

U.S. MILITARY HISTORIES

USAFIP WL & GELA ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN LAOS

1 of 100

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883078

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

5 May 1945

Subject: Brief History of USAFIP, NL

To : The Commanding Officer, USAFIP, NL

1. Lieut. Colonel MARTIN MOSES and ARTHUR K NOBLE arrived in the vicinity of Bukod, Mountain Province on or about 10 June 1942. At this time, they declined to exercise any command over units existing in the area, stating that they were merely on a "vacation" in the area.

2. On the 15th of September 1942, Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble visited the Headquarters of the Detachment, 43rd Infantry, PS, at Bening, Bukod, Benguet, Mt. Province, P.I. and stated that they were assuming command of guerrilla forces in North Luzon. Further actions and letters of Lieut. Colonels Moses and Noble indicated that they considered that they were assuming command retroactively at the time they arrived at North Luzon. For instance, an approval of the promotion of the undersigned (Lt. Col. Arthur Murphy) ~~indicated~~ was retroactively dated 1 July 1942.

Initially there was no set name used for the organization commanded by Lieut. Colonels Moses and Noble. Indorsement to the letter referred to in the above paragraph was headed:

"Headquarters, UNITED STATES ARMY GUERRILLA FORCES".

Last communication received from Lieut. Colonels Moses and Noble by the Detachment, 43rd Infantry, PS on or about 13 April 1943 after Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble had made radio contact with Australia bore the heading: "USAFIP, NL." It was assumed that the use of this title after this radio contact signified that this was the authorized designation of this command.

3. A possible reason for considering that USAFIP, NL had its origin at an earlier date might be the fact that Col. JOHN P HORAN in February or March 1942 issued a statement to the effect that he was assuming command of all USAFFE Forces in North Luzon. However, this command was never effectively exercised over or recognized by units of Lt. Col WARNER in Nueva Vizcaya or Major PRACOR in the province of Cagayan, and Colonel Horan's actual command was limited to the Provisional Battalion, 43rd Infantry, PS, and the 121st Infantry PA.



FMM

Historical Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

5 May 1945

Subject: Brief History of USAFIP, NL

To : The Commanding Officer, USAFIP, NL

1. Lieut. Colonel MARTIN MOSES and ARTHUR K NOBLE arrived in the vicinity of Bukod, Mountain Province on or about 10 June 1942. At this time, they declined to exercise any command over units existing in the area, stating that they were merely on a "vacation" in the area.

2. On the 15th of September 1942, Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble visited the Headquarters of the Detachment, 43rd Infantry, PS, at Bening, Bukod, Benguet, Mt. Province, P.I. and stated that they were assuming command of guerrilla forces in North Luzon. Further actions and letters of Lieut. Colonels Moses and Noble indicated that they considered that they were assuming command retroactively at the time they arrived at North Luzon. For instance, an approval of the promotion of the undersigned (Lt. Col. Arthur Murphy) ~~indicated~~ was retroactively dated 1 July 1942.

Initially there was no set name used for the organization commanded by Lieut. Colonels Moses and Noble. Indorsement to the letter referred to in the above paragraph was headed:

"Headquarters, UNITED STATES ARMY GUERRILLA FORCES".

Last communication received from Lieut. Colonels Moses and Noble by the Detachment, 43rd Infantry, PS on or about 13 April 1943 after Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble had made radio contact with Australia bore the heading: "USAFIP, NL." It was assumed that the use of this title after this radio contact signified that this was the authorized designation of this command.

3. A possible reason for considering that USAFIP, NL had its origin at an earlier date might be the fact that Col. JOHN P HORAN in February or March 1942 issued a statement to the effect that he was assuming command of all USAFFE Forces in North Luzon. However, this command was never effectively exercised over or recognized by units of Lt. Col WARNER in Nueva Vizcaya or Major PRACOR in the province of Cagayan, and Colonel Horan's actual command was limited to the Provisional Battalion, 43rd Infantry, PS, and the 121st Infantry PA.



FMDI

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883078

Historical Section

file

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
Camp SPENCER

/jal

9 July 1945

SUBJECT: Historical Reports

TO : See Distribution

1. Commanders of each regiment, or battalion not forming part of a regiment, or independent company, battery, or similarly organized units, will submit a detailed history of the services of the unit concerned not later than July 25, 1945. The file copy will be kept up to date furnishing the Historical Section of this Headquarters any additional information from time to time.

2. The history will be prepared under the direction of the Commanding Officer of the organization. It will be kept and submitted in the following form, the authority for each statement being cited, (Par 13 AR 345-105):

a. Original unit

- (1) Designation
- (2) Date of organization
- (3) Place of organization
- (4) Authority for organization
- (5) Sources from which personnel was obtained, i.e. by transfer from other units, voluntary enlistment or draft.

b. Changes in organization, i.e., changes in the designation of units, transfer of unit from one regiment to another as a unit, or changes due to changes in Table of Organization.

c. Strength, commissioned and enlisted.

- (1) At beginning of period
- (2) Net increase each month
- (3) Net decrease each month
- (4) At end of period

d. Stations (permanent or temporary) of unit or part thereof.

- (1) Date of arrival at each station.
- (2) Date of departure from each station.

e. Marches

- (1) Purpose
- (2) Length of daily march
- (3) Points between which marched, with dates.
- (4) Conditions of road and weather
- (5) Remarks (Other pertinent data)



Historical Section

file

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883078

f. Campaigns

- (1) Name
- (2) Duration
- (3) Purpose
- (4) Authority ordering

g. Battles

- (1) Name
- (2) Place
- (3) Date
- (4) Campaign of which battle was a part
- (5) Forces engaged
- (6) Result.

h. Commanding officers in important engagements

- (1) Engagement
- (2) Name (if different officers commander in same mention each with the hours of change)

i. Losses in action - officers and men

- (1) Engagement - Place and date.
- (2) Names and addresses of casualties:
 - (a) Killed
 - (b) Wounded
 - (c) Missing
 - (d) Taken prisoners.

j. Former and present members who have distinguished themselves in action.

- (1) Engagement - date and place
- (2) Names
- (3) Act
- (4) Reward received, or recommended for.

k. Photographs of personnel, important scenes or events.

3. In addition to the above, each unit commander will submit a report on (Par 10 AR 345-105) "Action against enemy, reports after. -- After every battle or engagement with the enemy, written reports thereof will be made by Commanders of regiments, separate battalions, squadrons, companies or detachments, and by all commanders of higher grade, each in what concerns his own command, which reports will be forwarded, through the proper channel, to the Adjutant General." It shall be the special duty of all staff officers with the units in the field to keep careful journals of the operations from which they will compile reports of said operations for their immediate commanders.

By Order of Colonel VOLCKMANN:

[Signature]
 FROILAN M MAGLAYA
 Lt Col, Inf, PA,
 Adjutant General

Distribution:

- | | | |
|---------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| CO, 121st Inf | CO, 2nd FA Bn | CO, Prov Bn (Elizondo) |
| CO, 69th Inf | CO, Engr Bn | CO, Rep & Cas Bn |
| CO, 15th Inf | CO, QM Bn | CO, Signal Co |
| CO, 14th Inf | CO, Med Bn | CO, HQ & HQ Co Serv Trps |
| CO, 11th Inf | CO, MP Bn | Historical Section (G-3) |
| CO, 1st FA Bn | CO, LCS Bn | F i l e |

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP, NORTH LUZON
Camp Spencer

9 July 1945

SUBJECT: Historical Reports

TO : See Distribution

1. Commanders of each regiment, or battalion not forming part of a regiment, or independent company, battery, or similarly organized units, will submit a detailed history of the services of the unit concerned not later than July 25, 1945. The file copy will be kept up to date furnishing the Historical Section of this Headquarters any additional information from time to time.

2. The history will be prepared under the direction of the Commanding Officer of the organization. It will be kept and submitted in the following form, the authority for each statement being cited; (Par 13 AR 345-105):


- a. Original unit
 - (1) Designation
 - (2) Date of organization
 - (3) Place of organization
 - (4) Purpose of organization
 - (5) Sources from which personnel was obtained, i.e. by transfer from other units, voluntary enlistment or draft.
- b. Changes in organization, i.e., changes in the designation of units, transfer of unit from one regiment to another as a unit, or changes due to changes in Table of Organization.
- c. Strength, commissioned and enlisted.
 - (1) At beginning of period
 - (2) Net increase each month
 - (3) Net decrease each month
 - (4) At end of period
- d. Stations (permanent or temporary) of unit or part thereof.
 - (1) Date of arrival at each station.
 - (2) Date of departure from each station.
- e. marches
 - (1) Purpose
 - (2) Length of daily march
 - (3) Points between which marched, with dates.
 - (4) Conditions of road and weather
 - (5) Remarks (Other pertinent data)
- f. Campaigns
 - (1) Name
 - (2) Duration
 - (3) Purpose
 - (4) Authority ordering
- g. Battles
 - (1) Name
 - (2) Place
 - (3) Date
 - (4) Campaign of which battle was a part
 - (5) Forces engaged
 - (6) Result



- h. Commanding officers in important engagements
 - (1) Engagement
 - (2) Name (if different officers commander in same mention each with the hour of change)
- i. Losses in action - Officers and men
 - (1) Engagement - Place and date
 - (2) Names and addresses of casualties
 - (a) Killed (c) Missing
 - (b) wounded (d) taken prisoners.
- j. Former and present members who have distinguished themselves in action.
 - (1) Engagement-date and place
 - (2) Names
 - (3) Act
 - (4) Reward received, or recommended for
- k. Photographs of personnel, important scenes or events

3. In addition to the above, each unit commander will submit a report on (Par 10 Ar 345-105) "Action against enemy, reports after."-- After every battle or engagement with the enemy, written reports thereof will be made by Commanders of regiments, separate battalions, squadrons, companies or detachments, and by all commanders of higher grade, each in what concerns his own command, which reports will be forwarded, through the proper channel, to the Adjutant General." It shall be the special duty of all staff officers with the units in the field to keep careful journals of the operations from which they will compile reports of said operations for their immediate commanders.

By Order of Colonel VOLCKMANN:


FROILAN M. MAGLAYA
Lt. Col., Inf -PA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, 121st Inf.	CO, MP Bn.
CO, 66th Inf.	CO, Land Communication Bn.
CO, 15th Inf.	BO, Prov Bn (Elizondo)
CO, 14th Inf.	CO, Repl Bn.
CO, 11th Inf.	CO, Sig. Co.
CO, 1st FA Bn.	Co. Hq. Serv. Co., USAFIP, NL
CO, 2nd FA Bn.	Historical Section
CO, Engr Bn.	F i l e
CO, QM Bn.	
CO, med Bn.	

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

4 May 1945

Subject: Data for Historical Section

To: See Distribution

1. There has been organized in the G-3 section, GHO, a sub-section called the historical section. The mission of the historical section is to compile data of importance and interest which has relation with the USAFIP, NL. In order that all important events are recorded, especially those that will be of interest to future readers of the history of the USAFIP, NL, it is requested that you submit the information by sending a special report to the GHO, USAFIP, NL, attention to historical section, G-3 Section.

2. You will also submit for file of this section extra copies of your field orders and reports - marked HISTORICAL SECTION.

By order of Colonel VOLCKMANN:

Calixto Roque
CALIXTO ROQUE
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

Distribution:

- CO, 15th Infantry
- CO, 11th Infantry
- CO, 131st Infantry
- CO, 14th Infantry
- CO, 66th Infantry
- CO, Replacement & Casualty Bn.
- CO, Field Artillery Bn.
- CO, Signal Company
- CO, MP Battalion
- CO, QM Battalion
- CO, Engineer Battalion
- CO, Medical Battalion
- CO, Land Communication Ser.
- G - 1, ✓ G - 2,
- G - 4, G - 5,
- JAGS, O of S,
- File

5416 200W
Historical Section, G-3 file

Subject letter Historical Reports dated
6 July 1945 Hq XIV Corps
is filed with XIV Corps.

gmar
8/27/45

Historical Section

Historical
USAFIP-NL

RECEIVED
8 SEP 1952
AGRD

RECEIVED
8 SEP 1952
AGRD

SHORT HISTORY, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON AND GUERRILLA
ACTIVITIES IN NORTH LUZON

Foreword

Guerrilla organization and activities in North Luzon went thru two phases: the phase in which individual units grew up and the phase in which USAFIP, NORTH LUZON grew into a unified organization. The history of the first phase can best be told in the history of the leaders of the various groups.

First Phase

WALTER CUSHING was the father of guerrilla warfare in North Luzon. Owned and worked a mine in Kalinga (or Abra?) at start of war, destroyed mine on USAFFE orders and started ambushing enemy convoys on Ilocos Coast early in January, 1942. Late came under command of Col. Moran. Later fought brilliant delaying action up Abra Valley. After Moran surrendered, declined command of 121st Inf. Made trips to Manila, disguised as priest (was Mexican half-breed and spoke fluent Spanish) to contact units in South, was betrayed by Ganaps near Jones, Isabela, surrounded by Japs and killed.

COLONEL J. P. MORAN: Commanded Camp John Hay at the beginning of war, ordered to remain in Baguio. Was trapped in Baguio by Jap advance down Ilocos Coast and previously ordered destruction of Mountain Trail. Took troops out over mountains in effort to rejoin USAFFE, was unsuccessful, returned to Kiangan and disbanded troops twice, was encouraged by Suyoc and Manayan American miners to start again. Got contact with Corregidor and was authorized to form 121st Inf. Started organizations in Mountain and Ilocos Provinces with HQ in Bontoc. Withdrew to Lubuagan behind blasted road when Japs entered Bontoc. Surrendered with Mountain Province command on General Wainwright's surrender order.

LIEUT. COLONEL WARNER, COLONEL NAKAR, LT. COL. ENRIQUES & MAJOR MANRIQUEZ: Warner stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, incompetent and a drunkard, followed Moran's party out across mountains but went to Aritao. Met Enriquez who was organizing troops left behind by Bonnet, Mosses and Noble. Warner accepted proffered command. Got radio contact with Corregidor, authorized to organize 14th Infantry. Nakar arrived later from Ilocos Coast. Triumvirate: Enriquez did organizing, Nakar fought Japs, Warner consumed quart of whiskey per day. When the Japs entered the Cagayan Valley, Warner and Nakar and some units retired to vicinity, Jones, Isabela. Enriquez and other units retired into Western Viscaya and Eastern Benguet. Units

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883078



re-united when Japs left Cagayan Valley for big Bataan push but again retired in same manner when Japs returned after the fall of Bataan. After this, in actuality, two 14th Infantry. Warner and part of east branch surrendered on Wainwright's order. Warner died in Bayombong jail. Nakar refused to surrender, but later captured and later reported executed. Remainder (about one company) under Major Arnold, carried on in vicinity Jones until reunited to west branch in late 1944. West branch survived, but Enriquez deserted command and voluntarily surrendered in April 1945. Major R. A. Manriquez then assumed command and still commands Regiment.

After surrender and parole, Enriquez tried to assume command of 14th Inf and of North Luzon from a soft seat in Baguio. When he discovered that no unit would accept his orders, he abandoned pretensions and started to become inside agent but was shortly apprehended and taken to Fort Santiago. Fate unknown.

MAJOR PRAEGER, CAPT. JONES AND CAPT. MINTON: Were officers of company of 26th Cav (PS), on detached service to guard Cervantes Road at the start of the war. Were cut off in Baguio and went part way over mountains with Col. Horan, but then headed north into Cagayan province. Raided Tuguegarao airport in early 1942 and later Aparri. During latter raid, Minton deserted and went to Warner's command, and latter surrendered on Wainwright's order. Praeger and Jones later withdrew to Apayao and defended sub-province against all attacks for months. Later forced further into mountains and got radio contact with Australia. His radio used by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble. Praeger and Jones betrayed and captured in August, 1943. Remnants of unit picked up by Major Blackburn in northward expansion.

MAJOR ROBERT ARNOLD: Was stationed with air-warning outfit at Cape Bojeador, Ilocos Norte, at outbreak of war, cut off by Vigan and Aparri landings. Moved southward and worked with Major Walter Cushing in earlier ambushes. Later under Horan. Later moved over to Lt. Col. Warner and later fell heir to east wing of 14th Infantry. Contacted in late 1944 and, when two branches 14th Infantry rejoined, was sent to Ilocos Norte to take command of 15th Infantry.

MAJOR PARKER CALVERT, MAJOR ARTHUR MURPHY, AND LIEUT. CRAFTON SPENCER: Were stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, went out over mountains with Lt. Col. Horan, but at Caranglan, Nueva Ecija, accepted offered permission to continue efforts to get into Bataan. Got as far south as Montalban, Rizal, but could not get into Bataan. Returned to Benguet, and picked up small detachment former Scouts and PA soldiers. Calvert and Spencer went north to contact Col. Horan but Horan surrendered before they arrived. Returned to Murphy and established small unit in East Benguet, later

RECEIVED
SEP 1952

8 SEP 1952

increased by incorporations of Sgt. Velasco's unit in Kapangan and by establishment of unit in Sablan (these units now 1st Bn, 66th Inf), took part in October, 1942, offensive. East Benguet unit moved west of Mountain Trail after Jap Nov 1942 counter offensive. HQ thereafter located in Kapangan. Calvert later appointed 1st District C.O. and Murphy commanded unit. Calvert now Chief of Staff and Murphy AC of S and G-2, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON. Spencer sent to take command of 2nd Bn, 66th Inf following Baldwin's capture, killed in action, April, 1943.

GOVERNOR ABLAN AND CAPT. MADAMBA: Little specific known of their activities. Carried on activities in Ilocos Norte in 1942 and early 1943, but units broken up, Madamba captured and Ablan disappeared (believed died). Remnants of units collected by 121st Inf in expansion into Ilocos Norte. Later became 15th Inf under Major Arnold.

CAPTAIN BALDWIN: Fought in Bataan, escaped after surrender and entered and organized unit in Baguio mining area (later 2nd Bn, 66th Inf) took part in 1942 offensive (unit took and held Baguio Mining Area for 72 hours). Was captured early 1943.

CAPTS. FRENCH, LANGLEY AND SWICK: Were Baguio miners at outbreak of war but took to mountains, making one trip to Baler and Dingallen and return to eastern Benguet. Commissioned by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble in September 1942 and assigned sector between Kennon Road and Agno River. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Swick captured in early 1943 but posed as civilian and sent to Camp Holmes. French murdered and robbed by own bodyguard. Langley later captured at Imugan, Nueva Vizcaya. Unit went part to Baldwin and part to Lapham. Swick escaped Camp Holmes early part of 1943, rejoined and now assigned 11th Inf.

CAPTAIN BADO DANGWA: Owner of Dangwa Franco at the outbreak of war. Gave all of trucks to USAFFE. Took to mountains on Jap occupation of Baguio and carried on active and passive resistance against enemy (is most influential man in Benguet). Commissioned by Lt. Col. Moses and Noble in October 1942 and unit combined with that of Molintas. Took part on October 1942 offensive. Later appointed C.O., HQ Bn., 66th Inf., (later HQ BN, USAFIP, NL) and G-4, USAFIP, NL which positions he now holds.

CAPTAIN DENNIS MOLINTAS: Was Benguet school teacher and reserve officer at the outbreak of the war, and for some time afterwards, was called to active duty by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Unit later expanded and became 3rd Bn, 66th Infantry. Succeeded Major Parker Calvert as C.O., 66th Inf., in late 1944.

RECEIVED
8 SEP 1952
AGRO

LIEUT. FISH: Operated sawmill on Mountain Trail at outbreak of war. Gathered small unit and ambushed Japs. Commissioned by Moses and Noble. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Captured in 1943. Unit merged with that of Capt. Molintas.


LIEUT. CHARLES CUSHING: Miner at Paracale at outbreak of war. Escaped to Manila, commissioned and sent to Bataan. Came out into Zambales with Lt. Col. Thorpe. When Thorpe holed up, crossed to San Nicolas area with J.P. O'Day. Later contacted and made a District C.O. by Thorpe but contact very poor, so came under Moses and Noble. Unit well organized for existence but made poor showing in October 1942 offensive. Voluntarily surrendered in early 1943, when contacted by native wife. Brother of Walter Cushing (see above) and of Col. James Cushing (Cebu Guerrilla).

CAPTAIN ROBERT BAPHAM: Sent into Eastern Pangasinan by Lt. Col. Thorpe but accepted command of Moses and Noble when no communication with Thorpe. Later refused to acknowledge command of USAFIP, NL or render reports. For this reason little known of subsequent activities.

CAPTAIN PERIAM AND MAJOR GEORGE BARNETT: American miners at Suyoc at outbreak of war. Commissioned by H. O. Han. Periam sent to Ilocos Sur and Barnett to La Union to organize Bns of 121st Inf. Refused to surrender when H. O. Han did. Periam unit not too prosperous, and Periam captured in late 1943. La Union unit prospered and went on big offensive in September 1942 but momentum was about lost when contacted by Moses and Noble for October 1942 offensive. Went thru bad surrender period in early 1943 when Major Barnett was sick but later came back and reorganized Periam's unit in Ilocos Sur and Abra and became present 121st Inf. Later expanded into Ilocos Norte, but this portion later detached to form 15th Infantry.

CAPTAIN JOHN O'DAY: Was mine superintendent at Acobe Chromite mine in Zambales at outbreak of war, worked mine until March 1942 on orders from Corregidor, then destroyed mine, stayed with Thorpe for a while then came with Chas Cushing to North Luzon where for six months almost died of dysentery. Was cured and commissioned by Lt. Chas Cushing. On Cushing's surrender, joined 121st Inf, reorganized Ilocos Sur and Abra areas and later brought Ilocos Norte under control. Was wounded in action under heroic circumstance while in Ilocos Sur. Is at present Executive Officer of 15th Inf.

LT. COLS. MOSES AND NOBLE: Commanded 11th and 12th Inf. (PA). On Ilocos Coast at outbreak of war, cut off with Lt. Col. Bonnett on Ilocos Coast in late December 1941, retreated with part of units to Baguio, went over mountains to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, and reached Bataan. On fall of Bataan, escaped to



Benguet arriving in June 1942. In Sept. 1942, assumed command of all forces North Luzon and ordered general offensive for 15 October 1942. Offensive fairly successful for a while, but broken up by enemy counter-offensive in November 1942 which badly disorganized units. Made way to Apayao (or Kalinga) and contacted Australia via Major Praeger's radio in January 1943, authorized to organize 12th Infantry (now known as 66th Inf). Issued orders to all units North Luzon to lay low, gather intelligence and perfect organization. Were shortly afterwards put on the run by enemy and were captured in June 1943.

MAJOR DONALD BLACKBURN AND COL. R. W. VOLCKMANN: Escaped from Bataan and reported to Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble in Benguet in August 1942. Blackburn made signal officer and Volckmann placed in charge of three sub-sectors of Benguet for October 1942 offensive. Both move into Ifugao as result of November 1942 counter-offensive and organized that sub-province. Volckmann appointed G-2 by Moses and Noble after Australia contact and assumed command, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON after Moses and Noble capture. Volckmann moved HQ to Kapangan, Benguet, in February 1944, leaving Blackburn in command of unit in Ifugao which was later extended to include Bontoc and Kalinga. Blackburn authorized to expand into Apayao and Cagayan when it was established that Major Praeger could not be contacted in that area. Blackburn at present C.O. 11th Infantry, having extended control over all of Apayao and over most of Cagayan.

Second Phase

The history of the second phase of the USAFIP NORTH LUZON can best be told by listing the difficulties that were placed and the manner in which they were met.

L. COMMUNICATIONS: It was the lack of a good system of communications that, until June 1943, had made North Luzon still a group of widely scattered units with very little central control. Communications were passed along from one unit to another in a haphazard manner and occasional travelers were the only means of getting communications across areas in which there were not units. In June 1943, there was established the beginning of a network of runner relay stations that now covers all of North Luzon. Mail or supplies or personnel can now be sent between any two points in North Luzon by the most direct routes in the minimum time. For example the average time for a RUSH message to go from the present HQ of this command to the HQ of each of its regiments is as follows: to HQ 121st Inf (La Union) 4 hours; to HQ 66th Inf (Benguet) 15 hours; to HQ 14th Infantry (Kauya Vizcaya), 3 days; to HQ 15th Infantry (Ilocos Norte) 6 days; to HQ 11th Infantry (Cagayan), 6 days. In fact, for the




greater amount of communications with the 121st Infantry and 66th Infantry, the rubber communication system has proven faster than radio.

2. INTELLIGENCE: In February, 1943, Lt. Col. Moses, at that time CO, USAFIP, NL, established radio contact with the GHQ SWPA and received orders to cease active resistance against the enemy and to gather and submit intelligence. Col. Moses transmitted these orders to all units of his command and appointed R.W. Volckmann as G-2. Due to the poor communications existing at the time, these orders did not reach all units until late in April 1943. Intelligence work got started very slowly for the following reasons: the inclusion of the entire island of Luzon for intelligence coverage; poor communications; unwillingness, and in some case inability, of units to subordinate activity against the enemy to the less exciting task of intelligence work; almost complete lack of training and written material regarding intelligence work; the fact that most intelligence work had to be done by military personnel, a great many of whom were wanted by the enemy; the necessity of inculcating habits of accurate and methodical observation and collection of information in personnel whose civilian habits are quite the reverse.

When Maj. Volckmann assumed command of USAFIP, NL following the capture of Lt. Col. Moses in June 1943, he appointed Actg. Major Parker C. Ivert as G-2 with Major Arthur Murphy as Assistant G-2. The compilation of a monthly G-2 report covering all of Luzon was commenced. As radio communication with GHQ SWPA had gone out following the capture of Col. Moses, efforts were made to forward these reports through each and every channel that offered the slightest chance of getting them to GHQ SWPA. A great improvement was noted when district COs were given a standard form for the submission of monthly S-2 reports regarding their areas. The greater majority of coverage areas outside of Northern Luzon was handled by GHQ USAFIP NL. Training was achieved by letters of criticism and suggestions on reports received. Efforts were also made to find some one who could build a radio transmitter from the considerable collection of parts that we had commandeered. Major Murphy was appointed G-2 in February 1944.


Late in August 1944 there was received through another unit a copy of a guide that was substantially the same as the "Philippine Intelligence Guide" issued by GHQ SWPA. Due to the fact that this guide indicated that GHQ SWPA desired a much more comprehensive and detailed intelligence coverage than this Hq had previously felt necessary or capable of handling, the intelligence-procedure was altered through GO No. 12 of this Hq, dated 7 August 1944. It was decided to abandon the attempt to cover the whole of Luzon. It was decided to obtain most of intelligence through agents rather than military personnel--though the direction of such personnel would be done by military personnel. More frequent reports were required.



In practice the majority of intelligence work and training of intelligence personnel is done by the various districts and Bns of USAFIP NL. The District and Bn COs and their S-2s are right on the ground. They are in the best position to obtain and supervise agents and to classify and organize the information received regarding their own areas. Agents of this HQ are used only to occasionally check conflicting or improbable reports and in a liaison capacity to assist District COs in areas they are having difficulty in working. Due to the distances involved, the greater part of training from this HQ takes the form of letters of criticism and suggestion. This HQ distributes copies of intelligence materials, which are now beginning to be received, renders such monetary aid for intelligence work, as it can to poor districts, exercises general supervision over the work of the Districts and prepares reports for GHQ SWPA. Of late it has also done considerable work in translating enemy documents and papers received from districts, a pro-american Jap prisoner being used for the purpose.

3. MORALE: Late 1942 and early 1943 were low points in the morale of our officers and men, and, in the disorganization following the enemy counter-offensive in late 1942, large numbers of officers and men began to surrender with their weapons. Drastic and immediate measures were necessary. An order was issued making it punishable by death for any officer or man to voluntarily surrender to the enemy or allow himself to be captured thru his own negligence; or for any person to advise a soldier to surrender or for any person to surrender to the enemy any army weapon or ammunition. The remedy worked. Until quite recently, USAFIP NORTH LUZON has been composed entirely of unsurrendered officers and men (plus a few Bataan men who agreed to break their parole fully and completely). During the past few months, due to acute shortage of personnel with administrative ability or other special qualifications, the bars have been let down somewhat. However, the officers and men of this organization who stuck it out during the tough times still look with scorn on the new arrivals who were living in comparative safety during those days.

4. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE AND KEEPING CIVILIANS LOYAL: The enemy, finding that he could not combat us by his efforts alone, began to use large numbers of spies and to obtain information by torture. This was met by making it punishable by death to give information to the enemy whether under coercion or not. Likewise, loyal civilians were made responsible for reporting and, wherever possible, apprehending suspected enemy agents. Very little trouble was encountered in keeping the mass of the civilians loyal in areas in which we had forces from the early days of the war. It was only when expansion into new areas was begun that cases of entire communities being pro-Jap were encountered. In some of these instances, heroic measures were necessary. In general, it was found that the people followed their leaders and suitable measures were applied to these



leaders. Radio news and propaganda was given wide circulation thru the communications system mentioned above.

5. TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE: In the early days of USAFIP, NORTH LUZON, members of units lived in their home barrios for purposes of concealment from the enemy. However, it was found that little or no training or discipline could be accomplished in this matter. Soon, however, the 121st Infantry took at that time bold step of moving their entire units into hidden company or platoon camps whose chief protection was in their control over the surrounding areas and knowledge of the enemy's habits. When it was found that the dividends in training and discipline far outweighed the occasional losses attendant upon a camp being found, all units in North Luzon were ordered to move their men into camps and there conduct regular training schedules. Another training problem was in the transition from theoretical knowledge to practical application. This was met by assigning to each unit occasional limited objective attacks in order to get the men over their battle shyness. It must be admitted that some units were so successful in their "examinations" that thereafter there was great difficulty in keeping them obedient to the "lay low" order.

6. SUPPLY: a. Food supply was never a great problem. Units naturally grew up in the food producing areas, and always used these areas as bases of operations. Loyal civilians always shared what food was available and accepted our receipts without question. Likewise, there was never a shortage of money (war notes) for any supplies or activities for which it was needed. With these, it was possible to purchase whatever supplies that could not be obtained from civilians on receipt.

b. Arms and Ammunition Supplies: When in 1941, the tide of the enemy advance rolled past North Luzon, there was a large quantity of these items left on the battle fields or discarded by disbanded soldiers. Most of this was collected initially by civilians. Thereafter, our problem was to collect it from the civilians and to prevent the enemy from getting it first. The first was accomplished by thorough and untiring effort - men have spent weeks, tracking down one rifle. The second was accomplished as outlined above. After the limited objective attacks were started, arms and ammunitions were obtained from BC or Japs by ambushing raids.

c. Clothing: This problem was met by purchasing what clothing as was possible and doing without the rest of the time.

7. MEDICAL CARE: Until very recently, USAFIP units had few, and in many cases no, doctors - these hopped on the band wagon in large numbers only after the war had turned unmistakably in favor of the United Nations. However, plans were made in advance for medical care for all units, hospitals were built and a campaign for securing medicines was started. A campaign was set out to get doctors - kidnapping them when necessary.



Complete medical and hospital service is now being administered to all members of this command.

8. CONTACT WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: After Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble were captured, it was not certain whether Major Praeger's radio was still in existence or not. While every effort was being made to contact Praeger, efforts were likewise made to acquire necessary parts and personnel to put another radio in operation. Radio parts of all kinds were secured from all over Luzon but difficulty was encountered in finding a man who could put them together. Finally two radio technicians were secured from Manila and a radio was put into operation. Power was secured from a home-made 220-volt hydro-electric plant. While the above efforts were made, other efforts were made to contact Higher Headquarters thru other units to the south but with little success, as when contact was finally made through Major Bernard L. Anderson, our radio was already in operation.

9. EXPANSION: When Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble contacted Australia, USAFIP, NL was assigned all of Luzon north of the line Lingayen (Pangasinan)-San Jose (N. Ecija). In the latter part of 1943, this area was divided as follows:

- 1st District - Benguet - 66th Infantry
- 2nd District - La Union and Ilocos Sur - 121st Infantry
- 3rd District - Abra and Ilocos Norte - Gov. Ablan and Capt. Madamba's units (to become part of the 121st Infantry)
- 4th District - Apayao and Cagayan - Maj. Praeger's units.
- 5th District - Isabela and Vizcaya - 14th Infantry
- 6th District - Nueva Ecija and Northern Pangasinan - Capt. Lapham's units.
- 7th District - Ifugao, Bontoc, and Kalinga - Units of Col. Volckmann and Major Blackburn.


However, all of these areas were not at the time under control. Also, some of the information upon which the decision was based, proved to be erroneous. Therefore, the following expansions were made:

(1) The 14th Infantry expanded into Isabela and contacted remnants of the "long lost" east branch of the 14th Inf.

(2) Bontoc and Kalinga were occupied.

(3) When it was found that Ablan's and Madamba's units had ceased to function in Ilocos Norte, the 121st Infantry expanded into Ilocos Norte from Ilocos Sur and Abra. Units in Ilocos Norte and northern Abra were later reorganized into the 15th Infantry.

(4) When it was found that Praeger's units had ceased to



function in Apayao and Cagayan, the 4th and 7th Districts were combined, the 11th Infantry authorized, and a rapid expansion from the 7th District into the 4th District was begun. This expansion is now almost complete.

(5) When Capt. Robert Lapham refused to accept the authority of this HQ, the 66th Infantry was authorized to expand southward into northern Pangasinan and the 121st Infantry was authorized to expand into Northwest Pangasinan. At the time of the landing the 66th had one company and the 121st Infantry had about one company plus one platoon in Pangasinan.



SHORT HISTORY, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON AND GUERRILLA
ACTIVITIES IN NORTH LUZONForeword

Guerrilla organization and activities in North Luzon went thru two phases: the phase in which individual units grew up and the phase in which USAFIP, NORTH LUZON grew into a unified organization. The history of the first phase can best be told in the history of the leaders of the various groups.

First Phase

WALTER CUSHING was the father of guerrilla warfare in North Luzon. Owned and worked a mine in Kalinga (or Abra?) at start of war, destroyed mine on USAFFE orders and started ambushing enemy convoys on Ilocos Coast early in January, 1942. Late came under command of Col. Horan. Later fought brilliant delaying action up Abra Valley. After Horan surrendered, declined command of 121st Inf. Made trips to Manila, disguised as priest (was Mexican half-breed and spoke fluent Spanish) to contact units in South, was betrayed by Ganaps near Jones, Isabela, surrounded by Japs and killed.

COLONEL J. P. HORAN: Commanded Camp John Hay at the beginning of war, ordered to remain in Baguio. Was trapped in Baguio by Jap advance down Ilocos Coast and previously ordered destruction of Mountain Trail. Took troops out over mountains in effort to rejoin USAFFE, was unsuccessful, returned to Kiangnan and disbanded troops twice, was encouraged by Suyoc and Manayan American miners to start again. Got contact with Corregidor and was authorized to form 121st Inf. Started organizations in Mountain and Ilocos Provinces with HQ in Bontoc. Withdrew to Lubuagan behind blasted road when Japs entered Bontoc. Surrendered with Mountain Province command on General Wainwright's surrender order.

LIEUT. COLONEL WARNER, COLONEL NAKAR, LT. COL. ENRIQUES & MAJOR MANRIQUEZ: Warner stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, incompetent and a drunkard, followed Horan's party out across mountains but went to Aritao. Met Enriquez who was organizing troops left behind by Bonnet, Mosses and Noble. Warner accepted proffered command. Got radio contact with Corregidor, authorized to organize 14th Infantry. Nakar arrived later from Ilocos Coast. Triumvirate: Enriquez did organizing, Nakar fought Japs, Warner consumed quart of whiskey per day. When the Japs entered the Cagayan Valley, Warner and Nakar and some units retired to vicinity, Jones, Isabela. Enriquez and other units retired into Western Viscaya and Eastern Benguet. Units



SHORT HISTORY, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON AND GUERRILLA

ACTIVITIES IN NORTH LUZON

Foreword

Guerrilla organization and activities in North Luzon went thru two phases: the phase in which individual units grew up and the phase in which USAFIP, NORTH LUZON grew into a unified organization. The history of the first phase can best be told in the history of the leaders of the various groups.

First Phase

WALTER CUSHING was the father of guerrilla warfare in North Luzon. Owned and worked a mine in Kalinga (or Abra?) at start of war, destroyed mine on USAFFE orders and started ambushing enemy convoys on Ilocos Coast early in January, 1942. Later came under command of Col. Horan. Later fought brilliant delaying action up Abra Valley. After Horan surrendered, declined command of 121st Inf. Made trips to Manila, disguised as priest (was Mexican half-breed and spoke fluent Spanish) to contact units in South, was betrayed by Ganaps near Jones, Isabela, surrounded by Japs and killed.

COLONEL J. P. HORAN: Commanded Camp John Hay at the beginning of war, ordered to remain in Baguio. Was trapped in Baguio by Jap advance down Ilocos Coast and previously ordered destruction of Mountain Trail. Took troops out over mountains in effort to rejoin USAFFE, was unsuccessful, returned to Kiangan and disbanded troops twice, was encouraged by Iyoc and Mankayan American miners to start again. Got contact with Corregidor and was authorized to form 121st Inf. Started organizations in Mountain and Ilocos Provinces with HQ in Bontoc. Withdrew to Lubuagan behind blasted road when Japs entered Bontoc. Surrendered with Mountain Province command on General Wainwright's surrender order.

LIEUT. COLONEL WARNER, COLONEL NAKAR, Lt. COL. ENRIQUES & MAJOR MANRIQUEZ: Warner stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, incompetent and a drunkard, followed Horan's party out across mountains but went to Aritao. Met Enriquez who was organizing troops left behind by Bonnet, Mosses and Noble. Warner accepted proffered command. Got radio contact with Corregidor, authorized to organize 14th Infantry. Nakar arrived later from Ilocos Coast. Triumvirate: Enriquez did organizing, Nakar fought Japs, Warner consumed quart of whiskey per day. When the Japs entered the Cagayan Valley, Warner and Nakar and some units retired to vicinity, Jones, Isabela. Enriquez and other units retired into Western Vizcaya and Eastern Benguet. Units




re-united when Japs left Cagayan Valley for big Bataan push but again retired in same manner when Japs returned after the fall of Bataan. After this, in actuality, two 14th Infantry. Warner and part of east branch surrendered on Wainwright's order. Warner died in Bayombong jail. Nakar refused to surrender, but later captured and later reported executed. Remainder (about one company) under Major Arnold, carried on in vicinity Jones until reunited to west branch in late 1944. West branch survived, but Enriquez deserted command and voluntarily surrendered in April 1943. Major R. A. Manriquez then assumed command and still commands Regiment.

After surrender and parole, Enriquez tried to assume command of 14th Inf and of North Luzon from a soft seat in Baguio. When he discovered that no unit would accept his orders, he abandoned pretensions and started to become inside agent but was shortly apprehended and taken to Fort Santiago. Fate unknown.

MAJOR PRAEGER, CAPT. JONES AND CAPT. MINTON: Were officers of company of 26th Cav (PA), on detached service to guard Cervantes Road at the start of the war. Were cut off in Baguio and went part way over mountains with Col. Horan, but then headed north into Cagayan province. Raided Tuguegarao airport in early 1942 and later Aparri. During latter raid, Minton deserted and went to Warner's command, and latter surrendered on Wainwright's order. Praeger and Jones later withdrew to Apayao and defended sub-province against all attacks for months. Later forced further into mountains and got radio contact with Australia. His radio used by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble. Praeger and Jones betrayed and captured in August, 1943. Remnants of unit picked up by Major Blackburn in northward expansion.

MAJOR ROBERT ARNOLD: Was stationed with air-warning outfit at Cape Bojeador, Ilocos Norte, at outbreak of war, cut off by Vigan and Aparri landings. Moved southward and worked with Major Walter Cushing in earlier ambushes. Later under Horan. Later moved over to Lt. Col. Warner and later fell heir to east wing of 14th Infantry. Contacted in late 1944 and, when two branches 14th Infantry rejoined, was sent to Ilocos Norte to take command of 15th Infantry.

MAJOR PARKER CALVERT, MAJOR ARTHUR MURPHY, AND LIEUT. CRAFTON SPENCER: Were stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, went out over mountains with Lt. Col. Horan, but at Caranglan, Nueva Ecija, accepted offered permission to continue efforts to get into Bataan. Got as far south as Montalban, Rizal, but could not get into Bataan. Returned to Benguet, and picked up small detachment former Scouts and PA soldiers. Calvert and Spencer went north to contact Col. Horan but Horan surrendered before they arrived. Returned to Murphy and established small unit in East Benguet; later



- 3 -

increased by incorporations of Sgt. Velasco's unit in Kapangan and by establishment of unit in Sablan (these units now 1st Bn, 66th Inf), took part in October, 1942, offensive. East Benguet unit moved west of Mountain Trail after Jap Nov 1942 counter offensive. HQ thereafter located in Kapangan. Calvert later appointed 1st District C.O. and Murphy commanded unit. Calvert now Chief of Staff and Murphy AC of S and G-2, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON. Spencer sent to take command of 2nd Bn, 66th Inf following Baldwin's capture, killed in action, April, 1943.

GOVERNOR ABLAN AND CAPT. MADAMBA: Little specific known of their activities. Carried on activities in Ilocos Norte in 1942 and early 1943, but units broken up, Madamba captured and Ablan disappeared (believed died). Remnants of units collected by 121st Inf in expansion into Ilocos Norte. Later became 15th Inf under Major Arnold.

CAPTAIN BALDWIN: Fought in Bataan, escaped after surrender and entered and organized unit in Baguio mining area (later 2nd Bn, 66th Inf) took part in 1942 offensive (unit took and held Baguio Mining Area for 72 hours). Was captured early 1943.

CAPTS. FRENCH, LANGLEY AND SWICK: Were Baguio miners at outbreak of war but took to mountains, making one trip to Baler and Dingallen and return to eastern Benguet. Commissioned by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble in September 1942 and assigned sector between Kennon Road and Agno River. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Swick captured in early 1943 but posed as civilian and sent to Camp Holmes. French murdered and robbed by own bodyguard. Langley later captured at Imugan, Nueva Vizcaya. Unit went part to Baldwin and part to Lapham. Swick escaped Camp Holmes early part of 1943, rejoined and now assigned 11th Inf.

CAPTAIN BADO DANGWA: Owner of Dangwa Tranco at the outbreak of war. Gave all of trucks to USAFFE. Took to mountains on Jap occupation of Baguio and carried on active and passive resistance against enemy (is most influential man in Benguet). Commissioned by Lt. Col. Moses and Noble in October 1942 and unit combined with that of Molintas. Took part on October 1942 offensive. Later appointed C.O., HQ Bn., 66th Inf., (later HQ BN, USAFIP, NL) and G-4, USAFIP, NL which positions he now holds.

CAPTAIN DENNIS MOLINTAS: Was Benguet school teacher and reserve officer at the outbreak of the war, and for some time afterwards, was called to active duty by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Unit later expanded and became 3rd Bn, 66th Infantry. Succeeded Major Parker Calvert as C.O., 66th Inf., in late 1944.



LIEUT. FISH: Operated sawmill on Mountain trail at outbreak of war. Gathered small unit and ambushed Japs. Commissioned by Moses and Noble. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Captured in 1943. Unit merged with that of Capt. Molintas.

LIEUT. CHARLES CUSHING: Miner at Paracale at outbreak of war. Escaped to Manila, commissioned and sent to Bataan. Came out into Zambales with Lt. Col. Thorpe. When Thorpe holed up, crossed to San Nicolas area with J.P. O'Day. Later contacted and made a District C.O. by Thorpe but contact very poor, so came under Moses and Noble. Unit well organized for existence but made poor showing in October 1942 offensive. Voluntarily surrendered in early 1943, when contacted by native wife. Brother of Walter Cushing (see above) and of Col. James Cushing (Cebu Guerrilla).

CAPTAIN ROBERT BAPHAM: Sent into Eastern Pangasinan by Lt. Col. Thorpe but accepted command of Moses and Noble when no communication with Thorpe. Later refused to acknowledge command of USAFIP, NL or render reports. For this reason little known of subsequent activities.

CAPTAIN PERIAM AND MAJOR GEORGE BARNETT: American miners at Suyoc at outbreak of war. Commissioned by Moran. Periam sent to Ilocos Sur and Barnett to La Union to organize Bns of 121st Inf. Refused to surrender when Moran did. Periam unit not too prosperous, and Periam captured in late 1943. La Union unit prospered and went on big offensive in September 1942 but momentum was about lost when contacted by Moses and Noble for October 1942 offensive. Went thru bad surrender period in early 1943 when Major Barnett was sick but later came back and reorganized Periam's unit in Ilocos Sur and Abra and became present 121st Inf. Later expanded into Ilocos Norte, but this portion later detached to form 15th Infantry.

CAPTAIN JOHN O'DAY: Was mine superintendent at Acobe Chromite mine in Zambales at outbreak of war, worked mine until March 1942 on orders from Corregidor, then destroyed mine, stayed with Thorpe for a while then came with Chas Cushing to North Luzon where for six months almost died of dysentery. Was cured and commissioned by Lt. Chas Cushing. On Cushing's surrender, joined 121st Inf, reorganized Ilocos Sur and Abra areas and later brought Ilocos Norte under control. Was wounded in action under heroic circumstance while in Ilocos Sur. Is at present Executive Officer of 15th Inf.

LT. COLS. MOSES AND NOBLE: Commanded 11th and 12th Inf. (PA). On Ilocos Coast at outbreak of war, cut off with Lt. Col. Bennett on Ilocos Coast in late December 1941, retreated with part of units to Baguio, went over mountains to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, and reached Bataan. On fall of Bataan, escaped to




Benguet arriving in June 1942. In Sept. 1942, assumed command of all forces North Luzon and ordered general offensive for 15 October 1942. Offensive fairly successful for a while, but broken up by enemy counter-offensive in November 1942 which badly disorganized units. Made way to Apayao (or Kalinga) and contacted Australia via Major Praeger's radio in January 1943, authorized to organize 12th Infantry (now known as 66th Inf). Issued orders to all units North Luzon to lay low, gather intelligence and perfect organization. Were shortly afterwards put on the run by enemy and were captured in June 1943.

MAJOR DONALD BLACKBURN AND COL. R. W. VOLCKMANN: Escaped from Bataan and reported to Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble in Benguet in August 1942. Blackburn made signal officer and Volckmann placed in charge of three sub-sectors of Benguet for October 1942 offensive. Both move into Ifugao as result of November 1942 counter-offensive and organized that sub-province. Volckmann appointed G-2 by Moses and Noble after Australia contact and assumed command, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON after Moses and Noble capture. Volckmann moved HQ to Kapangan, Benguet, in February 1944, leaving Blackburn in command of unit in Ifugao which was later extended to include Bontoc and Kalinga. Blackburn authorized to expand into Apayao and Cagayan when it was established that Major Praeger could not be contacted in that area. Blackburn at present C.O. 11th Infantry, having extended control over all of Apayao and over most of Cagayan.

Second Phase

The history of the second phase of the USAFIP NORTH LUZON can best be told by listing the difficulties that were placed and the manner in which they were met.

L. COMMUNICATIONS: It was the lack of a good system of communications that, until June 1943, had made North Luzon still a group of widely scattered units with very little central control. Communications were passed along from one unit to another in a haphazard manner and occasional travelers were the only means of getting communications across areas in which there were no units. In June 1943, there was established the beginning of a network of runner relay stations that now covers all of North Luzon. Mail or supplies or personnel can now be sent between any two points in North Luzon by the most direct routes in the minimum time. For example the average time for a RUSH message to go from the present HQ of this command to the HQ of each of its regiments is as follows: to HQ 121st Inf (La Union) 4 hours; to HQ 66th Inf (Benguet) 15 hours; to HQ 14th Infantry (Nueva Vizcaya), 3 days; to HQ 15th Infantry (Ilocos Norte) 6 days; to HQ 11th Infantry (Cagayan), 6 days. In fact, for the




greater amount of communications with the 121st Infantry and 66th Infantry, the runner communication system has proven faster than radio.

2. INTELLIGENCE: In February, 1943, Lt. Col. Moses, at that time CO, USAFIP, NL, established radio contact with the GHQ SWPA and received orders to cease active resistance against the enemy and to gather and submit intelligence. Col. Moses transmitted these orders to all units of his command and appointed R.W. Volckmann as G-2. Due to the poor communications existing at the time, these orders did not reach all units until late in April 1943. Intelligence work got started very slowly for the following reasons: the inclusion of the entire island of Luzon for intelligence coverage; poor communications; unwillingness, and in some case inability, of units to subordinate activity against the enemy to the less exciting task of intelligence work; almost complete lack of training and written material regarding intelligence work; the fact that most intelligence work had to be done by military personnel, a great many of whom were wanted by the enemy; the necessity of inculcating habits of accurate and methodical observation and collection of information in personnel whose civilian habits are quite the reverse.

When Maj. Volckmann assumed command of USAFIP, NL following the capture of Lt. Col. Moses in June 1943, he appointed Actg. Major Parker Culvert as G-2 with Major Arthur Murphy as Assistant G-2. The compilation of a monthly G-2 report covering all of Luzon was commenced. As radio communication with GHQ SWPA had gone out following the capture of Col. Moses, efforts were made to forward these reports through each and every channel that offered the slightest chance of getting them to GHQ SWPA. A great improvement was noted when district COs were given a standard form for the submission of monthly S-2 reports regarding their areas. The greater majority of coverage areas outside of Northern Luzon was handled by GHQ USAFIP NL. Training was achieved by letters of criticism and suggestions on reports received. Efforts were also made to find some one who could build a radio transmitter from the considerable collection of parts that we had commandeered. Major Murphy was appointed G-2 in February 1944.

Late in August 1944 there was received through another unit a copy of a guide that was substantially the same as the "Philippine Intelligence Guide" issued by GHQ SWPA. Due to the fact that this guide indicated that GHQ SWPA desired a much more comprehensive and detailed intelligence coverage than this Hq had previously felt necessary or capable of handling, the intelligence-procedure was altered through GO No. 12 of this HQ, dated 7 August 1944. It was decided to abandon the attempt to cover the whole of Luzon. It was decided to obtain most of intelligence through agents rather than military personnel--though the direction of such personnel would be done by military personnel. More frequent reports were required.



In practice the majority of intelligence work and training of intelligence personnel is done by the various districts and Bns of USAFIP NL. The District and Bn COS and their S-2s are right on the ground. They are in the best position to obtain and supervise agents and to classify and organize the information received regarding their own areas. Agents of this HQ are used only to occasionally check conflicting or improbable reports and in a liaison capacity to assist District COs in areas they are having difficulty in working. Due to the distances involved, the greater part of training from this HQ takes the form of letters of criticism and suggestion. This HQ distributes copies of intelligence materials, which are now beginning to be received, renders such monetary aid for intelligence work, as it can to poor districts, exercises general supervision over the work of the Districts and prepares reports for GHQ SWPA. Of late it has also done considerable work in translating enemy documents and papers received from districts, a pro-american Jap prisoner being used for the purpose.

3. MORALE: Late 1942 and early 1943 were low points in the morale of our officers and men, and, in the disorganization following the enemy counter-offensive in late 1942, large numbers of officers and men began to surrender with their weapons. Drastic and immediate measures were necessary. An order was issued making it punishable by death for any officer or man to voluntarily surrender to the enemy or allow himself to be captured thru his own negligence; or for any person to advise a soldier to surrender or for any person to surrender to the enemy any army weapon or ammunition. The remedy worked. Until quite recently, USAFIP NORTH LUZON has been composed entirely of unsurrendered officers and men (plus a few Bataan men who agreed to break their parole fully and completely). During the past few months, due to acute shortage of personnel with administrative ability or other special qualifications, the bars have been let down somewhat. However, the officers and men of this organization who stuck it out during the tough times still look with scorn on the new arrivals who were living in comparative safety during those days.

4. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE AND KEEPING CIVILIANS LOYAL: The enemy, finding that he could not combat us by his efforts alone, began to use large numbers of spies and to obtain information by torture. This was met by making it punishable by death to give information to the enemy whether under coercion or not. Likewise, loyal civilians were made responsible for reporting and, wherever possible, apprehending suspected enemy agents. Very little trouble was encountered in keeping the mass of the civilians loyal in areas in which we had forces from the early days of the war. It was only when expansion into new areas was begun that cases of entire communities being pro-Jap were encountered. In some of these instances, heroic measures were necessary. In general, it was found that the people followed their leaders and suitable measures were applied to these

RECEIVED
8 SEP 1952

leaders. Radio news and propaganda was given wide circulation thru the communications system mentioned above.

5. TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE: In the early days of USAFIP, NORTH LUZON, members of units lived in their home barrios for purposes of concealment from the enemy. However, it was found that little or no training or discipline could be accomplished in this matter. Soon, however, the 121st Infantry took at that time bold step of moving their entire units into hidden company or platoon camps whose chief protection was in their control over the surrounding areas and knowledge of the enemy's habits. When it was found that the dividends in training and discipline far outweighed the occasional losses attendant upon a camp being found, all units in North Luzon were ordered to move their men into camps and there conduct regular training schedules. Another training problem was in the transition from theoretical knowledge to practical application. This was met by assigning to each unit occasional limited objective attacks in order to get the men over their battle shyness. It must be admitted that some units were so successful in their "examinations" that thereafter there was great difficulty in keeping them obedient to the "lay low" order.

6. SUPPLY: a. Food supply was never a great problem. Units naturally grew up in the food producing areas, and always used these areas as bases of operations. Loyal civilians always shared what food was available and accepted our receipts without question. Likewise, there was never a shortage of money (war notes) for any supplies or activities for which it was needed. With these, it was possible to purchase whatever supplies that could not be obtained from civilians on receipt.

b. Arms and Ammunition Supplies: When in 1941, the tide of the enemy advance rolled past North Luzon, there was a large quantity of these items left on the battle fields or discarded by disbanded soldiers. Most of this was collected initially by civilians. Thereafter, our problem was to collect it from the civilians and to prevent the enemy from getting it first. The first was accomplished by thorough and untiring effort - men have spent weeks, tracking down one rifle. The second was accomplished as outlined above. After the limited objective attacks were started, arms and ammunitions were obtained from BC or Japs by ambushing raids.

c. Clothing: This problem was met by purchasing what clothing as was possible and doing without the rest of the time.

7. MEDICAL CARE: Until very recently, USAFIP NL units had few, and in many cases no, doctors - these hopped on the band wagon in large numbers only after the war had turned unmistakably in favor of the United Nations. However, plans were made in advance for medical care for all units, hospitals were built and a campaign for securing medicines was started. Then was set out to get doctors- kidnapping them when necessary.

RECEIVED
 SEP 1952
 ARCHIVES
 AGRD

Complete medical and hospital service is now being administered to all members of this command.

8. CONTACT WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: After Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble were captured, it was not certain whether Major Praeger's radio was still in existence or not. While every effort was being made to contact Praeger, efforts were likewise made to acquire necessary parts and personnel to put another radio in operation. Radio parts of all kinds were secured from all over Luzon but difficulty was encountered in finding a man who could put them together. Finally two radio technicians were secured from Manila and a radio was put into operation. Power was secured from a home-made 220-volt hydro-electric plant. While the above efforts were made, other efforts were made to contact Higher Headquarters thru other units to the south but with little success, as when contact was finally made through Major Bernard L. Anderson, our radio was already in operation.

9. EXPANSION: When Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble contacted Australia, USAFIP, NL was assigned all of Luzon north of the line Lingayan (Pangasinan)-San Jose (N. Eclija). In the latter part of 1943, this area was divided as follows:

- 1st District - Benguet - 66th Infantry
- 2nd District - La Union and Ilocos Sur - 121st Infantry
- 3rd District - Abra and Ilocos Norte - Gov. Ablan and Capt. Madamba's units (to become part of the 121st Infantry)
- 4th District - Apayao and Cagayan - Maj. Praeger's units.
- 5th District - Isabela and Vizcaya - 14th Infantry
- 6th District - Nueva Eclija and Northern Pangasinan - Capt. Lapham's units.
- 7th District - Ifugao, Bontoc, and Kalinga - Units of Col. Volekman and Major Blackburn.

However, all of these areas were not at the time under control. Also, some of the information upon which the decision was based, proved to be erroneous. Therefore, the following expansions were made:

(1) The 14th Infantry expanded into Isabela and contacted remnants of the "long lost" east branch of the 14th Inf.

(2) Bontoc and Kalinga were occupied.

(3) When it was found that Ablan's and Madamba's units had ceased to function in Ilocos Norte, the 121st Infantry expanded into Ilocos Norte from Ilocos Sur and Abra. Units in Ilocos Norte and northern Abra were later reorganized into the 15th Infantry.

(4) When it was found that Praeger's units had ceased to

RECEIVED
 8 SEP 1952
 ARCHIVED
 AGRD

function in Apayao and Cagayan, the 4th and 7th Districts were combined, the 11th Infantry authorized, and a rapid expansion from the 7th District into the 4th District was begun. This expansion is now almost complete.

(5) When Capt. Robert Lapham refused to accept the authority of this HQ, the 66th Infantry was authorized to expand southward into northeast Pangasinan and the 121st Infantry was authorized to expand into Northwest Pangasinan. At the time of the landing the 66th had one company and the 121st Infantry had about one company plus one platoon in Pangasinan.

WALTER GUBINSKI was the father of guerrilla warfare in North Luzon. Gained and worked a mine in Kalinga (or Abra) at start of war, destroyed mine on USAPF orders and started organizing army convoys on Ilocos coast early in January, 1942. Late came under command of Col. Moran. Later fought brilliant delaying action up Abra Valley. After Moran surrendered, he eluded command of 121st Inf. Made trip to Manila, disguised as priest (was Mexican half-breed and spoke fluent Spanish) in contact with units in South, was betrayed by Captain near Pinar, Ilocos, surrounded by Japs and killed.

COLONEL J. F. MORAN: Commanded 6th Div from start of war to beginning of war, ordered to remain in Baguio. Was trapped in Baguio by Jap advance from Ilocos coast and previously ordered destruction of Mountain Trail. Took troops out over mountains in effort to rejoin GUBINSKI, was unsuccessful, returned to Ilocos and disbanded troops twice. Was encouraged by GUBINSKI and other American soldiers to start again. Got contact with GUBINSKI and was authorized to form 121st Inf. Started operations in Mountain and Ilocos Provinces with HQ in Baguio. Fought battle in Ilocos which cleared road when Japs entered Baguio. Surrendered with Mountain Province command on Moran's surrender order.

COLONEL BARNER, COLONEL BARNER, LT. COL. BARNER: A Major in 1941. Stationed at Camp 2, Ilocos Sur at outbreak of war, incompetent and a drunkard, followed Moran's party out across mountains but failed to arrive. Got GUBINSKI and was organized into 121st Inf. by GUBINSKI, Moran and BARNER. BARNER was authorized to organize 121st Infantry. BARNER arrived later than GUBINSKI. BARNER did organizing, BARNER fought Japs, BARNER consumed most of whiskey for Japs. When the Japs entered the Cagayan Valley, BARNER and Moran and some units retired to vicinity, Jones, Franklin. BARNER was captured into Western Visayas and Eastern Luzon.

RECEIVED
8 SEP 1952

**SHORT HISTORY, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON AND GUERRILLA
ACTIVITIES IN NORTH LUZON.**Foreword

Guerrilla organization and activities in North Luzon went thru two phases: the phase in which individual units grew up and the phase in which USAFIP, NORTH LUZON grew into a unified organization. The history of the first phase can best be told in the history of the leaders of the various groups.

First Phase

WALTER CUSHING was the father of guerrilla warfare in North Luzon. Owned and worked a mine in Kalinga (or Abra?) at start of war, destroyed mine on USAFFE orders and started ambushing enemy convoys on Ilocos Coast early in January, 1942. Late came under command of Col. Horan. Later fought brilliant delaying action up Abra Valley. After Horan surrendered, declined command of 121st Inf. Made trips to Manila, disguised as priest (was Mexican half-breed and spoke fluent Spanish) to contact units in South, was betrayed by Ganaps near Jones, Isabela, surrounded by Japs and killed.

COLONEL J. P. HORAN: Commanded Camp John Hay at the beginning of war, ordered to remain in Baguio. Was trapped in Baguio by Jap advance down Ilocos Coast and previously ordered destruction of Mountain Trail. Took troops out over mountains in effort to rejoin USAFFE, was unsuccessful, returned to Kiangnan and disbanded troops twice, was encouraged by Suyoc and Manayan American miners to start again. Got contact with Corregidor and was authorized to form 121st Inf. Started organizations in Mountain and Ilocos Provinces with HQ in Bontoc. Withdrew to Lubuagan behind blasted road when Japs entered Bontoc. Surrendered with Mountain Province command on General Wainwright's surrender order.

LIEUT. COLONEL WARNER, COLONEL NAKAR, LT. COL. ENRIQUES & MAJOR MARRIQUEZ: Warner stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, incompetent and a drunkard, followed Horan's party out across mountains but went to Aritao. Met Enriquez who was organizing troops left behind by Bonnet, Mosses and Noble. Warner accepted proffered command. Got radio contact with Corregidor, authorized to organize 14th Infantry. Nakar arrived later from Ilocos Coast. Triumvirate: Enriquez did organizing, Nakar fought Japs, Warner consumed quart of whiskey per day. When the Japs entered the Cagayan Valley, Warner and Nakar and some units retired to vicinity, Jones, Isabela. Enriquez and other units retired into Western Visaya and Eastern Benguet. Units



- 2 -

re-united when Japs left Cagayan Valley for big Bataan push but again retired in same manner when Japs returned after the fall of Bataan. After this, in actuality, two 14th Infantry. Warner and part of east branch surrendered on Wainwright's order. Warner died in Bayombong jail. Nakar refused to surrender, but later captured and later reported executed. Remainder (about one company) under Major Arnold, carried on in vicinity Jones until reunited to west branch in late 1944. West branch survived, but Enriquez deserted command and voluntarily surrendered in April 1943. Major R. A. Manriquez then assumed command and still commands Regiment.

After surrender and parole, Enriquez tried to assume command of 14th Inf and of North Luzon from a soft seat in Baguio. When he discovered that no unit would accept his orders, he abandoned pretensions and started to become inside agent but was shortly apprehended and taken to Fort Santiago. Fate unknown.

MAJOR PRAEGER, CAPT. JONES AND CAPT. MINTON: Were officers of company of 26th Cav (PSC), on detached service to guard Cervantes Road at the start of the war. Were cut off in Baguio and went part way over mountains with Col. Horan, but then headed north into Cagayan province. Raided Tuguegarao airport in early 1942 and later Aparri. During latter raid, Minton deserted and went to Warner's command, and latter surrendered on Wainwright's order. Praeger and Jones later withdrew to Apayao and defended sub-province against all attacks for months. Later forced further into mountains and got radio contact with Australia. His radio used by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble. Praeger and Jones betrayed and captured in August, 1943. Remnants of unit picked up by Major Blackburn in northward expansion.

MAJOR ROBERT ARNOLD: Was stationed with air-warning outfit at Cape Bojeador, Ilocos Norte, at outbreak of war, cut off by Vigan and Aparri landings. Moved southward and worked with Major Walter Cushing in earlier ambushes. Later under Horan. Later moved over to Lt. Col. Warner and later fell heir to east wing of 14th Infantry. Contacted in late 1944 and, when two branches 14th Infantry rejoined, was sent to Ilocos Norte to take command of 15th Infantry.

MAJOR PARKER CALVERT, MAJOR ARTHUR MURPHY, AND LIEUT. CRAFTON SPENCER: Were stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, went out over mountains with Lt. Col. Horan, but at Caranglan, Nueva Ecija, accepted offered permission to continue efforts to get into Bataan. Got as far south as Montalban, Rizal, but could not get into Bataan. Returned to Benguet, and picked up small detachment former Scouts and PA soldiers. Calvert and Spencer went north to contact Col. Horan but Horan surrendered before they arrived. Returned to Murphy and established small unit in East Benguet, later



increased by incorporations of Sgt. Velasco's unit in Kapangan and by establishment of unit in Sablan (these units now 1st Bn, 66th Inf), took part in October, 1942, offensive. East Benguet unit moved west of Mountain Trail after Jap Nov 1942 counter offensive. HQ thereafter located in Kapangan. Calvert later appointed 1st District C.O. and Murphy commanded unit. Calvert now Chief of Staff and Murphy AG of S and G-2, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON. Spencer sent to take command of 2nd Bn, 66th Inf following Baldwin's capture, killed in action, April, 1943.

GOVERNOR ABLAN AND CAPT. MADAMBA: Little specific known of their activities. Carried on activities in Ilocos Norte in 1942 and early 1943, but units broken up, Madamba captured and Ablan disappeared (believed died). Remnants of units collected by 121st Inf in expansion into Ilocos Norte. Later became 15th Inf under Major Arnold.

CAPTAIN BALDWIN: Fought in Bataan, escaped after surrender and entered and organized unit in Baguio mining area (later 2nd Bn, 66th Inf) took part in 1942 offensive (unit took and held Baguio Mining Area for 72 hours). Was captured early 1943.

CAPTS. FRENCH, LANGLEY AND SWICK: Were Baguio miners at outbreak of war but took to mountains, making one trip to Baler and Dingallen and return to eastern Benguet. Commissioned by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble in September 1942 and assigned sector between Kennon Road and Agno River. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Swick captured in early 1943 but posed as civilian and sent to Camp Holmes. French murdered and robbed by own bodyguard. Langley later captured at Imugan, Nueva Vizcaya. Unit went part to Baldwin and part to Lapham. Swick escaped Camp Holmes early part of 1943, rejoined and now assigned 11th Inf.

CAPTAIN BADO DANGWA: Owner of Dangwa Franco at the outbreak of war. Gave all of trucks to USAFFE. Took to mountains on Jap occupation of Baguio and carried on active and passive resistance against enemy (is most influential man in Benguet). Commissioned by Lt. Col. Moses and Noble in October 1942 and unit combined with that of Molintas. Took part on October 1942 offensive. Later appointed C.O., HQ Bn., 66th Inf., (later HQ BN, USAFIP, NL) and G-4, USAFIP, NL which positions he now holds.

CAPTAIN DENNIS MOLINTAS: Was Benguet school teacher and reserve officer at the outbreak of the war, and for some time afterwards, was called to active duty by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Unit later expanded and became 3rd Bn, 66th Infantry. Succeeded Major Parker Calvert as C.O., 66th Inf., in late 1944.



LIEUT. FISH: Operated sawmill on Mountain Trail at outbreak of war. Gathered small unit and ambushed Japs. Commissioned by Moses and Noble. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Captured in 1943. Unit merged with that of Capt. Molintas.


LIEUT. CHARLES CUSHING: Miner at Paracale at outbreak of war. Escaped to Manila, commissioned and sent to Bataan. Came out into Zambales with Lt. Col. Thorpe. When Thorpe holed up, crossed to San Nicolas area with J.P. O'Day. Later contacted and made a District C.O. by Thorpe but contact very poor, so came under Moses and Noble. Unit well organized for existence but made poor showing in October 1942 offensive. Voluntarily surrendered in early 1943, when contacted by native wife. Brother of Walter Cushing (see above) and of Col. James Cushing (Cebu Guerrilla).

CAPTAIN ROBERT BAPHAM: Sent into Eastern Pangasinan by Lt. Col. Thorpe but accepted command of Moses and Noble when no communication with Thorpe. Later refused to acknowledge command of USAFIP, NL or render reports. For this reason little known of subsequent activities.

CAPTAIN PERIAM AND MAJOR GEORGE BARNETT: American miners at Suyoc at outbreak of war. Commissioned by H. O. an. Periam sent to Ilocos Sur and Barnett to La Union to organize Bns of 121st Inf. Refused to surrender when H. O. an did. Periam unit not too prosperous, and Periam captured in late 1943. La Union unit prospered and went on big offensive in September 1942 but momentum was about lost when contacted by Moses and Noble for October 1942 offensive. Went thru bad surrender period in early 1943 when Major Barnett was sick but later came back and reorganized Periam's unit in Ilocos Sur and Abra and became present 121st Inf. Later expanded into Ilocos Norte, but this portion later detached to form 15th Infantry.

CAPTAIN JOHN O'DAY: Was mine superintendent at Acohe Chromite mine in Zambales at outbreak of war, worked mine until March 1942 on orders from Corregidor, then destroyed mine, stayed with Thorpe for a while then came with Chas Cushing to North Luzon where for six months almost died of dysentery. Was cured and commissioned by Lt. Chas Cushing. On Cushing's surrender, joined 121st Inf, reorganized Ilocos Sur and Abra areas and later brought Ilocos Norte under control. Was wounded in action under heroic circumstance while in Ilocos Sur. Is at present Executive Officer of 15th Inf.

LT. COLS. MOSES AND NOBLE: Commanded 11th and 12th Inf. (PA). On Ilocos Coast at outbreak of war, cut off with Lt. Col. Bennett on Ilocos Coast in late December 1941, retreated with part of units to Baguio, went over mountains to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, and reached Bataan. On fall of Bataan, escaped to



Benguet arriving in June 1942. In Sept. 1942, assumed command of all forces North Luzon and ordered general offensive for 15 October 1942. Offensive fairly successful for a while, but broken up by enemy counter-offensive in November 1942 which badly disorganized units. Made way to Apayao (or Kalinga) and contacted Australia via Major Praeger's radio in January 1943, authorized to organize 12th Infantry (now known as 66th Inf). Issued orders to all units North Luzon to lay low, gather intelligence and perfect organization. Were shortly afterwards put on the run by enemy and were captured in June 1943.

MAJOR DONALD BLACKBURN AND COL. R. W. VOLCKMANN: Escaped from Bataan and reported to Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble in Benguet in August 1942. Blackburn made signal officer and Volckmann placed in charge of three sub-sectors of Benguet for October 1942 offensive. Both move into Ifugao as result of November 1942 counter-offensive and organized that sub-province. Volckmann appointed G-2 by Moses and Noble after Australia contact and assumed command, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON after Moses and Noble capture. Volckmann moved HQ to Kepangan, Benguet, in February 1944, leaving Blackburn in command of unit in Ifugao which was later extended to include Bontoc and Kalinga. Blackburn authorized to expand into Apayao and Cagayan when it was established that Major Praeger could not be contacted in that area. Blackburn at present C.O. 11th Infantry, having extended control over all of Apayao and over most of Cagayan.

Second Phase

The history of the second phase of the USAFIP NORTH LUZON can best be told by listing the difficulties that were placed and the manner in which they were met.

L. COMMUNICATIONS: It was the lack of a good system of communications that, until June 1943, had made North Luzon still a group of widely scattered units with very little central control. Communications were passed along from one unit to another in a haphazard manner and occasional travelers were the only means of getting communications across areas in which there were no units. In June 1943, there was established the beginning of a network of runner relay stations that now covers all of North Luzon. Mail or supplies or personnel can now be sent between any two points in North Luzon by the most direct routes in the minimum time. For example the average time for a RUSH message to go from the present HQ of this command to the HQ of each of its regiments is as follows: to HQ 121st Inf (La Union) 4 hours; to HQ 66th Inf (Benguet) 15 hours; to HQ 14th Infantry (Nueva Vizcaya), 3 days; to HQ 15th Infantry (Ilocos Norte) 6 days; to HQ 11th Infantry (Cagayan), 6 days. In fact, for the



greater amount of communications with the 121st Infantry and 66th Infantry, the runner communication system has proven faster than radio.

2. INTELLIGENCE: In February, 1943, Lt. Col. Moses, at that time CO, USAFIP, NL, established radio contact with the GHQ SWPA and received orders to cease active resistance against the enemy and to gather and submit intelligence. Col. Moses transmitted these orders to all units of his command and appointed R.W. Volckmann as G-2. Due to the poor communications existing at the time, these orders did not reach all units until late in April 1943. Intelligence work got started very slowly for the following reasons: the inclusion of the entire island of Luzon for intelligence coverage; poor communications; unwillingness, and in some case inability, of units to subordinate activity against the enemy to the less exciting task of intelligence work; almost complete lack of training and written material regarding intelligence work; the fact that most intelligence work had to be done by military personnel, a great many of whom were wanted by the enemy; the necessity of inculcating habits of accurate and methodical observation and collection of information in personnel whose civilian habits are quite the reverse.

When Maj. Volckmann assumed command of USAFIP, NL following the capture of Lt. Col. Moses in June 1943, he appointed Actg. Major Parker Culvert as G-2 with Major Arthur Murphy as Assistant G-2. The compilation of a monthly G-2 report covering all of Luzon was commenced. As radio communication with GHQ SWPA had gone out following the capture of Col. Moses, efforts were made to forward these reports through each and every channel that offered the slightest chance of getting them to GHQ SWPA. A great improvement was noted when district COs were given a standard form for the submission of monthly S-2 reports regarding their areas. The greater majority of coverage areas outside of Northern Luzon was handled by GHQ USAFIP NL. Training was achieved by letters of criticism and suggestions on reports received. Efforts were also made to find some one who could build a radio transmitter from the considerable collection of parts that we had commandeered. Major Murphy was appointed G-2 in February 1944.

Late in August 1944 there was received through another unit a copy of a guide that was substantially the same as the "Philippine Intelligence Guide" issued by GHQ SWPA. Due to the fact that this guide indicated that GHQ SWPA desired a much more comprehensive and detailed intelligence coverage than this Hq had previously felt necessary or capable of handling, the intelligence-procedure was altered through GO No. 12 of this HQ, dated 7 August 1944. It was decided to abandon the attempt to cover the whole of Luzon. It was decided to obtain most of intelligence through agents rather than military personnel--though the direction of such personnel would be done by military personnel. More frequent reports were required.

- 7 -

In practice the majority of intelligence work and training of intelligence personnel is done by the various districts and Bns of USAFIP NL. The District and Bn COs and their S-2s are right on the ground. They are in the best position to obtain and supervise agents and to classify and organize the information received regarding their own areas. Agents of this HQ are used only to occasionally check conflicting or improbable reports and in a liaison capacity to assist District COs in areas they are having difficulty in working. Due to the distances involved, the greater part of training from this HQ takes the form of letters of criticism and suggestion. This HQ distributes copies of intelligence materials, which are now beginning to be received, renders such monetary aid for intelligence work, as it can to poor districts, exercises general supervision over the work of the Districts and prepares reports for GHQ SWPA. Of late it has also done considerable work in translating enemy documents and papers received from districts, a pro-American Jap prisoner being used for the purpose.

3. MORALE: Late 1942 and early 1943 were low points in the morale of our officers and men, and, in the disorganization following the enemy counter-offensive in late 1942, large numbers of officers and men began to surrender with their weapons. Drastic and immediate measures were necessary. An order was issued making it punishable by death for any officer or man to voluntarily surrender to the enemy or allow himself to be captured thru his own negligence; or for any person to advise a soldier to surrender or for any person to surrender to the enemy any army weapon or ammunition. The remedy worked. Until quite recently, USAFIP NORTH LUZON has been composed entirely of unsurrendered officers and men (plus a few Bataan men who agreed to break their parole fully and completely). During the past few months, due to acute shortage of personnel with administrative ability or other special qualifications, the bars have been let down somewhat. However, the officers and men of this organization who stuck it out during the tough times still look with scorn on the new arrivals who were living in comparative safety during those days.

4. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE AND KEEPING CIVILIANS LOYAL: The enemy, finding that he could not combat us by his efforts alone, began to use large numbers of spies and to obtain information by torture. This was met by making it punishable by death to give information to the enemy whether under coercion or not. Likewise, loyal civilians were made responsible for reporting and, wherever possible, apprehending suspected enemy agents. Very little trouble was encountered in keeping the mass of the civilians loyal in areas in which we had forces from the early days of the war. It was only when expansion into new areas was begun that cases of entire communities being pro-Jap were encountered. In some of these instances, heroic measures were necessary. In general, it was found that the people followed their leaders and suitable measures were applied to these



leaders. Radio news and propaganda was given wide circulation thru the communications system mentioned above.

5. TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE: In the early days of USAFIP, NORTH LUZON, members of units lived in their home barrios for purposes of concealment from the enemy. However, it was found that little or no training or discipline could be accomplished in this matter. Soon, however, the 121st Infantry took at that time bold step of moving their entire units into hidden company or platoon camps whose chief protection was in their control over the surrounding areas and knowledge of the enemy's habits. When it was found that the dividends in training and discipline far outweighed the occasional losses attendant upon a camp being found, all units in North Luzon were ordered to move their men into camps and there conduct regular training schedules. Another training problem was in the transition from theoretical knowledge to practical application. This was met by assigning to each unit occasional limited objective attacks in order to get the men over their battle shyness. It must be admitted that some units were so successful in their "examinations" that thereafter there was great difficulty in keeping them obedient to the "lay low" order.

6. SUPPLY: a. Food supply was never a great problem. Units naturally grew up in the food producing areas, and always used these areas as bases of operations. Loyal civilians always shared what food was available and accepted our receipts without question. Likewise, there was never a shortage of money (war notes) for any supplies or activities for which it was needed. With these, it was possible to purchase whatever supplies that could not be obtained from civilians on receipt.

b. Arms and Ammunition Supplies: When in 1941, the tide of the enemy advance rolled past North Luzon, there was a large quantity of these items left on the battle fields or discarded by disbanded soldiers. Most of this was collected initially by civilians. Thereafter, our problem was to collect it from the civilians and to prevent the enemy from getting it first. The first was accomplished by thorough and untiring effort - men have spent weeks, tracking down one rifle. The second was accomplished as outlined above. After the limited objective attacks were started, arms and ammunitions were obtained from BC or Japs by ambushing raids.

c. Clothing: This problem was met by purchasing what clothing as was possible and doing without the rest of the time.

7. MEDICAL CARE: Until very recently, USAFIP, NL units had few, and in many cases no, doctors - these hopped on the band wagon in large numbers only after the war had turned unmistakably in favor of the United Nations. However, plans were made in advance for medical care for all units, hospitals were built and a campaign for securing medicines was started. Then was set out to get doctors- kidnapping them when necessary.



Complete medical and hospital service is now being administered to all members of this command.

8. CONTACT WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: After Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble were captured, it was not certain whether Major Praeger's radio was still in existence or not. While every effort was being made to contact Praeger, efforts were likewise made to acquire necessary parts and personnel to put another radio in operation. Radio parts of all kinds were secured from all over Luzon but difficulty was encountered in finding a man who could put them together. Finally two radio technicians were secured from Manila and a radio was put into operation. Power was secured from a home-made 220-volt hydro-electric plant. While the above efforts were made, other efforts were made to contact Higher Headquarters thru other units to the south but with little success, as when contact was finally made through Major Bernard L. Anderson, our radio was already in operation.

9. EXPANSION: When Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble contacted Australasia, USAFIP, NL was assigned all of Luzon north of the line Lingayen (Pangasinan)-San Jose (N. Ecija). In the latter part of 1943, this area was divided as follows:

- 1st District - Benguet - 66th Infantry
- 2nd District - La Union and Ilocos Sur - 121st Infantry
- 3rd District - Abra and Ilocos Norte - Gov. Ablan and Capt. Madamba's units (to become part of the 121st Infantry)
- 4th District - Apayao and Cagayan - Maj. Praeger's units.
- 5th District - Isabela and Vizcaya - 14th Infantry
- 6th District - Nueva Ecija and Northern Pangasinan - Capt. Lapham's units.
- 7th District - Ifugao, Bontoc, and Kalinga - Units of Col. Volckmann and Major Blackburn.

However, all of these areas were not at the time under control. Also, some of the information upon which the decision was based, proved to be erroneous. Therefore, the following expansions were made:

- (1) The 14th Infantry expanded into Isabela and contacted remnants of the "long lost" east branch of the 14th Inf.
- (2) Bontoc and Kalinga were occupied.
- (3) When it was found that Ablan's and Madamba's units had ceased to function in Ilocos Norte, the 121st Infantry expanded into Ilocos Norte from Ilocos Sur and Abra. Units in Ilocos Norte and northern Abra were later reorganized into the 15th Infantry.
- (4) When it was found that Praeger's units had ceased to



SHORT HISTORY, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON AND GUERRILLA
ACTIVITIES IN NORTH LUZON

Foreword

Guerrilla organization and activities in North Luzon went thru two phases: the phase in which individual units grew up and the phase in which USAFIP, NORTH LUZON grew into a unified organization. The history of the first phase can best be told in the history of the leaders of the various groups.

First Phase

WALTER CUSHING was the father of guerrilla warfare in North Luzon. Owned and worked a mine in Kalinga (or Abra?) at start of war, destroyed mine on USAFFE orders and started ambushing enemy convoys on Ilocos Coast early in January, 1942. Late came under command of Col. Horan. Later fought brilliant delaying action up Abra Valley. After Horan surrendered, declined command of 121st Inf. Made trips to Manila, disguised as priest (was Mexican half-breed and spoke fluent Spanish) to contact units in South, was betrayed by Ganaps near Jones, Isabela, surrounded by Japs and killed.

COLONEL J. P. HORAN: Commanded Camp John Hay at the beginning of war, ordered to remain in Baguio. Was trapped in Baguio by Jap advance down Ilocos Coast and previously ordered destruction of Mountain Trail. Took troops out over mountains in effort to rejoin USAFFE, was unsuccessful, returned to Kiangnan and disbanded troops twice, was encouraged by Suyoc and Mankayan American miners to start again. Got contact with Corregidor and was authorized to form 121st Inf. Started organizations in Mountain and Ilocos Provinces with HQ in Bontoc. Withdrew to Lubuagan behind blasted road when Japs entered Bontoc. Surrendered with Mountain Province command on General Wainwright's surrender order.

LIEUT. COLONEL WARNER, COLONEL NAKAR, LT. COL. ENRIQUES & MAJOR MANRIQUEZ: Warner stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, incompetent and a drunkard, followed Horan's party out across mountains but went to Aritao. Met Enriquez who was organizing troops left behind by Bonnet, Mosses and Noble. Warner accepted proffered command. Got radio contact with Corregidor, authorized to organize 14th Infantry. Nakar arrived later from Ilocos Coast. Triumvirate: Enriquez did organizing, Nakar fought Japs, Warner consumed quart of whiskey per day. When the Japs entered the Cagayan Valley, Warner and Nakar and some units retired to vicinity, Jones, Isabela. Enriquez and other units retired into Western Viscaya and Eastern Benguet. Units

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 883078

8 SEP 1952

- 2 -

re-united when Japs left Cagayan Valley for big Bataan push but again retired in same manner when Japs returned after the fall of Bataan. After this, in actuality, two 14th Infantry. Warner and part of east branch surrendered on Wainwright's order. Warner died in Bayombong jail. Nakar refused to surrender, but later captured and later reported executed. Remainder (about one company) under Major Arnold, carried on in vicinity Jones until reunited to west branch in late 1944. West branch survived, but Enriquez deserted command and voluntarily surrendered in April 1943. Major R. A. Manriquez then assumed command and still commands Regiment.

After surrender and parole, Enriquez tried to assume command of 14th Inf and of North Luzon from a soft seat in Baguio. When he discovered that no unit would accept his orders, he abandoned pretensions and started to become inside agent but was shortly apprehended and taken to Fort Santiago. Fate unknown.

MAJOR PRAEGER, CAPT. JONES AND CAPT. MINTON: Were officers of company of 26th Cav (PSC), on detached service to guard Cervantes Road at the start of the war. Were cut off in Baguio and went part way over mountains with Col. Horan, but then headed north into Cagayan province. Raided Tuguegarao airport in early 1942 and later Aparri. During latter raid, Minton deserted and went to Warner's command, and latter surrendered on Wainwright's order. Praeger and Jones later withdrew to Apayao and defended sub-province against all attacks for months. Later forced further into mountains and got radio contact with Australia. His radio used by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble. Praeger and Jones betrayed and captured in August, 1943. Remnants of unit picked up by Major Blackburn in northward expansion.

MAJOR ROBERT ARNOLD: Was stationed with air-warning outfit at Cape Bojeador, Ilocos Norte, at outbreak of war, cut off by Vigan and Aparri landings. Moved southward and worked with Major Walter Cushing in earlier ambushes. Later under Horan. Later moved over to Lt. Col. Warner and later fell heir to east wing of 14th Infantry. Contacted in late 1944 and, when two branches 14th Infantry rejoined, was sent to Ilocos Norte to take command of 15th Infantry.

MAJOR PARKER CALVERT, MAJOR ARTHUR MURPHY, AND LIEUT. CRAFTON SPENCER: Were stationed at Camp John Hay at outbreak of war, went out over mountains with Lt. Col. Horan, but at Caranglan, Nueva Ecija, accepted offered permission to continue efforts to get into Bataan. Got as far south as Montalban, Rizal, but could not get into Bataan. Returned to Benguet, and picked up small detachment former Scouts and PA soldiers. Calvert and Spencer went north to contact Col. Horan but Horan surrendered before they arrived. Returned to Murphy and established small unit in East Benguet, later

increased by incorporations of Sgt. Velasco's unit in Kapangan and by establishment of unit in Sablan (these units now 1st Bn, 66th Inf), took part in October, 1942, offensive. East Benguet unit moved west of Mountain Trail after Jap Nov 1942 counter offensive. HQ thereafter located in Kapangan. Calvert later appointed 1st District C.O. and Murphy commanded unit. Calvert now Chief of Staff and Murphy AC of S and G-2, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON. Spencer sent to take command of 2nd Bn, 66th Inf following Baldwin's capture, killed in action, April, 1943.

GOVERNOR ABLAN AND CAPT. MADAMBA: Little specific known of their activities. Carried on activities in Ilocos Norte in 1942 and early 1943, but units broken up, Madamba captured and Ablan disappeared (believed died). Remnants of units collected by 121st Inf in expansion into Ilocos Norte. Later became 15th Inf under Major Arnold.

CAPTAIN BALDWIN: Fought in Bataan, escaped after surrender and entered and organized unit in Baguio mining area (later 2nd Bn, 66th Inf) took part in 1942 offensive (unit took and held Baguio Mining Area for 72 hours). Was captured early 1943.

CAPTS. FRENCH, LANGLEY AND SWICK: Were Baguio miners at outbreak of war but took to mountains, making one trip to Baler and Dingallen and return to eastern Benguet. Commissioned by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble in September 1942 and assigned sector between Kennon Road and Agno River. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Swick captured in early 1943 but posed as civilian and sent to Camp Holmes. French murdered and robbed by own bodyguard. Langley later captured at Imugan, Nueva Vizcaya. Unit went part to Baldwin and part to Lapham. Swick escaped Camp Holmes early part of 1943, rejoined and now assigned 11th Inf.

CAPTAIN BADO DANGWA: Owner of Dangwa Tranco at the outbreak of war. Gave all of trucks to USAFFE. Took to mountains on Jap occupation of Baguio and carried on active and passive resistance against enemy (is most influential man in Benguet). Commissioned by Lt. Col. Moses and Noble in October 1942 and unit combined with that of Molintas. Took part on October 1942 offensive. Later appointed C.O., HQ Bn., 66th Inf., (later HQ BN, USAFIP, NL) and G-4, USAFIP, NL which positions he now holds.

CAPTAIN DENNIS MOLINTAS: Was Benguet school teacher and reserve officer at the outbreak of the war, and for some time afterwards, was called to active duty by Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Unit later expanded and became 3rd Bn, 66th Infantry. Succeeded Major Parker Calvert as C.O., 66th Inf., in late 1944.



LIEUT. FISH: Operated sawmill on Mountain Trail at outbreak of war. Gathered small unit and ambushed Japs. Commissioned by Moses and Noble. Took part in October 1942 offensive. Captured in 1943. Unit merged with that of Capt. Molintas.

LIEUT. CHARLES CUSHING: Miner at Paracale at outbreak of war. Escaped to Manila, commissioned and sent to Bataan. Came out into Zambales with Lt. Col. Thorpe. When Thorpe holed up, crossed to San Nicolas area with J.P. O'Day. Later contacted and made a District C.O. by Thorpe but contact very poor, so came under Moses and Noble. Unit well organized for existence but made poor showing in October 1942 offensive. Voluntarily surrendered in early 1943, when contacted by native wife. Brother of Walter Cushing (see above) and of Col. James Cushing (Cebu Guerrilla).

CAPTAIN ROBERT BAPHAM: Sent into Eastern Pangasinan by Lt. Col. Thorpe but accepted command of Moses and Noble when no communication with Thorpe. Later refused to acknowledge command of USAFIP, NL or render reports. For this reason little known of subsequent activities.

CAPTAIN PERIAM AND MAJOR GEORGE BARNETT: American miners at Suyoc at outbreak of war. Commissioned by H. O. ran. Periam sent to Ilocos Sur and Barnett to La Union to organize Bns of 121st Inf. Refused to surrender when H. O. did. Periam unit not too prosperous, and Periam captured in late 1943. La Union unit prospered and went on big offensive in September 1942 but momentum was about lost when contacted by Moses and Noble for October 1942 offensive. Went thru bad surrender period in early 1943 when Major Barnett was sick but later came back and reorganized Periam's unit in Ilocos Sur and Abra and became present 121st Inf. Later expanded into Ilocos Norte, but this portion later detached to form 15th Infantry.

CAPTAIN JOHN O'DAY: Was mine superintendent at Acche Chromite mine in Zambales at outbreak of war, worked mine until March 1942 on orders from Cerregidor, then destroyed mine, stayed with Thorpe for a while then came with Chas Cushing to North Luzon where for six months almost died of dysentery. Was cured and commissioned by Lt. Chas Cushing. On Cushing's surrender, joined 121st Inf, reorganized Ilocos Sur and Abra areas and later brought Ilocos Norte under control. Was wounded in action under heroic circumstance while in Ilocos Sur. Is at present Executive Officer of 15th Inf.

LT. COLS. MOSES AND NOBLE: Commanded 11th and 12th Inf. (PA). On Ilocos Coast at outbreak of war, cut off with Lt. Col. Bennett on Ilocos Coast in late December 1941, retreated with part of units to Baguio, went over mountains to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, and reached Bataan. On fall of Bataan, escaped to



Benguet arriving in June 1942. In Sept. 1942, assumed command of all forces North Luzon and ordered general offensive for 15 October 1942. Offensive fairly successful for a while, but broken up by enemy counter-offensive in November 1942 which badly disorganized units. Made way to Apayao (or Kalinga) and contacted Australia via Major Praeger's radio in January 1943, authorized to organize 12th Infantry (now known as 66th Inf). Issued orders to all units North Luzon to lay low, gather intelligence and perfect organization. Were shortly afterwards put on the run by enemy and were captured in June 1943.

MAJOR DONALD BLACKBURN AND COL. R. W. VOLCKMANN: Escaped from Bataan and reported to Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble in Benguet in August 1942. Blackburn made signal officer and Volckmann placed in charge of three sub-sectors of Benguet for October 1942 offensive. Both move into Ifugao as result of November 1942 counter-offensive and organized that sub-province. Volckmann appointed G-2 by Moses and Noble after Australia contact and assumed command, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON after Moses and Noble capture. Volckmann moved HQ to Kapangan, Benguet, in February 1944, leaving Blackburn in command of unit in Ifugao which was later extended to include Bontoc and Kalinga. Blackburn authorized to expand into Apayao and Cagayan when it was established that Major Praeger could not be contacted in that area. Blackburn at present C.O. 11th Infantry, having extended control over all of Apayao and over most of Cagayan.

Second Phase

The history of the second phase of the USAFIP NORTH LUZON can best be told by listing the difficulties that were placed and the manner in which they were met.

L. COMMUNICATIONS: It was the lack of a good system of communications that, until June 1943, had made North Luzon still a group of widely scattered units with very little central control. Communications were passed along from one unit to another in a haphazard manner and occasional travelers were the only means of getting communications across areas in which there were no units. In June 1943, there was established the beginning of a network of runner relay stations that now covers all of North Luzon. Mail or supplies or personnel can now be sent between any two points in North Luzon by the most direct routes in the minimum time. For example the average time for a RUSH message to go from the present HQ of this command to the HQ of each of its regiments is as follows: to HQ 121st Inf (La Union) 4 hours; to HQ 66th Inf (Benguet) 15 hours; to HQ 14th Infantry (Nueva Vizcaya), 3 days; to HQ 15th Infantry (Ilocos Norte) 6 days; to HQ 11th Infantry (Cagayan), 6 days. In fact, for the



greater amount of communications with the 121st Infantry and 66th Infantry, the runner communication system has proven faster than radio.

2. INTELLIGENCE: In February, 1943, Lt. Col. Moses, at that time CO, USAFIP, NL, established radio contact with the GHQ SWPA and received orders to cease active resistance against the enemy and to gather and submit intelligence. Col. Moses transmitted these orders to all units of his command and appointed R.W. Volckmann as G-2. Due to the poor communications existing at the time, these orders did not reach all units until late in April 1943. Intelligence work got started very slowly for the following reasons: the inclusion of the entire island of Luzon for intelligence coverage; poor communications; unwillingness, and in some case inability, of units to subordinate activity against the enemy to the less exciting task of intelligence work; almost complete lack of training and written material regarding intelligence work; the fact that most intelligence work had to be done by military personnel, a great many of whom were wanted by the enemy; the necessity of inculcating habits of accurate and methodical observation and collection of information in personnel whose civilian habits are quite the reverse.

When Maj. Volckmann assumed command of USAFIP, NL following the capture of Lt. Col. Moses in June 1943, he appointed Actg. Major Parker C. Ivert as G-2 with Major Arthur Murphy as Assistant G-2. The compilation of a monthly G-2 report covering all of Luzon was commenced. As radio communication with GHQ SWPA had gone out following the capture of Col. Moses, efforts were made to forward these reports through each and every channel that offered the slightest chance of getting them to GHQ SWPA. A great improvement was noted when district COs were given a standard form for the submission of monthly S-2 reports regarding their areas. The greater majority of coverage areas outside of Northern Luzon was handled by GHQ USAFIP NL. Training was achieved by letters of criticism and suggestions on reports received. Efforts were also made to find some one who could build a radio transmitter from the considerable collection of parts that we had commandeered. Major Murphy was appointed G-2 in February 1944.

Late in August 1944 there was received through another unit a copy of a guide that was substantially the same as the "Philippine Intelligence Guide" issued by GHQ SWPA. Due to the fact that this guide indicated that GHQ SWPA desired a much more comprehensive and detailed intelligence coverage than this Hq had previously felt necessary or capable of handling, the intelligence-procedure was altered through GO No. 12 of this Hq, dated 7 August 1944. It was decided to abandon the attempt to cover the whole of Luzon. It was decided to obtain most of intelligence through agents rather than military personnel--though the direction of such personnel would be done by military personnel. More frequent reports were required.

RECEIVED

8 SEP 1952

AGRD

In practice the majority of intelligence work and training of intelligence personnel is done by the various districts and Bns of USAFIP NL. The District and Bn COs and their S-2s are right on the ground. They are in the best position to obtain and supervise agents and to classify and organize the information received regarding their own areas. Agents of this HQ are used only to occasionally check conflicting or improbable reports and in a liaison capacity to assist District COs in areas they are having difficulty in working. Due to the distances involved, the greater part of training from this HQ takes the form of letters of criticism and suggestion. This HQ distributes copies of intelligence materials, which are now beginning to be received, renders such monetary aid for intelligence work, as it can to poor districts, exercises general supervision over the work of the Districts and prepares reports for GHQ SWPA. Of late it has also done considerable work in translating enemy documents and papers received from districts, a pro-American Jap prisoner being used for the purpose.

3. MORALE: Late 1942 and early 1943 were low points in the morale of our officers and men, and, in the disorganization following the enemy counter-offensive in late 1942, large numbers of officers and men began to surrender with their weapons. Drastic and immediate measures were necessary. An order was issued making it punishable by death for any officer or man to voluntarily surrender to the enemy or allow himself to be captured thru his own negligence; or for any person to advise a soldier to surrender or for any person to surrender to the enemy any army weapon or ammunition. The remedy worked. Until quite recently, USAFIP NORTH LUZON has been composed entirely of unsurrendered officers and men (plus a few Bataan men who agreed to break their parole fully and completely). During the past few months, due to acute shortage of personnel with administrative ability or other special qualifications, the bars have been let down somewhat. However, the officers and men of this organization who stuck it out during the tough times still look with scorn on the new arrivals who were living in comparative safety during those days.

4. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE AND KEEPING CIVILIANS LOYAL: The enemy, finding that he could not combat us by his efforts alone, began to use large numbers of spies and to obtain information by torture. This was met by making it punishable by death to give information to the enemy whether under coercion or not. Likewise, loyal civilians were made responsible for reporting and, wherever possible, apprehending suspected enemy agents. Very little trouble was encountered in keeping the mass of the civilians loyal in areas in which we had forces from the early days of the war. It was only when expansion into new areas was begun that cases of entire communities being pro-Jap were encountered. In some of these instances, heroic measures were necessary. In general, it was found that the people followed their leaders and suitable measures were applied to these



leaders. Radio news and propaganda was given wide circulation thru the communications system mentioned above.

5. TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE: In the early days of USAFIP, NORTH LUZON, members of units lived in their home barrios for purposes of concealment from the enemy. However, it was found that little or no training or discipline could be accomplished in this matter. Soon, however, the 121st Infantry took at that time bold step of moving their entire units into hidden company or platoon camps whose chief protection was in their control over the surrounding areas and knowledge of the enemy's habits. When it was found that the dividends in training and discipline far outweighed the occasional losses attendant upon a camp being found, all units in North Luzon were ordered to move their men into camps and there conduct regular training schedules. Another training problem was in the transition from theoretical knowledge to practical application. This was met by assigning to each unit occasional limited objective attacks in order to get the men over their battle shyness. It must be admitted that some units were so successful in their "examinations" that thereafter there was great difficulty in keeping them obedient to the "lay low" order.

6. SUPPLY: a. Food supply was never a great problem. Units naturally grew up in the food producing areas, and always used these areas as bases of operations. Loyal civilians always shared what food was available and accepted our receipts without question. Likewise, there was never a shortage of money (war notes) for any supplies or activities for which it was needed. With these, it was possible to purchase whatever supplies that could not be obtained from civilians on receipt.

b. Arms and Ammunition Supplies: When in 1941, the tide of the enemy advance rolled past North Luzon, there was a large quantity of these items left on the battle fields or discarded by disbanded soldiers. Most of this was collected initially by civilians. Thereafter, our problem was to collect it from the civilians and to prevent the enemy from getting it first. The first was accomplished by thorough and untiring effort - men have spent weeks, tracking down one rifle. The second was accomplished as outlined above. After the limited objective attacks were started, arms and ammunitions were obtained from BG or Japs by ambushing raids.

c. Clothing: This problem was met by purchasing what clothing as was possible and doing without the rest of the time.

7. MEDICAL CARE: Until very recently, USAFIP, NL units had few, and in many cases no, doctors - these hopped on the band wagon in large numbers only after the war had turned unmistakably in favor of the United Nations. However, plans were made in advance for medical care for all units, hospitals were built and a campaign for securing medicines was started. Then was set out to get doctors- kidnapping them when necessary.



Complete medical and hospital service is now being administered to all members of this command.

8. CONTACT WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: After Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble were captured, it was not certain whether Major Praeger's radio was still in existence or not. While every effort was being made to contact Praeger, efforts were likewise made to acquire necessary parts and personnel to put another radio in operation. Radio parts of all kinds were secured from all over Luzon but difficulty was encountered in finding a man who could put them together. Finally two radio technicians were secured from Manila and a radio was put into operation. Power was secured from a home-made 220-volt hydro-electric plant. While the above efforts were made, other efforts were made to contact Higher Headquarters thru other units to the south but with little success, as when contact was finally made through Major Bernard L. Anderson, our radio was already in operation.

9. EXPANSION: When Lt. Cols. Moses and Noble contacted Australia, USAFIP, NL was assigned all of Luzon north of the line Lingayen (Pangasinan)-San Jose (N. Eclija). In the latter part of 1943, this area was divided as follows:

- 1st District - Benguet - 86th Infantry
- 2nd District - La Union and Ilocos Sur - 121st Infantry
- 3rd District - Abra and Ilocos Norte - Gov. Ablan and Capt. Madamba's units (to become part of the 121st Infantry)
- 4th District - Apayao and Cagayan - Maj. Praeger's units.
- 5th District - Isabela and Vizcaya - 14th Infantry
- 6th District - Nueva Eclija and Northern Pangasinan - Capt. Lapham's units.
- 7th District - Ifugao, Bontoc, and Kalinga - Units of Col. Volekman and Major Blackburn.

However, all of these areas were not at the time under control. Also, some of the information upon which the decision was based, proved to be erroneous. Therefore, the following expansions were made:

(1) The 14th Infantry expanded into Isabela and contacted remnants of the "long lost" east branch of the 14th Inf.

(2) Bontoc and Kalinga were occupied.

(3) When it was found that Ablan's and Madamba's units had ceased to function in Ilocos Norte, the 121st Infantry expanded into Ilocos Norte from Ilocos Sur and Abra. Units in Ilocos Norte and northern Abra were later reorganized into the 15th Infantry.

(4) When it was found that Praeger's units had ceased to



function in Apayao and Cagayan, the 4th and 7th Districts were combined, the 11th Infantry authorized, and a rapid expansion from the 7th District into the 4th District was begun. This expansion is now almost complete.

(5) When Capt. Robert Lapham refused to accept the authority of this HQ, the 66th Infantry was authorized to expand southward into northeast Pangasinan and the 121st Infantry was authorized to expand into Northwest Pangasinan. At the time of the landing the 66th had one company and the 121st Infantry had about one company plus one platoon in Pangasinan.

1. This Headquarters has been informed that the records of Major [Name] have been forwarded to your office.

2. You are, therefore, directed to send all data in your files to this Headquarters without any further delay.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL [Name]



/jr

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
Camp SPENCER


25 July 45

Subject: Major Praeger's Records

To : CO, 11th Inf, PA

1. This Headquarters has been reliably informed that records of Major Praeger have been recovered by your command.
2. You are, therefore, directed to send all such records to this Headquarters without any further delay.

By Order of Colonel VOLCKMANN:


MANUEL P BIDES
Captain, Inf, PA
Asst Adj Gen



Historical Section