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7TH MIL DIST HQ

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UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
 SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT
 CIW-N

SECRET

17 January 44

OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUCTIONS

ANNEX NO. 2

I. OBJECTIVE

To organize BC into an armed secret organization and make it a part of our forces.

II. INSTRUCTIONS

A. Organization


(a) Selected Provincial Leader should canvass (secretly) all inspectors of their stand on the matter.

(b) Then select (secretly) a leader in each Company (BC) who is willing and fitted for delicate job. Give preference to the Company Commander.

(c) Leader of BC Company should canvass (secretly) all NCOs.

(d) Each NCO will be given a certain number of Privates to canvass.

(e) See Sketch below.



SI or Provincial leader will contact each CO individually. COs would not have any contact or mutual knowledge of the plan. All COs should keep secret all Provincial Leader's instructions. Then each CO will give instructions to each NCO individually. NCOs, just the same, will not have any contact or mutual knowledge of the plan. And each NCO do same to his Privates. The Privates know his immediate boss and no more, the NCOs know all their Privates and no more. The COs know their NCOs and immediate boss and no more.

(f) Any idea or plan may be submitted by Provincial Leader to suit their local condition.

B. DUTIES

1. Carry out letter of instruction to BC.

(Over)

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3. Furnish our units enemy strength, arms, capability, intention, and immediate plan of operation against our forces. (Intelligence Report)

4. Carry out sabotage of enemy installation as may be directed by DC.

5. Carry out instruction (X) to be executed on day of reckoning. To be given later.

C. Galvez
CERFINO R. GALVEZ
Major, Infantry.
Asst. G57MD

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT
CPW-N

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CONSTABULARY RELATIONS - GUIDE

ANNEX NO. 1

I. GENERAL BASES OF RELATIONSHIP

a. Consider BC organization still Pro-Allies. BC should at all times bear in mind that our organization is a recognized unit by the SWP Command and that Allied aid is sure to come.

b. Consider BC officers and men to be in the organization by force of circumstances. BC should consider us patriots fighting for the liberation of our country against Japanese tyranny. Broadmindedness at all times by both parties.

c. "Forgive and forget" attitude for misunderstandings, and hostile acts against each other in the past, for the present and in the future.

II. MISSION

To contact Constabular leaders and men and get maximum cooperation from them in any form that may be of any help for our organization in particular and for the Allied War Effort in general.

III. PLANS

a. Organize BC into a secret armed organization and make it a part of our organization.

b. Encourage BC personnel to desert their organization and join our units.

c. Combination of plans "a" and "b".

IV. DISCUSSIONS

Plan a.- The purpose of the first is to effect a BC organization inside the occupied areas that will help us indirectly defeating the enemy by passive and active resistance for the present. Passive resistance may mean lots of things like delay of execution of Japanese orders, misguiding enemy, secret propaganda among civilians, etc. Active resistance may consist of sabotage of enemy defensive installations and any of the kind. In the future, its mission will be embodied in the instruction (X) to be issued by DC later.

CONSTABULARY RELATIONS - GUIDE Cont'd.

The advantages of this plan for us are very obvious. We have nothing to lose. For the BC it is a very delicate matter. If BC is trusted, enemy usually leave them alone to garrison some towns.

In case organization is discovered and enemy begins to effect reign of terror against BC, they should be instructed to escape with arms and join us. Arrangements should be made so that our forces could help in their mass escape. BC should, at all times, be in readiness to insure evacuation of their families.

In the meantime that there is already complete understanding and the secret organization is already functioning, we should consider them part of our forces on detach services. They should render an organizational chart and roster of officers and troops irrespective of whether they are old soldiers or civilians. Commanders of the secret organization should recommend to BCED ranks for officers and men depending upon the size of their organization. Old soldiers (officers and men), however, cannot be reduced from their old ranks to suit the size of the organization.

Plan B.- The advantage of this plan over "a" is that the enemy will lose trust on the BC organization and probably disarm them. The enemy then will garrison the towns and themselves, thus decreasing their mobile forces. The disadvantages though is that we are not utilizing the BC to the maximum to our advantage. Moreover, the enemy can, at all times, increase their strength. Friendly civilians may suffer more too.

Plan c.- The combination of plan "a" and "b" seems to be hard to attain if not incompatible. There is no doubt BC distrusted will always be watched and disarmed and formation of secret organization of BC distrusted and without arms will be of least help to us.

V. CONCLUSION

Plan "a" is the best.

VI. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Don't capture BC. If unavoidable, treat captured BC as guest (with due surveillance). Absorb him if he chooses to join our forces.
2. BC and our forces should not shot each other. In case BC is with Japanese patrol and our forces ambush said patrol, BC should shoot up and as much as possible he should seek cover or lie flat on the ground. Our ambushing patrol should not shoot at BC.
3. "Forgive and Forget attitude" should predominate on both sides for all misunderstandings and hostile acts against

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
UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT
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CHART - BC SECRET ORGANIZATION

ANNEX NO. 4



REMARKS:

DC will contact directly Senior Inspector of Negros Oriental for the purpose.

CO, 72nd Division will contact directly Senior Inspector of Negros Occidental for the purpose.

In case SI do not like or can not be trusted or not fitted, other inspectors will be selected and contacted.

Objectives and instruction as to secret organization should be given secretly to selected BC leader only. Leader will have full discretion on the matter. Reports on development should be periodically. He should be instructed to submit a plan of his own for consideration.

Coordination of effort on both sides should be attained.

SI - Senior Inspector.

C. Galvez
CEFRINO R. GALVEZ
Major, Infantry
Asst. G371D

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

CPW - 1
Flanders Field

18 Nov. 43

Lieut. Col. Abcede
CO, 7th MD
In the field

Dear Sir:

I hope this letter will find you safe and in good health. The Japs certainly made it hot for us over there, -- but they are not yet smart or slick enough to get us. I hope my radio-gram to Ned on the morning of the 14th of October reached him in time to warn you all of the campaign. I sent a follow up but got no reply.

The campaign launched by the Japs at CPW on the 24th to the 28th of October, if gauged by their probable intention was a flop and a failure. Of course, it disrupted our organization here quite a bit, but all the men are intact. Tony and Mac personally handled the counter-attack on the 25th, such that Col. Yamaguchi, hearing of this personally came up on the 26th to lead the campaign. He was heard to remark in Amoco, he would like to fight with his equal. In the fight that ensued, approximately a hundred Japs and several PCs were killed and fifty or more wounded. Tony and Mac withdrew to the forest and the Japs penetrated. Luckily, they didn't locate the signal but went over it to the CP which had been previously burned by Tony before he left.

The Japs burned Bacs CP and his house. Most of his clothing and personal belongings which were dumped on a pit near their house were likewise burned, and some taken. The Japs had been expected for some time, ever since the last encounter at Talos Draw, but the outpost guards of Capt. Abao were busy playing "Patilik" they were caught unawares, despite the fact that the column of Japs came up at ten AM. I've been informed some of the records were taken. However, our set-up is still intact and we suffered no casualty. Mac withdrew his family to Pinedas place. Tony is in the field. He will not construct a permanent CP anymore, I suppose, and will be mobile like you.

When the Japs struck at CPW, they had received no reinforcement whatsoever from outside. Like their previous campaigns, they consolidated the few taken from each garrison and struck. That force, as I see it, was a feeler. They delivered some "punches" here and there, to feel just how strong we are, and having determined more or less our strength, they can estimate how strong a force to send in their all-out mountain campaign.

On the 15th, a Tare Charlie, escorted by a destroyer, and loaded with approximately 2,000 troops, was reported to have docked at Banago at 5:00P.M. This may be preparatory to their

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