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PHILIPPINE ARMY
(HISTORY OF AFWESPAC ACTIONS)

PA - 24

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MINUTES
AFWESPAC CONFERENCE
ON THE
PHILIPPINE ARMY

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Held at Hq AFWESPAC, Manila
15 November 1945

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MINUTES

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

OF THE

PHILIPPINE AIR



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AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE ON PHILIPPINE ARMY

<u>SPEAKER</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TIME</u>
1. Brig. Gen. McGaw AC/S G-3, AFWESPAC	Introduction	5 minutes
2. General Stivers GHQ, AFPAC	Status of the Philippine Army during the war period.	10 minutes
	a. Organization and Training	
	(1) Status on 7 Dec 1941	
	(a) Strength	
	(b) Equipment	
	(2) Surrender:	
	(3) Concentration at Camp O'Donnell, Capas	
	(a) Death of 40,000	
	(b) Parole	
	(4) Employment under puppet government.	
	(5) Guerrilla Activities.	
	(6) Recovery.	
3. Colonel Kreuter PA Div. G-3 Section	Transfer of control of responsibil- ities to AFWESPAC	5 minutes
	a. Attachment of PA units to AFWESPAC.	
	b. Complete transfer of responsibili- ties 5 November per letter GHQ, AFPAC dated 1 Nov 45 covering this letter duties have been assigned as follows:	
	(1) Execution of demobilization plans.	G-3
	(2) Arrangements for release of units to Commonwealth 30 June 46.	G-3
	(3) Enlistment - 50,000 Philip- pine Scouts	G-1

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Agenda for Conference on Philippine Army (Cont'd).

(4) Recognition guerrillas G-3

(5) Finance matters Fiscal 0

c. PA units now reassigned to major commands:

(1) MPC - AFWESPAC

(a) Combination of Hq PA and MPC (PA)

(b) Turn over to Commonwealth of the MPC (PA) in provinces.

(2) Off Shore Patrol - Philippine Sea Frontier.

(3) Service troops to bases.

(4) Air Corps to FEAF - possible elimination.

(5) Other units to area commands.

d. USATG - employment.

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|---|---|------------|
| 4. Colonel Lillard
PA Div. G-3
Opns. Branch | Revised plans for Demobilization of Philippine Army (Include relation to New Scout Organization). | 10 minutes |
| 5. Colonel Cheston
USATG | Revised plans for post-war Philippine Army. | 10 minutes |
-

Action being taken and plans being made for take over of responsibilities charged to AFWESPAC.

- | | | |
|--|--|------------|
| 6. General Christiansen
MPC | a. Present composition and future plans. | 5 minutes |
| | b. AFPAC directive on law and order. | |
| 7. Colonel Paschall
PA BR G-1 Section | c. G-1 responsibilities | 10 minutes |
| | (1) Actions under way. | |
| | (a) Processing. | |

Agenda for Conference on Philippine Army (Cont'd)

(b) Coordination with Recovered Personnel.

(c) Promotions, current.

8. Colonel Anderson
Plans and Policy
Division, G-4

d. G-4 responsibilities 5 minutes

(1) Actions under way.

(2) All expenses borne by U. S.

(3) Special accounting.

9. Colonel Marcus
Recovered Personnel
Section AG

e. AG responsibilities 10 minutes

(1) Recovered personnel.

(a) Confirmation of promotions.

(b) Arrears in pay.

(c) Claims of beneficiaries of deceased personnel.

(d) Duties of field teams.

1. Coordination between processing and recovered personnel field teams.

2. Coordination of payment of arrears with discharge of personnel.

10. Major Otti
Guerrilla Affairs

f. Guerrilla affairs 5 minutes

(1) Guerrilla organizations

(2) Policy on recognition.

11. Colonel Kreuter
PA Div. G-3 Section

Problems for future. 10 minutes

a. Coordination with Commonwealth.

(1) Internal Peace & Order.

(2) Demobilization.

Agenda for Conference on Philippine Army (cont'd)

- (a) Payment of arrears in pay and death benefits.
- (b) Disbandment of units and collection of property.
- (3) Control of PA - Osmena and Montelibano.
- (b) Claims arising out of guerrilla activities.
 - (1) Recognition - dates.
 - (2) Volume of claims - 1,000,000
- c. Adjustment of plans to reduce force to acceptable size on 30 June 46 in accord funds to be made available.
- d. Constitution of a military - naval mission.
- 12. General Styer Closing remarks.
- 13. Question Period.

REMARKS BY BRIG. GEN. McGAW
ACTING G-3 AFWESPAC

General Styer - Gentlemen.

The purpose of this conference is to orient those present on the background and present status of the Philippine Army and on its current relationship to AFWESPAC. I suppose everyone here knows that our headquarters has been delegated responsibilities in connection with all activities related to the Philippine Army. This transfer of responsibility became effective on 5 November. Prior to that date we had very few officers of AFWESPAC who were familiar with the intricate organization and operation of the Philippine Army. Because of this and the recent large turnover of personnel, it is my opinion that there are not many officers present this afternoon who visualize the magnitude of the task of administering, training, discharging and supplying the Filipinos. It is entirely different from performing these named functions for an American force of like size. For these reasons, I was very pleased to have been afforded this opportunity to assemble this group. I had been thinking of such a conference along these same lines a little later on, when we would be better worked into the new project and when we would know more of the answers. However, from the broad point of view this early conference is better. The sooner we know the background and the problems of the Philippine Army, the better we can all perform our jobs in relation thereto. Let me emphasize that there are several projects under study and that there are many policies yet to be established. Today we will tell you what we know. We will include the organization of the Philippine Army sections of this headquarters, and the G-3 relationship thereto. This is very necessary in order that you do not think that we of G-3 are trespassing on the responsibilities of the other staff sections on Philippine Army matters. Prior to 5 November, all matters except training and supply of the Philippine Army were functions of AFPAC. They had a Philippine Army section in their rear echelon in Manila, which was headed by Maj. Gen. Charles P. Stivers. He in turn was assisted by Col. R. H. Kreuter as his Chief Deputy and by 16 other well qualified officers, in addition to a large training group. Today we are fortunate to have Gen. Stivers, Col. Kreuter, and some of the other key officers formerly of AFPAC here. With the exception of Gen. Stivers, these officers, experienced in Philippine Army affairs, have been transferred to AFWESPAC to carry on the work which they have so efficiently initiated and brought to the present state of advanced development.

The first speaker will be Gen. Stivers, head of the Philippine Army Section AFPAC. We are fortunate to have him here. He is the best authority on the Philippine Army on Luzon and I know I speak for all of you, as well as for myself, when I tell him how much we appreciate his willingness to share his knowledge of Philippine affairs with us. He will discuss the status of the Philippine Army during the war period and up to the date of turnover to AFWESPAC. GEN. STIVERS!

Major General Stivers
Chief Philippine Army Section, AFPAC

General Styer and Gentlemen: I am going back a little further than the beginning of the war. The Philippine Army really came into being as a result of the Tydings-McDuffey Act, which was passed by our U. S. Congress in 1934, I believe. That provides for one little phrase that is really the background of this whole thing, as far as the U. S. Army is concerned. It provides, hidden down in a paragraph, that the President of the United States may call into the service of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines all military forces organized by the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

That is the basis on which the Philippine Army is now a component of AFWESPAC. This Tydings-McDuffey Act is the act that provided for the independence of the Philippines on July 4, 1946; it is still the basis on which that independence is forthcoming.

The first act of the Philippine Legislature under that act was the National Defense Act. It provided for a Philippine Army. Now this couldn't be a large army or certainly a very large standing army, from a budgetary consideration; the Commonwealth simply couldn't afford it and the independent Philippines would likewise not be able to afford it.

General MacArthur came to the Philippines in the fall of 1935 to initiate the plans and to carry out the development of the Philippine Army. The only nucleus that he had in the Philippines was the Constabulary--a national police force organized on military lines that had been in existence since the very early nineteen hundreds. The officers of the Constabulary became a part of the Philippine Army. In other words, they were in the Constabulary the way an officer in our Army might be in the Infantry, and the enlisted men were also to a somewhat lesser degree a part of the Philippine Army--the relationship there would be more like the Marine Corps in the Navy, I should say.

There were various steps, certain training of officers, the opening of the Philippine Military Academy, but the main basis for the Philippine Army was a sort of limited selective service. Young men attaining the age of twenty registered. They were passed on by local boards and a rather limited number selected for training each year. Somewhere between 17,000 or 18,000 were trained each six-month period. A selected percentage of that group, some ten or twelve per cent, were retrained for six months' additional service. At the end of the first six months' service, the trainee became a Reservist and from then on was subject to call to active duty. The man who took the second six months was a noncommissioned officer. A certain number of them were selected for still another six months in Officers Candidate School and provided the officers corps for the Reserve units of the Philippine Army. All together, their Regular Army, outside of the Constabulary, was nothing but a training cadre for the Reservists. There wasn't a single unit that really operated as a unit and no unit had any major duties other than the training of Reservists.

In the years between the time this Reservist training was initiated on the 1st of January, 1936, until the time of the war, there had been some 135,000 Reservists given this course of instruction. A good share of them

were assigned to ten Reserve Infantry divisions. The make-up of these divisions was very similar to our present divisions. They were triangular divisions except that the units were very much smaller--rifle companies of about a hundred and machine gun companies of the same strength, an infantry regiment of about 1,800 men, a field artillery regiment to each division, engineer battalion, medical battalion, quartermaster company, motor transport company, and so on--a very similar organization, if you divide all of our units in two.

The equipment wasn't very good. It was mostly surplus World War I equipment that the Commonwealth could afford to buy from the U. S. at cut rates. The rifles were Enfields. They did have Browning automatic rifles and Browning caliber-30 and caliber-50 machine guns. Their artillery regiment was really an artillery regiment only in name. It had three battalions. One battalion was a gun battalion, but the guns were 2.95 mountain pack Howitzers and with a very limited amount of ammunition, simply what there was on hand in the U. S.--there had been none made for some time and there was no intention of ever making any more. The other two battalions of this so-called artillery regiment were a mortar battalion, supposed to be 81-millimeter, but was actually the old smooth bore three-inch stokes mortar and a caliber-50 machine gun anti-aircraft gun battalion.

These units had had no training as such except for a ten-day training period for about one-third of the infantry battalions, held in the Spring of 1941, which really simply emphasized the weakness of the training. Individuals had a somewhat elementary basic training for five and a half months by instructors who were themselves not particularly well trained and the units had never been assembled. The noncommissioned officers had been generally trained as such but had never actually functioned in that capacity. The officers had never seen the enlisted men in their units.

When things began to get pretty hot over here, the President of the U. S., on the 26th of July 1941, under the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffey Act, called the Philippine Army into the service of the armed forces of the U. S. in the Philippines (get that--it isn't into the armed forces of the U. S.; in other words, the Philippine Army does not become, and has never been, a part of the U. S. Army) intact as an organization the Philippine Army.

These units were called at such times and places as might be specified by an officer to be designated by the Secretary of War, and at the same time the Secretary of War called General MacArthur back to active duty from retirement and placed him in command of all troops--both the old Philippine Department and the Philippine Army.

The equipment of the ten divisions of the Reserve units of the Philippine Army was available. It was there in mobilization center warehouses located perhaps in some fifty or sixty different mobilization centers throughout the Philippines. The clothing was there, the unit equipment, arms, everything, such as it was.

Postcards were all made out in the various military districts; all they had to do was mail them out to the man telling him when to report, and he came in. Mobilization went very smoothly. The mobilization was planned primarily in detail and actually conducted by the Philippine Army itself; it worked beautifully.

Initially there was no place and no facilities for assembling these divisions, so they were called in by echelon. One infantry regiment of each division was called on the 1st of September 1941. All the officers, key non-commissioned officers, communications personnel, etc., from the other units were called in for cadre training, and then as fast as they could get divisional training areas located and a minimum shelter there, the units that had first been mobilized, the first regiment in each division, were moved into that area and then the second regiment of the divisions called. The original training was done in the very small training camps where the Reservists had had their training.

Mobilization was not complete on December 8th, (as it was over here), 1941. Five infantry regiments and about that many field artillery regiments had not yet been called. Their mobilization dates were set for December 15th. That was immediately advanced to "now"; and most of those people did report to their units. However, the training that they had before the war started, varied from a period of from September to the 8th of December to absolutely nothing because they were mobilized after the war started.

Cadres of American Army officers on the basis of about eight officers to an infantry regiment and something like that to the other types of units were sent at the time the units were mobilized and about one noncommissioned officer either of the U. S. Army--that is American units-- or Philippine Scout units, to each company. However, the training obviously had not progressed far enough to enable these units to operate effectively as divisions or in most cases even as battalions. They were forced to do what they could with what they had.

I neglected to say that in the equipment provided there was no transportation; none. The various training camps had one or two administrative vehicles each, but as far as divisional transportation was concerned, there was none. We had to use what we could pick up locally--civilian transportation, buses, trucks, with civilian drivers. Many of those drivers went out on contract with the bus companies, reported to these various Philippine Army camps, went out with them as their transportation and stayed with them throughout the campaign; never did get home. Those people make up one of the "recovered personnel" problems. Actually they were in Bataan; they had a quasi-military status there, but many of those things were not formalized.

Another thing, of course--there are no records of the Philippine Army, all having been destroyed, which is an additional problem.

I won't go into the war activities much. You know generally what it was. I think that these units fought better than anybody had any right to expect them to fight under the circumstances, for the amount of training and the type of equipment they had.

On April 9th, units on Bataan surrendered. To give you an idea of the units, there were five infantry divisions largely on Luzon and two more brought up from the Visayans and had their training areas up here--the 71st Division from Negros and the 91st from Samar and Leyte. They got up here with the exception of the one infantry regiment in each division which had not been called at the time the war started. We were never able to get those regiments up here. One regiment of each of those divisions was in training in the Visayans but got up here after the war started.

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After the surrender, you know the circumstances of the "Death March." Most of them were taken to Camp O'Donnell, near Capas, as prisoners of war from April until some time along in August. Those of them who had not died then--and perhaps half of them did die of disease, starvation, and so forth--were released on parole. It came pretty near to being an oath of allegiance to the Japanese. General MacArthur has taken the stand, however, that that parole was not binding, given with reservations, given to keep them from dying and was of no real effect.

In the southern islands, the Visayas and Mindanao, the Japanese had not made a very extensive campaign until along in April and May. However, the terms of the surrender on Corregidor on the 7th of May provided for the surrender of those garrisons. Many of them, however, did not surrender individually and even fairly complete units moved back into the mountains and either went "bush" or continued resistance. Most of them faded out, but they took their weapons with them and kept pretty much together.

By mid-summer, say August or September, definite guerrilla movements were beginning to develop in many of those islands. They have been the nucleus of the guerrilla movement which increased very definitely. They were able to establish radio contact in certain cases with the U. S. or direct with Australia and, a little later on, submarine contacts were arranged. Certain supplies, and ammunition were sent in to these guerrilla forces, communication personnel sent in to them, officers sent in to size up the situation and, from time to time, certain of those guerrilla forces on Mindanao and the Visayas were recognized by the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, as authorized elements of his command.

That was not true on Luzon. We didn't have as good contacts here. The situation was obscure. We knew that there were many guerrillas here, but there were many cross-currents--various people claiming authority from nobody in particular, various people claiming absurd rank and claiming absurd numbers certain people claiming, for instance, to have 200,000 guerrillas in the field under them in a very restricted area fairly close to Manila, not substantiated by any impartial reports we could get.

Not until fairly soon before our actual coming into the Philippines were we able to give to the guerrillas on Luzon the assistance that we had been giving to them further south. We found one well-organized guerrilla force in Northern Luzon. Colonel Volckmann, formerly 31st Infantry, had succeeded in uniting the various elements up there and we found that force at least well organized. Certain others were organized to a lesser degree.

From time to time, since the initial landing on Luzon, various of the guerrilla forces on Luzon have been recognized as constituting an authorized element of the overall command here. President Osmond almost immediately after the landing on Leyte last October of last year issued an executive order providing that when a guerrilla element was recognized by the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area (as it was then), that unit and its individual members became a part of the Philippine Army.

Many of these guerrilla units all through the islands upon the landing of the Americans joined them and have fought alongside them, in some cases very successfully. In certain cases they had definite sectors and areas of the front, have operated substantially as an American division taking their

orders direct from the Corps commandor; in more cases, however, they have been attached to U. S. Army units, regiments, divisions, or smaller units.

As soon as we arrived in Leyte--almost the first day, I think--various officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army began reporting, saying that they were USAFFE soldiers--that is the term they would use. The command over here when General MacArthur was called back to active duty was U. S. Army Forces in the Far East. That was USAFFE, and that is what the average Philippine Army officer or enlisted man says when he wants to indicate that he was formally called into the service of the armed forces of the U. S. back in 1941.

So we have now the Philippine Army, consisting substantially of two elements which overlap: Those men who were definitely Reservists or a few Regulars of the Philippine Army that were formally called into the service of the armed forces of the U. S. in '41; in addition to that, the guerrilla forces. The guerrilla forces contain many of this USAFFE personnel, but many of the others were out-and-out volunteers without previous military service. However, they all now constitute elements of the Philippine Army.

There were units organized particularly in the southern islands--provisional units of various sorts--from surplus Reservists that weren't called into those initial ten divisions. Using what weapons they could, the weapons in the training camps and certain surplus stocks in some of the Philippine Army depots, they were able to organize a considerable number of additional units, and the designations and numbers were more or less ad lib. There was no definite pattern. The designations of the guerrilla units are even more "ad lib"; they called them anything. You would find weird titles there.

The initial idea on the landing was that the Philippine Army would be reconstituted with an idea of getting them in shape as soon as possible to carry out two missions: One, to take over certain combat duties from the U. S. forces in the way of mopping up, particularly clearing up remnants of the enemy which we visualized would hang out back in the hills; second, to provide certain service troops to further the overall effort of the command. Before we had succeeded in accomplishing too much along those lines the war ended, and the job now is primarily to demobilize what we now have, to provide forces essential to maintain law and order in the Philippines until the end of this Commonwealth period and to provide some sort of force to be turned over to the Philippines upon independence to constitute their law enforcement agency and their agency for internal security.

The Philippines, within any budget which can be forseen for an indefinite period, cannot afford to maintain any material force for defense against outside aggression--not unless they are subsidized.

That is a brief summary and history of the Philippine Army. I fear I have used a great deal more than the ten minutes that were allotted to me, but I believe that background will be useful to anyone who has anything to do with the Philippine Army in the future.

REMARKS BY BRIG. GEN. McGAW

ACTING G-3, AFWESPAC

Thank you, Gen. Stivers.

The letter transferring responsibilities of the Philippine Army to this headquarters reads in part as follows:

1. Effective 5 November 1945 you are charged with the responsibility for, and authorized to act on, all United States Army matters pertaining to the Philippine Army and the Philippine Commonwealth government. The following tasks are included among these matters:

a. Execution of Philippine Army demobilization plans as set forth in the revised Plan for Demobilization of Philippine Army, attached.

b. Preparation and conclusion of arrangements for the release of units to be turned over to the Philippine Government on 30 June 1946. In this connection you will be guided by policies set forth in the revised Plan for Post-War Philippine Army, attached.

c. Arrangements of details in connection with the enlistment of Philippine Army personnel in the Philippine Scouts under the 50,000 Scout project now being developed by the War Department.

d. Recognition of additional guerrilla units or individuals for the purpose of entitling them to benefits for services rendered.

e. Handling of finance matters pertaining to the Philippine Army. In this connection, authority is being delegated to you by separate communication to approve the allocation of funds from United States appropriations for use by the Philippine Army.

3. Action is also being initiated to transfer to you authority to make final determination under the Missing Persons Act, in cases involving personnel of the Philippine Army. When this action is completed, it is contemplated that the Recovered Personnel Division, Adjutant General Section this headquarters and the Recovered Personnel Detachment, United States Army Forces, Pacific will be transferred to your command.

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Gen. McGAW:

Col. Kreuter who assisted Gen. Stivers so ably in AFPAC is now my Chief Deputy for Philippine affairs. He will discuss some of the details of the responsibility transferred to us in the order just quoted. COL. KREUTER!

The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

1. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

2. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

3. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

4. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

5. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

6. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

7. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

8. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

9. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

10. The following information is being furnished to you as follows:

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1. Reconstitution of Philippine Army units was begun about March 1945. Hq Philippine Army was established as a major command directly under GHQ with the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army reporting directly to General MacArthur's headquarters. Philippine Army Replacement Battalions in Leyte and Luzon, and Camp Complements at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Camp Murphy, Rizal, one or two service units, the Presidential Guard Battalion, and band were placed under the direct control of Hq Philippine Army. Guerrilla units were progressively recognized on Luzon beginning January 9 and upon recognition became units of the Philippine Army. Guerrilla units previously recognized on islands south of Luzon were also included in the Philippine Army. All such units were attached to USASOS and later to AFWESPAC, and then attached by the latter headquarters to bases for "on-the-job" training. Initially combat units on Luzon were attached to the Sixth Army and, in the islands south of Luzon, to the Eighth Army. On withdrawal from Luzon of the Sixth Army, units attached thereto were attached to the Eighth Army. Upon withdrawal of the Eighth Army, all Philippine Army units attached thereto were then attached to AFWESPAC.

2. Responsibilities for tasks listed in the AFPAC Directive to the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, effective 5 November 1945, were assigned by the D C/S for Operations to various sections as follows:

- a. Execution of Demobilization Plans - - - - - G-3
- b. Arrangement for release of Philippine Army units to Commonwealth, 30 June 1946 - - - - - G-3
- c. Enlistment of 50,000 Philippine Scouts - - - - - G-1
- d. Recognition of Guerrillas - - - - - G-3
- e. Financial matters - - - - - Fiscal

Philippine Scouts are a part of the regular US Army and are not an element of the Philippine Army. It is intended, however, that suitable personnel discharged from the Philippine Army be recruited into the Philippine Scouts.

Director

3. a. All Philippine Army units and activities related thereto are now assigned to HQ AFWESPAC or its subordinate commands. HQ Philippine Army maintains the same relation to AFWESPAC as it did previously to GHQ. It functions as a major command directly under this Headquarters, with the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, reporting directly to General Styer. HQ Philippine Army controls the same elements as before.

b. Other elements of the Philippine Army attached to HQ AFWESPAC or to major U.S. Army commands under AFWESPAC are:

- (1) MPC - directly under HQ AFWESPAC. General Christiansen will comment further on this command.
- (2) Combat units - both standard and non-standard are attached to Area Commands. Standard units are those that have been reorganized under U. S. T/O & E's or special Philippine Army T/O & E's. The policy of organizing under U. S. Army T/O & E's has been followed as far as practicable. To avoid

On in reference to Philippine units, it is desired to point out that recognized guerrilla units are elements of the Philippine Army even though they bear guerrilla designations. All units of the Philippine Army include at least some recognized guerrillas; therefore, it is preferable not to use the expression "Philippine Army and Recognized Guerrillas". It is desirable to eliminate all distinctions between guerrillas and non-guerrillas within the Philippine Army. By Executive Order # 21, by the President of the Philippines, dated 28 October 1944, all persons of any nationality or citizenship who were actually serving in the military forces in the Philippines were placed on active service with the Philippine Army. Recognized military forces were those that had been officially recognized by GHQ, SWPAC. The status of all personnel called into the services of the Armed Forces of the United States, by a proclamation of President Roosevelt dated 26 July 1941, was considered not to have changed since that time. However, a policy was adopted that permitted American personnel and Philippine Army personnel called into the services of the Armed Forces of the United States in 1941 to remain on duty with recognized guerrilla units as long as the services of these units were required in combat operations. On duty with these forces was a small number of men who had escaped from the U. S. Armed Forces at the time of the surrender. Included among these were guerrilla leaders such as: Colonels Volckmann, Fertig, Ramsey, Anderson, Boone, Lapham, and Folsom. Functions of the Guerrilla Affairs Branch, G-3, will be explained by Major Otti who heads that branch.

- (3) Non-divisional service troops with few exceptions have been attached to bases.
- (4) The Off-Shore Patrol with a strength of 500 officers and enlisted men is to be attached to the Philippine Sea Frontier for training, operation, and supply of naval material. Rations, clothing, pay, and land transportation are to be provided by the Philippine Army. Functions of the Off-Shore Patrol will include coast guard duties and all other patrol activities. The Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier, favors the operation of all small boats controlled by the Commonwealth government by the Off-Shore Patrol, but the Commonwealth has not yet concurred in such.
- (5) The Far East Air Forces have been charged with the responsibility of training, operation and technical air corps supply of the Philippine Army Air Corps. At present this force consists of a troop carrier squadron and elements of an air service group. The Chief of the Philippine Army Air Corps serves as a staff officer to the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, in addition to his other duties.

c. An American unit has been organized to assist in the training of the Philippine Army. This unit is known as the United States Army Training Group, AFWESPAC, and is a separate command assigned to Special Troops.

AFWESPAC, under the operational control of G-3. It is composed of U.S. Army personnel. Functions of the Training Group are to organize and train teams for attachment to area commands. Under the control of the area commander, these teams are employed to assist in the training of Philippine Army units. The Training Group commander is charged with the responsibility of procuring personnel and supplies for these teams including necessary training aids. Area commanders exercise operational control of all attached training group teams.

d. Another considerable group of American personnel largely occupied with Philippine Army affairs is the Recovered personnel Division, Adjutant Generals Section, this Headquarters. Functions of this division will be explained later by Colonel Marcus, the Chief of this division.

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Gen. McGaw:

ARKS

BR

In my reading of the extracts of the AFPAC letter, reference was made to two inclosures, the first listed was a revised plan for demobilization of the Philippine Army. It requires considerable implementation. Col. Lillard who I have been told, was the only real authority in this headquarters on the Philippine Army prior to 5 November, will discuss this plan of demobilization. I have also asked him to discuss briefly the forthcoming Philippine Scout Project and its relationship to the Philippine Army tasks. COL. LILLARD:

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General Styer and Gentlemen: As you have heard from the other speakers this afternoon, the primary problem that this Headquarters has is one of reducing an existing army to one that it is assumed they can support by the 4th of July, 1946, and to be subsequently reduced as to be discussed by other speakers.

The mission, then, is to demobilize by the 30th of June 1946 all the units that are not to be required within the Philippine Army and on or by the 4th of July 1946, turn those units over to the Philippine Commonwealth, there they are to retain initially in their military establishment.

I think first we should discuss briefly what the Army consists of today. Roughly, the strength of the Army, to all practical purposes, is 210,000. (See chart I). Of that number, as of the date we prepared that chart - about the 6th of November - some 54,600 were non-standard Philippine Army units - the so-called recognized guerrillas. The remainder, 154,000, are in standard Army units.

Very briefly, that Army is composed of two activated and organized infantry divisions - the 2nd, which completed its organization as of this date, and the 6th, which has been organized for some time. The 3rd has been activated but not organized, and the 4th and 5th activated and their Headquarters now organized. The 3rd is completely an unorganized division. We also have six regiments in the Visayans, for a total of twelve T/O and T/E Philippine Army regiments. Very little field artillery - actually about one battalion - an air force of about 600 and about 13,000 personnel in the service units.

Generally, your standard units, with the exception now of the 2nd Infantry Division which is just organized, are found in the southern islands and Mindanao. However, we have the 2nd Infantry Division in Northern Luzon. The non-standard units are entirely on Luzon, either attached now to the 86th Infantry Division - some 20,000, say - and as surplus to the 2nd Infantry Division in Northern Luzon, perhaps 8,000. Colonel Volckmann estimates now. The service units are all largely hereon Luzon.

For the figures that were made on this chart (Chart #1) show the reduction that this revised plan for demobilization of the Philippine Army envisages 95,000 by the 31st of December. I wish to emphasize that the original plan was predicated on initiation by the 1st of October, which of course we weren't able to do, not even receiving the basic directive until 1 November, and we have not been able to do more than the initial process of deactivation up to now. By the 31st of March, the figure is shown as 45,000, and the estimated figure on June 30th - 44,000. I will not discuss the figure of 12,844, which is shown as post-independence, because Col. Cheston will discuss that.

The demobilization is considered to be executed in three progressive reductive phases: The first one I mentioned, the 31st of December, the second the 31st of March, and the last one, the 30th of June. The units to be retained as of the 31st of December will consist at least of those that you see listed, (Chart # II) starting with the infantry division units at the top. You will notice that we are allowed to have three, but we do not have to have more than two, on 31 March, so obviously another division will not

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be activated or ordered. Neither do we have fifty infantry regiments. Ultimately there will be a strength of three infantry regiments - undoubtedly one each on Luzon, Mindanao and the Visayans.

The MP Command, which will be discussed in greater degree by General Christiansen remains constant at 19,204 straight through. I have lumped the engineer, medical, ordnance, signal, QM, as you can see showing that they go in certain branches to extinction.

This reduction will be accomplished largely by elimination of surplus personnel and the casuals in the standard T/O & E units. That will run about 50,000; and the non-standard units that we have on Luzon should run around another 50,000. Remember that recognition of guerrillas is a continuing process; therefore while we lose at one time we stand to gain ten, fifteen or twenty thousand thereafter. So our problem is to eliminate 100,000 people from the Philippine Army by the 31st of December, and largely without touching activated units.

In Phase 2, details which I will not discuss - I think the chart is self-explanatory - we will continue to eliminate surplus personnel and then subtract units from the Phase 1 list. Phase 3 brings us down then to what we expect to turn over to the Commonwealth. We will have estimated the, by the time we reach 34,000, some 165,000 personnel, if no other guerrillas were recognized. This readjustment can be advanced in any phase if the conditions permit.

The efficiency with which this is executed will depend entirely upon the smoothness of the mechanics which we will have perfected for the discharge or relief from active duty and disbandment and turn-in of equipment of these organizations. It terminates, as I stated before, with a turnover to the Commonwealth Government of, generally speaking, what is shown for Phase 3. That it might be changed between now and Phase 3, but 34,000 is at least a good target figure.

I shall remark very briefly, on the Philippine Scouts, as they have been mentioned by Col. Kreuter. Obviously the Philippine Scouts belong to the U. S., but the personnel will be Filipinos and we will have available roughly 165,000 men who, if the promise of the future is attractive enough to them, will doubtless wish to enlist and should provide plenty of material from which to get the 50,000, of which I presume there must be about 4,000 now alive.

I believe that is all I have to say in this very brief coverage of the revised plan.

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Gen. McGaw:

Col. Cheston, the next speaker is a member of the USATG, AFWESPAC, which was touched upon by Col. Kreuter. Before Col. Cheston joined AFWESPAC and the Training Group, he was largely responsible for the 2nd inclosure to the AFPAC letter previously read by me, namely, the revised plan for the post-war Philippine army. Because of his familiarity with that plan, I have asked him to discuss it here. COL. CHESTON:

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REMARKS BY COL. D. M. CHESTON, USMAG, AFESPAC

General Styer, Gentlemen:

The subject of my conference is "The Eventual Post-Independence Philippine Army."

In drawing up the plan for this Regular Force Army, it was necessary to establish a basis on certain assumptions. These are as follows:

First. That the United States will retain in the Philippines for an indefinite period after Philippine Independence, military, naval and air bases. These bases will be garrisoned and defended by military forces of the United States.

Second. That the annual budget for National Defense for several years will approximate \$20,000,000 which was the amount allocated in the fiscal year 1941-42. For a period of at least 5 years, it is not believed this sum can be materially increased.

Third. That necessary expenditures in excess of this figure for temporary maintenance of a military force considered essential for internal security will have to be met from funds other than current income.

Fourth. That the United States will furnish the Philippine Government without reimbursement all the equipment required to implement this plan.

Fifth. That subsequent to Philippine Independence, the United States will not undertake to support financially the military program of the Philippine Government.

Base on the above assumptions, the following components were considered necessary to be included in the Regular Force.

A command and administrative headquarters.

A National Police Force for the maintenance of internal security.

An agency for the training of a limited reserve force.

Miscellaneous small units.

(Chart III - Organization of the Philippine Army.)

Now, let us glance at the Organization Chart of the Philippine Army. The Bureau of National Defense is charged with the responsibility of performing all functions connected with military operations in the Philippine Government. The Secretary of National Defense heads this bureau. Under him the Chief of Staff is the President's military assistant in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The Chief of Staff heads the Philippine Army and under him are a Deputy Chief and both a General and a Special Staff.

(Let me point out at this time several abbreviations which might be confusing later on. PMA is the Philippine Military Academy; MTC is the Military Training Command; and Mob is the Mobilization Planning Section, Rec Pers, is the Recovered Personnel Section.)

See (Chart # IV)

The service and supply for the headquarters will be the function of Headquarters Company containing Company Headquarters, Signal Platoon, Transportation Platoon, and Medical Section.

The Philippines will be divided geographically into 10 Military Districts as organized before the war and based on the population of the islands. The training and administrative functions these districts had before the war will be eliminated by the concentration of trainee instruction in a single training camp, but duties in connection with registration, selection, and preliminary processing of trainees and with mobilization operations will be carried out by the district headquarters.

Five mobilization areas have been designed as general location for the mobilization of the 5 Reserve Infantry Divisions planned in event of a national emergency. These areas are also based on the distribution of the population and include two military districts per area. In each of these areas, there will be designated a camp for one division and necessary service troops. It is also planned that the equipment for these units will be stored and maintained at each camp.

See Chart V - Military Police Command.

The Military Police Command will consist of a headquarters in Manila, a Headquarters Company, 4 Zone Headquarters, 49 Provincial Headquarters, 65 MP Companies, a Medical Service Battalion, and a Signal Service Battalion. The present MPC comprises approximately 19,000 officers and men. It must be understood that this reduced organization is not considered adequate by certain officials of the Philippine Commonwealth to maintain internal law and order during the first year of independence, due First, to the breakdown of the normal civil law enforcement agencies during the three years of enemy occupation, Second, to the large number of weapons now in the hands of the civil population, and Third, to general disorder and lawlessness developed and fostered by widespread guerrilla activities. Considering that law and order are of primary importance to an independent nation, these same officials believe that funds in excess of current income must be provided to maintain the present or a slightly reduced MPC from funds now held for the Philippine Government in the United States.

See Chart VI - Off-Shore Patrol.

The Off-Shore Patrol will function as a Coast Guard directly under the Chief of Staff and will maintain close liaison with the MP Command. Its organization is shown on that chart. (Col Kreuter has mentioned the mission) (Its principal duties will be to enforce maritime, custom and fishing laws; render assistance to ships, planes, and persons in distress; render relief to isolated areas suffering from disaster; support primitive expeditions of the Philippine Army; assist the MP Command in the apprehension of personnel under warrant of arrest; report on navigational hazards; establish beach and coastal lookouts; and inspect isolated islands for the purpose of maintaining current intelligence information.)

The Presidential Guard and Army Band are what their names imply. The Philippine Military Academy is necessary to continually provide trained officers for the Regular Force. The National Defense Act authorizes an enrollment of 350 cadets. It is estimated that 75 will be the initial year's

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quota. The functional staff for the Philippine Military Academy will include a Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, Administrative, Tactical and Academic Departments.

The Military Training Command will have a permanent personnel as shown in the chart. (See chart VII). This command will be charged with the training of approximately 12,000 reservists each year.

The ten Military Districts will select and process men from their districts and send them to a central camp on Luzon where the trainees will be assigned to units. Shown on that chart (pointing). Basic training will be conducted for all units for the first 20 weeks followed by advanced and technical training the last 23 weeks. At the conclusion of basic training, those trainees demonstrating exceptional leadership or technical ability will be given temporary grades and ratings. At the conclusion of the training year trainees will revert to the Reserve Corps.

The Supply Plan for this army of approximately 25,000 will be operated generally as follows:

First. All Philippine Army units other than the MP Command will draw all classes of supply and equipment from a General Depot located in the vicinity of Manila. Class I supplies for Luzon will be stocked and issued at this depot. Some items may be procured by local purchase.

Second. MP Command units, District Headquarters, and Mobilization Centers will draw their supplies and equipment from 4 sub-depots, one established in each of the 4 MP Command zones; namely Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao. Class I supplies will be purchased locally as far as possible. Supplies in the sub-depots will be kept at prescribed levels and requisitions for replenishment made on the General Depot.

The Medical Service, Philippine Army, will administer four hospitals:

1 - General Hospital (500 bed)

3 - Station Hospitals (25 bed)

The general hospital will be located in the vicinity of Manila accessible to all units in Luzon. It will be under the operational control of the Chief of the Medical Service, Philippine Army. It will be capable of expansion to double its rated capacity.

The 3 Station Hospitals will be under the operational control of the MP Command and administered by the Office of the Chief of Medical Service. Each of these hospitals will be located in areas convenient for units of the MP Command and each hospital may be expanded in an emergency to four times its rated capacity.

In conclusion, may I point out again that the Post Independence Army is based on the financial capacity of the Philippine Government and its immediate requirements for (1) maintenance of internal law and order and (2) the training of a reserve force. In addition to those units which I have just enumerated, it is considered desirable but not practicable from a financial standpoint that the Philippine Army maintain:

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The Philippines will be divided geographically into 10 Military Districts as organized before the war and based on the population of the islands. The training and administrative functions these districts had before the war will be eliminated by the concentration of trainee instruction in a single training camp, but duties in connection with registration, selection, and preliminary processing of trainees and with mobilization operations will be carried out by the district headquarters.

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1. A small Air Force provide primarily for the training of pilots and technicians for the Reserve Force.

2. Ground and Service forces for use against an external aggressor.

The necessity for the second force is not imminent for obvious reasons, but for the maintenance of a small Air Force, there seems a very logical need and it has been recommended by AFPAC that the United States Government consider a project of contributing an estimated \$6,500,000 annually for the maintenance of this force.

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Gen. McGaw:

We are half through the agenda and I recommend that we take a five minute break!

B R E A K

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The next general subject on the agenda deals with the actions being taken and plans being made to take-over the responsibilities of the Philippine Army. On the 29th of October, G-3 received a check sheet from the Deputy Chief Staff for Operations, in substance as follows:

Check Sheet from D/C for Opns

1. G-3 will prepare a complete plan for the readjustment of the Philippine Army to a peace time basis, to be submitted to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations on or about 30 November 1945.
2. The plan will include complete organization charts (both position and functional) of the American Staff required to guide and assist in the demobilization, reorganization and training of the Philippine Army. This portion of the plan will provide for the organization of an Advisory Group consisting of the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-3, G-4; for the organization of Philippine Army sections in the G-1, G-3, G-4, Fiscal and such additions to other general and special staff sections as are required; for the provision of such liaison officers and teams as may be required.
3. A program for the training of one year trainees at basic training centers. Preferably one and not to exceed two such training centers will be provided.
4. A complete demobilization plan to provide for the progressive reduction of the Philippine Army (to include recognized guerrilla forces) to a permanent peace time basis as of 30 June 1946. It will include complete procedures to be followed in effecting demobilization with the specific responsibilities of AFWESPAC staff and command agencies as well as agencies of the Philippine Army.
5. A plan for supply of the Philippine Army based on the assumption that the U. S. Army will completely equip the post-war Philippine Army with U. S. equipment. The plan will include complete procedures to be followed in the supply of the Philippine Army.
6. Provide for the relief of the Philippine Army from U. S. Command as of 30 June 1946. However, it is anticipated that American Staff and Advisory assistance to the Philippine Army will continue indefinitely.
7. In the preparation of the plan G-3 will carefully coordinate with all other staff sections as required.

Obviously, this in itself is a big order and will keep as busy working overtime until the due date, 30 November. Col. Lillard is heading the committee working on the plan. He is being assisted by representatives from G-1 (Col. Paschall) and G-4 (Col. Anderson). We expect to call on the AG's recovered personnel division and the Fiscal director for assistance very soon. But before discussing our actions and plans further, I would like for Gen. Christiansen, Commanding General of the Military Police Command to say a few words about the Philippine Army elements of his command and some of the peculiar problems with which they are faced. GEN. CHRISTIANSEN!

Major General Christiansen, MPC.

GENERAL STYER, Gentlemen:

The Military Police Command, Philippine Army is presently composed of one headquarters Military Police Command, three Zone headquarters, 49 provincial headquarters and 112 Military Police Companies, with a total strength of 1019 officers and 18,637 enlisted men. It has an authorized strength of 1016 officers and 18,173 enlisted men. The projected strength of the command on 1 July 1946 is 19,300. Therefore, we are approximately at full strength now lacking about 100 officers for specific spots and 1500 enlisted men. The bulk of our units have completed their basic training.

Points on maintenance of Civil Law and Order:

General MacARTHUR, in response to a letter addressed to him by President Osmena in which the President asked for active assistance of United States Army Units to enforce the Fire Arms Laws, stated in substance as follows: The application of the Fire Arms Law to the citizens of the Philippines should be deferred until the demobilization of Guerrillas has been effected; then the great bulk of arms and ammunition will have been withdrawn from other than authorized forces which will make the enforcement of the Fire Arms Laws easier; that the agencies which should be employed in the application of the Commonwealth Laws to its own citizens should unquestionably be the forces of the Commonwealth; that the primary forces for the purpose would be the Military Police Command, Philippine Army. If these forces should prove inadequate, other forces of the Philippine Army will be released to the Commonwealth.

In a later directive to the Commanding General AFWESPAC, General MacARTHUR directed:

(1) That Military Police Command Units, Philippine Army be prepared as rapidly as possible to perform their function in the maintenance of civil law and order.

(2) That Military Police Command Units of the Philippine Army in appropriate areas, where capable of full performance of their duties of the maintenance of civil law and order, be turned over for operational control to the Government of the Commonwealth.

(3) That only units of the Philippine Army should be used in the functions of maintaining civil law and order. He gave authority to the Commanding General AFWESPAC to determine what forces of the Philippine Army would be employed, first, in an area in which operational control has been returned to the Commonwealth and second, in an area in which operational control is still in our hands.

It is apparent that General MacARTHUR desires:

(1) To use only personnel of the Military Police Command, Philippine Army and personnel and other units of the Philippine Army in the maintenance of civil law and order.

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(2) That he desires to turn back to the Commonwealth Government that responsibility for the maintenance of civil law and order in the Islands of the Philippines as rapidly as possible.

General STYER, on the 8th of November, sent a letter to President Osmena in which it was stated that 9 provinces could be turned over now to the Commonwealth Government for their operational control, and that additional provinces could be turned over at an early date. So far, no reply has been received from the Office of the President and no negotiations are presently underway to effect this transfer.

Please note, that General MacARTHUR desires to turn over operations control of Military Police Units, Philippine Army, to the Commonwealth. I interpret this to mean that he realizes that we cannot at present turn over supply, financial matters, maintenance and related administrative matters to the Commonwealth Government because of their lack of a comprehensive set-up for these matters. Therefore, while we expect to progressively turn over operational control, we will still be in the administrative picture until that can be cleared up. General MacARTHUR directed that Philippine Army Units transferred to the operational control of the Commonwealth Government would remain in the service of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines for the time being -- presumably that will be until 4 July 1946.

The present plans call for a complete Military Police Command Headquarters separate from the Philippine Army Headquarters. This would provide two headquarters of considerable size for a force aggregating 34,000 on July 1946. I believe such an arrangement would be a violation of the principle of economy of force. It appears to me that it would be much more economical for the Philippine Government to set-up one headquarters which would provide service for both the Military Police Command of the Philippine Army and the other units of the Philippine Army. A basic decision is needed now as to whether there will be one or two headquarters.

Regardless of whether one or two headquarters are prescribed it is obvious that one supply system and one maintenance organization should function for both the Philippine Army and Military Police Command (Philippine Army).

Thank you,

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Gen. McGaw:

When I was first advised of the transfer of Philippine Army activities to AFWESPAC, Gen. Leavoy (D/C and C/S) told me that he wanted but one officer on this staff with whom he could deal concerning the Philippine Army. He stated further that G-3 was elected. I immediately brought up the difficulties which might develop, should G-3 get mixed up in supply, hospitalization, fiscal and personnel matters. But he told me that a command decision had been made that there would be no Philippine Army section, possibly G-6, formed in this Headquarters. I then suggested that all Chiefs of the general and special staff should organize Philippine Army branches (you will all have Philippine Army problems) and that G-3 in addition to performing normal G-3 functions would maintain close liaison with the other staff sections of the headquarters and at the same time coordinate their actions, so that I as G-3, and other members of my (P.A.) section, could be in a position to accomplish our Philippine Army mission namely to be an information center and in addition the Chief Director acting for the Chief of Staff, only insofar as the Philippine affairs are concerned. I ask the G-1 and G-4 representatives particularly, to pass this information along to your Chiefs of Section, so that we can keep the record straight. G-3 is not trying to usurp their authority. Col. Paschall, who was head of the G-1 Section of the AFPAC Philippine Army Branch and who is now assigned to our G-1 section will discuss some of G-1's responsibilities toward the Philippine Army. COL. PASCHALL!

Gen. Styer and Gentlemen:

I. "Actions under way" include, as far as G-1 is concerned, several assigned undertakings. The principal ones are:

1. Establishment of the procedure for and supervision over the discharge of personnel of the Philippine Army Forces to keep pace with the program of inactivation of units established by G-3.

2. The determination of policies and overall plans for a recruitment program which is to raise the strength of the Philippine Scouts to a total of 50,000.

II. The discharging of personnel from the Philippine Army forces entails numerous interesting and important considerations, namely-

1. The very evident need to eliminate or reduce the financial burden now on the U. S. Government of carrying these better than 200,000 personnel on its payrolls.

2. The need of getting a large portion of these men back to the farms to help feed their families and help rehabilitate the Philippine Islands.

3. While the Philippine Army Forces are at present paid by U. S. the demobilization must be accomplished by actual discharge or relief from active duty by the Philippine Army.

4. The completion of this demobilization program within the time allowed is dependent on careful planning and execution. The large scale inactivation of personnel may be expected to cause dissatisfaction to many individuals. This is unfortunate but cannot be helped.

5. It is also necessary that actual discharge or relief from active duty be not conditioned on any other processes which may delay final accomplishment. Effort has already been made by a Commonwealth official to make the final settlement of an individual's claim for arrears in pay prerequisite to his discharge or relief from active duty. It is readily seen that such a condition may and probably will prolong the demobilization program indefinitely.

6. Concerning arrears in pay and settlement thereof it is well to note that only the chief of the RPD is empowered to make final adjudication and settlement of these claims. Everyone is agreed to the desirability of settling the claims as soon as possible, even prior to discharge. But this latter cannot be done unless the RPD has been previously able to obtain the evidence necessary to justify the claim. Consequently in this program for discharging personnel, close coordination is being maintained by G-1 with the AG and RPD with a view to devising some plan whereby the RPD may be able to save itself future expenditure of time and effort by coordinating its procedures for collection of evidence with our discharge procedure while the personnel involved are still concentrated in various centers. Any such plan which will assist the RPD in the early and expeditious payment of claims, some even before discharge, will be worth trying.

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7. In general the plan for discharge or relief from active duty is as follows:

a. HPA is setting up the detailed procedure to be accomplished by its commanding officers in the field including the settlement of all current pay accounts, closing personal records, physical examinations and issuance of discharge certificate. Effort is being made to see that each man is furnished transportation from place of separation to his home.

b. It is anticipated that 30 to 50,000 casuals and attached unassigned personnel will be immediately available for separation, followed thereafter by a steady flow of personnel coming from the inactivation of units by G-3.

c. It is planned that the procedure of discharge and separation will be closely supervised by American teams of officers and enlisted men.

III. As to the Philippine Scout Recruitment Program, the final directive has just been received from GHQ AFPAC placing the responsibility on the CG AFWESPAC for initiating action immediately for an intensive enlistment campaign to bring the strength of the Philippine Scouts to 50,000.

1. It is planned that the AG be charged with the implementation and conduct of this program. Directives are issuing forthwith.

2. The principal source for enlistees will be personnel of PA forces and Filipinos in A.U.S. Civilians will be resorted to last.

3. Governing considerations will be contained in AFPAC directive, some of the principal ones being that-

a. Enlistments will be for 3 years unless sooner terminated.

b. Filipino members of A.U.S. who are eligible may be discharged to accept enlistment in P.S. This re-enlistment will be in present grades. Other enlistments to be in grade 7.

c. Former P.S. now enlisted or commissioned in AUS or P.A. may retain their current status until further notice if they so desire.

d. Pay of the P.S. in grade of Private will be 18 pesos per month. It is understood that matter of increasing this pay is under study in Washington but this cannot be relied on.

e. Prior service in the P.S. and A.U.S. may count for retirement, longevity and mustering out payment.

f. Existing high standards of P.S. are to be maintained. Ability to speak English will be highly important.

g. Provisions of the "Red Apple" Bill, in general does not apply to P.S.

h. It will be necessary to establish a replacement installation to accommodate the P.S. enlistees on a casual basis until provisions are

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made to form them into organizations. Recommendations are being requested of G-3 and G-4 as to site and installations.

i. Plans include furnishing the AG the necessary personnel for the conduct of enlistment campaign, as soon as the needs are known.

IV. Current promotions in P.A. forces-

This activity presents no great problem. The current policy is to keep promotions in general to a reasonable minimum, but more particularly in the field grades. Except for promotion from 3d to 2d Lieutenant which is automatic based on time in grade, recommendations for promotion must be first approved by the President of the Commonwealth before coming to this headquarters for approval. Also there must exist a position vacancy and evidence of the time previously served in such position by the officer.

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Gen. McGaw:

Col. Anderson a new member of our G-4 Section will next discuss G-4 responsibilities toward the Philippine Army. COL. ANDERSON!

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REMARKS BY COL. G. B. ANDERSON
PLANS & POLICY DIV., G-4, AFWESPAC

General Styer and Gentlemen:

In my talk the following G-4 responsibilities to the Philippine Army will be covered:

- (1) Action under way.
- (2) All expenses borne by the United States.
- (3) Special accounting.

1. Relative to action under way, a brief statement of the status during the War Period in respect to supply, equipment and maintenance of the Philippine Army, reveals:

a. That their operation was patterned generally in accordance with G-4 activities of our own Army.

b. That these units were supplied, equipped, and maintained by U. S. Army organizations to which they were attached or assigned, through local supply points and bases in the vicinity of their field of action. This included temporary shelter and housekeeping facilities where necessary. Requisitions were, and are, submitted for items of equipment based on T/O & E's to the Area Army Commander. Items unfilled by the Army Commander were processed to appropriate supply agency of AFWESPAC for replenishment. Wherever possible, Philippine Army units draw supplies directly from area AFWESPAC supply bases thus relieving the Army Commander of this responsibility and making these units self-sufficient in respect to supply procedures, which is being greatly emphasized. Supply of these units will continue until their inactivation and/or release to the Philippine Government.

c. Following the transfer of control of responsibility to AFWESPAC, action incident to supply procedures on inactivation of units resulting from demobilization consists of the turning in of equipment and supplies to local supply points and bases under the jurisdiction of Area and Base Commanders respectively. Equipment thus turned in is disposed by salvage, if unserviceable; reconditioned for subsequent reissue; or if new, returned to stock. Upon receipt of directive presently being prepared by G-3, this section will designate installations or supply points which will receive, segregate and store all serviceable supplies and equipment turned in by the Philippine Army and recognized guerrilla units. These supplies will be held for reissue to units composing the permanent Philippine Army.

d. Plans are in the process of formalization for the disposition and release of real estate used by these units, upon inactivation, for purposes of temporary shelter and housekeeping facilities.

e. In accordance with recently published "Plan for Demobilization of Philippine Army," the supply plan provides for the following:

- (1) Completely equipping Post War Philippine Army with U. S. equipment.
- (2) The establishment of a War Reserve for initial equipment and 150 day's supply for a Philippine Army of five (5) divisions and supporting troops at an aggregate strength of approximately 100,000.

f. Recapitulation showing Phases, aggregate strength and periods:

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Aggregate Strength</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
I	95,241	1 Oct to 31 Dec 1945	15 Inf Regts, supporting troops & Mil Pol Cmd (19,204)
II	45,719	1 Jan to 31 Mar 1946	6 Inf Regts, supporting troops & Mil Pol Cmd (19,204)
III	34,000	1 Apr to 30 Jun 1946	3 Inf Regts, supporting troops & Mil Pol Cmd (19,204)

NOTE 1. To the above is to be added a general supply depot scheduled for organization within the Manila Area after 1 April 1946.

NOTE 2. Reserve units scheduled for organization:

5 Infantry Divisions and supporting troops aggregating 100,332.

NOTE 3. Post-Independence Philippine Army, 12,844.

g. Hospitalization. Philippine Army units are to be served under existing U. S. Station and Base hospitals until the establishment by the Philippine government of station and general hospitals as previously indicated in this conference.

2. The expenses incident to the operation of the Philippine Army have to date been borne by the United States. Equipment has been issued on memorandum receipt and supplies have been issued as requisitioned. A record has been, and is being, kept of all these loans and issues.

3. There is no special accounting other than the records indicated above. Since this is a function of the Fiscal Director there is nothing to report on this matter at this time, except to state that the Fiscal Director has recently received a radio from the War Department to the effect that there is now pending in Congress a bill declaring surplus all equipment loaned on M/R and all supplies filled on requisitions with a limitation that the amount is not to exceed \$100,000,000.00.

Gen MacGaw:

Col. Marcus, past and present head of the recovered personnel division will discuss some of the responsibilities of the Adjutant General. The recovered personnel division now operates under the direction of the Adjutant General, AFWESPAC. COL. MARCUS!

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REMARKS BY COL. M. H. MARCUS
RECOVERED PERSONNEL SECTION, AG, AFWESPAC

I would like to deviate slightly from the scheduled agenda in order to explain the provisions of the Missing Persons Act and to clarify in proper sequence the functions of the Recovered Personnel Division. The Recovered Personnel Division was transferred on November 5th from GHQ, AFPAC to AFWESPAC. It has previously processed only AUS, Philippine Scouts and Civilian Employees of the War Department. The processing of Philippine Army personnel has been accomplished by the Philippine Army, subject to final approval in each case, of the Recovered Personnel Division.

The Missing Persons Act provides the following benefits:

1. That pay and allowances for the entire period that a person is missing in action will accrue to his benefit and will eventually be paid to him upon his recovery or to his beneficiary in case of his death. The term "Missing in Action" as used above indicates those actually "Missing in Action", interned in a neutral country, captured by the enemy and beleaguered or besieged.
2. That no pay or allowances will be paid for any period in which it was determined that the missing person was absent from his post of duty without authority.
3. That all allotments made by the missing person will be contained until full settlement of his accounts are made.
4. That in case of necessity to provide for the missing person's family, new allotments may be initiated or old allotments increased during the person's absence.
5. That after 12 months period has elapsed, a review of each case will be made, and if circumstances warrant, a finding of death may be made.
6. That determination of death may be made at any time that evidence clearly points to the death of the individual.
7. Punishment for fraudulent acceptance of money paid under the Missing Persons Act.
8. Grants authority to the head of a department or his designated subordinate to make final determinations.
9. For the protection of personnel administering the act, it provides that no disbursing officer or officer authorizing payments will be charged with erroneous payments or over-payments except in cases of fraud.

The War Department instructions for the administration of the act were contradictory in that they provided in one paragraph for complete payment of arrears in pay to all personnel, while in another paragraph it stated that the occupation of the country and who were allowed to resume their normal way of living would not be entitled to any payment during that period. The Commander-in-Chief was asked to announce a policy on the interpretation of this directive. In reply the following policy was announced: (C/N Fm. D C/S to G-1, 7 March 45.)

"a. Individuals to be considered as in a "missing in action" status for the entire period during which they were absent from full military control, except:

- (1) Cases of actual desertion or AWOL in the face of the enemy prior to the surrender of the unit.
- (2) Cases of acceptance of positions in Japanese or puppet agencies.

This to include the Japanese sponsored BC, municipal, provincial or "republic" offices, etc. (Note: BC - Bureau of Constabulary)

"b. Payment for the period "missing in action" to be based on the foregoing, that is, for all persons, whether prisoners of war, with guerrilla forces, at home or elsewhere, except when positive disloyalty has been demonstrated."

Based on the above policy no individual who worked for the Japanese in any capacity has been paid for the period beginning with his acceptance of employment under the Japanese until his return to full military control.

As a result of a staff study and memorandum submitted to the Commander-in-Chief on August 11, 1945, a decision has now been rendered that persons are not entitled to benefits under the Missing Persons Act where there appears to have been but little enemy restraint, the individual was not deprived of reasonable freedom of action or opportunity of livelihood and there was no serious deprivation by reason of his official military status.

The direct result of this will be that the majority of the Filipino military personnel and civilian employees will not be in a casualty status under the Missing Persons Act from the date of giving parole to the Japanese until their return to military control. For this period, then, they will not be entitled to payment of arrears in pay under the Missing Persons Act.

This brings us to the problem of processing the individuals of the Philippine Army with respect to the Missing Persons Act. It is to be noted here that the Philippine Army has very few records to show who belonged to the Philippine Army and what grades they held. Therefore the first step is to confirm that fact that an individual is actually a member of the Philippine Army. This may be done by having him present in the form of affidavits, statements from individuals of recognized authority confirming his membership. The second step is to determine what grade he legitimately holds. Many members of the Philippine Army are claiming promotions of several grades for which there are no records. Here again it is necessary for the individual to support his claim by affidavits from responsible authorities showing in detail the promotions made and the dates of such promotions. Here a matter of policy must be decided. Many persons claiming promotions have been unable to substantiate their claim in any way. It is my recommendation that in such cases the officers or soldiers be processed in the highest grade which he can prove that he held and his claim to any higher grade be denied.

In the absence of any other evidence it is recommended that a grade commensurate with the position held be authorized.

In similar manner claims of beneficiaries must be fully substantiated by

identification and confirmation of the status of the deceased individual, by identification of the claimant, and proper supporting papers to show the relationship of the claimant to the deceased.

In order to expedite the adjudication and payment of arrears in pay and claims for benefits, it is proposed to send teams into the field to prepare affidavits for each individual officer, and soldier and claimant, and to collect such supporting data as he or she is able to provide. These affidavits and supporting papers will then be delivered to the Recovered Personnel Division in Manila for adjudication. Upon receipt of these papers a locator card and 201 file is prepared for each individual; his name is sent to the CIC for loyalty clearance; his name is also checked against the AUS, Philippine Scouts and Civilian files to prevent duplication of claim. His application is then studied for determination of his membership and confirmatory orders are cut verifying any promotions which have been confirmed. Papers are then sent to the Finance Branch for computation of arrears in pay. After review and approval by Director of Recovered Personnel Division, they are sent to the Finance Officer of Philippine Army for payment by check. Any case in which the loyalty of the subject individual is questioned will be referred to a Loyalty Status Board for determination.

As stated previously, Recovered Personnel Division has up to this time, processed only AUS, Philippine Scouts and Civilian employees. It is not prepared to start immediately on processing the Philippine Army. It has been estimated that a total of 292 officers, 1,275 Enlisted Men and 83 Civilians will be necessary to accomplish this task. This represents an increase of 196 officers, and 872 enlisted men over our present authorized strength. In addition to this several hundred typists will be required, which it is anticipated can be furnished by the Philippine Army at the station where each field team is working. Tables of Organization and equipment for such a unit are being prepared. In addition room-space amounting to 73,200 square feet will be needed for this purpose. I have asked the Headquarters Commandant to obtain and assign to Recovered Personnel Division the entire Trade and Commerce Building. After receipt of the required space and personnel a short time must be allowed for organization and training of this personnel.

As you can see from the above outline the processing of an individual under the Missing Persons Act will take some time to accomplish. It cannot be done as rapidly as men could be discharged from the Philippine Army. As Colonel Paschall so well pointed out a few moments ago, as many individuals as possible should be paid their full arrears in pay prior to discharge. There is no doubt that this can and will be accomplished in a great many cases. All payments under the Missing Persons Act are made by check and those individuals who are not paid prior to their discharge will receive their check by mail or courier or thru the agency of the nearest local military unit.

Gen. MacGaw:

Guerrilla units played a big part in the liberation of the Philippines. Likewise, guerrilla affairs consume much attention in the Philippine Army Branch of G-3. Major Otti who has been associated with this component of the Philippine Army for several months will tell you what he knows about it.
MAJ. OTTI!

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REMARKS BY MAJ. OTTI
GUERRILLA AFFAIRS BR. PHIL. ARMY DIV. G-3 SECT. AFWESPAC

On 20 April 1945, the United States Army Training Group was activated under authority Staff Memo #44, Headquarters, USAFFE, dated 19 April 1945. This organization had as its primary mission recognition and induction of bona fide guerrilla units into the Philippine Army and assisting the Commonwealth Government in the training and use of this potentially valuable source of military aid. Naturally the disbanding and disarming of thousands of pseudo-guerrillas, who were actually a burden on the social and economic life of the Islands, fell under the above named objectives.

The guerrilla situation on Luzon was Unique and presented many baffling problems. On the other islands of the Philippine archipelago the guerrilla organizations were well organized cohesive units fairly well controlled and disciplined. They presented a very definite obstacle to the domination of those islands by the Japanese. On the other hand the heavy concentration of Japanese troops on Luzon precluded the possibility of a centrally controlled and organized resistance movement. There were at one time some 400 different units on Luzon operating independently and without central control. However there were several large units functioning in active opposition against the occupation. There were:

- (1) Volckman's (outstanding in organization & performance).
- (2) Marking's Fil-Americans.
- (3) President Quezon's Own Guerrillas.
- (4) Hunter's Reserve Officer Training Corps.

The Sixth Army recovered and utilized some 150 guerrilla units totalling approximately 75,000 officers and men. By March 1945, those guerrilla units not under Army control were presenting a serious problem. These groups totalling about 320,000 armed inactive guerrillas were impeding military operations by looting and pilfering quantities of arms and ammunition. It was at this time that Guerrilla Affairs Section was activated to counteract this situation. The work of this section was organized in four phases, namely to:

- a. Review and recommend final action on guerrilla units attached to the U. S. Army.
- b. Locate and investigate all unrecognized guerrilla units and recognize those worthy of becoming a part of the Philippine Army.
- c. Arrange for processing of such units recognized.
- d. Disarm and disband those units found not worthy of recognition.

Recognition of a guerrilla unit implied that its services were of definite value to the U. S. Army and that the organization of that unit was sufficiently military to lend itself to easy incorporation into the Philippine Army. After recognition and processing of such a guerrilla unit it became a bonafide part of the Philippine Army.

At the present time the guerrilla situation has assumed a highly political nature. Most of the recognized officer personnel of units are civil offi-

cials, such as mayors, governors, chiefs of police and other less important political job-holders. The situation is complex and one of the most important problems of AFWESPAC necessitating the greatest possible tact and diplomacy.

... have in general covered the subject of the conference, but ...
... would like for Col. ... to ...
... that will face us in AFWESPAC within the next few weeks and months.

COL. ...

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Gen. MacGaw:

We have in general covered the subject of the conference, but before closing, I would like for Col. Kreuter to outline briefly some of the problems that will face us in AFWESPAC within the next few weeks and months.

COL. KREUTER!

REMARKS BY COL. R. H. KREUTER
CHIEF PA DIV. G-3 SECT. AFWESPAC

1. I believe future problems confronting us regarding the Philippine Army have been brought out by various speakers but I shall mention again those that seem most important to me. Among problems expected to arise before the date of Philippine Independence, is the matter of coordination with the Commonwealth on the following:

a. Control of the Philippine Army and enforcement of internal law and order until that duty is completely turned over to the Commonwealth. Enforcement of internal law and order to the satisfaction of the Commonwealth government in areas for which the Army is still responsible, may prove rather difficult. The Commonwealth government in my opinion appears to be very much concerned about minor disorders and considers that a great need exists for a greater law enforcement body.

b. Demobilization of the Philippine Army. The desires of the Commonwealth naturally differ with proper procedures as we visualize them. The Commonwealth desires to accomplish payments of arrears in pay and allowances prior to discharge of any individual. Before beginning the demobilization, it is the desire of the Commonwealth to settle claims for arrears in pay of all personnel who have already been discharged. Because of the time required to collect necessary evidence in each case, considerable delay would result. For the same reason, settlement of arrears in pay prior to discharge would prevent necessary demobilization before independence. The Secretary of National Defense believes that to discharge approximately 150,000 men, without payment of arrears will cause unrest and difficulties arising from increased unemployment and further that such a body of unpaid men will be apt to join readily with subversive elements. Because of the great expense to the United States in maintaining the present strength of the Philippine Army, obviously it is to our interest to demobilize that Army as rapidly as possible. It is estimated that the daily cost of this force is over 1,200,000 pesos. Another problem connected with the demobilization is the deactivation and disbandment of some Philippine Army units. In some cases, it is believed that a large number of arms have been hidden and that personnel being disbanded will be reluctant to surrender such arms. The Commonwealth government expects the U. S. Army to disarm all those units that have served in the Armed Forces of the United States, and believes that serious disorders will result unless all arms and ammunition are collected. It is conceded that we have a real responsibility to disarm, upon demobilization, all individuals called into the armed service of the United States and that failure to do so places a great burden on the agencies charged with enforcement of civil law. To accomplish this task, it is further agreed that we should take the best measures possible under existing circumstances. However, in performing this duty there must be considered the desire of the Commander-in-Chief to avoid bloodshed within the Philippines and especially to avoid the employment of the U. S. troops against Filipinos. Other than routine measures to collect arms or payment therefor on statement of charges, must include careful plans to make it advantageous for each individual to surrender all U. S. property. For example, the Loro places little value on paper money compared to firearms. Opposed to that attitude is his great desire for silver that he can use in the manufacture of jewelry and sell at high profit. It may be possible to induce him to turn in many hidden arms by tendering his final pay in silver. In relation to the demobilization, it should be noted that considerable administrative difficulties are being experienced in discharging our own personnel, all of whom desire discharge. The administrative problems of discharging over 150,000 Filipinos, who do not desire discharge, will undoubtedly involve great-

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or difficulties.

2. Strong antagonism has developed between those who joined guerrilla elements and those who stayed in their homes and carried on under the Japs. Guerrillas have contended generally that those who failed to join active guerrilla units were neglecting their responsibilities to their country and shirking military service. Those who stayed at their homes and carried on civilian activities contend just as strongly that they bore the chief burden of the occupation including torture by the Japs and economic hardships caused by great inflation. They hold that a high percentage of the guerrillas was made up of bandits, living in safety and comfort, preying the country-side, while doing little to harrass the Japs. The most important current political issues seem to spring from the antagonism between the guerrilla and non-guerrilla elements.

3. The number of claims growing out of guerrilla activities promises to assume major proportions. It is estimated that a least a million separate claims for materials furnished guerrillas will be recieved. At present it is planned to consider only those claims originating after the date or recognition of guerrilla units concerned.

4. A further problem to be coped with will be the adjustment of existing plans for the demobilization in order to turn over a force that can be maintained by the Commonwealth. It may be necessary to reduce considerably below 34,000 by 30 June 1946, if adquate funds are not forthcoming. The size of this force can be determined only after it is known what funds will be available.

5. The Philippine Army Air Corps presents a special problem. The Secretary of National Defense has indicated informally that the Commonwealth cannot support the air force as now planned and as soon as the President returns, a counter-proposal from the Commonwealth is expected. The Secretary of National Defense recently favored the inclusion of only a skeloton troop carrier squadron and skeloton light bombardment squadron for use by the MPC. He desired that the remainder of the Air Force be incorporated in the Philippine Scouts. The Commanding General, FEAF, probably will oppose the latter. The Philippine Commonwealth particularly desires that a Filipino air force be established because they consider it to be an essential element to support enforcement of internal law and order.

6. All of the above problems appear to have political implications and it is anticipated that, in some cases, political pressure may be exerted in Washington in an effort to obtain action more favorable to the Commonwealth.

7. Procurement of cadres to train the new Philippine Scout force will be difficult. A decision must be reached as to whether or not American officers are to be used in the Scout organization. Because there has not been an opportunity to train adequately Filipino officers, it appears that a great percentage of officers assigned must be AUS if the force is to be organized and trained within a year. All officers above the grade of 1st Lieutenant should be AUS initially and a gradual reduction of this number should be accomplished by introducing Filipino officers progressively from the lower to higher ranks.

8. With a view to continuing U. S. assistance in Philippine Army problems after independence, it is planned that the Senior U. S. Army Commander in the Philippines shall provide a Military Advisory Group to the Philippine government, with functions similar to those performed by General Mac Arthur's pre-war mission.

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At the suggestion of Gen. Wood, I have reversed items 12 and 13 on the agenda. So before asking Gen. Styer for his closing remarks I would like to solicit some discussion of Philippine Army problems from the floor. With the fine staff of advisors that I have here present, I am in hopes of obtaining answers to your questions, however, I must remind you that there are to-day many unknowns in this problem;

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Gen. McGaw: I think I can answer that question. There will be a... exactly the same as an American soldier who is in the same line. I expect... will be hospitalized until he can progress no further and then... will be discharged and subject to care by the Veterans Administration.

Gen. Styer: Where is he going to be hospitalized?

Gen. McGaw: Philippines Islands.

Gen. Styer: In what institution?

Gen. McGaw: In other U. S. Army or Philippine hospitals, I believe.

Gen. Styer: Army hospitals?

Gen. McGaw: I believe so. Hospitals now are being hospitalized in some... hospitals and also in some of our own army hospitals.

Col. Dyer: There is a question of hospitals to be established... in Manila. They are now being hospitalized in civilian hospitals and in our own.

Gen. Styer: Very slight question was made of the Philippine Service. I... like to have included in the minutes of the meeting a statement of the progress... if possible, a status list.

Gen. McGaw: The items of the troop basis are to be prescribed by AFSA... and I understand that it is quite long. I believe that you have been... furnished. I mean the actual location. The major portion of the... troops is to be stationed in the medical Infantry division with... two regiments of an Engineer Special Brigade.

Gen. Styer: A complete troop basis is not available from AFSA... published at this time.

Gen. Styer: Will they be used in Manila?

Gen. McGaw: One division is contemplated; for use in Manila; and for... use for training Gen. McNulty's 8th Division.

Gen. Styer: The like hospital out... have been to the U. S. Army who have... low other purposes. I think... and... the matter be taken up... and... they purposes or... to Manila?

DISCUSSION

GEN. STYER: Among these Philippine Army and Philippine guerrilla units, there are quite a number of disabled veterans who had an arm shot off or a leg shot off or were otherwise disabled, and I think to make the notes more complete, you had better write up the action to be taken in these cases so that those people who have attended will know how to proceed.

GEN. McGAW: I think I can answer that quickly: They will be treated exactly the same as an American soldier who is in the same fix. In other words, he will be hospitalized until he can progress no further and then he will be discharged and subject to care by the Veterans Administration.

GEN. STYER: Where is he going to be hospitalized?

GEN. McGAW: Philippine Islands.

GEN. STYER: In what institution?

GEN. McGAW: In other U. S. Army or Philippine hospitals, I believe.

GEN. STYER: Army hospitals?

GEN. McGAW: I believe so. Filipinos now are being hospitalized in some civilian hospitals and also in some of our own army hospitals.

COL. DUKE: There is under way a Bureau of Hospitals to be established here in Manila. They are now being hospitalized in civilian hospitals and in our own.

GEN. STYER: Very slight mention was made of the Philippine Scouts. I'd like to have included in the minutes of the meeting a statement of the troop basis, if possible, a station list.

GEN. McGAW: The items of the troop basis are to be prescribed by AFPAC and I understand that it is quite long. A station list has not yet been determined. - - I mean the actual locations. The major portion of the new Philippine Scouts is to be organized in to two modified Infantry divisions with two regiments of an Engineer Special Brigade.

Editors Note: A complete troop basis is not available from AFPAC for publication at this time.

GEN. STYER: Will they be used in Japan?

GEN. McGAW: One division, is contemplated, for use in Japan; one is for use here to replace Gen. Molasky's 86th Division.

GEN. STYER: I'd like to point out another thing. As our troop units move back to the U. S., we will have certain camps here that become available for other purposes. I think perhaps before any of these camps are torn down and dismantled, the matter be taken up with your section to be sure that they can't be used for Philippine Army purposes or Philippine Scouts.

GEN. McGAW: I agree, sir.

Gen. McGaw:

If there is no further discussion I would like to ask Gen. Styer if he will favor us with his comments?

This conference was called for the purpose of discussing the general concept of a conference of this nature whenever some big job is given to us. Some important project has to be started. These conferences serve several useful purposes. One is that I am saved from reading an awful lot of minutes. People who are responsible for the various phases of the conference have to dig down and get to know their stuff and develop an interest in it; it affords a very convenient means of informing other people who have some interest in the subject and the publishing of the minutes of the conference. Still other people who keep current with the situation. We will have these minutes reproduced with the charts and they will be distributed to you and to others who have this problem before them. Another useful purpose is that it gives a chance to those people who do the "back-end" work, which is perhaps the hardest part of the work, to display their work so that we have an opportunity to look them over and see how they have been performing.

I want to thank Gen. Styer for coming over here and giving us a very fine background of the Philippine Army and its problems. We have been training at this time the members of the Philippine Army Division who have been transferred here from AFAC; we are glad to have you here and to welcome you.

We have devised a plan on which many people have worked. I want to point out that this is only a plan and it can serve no useful purpose unless it is put into operation and carried out. Let's not drop it with this conference and with the formulation of a plan. Let's dig down and get the operating details worked out and get the plan executed efficiently and as expeditiously as we can.

I intended first to have this conference just for a limited number of people, the way going to be organized with this problem. The fact that it is now on a wider scale, Malaya's Headquarters I invited him to come down and did the same with Gen. Bradley. He thinks he has been suggested from Manila. He is glad to see both of you here. Sorry to have had Gen. Boyd of the 33rd, but we will give him all the information that we have regarding today.

I want to thank Gen. Styer for the very fine presentation of the conference and thank all of those who participated and advised that for the execution of their responsibilities. I think we have all gotten a great deal more information concerning this matter than we would have otherwise. I certainly think it was a very fine conference.

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CLOSING REMARKS BY
GEN. SLYER

This conference was called at my request for two purposes. We generally conduct a conference of this nature whenever some big job is given to us or some important project has to be started. These conferences serve several useful purposes. One is that I am saved from reading an awful lot of mimeographed sheets, maps, charts, and so forth; and the people who are responsible for the various phases of the conference have to dig down and get to know their stuff and develop an interest in it; it affords a very convenient means of informing other people who have some interest in the subject and by the publishing of the minutes of the conference, still other people are kept current with the situation. We will have these minutes reproduced with the charts and they will be distributed to you and to others who have this problem before them. Another useful purpose is that it gives a chance to those people who do the "pick-and-shovel" work, which is perhaps the hardest part of the work, to display their wares so that we have an opportunity to look them over and see how they have been performing.

I want to thank Gen. Stivers for coming over here and giving us a very fine background of the Philippine Army and its problems, and I want to welcome at this time the members of the Philippine Army Division who have been transferred here from AFPAC; we are glad to have you here and we welcome you.

We have devised a plan on which many people have worked. I want to point out that that is only a plan and it can serve no useful purpose unless it is put into execution and carried out, so let's not drop it with this conference and with the formulation of a plan. Let's dig down and get the operating details smoothed out and get the plan executed efficiently and as expeditiously as we can.

I intended first to have this conference just for a limited number of my staff who were going to be concerned with this problem. We later enlarged it and on a visit to Gen. Melasky's Headquarters I invited him to come down and did the same with Gen. Bradley. He thinks he has been shanghaied from Mindoro. We are glad to see both of you here. Sorry we haven't got Gen. Boyd of the 93rd, but we will give him all the information that we have expounded today.

I want to thank Gen. McGaw for the very fine arrangement of the conference and thank all of those who participated and commend them for the excellence of their presentations. I think we have all gotten a great deal more information concerning this matter than we would have otherwise. I personally think it was a very fine conference.

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