

333.5 66TH INFANTRY USAFIP-NL (1ST MA)
Hq. 2nd BN
INVESTIGATIONS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NN0883078

USAFIP NORTH LUZON
OFFICE OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER
2nd Battalion 66th Inf., 6th Army, USA
In the Field

19 January 1945

Subject: Findings and Recommendations on Investigation
To : CO, 66th Infantry, USAFIP, NL, 6th Army, USA

FINDINGS

1. Compliance with S.O.#101, HQ, 1st District dated 9 December, 1944.

a. T/O and monthly rosters are fully complied with by 2nd Bn including Bn HQ, "G" & "H" Cos for 3 months, December inclusive as shown by the duplicate copies filed in the office of the Bn Comdr. The T/O and roster of the "F" Co., a newly organized company are just forwarded to that Headquarters.

b. Government receipts issued by the Bn CO and COs are all prepared and ready to be forwarded when called for.

c. Service Records were sent to that HQ in triplicate but two copies were sent back to the Bn. The service records of the "F" CO. are now on their way to that Headquarters.

d & e. Citation re the death of Lt. Spenser and Cpl. Juan Carantes was sent by the 2nd Bn HQ to that Headquarters but the matter was taken up by the GHQ. Message #174 HQ, 2nd Bn dated December 2, 1944 commending on the Gallantry of the men of "H" Co. for the Ambush of Japanese soldiers and civilians as acknowledged by a message of commendation, HQ, 66th Inf. dated 10 December 1944 was made of record.

f. Reports on arms, weapons with serial number and total amount of ammunition were sent and included in the monthly strength report. Report on ammunition consumed is being prepared.

2. Compliance to G.O. #9, GHQ, dated 27 June 1944.

a. The Executive Officer, 2nd Bn issued instructions, dated Dec. 10, 1944 to Co. COs ordering the destruction of communication lines with indorsement requiring action taken even dated. The report of the tasks for the D-Day and plans of 2nd Bn in a communication sent to the CO, 1st District, dated Sept. 3, 1944 re the different tasks of D-Day assigned to "G" & "H" Cos, this later was covered by the report of Bn CO to CO, 1st District dated Jan. 1, 1945. The Bn CO reports to CO, 1st District, dated 1 January 1945, alternate sub-task (a) and alternate task #4 re destruction of communication lines.

b. The letter of Bn, HQ, 2nd Bn to CO, 1st District gives a complete report of Ambush of Japanese Trucks dated December 10, 1944 with a full account of the report of Lt. Carantes dated Nov. 29, 1944.

c. Destruction of enemy supply dumps etc. is found in the report of accomplishment of "H" Co. dated Jan. 13, 1945. A demolition of the Sangilo-Antamok Road and ransacking of the Japs Bodega at Sangilo with large booties of 15 cavanos of rice and supplies. Bn S-2 report dated 18 Jan. 45 "G" Co. contacted 500 Japs with an estimated casualties of 100 Japs and none on our side. Two strong bridges on Camp 4 blasted by same Company checking the movement of troops. Engagement with enemy by "H" Co. at Sangilo 16 Jan. 45 with 3 enemies killed and 4 wounded. Secret communication lines were successfully cut and taken by the "G" Co.

d. In the prevention of transportation of food supply of the enemy, circulars or verbal warnings in meetings held by civilians and bolo men were made to the effect that all forms of conveyances such as carromatas, bulcarts and cargadores are prevented in carrying any form of supply of the enemies within the Bn area.

e. Bn orders to Co. COs, 2nd Bn. dated Jan. 8, 1945, were issued to keep them alert and mobilize their units upon receipt of combat orders.

3. Compliance on T/O and demotion of EM.

a. According to par. 1, Subject T/O dated Dec. 23, 1944, (A true copy) issued by HQ, 1st District, EM in excess of the of the T/O, can be transferred and demoted in grade if there are no vacancies to which they may be appointed with their present rank. This is applied to the cases of Placido Carantes and other EM who were excess of the Company's T/O.

4. Report of Sgt. Mapili dated 3 January 1945, re lack of preparation by the 2nd Bn for D-Day before the arrival of Sgt. Mapili in the second Bn area. With respect to plan, reference is cited in the 2nd Bn CO's communication sent to the CO, 1st District, dated Sept. 3, 1944 re the different tasks of demolition assigned "G" and "H" Cos for the D-Day. Another was the plan reported to the CO, 1st District by the Bn CO, 2nd Bn dated Jan. 1, 1945.

5. Personnel:

a. Lack of intimacy - The relation of one officer to another needs much ground of improvement in order to carry the activities of the 2nd Bn to a maximum efficiency. I want to illucidate by example:

(1) The Bn CO is not in good term with the Ex.O, and the Ex O with the S-1 or Adjutant.

(2) The CO, "F" Co. assumes command of this newly organized unit with an ample power which he believes emanates from the CO of the Regiment.

b. The EM personnel are given much instructions in discipline, spiritual and moral matters, and are more closely intimate to one another or more or less brotherly in their treatment.

Comments:

1. The compliance with SO #101, HQ, 1st District dated Dec. 9, 1944 is almost complete. The deficiency in the accomplishments of T/O, rosters and Service Records is due to the lack of facilities such as stationery, typewriters and other accessories of office work. Due to the far distances covered between the 2nd Bn HQ and the HQ of the Companies, reports on arms and ammunitions are hard to secure specially when the platoons or squads are assigned to different sectors.

2. Compliance to GO #9, GHQ, dated June 27, 1944, have been accomplished to a great extent although full compliance could not be attained due to lack of demolition materials. It is true that the 2nd Bn area is a mining region where plenty of materials could be secured but some of the dynamite or explosive materials that were possessed by this Bn were distributed to other units or Battalions to help them in the execution of the D-Day plan. Some have long been immersed in water that would render them useless for the purpose.

The harassing and eliminating of enemies, this Bn has done splendid work before the landing of our troops as shown by the commendation written by that Headquarters to the "H" Company in its splendid work ambushing Japs trucks and attacking their garrisons resulting to many casualties and booties secured in these enterprises.

Prevention of acquisition of food supply by the enemy is evident in the rapid organization of the bolo units in this area and in the prevention of the different conveyances to transport these supplies to the Japanese supply depot. In the 2nd Bn. mountainous region, the natives do not accept Jap Military War Notes in order to prevent the Japs purchase their products. Food and other necessary supplies are secured under receipt or sometimes acquired free, given as a help to our men.

3. The demotion of EM was made in accordance to par. 1, Subject T/O, dated December 23, 1944 (true copy) issued by HQ, 1st District. The provision says that EM in excess of the T/O may be transferred and demoted in grade if there are no vacancies to which they may be appointed with their present rank.

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The situation of this excess men would have been avoided had not Lt. Pedro Abubo, CO, "F" Co. done wrong with respect to its organization. Lt. Abubo upon arriving at the Company, disorganized the company that have already been organized by the Acting CO, Lt. Blanco appointed temporarily by the Bn C.O. He discarded some old servicemen and filled their places by volunteers until he had the required T/O. He was asked by the Bn Adjutant to reserve places for the USAFIP soldiers who would be pulled as excess in the different companies but he did not mind it. As a result many excess USAFIP men who were pulled out of Bn. HQ, "G" and "H" Cos due to complete T/O are now out of the organization because we cannot place them in "F" Co.

4. The report of Sgt. Mapili dated 3 January 1945 re lack of preparation by the 2nd Bn for the D-Day before his arrival in the 2nd Bn area is unfounded. As to plan, your attention is invited to the reports of 2nd Bn CO to the CO, 1st District dated Sept. 3, 1944 and that of Jan. 1, 1945. With respect to materials such as dynamite and explosives, it is accepted that there is not much preparation due to the fact as stated above that these materials were distributed to other units and some were immersed in water that render them useless. However, there were several boxes that were left but due to the lapse of time in which they were kept, made them also incapable of use.
5. The lack of intimacy in the personnel was evidenced to me by some personal grudges aired by individual officers to me and by letters written to one another. One officer wants to step on the toe of one above him and dominates all other officers of his rank. As I see it there is an officer who is a trouble-maker causing the lack of intimacy with one another.

Recommendations:

1. Request that sufficient amount of time be given the preparation of the forms since we have no ready printed blanks to accomplish them. Before they are called for from this Bn area due to its far distance from that HQ, at least 10 days allowance would be given before a follow up will take place.

2. The accomplishment of the missions of D-Day in this area was delayed due to lack of proper materials. The timely arrival of demolition materials brought in by Sgt. Mapili expedited the accomplishment of the mission. The tactical engagement of fighting did not take place since the enemy did not confront the 2nd Bn at the beginning of the M-Day. But at present, there will be a great contact because Japanese forces are infiltrating this area and probably reports on the activity of this Bn. may crowd the docket of the S-3.

3. The demotion of EM in this Bn can be remedied by pulling out volunteers in the "F" Co. and replace them with the USAFIP who were the excess of the other companies. Another remedy is to observe them in some companies which do not have complete T/O, such as the HQ & Serv. Co. and the Heavy Weapon Co. etc. I am sending Sgt. P. Carantes to the HQ & Service Co.

4. The Bn CO cannot be accounted for by the letter of Sgt. Mapili for it is shown that there was a definite plan for D-Day. The lack of demolition material is due to unforeseen circumstances that took place at that time.

5. The efficient administration of this Bn can be attained by shuffling the officers. It is highly recommended that Lt. Olen Cole be retained in his position as Battalion Commander. He had been doing his work efficiently and enthusiastically but he had only been a victim of circumstances which are the causes of his little failure to comply with some of his duties. If Lt. Cole would be retained as Bn CO I recommend that he should be prevailed upon to send his wife to her home or live separately far from the camp. I highly recommend the transfer of Lt. Clayton Rollins to other units for he cannot go along with other officers of his rank and under him. Since Lt. Rollins was assigned as in charge of the radio, he did not function anymore as an Ex. O of the 2nd Bn. He wants to be transferred to the Heavy Weapon Co.

Both Lts. Cole and Rollins, Americans and of the same blood cannot go together due to individual differences, so it is a good step to separate them so that a more efficient administration of this Bn. can be effected. If a Filipino officer would be appointed to command this Bn., both Americans should be transferred because if a Filipino officer would be appointed to command and an American be assigned in a lower capacity, unforeseen conflicts and disagreement may occur, ^{which are destructive,} to an efficient administration. I request then that if the Commanding Officer has my person in mind to be appointed as the CO of the 2nd Bn., I respectfully decline for the reason stated above. I wish to return to my own position to serve CO and his HQ, the Commonwealth Government and the United States of America. ing

Lt. Pedro Abubo fails to comply with the orders of his Commanding Officer many times. He sometimes argues that his orders come directly from that Headquarters. According to the investigation made by me, he is not very appropriate as a Company Commander, for he antagonizes his other officers and men for many displeasing acts he has committed. He even uses corporal punishment in dealing with his men. I highly recommend that he should be relieved as a Company Commander and that the 2nd in Command Lt. Jose Blanco is fully qualified to take his place. Lt. Jose Blanco aside his high educational qualifications has excellent record in military service and has an amiable relation with the men of Co. F. In fact Lt. Abubo is asking assignment to some other companies in the Bn. particularly those that are actually engaged with the enemy. Since Co. "G" has two vacant posts, I recommend that Lieut. Abubo be assigned to that Company left vacant by Lts. Ara and Fadlen. Lt. Cristobal Rodrigo, who had been acting S-3 is recommended for an appointment in his rank for he did not voluntarily surrender but he was forced to surrender due to the fact that his whole family was taken as hostages by the Japs. If Lt. Rodrigo could not be appointed to S-3, I recommend Lt. Pacifico Ylarde platoon leader in "F" Co. to be appointed as S-3 of this Bn. Lt. Ylarde ^{was} an Instructor in ROTC, Mapua Institute of Technology and an Engineer by profession.

Conclusion:

The undersigned as investigator has accomplished his mission unviased and untarnished by personal equation and intimacy of relationship. My investigations are based on the true findings and circumstances of the cases as presented to me.

Rec'd REP 10:00 P.M.
22 Jan 45




PEDRO G. BALAGOT
Captain, Infantry, USA
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Special Investigator and
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