

PHOTOSTATIC COPY OFFICIAL REPORT

OF

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EVERETT LAUMAN  
WARNER, 0125573

(deceased)

CERTIFICATE-REPORT

I certify that I am Everett Lauman Warner FA (O-125,572) Lieutenant-Colonel Field Artillery, Army of the United States.

That I certify to the following report which purposes to give all the facts concerning my movements and actions beginning with my arrival in the Philippines August 1, 1941 and with particular attention to same beginning with the outbreak of war-December 8, 1941 and culminating with my return to American Prison Camp in the Philippines Number One, Cabanatuan Nueva Ecija December 6, 1942.

That as Captain Field Artillery I arrived in Manila, Philippines on above date mentioned from duty at the United States Army Quartermaster Depot (Remount) Front Royal Virginia, as per paragraph 28 General Orders Number (I believe 199) The Adjutant General's Office, War Department, Washington D. C. dated May 26, 1941.

That by Special Orders No. 177, Headquarters Philippine Department August 1, 1941 I was assigned to the Provisional Field Artillery Brigade (Philippine Scouts) commanded by Colonel Louis R. Dougherty FA at Fort Stotsenburg P. I. That Colonel Dougherty assigned me to command Battery "D" 88th Field Artillery (PS) and that on September 1, 1941 I was given command of the Second Battalion 88th Field Artillery (PS). That on or about October 27th 1941 the arrival from the United States of six Lieutenant Colonels FA made it necessary for Colonel Dougherty to replace four of us six Battalion Commanders Junior to these officers. That Lieut-Colonel John R. Ball FA. became my new Battalion Commander and designated me as his Executive Officer.

That early in November 1941, Headquarters Philippine Department ordered Fort Stotsenburg to furnish one officer for detail to Camp John Hay P. I. to replace Major Francis E. Fellows 24th F.A. (PS) due to return to the United States. That I was selected by General William R. King thru Colonel Dougherty for this detail and that I received orders from Headquarters, Philippine Department on November 10, 1941 to report for duty at Camp John Hay, That I proceeded to and arrived there about noon November 11, 1941.

That by Special Orders Number 93, Headquarters, Camp John Hay I was designated Intelligence Officer (S-2), Provost Marshal, Investigating Officer, Summary Court Officer, Surveying Officer, Post School Officer, Assistant Fire Marshal, Classification Officer, Morale Officer, Officer in Charge Post Library, Entertainment and Recreation Officer, and Officer in Charge Enlisted Men's Dormitory. That I functioned in these assignments until Camp John Hay was ordered abandoned and was actually evacuated December 24, 1941. That I was promoted to Major Field Artillery, December 17, 1941 while at Camp John Hay.

That on December 8, 1941 at 8:19 A. M. just after an officers meeting called by Lieut-Colonel John P. Horan to discuss war plans a bombing attack by 17 and 1-- eighteen Japanese Planes hit Camp John Hay inflicting casualties totalling eleven (11) killed and approximately 40 injured--soldiers and civilians. That in this I received slight injuries of the face, abdomen and legs. That there were dropped approximately 117 bombs in the attack. That two duds found by me were 50 kilogram bombs 39 inches long and 12 inches in diameter. That in this raid there was also damage to buildings and utilities.

That Lt. Colonel Horan ordered me to identify and bury the mortalities which I did in Cemetery Number Two.

That twice more, December 13th and December 15, 1941, Camp John Hay was bombed, on the 13th with 2 persons injured (one soldier, Sergeant Eddie Cook and one civilian Filipino child). That the main camp quartermaster garage was heavily damaged. That in these last two attacks approximately 40 bombs were dropped.

That my duties now as Intelligence Officer and Provost Marshal along with other duties ordered by Lieut-Colonel Horan, kept me quite busy. That I frequently kept up liaison from Camp John Hay with our 43d Infantry Unit Outposts on the Nagullian Road, and later conducted Philippine Army Units moving thru Baguio to overnight bivouac positions in and around Baguio.

That it seemed difficult to get any information or orders on what might be any plan to defend or to evacuate Baguio and that there seemed to be no effort made toward an adequate defense of Camp John Hay.

That on the afternoon of December 24, 1941 I received orders from the Camp John Hay Adjutant to be ready to evacuate--that the camp personnel would evacuate at night by way of Antamok Goldfields and Twin Rivers. That after dark I went to Twin Rivers in a car with First Lieutenant Silvio Gasperini and there saw Lieut-Colonel John P. Horan directing the destruction of army rolling stock and other equipment by having same pushed over a steep embankment and into a ravine off a blind-end road at Twin Rivers. That we all were told that 10,000 Japanese Troops were approaching Baguio via the Kennon Road and should arrive by midnight.

That after the attempt at demolishing equipment the Camp John Hay Personnel was ordered to move eastward on foot over the mountain trails. That the information I was able to gather was that we were to try to make it thru to our lines in the south. That the first stop was Lusod Sawmill about 30 kilometers east of Antamok.

That in order to get information on Japanese entry into Baguio I remained overnight at Antamok and returned the following morning (December 25, 1941) to Baguio. That no Japanese actually came in before December 27th to Baguio.

That about 11 o'clock A. M. December 25, 1941 I left Twin Rivers and moved alone with 2 Filipino Cargadore Guides to Lusod Sawmill arriving there after dark. That the following day December 26th, I asked Lieut-Colonel Horan for his orders concerning me. That Lieut-Colonel Horan gave me the following verbal orders, overheard by Private First Class Alfredo Reyes #10304960-88th Field Artillery (PS)- (my former driver at Ft. Stotsenburg). That Colonel Horan's order to me was-Quote "Proceed to National Road Number Five and let me know whether it is open and clear to the south. Also, if there is transportation available and how much", unquote. That I asked in reply "At what point on Road Five, Aritao?". That Colonel Horan replied, quote "Yes, and you had better move out. It is not well for too many of us to move over the trail together" unquote.

That in the evacuation of Camp John Hay there was much military equipment and ammunition destroyed and abandoned, which equipment also included some of the battalions of self propelled mounts 75MM Field Artillery. That Lieut-Colonel Joseph Ganshl FA. U. S. A. (c/o Dr. Hanna-Cleveland News, Cleveland, Ohio- or 3280 Chadburne Road, Shaker Heights, Cleveland, Ohio) and Captain E. W. Jones FA-2843 E. Third Street, Tucson, Arizona, can give more accurate information on this than I, also Major Francis E. Fellows, FA.

That upon receiving Colonel Horan's verbal order December 26, 1941, to proceed to Aritao on National Route #5 I started for that point about 3 o'clock P. M. with Pfc. Alfredo Reyes.

That on the night of December 27, 1941 we arrived at Kayapa Nueva Viscaya and the following morning I succeeded in getting Major Martin Moses Inf. on the telephone in Aritao-5 Kilometers away. Major Moses commanded the 12th Infantry P.A. That Major Moses informed me Route #5 was open and clear of enemy to the south and that there was ample motor transportation at Aritao for many troops. That there were many Filipino Soldiers in Aritao. That I returned this information by written message to Lieut-Colonel Horan behind me on the trail.

That proceeding toward Pingkian, Nueva Viscaya, en route to Aritao I met several groups of Philippine Army Soldiers, some with arms and equipment and some without. That these men told me their respective units had been disbanded by their officers and that they had been directed to proceed to their homes. That I doubted this and instructed the men to follow us to Aritao. That upon reaching Pingkian I met a Filipino named Aponio Balic, Baan of Pingkian who was gathering U. S. Army rifles and ammunition reported to be thrown away by troops of the Philippine Army. That Balic claimed to be a veteran of World War #I in Europe and said he had service with the 36th Infantry in the United States.

That I instructed Balic to continue gathering arms, ammunition and other scattered U. S. Army Equipment and to turn it over to the Police Chief at Pingkian.

That I also instructed the Pingkian Police Chief (Designated "Sergeant") to collect and hold for further instruction from our forces, all arms, equipment and ammunition known to be disposed of by USAFFE Troops.

That I proceeded to Aritao Nueva Viscaya, arriving there about 4 P. M.--Monday December 29, 1941. That there I met Captain Manuel P. Enriquez C.S.C. (PA.) Assistant Intelligence (G-2) Officer 11th Division Philippine Army, (Commanded by General Brougner) and other officers (Philippine Army) including 2d Lieut. Edmundo G. Navarro Inf (Dist. Hqrs. First Military District), 2d Lieut. Melito P. Bulan Inf. (Dist. Hqrs. First Military District), 3d Lieut. Honorio Quines (Inf.) (Reporting for duty The Adjutant General Dec. 28, 1941), 3d Lieut. Manuel T. Nery (Reporting to First Regular Division Dec. 28), and reserve officers (full names not all here available) Lieutenants Fotas, Turingan, Evangelista, Valdepena, Palaylay, Pagalilauan, Hernando, Vea, Validez, Ascuncion, Baguiran and Cervacio Reyes. That in addition were about 200 enlisted personnel of District Headquarters First Military District, the Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Twenty-Second and Seventy-First Infantries and Eleventh Engineers, Philippine Army. That Captain Enriquez reported that all were proceeding as ordered to Manila but had been delayed by Japanese activity in San Jose Nueva Ecija. That I immediately investigated this report of Japanese activity south of us and found that large Japanese Forces had occupied San Jose and territory east and west of same about midnight December 28th, 1942.

That this news I sent back by written message and messenger to Lieut-Colonel Horan whom I presumed to be following me east on the trail to Aritao.

That further, I succeeded in getting a telephone connection with Mayapa where I got the police chief on the telephone to deliver a message to Colonel Horan. That the Chief informed me that on the previous day--December 28, Lt-Colonel Horan had with his troops of the 43d Infantry (PS) moved south toward Imagan, Santa Fe and Belete Pass to Road Number 5. That he sent me no word of this.

That believing therefore I was going to see Colonel Horan later coming North, I decided to temporarily take command of the Aritao situation, and with the aid of Captain Enriquez, procured rations for the approximately 200 officers and men here who had few emergency rations. That with the help of citizens available we provided sufficient subsistence for several days and immediately organized and sent out details for additional food supplies. That on the same night (December 29th) I ordered all troops and supplies moved out to Borrio Comon, 3 kilometers southeast of Aritao to reorganize troops there.

That my purpose for reorganizing these troops was threefold, namely,

- (a). To keep up their morals and the morale of Filipino citizens who feared that disbanded troops meant a lost cause.

(b) To preserve law and order and to prevent armed disbanded soldiers from demanding individually, food and shelter from the populace and being tempted to loot.

(c) To put up the best defense we could if Japanese Forces proceeded north, from San Jose.

That many of the troops collected had thrown away their blankets and other army equipment, fearing identification as soldiers by the enemy if captured.

That I immediately gave orders to all the provincial and municipal government officials that I could contact, of Nueva Viscaya, to gather and hold for our collection, all USAFFE Arms, ammunition and equipment known to be abandoned or discarded by troops. That we made a check-up of troops as well to get information on this-and followed up collection of that which we located.

That we proceeded to organize into a Provisional Battalion of Infantry and I designated Captain Enriquez as my Executive Officer.

That we located and brought back out of hiding Governor Demetrio Quirino of Nueva Viscaya and had him call a meeting of Provincial and municipal officials for the purpose of reestablishing law and order, and systematizing our procurement of food and supplies for our troops. That we immediately put a stop to looting which had begun to take place in considerable proportions, and that we took over the constabulary in Bayombong under Captain C. L. Prudenciado, and reorganized volunteer Guards for Governor Quirino S. Province (Nueva Viscaya) and important municipalities thereof, also municipal police-assuring them all of our assistance when needed. That later we did this same thing for the Governor and Province of Isabela-also offered assistance to Governor Marcelo Addurn of Cagayan Province. That later also, after we procured and set up our radio transmission and receiving set, we sent and received numerous messages between and for President Quezon and Governors Quirino of Nueva Viscaya, Vasaya of Isabela and Addurn of Cagayan. That in one instance we were able to get a vacant circuit judgeship filled in Isabela Province by President Manuel L. Quezon. That I was anxious to help the established provincial and municipal governments function normally without declaring and placing them under Martial Law. That I announced this policy to the Governors and pledged our assistance to them to keep their governments functioning. That on this subject Governor Marcella Addurn of Cagayan Province especially deserves to be commended. That with considerable Japanese Forces constantly in his Province at Aparri and Tugueguermo, he was still able to carry on an efficient and effective government, helpful to our cause.

That in early January 1942 while we were organizing and growing in strength of personnel, the two provincial engineers, A. J. Zerate of Nueva Viscaya and Bartolome Pason of Isabela were of unestimable value to us by their unselfish and efficient services and their untiring energy in procurement for us and for their respective provinces.

That on or about January First 1942 in the late afternoon Captain Enriquez was on a mission in nearby Arisao (we were in Barrio Comon) when Lieut-Colonel John P. Horan,

with Captains Leo Gitter and Cameron Starnes came thru up National Road Five heading north and with two trucks filled with soldiers of the 43d Infantry (PS)-about 60 Troops, that Captain Enriquez reported my presence nearby to Lt. Colonel Horan and asked the Colonel if he desired me to report to him. That he (Colonel Horan) replied "No" and said that he was in a great hurry. That according to Enriquez, Colonel Horan sent me his regards and told Enriquez that he was glad I was in charge-plus a few complimentary remarks. That Captain Enriquez reported Lt. Colonel Horan had not stated his exact destination.

That on or about January Fifth 1942, Captain Guillermo Nakar, 71st Infantry P.A. with about 150 officers and men of the First Battalion 71st Infantry reported to join us. That Nakar reported that after heavy fighting at Bausang, La Union, he had been cut off and had fought his way sometimes thru heavy odds to Nueva Viscaya. That his unit was all that remained of the First Battalion, 71st Infantry. That Captain Nakar's men had most of their arms, ammunition and equipment in tact.

That at this time and since December 30, 1941, Captain Ralph B. Praeger-26th Cavalry (PS) with First Lieutenants Warren A. Minton and Thomas S. Jones and about 75 enlisted men of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) were in Bambang, Nueva Viscaya, about 6 kilometers north of Aritao. That his unit, recently on patrol duty on the Kennon and Magulian Roads near Baguio, had been ordered by Lt. Colonel Horan to move out, and had also been ordered, it was reported, to destroy 3000 rounds of 50 calibre ammunition, 2 air-cooled machine guns, and 17 garand rifles. That on January 3, 1942 Captain Praeger and his unit prepared to move in to Isabela Province and now transferred to Santiago. That I sent an invitation to Captain Praeger and troops to join our forces if I could get permission from Headquarters Philippine Department to organize troops nearby.

That Captain Enriquez now reported to me that we could procure a 171 radio transmitting and receiving set with operators from Banawa and I ordered him to do so. That by January 9, 1942 we had the set erected in the Bayombong Hospital and operating. That the Chief Operator was Staff-Sergeant Jose Gabaneryo S.C. and his assistant was Corporal Ednalino. Both of First Military District P.A. That Gabaneryo was later promoted to Third, then Second Lieutenant. That we set up the transmitter in Bayombong in order to use the town power, meantime trying to locate a power engine and generator for use in out-of-the-way places.

That our first message after contacting U.S.A.F.F.E. Headquarters January 9th 1942 was to report identified officers and troop units in my vicinity thereto and that I asked Headquarters permission to organize a Provisional Regiment with Enriquez as Executive and Praeger and Nakar as Battalion Commanders of First and Second Battalions respectively. That further I asked if plane could bring us ammunition to Bagabag Airfield.

That on January 13th I received the following reply-quotes

"1-10/JC 620P 61 KZWX 1-13-42  
Major E. L. Warner KZPG

Our main forces hold only Bataan Province and Corregidor Island  
West Manila period Staying in hills continue to operate support trenches

Please send as much information any possible means stop Not practical at this time to drop any support from planes but will do so when possible stop Organize your forces to meet your needs end  
MacArthur 740P.

That on the authority of this telegram I again requested Captain Praeger to join us. That because Captain Praeger delayed accepting I then asked him to send me 1st Lieutenant Warren A. Minton and as many troops as he could spare. Lieutenant Minton accepted with Praeger's approval and brought 40 Philippine Scouts of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) and about 260 officers and men of the Philippine Army. That some in fact, the majority, of the Philippine Army Personnel had been men called to the colors but unable to report to their respective units before this. That the training of some of these was limited.

That my second radiogram to U.S.A.F.F.E. Headquarters asked permission to requisition and sign for subsistence and other necessary supplies for my troops. I further asked if I would be authorized any set or limited amount. The reply to this was as follows:-quote

"1 BJ/DO 235P KZPT January 24, 1942  
Major Warner KZPG

To Major Warner (stop) Chips issued by you on payment of legitimate expenditures will be reimbursed in cash at earliest date. (stop) It is inadvisable to set limitation amount. Authorized End.

MacArthur  
So Sig 300P

That on January 13, at 2 A.M. Captain Ralph B. Praeger, First Lieuts Minton and Jones with Technical Sergeant William E. Bowen, Sixty Philippine Scouts and 28 officers and men of the Philippine Army conducted a successful raiding attack on the air field and Japanese occupied constabulary barracks at Tuguegarao. The results were reported by me to Headquarters U.S.A.F.F.E. that Captain Praeger had 1st Lieutenant Warren A. Minton do the 6 day reconnaissance and intelligence work preparatory to the attack.

That Captain Praeger with Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) had now moved to Santiago Isabela.

That again and again we requested from U.S.A.F.F.E. Headquarters, ammunition, to be sent to or dropt at Bagabag Air Field Nueva Viscaya and on or about January 18th received the following radiogram from General MacArthur-

LO/JC 1005A KZWK Jan. 18 1942  
Major Warner-KZPG

Regret exceedingly that I have no way of sending you ammunition stop. Avoid any mass battle action against you which might be designed to exhaust or destroy your forces stop. Harass but do not repeat. Do not fight them stop. For present you just rely on your own forces stop. Your energetic action has pleased me greatly and I commend you and your entire command. stop Be careful as to messages you dispatch me and hold them to a minimum end  
MacArthur 1102A.



That on or about January 20, 1942, Captain Cameron Starnes, Infantry reported from Lieut-Colonel Horan to my Headquarters now in Bayombong stating that he had a message from Colonel Horan for me to send to U.S.A.F.P.E. Headquarters. That the message read:-

"Commanding General

Dated (Jan 20th)

Lieut. Colonel Horan, Major Warner, Captain Sitter and Captain Starnes, all safe and with troops.

(Signed) Horan

That Captain Starnes stated Lieut. Colonel Horan had instructed him to wait for acknowledgement of receipt by U.S.A.F.P.E. Headquarters of this message, and that if reply did not come by the following night (January 21st) he (Starnes) had been instructed by Lieut. Colonel Horan to send a second message.

That the second message to U.S.A.F.P.E. was to contain the following--

Commanding General  
 U.S.A.F.P.E.

"It is reported that Lieut. Colonel Horan with 600 (six hundred) heavily armed troops is guarding at strategic points, all roads and passes leading to Kiangan." (That I was requested to sign this message "Warner")

That I refused to send this message on the grounds that I knew the information to be incorrect. That I knew Lt. Colonel Horan, now in Kiangan, had dismissed about half of his two 43d Infantry (PS) Companies and had no more than seventy soldiers with him. That when I asked Captain Starnes Lieut-Colonel Horan's reason for sending such a message, Starnes replied "Colonel Horan believes that the Japanese are intercepting your messages and he wishes to misinform them.". That I advised Captain Starnes that U.S.A.F.P.E. Headquarters was expecting me to send truthful information and that this message would mislead them also. That Captain Starnes here advised that Colonel Horan would order me to send this message and I replied "Not over my name.". That I was later informed that Lt. Colonel Horan was angry with me about this.

That now on or about January 21, 1942, my Headquarters was at Bayombong with the main body of Headquarters Troops numbering 165 officers and men, at Santo Domingo-7 kilometers south near Bato Ferry on the Magat River, and at Bayombong, Solano and Bagabag Air Field 10 kilometers north. That Captain Nakor's 160 men battalion, the second, was at Dupuy-30 kilometers south of Bayombong and 1st Lieutenant Minton's, The First Battalion at Santiago Isabela, strength 302 officers and men-25 kilometers to the northeast. That all troops were available to and from main roads. That on or about January 24, 1942 I moved my Headquarters to Bagabag north of Bayombong and moved my Headquarters Troops from Santo Domingo to the same place. My Second Battalion at Dupuy under Captain Guillermo Nakor were moved to Bambang. They numbered 147.

That on or about January 25, 1942 Captains Nakor and Enriquez were in compliance with my request, promoted to Majors of Infantry and General Staff Corps respectively.

That on or about January 25th 1942 Japanese Forces began pursuing us from the south. On or about that date we engaged and defeated an advanced detachment of approximately 150 endeavoring to enter Bambang with the slight loss of one man killed. This was reported. That on January 26th we again repulsed an attempted crossing of the Magat River near Bato Ferry.

That the enemy forces now in Aritao south of us numbered about 2000. That we had at the same time plain clothes intelligence patrols in this place and raiding patrols beyond to the south, also to the north and east. That Master-Sergeant Restitudo F. Teijan, formerly 11th Engineers (PA) was particularly effective on intelligence work in plain clothes.

That on January 27, 1942 I gave orders for the entire regiment to assemble on the school house grounds in Bagabag on the morning of January 29th. That on that date the First and Second Battalions plus Headquarters Troops assembled and I ordered the entire regiment to move into Isabela Province from Bagabag Nueva Viscaya.

That the movement eastward began the same date, the Regiment moving in sections, because it was necessary to cross the Magat River using rafts that we had constructed to carry supply trucks and cars. Our total strength now was about 627 officers and men.

That we placed a rear guard detachment of 35 men under Major Nakar armed with dynamite-bamboo bombs in Bagabag and about 250 officers and men as a delaying rear guard, the same with automatic weapons extended over a distance of one kilometer and placed on both sides of the road thru Orinong Pass-these troops also under Major Nakar's command.

That these precautions because we believed the Japanese Forces would soon endeavor to pursue us in effective numbers which proved to be true.

That our movement eastward covered about 24 hours in order to clear all units from Bagabag.

That about 8:30 o'clock on the morning of January 30th-just after our last supply unit had cleared, seven Japanese Bombing and one Pursuit Plane appeared from the south and made an attempt to destroy us. That the school buildings were all demolished in Bagabag by bombs, that also were two buildings just north of Solano N.V. where we had about 30 malaria cases, destroyed. Several bombs were dropped on Bayosong and an attempt was made to smash my former Headquarters and Transmitter Station on the Bagabag Ferry Road about one kilometer east of the school property. That was just prior to our movement eastward. Japanese Planes had dropped printed pamphlets addressed to me and Major Enriquez labelling us "Brave and Clever" but urging our surrender and stating that it was "Futile" to resist Japan.

That in the bombing attack we received three soldiers slightly injured-one man at the telephone switchboard in Bagabag and two men near by him watching the planes and reporting their movements to the telephone operator to be relayed on to Major Nakar at a point in North Bagabag. That these men remained at their posts in the face of great danger to their lives. That this was later reported to Headquarters Philippine Department, with the men's names and rank. That after the bombing the one Japanese Pursuit

Plain located and machine-gunned a section of our supply train going east on Route #5 but did little damage.

That we arrived and established Regimental Headquarters setting up the radio in Jones Isabela this same date-January 30, 1942. That the main bodies of our troops were moved across the Cagayan River to Palagao Barrio south of Jones and to Daligen Barrio 12 Kilometers south of Jones on the east side of the Cagayan. That on February 3, we moved also my Headquarters and the radio to Palagao.

That on February 1st 1942 as we had expected, a convoy of 32 trucks loaded with Japanese Soldiers followed up the bombing attack. That these stooped to search around the debris of the school yard, my former Headquarters just east of same, where they burned the house on the property, and did considerable digging around apparently expecting to find buried records.

That there were approximately 1000 enemy troops in this body and while they were apparently deciding which direction to proceed from there our 35 men detail just to the northwest of the town became active firing a number of rounds and exploding dynamite-bamboo bombs for a limited time then withdrawing into the woods to await results. This fire drew the Japanese to the north where they deployed about 200 men with rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, and mortars and advanced toward the positions our troops had occupied-our detail withdrawing. That the Japanese Forces later withdrew untrucked and proceeded north toward Kiangan. That we had sent warnings to Major Gitter's troops-the 43d Infantry (PS) to be on the lookout for a northward move by Japanese Forces. That the troops of Major Gitter were ready and under Captains William Joels and Cameron Starnes. They met the enemy at Ibalao Pass and inflicted heavy casualties thereon. That our details reported fourteen truckloads of enemy casualties returned and it was reported to me by Captain Minton after surrender that Japanese Officers admitted losses of 272 killed in this fight.

That now with the main bodies of my troops at Palagao and Daligen also at Barrios Rosario, Buaya and Ipil, Echague I moved my Headquarters on the night of February 3d across the Cagayan River to Palagao-south of Jones. That I immediately decided after the bombings of Bagabag, Solano and Bayombong to move our troops off the main roads and to build our own camps in woods and bamboo groves not too near Barrios-this in order to not attract bombings and other attacks on the Barrios by the enemy. I chose the Cagayan Valley below Jones Isabela to establish our main bases-these to be close to the Cagayan River.

That on February 6th 1942 First Lieutenant Warren A. Minton was promoted to Captain Cavalry.

That on February 9, I took Captain Minton and we made a reconnaissance trip on horseback south in the Cagayan Valley over a distance of about 40 kilometers to select Battalion Camp Sites on the east and west sides of the river. That we had previously chosen from Coast and Geodetic Survey Maps certain sites that we wanted to see actually.

That for the First Battalion commanded by Minton we selected for his Battalion Camp a huge bamboo grove covering approximately three acres near Barrio Sinuangan Norte-this place being on an island bounded by the Cagayan, Dububu and Palatian Rivers,

approximately 39 kilometers south of Jones, and directed Captain Minton to move there and to plan his camp. That this he did, planning an excellent camp layout and immediately began construction of same in the bamboo grove. That the greater part of this work was done by Captain Minton's Soldiers often working late into the night, and that Captain Minton personally took over the planning and supervision of the work. That the camp was completed on or about March Third and its completion celebrated by a big Battalion Field Day March 4th attended by over 8000 citizens, relatives and friends of the soldiers. That there was a fine review of the troops by me, excellent competitive drills and demonstrations, horse racing and athletic events. That this event in itself was a valuable morale booster for the soldiers and civilians for which Captain Minton deserves praise.

That the camp itself was an exceptionally fine job of approved type Philippine Army construction built of course from bamboo grass, Nipa and Rattan without mill dressed lumber. There were in all, 35 buildings all hidden from air observation in the bamboo grove, including barracks, storage buildings, hospital, kitchens, latrines. That rimming the camp was a stockade bamboo picket fence 12 feet high reinforced 3 feet thick inside with logs, and camouflaged from outside observation by Banana Trees. That inside beneath and following the fence was a parapet trench from which effective rifle fire could be carried on against attacking ground forces. That there was an underground bomb-shelter exit passage from which the camp could be emptied to the southeast approaching an auxiliary position. That two heavily reinforced gates served as surface entrances and exits. That outside the main grove and about 200 yards under natural woods and boulder shelter were excellent stables with individually complete stalls for 300 horses. That we had in the regiment about 350 horses, 300 of which were in the First Battalion where Captain Minton planned and equipped them for use as a Regimental Pack Train to have ready for use as outlined here later. That in addition to these installations Captain Minton had constructed a large ground floor recreation and drill hall capable of drilling 600 troops within at close order drill and other instruction—a valuable asset in rainy weather training.

That I named Minton's Camp after and for him "Camp Minton" and that he deserves commendation for the excellent planning, efficient construction and long hours of hard work put in in connection therewith. That in addition to this camp, Minton did additional valuable construction later outlined, at the same time carrying on an effective training program for his officers and men numbering at one time 800. That a large number—about 600—of these were originally reservists and untrained Filipinos reporting for army service and that Captain Minton thru energetic effort trained them into a splendidly drilled unit with as much field training as it was possible to give under the circumstances. That because USAFFE Headquarters later limited our strength to 800 Philippine Army (two Battalions) plus attached troops Captain Minton was obliged to discharge about 500 men which he did, giving each a certificate to the effect that the soldier had reported for service and duty and had been trained for the period he had been so enrolled, which his certificate stated.

That in addition to Camp Minton, Captain Minton completed a very satisfactory air landing field near Palatian and Sinuanguan Sur about 4 kilometers south of Camp Minton. The field 1400 meters in length being dragged and well packed by 100 log rollers cerabao drawn. That this field was 400 meters in width had hangars cut out in the

immense bamboo grove at the south end sufficiently large to hold 3 B-17 planes. That there were wind cones and removable camouflage in the form of imitation houses and grass shocks the removal and replacement of which was handled by our detachment stationed there plus the citizens of 2 nearby Barrios if called upon, under respective Barrio Lieutenants, in contact with our officer in charge. That we named this field "George Field" for Colonel George of our Air Corps.

That we attached great importance to getting a plane to visit us, first in order to send in rosters, personnel records, copies of orders and mail to Headquarters and second to bring if possible a Staff Officer from Headquarters who could see and report on our set-up, our plans and operations, in order that our G-2 and G-3 could evaluate better and advise if we were making a worthwhile effort. That we requested many times a plane to land and bring a Staff Officer and were advised to prepare for a night landing when the fall of Betasan apparently changed the plan of our High Command.

That simultaneous with the building of Camp Minton and George Field, Major Enriquez selected with me a heavily wooded and bouldered hill site between Barrios Dappig and Masaya on the west side of the Cagayan River for the Second Battalion Camp. Here a very sufficient camp was constructed under 1st Lieut. Manuel T. Wery-the buildings also being of approved Philippine Army Type. Here we did not consider trenches, stockade and bomb shelters necessary because of the barricades to land attack offered by hills, boulders, and trees as well as some air attack protection by the same.

That Major Enriquez constructed also a second camp in the hills about 17 kilometers south of Santiago Isabela. This to be used as an operations base, named Camp St. Francis.

That Bilala Isabela in the foothills of the Sierra Madre Mountains about 9 kilometers east of Camp Minton and George Field, Captain Minton constructed our fourth camp-named Camp Warner. That this was used as an overnight terminal for the First Battalion on hikes and field maneuvers and for recreation for the entire regiment.

That beginning March 1st I moved my Headquarters from Camp Minton where I had been during construction of same to Daligen then on March 10th to Barrio Osal on the east bank of the Cagayan River 15 kilometers south of Jones. That at this time I changed Executive Officers also, relieving Major Enriquez and placing him in command of the Second Battalion and switching Major Nakar from the Second Battalion to the Regimental Staff as Executive and in command of Headquarters Troops. That I moved the radio transmitter across the river from Masaya where it had been placed February 7, 1942 to Dibuluan. That fuel shortage for operating the generator engine was beginning to hamper us and in Dibuluan I was able to produce power from a Chinaman's crude oil rice mill engine. That now the radio transmitter at Dibuluan was about 3 kilometers south of my Headquarters at Osal. That at Dibuluan we erected a radio station with aerials well protected from air observation and here in addition to the Signal Detachment we placed a Guard Detachment with strict orders to keep unauthorized persons away from the station. That it was also necessary to order that military news from Headquarters be not repeated nor discussed outside by those receiving and decoding same-or transmitting. That we did publish a daily news bulletin for the people of news broadcast from the United States.

That in early March we again called together at our Headquarters the Governors, other important provincial and chief municipal officials of the Provinces of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Viscaya. That this meeting was for the purposes outlined below-

First-To confer on law and order in the Provinces and to offer our assistance in keeping same enforced.

Second-To check up on our subsistence status making sure that food supplies were being drawn without hardship on the people of any one or more communities.

Third-To urge farmers in the tobacco growing sections, particularly of Isabela to plant less tobacco and more food such as upland rice, corn, comotes, sugar cane and other food crops, and to offer soldier labor to help.

That I had been promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel Field Artillery as per Paragraph 4 Special Orders 22 Headquarters U.S.A.F.F.E. dated February 12, 1942 and accepted by order February 13, 1942.

That following our withdrawal of main forces from Nueva Viscaya into Isabela in January Japanese Forces moved into Bayombong N. V. under a Japanese Reserve Officer-Lieut. H. Miyamoto-who had been for the past ten years a photographer of Bayombong. That Miyamoto had upon entering Aritao endeavored to hold meetings of Filipino Citizens urging them to get their friends, relatives and former neighbors to return to their homes and stores out of evacuation places. That Miyamoto assured the people that the Japanese were their friends.

That in Bayombong Miyamoto appointed an Acting Governor for the Japanese Forces-a Mr. Jose C. Aguila. That himself affected with lung trouble, Lieutenant Miyamoto, appeared to be relieved of field duty with the Japanese Forces and continued to live in Bayombong.

That here he arrested a number of citizens some of whom he charged with unfriendly activities against the Japanese, and that he assessed all Chinese Store Keepers and Operators of any type business a weekly indemnity of fifty pesos.

That soon Miyamoto needed a houseboy and we furnished him one in the person of an intelligent Sergeant-thru "Channels". That this soldier furnished us with information valuable to us from time to time. Reporting to us when the Japanese Officer set up and operated a radio transmitter and receiver and was able to decode our messages sent by our old code which we knew was captured at Vigan. That when our Headquarters sent a cipher device and codes by plane and dropt same and we were able to change codes-our Sergeant reported that Miyamoto could no longer decode our radiograms.

That all in all we were able to get valuable information at times from our arrangement and I gave orders for the time being not to disturb Lieut. Miyamoto. That Bayombong at the time was in the operations area of Major Enriquez, commanding my Second Battalion. That functioning in charge of our constabulary detachment covering Bayombong was Captain G. L. Prudenciano. That Prudenciano had for sometime previous to the war been unfriendly with Miyamoto.

That one night in early March while there were few Japanese Troops in Bayombong and Myimoto had released most of his bodyguard, a Constabulary Detachment later determined to be directed by Captain Prudencio raided the Japanese Officer's Quarters to arrest him. A gun fight ensued and Lieutenant Myimoto was killed. That Major Enriquez then took charge of Myimotos effects and confiscated same including about P2000 which I ordered turned over to the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Viscaya to be returned to Chinese Merchants in Bayombong who had been forced to pay Myimoto a weekly indemnity of P50.00 each. That after Myimotos death the few Japanese remaining were taken care of by us and Major Enriquez raised again the Philippine and American Flags. That about March 20th I received from Governor Quirino of Nueva Viscaya the following letter-  
quote

March 17, 1942

Lt-Colonel Everett L. Warner, Commanding  
Fourteenth Infantry

Dear Colonel Warner-  
Mabuhay! Congratulations for driving the Japanese out of Nueva Viscaya. I hope they are driven out to stay.

Your name and that of Major Enriquez are deeply engraved on the hearts of the people of Nueva Viscaya forever,

Sincerely  
Demetrio Quirino  
Governor

That along with this letter came a message signed by Governor Quirino to be sent to President Manuel L. Quezon over our transmitter which message stated that our Major Enriquez had "Recaptured" Nueva Viscaya from the enemy. That we sent the message to President Quezon just as the Governor had written it but along with it sent to our USAFFE Headquarters a supplemental radiogram requesting attention to the fact that the Governor's message was misleading in that there had been no fight with Japanese occupying troops. That we recaptured and not recaptured Bayombong after the Japanese Forces of adequate size to defend it had voluntarily moved south.

That upon Japanese withdrawal from our territory toward the south I notified our Headquarters Philippine Department of this stating that I believed they were moving to Batan.

That while in Bayombong the Japanese Officer Myimoto had been actively behind considerable propaganda directed at me and our forces. That one message to me was that I could expect 3000 Japanese Troops on me in four hours if anything happened to Myimoto. Another was that there was a P40,000 reward offered for my capture, P30,000 for that of Major Enriquez and P20,000 for Captain Minton's. That several times our messenger's rode into my Headquarters at night excitedly reporting that large Japanese Attacking Forces were approaching our positions on horseback from Japanese Bases where we knew there were enemy troops.

That at all times our intelligence and raiding patrols were dispatched where they could be most effective and in some cases the citizens and volunteer guards would assist them or even function separately under their direction. That two instances of this were volunteer guards overturning Benches loaded with Japanese Troops and machine guns in the Cagayan River near Tubagarao which instances were reported to our Headquarters.

That continuously I requested Headquarters for ammunition and particularly for a plane to come bringing a Staff Officer so that he could report on our set-up and we could be advised whether we were expanding too much. That our belief was that help would come from the United States and what we were doing would be of value at a later time as well as to us at the present. Bataan for a Field Artillery Assignment. General

That in addition to our four camps-Camp Minton, Camp Nery, Camp St. Francis, and Camp Warner at Sinaunguan Norte, Dappig, south of Santiago and Bilala respectively and George Air Landing Field near Palatian-Sinaunguan Sur we planned and built a second air landing field near Casiguran Tayabas, 125 kilometers east across the Sierra Madre Mountains. That in addition we completed a ship dock in the Casiguran Bay near the road to Casiguran the dock having been started by Civilian Japanese who owned an adjacent lumber concession prior to the war. That these projects were completed with the purpose of our getting ammunition and medical supplies as well as arms, by boat or plane. That we planned also to blaze across the Sierra Madre Mountains trails that could be negotiated by animal and were going to put to work 500 soldiers on these. That we had a pack train of 300 ponies with pack carriers all ready to operate.

That in March 1942 I was visited by two groups of officers from Lt-Colonel Moran's 1st Battalion. That until now no trails crossing the Sierra Madres above Baler were negotiable by animals-Cargadores used being for the most part Negritos between Palanan and San Mariano and Filipinos between Pinapegan and Casiguran. (Air Service). That the First

That we began work on the above installations in February 1942 completing the projects in April. That in late March I radioed Headquarters Philippine Department asking permission to make a reconnaissance of some of the unexplored territory and an inspection of these coastal installations to be absent from the Regiment from 15 to 30 days effective April 15th and to leave Makar in command during my absence. That this permission was granted by General Wainwright early in April. That we had from the First (Captain Winton's) Battalion a detail of 45 men under an officer (Filipino) and Acting Sergeant Henry Ruesch (American) on detail in Casiguran to handle construction of the dock and air field since February. Acting Sergeant Ruesch reported to us the former Japanese Lumber Concession there-also that there were several Japanese owned motor launches connected with it in the vicinity.

That up until February 14, 1942 we called our unit the First Guerilla Regiment when on that date a radiogram from General MacArthur ordered its disuse and designated us the Fourteenth Infantry. That we had used "First Guerilla" believing that to be our correct designation because our plane in February had dropt addressed to "Major Everett L. Warner, Commanding, First Guerilla Regiment" a cipher device and codes for us and for Kibugao which we delivered there thru 2d Lieut. Francis Camp. Headquarters radiated a "warning" to us

That in this connection planes came from behind our lines to visit us on four occasions but did not land. That the planes dropt us first the cipher device, code, and medicine some of which broke in landing. Second trip the planes dropt shoes for Minton and me and medicine. The third and fourth trips 4 boxes of rifle 30 calibre ammunition were dropt about half of which bent up unfit for use. That the last visit by planes was after the Fall of Bataan or about April 15th.

In which radiogram stated that Lt-Colonel Moran was disbanding his troops and that he (Moran) did not desire to be located but desired to join us. That I replied



That prior to the Japanese Drive on Bataan in April when we were expecting one of our planes to land at Palasian, I had radioed General Weinwright explaining that trained in the Field Artillery I believed myself to be of more value to the service in that arm than as an Infantry Commander and I asked if our plane should come, if I could turn over my command to Major Baker and come to Bataan for a Field Artillery Assignment. General Weinwright replied that it was desired that I remain where I was.

That ordered by USAFFE Headquarters in March to reduce to two Philippine Army Infantry Battalions plus attached troops (Philippine Scouts and Americans) we as mentioned before in this report we reduced our strength from more than 1600 officers and men to less than 1000.

That one of my most difficult problems among the troops was to impress upon them the importance of maintaining secrecy of military information. That another was the necessity of keeping always on the alert on outpost duty being impressed on them and that punishments for sleeping on outpost duty were sometimes necessary.

That in March 1942 I was visited by two groups of officers from Lt-Colonel Horan's Headquarters (The 121st Infantry). The one group being Captains George W. Stevens and Stanley E. Johnson, and the other, Captain George T. Scholey, First Lieutenant Dean Nicholson and Acting Sergeant Harkway (Formerly Air Warning Service). That the first group was on a mission from Lt-Colonel Horan which mission was to find out from us the tables of organization of Philippine Army Infantry--and to leave with us certain documents captured by Major Walter Cushing which we were to send in to Headquarters Philippine Department by plane if same came to land on our George Field.

That in this connection I learned that Lt-Colonel Horan instructed Captain Stevens--not yet actually commissioned--as follows, quote- "I am making you a Lieut-Colonel on this trip since I do not desire that you be outranked." unquote. That these officers in addition were instructed to look over our set-up which they did--Captain Scholey's Group joining them for visit to Camp Hinton and George Field. That Scholey and Stevens both stated to me--quote "You have a real set-up here," unquote.

That I was impressed with these gentlemen from Lieut-Colonel Horan's Command quite favorably, and when I learned from them that their commissions had not yet been actually confirmed I radioed Headquarters USAFFE and requested that this be done. That early in April the men named in the previous paragraph were commissioned in the ranks mentioned with their respective names.

That late in March our Philippine Department Headquarters radioed a "warning" to me to "stop stealing" Lieut-Colonel Horan's men. That whoever made accusation that such a thing as "stealing" Colonel Horan's men had happened made such accusation unfairly and without grounds. That I never at any time made any attempt to "steal" officers or men from anybody. That on several occasions officers and enlisted men believed by me to belong to Lieut-Colonel Horan's Troops wrote me asking to join my forces and in all but one case I refused them. That the one exception to this was in January 1942 when ill with malaria I received from Master-Sergeant Montecastro (43rd Infantry P.S.) a letter in which Montecastro stated that Lieut-Colonel Horan was disbanding his troops and that he (Montecastro) did not desire to be inactive but desired to join me. That I replied

by letter to Sergeant Montecastro stating that I should be pleased to have him under the circumstances. That later Private John R. Marshall QMC #6572813 and Corporal Quinley formerly Air Warning, both recently with Lt-Colonel Horan reported to my Headquarters and stated to me that Colonel Horan had told them that he (Lt-Colonel Horan) did not know where his Headquarters would be, that food was scarce and that they (Marshall and Quinley) were now "on their own". That these soldiers came at separate times-Marshall in February and Quinley in March, but each with the same story. That I permitted the men to remain until I could ascertain the truth about them and that Captain George Scholey of Lieut-Colonel Horan's Forces-the 121st Infantry stated later the information stated by Marshall and Quinley was true.

That about the middle of March I was successful in getting about 10 young pigeons which I hoped to use as carriers from our Intelligence Details out from base camps in order to speed up getting in important information, and keeping it from passing thru Filipino Barrios and the population. That as mentioned before, it was difficult to keep military information away from the Filipino Population with my soldiers, and once out, a piece of information would frequently be gossiped and twisted, also I suspected once or twice, gotten into the hands of the enemy.

That a particular and peculiar instance of news leaking into Japanese Hands is the following. That in early February our patrols and intelligence reported heavy enemy troop groups in Tugueguarao and Arisco. That upon confirming this news I radioed our Headquarters asking that we bomb these places from the air. That four days following my request-four bombs were dropped beside the road just south of Arisco-between there and Bone to the south. That almost simultaneously a dive bomber dived down (identity reported American to me) on Tugueguarao with one bomb. That Filipinos seemed overjoyed at these actions which our patrols and Filipino Civilians reported that upon thanking our high command for this action-our Headquarters denied having ordered any such bombing. That investigating further I was able to ascertain the following. That Filipinos had got hold of the news from our transmitting station detail and passed it on that we had requested the places mentioned be bombed. (This was likely not decoded by the enemy from the air because we now had the new cipher device and codes.) That receiving the information from Filipinos the Japanese Forces faked a bombing then pointed out to Filipino Citizens that our forces were willing to bomb and destroy their towns. But that we were poor marksmen, in that no damage was done to intended objectives.

That as pointed out we kept Philippine Department Headquarters informed as to enemy movements and activities in my territory-especially the Provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Cagayan. That we frequently asked for ammunition having in late March not more than 5000 rounds of rifle ammunition for the entire regiment and 3 Browning Heavy 30 Calibre Machine Guns. That Private First Class Albert S. Hendrickson and Pvt. Yano Tony Mangiameli who had reported to us for duty January 1, 1942 and sent by me to locate 2 air-cooled 50 calibre machine guns which they reported Lieut-Colonel Horan had ordered buried and 5000 rounds of ammunition for same-Hendrickson and Mangiameli insisted that they knew the location of the equipment-did not return but remained out at Lused Sawmill and made themselves generally troublesome there, it was reported to me. In late March therefore I directed and sent Major Manuel Enriquez to pick up Hendrickson and Mangiameli and their equipment and to take charge of them. That Enriquez did accomplish this but did not get Hendrickson back until about the middle of April.

That continually we radioed at intervals requesting Philippine Department Headquarters for ammunition a portable radio set-which Headquarters promised to send to us and for a Staff Officer to come to look over our set-up and report to Headquarters so that H.P.D. could advise. That we could have raised, housed, and fed an entire division provided we could get arms, ammunition for same, and believing as we were promised, that help would come, we believed-I did- that a division already to go into action in the Cagayan Valley Mountain Province and even parts of the Sierra Madres as well as the Caraballas could be of considerable tactical value. That further we felt that these mountains had great strategic value if our high command chose to use them. That as pointed out, the second air-landing field at Casiguran and the ship dock in Casiguran Bay were constructed by us at considerable effort chiefly in order to facilitate supplying organized forces. That we planned and could have constructed good trails for pack trains across to Casiguran Bay from various favorable dump points which could have been protected if Headquarters Philippine Department had so ordered.

That realizing also that our radio number 171 transmitting and receiving set was too cumbersome to erect in the best spots from time, to time as necessary, because of the great possibility of breakage and difficulty in transporting same, we carried on considerable radio conversation with H.P.D. concerning getting the portable set. That we were anxious to get this set and as here stated, were promised it, by Headquarters. That finally when we knew there was no longer any chance to get the portable set from Headquarters we commandeered the post radio sets at Casiguran and Palanan. That our chief reason to have portable sets was to establish contact between Battalions if spread out and to keep one set constantly safe for contact with Headquarters Philippine Department. That we feared capture or destruction by air bombing of our 171 set if located by the enemy and that several times Japanese Scouting Planes came over our locations looking we believe for our radio and for our camp locations. That these planes hovered especially over Barrio Messya-the location of our radio from February 7 to March 10 and over Dappig where the main Second Battalion (Major Enriquez's) was located. That I considered it good policy to move my radio station at frequent irregular intervals allowing for the time the enemy would take to follow up his radio detector information. That in the case of Camp Nery it was probably too well hidden to be spotted from the air but I learned that since Major Enriquez had chosen to use chiefly civilian labor in it's construction some of the civilians had given the camp's location to the Japanese Forces. That also we were visited by spies in the Japanese Service (Filipino's) two of whom were convicted by court-martial and executed.

That back in February when the first big Japanese Drive was taking form in Bataan I held a regimental officers meeting for the purpose of planning a way to bring my entire regiment-then numbering 1600 but with little ammunition- to Bataan but my two Philippine Regular Army Majors-Nakar and Enriquez strongly advised against such move and finally convinced me that we could not survive over that distance with so many enemy forces to pass. Major Nakar especially reminded me of General MacArthur's radiogram of January 18-quoted above- which ordered me not to contact overpowering enemy forces-able to destroy mine. That on the advice of Major Nakar and Enriquez I decided not to undertake leading my forces to Bataan about 230 miles (380 kilometers).

That our intelligence and combat patrols continued to function and we reported their activities as we were able to. That as before mentioned, I had received permission from General Wainwright to make a reconnaissance and inspection trip into the unexplored

territory and to the new ship dock and airfield constructed by us near Casiguran-this trip to last from 15 to 30 days effective April 15th. That in addition I was anxious to now get and set up at another location, the post-radio transmitting sets of Casiguran and Palanan since it appeared doubtful that I was going to receive the portable set promised me by Headquarters Philippine Department. That now, early in April the installations here mentioned were ready for use. That the Japanese Forces in our area had moved out in large numbers and that we notified Headquarters Philippine Department that we believed the enemy to be reinforcing for another big effort on Bataan. That I wanted to explore into the unexplored territory for the purpose of blazing animal trails across the Sierra Madre Mountains to the Pacific Ocean (Casiguran Bay-Diatican Bay and Palanan Bay).

That beginning April 4, 1942 we were informed that the Japanese Forces were beginning an all-out attack on Bataan, each day increasing in intensity. That on April 10th 1942 about seven o'clock P.M. Major Nekar returned to my Headquarters from our transmitting station at Dibuluan 22 kilometers south with a KGEI (San Francisco) News Broadcast to the effect that we had lost the Philippines but would regain them. That included in the broadcast were statements of Secretary of War Stimson, General MacArthur and Commissioner Elizalde, in Washington. That in addition to the news broadcast, Major Nekar brought from the Commanding General Philippine-American Forces, the following-quote:

Bj/DO 10:20A April 10, 1942

(a) Lt-Colonel Warner TMT-King surrendered Bataan yesterday to enemy divisions stop. They will pay more attention to you now end.

(b) To call at once a meeting of all Battalion and Battalion staffs for purposes of instruction in the above plan and to order same

That upon receipt of his first battalion copy of the KGEI News at Sinuanguan Norte-Captain Warren Minton came riding to my Headquarters with the report that he was getting from Filipinos. The news that Corregidor also had fallen for the reason that the Japanese Forces had demanded it's surrender, holding the approximately 45,000 Bataan Prisoners as hostages and stating that these would be machine-gunned unless Corregidor also surrendered.

That our individual and battalion officers meeting was called for 10 o'clock P.M. on 10th. That upon receipt of General Wainwright's message I called Major Nekar my Executive into conference-I had great confidence in Nekar's ability and judgement and had three times asked for his promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel-and with maps before us we agreed upon the following:

(a) That with the influx of large numbers of Japanese Forces into our territory our subsistence supply lines and sources were going to suffer.

(b) That any effort on the part of our forces to attempt a stand against Japanese Forces in equal number would most likely result in our annihilation since we had only about 3000 rounds of ammunition in the entire command and 10 hand grenades.

That Major Nekar and I agreed on the following solution to the situation:

(a) To scatter and disperse in small groups under officers and non-commissioned officers, all of my men, thruout the Barrios of the Cagayan and Warner (formerly King Kong) Valleys, and the east coast Barrios

of Isabela and Tayabas with Regimental Assembly Point to be Jones Isabela. (The governing commission-Governor, Provincial Treasurer and third member of the province of Nueva Viscaya had in March 1942 officially named and recorded the Valley of the Addalam River-formerly known as the King Kong Valley-the "Warner Valley" in my honor.) That dispersing the troops in this manner two points could be accomplished.

1. The subsistence problem would be solved in that the men could share proportionately the food of the Barrios at the same time assisting the farmers.
  2. By dispersing large groups of soldiers there would be less attraction to larger bodies of Japanese Troops in attack formation (The we could have taken care of a considerable attacking force had we ammunition.)
- (b) To operate the 171 radio set as long as it could be reasonably out of the way of capture or destruction by the enemy but to substitute for it as soon as possible a more easily portable set-one from Casiguran or Palanan.
- (c) To maintain a highly portable regimental headquarters.
- (d) To call at once a meeting of the regimental and battalion staffs for purposes of instruction in the above plan and to order same effective as of April 11.

That on the night of April 11, our Headquarters received information from patrols in San Jose Nueva Ecija that approximately 3000 Japanese had arrived that date in San Jose headed for Nueva Viscaya and Isabela.

That our regimental and battalion officers meeting was called for 10 o'clock A.M. on the 11th of April but prior to it's convening another important event took place-an event which caused me to somewhat change my personal plans and to order the Americans in the regiment with me for what I believed to be the good of the Filipino Citizens nearby if not for their peace of mind. That I felt deeply appreciative of these people and their up-to-now fine generous spirit toward us and since we were not able to defend them in battle I decided that I did not want to bring additional suffering to them by inflicting enemy punishments on them for their loyalty to me and my troops.

That early on the morning of April 11th before our officers meeting, a committee of Citizens of Isabela Province lead by Governor Visays, Treasurer Juan Silvestre (Spokesman), the third member, and the Mayor of Jones, with several other prominent municipal officials of Isabela and Nueva Viscaya called. That this delegation already had news of the fall of Bataan and was visibly nervous over what would happen to the people here if our troops attracted Japanese attacks, knowing that our forces had little chances against well organized troops heavily armed.

That I informed the delegation that we had made plans to disperse our troops in such a way that they could be inconspicuous at the same time helping the farmers and that we planned to have our Headquarters as portable as possible.

That the civilian delegation now seemed concerned that the presence of Americans among them would increase the danger of attack on the people and the spokesman Mr. Juan Silvestre suggested that we permit them to hide away me, Captain Minton, and the other Americans.

That I replied to this that we Americans had no desire nor intention to hide away but that I would take charge of a movement that would remove any situation of danger for the people on our account. That at our officers' meeting which followed and at which Major Enriquez of our Second Battalion was not represented I gave the following verbal order.

1. All Americans-officers and enlisted, in the Fourteenth Infantry would immediately accompany me and in cases where they were out on details instructions to Major Nakar were for them to follow me first to Pinappagan thence across the Sierra Madre Mountains east to Casiguran or the Barrios near there.
2. Captain Minton (First Battalion) would bring his battalion over the same route and place it dispersed in the Casiguran Bay Barrios.
3. Major Nakar would remain in the Cagayan Valley in command of his and Major Enriquez troops and the radio and would upon approach of the enemy destroy or bury the radio and scatter the troops throughout the Barrios in the Lower Cagayan and west thruout those of Warner Valley. The radio to be transported as far as possible.
4. Any opportunities for harassing or delaying action against the enemy would be taken advantage of.

5. I would contact Major Nakar as soon as possible at a later date with further instructions.

With the above instructions clearly understood I left Headquarters at Osal shortly after noon April 11, 1942 and proceeded to Camp Minton at Sinuanguan (N). There with Captain Minton we prepared the First Battalion to begin its movement to Pinappagan the following day.

That prior to leaving Headquarters at Osal I wrote out the following message to the Commanding General, Philippine Department and left same with Major Nakar instructing him to send it during the next operating hours of our radio (That unless we were instructed otherwise by Headquarters Philippine Department, we operated the radio over approximately two 2 hour periods daily in order to conserve fuel.)

The message-quote

Commanding General  
Philippine Department

11 April 1942

Subsistence problem with us now likely to become acute. Am scattering troops among Barrios to ease situation also for them to assist farmers. Will order Americans in regiment to join me and will try to join United Forces elsewhere. Meantime will now leave on reconnaissance and inspection trip authorized by you, leaving Nakar in command until further instructions. Our assembly point will be Jones Isabela.

Warner

That my reason for mentioning "Try to join United Forces elsewhere" was for two purposes, first that if I found one of the Japanese Launches reported at Casiguran, to be seaworthy I would consider taking the Americans and making effort to join Chinese or American Forces in China or even venture to reach Australia after I had first set up one of the portable radio sets on directional antennae to talk with Hawaii, the United States, and Australia. That now I was skeptical as to whether or not our Headquarters at Corregidor was actually under Japanese control as Filipino rumor had it. That it was, and I was honestly fearful that my messages to H.P.D. might be acknowledged as received, in fake, and that messages to me likewise sent directly under enemy observation and command. That on several occasions during the bombardments or air-bombings of Corregidor our signal detail had great difficulty in making radio contact--once reporting to me that contact with the United States had to first be made to contact Corregidor. That the second reason why I worded my message "Try to join United Forces elsewhere" was to mislead in information leaking out to the public as to my whereabouts. This idea worked for a while but in 4 days after I reached Palanan Bay all of Isabela Province knew it I later discovered.

That on the morning of April 13th at Pinaappagan I received the first news-mentioned before in this report--that 3000 Japanese troops were in Nueva Viscaya and Isabela.

That on the morning of April 14th I proceeded with Captain Minton, Acting-Staff Sergeant Coyle, Corporal Quinley and 150 officers and men of Captain Minton's (the First) Battalion eastward across the Sierra Madre Mountains toward the Barrios on Lower Casiguran Bay and the municipality of Casiguran. I reached Barrio Disapou on the 19th of April in the afternoon. That Captain Minton with approximately 75 of his officers and men continued on into Casiguran. That on April 21st I moved farther up the Bay to Barrio Dinalanan Tayabas. That there I prepared a message as to my whereabouts to be radioed to General Wainwright and sent same by a corporal Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) to Major Nakar to transmit. That I received no acknowledgement nor reply from Nakar--in fact I did not receive any word from him after the news about the 3000 enemy troops April 13th, in his message dated April 11th.

That on or about the night of the 21st of April Captain George T. Scholey, Lieutenant (1st) Dean Nicholson, Acting Sergeant Markway (AW) and 2 Chinese Sergeants Lao Hong and Tan Toh all of Colonel J. P. Moran's 121st Infantry arrived in Casiguran.

That they reported that they had been on a mission for Colonel Horan and were cut off from their units by Japanese infiltration. That they therefore decided to join us. That on their way they had seen my Major Manuel P. Enriquez and some of his officers in Bayombong Nueva Viscaya. That Enriquez was according to Scholey badly frightened and was dismissing his men. That Captain Scholey and party then proceeded to our Headquarters at Omal. That here according to Scholey were some Americans. That Lieut-Colonel Nakar (Scholey reported that Nakar's promotion which I requested three times had come.) was disobeying my orders that Americans follow me and was persuading some of them to remain with him. Scholey also reported to me that he believed Nakar had pulled a "fast one" on me and had engineered the meeting in which the civilian delegation of April 11th described above had called on me expressing fear over the presence of Americans. That according to Scholey, Nakar had arranged this beforehand with his friend Juan Silvestre, Provincial Treasurer and Spokesman, in order to get command of the regiment himself (Nakar). That I do know that Nakar was ambitious to advance himself politically.

That thinking over Scholey's report to me I decided then and there to right matters and on the morning of the 22d of April sent a second message to Lt. Colonel Nakar instructing him to consider me still in command. That I was remaining in command and had no idea of leaving the Islands unless relieved or ordered to do so by higher authority. That he (Nakar) would make a full report to the Commanding General H.P.D. by radio of my positions and activities. That this order to Nakar from me according to later information from Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka Q.M.G. Representative of General Wainwright was not carried out tho it was received by Nakar. Lieutenant-Colonel Kalakuka informed me that Nakar did not radio in to H.P.D. this information. That further according to Colonel Kalakuka a message was sent to me by General Wainwright to retain command and not to turn same over to Nakar. Neither did this message nor any word of it ever reach me tho Lieut-Colonel Nakar knew at all times how to reach me and also knew my locations. That I, however, did not relinquish command of the regiment at any time and finally surrendered the 14th Infantry in compliance with Lieut-General Wainwright's order as later herein described, to the Japanese Army.

That at Casiguran the ship dock and air landing field were completed and passed inspection the credit for construction of these also going to Captain Warren A. Minton commanding my First Battalion.

That on the morning of April 24 one of the launches seized from the Japanese Lumber Concession came down the Casiguran Bay and anchored off my Headquarters at Dinalanan, Tayabas. There was on board Captains Minton and Scholey, First Lieutenant Dean Nicholson, Acting Sergeant Markaway, Sergeants Lao Hong and Tan Toh, Corporal Quinley, Corporal Limpanan and Private Rusch. That in their possession was the post radio transmitter from Casiguran without generator-same being reported broken beyond repair. That in a meeting held on shore before noon I decided that we would go to Palanan and there I would obtain the Palanan Post Radio and that somewhere near in a suitable place we would erect on directional antennae and operate a radio with which we could contact Hawaii, the United States and Australia. That before leaving I instructed Sergeant Primitivo L. Gorospe to follow overland to Palanan and with Acting Staff Sergeant James R. Coyle and Corporal Joyce Altamero in addition to the nine officers and men already on the launch I boarded and we moved out the Casiguran Bay and headed north. Before leaving I instructed Sergeant Gorospe to bring overland with him approximately 30 non-commissioned officers and privates for guard and patrol work around Headquarters.



That on the morning of April 25th we motored into Distican Bay and spent the day repairing and trying to condition the engine which was burning far too much fuel and not running smoothly. At dark we moved into the Pacific and again headed north. That later in the evening we hit stormy weather and heavy seas but reached and anchored in Palanan Bay about 8:30 A.M. April 26th. Here we motored the boat into one of the estuaries of the Palanan River and set up temporary Headquarters on Sibang Island at the mouth of the Palanan River and Bay.

That here we immediately began preparations to set up and get into operation-the radio-but our first delay was the lack of a 110 volt generator-that generator of the Palanan Post Radio having reported to be broken in the coil and sent by way of Ilagan to be repaired in Manila shortly after the outbreak of war. That this generator, it was reported, was in Ilagan, still broken, its' passage to Manila having been delayed by war. That its' location in Ilagan was believed to be known and I decided to try to get it and repair it ourselves.

That we had also along with us a commerial radio receiver and six three cell batteries all nearly run down. That we did succeed in getting a small one cylinder gasoline engine with which I hoped to charge batteries and operate the radio until we could locate and build a dam and water-wheel for generating power. That on May First I made a reconnaissance for such water power site and located an excellent one near Barrio Dimatican about 20 kilometers south west of Sibang, past Palanan-where a stream at the base of the Mountains (Sierra Madre) met the Palanan River from the northwest.

That now May 6th I sent Captain Warren Minton in charge of a detail consisting of Corporal Quinley, Corporal Limpahan, Private Rusch and about fifteen volunteer guards across the Sierra Madre Mountains west and south for two purposes-first to locate obtain and return to us if possible the generator (110 volt) said to be in Ilagan-secondly to go to my Headquarters under Lt-Colonel Nakar in the lower Cagayan Valley, send over our big radio with him a report of our operations to Headquarters Philippine Department and to bring to my new Headquarters at Dimatican (to be) the generator and tubes of the big 171 radio set after Nakar had sent in my report and notification of what I was doing in changing the radio.

That I had planned originally to have radios operating between myself and two Battalion Headquarters but now decided that due to lack of generator that it would be of more value to our services to have at my Headquarters a portable set with which to contact H.P.D. and then later if possible, the United States Hawaii and Australia. That from the heavy bombing of Corregidor reported over radio broadcasts I expected Corregidor to fall because I felt and believed that the Japanese Forces would attempt a troop landing there.

That in the early afternoon of May 7 I heard radio broadcasts that our forces were offering to negotiate with the Japanese under a white flag. That on May 8 I head the voice of whom was claimed to be General Jonothan M. Wainwright calling for the surrender of General Sharp in Mindanao, Colonel J. P. Moran in Mountain Province and Lt. Colonel Guillermo Nakar to surrender my forces. That this happened as I planned it to be. That I retained command but was publicly out of "the picture" and I determined at this point not to surrender. That also I did realise by now that Nakar wanted to keep me out of the picture in order to himself "be the hero" of what was to later happen.

That after being convinced of the surrender of Corregidor I sent a special messenger after Captain Minton with this news, instructing also Captain Minton to contact Nakar if possible with the news and to bring back the radio generator to me from our regimental 171 set.

That I had heard from an officer passing through Palanan on emergency leave a few days prior to surrender that Lieut-Colonel Nakar had on about May First discontinued to operate his radio for fear of its destruction or capture.

That on about May 10th I received a reply from Captain Minton acknowledging receipt of my information and instructions. That we continued with and completed construction of the dam and water-wheel and established Headquarters at Dimatican.

That on Sunday May 24 Captain Minton returned to me with the following report.

- (a) There were about 3000 Japanese Troops in the middle Cagayan Valley with main bodies at Ilagan, Echague and Jones.
- (b) That he (Minton) had gone south nearly as far as Jones where he met a detachment of Nakar's soldiers who informed him that Lieut-Colonel Nakar had disbanded his troops and had himself gone to Mountain Province-exact spot not known.
- (c) That further effort to check on this information from other sources brought Captain Minton the same story.
- (d) That from what he could learn about the subject from responsible sources-Lieut-Colonel Nakar had since Captain Minton's and my movement to the east coast, not carried out my order to have all Americans follow and join me but had rather encouraged them-if they were lower than his own rank-to remain with him until about May 3d when their presence made him fearful-then Nakar endeavored to get rid of them.
  1. That in this connection Captain Minton heard that Major E. C. Jacobs (M.C.) USA and a Captain Arnold Air-Warning Service had joined Lieut-Colonel Nakar in April. (That I had expected Major Jacobs arrival and will report on his experiences below.) That also Lt-Colonel Nakar failed to order Lieutenants Harley Heib and Francis Camp to report to the east coast.
- (e) That he (Captain Minton) had sent Corporal Tirso Limpahan to Ilagan to get the generator reported there and after 10 days Limpahan had not returned. (Captain Minton believed him captured by the Japanese.
- (f) That Corporal Quinley and Private Rusch had been allowed to remain near San Marians for the purpose of gathering and returning to us further information of value.

- (g) That due to the report that Colonel Naker had gone to Mountain Province (which I did not believe because I knew too well that Naker wanted to be a "hero" in Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya) and because of the location of Japanese Forces in number between, Captain Minton felt that it would be impossible to locate the radio set and therefore did not get the generator, for our use.

That on May 10th while in Palanan Captain George T. Scholey #O-890-360 and First Lieutenant Dean Nicholson O-890,370 purchased for ₱65.00 of their own funds a large sailing Bangka with outrigger with which they announced their intention of making a get-away to the China Coast or Australia and invited me to join them. I declined but since Captain Minton did desire to go I asked that he be taken along. That with Captain Minton I planned to send to USAFFE Headquarters copies of our rosters, orders and a full report of our locations and activities and Captain Minton's mission was to reach friendly troops if possible where these papers were to be sent forward. That meantime I would be making every effort to locate a generator for our portable radio.

That on or about May 27 I sent an intelligent Filipino Citizen, Trinitario Pintang of Palanan (a sanitary inspector who had a personal mission in Jones, Isabela) to try to contact Lieut-Colonel Naker if he was anywhere in the Lower Cagayan or Warner Valleys. My instructions to Pintang were to go first to Pinappagan for information as to Naker's location. To Pintang I gave, for delivery to Naker, Lieut-Colonel Theodore Kalakuka's true copy of General Wainwright's order to surrender, also a message from myself in code, and Colonel Kalakuka's personal appeal to Naker. That these messages from Kalakuka to Naker had been written by Kalakuka and sent by him thru a Lieutenant Obinia who turned them over to another Filipino and they reached Captain Minton outside Jones, and Minton brought them back to me. That Lieut-Colonel Theodore Kalakuka O-16841 was General Wainwright's special representative to assist in bringing about the surrender of my forces and had arrived at Bagabag Airfield (with Colonel Galbraith who was after Colonel Horen's troops) in a Japanese Plane on May 9th. Kalakuka later went all the way to Pinappagan for Naker and we afterwards learned Naker was there at the same time, but Filipinos protected and hid him and denied knowing of his presence. That my instructions to Pintang who was to now attempt to contact Naker was to discuss his mission of delivering these messages, with no one but to locate Naker and give the messages to him personally.

That on the night of June 5, Corporal Tiro Limpahan returned from Ilagan to Captain Minton, now with Captain Scholey and Lieutenant Nicholson in Palanan preparing the get-away boat for a 90 day voyage. That Corporal Limpahan had been captured in Ilagan and escaped-unable to locate any generator. That in returning thru San Mariano Isabela to reach Captain Minton, Limpahan had there contacted Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka who had in Pinappagan learned of my position and had been directed by Japanese Colonel Yehisawa at Echague to contact me. That the Japanese Intelligence had now learned my position also believing that Major Eugene C. Jacobs M.C. was with me. Major Jacobs was on his way to join me and the story of him will follow in this report.

That in San Mariano, Corporal Limpahan was directed by Lt-Colonel Kalakuka, representative of General Wainwright-to deliver to me a copy of General Wainwright's orders to surrender also a letter which he-Kalakuka wrote me explaining and announcing; First-that

the unconditional surrender of General Wainwright had been authorized by the President of the United States and that he (Lt-Colonel Kalakuka) had personally seen the radiogram. Second-that my failure to surrender would delay the acceptance of the surrender of General Wainwright by the Commanding General Imperial Japanese Forces. That instead of surrender terms being granted there would exist a state of cessation of hostilities. That this would mean that our surrendered troops would be held as captives and not entitled to the rights of prisoners-of-war, and this would likely leave "loop-holes" for the mistreatment of our surrendered troops. That to date the Japanese Forces were living invincibly up to their agreement to guarantee the lives of those surrendered and would continue to do so if the surrender became complete. That thus the personal letter of Lt-Colonel Kalakuka to me, also one from Lieutenant Ziegler, who knew me and who was assisting Kalakuka, informed me.

That up to now I had determined not to surrender but had planned to erect on directional antennae at all costs one of the portable radios with which I could talk to the United States. That now however believing that the plan of our high command was not to continue the war in the Philippines I felt that my next obligation was to my fellow soldiers now surrendered and I evaluated that my remaining out could do little good for the cause whereas it might even bring hardship and suffering to Filipino Civilians as well as to my fellow soldiers. I therefore decided that I would surrender. I had heard General Wainwright calling to Lt-Colonel Nekar to surrender my troops and had seen a true copy of his order as described above. I learned later from Lt-Colonel Kalakuka that General Wainwright had radioed me a reply to my last message to him-but this message never reached me tho at all times Nekar knew my location.

That together Captains Minton Scholey and I discussed the matter of surrendering and together we agreed to surrender. That I wrote a letter stating our decision on the night of June 5th, addressed it to Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka-awaiting my reply in San Mariano Isabela-and started it off to him, the following morning, June 6th 125 kilometers away from my position by Captain Minton. That in my reply to Colonel Kalakuka I told him that I would be in San Mariano if possible by the night of June 13th accompanied by the remaining officers and men not now present with Captain Minton.

That on the morning of June 6th I announced to Acting First Sergeant Goroze and the 30 Filipino enlisted men of Headquarters Company that we would surrender. That by night-fall all but five had left-deserted. That 6 days later Sergeant Goroze was "too ill with Malaria to go on further and I left him outside San Mariano with the promise that he would turn in at Echague. That Corporals Limaphan, Altamero, and Privates First Class Baves and Valderis continued in with us. That we left Dimtican June 7, and Palanan June 9-Captain Scholey Lieutenant Nicholson Acting Sergeant Harkaway and the two Chinese sergeants preceding us by six hours. That with us were Acting Staff Sergeant James R. Coyle QMC and the Filipinos named above.

That on the late afternoon of June 10th I received a note returned from Captain Minton ahead stating that he had contacted and was with Lt-Colonel Kalakuka who would await us in San Mariano.

That a few hours later-about dark, and as we were at the eastern base of the high mountains of the Sierra Madre Range I met Captain Scholey and party who had reversed their direction and were now returning toward Palanan. That Scholey now informed me he had changed his mind about going in with Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka and now said that they wanted to take their boat up to Aparri and surrender it-asking me to give him permission to do so. That this I refused to do stating that I could not countermand General Wainwright's order. Scholey however with Nicholson, Sergeant Harkaway and the two Chinese continued the journey toward Palanan. That I felt convinced that they had no intention of surrendering unless captured.

That I with Sergeant Coyle and the Filipinos mentioned continued on toward San Mariano reaching there June 14th where we met Lt-Colonel Kalakuka, Captain Minton, 2d Lieutenant Albert S. Ziegler (who had surrendered) from Colonel John P. Horan's Troops (the 121st Infantry) and was assisting Kalakuka) and a Mr. Roy Fuxman civilian Australian resident of the Philippines whom Colonel Horan had recommended for commission but as yet not commissioned-but also surrendered to Lt-Colonel Kalakuka.

That here in San Mariano, Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka had, before my arrival, succeeded in locating and getting to surrender on of my Philippine Army Officers of the Regular Army-First Lieutenant Meliot P. Bulan-Infantry. That Bulan had been my assistant executive officer and I had left him to work with Major Naker. That he had been on duty near San Mariano and had come to visit his father ex-governor Bulan of Isabela now also in San Mariano.

That in San Mariano we rested over June 15th then continued on-the entire party plus Lieutenant Bulan toward Ilagan.

That at noon on June 16th we passed thru San Antonio Isabela and at that place we were joined by Major Eugene C. Jacobs, Medical Corps, USA. That the story in brief of Major Jacob's experiences follow.

That Major Jacobs had been in charge of the Station Hospital at Camp John Hay and gave first treatment there to all soldiers and civilians injured in the bombings by Japanese Planes of December 8th and December 13th. That on December 23d we all at Camp John Hay were ordered to evacuate the camp and did so on the morning of that date. That at nightfall of the same day some of us were ordered to return to Camp John Hay and did so. That Major Jacobs however continued on with one American and fourteen Philippine Scout Medical Detachment Soldiers, and the two Camp John Hay Army Nurses-Second Lieutenants Ruby Bradley and Beatrice Chambers. That Major Jacob's mission was to hike overland east across the mountains to National Road Number Five, then to proceed south and join our troops in the line. That Major Jacobs left the two nurses, Misses Bradley and Chambers at Lusod Sawall-about 30 kilometers east of Baguio and continued afoot with the Medical Corps Men. The American Soldier was Pvt. (later Corporal) Ryan-Medical Detachment 194th Tank Battalion.

That about ten o'clock A.M. on December 29th after having just passed thru Belete Pass and still on Route 5 going south Major Jacobs and party ran directly into Japanese Troops. That there he and his troops encountered first three Japanese Officers in a car

followed closely by three light tanks and that these tanks machine-gunned Major Jacobs and his men. That Major Jacobs and his men were able to take cover in the foothills of the Caraballo Mountains east of Route 5 and here Japanese Troops after dark, hunted them for some hours but were unsuccessful. That now Major Jacobs established a temporary position on the top of one of the high mountains and from here could see considerable activity to the southwest and south including the burning of part of San Jose, and at night gun flashes over in Estaan. That soon Japanese Forces were on the north south and west of him and he realized that he could not move far to the south.

That, cut off from the south, Major Jacobs heard that I was north of him and so decided to join me. This he set out to do but he was forced to move north, away to the east of Road Five since after early January Japanese Forces were on that road north of him.

That travelling at night Major Jacobs was on or about April 11th able to reach Osal, then my Headquarters but a few hours after Captain Minton and his battalion had gone with me to Pinappagan. That he reached here also just after we had left Pinappagan for Casiguran and here he was taken with malaria, returning to Osal for rest and treatment. He remained with Lieut-Colonel Nakar until able to move on. That Lieut-Colonel Nakar reported his presence by radio to Headquarters Philippine Department and that Colonel Horan, learning of Major Jacobs presence with my troops requested that he come with him. That this Major Jacobs attempted to do. But the condition of his health interfered so he was able to start about May 3d and about this time Lieut-Colonel Nakar was anxious to have the Americans separate from him. That earlier while Major Jacobs was ill, Private Ryan M.C. left him and continued to join Colonel Horan. That Major Jacobs later reported to me that due to excessively heavy bombing of Corregedore, Lt-Colonel Nakar was frequently unable to contact Headquarters Philippine Department by radio so that intervals existing with no radio communication with Headquarters. That shortly after reaching Osal Major Jacobs learned that I was in Palanan. Then when after May 3d he was able to travel he was out from reaching Colonel Horan by Japanese Troop Infiltration between and he therefore decided to join me near Palanan. That still travelling at night and detouring Japanese Detachments on outpost duty he was able to reach San Antonio Isabela, planning to continue over the Sierra Madre to join me. That it was here that I told him that I had received orders to surrender and was on my way to Echague to do so. That Major Jacobs here joined our party proceeding to Echague.

That on the night of June 17th we arrived at the First Japanese Detachment Headquarters at Ilagan where the Filipino Soldiers with us had their baggage searched and here we turned over our rifles to the Imperial Japanese Forces. There had been ten rifles among us, and less than 100 rounds of ammunition.

That the following night we spent in Cauayan and on the afternoon of June 19th arrived and surrendered at the Headquarters of Japanese Colonel Yoshizawa in Echague. Privates John R. Marshall and John Henry Rusch attached to my forces and Corporal Quinley of Colonel Horan's as mentioned herebefore Quinley had joined us some time before (as had Marshall). That Marshall surrendered in Jones Isabela May 9th or 10th and Quinley who had gone with us to Palanan and then back with Rusch under Captain Minton when they came west and south from my Palanan location in order to get generators and contact Lt-Colonel Nakar, had surrendered about May 19th.

That upon surrendering, the Japanese Staff Officer Interpreter Lieutenant Sasaki informed me that Lieut-Colonel James Andrew Green and First Lieutenant William C. Burch of the Philippine Constabulary had surrendered to them several days previously and had been permitted to proceed to their respective homes.

That in our party, besides Lt-Colonel Kalakuka and his assistants Lieutenant Ziegler and Mr. Fuxman, were Major E. C. Jacobs, Captain W. A. Minton, Acting Staff Sergeant James R. Coyle with me-four Filipino Soldiers arriving on foot from Ilagan one day later. That on the night of June 19th I was permitted to stay with Lt-Colonel Kalakuka at the Hacienda of Senor Cue after first being thoroughly questioned as to my movements since the beginning of war and the present whereabouts of my regiment. That I was particularly questioned about my radio and I reported that I had left it at Osal, Isabela. That I volunteered to go personally after elements of my regiment if permitted to go without Japanese Troops. That I was told that I might be called on to do this later-and was, later as will be shown. That on June 20th I was sent with all other prisoners of war, American and Filipino, except those on duty as drivers for the Japanese Forces in Echague to the barracks of the Second Isabela Cadre near Echague now occupied by a Battery of the 142d Japanese Field Artillery under Captain Michimura. That here we were treated kindly. That on several occasions I was called back into Colonel Yoshizawa's Headquarters Echague for questioning and twice Japanese Intelligence Officers came to the barracks and questioned me concerning the personnel and equipment of my regiment.

That Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Kalakuka was kept in Echague staying in Senior Cue's Hacienda and available to the Japanese Commander Colonel Yoshizawa's orders.

That on or about June 23d I asked Lt-Colonel Kalakuka to make effort to contact my former Regimental S-2, First Lieutenant Leandro Rosario Infantry. That I believed Rosario to be near his home in Aritao Nueva Viscaya. That Colonel Kalakuka did contact Rosario who on my orders surrendered and later assisted Kalakuka to gather in about 200 of my officers and men. That to date there were still remaining out approximately 750 of my officers and men.

That on or about June 26th the Japanese Commander asked me to write letters ordering surrender to Lt-Colonel Guillermo Nakar and Major Manuel P. Enriquez, with their officers and men. That I was informed that many copies of these letters would be made and distributed if possible so as to reach the officers concerned. That I wrote these letters signing about 20 copies of each. That later when the Japanese Forces captured Lt.Colonel Nakar he had, I was informed, my letter, ordering surrender, in his possession.

That on or about July First word came that Second Lieutenant Francis A. Camp of Lt-Colonel Nakar's Troops had made a raid on Japanese Troops near Tuso inflicting some casualties. That Japanese Colonel Yoshizawa had already sent two Americans a Sergeant Barnhouse and Private Darcy to bring Camp in and that Camp had replied that he had captured these soldiers and intended to capture or kill all additional Americans sent to capture him. That now Colonel Yoshizawa insisted that Lt. Colonel Kalakuka bring Camp in and that Kalakuka now detailed, with Japanese approval, Corporal Quinley and Mr. Fuxman-both of whom claimed to know Camp to negotiate his surrender. That now still another raid by Camp was reported and Japanese Colonel Yoshizawa designated Lt-Colonel Kalakuka himself to go. That on July 10th Lt-Colonel Kalakuka took with him, approved by Colonel

Yoshizawa--Second Lieutenant Albert S. Ziegler (O-890,522) who stated that he knew Camp well and believed he could negotiate his surrender. That I learned later these officers contacted Lieut-Camp but were unable to induce him to surrender--that as a matter of fact they were very nearly killed or captured themselves by him. That this was told to me by Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka.

That on or about July 17th 1942, Japanese Staff Lieutenant and Interpreter Sasaki came to the Cadre Barracks to interview those of us who remained there to get information on our U.S. Army Status. That at this time Lieutenant Sasaki also informed me that I would not be asked further assist in bringing in Nakar and Enriquez but that this would be done by Japanese Troops. That, according to Sasaki we would all go to Baguio, then to prison camp and later to Japan.

That on July 19th we prisoners of war were told that we would leave for Baguio the following day. That here I wrote a letter to the Commanding General Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines requesting him to consider the Fourteenth Infantry (Bagayan Valley Forces) surrendered--this in order to bring about fulfillment of General Wainwright's surrender agreement. That apparently the Japanese High Commander honored this request because shortly after arrival at Cabanatuan Prison Camp we were notified that we prisoners were on full prisoner-of-war status. That we arrived in prison camp July 21st--the Americans remaining at Camp No. 1 Cabanatuan and the Filipinos being taken elsewhere probably to Camp O'Donnell.

That on or about September 5th, 1942 Captain Minton and I were called to Japanese Camp Headquarters where we were again questioned as to all our movements and informed that Lt-Colonel Nakar was now operating my radio and talking with Australia. That again on September 10th and the third time, September 12th we were again called in on this subject. That closely following the third questioning Minton and I were ordered to Japanese Headquarters with baggage. That we were taken to Cabanatuan, separated and further questioned by intelligence officers. That the following day September we were taken to Echague in a long truck convoy which included the car and presence of Japanese Lieut-General Nara and some approximately 400 Filipino Members of G.O.N.O.P.--that Minton and I were told that we were going to hunt Nakar and the radio.

That we arrived in Echague about 10:30 P.M. September 13th and on the afternoon of the Fourteenth Minton and I were separated, I again being sent to Captain Michimura's 142d Field Artillery at the Cadre Barracks, and Captain Minton being sent to Jones Isabela about September 19. That here I was kept more or less in isolation for nearly one month the I was sent to the Japanese Army Infirmary in Echague September 20 to 22d for treatment for Amoebic Dysentery which I had contracted at prison camp and had suffered with since August 15th. That I realized I was being held as hostage at the Cadre Barracks tho I was treated kindly and with respect. That two Japanese Intelligence Officers were quartered near me for about ten days and engaged in friendly conversation with me from time to time.

That on or about September 21st 1942 the radio of my regiment was found with some of our records, by Japanese Forces, buried near Pinappagan. That, I learned later, Filipino Citizens there had disclosed the radio's hiding place. That on September 28th Lieut-Colonel Nakar was captured in a cave near Barrio Minuri about 40 kilometers from Pinappagan.



to the north and east. That the Filipino Police Chief of Jones Isabela received the P1000 reward by the Imperial Japanese Forces for disclosing Nakar's hideout and thus bringing about his capture. That at this time the Japanese Military Police had Captain Minton along with them in the Barrios of the Lower Cagayan Valley but Captain Minton was unable to give information as to where Nakar might be. They had not communicated actually since April 11, 1942 more than five months previously.

That Captain Minton was brought into Jones with the troops which brought in Nakar and later Minton was taken to Baguio as was Colonel Nakar. Also that on two occasions Minton was able to talk with Nakar who gave Minton a brief resume of his (Nakar's) activities since the surrender. That Captain Minton was returned to prison camp at Cabanatuan on November 24th.

That on October 9th after Lt. Colonel Nakar's transfer by the Japanese Guard to Echague, I was moved to Jones Isabela where I was instructed by Japanese Captain Fujita, Executive Officer of Colonel Ide, successor to Colonel Yoshitawa, that on the following day I was to take charge of a detail of Americans consisting of Lt-Colonel Theodore Kalakuka and 2d Lieut. Albert S. Ziegler and that it was our mission to gather in additional unsundered Filipino and American Troops. That it was reported there were three Americans-Captain Arnold Air Warning, 2d Lieut. Harley T. Hieb formerly Colonel Nakar's Staff my Regiment and Corporal Tony Mangiameli-active in the Lower Cagayan Valley and that another transmitting radio was believed to be operating near Pinappagan.

That the following morning, October 10th, Japanese Colonel Ide met and gave us instructions to locate these Americans and to bring them in, also to locate and bring in unsundered Filipinos of the USAFFE now in the areas to which we were to be sent. That I asked the Japanese Commander if we could guarantee the lives of both Americans and Filipinos who voluntarily surrendered and that his reply was yes.

That we were instructed to follow the course of the Adoalam River to Pinarapad in the Warner Valley and at that place to contact Japanese Captain Shojima for further instructions. That we were further given a Japanese Flag and a white flag of truce and told to be sure to display these since Japanese Troops in the Valley might not know of our mission and in addition were on the lookout for three Americans. That approaching Pinarapad Barrio on October 11th the Japanese Garrison did nearly mistake us for the three Americans said to be in the vicinity. That at Pinarapad Japanese Captain Shojima sent us on to Pinappagan to interview Japanese Major Kamada. That we arrived at the Major's Headquarters about dark October 12th and there discussed probabilities of the whereabouts of the three Americans in question as well as Filipino Soldiers.

That after the conference my detail was directed to billet in a house in Pinappagan operated by First Lieutenant Leandro Rosario, formerly my S-2, and now detailed by the Japanese Authorities as Provincial Superintendent of Police for Nueva Viscaya. That Rosario had up until now succeeded in getting in approximately 500 more officers and men of the Fourteenth Infantry, That most of these were now in his charge in Pinappagan. That this made a total surrendered of approximately 700 out of 1000 of the Fourteenth Infantry.

That on October 15th my detail was ordered to proceed to the Barrios to the south, southeast and west of Pinappagan there to search for unsundered soldiers. That here in Barrios Tancab, Santo Nino, Calalcangan, Bapinpin, daily searches were made by Japanese Troops accompanied by surrendered Filipino Troops and Lt. Colonel Kalakuka, and Lieutenant Ziegler. That I was not forced to go because by this time I did have Amoebic Dysentery very badly and was quite thin and weak. That in addition to the Barrios all known caves and possible mountain hideouts were searched, but no proven clues to the whereabouts of Americans could be found. Neither was any other radio located according to my knowledge.

That on the morning of October 22d the Japanese Troops in the Lower Cagsyan and Warner Valleys began to move northward with the Filipino Soldier Prisoners and with us-my detail. There had been and was during the trip much rain so that rivers and creeks were difficult to cross. That the first day we covered about 30 kilometers over rugged hilly and wooded country-the west side of the Cagayan River. That we were wet and somewhat cold most of the time.

That upon arrival at Jones Isabela on the afternoon of October 24th-Lieut. Ziegler who was complaining of malaria chills was separated from Lt. Colonel Kalakuka and me and with Japanese Troops and Filipino Surrenderees was taken to Echague. That Kalakuka and I remained with Japanese Forces under Lieut. Kitura at Jones. That we both felt malaria pains, I in addition to the dysentery, now worse.

That on October 26th we left Jones with Japanese Troops in trucks, stopt overnight in Santiago Isabela and arrived in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya on the afternoon of October 29th. That Lt-Colonel Kalakuka and I were both very ill and the Japanese Doctors on the way planned on rest and treatment for us in Bayombong.

That upon arrival in Bayombong we were placed in comfortable quarters in the home of Dr. Miguel Merzan and given excellent medical treatment by Filipino Doctors under Dr. L. V. Leon whom I had known. That Captain(doctor) Uchiyama of the Japanese Army Medical Corps and Lieutenant Sasaki, Staff Officer and Interpreter were responsible for this good care, approved by Colonel Ide.

That on the night of October 30th Colonel Kalakuka lost consciousness and was moved to the Japanese Army Hospital nearby. That there the following afternoon, October 31 Kalakuka died of cerebral malaria. That both Japanese and Filipino Doctors diagnosed our illness-Kalakukas and mine, as cerebral malaria. That the second week following-on November 8, 1942 Japanese Officers stopt in to inform me that Lieut. Albert S. Ziegler had also been moved to the Japanese Military Hospital in Bayombong from Echague with cerebral malaria as of November First and had died there November 8.

That both Lt-Colonel Kalakuka and Lieutenant Ziegler were buried with church services and interment in Bayombong Catholic Cemetery. The deaths of both officers were regretted by the Japanese Forces who made public expression to same.

That I was permitted to remain where I was under treatment for both dysentery and malaria until December 6, 1942 when I was returned to prison camp number one, Cabanatuan Nueva Ecija.

SUMMARY

That in summary I wish to certify and say that at all times and in all my plans and moves I considered only two things,

First -the good of the service and USAFFE.

Second-the good of the Filipino Citizens who supported us and were loyal to our cause.

That when I reached the conclusion that I could no longer be of help to the above because of circumstances beyond my control I then put aside all personal selfish desire not to surrender, soley and entirely, to prevent in so far as I could any undue suffering of my fellow soldiers who were thru no fault of theirs already captives.

Everett Lauman Warner  
Lieut-Colonel P.A. Comdg  
14th Infantry P.A. -to June 20, 1942

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