P.O.W/C.I. - W.A. Minton

Folder 1

File: 029-2-119

Title: Diary

AGRP-88

Origin: Notes kept by Capt. Warren Arthur Minton

Dates: 1942

Classification: None

Authenticity:

Source: Unknown

Extracted by B.J.E. Date 15 Aug. 45 Microfilmed _____ Date _____

AG-KI Form 91 (20 July 1945)

SCREENED (No PAP)

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ARCHIVES FILE NUMBER 999-2-119

TITLE DIARY

ORIGIN NOTES KEPT BY CAPT. WARREN ARTHUR MINTON

DATES 1942

AUTHENTICITY

SOURCE UNKNOWN

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Extracted from the Affidavit of
Captain Warren Arthur Minton
Cavalry

- Affidavit -

District of Cabanatuan)
Nueva Ecija Province ) ss
Philippines )

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, an officer authorized by law to administer oaths, one Warren Arthur Minton, Captain, Cavalry, Army of the United States who being duly sworn, deposes and says: -

"I certify that I am Warren Arthur Minton, O-362, 251 Captain, Cavalry, Army of the United States with residence in the United States at 219 W. Nevada Street, El Paso, Texas.

That I desire to give this statement which covers my knowledge of the activities and plans of Lieutenant-Colonel Everett Lauman Warner, O-125, 572, Field Artillery, Army of the United States and Commanding Officer Fourteenth Infantry, Philippine Army U.S.A.F. F.E. to which regiment I was assigned from Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) and served as Commanding Officer first Battalion also as Adjutant.

That my reason for submitting this affidavit is that I desire to confirm the report of his activities that I know Lieut-Colonel Warner has written personally and truthfully, and to offset and overcome if possible certain misrepresentations that one United States Army officer and one or two Philippine Army officers thru envy perhaps or desire for each his own respective personal glory, have tried to make against Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, some of these misrepresentations having taken place directly within my knowledge and observation.

That I first became personally acquainted with Lieutenant-Colonel Warner while he was a Major Field Artillery and on detached service at Camp John Hay P. I. from the provisional Field Artillery Brigade, Philippine Scouts, Fort Stotsenburg. Our first meeting was at Lusod Saw-Mill, Benguet Mountain Province, December 26, 1941 upon the occasion of the ordered evacuation from Camp John Hay of our forces. That at Lusod Saw-Mill Major Warner received from Lt-Colonel John P. Horan late Commanding Officer at Camp John Hay verbal orders to precede him (Colonel Horan with troops of the 43d Infantry PS.) over the mountain trail to the east and when reaching Aritao, Nueva Viscaya province to inform him (Lt-Colonel Horan) whether or not the road (National route number five) was free of enemy troops to the south and whether there was transportation available to move him and the troops with him, south. That Major Warner carried out this mission endeavoring to keep contact with Lt-Colonel Horan, and that near Kayapa Lt Colonel Horan, about 60 Kilometers behind Major Warner, without advising or warning Major Warner, turned and proceeded southeast thru Imugan toward Belete Pass, and there to road five.

That Japanese forces at midnight December 28th 1941 occupied San Jose Nueva Ecija and prevented all movement south of our forces which Major Warner made effort to advise Lt-Colonel Horan concerning, he (Major Warner) having reached Aritao early on the afternoon of December 29th 1941.

9-2-9

That on January first 1942 Lieut-Colonel Horan with a portion of his troops and two of his officer personnel, namely Captains Leo Gitter and Cameron Starnes came north thru Aritao and expressed to Captain Manuel P. Enriquez, 11th Division Staff Philippine Army that he did not desire Major Warner now to report to him (Colonel Horan) but to advise Major Warner to carry on with his work in charge of Philippine Army Troops, that Lieut-Colonel Horan then moved north and spent the night of January first with US-Troop "C" 26th Cavalry PS at Bambang - about twelve kilometers north of Major Warner's position. Then moved north to Kiangan, Ifugao, Mountain Province.

That Major Warner meantime just prior to and upon arriving in Aritao on the afternoon of December 29, 1941 came upon several hundred cut off troop units of the Philippine Army, some of who said that their Commanding Officers had disbanded them and directed them to proceed to their homes. That Major Warner after making effort to contact Lieut-Colonel Horan with the news of the Japanese occupation of San Jose to the south, took charge of the loose Philippine Army elements ordering them to remain under himself until further definite information and orders could be obtained.

That in command of the Advance Party of my troop ("C" 26th Cavalry PS) I preceded that troop over the trail just behind Major Warner's party, arrived in Aritao just behind him and met and talked with him in Aritao where I learned and could observe that he was doing. That I considered his efforts to be well worthwhile and of importance to the aid of both the law, order and good morale of both soldiers and citizens in Nueva Viscaya.

That Major Warner obtained and erected on or about January 9, 1942 a transmitting and receiving radio with which he contacted our high command and reported the situation as it concerned those of our forces which to his knowledge were cut off from proceeding south and were now in proximity to him. That General MacArthur replied by radiogram dated January 13th authorizing Major Warner to operate support trenches in the hills, directing him to send information by every possible means and authorizing him to organize the troops to meet his needs. That shortly following, General MacArthur authorized Major Warner to sign chits for legitimate expenses for subsistence and other necessities for his troops. That later General MacArthur commended Major Warner for his energetic action in north Luzon and on February 12th by paragraph 4 Special Orders twenty-two promoted Major Warner to Lieutenant-Colonel.

That I joined Major Warner with a portion of troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) and about 250 Filipinos (some already in the Philippine Army) under my command and Major Warner placed me in command of his provisional first Battalion where he had originally intended to place Major Ralph B. Praeger, Cavalry. That on February 14th 1942 with a strength of 1600 or over Lieut-Colonel Warner's command was officially designated by General MacArthur - the Fourteenth Infantry, Philippine Army with such Philippine Scouts and Americans as were with us attached.

That I was the first American commissioned officer to join with Lieut-Colonel Warner - while he was still a Major - and as such we were much together in conference, on reconnaissance and in operations.

9-2-9

That Lieut-Colonel Warner took me at all times into his confidence and that I believe I know better than anyone else his plans and purposes in all of his decisions and actions. That I remained with him thru surrender and was taken out of prison camp with him by the Japanese Army to force the surrender of certain elements of the Fourteenth Infantry not yet surrendered. This was from September 12 to December 6, 1942.

That short of ammunition, automatic and heavy weapons as we were also individual equipment and medicine, Lt-Colonel Warner inspired and held together the regiment when no other officer therein, I believe, could have done so. That his attitude to both his troops and to the civilian population was one of always extreme fairness and that I believe he has the love and respect of all the right thinking officers, enlisted men and civilians who knew him. That I have heard Filipino Army Officers tell him that Filipinos particularly like him and I have heard his kindness praised by Spaniards and Filipinos alike.

That Lieut-Colonel Warner's policy was to keep up the morale of both the troops and the civilian population by assisting the people to preserve law and order thru their own provincial and municipal officials without declaring Martial Law, and by letting them know that his troops were there to help and not to bring suffering to them. That he likewise strongly advised and encouraged the officials to remain in office and to thereby serve their people rather than to evacuate in the path of the incoming Japanese forces and thereby bring into power those who had not the interests of the citizens at heart first. That in some instances the Japanese Army permitted to remain or appointed to office certain citizens that Lt-Colonel Warner had previously urged to serve. In other instances this was diametrically the opposite.

That first, for Governor Quirino of Nueva Viscaya, then later for Governor Visaya of Isabela and for Governor Addurn of Cagayan, Lt-Colonel Warner over the regimental radio, contacted President Manuel L. Quezon with respective problems of each and returned to these officials President Quezon's return reply or solution with authority to act. That emergency script currency for one thing was authorized, and that in another instance Lt-Colonel Warner had a circuit judgeship, which was vacated by death in Isabela province, refilled by presidential appointment so that numerous prisoners in jail overlong awaiting trial could be properly tried and other cases on the docket disposed of legally and officially. That in addition Lt-Colonel Warner inducted in to U.S.A.F.F.E. such constabulary elements as were within his contact, reenforced them where necessary and requested permission of our High Command that he be permitted to use the constabulary in civil law enforcement where possible and not in the battle line unless necessary. That General MacArthur approved this and informed Lt-Colonel Warner that such policy was in keeping with the plan of the High Command.

That it is evidenced that the civil population thought well of Lieut-Colonel Warner in that the governing commission of Nueva Viscaya province - the Governor, Provincial Treasurer, and third member, officially named and recorded the adjacent valley (of the Addalam River) west to the southern portion of the Cagayan River Valley, and called for a period of the time the Kong Kong Valley, - officially named this valley the Warner Valley. That third member Leandro Rosario verbally

9-2-9

10

notified Lieut-Colonel Warner of this and likewise informed him that the province wished to make him a present of a strip of timberland in this valley, and stated that an official letter would come confirming all of this. That Japanese occupation, however, shortly after this, prevented completion of this plan and the ceremonies that were to take place concerning it.

That Lieut-Colonel Warner in his capacity as regimental commander frequently called meetings of provincial and municipal officials of Nueva Viscaya, Isabela and Cagayan provinces to discuss with them matters of importance pertaining to the well being of the people and the relationships of troops toward civilians and vice versa. That at such a meeting in March Lt-Colonel Warner advised the increased planting of food in place of the large tobacco planting usually done, and advised that should Japanese occupation occur, the people to remain in their homes and accept gracefully and without resistance the enemy's occupation, provided that by such time our forces had not received additional help from the United States, nor have help near in sight.

That because of inability to send help in the form of ammunition, automatic weapons and medicines in the quantities requested, General MacArthur directed Lieut-Colonel Warner not to fight enemy forces that could overpower and destroy his own but to harass and to contact in combat small patrols that could be overpowered. That in this same message General MacArthur told Lt-Colonel Warner that his energetic action pleased him (Gen. MacArthur) greatly and commended him (Colonel Warner) and his entire command.

That unless he believed it to be of importance to the cause, Lt-Colonel Warner after some earlier demostrations of retaliation on towns and barrios, by planes made effort to guide the bombings of points not too near a community, and that after the bombings of Bagabag and Bayombong by enemy planes in an effort to destroy our troops, Lt-Colonel Warner and I made an extended reconnaissance of positions in wooded areas where we constructed our own camps, and air landing fields and a ship dock or pier in the Casiguran Bay - two of the camps the air fields and dock construction being under my direct supervision. That the first Battalion under my command had the largest strength of personnel, reaching at one time 800 and over and this being my Battalion I used soldier labor in hours that would not interfere with drill and military training. That we planned and were soon to be ready on construction of good trails east from our positions over the Sierra Madre mountains to the Casiguran Bay where if help and supplies could come by boat we could use my 300 pony pack train with pack carriers we had constructed for them.

That both Lieut-Colonel Warner and I believed that all of these installations and more that we had in mind would be of value to our forces when if and as additional help came and Lieut-Colonel Warner requested of our High Command numerous times that a plane come and land where we had prepared a suitable field, and bring along a staff officer to report on what we had accomplished so that our High Command could direct us whether to continue or not, our program of expansion.

9-2-9

That upon completion of my Battalion's main camp near Sinuanguan Norte Barrio (But hidden in a huge bamboo grove south of this place) and our first air landing field in the Barrio Palatian and Sinuanguan Sur Area Lt-Colonel Warner backed my plan and suggestion to hold a review, competetive drill exhibition and field day and to invite the public. This we did on March 4, 1942 and the day proved highly successful. The review, drills and athletics were full of spirit. The camp was admired and the results of everything were highly favorable to the morale of both soldiers and citizens of whom there were about 8000 present that no Japanese planes flew overhead during the day tho we could have hidden most of the crowd from view had they come.

That after the Tuguegarao attack of January 13th in which I and my Philippine Scout Troops participated as did all of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS), many Filipino reservists not before able to report for duty, and volunteers, came to join us. That Lt-Colonel Warner wishing to gain results from the training of our scouts designated most of the recruit training to my Battalion. That we were obliged on March 15th however, by direct order from higher authority, to discharge about 500 men after two months of the best training we were able to give them with our limited equipment and ammunition. And that upon discharging them we gave each a certificate attesting to his training.

That as before mentioned Lt-Colonel Warner maintained contact between President Quezon and the Provincial Governments of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Viscaya provinces.

That during activities and operations in north Luzon prior to the ordered surrender of our forces we were able to recapture from the enemy certain loot in the form of dry goods dress material and a truck load of salt. That this was all distributed to Filipino citizens who needed it. That further certain funds were taken from the enemy powers that were in Nueva Viscaya and returned to Chinese merchants who had been forced to pay a weekly indemnity thereto. That it is believed Lieut-Colonel Warner will cover these items in his report.

That Lieut-Colonel Warner constantly impressed on his officers and men the necessity of reporting promptly worthwhile activity and news and the importance of making truthful and not exaggerated reports. That to facilitate news reaching our headquarters quickly from intelligence and combat patrols sent out, Colonel Warner succeeded in procuring some carrier pigeons. That these were about ready to put into use when the surrender of our forces was ordered.

That as time went on without help coming Lieut-Colonel Warner doubted the ability of our forces in Bataan to hold so that he and I made some plans together. That in addition to the four well hidden camps and the air field we had constructed in the south Cagayan River Valley we constructed near Casiguran a second air landing field and in the Casiguran Bay a sizeable ship dock or pier. Had our forces been able to hold out or could we have avoided General Wainwright's surrender order later we would have constructed trails passable with pack animals, over the Sierra Madre Mountains and concerning with Casiguran Bay.

That further, Lieut-Colonel Warner planned to erect at suitable points transmitting and receiving radio sets and to establish thru them direct contact with Hawaii and the United States, that in addition, if

9-29

Bataan surrendered, we planned to break up the larger groups into effective small groups and scatter them so that they could be fed, because we realized that Bataan's surrender would bring the enemy in large numbers after us and into our subsistence routes. That in addition we planned to cover outlying territory and organize new harassing groups, wherever this seemed advisable. We planned further to organize effective operating bases at certain points in the so called unexplored territory.

That activities of our patrols and military information was reported by our headquarters to our high command as it came in and was evaluated.

That Lieut-Colonel Warner had some differences with Major Manuel P. Enriquez who up until March first 1942 had been Colonel Warner's executive officer. These differences coming about because Enriquez had on several occasions sent his personal messages on the radio against Colonel Warner's orders. That Lt-Colonel Warner at about this time designated Major Guillermo Nakar as his executive officer, and placed him in direct charge of the radio.

That on the night of April 10th General Jonothan M. Wainwright, Commanding USAFFE Forces in the Philippines notified Lt-Colonel Warner that General King, April 9th had surrendered our forces in Bataan to enemy divisions and warned Colonel Warner to be on the lookout for them (Enemy Divisions) now.

That about March 25th, Lt-Colonel Warner had received from General Wainwright, permission to be away from the regiment for from fifteen to thirty days effective April 15th for the purpose of inspecting installations on the east coast (The dock in Casiguran Bay and air field nearby) and of making a reconnaissance in the unexplored territy. That permission had been asked and granted in this instance to place Major Nakar in command of the regiment during Lt-Colonel Warner's trip. That Lt-Colonel Warner had three times requested Major Nakar's promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel up to this time.

That despite Lt-Colonel Warner's strict orders that official radio news be not made known outside the radio station, It is believed that Major Nakar saw to it that certain civilian officials appeared at our regimental headquarters on the morning of April 11th 1942 in connection with the radiogram from General Wainwright concerning the surrender of General King in Bataan. That leading this civilian detail were Governor Visaya and Provincial Treasurer Juan Silvestre who was spokesman also the third member, the Mayor of Jones and others. That the mission of this delegation proved to be to request Lt-Colonel Warner with other Americans to hide out away from the regiment. That at first Colonel Warner and others of us respected the sincerity of such a suggestion or request and were inclined to honor it. But later we became convinced that this was all part of a cheap, put up political scheme of Major Nakar's to make it appear that Lt-Colonel Warner and I with other Americans had deserted the regiment while he (Nakar) proved to be the hero who stuck by, refused to obey the surrender order of both General Wainwright and Lt-Colonel Warner and built up a political prestige for himself by forcing the Japanese forces to capture him. That shortly after Nakar was captured (He had been promoted to Lieut-Colonel about April 15th) I personally saw and talked with him and he (Lt-Col. Nakar) proudly said to me quote "This has made me famous en-

9-29

ough that I will be elected President of the Philippines" unquote. That it was Lt-Colonel Warner who finally surrendered the regiment.

That returning to what happened within our regiment after General Wainwright warned Lt-Colonel Warner to expect Japanese attention to be now turned toward us the following is recorded.

First - That Lt-Colonel Warner immediately called a meeting of his Staff, his Battalion Commanders and their Staffs, for the purpose of discussing his plans and to order the execution of them. That this meeting was called for ten o'clock A.M. April 11th and Major Manuel P. Enriquez commanding the second Battalion failed to appear or to be represented. That information reached Lt-Colonel Warner about 15 days later in the person of Captain George T. Scholey from Colonel John P. Horan's regiment, the 121st Infantry. That he (Scholey) had seen Major Enriquez while coming thru Bayombong and that Enriquez was very excitedly engaged in disbanding and scattering his own troops. This was about April 12th.

That at the officers meeting called for ten o'clock A.M. April 11th Lt-Colonel Warner brought to our attention two facts: Namely first, that any considerable movement of Japanese troops from the south toward us would cut off our food supplies. We now had approximately 1000 troops assigned and attached. That secondly any effort on our part to make a stamp as a regiment would surely bring disastrous defeat because of our extremely small quantity of ammunition and limited automatic weapons. That we had no heavy weapons.

That almost before the meeting had closed our patrols to the south informed us that 3000 Japanese troops were headed from the south, were now in San Jose, Nueva Ecija and would proceed north into Nueva Viscaya and Isabela the following day.

That Lt-Colonel Warner now met with Major Nakar and the following was decided upon -

1. That Captain Minton's - the first Battalion - would be moved east over the Sierra Madre mountains and distributed in Casiguran and thru the barrios, on the Casiguran Bay and those north in Isabela province near the east coast.
2. That the headquarters troops under Major Nakar would occupy in small groups the outlying barrios in the far southern Cagayan Valley and west thruout the Warner (former Kong Kong) Valley of Nueva Viscaya.
3. That the second Battalion under Major Manuel P. Enriquez would occupy scattered positions in Nueva Viscaya within reach of Bayombong, Belete Pass and far enough west on the trail into Benguet province to contact Baguio.
4. That all troops would remain under the orders of specified officers and non-commissioned officers.
5. That in the barrios the soldiers remaining would keep their arms hidden and would assist the farmers to grow food.
6. That the best qualified officers and enlisted personnel for harassing contact would be selected from all groups and stationed at vantage points away from the barrios as much as possible.
7. That Lt-Colonel Warner would take along with him all American personnel and would use such portions of the unexplored territory in Isabela province as he considered advantageous.

9-2-9

6

8. That Major Nakar would make use of such unexplored territory in Tayabas province as he needed - he having claimed experience in this territory while with the Philippine Constabulary.
9. That the regimental radio would remain until further arrangements under Major Nakar's direction while Captain Minton and Lt-Colonel Warner made an effort to acquire and erect a more portable set and if possible two sets. With these we could also establish contact between battalions and Lt-Colonel Wanted to arrange contact directly with the United States, Hawaii and Australia.

That Lt-Colonel Warner sent a radiogram on April 11th to General Wainwright stating that now our food supply was endangered, that we were scattering troops to assist farmers that our assembly point would be Jones Isabela, that he (Col. Warner) was ordering the Americans in the regiment to join with him and that he was going to make effort to join united or allied forces elsewhere. That the wording of the telegram was aimed to mislead and to cover up from the local news spreaders and gossipers - who would be sure to spread the contents of Colonel Warner's message. That Colonel Warner believed that General Wainwright would issue orders covering any change in the situation that he wished Lt-Colonel Warner to make and that the understanding between Lt-Colonel Warner ~~to make and that the understanding between Lt-Colonel Warner~~ and Major Nakar whom he left in charge of the radio was that Major Nakar would forward to him any instructions from General Wainwright. Lt-Colonel Warner told Major Nakar that he would notify him (Nakar) of his movements.

That on the morning of April 12 we began moving my battalion to Pinappagan all but two Americans with the regiment accompanying Lt-Colonel Warner and me there.

That on the morning of April 14th we started eastward over the Sierra Madre mountains toward Casiguran. That already I had a detail of about 70 men there working on the ship dock and the air field, and that I reached there (Casiguran) on April 19th. That Lt-Colonel Warner reached Calabgan on the lower Casiguran Bay the same date and established temporary headquarters in barrio Dipsadu then at the school house at Dinalanan.

That on or about April 21st Captain George T. Scholey, 1st Lieut. Dean Nicholson (Mining Engineers Commissioned) Sergeant Harkaway and two Chinese Sergeants - all from Colonel John P. Horans regiment - the 121st Infantry joined me in Casiguran. That these officers and men came of their own accord and not on the invitation of any of us.

That in Casiguran Captain Scholey's group helped us condition for travel a small launch formerly belonging to a nearby Japanese lumber concession.

That on April 23d Scholey's group joined me with Corporal Quinley, Pvt. John Rusch and Corporal Tirso Limpahan of my regiment on the launch and we went down the Casiguran Bay where on April 24th we picked up Lt-Colonel Warner, Sergeant Coyle and Corporal Altamero at Dinalanan and set out for Palanan Bay arriving there at Sibang Island on the morning of April 26th. That Lt-Colonel Warner instructed certain detachments of our troops to hike up the coast and join us in Palanan, which they did totalling about 35. Some others were sent back to Pinappagan with messages from Lt-Colonel Warner to Lt-Colonel Nakar(promoted about

9-2-9

April 15th) giving him information to radio General Wainwright about our activities. That after this time we did not get any direct information from Lt-Colonel Nakar tho' Colonel Warner sent him a number of coded messages.

That around the Palanan area, Lt-Colonel Warner worked on ways and means of establishing power to operate one of the two radios we had available but were unable to get into operation due to lack of a generator sufficiently strong.

That we had a small radio receiving set (Commercial) over which we heard some news tho our batteries were weak and we had no way of recharging them.

That Lt-Colonel Warner now detailed me in charge of a small group of Filipinos and Americans to cross over the Sierra Madres again to contact Lt-Colonel Nakar with messages to General Wainwright and after they were sent to get the generator from our regimental radio in Lt-Colonel Nakar's care then to bring same back to use at a place in the Sierra Madres where we'd have water power available - also to bring back the broken Palanan post radio generator now reported to be in Ilagan on its way to Manila for repair.

That I left Colonel Warner on my mission on May 5th and upon the surrender of Corregidor, he got the information over the small commercial receiving set and sent it after me. That in the announcement of General Wainwright calling organizations outside of Corregidor to surrender he (General Wainwright) called for the surrender of Lt-Colonel Nakar with our forces rather than for Colonel Warner. This we learned later from Lt-Colonel Kalakuka, General Wainwright's representative was because Lt-Colonel Nakar had previously informed General Wainwright that he (Nakar) did not know Lt-Colonel Warner's whereabouts - which was entirely untrue because Lt-Colonel Nakar knew at all times what Colonel Warner was doing and his location. That at Pinappagan where Lt-Colonel Kalakuka was later hunting Lt-Colonel Nakar, Nakar was hidden out in the town while his friends seemed only too anxious to start Lt-Colonel Kalakuka after Lt-Colonel Warner telling him his location. That this is the beginning of where we discovered that instead of Lt-Colonel Nakar cooperating with Lt-Colonel Warner in carrying out a workable plan which would be to the best advantage of all concerned, Lt-Colonel Nakar instead tried to make himself quite a hero in the eyes of the Filipinos and tried to make it appear that the Americans had deserted the Filipinos and that he (Nakar) had courageously remained by. That later on also Nakar tried to encourage certain Americans who contacted him to remain with him. Then later became frightened and tried to get the Americans to leave him - the very plan and advice that Lt-Colonel Warner had given him in April. That Lt-Colonel Warner's only reason for himself and Americans leaving the Cagayan Valley was to save suffering by the people at the enemys hands and because Colonel Warner's maxim, i.,e., "A live soldier is worth more to his country than a dead one or a prisoner". He tried to locate his troops so as to enable them to do something of value. He felt that from the beginning we had been unable to do much.

That now Japanese forces were heavily in the Cagayan Valley and in all the important towns such as Jones, Echague, Cuayan, Ilagan with the Japanese flag now flying in larger towns away from the main highways such as San Mariano Isabela etc.

9-2-9

That on my trip to contact Lt-Colonel Nakar whom we still believed to be south of Jones I planned to detour the Japanese forces in Jones. That not far north of Jones however I came upon two small groups of troops of our regiment who had remained behind with Lt-Colonel Nakar. That each of these groups gave me information to the effect that Lt-Colonel Nakar had disbanded his troops and had gone to Mountain Province. That other Filipinos whom inquired of, likewise verified this information as correct.

That near San Mariano I succeded in getting only a small automobile generator sufficient to recharge dry cells but not to operate the radio transmitter.

That on my return I picked up the copy of General Wainwright's surrender order to Lt-Colonel Nakar and Lt-Colonel Kalakuka's personal letter to him from Filipinos entrusted by Colonel Kalakuka to deliver these to Lt-Colonel Nakar. That these I brought back to Lt-Colonel Warner, returning to his headquarters at near Barrio Dimatican on May 25.

That by now Capt. George Scholey and party in Palanan had purchased for ₱6500 and were putting into condition for sailing a 35 foot boat with outrigger and Scholey planned to try to get away from Luzon thereby and if possible reach the Chinese coast hiking inland in an effort to contact friendly forces. That Lt-Colonel Warner and I were invited to go along and concerning this we had a conference together with the following decision.

Lt. Colonel Warner decided that he would remain in Luzon to do what he could in keeping radio contact with higher headquarters and in organizing effective harassing groups in so far as ammunition could be procured. That since I was anxious to try to reach the China coast he would entrust to me certain records that we wished to get to our lines and a full report of his plans which he also hoped I could get to where it could reach our headquarters in the Far East. That also was prepared for me to take along a request to our high command from Lt-Colonel Warner to remain out in an effort to carry out his plans.

That the boat was in readiness to leave Palanan on the morning of June 6th stocked with provisions for seven men for about seventy days, when on the night of June 5th a messenger (one of our soldiers) arrived from Lt-Colonel Theodore Kalakuka QMC (General Wainwright's representative sent out on Japanese order) in San Mariano, which messenger brought to me for Lt-Colonel Warner and the rest of us General Wainwright's order to surrender. That along with this came an explanatory letter from Lt-Colonel Kalakuka stating by refusing to surrender we would be subject to charges of desertion and that in addition Lt-Colonel Warner's failure to surrender would prevent the Japanese command from agreeing to the surrender terms and would open the way to possible mistreatment of our already surrendered troops. That Lt-Colonel Kalakuka further stated that General Wainwright's surrender was authorized by Washington and that he (Kalakuka) had seen President Roosevelt's radiogram of authorization, himself.

That Lt-Colonel Warner, Captain Scholey and I all decided to drop our other plans and to obey the surrender order chiefly on account of the prisoners already surrendered. That up to this time we had all decided not to surrender at any cost.

9-2-9

That because Lt-Colonel Kalakuka stated that personal illness would detain him a few days in San Mariano (about 5 days hike from us) He requested us to contact him there and I left on June 6th for San Mariano to inform Lt-Colonel Kalakuka that Lt-Colonel Warner, Captain Scholey and the soldiers with them would be in San Mariano by June 14th. That on this date Lt-Colonel Warner arrived with some troops, others having deserted after being ordered by Colonel Warner to accompany him to San Mariano where he would discuss surrender terms.

That in San Mariano Lt-Colonel Kalakuka informed him that General Wainwright held him (Lt-Col. Warner) still in command of the 14th Infantry and responsible for the surrender of the unit. Further that General Wainwright meant it that he wanted Lt-Colonel Warner to surrender. That Lt-Colonel Warner before contacting Lt-Colonel Kalakuka but hearing appeals over the radio for the surrender of Lt-Colonel Nakar, had prepared and sent in code to Lt-Colonel Nakar by a Filipino civilian - one Trinitario Pintang, a written message instructing Nakar not to surrender. That Pintang on his way to Lt-Colonel Nakar in Pinappagan told Lt-Colonel Kalakuka when they met in San Mariano, that he had this message for Nakar and that Kalakuka then decoded that message and thereafter mistrusted Colonel Warner's intention to surrender.

That the surrender was to take place in Echague - Japanese designated capital of Isabela - and on the way there we were joined in San Antonio by Major Eugene C. Jacobs, Medical Corps who had previously joined our regiment and was on his way to join Lt-Colonel Warner in Palanan.

That we surrendered in Echague to Japanese Colonel Yoshizawa on June 19th and were questioned. Then detained with a Japanese horse - drawn Field Artillery unit at the former second Isabela cadre barracks in Echague until July 20th. Meantime the number of our Filipino officers and men surrendered was small and the Japanese commander desired to have more turn in. That Lt-Colonel Warner offered to make an effort to get Lt-Colonel Nakar and Major Enriquez with more men if permitted to try without Japanese soldiers to contact them. That at first the Japanese authorities seemed to favor this but later declined. That meantime Lt-Colonel Kalakuka was sent out again after these officers whom Lt-Colonel Warner was required to send surrender orders in writing. That a note from Lt-Colonel Warner by way of Lt-Colonel Kalakuka to 1st Lt. Leandro Rosario of Lt-Colonel Warner's staff brought in Lieut. Rosario with about 200 officers and men, and Rosario on Lt-Colonel Warner's advice surrendered.

That after this surrender Japanese staff Lieutenant Sasaki told Lt-Colonel Warner that he need not be longer concerned with Lt-Colonel Nakar and Major Enriquez and their men surrendering - that Japanese troops would surely be successful in capturing them. That here Lt-Colonel Warner asked that if possible they be given a chance to surrender if contacted, and that their lives be spared, which was promised.

That on July 19th we were put in trucks with Japanese troops and brought to Cabanatuan prison camp where we Americans were left and the Filipino soldiers with us were taken presumably to Camp O'Donnell.

That late in August Lt-Colonel Warner and I were called to Japanese headquarters at prison camp and thoroughly questioned as to all of our movements since the outbreak of war. That at the termination of

9-2-19

the questioning Lt-Colonel Warner was told that our radio was operating and in communication with Australia, and that he and I would be taken out with Japanese forces to assist in capturing Lt-Colonel Nakar and the radio.

That twice more Lt-Colonel Warner and I were questioned and on September 12th 1942 we were taken out of camp and taken again to Echague Isabela. That here Lt-Colonel Warner was held until October 9th as a hostage with the Japanese Army Military Police into some of the barrios south of Jones Isabela.

That sometime near the middle of September, I learned later, the Japanese located and captured the radio which at the time was buried in Pinappagan. That on or about September 28th or 29th on the information of a Filipino policeman of Jones, believed to be antagonistic to Lt-Colonel Nakar, the Japanese forces captured Nakar in a cave in the Sierra Madre foothills near Barrio Minuri Isabela.

That, I learned later Lt-Colonel Warner was not ever permitted to see Lt-Colonel Nakar but was sent south in the Cagayan Valley with Lt-Colonel Kalakuka and Lieut. Albert Ziegler who had been assisting him to bring back about 500 officers and men of the Fourteenth Infantry who learning that Lt-Colonel Warner and I were being held as hostages, voluntarily surrendered. That now Major Enriquez and his troops still remained out and Lt-Colonels Warner and Kalakuka were taken to Bayombong, it is believed to try to get them in. That both these officers however as well as Lieut. Ziegler, separated from them at Jones and sent to Exhague, were taken ill with cerebral Malaria, Lt-Colonel Kalakuka dying on October 31, 1942 in Bayombong and Lieut. Ziegler died November 8, 1942. Lieut-Colonel Warner got better and was returned to Cabanatuan prison camp December 6, 1942 after I had been returned about November 24th.

That after Lt-Colonel Nakar was captured and brought to Jones Isabela on or about September 29th and Later in Baguio I saw him and once had a slight opportunity to talk with him. It was at this time that what he said to me had in it a ring of insincerity and condemnation of Lt-Colonel Warner, of me and the other Americans when as a matter of fact all of his actions bore out that we had done what we had agreed to do for the best interests of the service and of the Filipino people, whom we could do no better for under existing circumstances. That Lt-Colonel Nakar tried his best later to rid himself of Americans who tried to remain with him after

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Ruth H. Essary

RUTH H. ESSARY
Capt Wac

9-2-119

P.O.W/C.I. - W.A. Minton

Folder 1