguete to Tolong, however, was still open and while the Japanese had not ventured to use the highway for fear of ambush, there was nothing to prevent them, especially if re-enforced, from using armored trucks for taking their soldiers to the southern towns.

In Siaton the mayor was loyal and was doing for the Japanese only what he was forced to do. On the other hand, the Chief of Police was a weakling and a willing puppet. Thus it was impossible for the mayor and the chief to co-operate as had been the case in Tolong. The situation was made worse by the fact that Siaton was the home of the Japanese special agent and deputy governor, Lajato. Furthermore Lajato had been a former mayor of the town and a special friend of the chief of police. The fact that more guns were surrendered in Siaton in proportion to any other town is due to the effective work of Lajato and the Chief of Police, Kitani. By August 23 these men had succeeded in getting all the guns of the soldiers except

one. This soldier lived in the hills about 1 1/2 kilometers from the town. On the night of August 23 Agent Lajato, the Chief of Police, and three armed puppet policemen made a surprise visit into the hills. A midnight call was made at the home of this soldier, but the boy with his gun was sleeping somewhere else that night. The relatives were warned that terrible things would happen to them if the soldier did not immediately go to town and surrender his gun.

This group had another mission to perform for the Japanese - the capture of an American family, evacuated nearby. Living with this family was a Filipino school teacher and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Joaquin G. Fonda. Joaquin before finishing his course at Silliman University had served for three years in the Philippine Constabulary and was thus ably prepared to become, a short time after the above incident the leader of the Siaton guerilla forces.

It was known that the family and that Lt. Fonda were armed and would resist capture. For some reason Lajato and the chief lost their nerve and instead of paying the family a forced visit, they sent a diplomatic note. Said this note, among other things, "My purpose of contacting you is to inform you that several Americans have already surrendered --- Mr. _____ (a close friend of the Americans and a Government official) is very anxious to see about your early surrender and will guarantee your safety and fair treatment by the Japanese army."

Feeling confident that the last USAFFE boy and that the only Americans in the hills of Siaton would soon voluntarily surrender, agent Lajato, Chief of Police Mitani, and the three armed policemen returned to town. As they arrived in town late in the afternoon of August 24, they were met by a Japanese patrol which was waiting for them. Already the enemy had taken the guns of the policemen left in the town and now the chief's revolver and the shotguns of the threemen were taken also. The Japanese still trusted the chief, but the night before Vic Jornales and his guerilla band had disarmed the chief of police and his men in the town of Sibulan just north of Dausguete. The Japanese had decided therefore that this must not happen in other towns - thus they recalled all guns.

When they learned what had taken place in town, the three Americans, Mr. and Mrs. Fonda, and one lone USAFFE boy in the hills of Siaton slept more easily the next night. No puppet police would again dare to go into the hills unarmed. A week later agent Lajato was himself ambushed and severely wounded on his way from Siaton to Dausguete. Three weeks later on September 21 the largest bridge between

Siaton and Zamboanguita over the Malubun river was destroyed by a small guerilla band. Some other bridges were also destroyed between Zamboanguita, Lunin, and Accong, so the road south of Dausaguete was as completely closed as the road to the north.

The Malubun bridge was burned by the former school teacher, J. G. Fonda and four armed men loaned to him by Capt. Vitoria. After destroying this bridge, in order that the Japanese wouldn't follow them into town in armored trucks, Fonda and his men possessing only two borrowed army rifles and three borrowed shotguns went on south and arrived in Siaton in the afternoon of September 22. Their first mission was to find the Chief of Police and to shoot him as a Japanese puppet. But they found a very sick man, who knowing what had happened to diployal officials in other towns and seeing the hand-writing on the wall after the enemy had disarmed him and his men and knowing of the narrow escape of his friend Lejato, had suffered a complete nervous breakdown. Seeing a helpless old man sick in bed, the boys lost their desire to kill. However, they ordered his family to carry him into the hills and told the entire family to stay out of town - just in case the Japanese should return by sea or by the long forced march overland.

Next they rounded up the two leading pro-Japanese citizens who were listed as fifty columnists or Japanese collaborators. These two men were taken that night as prisoners into the hills for safekeeping. The other inhabitants of the town and the mayor welcomed the little band of five armed men as conquering heroes. The Japanese flag was torn down from the municipal building and burned. From somewhere appeared a hidden American flag and soon it was proudly waving in the breeze. A town meeting was held in the Plaza with the mayor and guerilla leader Fonda explaining to the people that from now on it was to be an all-out resistance. If the Japanese returned to burn the town, that was the price which must be paid. If they returned to garrison the town, all must evacuate into the hills. The enemy might return, but the day would come when all would be driven out by American aid, for America was winning and would win the war.

In a few days the town was re-organized and a new chief of police appointed. Volunteers joined the guerilla band. The seven guns which had not been surrendered were turned over to the group. A few additional guns which had been left or hidden in the area by evacuees from other areas were located and in a few weeks Lt. Fonda had a force of 18 men and 18 weapons, mostly shotguns, 22 rifles and even a few home-made guns. It was a small force but a carefully selected group of former soldiers and three constabulary men with a few picked men who had not been in the

army before. Because of this group the Japanese had to cross off Siaton, the home town of their favorite agent, as a guerilla controlled town. They could retake the town but a few of their number would be killed - they could garrison the town, but one by one at a night a Japanese would stop a bullet - they could patrol the nearby area but from every bank and rock or hillside they could be ambushed. Thus retaking the town was not worth the effort.

What had taken place in Tolong and in Siaton was soon to occur in Zamboanguita and in Davao. No longer could the Japanese enter the towns at will and take unto themselves whatever they desired or found worth taking. Conditions in Oriental Negros, so pleasing in June and July, were now in September no longer to the liking of the Japanese. Instead of being able to do anything about it, the Japanese had to watch the guerilla bands continue to grow in numbers as UNLAWFUL boys everywhere came out of hiding. Soon these loose units in the Zamboanguita area and from Tolong to Zamboanguita were to be united into one common organization under one leader. On October 16 Major F. A. Masejo, an experienced Constabulary officer, who had refused to surrender in Mindanao and who had returned to the Province, took over the command of all the guerilla forces in southern Negros Oriental.

Five days before this, however, an event occurred which greatly increased the respect of the enemy for the guerilla forces of Negros Oriental - an event which also caused them to be more cautious in the future - the battle of Loos.

Early in October the three guerilla leaders operating in the area immediately north of Zamboanguita, Federico Almad, David Cirilo, and Vic Jornales, decided to unite forces for a combined attack upon the Japanese. The plan was to assemble their troops near Sibulan and then have a trusted spy notify the enemy that the Okoy bridge (just north of the town) was being destroyed; then when the Japanese arrived in their armored trucks, the boys would ambush and completely annihilate them. They would then take the uniforms of the dead soldiers and their arms and ride back to Zamboanguita in the armored trucks for a surprise attack upon the remaining members of the garrison, thus capturing the town itself. This bold plan did not work because the Japanese refused to fall into the trap. Their own spies had informed them of the true situation.

After waiting for the Japanese for four days during which time they lived on boiled bananas and coconuts and were kept awake at night by mosquitoes, the boys decided to move to the barrio of Loos, two kilometers north of Sibulan, where better food supplies could be secured.

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On October 11 about 1:30 P.M. a guard brought word that a truck load of Japanese soldiers was approaching. The boys deployed and were ready to ambush the truck, but again the enemy had been informed by a spy of the exact position where the boys intended to ambush them. The truck stopped before it came within range and the Japanese quickly jumped out with their guns ready for action. This naturally disrupted the ambush plans and demoralized some of the boys who lost their nerve and retreated as the enemy approached. Two other trucks brought re-enforcements which permitted the Japanese in a three point attack to encircle the remaining guerrillas who had stood their ground. The only advantage of the guerrillas was a favorable terrain and one automatic rifle. Altogether they had only 26 rifles as against 70 Japanese rifle men aided by trench mortar and machine gun. Surrounded on all sides it was impossible for the boys to withdraw; so there was nothing left but to fight to the last man and the last round of ammunition and to pray, as Lt. Rided later told the writer, for darkness. The fight lasted from 1:30 to 5:00 P.M. when the last enemy assault was repulsed. After this the enemy themselves waited for darkness to gather up their dead and wounded and to load them in their trucks and take them back to Dumaguete.

In this fight eleven guerrillas were killed and eight wounded. Included in the latter group was Lt. Rided who was wounded in the leg by a machine gun bullet. But the Japanese losses were far greater, for 37 were killed in the battle itself or later died in Dumaguete from wounds. Their loss was still greater than the number of dead would indicate because they lost their commander, Capt. Sada. The Dumaguete garrison was so completely demoralized by this encounter and by their losses that it was completely replaced not only by a new captain but also by an entirely new group of soldiers, the remaining members of the old garrison being transferred to another place.

Again MacArthur's school boys had vindicated themselves and Negroes Oriental guerrillas had struck the Imperial Occupation Forces a hard blow - not only by hit and run attacks but also by openly fighting against great odds. With proper equipment, ammunition, and leadership what might not these boys do? From this time on Negroes Oriental would no longer be a south sea island paradise - a resting or recuperating place for tired Japanese soldiers. Having struck the enemy such a blow the guerrillas would strike and strike again until the last Japanese would be driven from their once happy and peaceful shores.

FIRST GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION IN THE DUMAGUETE AREA

In August the Japanese intensified their drive to obtain the surrender of all ex-USAFV soldiers, their arms and ammunition. A date was set - a dead line for the surrender of such men and their guns after which time all with guns would be declared outlaws and would be hunted down as bandits. To show that they meant business a group of 40 Japanese on August 15 went to barrio Palapinon, 7 kilometers west of Dumaguete. They went direct to a house (thanks to fifty column work) on the bank of the Cocoy river where three or four soldiers were living, one an ex-P.O. man. When in sight of the house the Japanese began to machine-gun the place, killing the young daughter of one of the men. One of the soldiers was caught and bayoneted; also two innocents old men swimming in the river were captured, tied and bayoneted.

This was the first show of force - the first killing in the Dumaguete area - the first attempt of the Japanese to frighten the people by a policy of terror, a policy which failed miserably. In the case of this first killing, before night relatives and friends of the three murdered men and the child came to the evacuation place of an American, Mr. Bell, asking for help (They had no-one else to whom they could turn) and begging for guns that they might "get even" with the Japanese.

Small groups had already begun to band together for self-protection. In a few cases these armed men were restless and the spirit of outlawry was rising. Many of the returned soldiers were Williman University R.O.T.C. students and a few of these boys were in almost every group. These bands which now began to organize themselves had no high ranking military officer to turn to for leadership. All the American officers on the Island had surrendered together with their Filipino staff officers. Only two of the five sector commanders on the Island, Majors Abcede and Mate, did not surrender, but they were both in Occidental Negros separated from Negros Oriental by a high mountain range. Communication with them at this time was impossible. In fact, their exact whereabouts were unknown. Since all the Filipino Provincial officials had returned to Dumaguete during the first occupation week, there was no governor nor other public official around whom these loose units might organize or group themselves as had been the case in some of the Islands; such as Panay and Bohol.

However, from the outbreak of the war to May 26 the Director of Civil Affairs

appointed by the army was H. H. Bell. He was in the hills, still free and had been very active in travelling about, in visiting the different soldiers and their families, and in urging the boys not to surrender. Thus it was but natural that they should turn to him for guidance. In fact, they used his name long before they had a right to do so. For example, one night a group of boys went into Zamagete and put up posters ordering all the people to get out of town and to stop collaborating with the Japanese and for all the ex-~~USAF~~ men to go to Mr. Bell's evacuation place in the hills to join up. As a result over one hundred ex-soldiers went to Mr. Bell expecting to be furnished with guns only to be turned away because such were not available.

The first meeting to discuss the possibility of a real guerrilla organization for the purpose of harrassing the Japanese and at the same time of preventing our own armed men from running loose was held on August 13, 1942, at Lake Danao, the evacuation place of Mr. Bell and of Dr. Carson. Among those present were Capt. Estrada and Lt. Gomez. A series of meetings followed, each being attended by a larger group.

At a conference on September 5 attended by Capt. Estrada, Capt. Flores, Lt. Viloria, Mr. Bell, Dr. Carson, Mr. George Fleischer, Dr. Siencz, Atty. Antequillo, Mr. Lowry, Lt. Gomez, and some enlisted men, Mr. Bell was elected leader of the Guerilla Forces to act until a ranking officer would be found to head a re-organized army unit.

Having heard that Major P. A. Ausejo had arrived from Mindanao and was living near Assy, southern Oriental Negros, Mr. Bell sent a special messenger to contact him and to invite him to come north for a conference with the group leaders in the Zamagete area. Mr. Bell had also heard that Col. Garod was somewhere around Guimuligan; so he and Capt. Estrada the first week of October started north to contact the Colonel. Because of the Japanese occupation of Zam and because of the high mountains west of the town, communications with the north were extremely difficult. On their way they heard conflicting reports about Col. Garod - that he was inactive - that he had refused to take part in the guerilla organization in the north - that he considered the time not ripe for such a movement - that he would head such an organization only if orders to do so from Washington. Discouraged by these reports and by other

rumors, Mr. Hall and the Captain returned south.

In the meantime Major Ausejo in response to the invitation he had received proceeded north with a small armed unit, arriving at Malabo early in October.

By this time the group in the vicinity of New Aguaiton, north of Amaguete, had established headquarters at Gansahonog in the mountains of Aguaiton. In August the two groups in that area, one under Lt. Ridad and the other under Capt. Flores, had fused into one Unit with Capt. Estrada as their Unit commander and with Capt. Flores as the District or Battalion commander. The plan was to unite the units farther north and thus form a real battalion with headquarters at Gansahonog, the C. P. of Capt. Flores.

Now in October Major Ausejo and Mr. Hall, together with Lt. Oracion, Lt. G. Sibela, Lt. Juan Dominado, Lt. Rito Dominado, and Lt. Vilorio proceeded to Gansahonog. Here, with the men of Capt. Flores, plans were discussed for a real organization. From this time on Major Ausejo assumed command of the "Negros Oriental Guerrilla Forces." After this meeting at Gansahonog Major Ausejo returned to Malabo to establish his headquarters there and to perfect the re-organization of the 23rd Inf. Reg. By the latter part of November he had selected as his staff officers; Capt. B. N. Vilorio (promoted by Col. Ausejo), Executive officer; Lt. A. M. Estacion, Adjutant; Lt. Juan Dominado, Intelligence Officer; Lt. Rito Dominado, Operations Officer; Lt. T. B. Oracion, Supply Officer.

Under this new organization the Province was divided into four sub-sectors with a Battalion Commander over each. The commanding officers were: First Battalion, Capt. H. Mercado; Second Battalion, Capt. Leon Flores; Third Battalion Capt. Felix Estrada; Fourth Battalion, Major Anito Cansanan. Each Battalion was composed of four companies, the nucleus of each being, in most cases, the local or original guerilla band in each municipality with their leader, now a lieutenant, and with the group under the control of and a part of the larger organization.

This organization as worked out by Major Ausejo was logical and carefully planned. It should have worked and would have worked had it not been for personal jealousies and ambitions among a few officers and had it not been for a more serious situation that soon developed - the problem of disputed command for the Island as a whole. Soon we were to have not one commander of Negros Oriental but three and three separate over-lepping organizations. The problem was then no longer one of lack of organization but one of over-organization.

Trouble Between Captain Mercado and Colonel Gador

The first organization meeting in the Cullalangen area was held on the night of August first at the evacuation house of Lieutenant Palaga's Troop. Captain Mercado was elected the leader and plans were made to attack the Japanese guerrilla located in the Elementary School of the town. This attack was made on the night of August 4, 1944 by fifteen men, twelve of whom had rifles. The Japanese were taken by complete surprise and was estimated that thirty may have been killed.

The Japanese immediately began to patrol the interior and to look for Captain Mercado and his men. There were constant patrols and searching of patrols until August 24 on which date the Japanese evacuated the town.

In the meantime Captain Mercado had appointed leaders in the various districts and nearby towns, and after the Japanese left, he was rapidly perfecting an organization of the area. The Mayor and the Health Inspector of Cullalangen who had actively aided the enemy left with the Japanese. These men were replaced by local officials.

While Captain Mercado had heard that Colonel Gador was evacuated in the nearby hills, he was unable to contact him until after the Japanese had left the area. Around the first of September the two men held a conference. Colonel Gador told the Captain that he had under his units in Cebu, Bohol, and Negros Occidental all of which were co-operating with him. Believing this to be true Captain Mercado also agreed to co-operate with the Colonel.

Captain Mercado was led to believe that he would remain in charge of and be permitted to perfect and enlarge the organization he had already started. On September 3 Colonel Gador had prepared a memorandum for Majors Salazar, Alegre, Mate and for Captain Mercado. Major Salazar was supposed to be in the south around Zamboanga while Major Alegre and Mate were known to be active in Occidental Negros. Captain Mercado on September 14 issued under the heading of the PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, MEMORANDUM, #177777777, a Field Order #1, consisting of Information, Decision of Mission and Instructions. The area to be under Captain Mercado's jurisdiction was essentially to include the whole of Central Negros. Under the heading "Information" it is stated that "Det. Gualina" never have been active in Zamboanga since June -- 14. One is starting to organize in Libertad, Negros Occidental is presently organized to organize the Libertad Unit, in Villavieja of Zamboanga. He will be heading of from Capt. Flores who is starting to organize guerrilla band in the south." This it is clear that on September 14 there was no effective organization to the south of Cullalangen, and the reference to Capt. Flores proves that the units north of this were secret in support of the activities south of this as the people of the south were worried about what was taking place in the north.

This order of Capt. Mercado of September 14 is now used by the men of Col. Gador to prove that the "Captain" was at one time working with and under Colonel Gador. It is true that he did work with the Colonel until October 1.

The Colonel had established his own headquarters along the Provincial road south of the town of Cullalangen. Instead of giving Capt. Mercado a free hand to build up his organization, the officers under the Captain were called to Col. Gador's headquarters for a conference. One of these officers was dismissed, and the Unit commanders in the areas of Libertad, Tagasan, and Jomalal were changed without the knowledge or consent of Capt. Mercado. Also sayors appointed by the Captain were replaced even though affairs had been running smoothly.

Finally Capt. Mercado himself was relieved of his command and was given no further connection with the army. On a visit to Cebu and Occidental Negros after his dismissal by the Colonel, Capt. Mercado learned from the officers there that they had never had any connection with Col. Gador nor any intention of coming under his command. Thus Capt. Mercado decided to continue his own original guerrilla organization.

Many of the Captain's officers who had been relieved of their commands and most of his men remained loyal to him. So there grew up two separate organizations with two leaders and their personal followers. Each leader in turn built up an organization out of proportion to the number of guns they had and to the needs of the area for guerrilla fighting, especially as there were no longer any Japanese in the entire area. Officers were rapidly promoted or commissioned and openly bid for. In case of

discipline they could always join the other group.

On October 16 a large force of Japanese crossed the mountains from Isabel, Negros and entered Guihulngan. At the same time a second group landed from the sea. Captain Mercado was himself in the hills. Learning that the enemy were coming across the mountains, he sent to town for re-enforcements - but his men in town had sighted the incoming ship and remained to ambush the Japanese along the beach as they landed. The Captain with his small force was able, nevertheless, to ambush the Japanese in the hills and to kill a number of them.

BEGINNING OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE GUIHULNGAN AREA

The first organization meeting in the Guihulngan area was held on the night of August first at the evacuation house of Lt. Pelagio Ysalay. Captain Mercado was elected the leader and plans were made to attack the Japanese garrison located in the Elementary School of the town. This attack was made on the night of August 4, 1942 by fifteen men, twelve of whom had rifles. The Japanese were taken by complete surprise and as many as thirty may have been killed.

The Japanese immediately began to patrol the interior and to look for Capt. Mercado and his men. There were constant patrols and ambushing of patrols until August 28 on which date the Japanese evacuated the town.

In the meantime Capt. Mercado had appointed leaders in the various districts and nearby towns, and after the Japanese left, he was rapidly perfecting an organization of the area. The Mayor and Sanitary Inspector of Guihulngan, who had actively aided the enemy, left with the Japanese. These men were replaced by loyal officials.

While Capt. Mercado had heard that Col. Gador was evacuated in the nearby hills he was unable to contact him until after the Japanese had left the area. Around the first of September the two men held a conference. Col. Gador told the Captain that he had under his units in Ulan, Bohol, and Negros Occidental all of which were co-operating with him. Believing this to be true Capt. Mercado also agreed to cooperate with the Colonel.

Capt. Mercado was further led to believe that he would remain in charge of and be permitted to perfect and enlarge the organization he had already started. On September 3 Col. Gador had prepared a memorandum for Majors Sabarre, Abcede, Mate and for Capt. Mercado. Major Sabarre was supposed to be in the south around Dumaguete while Majors Abcede and Mate were known to be active in Occidental Negros. Capt. Mercado on September 14 issued under the heading of NEGROS ORIENTAL GUERR.

KILLA UNIT, HEADQUARTERS, QUIHULGAN, a Field Order #1, consisting of Information, Decision of Mission and Instructions. The area to be under Capt. Mercado's jurisdiction was eventually to include the whole of Oriental Negros. Under the heading "Information" it is stated that "Capt. Gidili's men have been active in Vallehermoso since June --- Lt. Greo is starting to organize the La Libertad Unit, Capt. Alcantara is presently assigned to organize the Jimelalud Unit, Lt. Villarín at Tayasan. He will be hearing yet from Capt. Flores who is starting to organize guerrilla band in the south." Thus it is shown that on September 14 there was no effective organization as yet south of Quihulgan, and the reference to Capt. Flores proves that the units north of Baig were as yet as ignorant of the activities south of Baig as the people of the south were regarding what was taking place in the north.

This order of Capt. Mercado of September 14 is now used by the men of Col. Gador to prove that the Captain was at one time working with and under Colonel Gador. It is true that he did work with the Colonel until October 1.

The Colonel had established his own headquarters along the Provincial road south of the town of Quihulgan. Instead of giving Capt. Mercado a free hand to build up his organization, the officers under the Captain were called to Col. Gador's headquarters for a conference. One of these officers was disarmed, and the Unit commanders in the areas of La Libertad, Tayasan, and Jimelalud were changed without the knowledge or consent of Capt. Mercado. Also mayors appointed by the Captain were replaced even though affairs had been running smoothly.

Finally Capt. Mercado himself was relieved of his command and was given no further connection with the army. On a visit to Cebu and Occidental Negros after his dismissal by the Colonel Capt. Mercado learned from the officers there that they had never had any connection with Col. Gador nor any intention of coming under his command. Thus Capt. Mercado decided to continue his own original guerrilla organization.

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When Col. Gador was informed of Capt. Mercado's call for re-enforcements, he ordered the town of Guibulungan burned; the first two houses set on fire were the isolated headquarters of Capt. Mercado. Also destroyed in this fire were the school building, the old and new municipal buildings, the market and all the Chinese stores.

The Colonel himself returned to his evacuation place in the hills. Later a Japanese patrol passed near his house. Hearing of their approach, the Colonel sent a scout to ascertain the number in the patrol; he reported 22. Col. Gador with 45 men on the top of a small hill refused to let his men fire on the Japanese as they passed below him. According to the affidavit of the scout who is now with Capt. Mercado, the Colonel refused to let the men fire because he said, "We don't know their mission or their number." Some of the men were so disgusted that they left the Colonel and joined Capt. Mercado's forces.

After staying in the area only two days the Japanese again evacuated the town, this time aboard the SS Legus. Following this second invasion of Guibulungan on October 16 (the day Major Masajo assumed command of the guerilla forces in the south) and after the withdrawal of the Japanese, friction immediately began between the men of Col. Gador and those of Capt. Mercado. The Captain sent some of his men in a car to La Libertad to investigate what had happened there. As they passed Col. Gador's headquarters, they were fired upon. Leaving their car and returning north, they met a second car with other soldiers of the Captain, one of whom had an automatic rifle. The latter group went on and fired their automatic at the Colonel's headquarters. The first group also went back to try to recover their car; again there was an exchange of fire during which one of the Captain's men was killed.

After the outbreak of trouble between the two groups, Colonel Gador moved his headquarters south to La Libertad and a month later he moved still farther south, to Payabon. Since then Capt. Mercado has been in undisputed control of the Guibulungan area.

Further trouble arose between Capt. Mercado and Col. Gador over the detention of


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some of Captain's soldiers who were passing through the Colonel's area. One of the Captain's men, Lt. Estocaino, was killed. During the second week of January, 1943 a patrol of Capt. Mercado's men led by the elder Bernadez went to Fuyabon to secure the release of five of the Captain's men who were being held prisoners by the Colonel. The headquarters of the Colonel were on the top of a hill. Leaving his men below, the patrol leader Bernadez proceeded up the hill alone to confer with Col. Gador. Before he reached the top, he was shot and killed by the Colonel's men. Immediately the men below and Gador's men at the top of the hill began firing at each other.

According to Col. Gador, as told by him to Mr. Bell, five of the Captain's men were killed and Capt. Mercado's men, furthermore, wasted 700 rounds of ammunition while the Colonel used only 70 rounds and lost no men. However, according to the Captain himself, in an interview with the writer, none of his men were killed at that particular time except their leader Bernadez and his men fired only a few shots, retreating at once because they were so outnumbered. But upon their return to Guihulagan they were ambushed at a ^{libertad} where two of his men were killed. The man who killed them is now serving under Col. Gador.

Because of the Fuyabon fight Col. Gador has named the hill "VICTORY HILL," a victory which the Japanese in this celebrated a few days later (as told to Lt. Sibales by one of his secret agents) - one Japanese officer remarking, "The USAFFE now our friends - fight each other."

Since that fight a state of civil war has existed in the north, the men of Col. Gador not daring to pass through the north and the men of Capt. Mercado not daring to pass through the territory occupied by Col. Gador. Following the fight the sons of the elder Bernadez, officers under Capt. Mercado, went out at night, without the permission of the Captain, and killed the father of one of Col. Gador's men and two others living in the same house, also the brother of another of the Colonel's men - four in all, to avenge the death of their father. Up to March 10 five of Capt. Mercado's men have been killed by the men of Col. Gador. It would be safe to say that at least an equal number have been killed on the other side.



PROBLEMS OF ISLAND COASTLAND

After taking command of the Negroes Oriental Guerrilla Forces on October 16, Major Aucejo set up his headquarters at Malabo where he began to plan for a united and effective organization which would include the whole of Oriental Negros. The units around Dumaguete and from Dumaguete south to Tolong immediately recognized and welcomed his leadership.

As all communications were cut off with the north, no one had any idea at this time of just what had happened or was taking place north of Bais. It was known that Capt. Mercado was active in the Quihulungan area and that he was the leader of the guerrillas there; so a special messenger was sent north to contact him and to report on his organization and other activities. He was also to inform Capt. Mercado of the organization taking place in the south.

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To get in touch with units operating in the Bais-Tanjay area, Lt. Estacion, after the meeting at Candahonog, with Major Aucejo, proceeded north. The units operating in the Bais area at the time were those of Lt. Alora, the Teves brothers, Lt. Silva, Lt. Guillano, and Lt. Millie. As a result of a meeting held with these leaders, Lt. Alora was assigned to take command of the Bais area and Lt. Sibala was to take command of Tanjay thus relieving Lt. Millie while Lt. Guillano was appointed commander of the entire area (Bais-Tanjay). All units were to come under one district, Bais-Tanjay (New Aguaitan) and one commander, Capt. Flores, with the district headquarters at Candahonog (New Aguaitan). This organization was approved by Major Aucejo.

Later, since there were no Japanese in the area of New Aguaitan, the Japanese being concentrated in Dumaguete and in Bais, and since there had developed some dissension among the units in the Bais area, Major Aucejo on October 30 transferred Lt. Estacion from the staff of Capt. Flores to the command of the Bais-Tanjay area. The major had talked the matter over with Lt. Guillano and Lt. Millie, also with Mayor Teves of Tanjay, these three men having reported to Malabo, and he knew these men would welcome Lt. Estacion as their district leader. This order of transfer was received by Lt. Estacion on November 3.

On his way north to take over his new command, Lt. Estacion was shown a copy of a memorandum from Col. Gador, dated 15 October 1944, to Lt. Sibala, stating that one hour before the surrender of Mindanao he had received orders to proceed to Negros Island and that he had assumed command on June 3, 1944. In this memorandum all officers who had not already reported to the Gador

headquarters were ordered to do so. Lt. Estacion was confused by this memorandum, but he continued north and on November 10 he took command of his new post, the San-Tanjoy sector.

In the meantime Col. Gador had on October 13 Special Order #2 assigned Lt. Lera, Lt. Flores, Lt. Guillano, and Lt. Emilio to be in charge of San, Tanjoy, Aquitan, and Sibulan respectively with Lt. Cesar V. Lamasarias as the commander of the San-Sibulan Guerrilla Sector (4th Negro Sector). On November 23 after he had learned that Lt. Estacion was in actual command of the area and that there was little likelihood of Lt. Lamasarias succeeding in perfecting an organization, Col. Gador in Special Order #18 assigned Lt. Estacion as the Sector Commander of the 4th Negro Oriental Sector and ordered him to report to the General Headquarters for instructions. Lt. Lamasarias was also directed to report for a new assignment and for instructions.

It should be pointed out that while the first Gador appointments for the area date back to October 13, Lt. Estacion was ignorant of them when he took command of the area on November 10. They were paper appointments and Lt. Lamasarias never actually took over his command nor exercised any real authority over the area while, on the other hand, Lt. Estacion still under Major Asejo was in actual command and was so recognized by the group leaders. It should further be pointed out that only two days prior to the Estacion appointment Col. Gador on November 21 by Special Order No. 16 appointed Major Asejo Assistant Chief of Staff of the Negro Guerrilla Force and also Provincial Guerrilla Commander for the Province of Negro Oriental.

The appointments of Col. Gador all followed the same pattern, as later in his assignment of Major Mata and Major Antegen to head the newly organized (Paper) Occidental Negro 76th Inf. and 77th Inf. Regiments, men were appointed who were already in actual command of an area and then ordered to report to this General Headquarters in the Field for instructions - the travel directed is necessary in the Public Service.

Just as Majors Mata and Antegen remained loyal to Col. Abcede, so Major Asejo continued loyal to Col. Fertig, but the appointment of Lt. Estacion by Col. Gador was a clever stroke on the part of the Colonel as Lt. Estacion was not only in actual command but he had also at this time become displeased with Malabo. He had just received an order to report to Malabo to become S-1 on

the Regimental Staff of Col. Ausejo. Lt. Estacion did not wish to move his family from his new quarters to Malabo, and he was further greatly displeased because the Executive Officer of the Regiment, who would be over him, was one whom he considered himself to outrank. So keenly was this "injustice" felt that the Regimental Staff of Col. Ausejo. Lt. Estacion did not wish to move his family from his new quarters to Malabo, and he was further greatly displeased because the Executive Officer of the Regiment, who would be over him, was one whom he considered himself to outrank. So keenly was this "injustice" felt that the wife of Lt. Estacion wrote to Col. Ausejo in protest. In Mindanao both these men had been in the same regiment and battalion, but Lt. Estacion had been the Executive Officer whereas the man who would now be his Executive Officer, had been his S-2, S-3 officer. Thus Lt. Estacion was not pleased with the Malabo organization set-up and he felt he could do better by joining up with Col. Gador. Having made his decision Lt. Estacion reported to Col. Gador. On the other hand, Lt. Sibala and the Tanjay Unit remained loyal to Col. Ausejo.

Lt. Estacion was promoted to a captain by Col. Gador on December 11 at which date he reported to the Colonel's headquarters; on January 15 he became a Major and soon afterwards in the new Gador set-up for Negros he was made Commander of the 76th (Gador) Regiment in charge of the entire Province of Negros Oriental.

This Oriental Negros was soon to be garrisoned by two rival regiments - the 75th Infantry under Col. Ausejo and Col. Fertig and the 76th Infantry under Major Estacion and Col. Gador.

To complicate the problem still further, on October 1, Lt. Col. Feralte of Pansy assumed command of the IV Philippine Corps (Pansy, Negros and Cebu) and soon after appointed Lt. Col. Abebe the commanding officer of Negros Island. Not knowing what had been done or accomplished in Negros Oriental in the way of organization, Lt. Carbonell and twenty armed men (mostly shot-gun and "patik") from Occidental Negros came to Oriental Negros on orders of Col. Abebe, for the purpose of "proclaiming martial law - replacing disloyal officials - re-organizing the civil government - getting guns from civilians - enlisting ex-USAFVE - and building up a military machine. Lt. Carbonell and his men, now increased to 40, half of them without arms, arrived in Siaton the third week of October only to discover that the civil government had been re-organized and had been functioning normally since September and that the guerrilla forces in Siaton

had already been organized under Col. Ausejo. Lt. Carbonell found the same conditions true in other towns as he proceeded north. Thus he was unsuccessful in building up a larger force or in getting guns for his unit. In other words, what Lt. Carbonell had been sent into the Province to accomplish had already been achieved by Mr. Bell (as Director of Civil Affairs) and by Col. Ausejo.

After learning of the true situation in the Province, Col. Abcede then offered the command of the Province to Col. Ausejo, but the latter was unable to accept the position as he had already come under the command of Lt. Col. Fertig of Mindanao who was at the time attempting to build up a unity of command for the Mindanao-Vissayan forces. After Col. Ausejo's refusal to come under the command of Col. Abcede, the Colonel then offered the appointment of Commanding Officer of Negros Oriental to Capt. Mercado.

On December 1 Capt. Mercado had reported to Malabo and had accepted under Col. Ausejo the post of Commanding Officer of the First Battalion comprising the Tanjay-Vallerhermoso area. Then upon his return to Guihulagan he received from Col. Abcede an official appointment as Commander of Negros Oriental and instructions to organize a regiment to garrison the entire province. Thus instead of building up a battalion under Col. Ausejo, Capt. Mercado now undertook the more tempting task of organizing a regiment.

To carry out his assignment Capt. Mercado (Now promoted to the rank of Major by Col. Abcede) issued on December 14 (Special Order #14) a new set of papers for the Province of Negros Oriental making Capt. Etacion the Executive Officer of the new Regimental Staff, with Lts. Guillana, Llera, and Sibala as members of the 2nd Battalion staff which was to comprise the Mis-Tanjay area as far north as Manjayod. Capt. Etacion as the Executive Officer of the Regiment was to remain in the area to help the new battalion Commander, Capt. Faralejes organize the new (second) battalion. It may be said in passing that Major Mercado was equally unsuccessful in his attempt to extend his control over the Mis-Tanjay area, for Lt. Sibala remained loyal to Col. Ausejo and Capt. Etacion, to Col. Qador. Major Mercado commissioned a large number of officers for his regimental and 4 battalion staffs but he was hemmed in on the south by the men of Col. Qador at Payabon and to the north by the force at Vallerhermoso.

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Later when Major ~~Harold~~ and a force of men went to Tanjay on an inspection trip, he found it necessary to cross to Cebu in sail boats, to go down the coast of Cebu, and to again cross to Negros near Tanjay in order to avoid a conflict with the Gador men which would have taken place had he passed through the Gador territory.

By December, then, three Lt. Colonels claimed command of Negros Island, three Majors claimed command of Negros Oriental. Only Col. ~~Ausejo~~, however, had undisputed control over the area from ~~Uitulan~~, north of Dausguete, to the southern border of the Province. From Tanjay to ~~Valichor~~ there was confusion and chaos and even bloodshed. Worst of all was the suffering of innocent civilians who were called upon to support and feed the swollen and enlarged soldier groups. Soldiers were recruited out of all proportion to the needs of the area or of available guns; furthermore, discipline could not be enforced. Promotions were rapid and officers were taken in by one group who had failed to pass the medical examination of another organization.

Col. ~~Ausejo~~ was the only one who refused to bid for officers even when his own officers were receiving flattering letters and most attractive ~~offers~~ offers from Col. Gador. Likewise he refused to lower the medical requirements for admission into the army. It was discouraging to his men who were actually fighting the Japanese and who really deserved every recognition, to learn of an ex-corporal without a single combat with the enemy becoming a captain and of lieutenants becoming majors, of a retired supply sgt. at the beginning of the war now becoming a full Colonel. Nevertheless the well-disciplined men of Col. ~~Ausejo~~ for the most part remained loyal.

Also the civilians south of ~~Dausguete~~ had few complaints against the army. None were driven from their homes or abused. They were indeed fortunate to be spared the assessments and the trouble and chaos which had resulted from the rivalry of the armed groups in the north plus the lack of a real organization with effective control over the armed men who composed the different units. In the north persons of questionable guilt were killed as supposed fifty colonists and their property confiscated. Others fled from their homes in terror after reporting cases of looting to higher command only to be secretly threatened and abused in retaliation by armed groups drunk with power. Officers claimed that the abuses had been committed by the men of some other unit and not by their own men.

In the south the soldiers of Col. Azejo were paid by funds from General Fertig; also the civil officials received part payment. So by being able to pay their way, the army was not a drain on the communities in which they were quartered. Money was put into circulation and the civil government was efficiently conducted under Mr. Bell as Director of Civil Affairs. Schools were opened and the local officials were permitted to carry on the government under almost normal conditions. Thus there was whole-hearted support of the army by the civil officials and the civilians.

In contrast is the story of the mistreatment and suffering of the civilians in the Tanjay-Dais area and throughout the so-called area under the control of Col. Gador and his military regime, a story that is not pleasant to tell, but one which will, nevertheless, be told in another chapter.

The Guerrilla Battle

Our Friends Must be Discarded

Before the evacuation of the Island of Negros by Col. Bilson his troops had been concentrated in Occidental Negros and in the border town of Villahermosa, all points south heading southward. On May 25, 1942 the Japanese entered Zamboanga, the capital of Negros Oriental, there were no soldiers in the Province Center of Villahermosa. The small constabulary unit under Capt. Fabrice had been left in Zamboanga to maintain peace and order but had probably been completely destroyed, and the work had been done by the Japanese and their families. The majority of these constabulary men, however, never surrendered either themselves or their guns to the Japanese.

After Col. Bilson's surrender at Fabrica on May 11 he was given ten days extension of his command in order to collect all his troops, their arms, and other equipment. In spite of his efforts less than seven hundred soldiers, out of a total of three thousand, surrendered. At the end of the ten day period Col. Bilson and the American officers were taken to Zamboanga. The Japanese then called for volunteers from among the Filipino officers to go out and persuade their fellow officers to surrender. The two most active "volunteer" officers from Negros Oriental were Capt. Martinez and Lt. Lorenzo Teves. These men were able to contact a number of officers and to persuade several to surrender, but in the main they were as unsuccessful as the American officers had been. For example; in the hills of New Ayuguitan there were a number of evacuee officers among them being Capt. Estrada, Capt. Flores, Major Barbero, Lt. Estacion, and Capt. Luis. It was especially difficult to contact these men because the entire town of New Ayuguitan had been evacuated and all the town officials from the mayor to the town policemen were loyal and were living in the hills. Nevertheless Capt. Martinez and Lt. Teves went into the hills where they finally located a woman who admitted that she knew Capt. Estrada and the place where he was living. They left a note with her to be given to the Captain to the effect that if he did not come down from the hills and surrender he would later regret. Before returning to Zamboanga Capt. Martinez was quoted as having said that if these officers did not surrender, he would return with two truck loads of Japanese soldiers. Yet in spite of all such pressure the town officials and all the officers refused to surrender, and thanks to the loyalty of the people of the area these officers were

to remain free. This is also true of the private, for in that entire area not a single soldier surrendered nor was a single gun given over to the enemy.

The Japanese were more successful south of Zamagute than they were in the area north of the capital with the exception of the town of Mis. As has been pointed out, all the provincial officials had returned to their posts. Governor Villanueva was the first to go back to the capital, and immediately after conferring with the Japanese he issued a widely circulated mimeographed order stating that:

All officials and employees and prominent persons must come down from the hills to resume their normal business and occupations and offices on or before June 30, 1942. Failure to do so will subject such officials and employees and prominent persons to prosecution in accordance with the military laws of the Imperial Forces of Japan.

Signed, G. L. Villanueva
Temporary Governor of Negros Oriental

Furthermore, Governor Villanueva, Assemblyman Teves and Romero, and Board Member Martinez soon visited the towns of the south where by their example and special orders as well as threats they succeeded in getting the mayors of the five southern municipalities of Masang, Misin, Zamboanguita, Sison, and Tolong to return to their duties. For example: Mayor Caspando of Zamboanguita who was in the hills received a special message from his friend the Governor ordering him to return ~~to town within an hour after receiving the message.~~ ~~to town within an hour after receiving the message.~~ ~~to town within an hour after receiving the message.~~ The Governor threatened that if the order was not complied with, he (the Governor) would no longer be able to protect the mayor or his family from the Japanese. Within the hour limit the mayor was on his way back to Zamboanguita.

In Sison Mayor Ryko was similarly threatened by his fellow townsman, Teodorico Lajato, who had met the Japanese in Zamagute on May 26 and had immediately become one of the leading Japanese collaborators. Lajato now acting as a special agent of the enemy and as a sort of deputy governor of the south, not only threatened the mayor himself but also his entire family if the mayor refused to come in and to work with the Japanese. The minor officials followed the example of their mayors, just as the latter had followed the example of their higher provincial officials. Likewise the townspeople soon followed the example of their local leaders. The Japanese were said to be kind to the Filipinos, and anxious to prove this friendship the Japanese themselves were everywhere proclaiming -

"Filipinos, friends - only Americans and Japanese enemies." - "Filipinos and Japanese, brother orientals," - "Asia for the Asians." All were to be free now from the white race. Soon there would be great prosperity - a new order - a new mysterious "Go-Prosperity" would soon solve all economic ills.

The leading Damagute Japanese civilian, the former manager of Ogawa's Bazaar, newly released from a concentration camp which was now being filled with Americans, went from town to town, accompanied by Governor Villameva and other prominent provincial officials, explaining why the people should all return to town and work and co-operate with the Japanese. In each town Plaza the same appeals were made - with the Japanese speaker inevitably pointing to his own arm and then angrily saying, "See same color." Not all the people returned to their town homes, but the vast majority did. The unexpected kindness of the Japanese, their propaganda, and the example of the higher officials and their apparent acceptance of the "New Order" caused the common people to flock back to their former and more comfortable town homes.

After succeeding in getting the local officials and most of the citizens back into the towns, the next move of the Japanese was to order the local mayors and chiefs of police to collect and surrender all private arms and the weapons of all ex-USAFVE who might have returned to their homes. This would prevent "disorder," "Banditry" (and also any later guerilla movements). According to the Japanese the people would have no need for their guns as the Japanese themselves would be responsible for peace, law, and order. Those who kept their guns would be considered as unfriendly and as enemies of the Japanese. Since the enemy had obtained from provincial officials a record of all gun owners in the Province, those who had returned to the towns hastened to comply with the order. In Misaton, for instance, there was a total of over 60 privately owned guns (shotguns, 22 rifles, and pistols), all but seven were surrendered to the Japanese.

Greater difficulty was encountered in getting the guns of the soldiers. The men who had come back from Mindanao were without arms, having returned in civilian clothes and unarmed, but those who had come through the hills from Occidental Negros and from Vallehermoso had brought their guns and some ammunition. They had been told by several of their company commanders to take their guns home and to hide them and to wait for American aid. Fearing that they themselves would be put into concentration camps, most of these men stayed in the hills or away from the Japanese. When they appeared in town, they were dressed as ordinary civilians; so the Japanese had no way of recognizing them

as soldiers. All would have gone well had it not been for fifty columnists and ambitious officials anxious to please the Japanese. Soon the enemy had a list of all the former soldiers in each community, those with guns and those without. The Mayors and the Chief of Police in each town were ordered to get the guns of all these soldiers. Some of the soldiers moved deeper into the hills, and a few even went to other islands where they would not be known. The Japanese themselves never went into the hills to look for individual soldiers; instead clever propaganda was used to induce the soldiers to voluntarily surrender.

When the Japanese first entered the Province, they brought with them a small poster with a picture at the top of General Weinsright delivering his famous forced speech over the radio calling upon all USAFFE in the Philippines to surrender. Below the picture was the printed speech of the General in which according to the Japanese the General himself "issued orders to disarm and surrender to the remnants of the USAFFE forces who are hiding among the mountains and in the outlying regions." Then followed his instructions as to where the troops in the various regions were to assemble. A second printed form, widely circulated throughout the Province was dated June 3 and addressed "To the officers and enlisted men of the Fil-American Forces in Visayas".

In this way the soldiers were informed that "1. The Fil-American Forces in the Philippines have surrendered totally ---- The resurrection of the American Forces in this country is absolutely hopeless. 2. New Government was organized in Manila sometime ago and it is constructing a New Philippines for the Filipinos under the direction and guidance of the Imperial Japanese Forces. 3. The Japanese Forces are not devils as propagated by the USAFFE, on the contrary they are the most righteous forces in the world. The Japanese Forces will never kill those who surrender but protect their lives. 4. The majority of your comrades have surrendered. You must surrender at once complying with orders of your chiefs. Those who will not comply with this order to surrender, shall be searched until the last man, and will be severely punished with their parents, wives, and children. 5. Upon surrendering, bring arms and attached card of surrender for identification." This was signed by the commanding officer of the Imperial Japanese Forces. The attached card read, "any officer or enlisted man who bring this card will not be killed but will be protected their safety."

A third printed form had at the upper half the picture of a large and pathetic group of American soldiers seated on the ground in a concentration camp. Below the picture one read in large letters the heading YOUR RIGHT. Then followed this proclamation - "A Filipino under the American regime, you have fought to your utmost side

by side with the USAFV forces until they surrendered themselves. You have thus discharged your obligations to the United States of America. Therefore, you are now entitled to your natural right as Filipino to enjoy peace as soon as possible."

"till another printed form, dropped from Japanese airplanes over unoccupied towns and barrios, warned the people that any one who "took part with the disturbers are enemies of the co-prosperity order in the New Philippines. Anyone who opposes the Imperial Japanese Forces and damages the means of communication --- will be dealt with severely ---." Added to this was the frightful warning, "Those who can inform regarding the whereabouts of the offenders who disturb the order and welfare of the people, especially of their leaders or of his dead body, will be amply regarded."

Other pictures and cartoons were broadcast. One of the most interesting of these was a picture of President Roosevelt with a torn American flag draped around him, his hair standing on end and his face the face of a mad man, snatching in one hand a long scythe. These proclamations, notices, and cartoons were all in circulation before the end of the first week of June, within ten days of the occupation of Negros Oriental. Public officials and a few officers were greatly impressed by this propaganda, but the effect upon the average soldiers in the hills was negligible. He was proud of his gun; the Japanese would have to make a greater showing of force to frighten him.

The Japanese themselves were too few in number to enforce any of their demands or edicts. After the occupation of the capital the garrison for several months averaged only around 120 men, and later the number was even less. In June 1942 the enemy had other plans and other needs for their soldiers than to scatter them into thousands of small Philippine towns. If they had garrisoned all the towns even with a score of soldiers, a sizeable army would have been swallowed up. Already the Japanese had tarried too long in the Philippines, and the New Order must be set up in a hurry. The plan was to garrison only the provincial capitols and the main towns where sugar controls or other economic interests of value to the Japanese should be protected. The Filipinos, they thought, would be enslaved by propaganda and bribery. Not the Japanese themselves but the wiselings and willing slaves were to carry out the orders of the Master Race of the New Orient.

This it was that the town mayors and the local police chiefs were ordered to get first the guns of the soldiers and then the soldiers themselves. The local Filipino officials could go into the hills to contact the soldiers. It was always - "If you don't surrender your gun, Japanese soldiers will come from Masagete with their machine guns" or "Their planes will bomb the hills." "By surrendering your gun you can protect

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your families, your friends, and the community itself.* The threat to bomb the hills was not an idle one, for the hills of Tolong and of Guinhulngan, and later of Dunsaguste were bombed and innocent persons were killed - all of this just to force civilians back into the towns. When a soldier still refused to give up his gun, friends and relatives went to persuade him that for the good of all, even for the soldier himself since he would be left alone after giving up his gun as that was all the Japanese wanted, he should surrender his weapon. The pressure of every sort was brought to bear by the town "puppet" officials. This was all too much for many a soldier who shamefacedly surrender his gun but not himself.

One Constabulary sergeant in the hills of Miaton held out until his entire family were sick with malaria and he felt he could be unable to run or to resist if Japanese soldiers actually came after him. In the municipality of Miaton only one soldier stayed in the hills and never gave up his army rifle. In the town of New Aquitlan where the entire town had moved into the hills, no guns were surrendered. These two towns represent two extremes. In other communities the number of guns given up was in proportion to the loyalty of the local officials and to their cleverness and bravery in resisting the Japanese. Thus the enemy were only partially successful in their campaign for the surrender of civilian and army guns. Later in August and September when the guerrilla movement broke out, a surprising number of weapons turned up somehow from somewhere.