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Authority NND 333073

PHOTOSTATIC COPY OFFICIAL REPORT  
OF  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL EVERETT LAUMAN  
WARNER, 0125573  
(Deceased)

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 883078

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The PHOTOSTATIC COPY OFFICIAL REPORT

OF

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EVERETT LAUMAN  
WARNER, 0125573

(deceased)

has been withdrawn from this file and sent to:

Officer-in-charge  
Office of the Judge Advocate for Army Affairs  
Department of the Army  
APO 928, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

this date: 21 JAN 1954  
*WJG*

*Copy of ltr of transmittal  
in ser. file of Warner,  
Everett L., 0125572.*

*W*

14TH INFANTRY (PA)

CERTIFIED REPORT

I certify that I am Everett Lauman Warner (0-125-572), Lt. Col. FA, Army of the United States, and that at the time of surrender of the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines May 6-7, 1942 by Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, commanding same, I was in command of the 14th Inf., PA, USAFFE, otherwise frequently referred to as the Cagayan Valley Forces of North Luzon in radio broadcasts, news bulletins, etc. That I am completing herewith a brief certified report to cover my activities and those of my command, briefly but truthfully, from the date of my arrival in the Philippines, Aug. 1, 1941 to the present date, May 30, 1943... That some records retained and are referred to, others were lost and memory is trusted...

That, upon arrival at Ft. Stotsenburg, I was placed in command of Btry. D, 88th FA (FS) and on Sept. 1, 1941 was given command of the 2nd Bn. (Later executive under Lt. Col. John H. Ball (Bn C.O.)...

That I reported for duty to Camp John Hay on Nov. 11, 1941 and the c.o. there, Lt. Col. John P. Horan, 43rd Inf, (PS), issued special orders #93, Nov. 12 designating me as Intelligence officer, Provost Marshal, Investigating Officer, Summary Court, Surveying officer, post library, entertainment, and recreation and officer in charge enlisted men's dormitory...

About 5:30 o'clock on the morning of Dec. 8, 1941 a retired naval man resident of Baguio, who had worked some with me on intelligence work, telephoned to me that Japanese planes had, that morning, heavily bombed Pearl Harbor and other Hawaiian points, and that this was confirmed by the 6:30 and 6:45 a.m. radio reports from Manila.

Lt. Col. Horan called an officers meeting to begin at 8 a.m. for the purpose of discussing our war plan. This meeting lasted but 12 minutes and at 8:19 a.m. 17 Japanese two-motored bombers in formation, followed by one lone plane flying at an altitude which I judged to be 3,000 feet came over from the west. They dropped bombs, later counted by me to total 117. Two of them dropped just outside the main camp John Hay entrance gate and did some damage in Baguio, but the majority of them fell on Camp John Hay, killing 11 soldiers-- one American Sgt. Cecil. Brandt, on detail from the 31st Inf, and 10 PS non-commissioned officers and privates of the Band and Cos. A, 43rd Inf, (PS) and injured approximately 40 military and civilian personnel. Some of the bomb fragments, dirt, stones, and timber injured me slightly in the face, legs and abdomen, not seriously.

I commandeered transportation and assisted to load a number of the badly injured aboard to be taken to the station hospital where Capt. Eugene C. Jacobs, MC, and nurses, 2d Lts. Ruby Bradley and Beatrice Chambers rendered aid and treatment working with heroic effort. Some of the patients in need of major operations were moved to the Notre Dame Hospital in Baguio... Since Camp John Hay was the first army point so far as I know bombed in the Philippines, it probably follows that Sgt. Cecil Brandt was the first American soldier killed in the Philippines.

After the outbreak of war, we were anxious to know what plan of action we were to follow but it was difficult to get from the Headquarters at Camp John Hay any very definite information on a plan. Construction of a bomb-proof shelter was begun with the assistance of mining engineers... Almost daily flights of enemy planes came over... Toward the end of December elements of the 11th Division, Co. C of the 192 Tank Bn., Battery A. AFM, Troop C, 26th Cav (PSO came through or arrived for further disposition... My promotion to Major, FA came dated as of Dec. 11, 1941, accepted DEC. 17...

On Sunday, Dec 21, 1941 on the verbal order of Lt. Col. Horan's executive and adjutant, Maj. Frank Fellows, quoting Col. Horan, I went to Camp Allen, Baguio and inducted the personnel of the first Military District, Philippine Army into the USAFFE.

About the middle of Dec. considerable discussion took place concerning Baguio's being declared an "open city". That Maj. Emil Speth, (FS) USA, retired, of Baguio, was reported to be connected with some such agreement along this line with certain Japanese persons and was apprehended on order from Manila. He was held technically under arrest in the Camp Hay Hospital and released about Dec. 21.

Camp John Hay had received 3 air bombings, one of 8th another the 13th and one Dec. 15. On the 13th, Sgt. Eddie Cook, WMC, and a Filipino child were injured and damage done to the QM garage and motor transportation. The third bombing did little damage. They were apparently after the ice plant which was an air raid warning central.

As the end of Dec. approached there were interned at the Camp about 350 Japanese nationals under guard of the FC and Capt. Cameron Starnes, Inf., attached to Camp Hay. These internees were treated well and Col Horan later received from a local merchant, Henry Hiwakawa, a letter to that effect, this letter requesting kind treatment if Col. Horan ever came into the hands of Japanese forces...

On the morning of Dec. 23 I was directed by Maj. Fellows to proceed with the convoy---34 vehicles in all (gathered the night before---43rd Inf, Equipment) toward Antamok Goldfields and Twin

Rivers east of Baguio...About 8:15 a.m. prior to leaving, Jap planes came over and apparently dropped bombs on the outskirts of Baguio. On the Itogen road 3 more observation planes flew over. Toward dark Maj. Fellows, who had taken charge, notified me that we would return to Camp Hay at once. During the night 1st Lt. Harry Simpson and I trained PS soldiers for the second time to operate the telephone switchboard in Baguio, the regular women operators having left during the day--also the employees at the Baguio post office.

On the morning of Dec. 24 another staff meeting was held. In the afternoon Maj. Fellows told me, "We will evacuate Camp John Hay again about dark, going to the same place we were yesterday". That afternoon we heard that about 10,000 Jap troops were approaching Baguio via the Kennon road from the south and would reach Baguio between 6 p.m. and midnight...When I arrived at Twin Rivers I saw all of our motor equipment being pushed off a blind-end road (Column cleared Baguio 6 p.m.). Several had grenades were thrown into the heap of battered trucks and cars at the bottom of the ravine....Lt. Col. Horan was directing these activities and about 8 p.m. most of our detail personnel had already gone forward over the mountain trail afoot toward Lusod saw mill. (We could have gone to Bontoc and taken mountain positions with heavy weapons and more ammunition)...We were to proceed east on foot over the mountains to National Road No. 5 which we believed open thru to the south. Lusod saw mill would be the first step on this movement...Before setting out I rested that night, returned to Baguio next morning for information, found no Japs there--they didn't arrive till the 27th...I departed alone except for two Filipino boys, civilian guides and cargadores, about 11 a.m. Dec. 25 for Lusod saw mill and reached the outpost guards of the 43rd Inf there about midnight. Lusod is about 30 km over the trail east of Twin Rivers. Early on the morning of the 26th I reached the saw mill and sought to contact Col. Horan...He came in about 2 p.m., stating that he had been out on reconnaissance. He told me, "Precede me over the trails to the east and let me know if National Road No. 5 is free of Jap troops and clear to the south. Also if there is transportation in which to proceed south and how much. You had better proceed at once since it is not well for too many of us to go out over the trail together." I had assumed Aritao to be the place, since I had heard it mentioned in everybody's conversation about the evacuation.

That at or near Lusod saw mill at the time of my departure for Aritao were Lt. Col. Horan, Capts. Calvert and Glitters, and 1st Lt. Murphy with their companies A and B, 43rd Inf (PS), Capt. Ralph F. Praeger, 1st Lts. Warren A. Minton and Thomas Jones, with their Troop C, 26th Cav. (PS), Nurses, 2d Lts. Ruby Bradley and Beatrice Chambers, T. Sgt. William E. Bowen, SC, Privates John R. Marshall,

James R. Coyle, and Pfc. Alfredo Reyes, 88th FA (FS)...Reyes overheard Lt. Col. Horan's instructions last given to me by him directing me to precede him to Aritao...All other officers and enlisted personnel of the Camp John Hay detail had gone on ahead to Aritao and the south "every man for himself" in order to reach our main lines. This officer and enlisted personnel included Maj. Henderson Allen, QMC, Maj. Francis E. Fellows, 24th FA, Capt. Eugene C. Jacobs, MC, with the American (Pvt Ryan) and 14 FS Medical Corps men, 1st Lts. Lars C. Jensen, Harry Simpson and Silvio Gasperini and all other officer and enlisted personnel...Capt. Cameron Starnes Inf., remained with Col Horan.

On the night of Dec. 27 we (Pfc Reyes and 2 cargadores), reached Kayapa central, Nueva Viscaya, the first place of any size en route, where I tried to contact Aritao, still 65 km. east, by telephone, but unsuccessfully. The following morning, however, I did get a telephone call thru to Maj. Martin Moses, commanding the 12th Inf. PA. Moses, in Aritao, told me that there was, to the best of his knowledge, a clear road to the southern No. 5 and that there was some transportation in the form of four trucks plus more to come from the south and return. Many soldiers were in Aritao awaiting transportation. On the morning of the 28th I reported this information back on paper in two notes addressed to Col Horan; paid a messenger PA to take one back to him following me on the trail and asked the Kayapa police chief to send the other two hours later to Col. Horan by another messenger and left the policeman the money to pay the second man. After administering oaths and instructing citizens who claimed the USAFFE had taken horses from them what to do about their property, I resumed, with Pfc. Reyes and a citizen named Julian T. Ibasco of Aritao, the trip to Aritao. Arriving at Pingkian, the next town, before night, a bad rain storm hit us and I decided to spend the night on the school house porch there, lest Col. Horan and his troops should come thru, which they did not. Near Pingkian we encountered three soldiers of the PA going in the opposite direction to us, one being without rifle and other equipment. These soldiers told us that they had been disbanded by their officers and told to proceed to their homes. At first I doubted this and believed the men to be deserters. I instructed them to remain with me, which they did. Shortly thereafter, I met a Filipino, Aponio Balic by name, who said that he was Baan of Pingkian (a sort of town authority such as constable). Balic had with him a carabao sled on which there were 11 of our USAFFE rifles, which had been abandoned recently by PA troops. The police chief of Pingkian verified all that Balic had told me. I then instructed the policeman and Balic to continue gathering any known abandoned equipment and to hold same for further instructions from me or any competent authority.

Balic later did turn over to us some 20 rifles. Dec. 29 I met about 10 or 12 more PA soldiers "on their own" and likewise instructed them to follow me. Now Filipino citizens were beginning to approach me in wonderment and from their attitudes and conversation appeared to be greatly upset and afraid that our defeat at the hands of the Japanese had occurred. I told them otherwise and now continued to Aritao meeting more and more PA troops "disbanded", according to them...

My party arrived in Aritao about 3 p.m. Dec. 29 and found around 200 officers and enlisted men of the PA there. I was notified that these men were in charge of Capt. Manuel P. Enriquez, GSC (later assistant G-2 11th Div).

Proceeding to Aritao, Presidencia, I received Capt. Enriquez' report; he and 16 other officers and the enlisted men, elements of the 11th, 12, 13, Inf., 11 Engrs., 22d Inf., 71st Ind., were to proceed south but had now been cut off the prevented from doing so because of Jap activity now south of them in San Jose, Nueva Ecija. So far as he could ascertain, all routes to the south were now cut off by the Japs and these had entered and taken San Jose midnight on the 28-29.

Further investigation confirmed the truth of it, so that now I went to the telephone to get this information back to Col. Horan, also sending messengers along the trail toward him with it, for I presumed that he was closely following the trail I had taken. The chief of police at Kayapa said, "Sir, Col. Horan and troops turned south from here yesterday (the 28) afternoon and is proceeding southeast toward Balete Pass thru Imogen" I then instructed the policeman to send messengers after Col Horan. He agreed. I inquired of a short cut trail which might enable me to reach him between Kayapa and Balete Pass and sent after him a sergeant and two enlisted men with the news, also a like detail south on No. 5.. All of them returned Jan. 2 stating they had not contacted directly Col. Horan but they learned he already had the news...

I felt that it would be better to hold together as long as possible the men recently "disbanded" for the following reasons:

1. The sake of their morale and that of the citizens.
2. To prevent temptation to loot and demand subsistence from the citizens in a disorganized manner.
3. To assist the civilian officials to maintain law and order.
4. To make a stand to the best of our ability against the Jap forces should they decide to move southward from San Jose.

Therefore, taking charge of this troops situation with Capt. Enriquez as my acting executive officer, I first, with the help of public spirited citizens, requested subsistence for the men, whose reserve rations were low. Considerable rice, chickens, eggs, and pork came in, enough to last thru the next day.



We had appointed a subsistence detail to carry on with the help of the citizens for future needs under 3d Lt. Manuel T. Nery.

Other officers present were 2d Lt. Melito P. Biolan (same), 3d Lt. Honorio Quines, Inf. reporting for duty-from Phil. Mil. Academy, Baguio, to the AG; 3d Lt. Nery (1st Reg. Div.) and 12 officers from the respective units mentioned above, Lts. Fotad, Turingan, Evangelista, Valdepena, Palsalay, Pagalilauan, Hernando, Vea, Valdez, Juan A. Asuncion, MC, Bauran and Gervasio Reyes. Also present are enlisted personnel of HQ. 1st Mil. Dis. PS...

On the night of Dec. 29, we moved to Barrio Comon, about 4 km southeast of Aritao. Here we placed the troops in a large school house, established a hq. in a barrio house across the road and chose a cooking and training area in a wooded, rock-bouldered section nearby...

Early on the morning of Dec. 30, 1st Lt., W. A. Minton with an advance patrol of troops C, 26 Cav. arrived in Aritao over the trail I had taken, and later the rest of the troop under Capt. Praeger and Lt. Jones, with T/Sgt. William E. Bowen, Sc, and Pvt. James R. Coyle, QMC of the Camp Hay detachment arrived also with a civilian miner and ex-marine, Francis A. Camp. Capt. Praeger proceeded with his troop and others named north to Bambang, NV, about 12 km north of Aritao.

On the afternoon of Jan. 1, 1942, I sent Capt. Enriquez on a mission into Aritao and while there Lt. Col. Horan with Capts. Glitters and Starnes and approximately 60 em of 43 Inf. in two trucks came up No. 5 from the south and proceeded north. Enriquez reported to him that I was near, but Horan stated, "No, it is not necessary for Maj. Warner to report to me. I am glad he is in charge of your group. Give them my kind regards. I am in a great hurry." He did not state his destination, but he did proceed to Bambang and spent the night there with Capt. Praeger and then proceeded to Jan. 2 to Kiangian in Ifugao (Mountain Province). Simultaneous with the arrival of Col. Horan, Pfc. Albert I. Hendrickson, SC and Cpl. Tony Yano Mangeasueli, 60th GAC, arrived and stated they were not a part of Col. Horan's forces, having come across the mountains on their own...

The two army nurses had been left to remain at Lusod saw mill. Capt. Jacobs with the med. det. cleared the trail and went towards San Jose; about 10 a.m., Dec. 29 he and detail ran nose-on into a carload of Jap officers on the road, same coming north. Neither Jacobs nor the Japs fired. Jacob's detail possessed only two 45 automatic pistols. The Jap car passed him, turned around, sped past him again, returned and soon their light Jap tanks rolled up in his direction from the south and opened with machine gun fire on him. He and detail escaped injury and took refuge first in the foothills, and later in the Caraballo mountains east of No. 5. A Jap patrol tried unsuccessfully to locate them and from his position he could observe much Jap activity in the plains south and west of him, even to gun flashes in Bataan. Later...

Traveling at night and over rugged trails east of the main roads to avoid Jap patrols he finally reached my Hq. at Barrio Osal, Isabela on April 11, 1942.....

I prepared a memorandum of information and selected a soldier-- name not now available-- to pass thru the Jap lines as a civilian with it and reach our hq. in Manila or Bataan. Later I discovered this volunteer to be worthless in that he showed to and discussed with numerous people the confidential message he had and I learned that it finally reached Jap hands. As a result, the enemy attempted to come to us on the afternoon of Jan. 7, 1942, planes failing and bombs falling wild.

On or about Jan. 5, Capt. Praeger and his troop moved north-east to Santiago, Isabela. About Jan. 7, Capt. Guillermo Nakar and some 147 officers and men of the 1st Bn., 71st Inf. PA joined me. In the interim other groups had come so that my strength was now approximately 450. Nakar reported that his troops had been cut-off from his regt., in heavy fighting at Bauang, La Union and that he had to fight his way often against great odds thru to our position. I later learned from Lt. Col. Theodore Kalakuka, QMC, who came to order me to surrender as representative of Gen. Wainwright, that Nakar and his troops had run away from Bauang and that Enriquez had been sent to locate him. This was never discovered by me before and how much truth there is to it, I do not quite know. It is true that there was never a too good feeling existent between Nakar and Enriquez and there was considerable jealousy apparent between them at times...

I traveled north about 30 km to Bayombong to enlist the assistance of the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, the Hon Demetrio Quirino. I found that Quirino had evacuated to the hills and I was obliged to make some emergency deals thru the Provincial Engineer, AJ. Zarate. He located merchants in hiding and had them open their stores to enable us to get necessities and later was of immeasurable assistance to us in the procurement of essentials. Likewise, an able, cooperative and unselfish Provincial Engineer was Mr. Bartolome Fuzon of Isabela and aided us beyond measure...In Bayombong we encountered considerable looting and general laxity in government due to the absence of so many of the officials. Before the 10 of Jan. we persuaded the governor and others to return and carry on their duties. We inducted into USAFFE Capt. G.D. Prudenciado, PC and the enlisted personnel which had already been assigned to the Bayombong, NV, dist, and we assured the governor that we would render him all available assistance in keeping law and order, that we did not desire to establish martial law but preferred to have the normal civil government of the Province function as it had before the war.

Now our troops were in Dupax, NV, barrio Comon and Aritao, all about 30 km to the south with Capt. Praeger at Santiago, Isa. I received word unofficially that Col. Moran and his officers with about 60 PS of the 43d Inf. were at Kiangan, perhaps 60 kms to the northwest.

Shortly after arrival of Capt. Nakar I was able to get, thru Capt. Enriquez, a new 171 type U.S. Army transmitting and receiving radio set with a full complement of operators--S/Sgt. Jose Cabanero, SC, PA in charge...The city of Bayombong agreed to let us have current from its light plant provided it could get crude oil. Mr. Zarate helped by furnishing us the oil and found us our first station, the Bayombong hospital, whose patients and equipment had been temporarily evacuated to barrio San Francisco, NV, near Bambang..We contacted USAFFE Jan. 9, 1942. Having no cipher device nor code, we used the old PA code which I believed had been captured by the Japs at Vigan.

At 2 a.m., Jan. 13, Capt. Fraeger and troops with now Pvt. Camp and 63 EM of the 26th Cav., 2d Lt. de Leon PA and 30 EM of PA did, after a 6 day reconnaissance and preparation, carry out a successful five point raid on the Jap held airfield, Constabulary barracks and other installations at Tuguegarao, Cagayan Province. Approximately 400 Jap troops had been there and from 15 to 90 planes on the morning of the raid. Only two planes were on the ground. Our attacking forces used 80 bancas to cross the Cagayan river from Solano on the west bank into Tuguegarao on the east.

Jan. 13 I received from USAFFE the reply to my first radiogram:  
1 LOJNC 6:20 P 61 KZWX 1-13-42  
MAJ. E. L. WARNER KZPG.

OUR MAIN FORCES HOLD ONLY BATAAN PROVINCE AND CORREGIDOR ISLAND WEST MANILA PERIOD. STAYING IN HILLS CONTINUE TO OPERATE SUPPORT TRENCHES. PLEASE SEND AS MUCH INFORMATION ANY POSSIBLE MEANS STOP NOT PRACTICAL AT THIS TIME TO DROP ANY SUPPORT FROM PLANES BUT WILL DO SO WHEN POSSIBLE STOP. ORGANIZE YOUR FORCES TO MEET YOUR NEEDS END

MACARTHUR 7:40 P

In reporting the troops present in my vicinity I had suggested that I be permitted to organize into a provisional regt with Capt. Fraeger commanding the 1st Bn, Capt. Nakar, 2nd, Capt. Enriquez, hq. and ex officer. Upon authority vested in me by Gen. MacArthur's first radio reply I now proceeded to order the above organization which became effective actually on Jan. 29 when Lt. Minton in lieu of Capt. Fraeger joined me with 42 of the enlisted men of that troop plus some 250 PA.

Now, Jan. 15, Jap forces in Cagayan valley were chiefly at Aparri and Tuguegarao. My Hq. were at Bayombong with the radio transmitter; my hq. troops were at barrio Santo Domingo on the Magat river at Bato ferry crossing, about 7km south and my combat bn. (to be the 2nd) was at Santiago, Isabela. My total strength including all was about 750 officers and men--PA, about 700, PS and Americans about 50.

I had taken it upon myself to requisition and sign for such subsistence and supplies as we needed and could obtain and I radioed USAFFE asking permission to requisition and sign for these items, also if I would have a limit authorized on the amounts to

spend...Reply

1 BJ/DO 2:35 P KEPT Jan. 24, 1942  
MAJOR WARNER KZPG - To MAJOR WARNER STOP CHITS ISSUED BY YOU  
ON PAYMENT OF LEGITIMATE EXPENDITURES WILL BE REIMBURSED IN CASH  
AT EARLIEST DATE STOP IT IS INADVISABLE TO SEND LIMITATION AMOUNT  
AUTHORIZED END MacARTHUR 30 Sig 300 P

I had also radiced President Manuel L. Queson for Gov. Quirino  
of NV the information that there were little currency in circula-  
tion or available to carry on business, pay officials, etc. The  
President in reply stated that it was not possible to send funds by  
plane and therefore authorized NV as well as the other two provinces  
ISABELA and Cagayan to issue Emergency Scripts.

About Jan. 19, I discovered that Col. Glen R. Townsend had left  
near the Rest House, operated by a Filipino named Sanchez in Balete  
Pass, a supply of Army emergency field rations, gasoline, etc. to be  
used by such of our forces as were cut off. Sanchez was making an  
effort to hide these supplies. I sent two officers to apprehend  
him and bring him to me... Sanchez surrendered some of these supplies  
but not all and Jap Forces later got them.

About Jan. 20, Capt. Cameron Starnes appeared, saying he had  
message which Col. Horan wished me to send.

"COMMANDING GENERAL USAFFE  
LT. COL. HORAN, MAJ. WARNER, CAPT. GLITTERS AND CAPT. STARNES  
ALL SAFE AND WITH TROOPS SIGNED HORAN"

I sent it, whereupon Starnes told me that he had been  
instructed to wait for acknowledgment and if it did not come by  
the following night he was to send a second message.

No acknowledgment so  
"CO USAFFE

IT IS REPORTED THAT LT. COL. HORAN WITH (600) SIX HUNDRED  
HEAVILY ARMED TROOPS IS GUARDING AT STRATEGIC POINTS ALL RADS AND  
PASSES LEADING TO KIANGAN.  
TO BE SIGNED "WARNER"

Knowing this information to be entirely incorrect, I questioned  
Capt. Starnes as to why Col. Horan wished me to send it. Starnes  
replied that Col. Horan believed the Japs were getting my radiced  
messages and wished to mislead them. I replied to the effect that  
this also mislead our own hq. and refused to send the message over  
my name...I would send without question for Col. Horan such messages  
to which he was willing to sign his own name.

My stand in this matter, I was informed later, greatly angered  
Horan who accused me to a number of people of "messing up things"  
for him.

About this time I was called late one night to the telephone where the excited voice of Gov. Quirino informed that he just had reliable information that between 1,000 and 2,000 Jap troops were approaching Bayombong from the north via the road from Kiangnan and would probably reach us before daylight. That on this information I ordered troops from Santo Domingo, Dupax and Santiago into position north of Bayombong where delaying action could be effected but before enemy contact was made Gov. Quirino send word to us that the news was false...I checked it down to a barrico lieutenant and his friend in a NV barrico who...wanted to loot the barrico after the people had been scared out. We apprehended the guilty men and kept them under arrest for 60 days, warning them a recurrence of such behavior would mean their execution.

About Jan. 19, Jap forces number about 300 entered Aritao under the guidance of a reserve infantry Lieutenant, H. Miyimoto, former resident photographer of Bayombong for the past ten years. Early in the war, Miyimoto had succeeded in escaping NV to the Jap lines and now, familiar with the province, was brining the first Jap forces to locate there. He immediately called for a citizens meeting and when, after some time, he was able to hold one he told the Filipino citizens that the Japs would given them good government, that the Japs and not the Americans were their true friends. That, prior to the Jap entry into Aritao, I had instructed Nakar to engage these troops but Nakar, checking their strength, chose instead to move his troops into Bambang and there prepare to meet them if they came further north. This they did on Jan. 24 and a fight ensued, the results of which were reported...About 100 Japs fired on our patrols at Abian south of Bayombong and tried to cross the Magat river at Bato ferry but were repulsed with heavy losses by our force of nearly equal strength under then 2d Lt. Edmundo G. Navarro, Inf...

About Jan. 21, I had moved the radio transmitter from Bayombong to about 1 & 1/2 km east of Bagabag on the Bagabag ferry road and had placed the troops of my unit in addition to those at Santo Domingo at Solano and Bagabag, using the Bagabag school house. I had located a generator and operating engine thru Bartolome Fuson, provincial engineer of Isabela province, so that I could move the radio to points away from a power plant.

On Jan. 25, Captains Guillermo Nakar and Manuel P. Enriquez were promoted to Majors...

Realizing now that Jap forces would push us from the south and endanger the towns in which we were by bombing our burning and knowing that we could not make a successful stand due to lack of automatic weapons and ammunitions against an enemy force of any size, I decided to get my troops located away from the towns, barricos, and main roads...Early on the morning of Jan. 29, all units assembled as ordered on Bagabag school grounds where we issued to those without any uniforms a number of the old type PA helmets...We had to use bamboo rafts to ferry the motor and other vehicles across Magat river...I arrived in Jones, Isabela late in the afternoon of Jan. 29.

We set up the radio transmitter for the time in Jones, placed our Hq. troops there also and left for a rear guard two groups under Nakar, one of 4 officers and 35 EM near the RJ of Kiangon No. (5) - 4 south of Bagabag and a heavily armed detachment of two companies, about 200 officers and men, covering Oriwong pass thru which No. (2) - 5 enters Isabela. We already had news from our patrols south as far as San Jose, NE, that we could expect a fairly large troop movement in our direction and these rear guard detachments were instructed to remain at the places mentioned to await developments...The troops assembled at Bagabag were those of Maj. Nakar, the 2nd Bn, the Hq. Troops under Maj. Enriquez and the 1st bn, now under 1st Lt. Minton. Following the Tuguegarao raid of Jan. 13...Capt. Praeger requested that he be not included in my line-up but that he was willing to let Minton come to me with about 42 of his troop "C" Scouts and whatever PA he had. Minton thus brought about 300 men and but few officers, the men, aside from the Scouts, being trained in various degrees...

3 TOPMC 8:25 a 27 KZPT Jan. 29, 1942

WARNER

TUGUEGARAO RAID SPLENDID STOP OFFICERS AND MEN DISTINGUISHING THEMSELVES BY PERFORMING GALLANTLY CITED FOR DSC  
 MacARTHUR 4:41 P

In all my messages to USAFFE I requested ammunition be sent me by plane either to be landed at Bagabag air field which we had under a detachment placed there and obtaeled against enemy use or in case landing was inadvisable I asked that ammunition be dropped by chute.

LO/JC 1005 a KZWX JAN. 28, 1942  
 MAJOR WARNER-KZPG

REGRET EXCEEDINGLY THAT I HAVE NO WAY OF SENDING YOU AMMUNITION STOP AVOID ANY MASS BATTLE ACTION AGAINST YOU WHICH MIGHT BE DESIGNED TO EXHAUST OR DESTROY YOUR FORCES STOP HARASS BUT DO NOT FIGHT REPEAT DO NOT FIGHT THEM STOP FOR PRESENT YOU JUST RELY ON YOUR OWN FORCES STOP YOUR ENERGETIC ACTION HAS PLEASED ME GREATLY AND I COMMEND YOU AND YOUR ENTIRE COMMAND STOP BE CAREFUL AS TO MESSAGES YOU DISPATCH ME AND HOLD THEM TO A MINIMUM  
 END MacARTHUR 1102 a

On the morning of Jan. 30 we began crossing the Cagayan river with the units already arrived in Jones, establishing same in Barrio Palagao and other barrios furthersouth along the Cagayan. The Cagayan River makes an A turn at Jones which is on the north and east banks. Just after our last elements--a supply section--was clearing Bagabag, 7 Jap bombers and a fighter plane came from the south flying over Bayombong, Solano and Bagabag. About 10 bombs were dropped on Bayombong, doing little or no damage, two buildings in which I had a regill infirmary just north of Solano were demolished, the schools in Bagabag and my hq. bombed but not hit. The fighter plane located and machine gunned the last section of our column under Staff Sgt. (Acting) J. R. Coyle, damaging slightly several trucks and food supplies but not injuring any personnel...

My hq. in Jones until Feb. 3. Troops in Barrios Rosario and Ipil, Echague, Palagao, Jones, rear guards at Bagabag, Bagabag jct. and Oriwong Pass till Feb. 2, then all w/d to Oriwong Pass till Feb. 10, 5 jct. and there our detachment of 35 men under Lts. Januario Longuo, Vea and Evangelista contacted them. From wooded positions just west of the road and north of the jct our detachment fired into the head of the enemy column and exploded a number of dynamite-bamboo bombs chiefly to make misleading noise. This brought a deployment and advance toward our positions from certain of the leading elements of the enemy, whereupon our troops withdrew. This occurred about 10 a.m. and in early afternoon the Jap column continued north thru Bagabag and later north up the road toward Kiangan. In Bagabag they dug around the debris of the school buildings and dug up around my former hq. apparently trying to locate anything we might have buried there. A few days prior they had dropped propaganda leaflets:

"TO MAJOR WARNER, MAJOR ENRIQUEZ AND THEIR SOLDIERS--  
BEING CORNERED TO BATAAN PENINSULA U.S. FORCES ARE NOW ONLY  
WAITING FOR THEIR DESTINY OF ANNIHILATION OR SURRENDER. ON THE  
SEA JAPANESE NAVY ARE SURROUNDING ON ALL SIDES AND KEEPING STRICT  
WATCH ALL THE TIME. NOW YOU HAVE NO WAY TO ESCAPE FROM THIS FATAL  
LAND AND REINFORCEMENT FROM FAR OFF AMERICA IS OUT OF QUESTION.

YOU ARE ALREADY DOOMED.  
ANY MORE OF THIS USELESS RESISTANCE IS ONLY LEADING YOU TO  
MORE MISERABLE SITUATION.

ALL THE PHILIPPINE CITIZENS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DOING THEIR  
BEST TO ESTABLISH NEW LIFE IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE JAPANESE  
ARMY.

THROW OFF YOUR WEAPONS AND COME TO OUR SIDE, OR JAPANESE ARMY  
WILL OVER RUN THE PROVINCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA WITHOUT MERCY.

BRAVE AND CLEVER MAJORS WARNER AND ENRIQUEZ AND THEIR SOLDIERS!  
WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOU WILL RECONSIDER THE PRESENT SITUATIONS  
AND WILL STOP MISLEADING CONDUCT.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE JAPANESE ARMY"

Feb. 1, 43d Inf plus a small detachment of PC and Ifugao civilians armed with native weapons took up position at Ibilao Pass south of Kiangan and when the Jap column reached that place these troops engaged it with heavy casualties, and we estimated 300 enemy dead...Capt. Minton later reported since surrender that Jap officers had admitted to him losing 272 men at Ibilao and a Jap enlisted interpreter reported same to me.

It is my understanding from some who are close to or in this action that Capt. Starnes and William Joels were in command of Col. Horan's troops and their allies at Ibilao and that Col. Horan and Maj. Glitters had moved north several hundred km to Lubongan in Apayao Prov.

After the Ibilao Pass fight...Jap planes came over and bombed Kiangan and adjacent barrios and areas. Also some of the enemy troops occupied Kiangan and about Feb. 5...about 400 Japs came back from the Kiangan direction and occupied the same positions my troops had held.

With this movement we were "informed" promptly thru sources which we suspected as unreliable, that all Japs had withdrawn from Igu-gao and Nueva Provinces to the south. Our scouting patrols, however, were aware of the enemy's occupying Oriwong Pass and we later decided they were doing so in an effort to trap in our own style our forces should we attempt to come back via this route.. but we approached Bayombong and other points west across the Warner (former Kong Kong) valley and the mountains west of the Cagayan river south of Jones barrios...

Mar. 7 I changed executive officers, placing Maj. Nekar in that duty and assigning Maj. Enriquez in command of the 2nd Bn. (combat)

I had (Feb. 3) moved my entire command south across the Cagayan river and established my Hq. at Barrio Palagao on the south bank. I located my radio transmission unit first at Palagao then farther south at Masaya (about 12 km. south) and my hq. at Masaya under Enriquez. 2nd Bn. in Daligen on east bank of Cagayan just north from Masaya on west shore of river. 1st Bn. at Palagao...

Jap forces seldom went far off the main roads to locate, but rather only in pursuit of our forces if they knew our locations. Enemy convoys frequently carried Filipino hostages against ambushing...

We moved the 1st Bn. to Barrio Simangan Norte and began work on the 3 acre camp site in the bamboo grove. Here were erected 38 buildings--barracks, kitchens, supply and latrines. Nine full sized PA barracks. Rimming the camp was a 12 foot bamboo picket fence reinforced with 3 feet thickness of logs and open at bottom to permit fire from a parapet trench. A 300 foot long underground bombproof combined shelter and exit which led on to a ravine which continued on to a trail to a second camp erected at the foot hills of the mountain 9 km east near Barrio Bilala. Named first Camp Minton and the 2nd Camp Warner. Also 300 yards from main camp a set of stakes to accommodate 300 horses for pack and recon...Blazed good trails for animals across Sierra Madre Mountains to Casiguran Bay where we also completed the erection of a boat dock and 2nd air landing field. Our first air field was constructed near Camp Minton and 1400 meters long, 400 wide...Well camouflaged with house roofs on shell frames and grass shocks all readily removable.... Large recreation bldg. near Camp Minton also for training in bad weather. We made a dam in the Dububu river for swimming.....

We were obliged to discharge about 700 men to limit us to two bns. Our regt. strength had by the middle of Feb. reached 1600 men with 59 officers.

Minton held a review, competitive drills and field day with athletic competitions and horse races on Mar. 4...5000-8000 people attended...



2nd bn. Camp just west of Gagayan river between barrios Masaya and Dappig...Named Camp Nery. Six PA barracks with other bldgs. Enemy reconnoitered from air but apparently never located them.

Lt. Miyamoto preceded his forces into Bayombong, NV's capital, sending...detachments to machine gun a small barrico on the east side of the Magat river where there was the family of Capt. C.L. Prudenciado, my PC officer assigned there. There had been personal enmity between Miyamoto and Prudenciado and shooting had been threatened before the war. Prudenciado was later killed using a gun in each hand against an overwhelming force of Jap troops according to Jap 1st Lt. Kiritu who admired his bravery...It was he who engineered the killing of Miyamoto.

Miyamoto, about Feb. 5, moved into Bayombong with about 1000 troops, part of regt. occupying Aritao, Dupax, Santa Fe, Bone, Bambang and Balete Pass...Miyamoto was one of civil duty rather than troop duty. He was suffering from lung trouble and he took residence with a small Jap and Filipino body guard in a hotel where he also had a small transmitting and receiving radio. He directed the affairs of provincial government, replacing such officials as he saw necessary with those of his choice who were expected to be loyal to the Japs. He hauled down the American and Filipino flags and had Filipinos responsible for their flying slapped and jailed...He demanded a weekly indemnity from each Chinese merchant, \$50 each which he gave to his Filipina wife...He chose to appoint a highly regarded citizen, Mr. Jose C. Aguilar, provincial school supt., to act as governor. Aguila hesitated but upon our advice he accepted. We believed it to be to the people's protection to have him rather than some really pro Jap. Aguila was able to obtain the release of some 11 or 12 citizens whom the Japs had captured and threatened with death.

A reward of \$40,000 was offered for my capture; 20,000 for that of Enriquez, and 10,000 for Minton.

In early Feb. USAFFE dropped by plane a cipher device and new codes for my hq. and that of Maj. Praeger at Kabugao, Apayao prov. which I delivered to him by Pvt. (later Lt.), Camp...One of my sgts. worked as house boy for Miyamoto. After I got the new code he told me, "SIR, HE CANNOT GET YOUR MESSAGES NOW."

My promotion to Lt. Col. PA accepted Feb. 13. Next day we were officially named the 14th Inf. PA, 2bns. authorized plus atchd. units.

The air field near Camp Minton provided at south and with huge hanger cut out of bamboo and capable of holding 3 B-18's, also wind cone, and permanent detachment stationed there. Named George Field in honor of Col. George, AG, Nearest to Barrio Palatian.

Twice before and twice after the completion of it planes came with cipher devices, medicines, 2nd time field shoes for Minton and me, 3d and 4th rifle ammo (2 boxes each trip). Last trip April 15...

Mar. 15 our Constabulary Detachment of Capt. Frudenciado broke into Myimoto's hotel bedroom whereupon he fired a shot gun and wounded the sgt. in charge of the detail who returned fire and rifled the Jap.

Simultaneously other details took care of the few enemy guards about and following day Enriquez took over Bayombong and NV again.

March 17, 1942

LT. COL. EVERETT L. WARNER, COMMANDING  
14TH INF. USAFFE

DEAR COLONEL WARNER,

MAHUHAY! CONGRATULATIONS ON DRIVING THE JAPANESE OUT OF NUEVA VIZCAYA. I HOPE THEY ARE DRIVEN OUT TO STAY. YOUR NAME AND THAT OF MAJOR ENRIQUEZ ARE DEEPLY ENGRAVED IN THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE OF NULVA VIZCAYA FOREVER.

SINCERELY,  
DEMETRIO QUIRINO, GOVERNOR

Along with this came a message in the same town to Pres. Quezon. I transmitted it, explaining however, that there was no considerable fight over the matter--surely not one big enough to justify the idea of "recapture". That most of the Jap troops had voluntarily left for the south (evidently for the Bataan push) and this small clean up job was not much more than one merely of re-occupation...

Myimoto had threatened 3,000 troops would hold reprisals if anything happened to him. This now came in about April 12...

During Feb. Enriquez in charge of Nueva Vizcaya, Nueva Ecija and Benguet provinces; Nakar of Isabela and Ifugao; Minton of training and military installations...and had the war continued it is my belief that my regt. would have offered valuable aid to our forces.

One storekeeper near Enrile placed Jap money in separate sack and not in cash drawer with Commonwealth and Emergency script. The ₱2000 taken from the late Lt. Myimoto's effects was in Commonwealth currency...

At the meeting of provincial officials held in Feb., March and April were discussed the following:

1. Law and order...
2. Discussion and planning improvement of our subsistence and supply...
3. To make sure it was fairly carried out and no unauthorized person falsely claiming to represent us was gathering

subsistence (at first men with rifles demanded individually items of subsistence).

4. We urged farmers to grow food instead of tobacco and to grow upland rice which does not need flooded paddies but grows like wheat...

About Mar. 1, I inducted Lt. Col. James Andrew Green, inspector, Northern Luzon District, PC...I did not use the constabulary personnel for fighting warfare (but for police work) though Capt. Prudenciano...on more than one occasion picked for himself a fight with the enemy troops.

Feb. 10, A patrol of 14th raided Ilagan and killed 30 Japs, captured two trucks of salt which they gave out in the barrios. They were Hq. Troops, 100, under Naker. Afterward the Japs bombed and burned the town and threw out pamphlets explaining the reason for it "because they had been mobbed by malicious Americans."

The 14th ambushed enemy several times at Balete Pass. Killed 73 April 27 below Bayombong--Lt. Honorio Guinea; Enriquez tried unsuccessfully to blow Balete Pass.

Mar. 20, Tuguegarao raided at 4 a.m. for 15 min. from across river. Japs retaliated by an expedition into hills.

One Thursday, Warner learned from a scout that the previous Sat. a cavalry patrol of 700 Japs was headed east. He went out to inspect his sentries, found one post asleep, fired two rounds into ground, one Filipino ran off. False rumor. Another time, a friendly patrol stampeded some of his men sleeping in a school house.

There were 1000 to 3000 Japs in Cagayan valley; 500 in Tuguegarao, 500 in Aparri.

Only 3 KIA and 15 WIA 14th. Two captured by Japs and were killed.

Warner listened to radio 10-12 a.m., 4-6 p.m. located at Dibulagan, South of Jones and powered by Chinaman's rice mill. He published a bulletin of KGEI news for barrios.

April 10 This radio received: "KING SURRENDERED BATAAN YESTERDAY TO ENEMY DIVISIONS. THEY WILL MORE THAN LIKELY PAY MORE ATTENTION TO YOU NOW. WAINWRIGHT!"

Warner then divided into patrols to ambush. April 25 caught Japs at Magat river and killed 73.

At Casiguran bay 3 Japs had been interned but bought their way out from Filipino, Warner left on 14th and arrived at Casiguran 17th. Took over their hosts, Hq. at Dinalonan; patrolled coast. On 24th moved hq. to Sibong in Paliuan bay. 35 men with Warner. Took post radio. Were on reconnaissance. Wainwright ordered surrender, sent Lt. Col. Kalekuka looking for him.

Contacted Minton who had been sent to Nakar for radio generator. Minton returned to Warner. Decided to turn in. Minton left 6th arrived San Marino, 10th. Warner got there 14th. He was allowed to confer with Kalakuka and carry his side arms at Jap Hq. before surrendering. He turned over on June 19 to Col. Yoshizawa, C.O., 142 Inf. Warner had 15 Pils. with him, 20 had taken to hills. Got big feed. These Americans surrendered with Warner; Minton; Maj. Jacobs, Sgt. Abner Quinley, Sgt. John R. Marshall, actg. S. Sgt. James R. Coyle, Pvt. Harry Rusch, Pvt Charles Darcy; 2d Lt. Francis A. Camp, Cpl. Mangionola, however, are still out, May 1944.

From Camp 1, Warner sent to Echague July 23. He went out Sept. 12 and rounded up 200 men. Returned Dec. 6, 1942 to Camp 1.

Note: Col. Warner promises me a copy of his official report to Washington as soon as compiled after the war. He has my address.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

(SGD) D. M. LYNCH  
Major, Inf  
Actg Ass't Adj Gen

COPIED FROM PROJECT "J" ARCHIVES:

File: 999-2-214 Bk 3  
Title: Diary (War)  
Origin: Property of Major Calvin P. Chunn  
Dates: True certified copy of originals  
Sources: These records were recovered from Cabanatuan  
POW Camp #1 on 29 April 1946 by Archives  
Section, RFD.  
Pages: 1 thru 17

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

s/ T. H. Mehler  
t/ T. H. MEHLER  
CWO, USA  
Asst Adjutant

A true copy of a true extract copy:

/s/ Richard Evans  
WOJG USA

A TRUE COPY:

114-15 Union Turnpike  
Forest Hills, New York

April 8, 1946

Ref: AG 704 (3 Apr 46)

Subject: Status of 14th Infantry Regiment

TO : The Adjutant General's Office  
War Department  
Washington, D. C.

1. Your communication on the above subject has been received and reviewed. I believe that the rosters are substantially correct. Actually the original rosters of the 14th Infantry were destroyed in 1942 when their capture by the enemy appeared imminent. I did note, however, two discrepancies: Lt. Emilio Madarang (No. 18) was not, to my knowledge, authorized for induction into the Army of the United States, and the officer along side of No. 23 under the caption "Officers Known to Have Been Killed" whose name is Leandro Rosario was actually killed by members of the 14th Infantry for repeated treason and espionage for the Japanese. A number of other officers and men on these lists were, it is believed, also guilty of collaboration with the enemy, and a number surrendered voluntarily to the enemy and were later given their freedom when they took oaths of loyalty to the Japanese Government in the Philippines. I am not now in a position to identify these names, but they can be accurately determined, it is believed, if investigations are made in Northern Luzon by loyal officers in the Philippine Army.

2. It may be of interest and value for you to know that after the fall of Corregidor I was Commanding Officer of the Headquarters Battalion 14th Infantry, P.A. In the latter part of June 1942 we were able to establish radio communication with the Headquarters SWPA. Actually, at this time, the largest part of the 14th Infantry, P.A. had been disbanded upon orders of the regimental commander, so that when a radiogram was received from Australia signed "MacArthur" authorizing the induction into the A.U.S. of the personnel of the 14th Infantry, P.A., it was impossible to induct all of the members who had formerly been in this regiment prior to the wholesale disbandment that had occurred. The number of officers and men listed in the roster you mailed me is approximately correct.

3. Insofar as the original rosters are concerned, it is believed that Major Arturo Dingoong, who served loyally under my command, is the best authority, but as regards the subsequent loyalty of these men and officers, it is recommended that a further check of these records be made to determine if said personnel is entitled to the same treatment accorded other A.U.S. personnel.

/s/ Robert H. Arnold  
/t/ Robert H. Arnold  
Colonel, A.U.S.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority *NND 333073*