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Title: PERSONAL PAPERS

Origin: Lt. Col. F. B. Miller

Dates: 1941 Dec. - 1945 Feb.

Classification:

Authenticity: Copy of original

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
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AG-KI Form 91 (20 July 1945)

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SCREENED (24 APR)
NO [Signature]

Bataan



Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Hq. Co. Cont'd. - Odonel:

Pvt. Robert Wiring - 20931792 - 6/6 - Mal.
 Pfc. Robert E. Emley - 20900675 5/27-Dys.

Cabanatuan (Batangas)

| | Serial | Date | Location | Remarks |
|----------|----------------------|----------|----------|---|
| Pvt. | Alvin C. Brod | 39601688 | 6/9 | Inanition |
| | Eddie M. King | 20945456 | 6/14 | Dys. |
| PFC. | Louis J. W. Yager | 20720286 | 6/7 | Mal. |
| " | Donald J. Reilly | 20900684 | 7/1 | " |
| " | Mario Mirko | 39478896 | | San Fernando - Mal. |
| " | John H. Bloomquist | 39378193 | | " |
| Pvt. | Glenn L. White | 37037364 | 7/5 | Dys. |
| " | Corbin H. Buell | 37006445 | 7/4 | Mal. |
| " | Ralph C. Wiliford | 20932906 | 7/7 | Dys. |
| Sgt. | Howard C. Barry | 39378190 | 7/12 | Mal. |
| Pvt. | John P. Lawson | 39231831 | 7/12 | " |
| " | Frank H. Condon | 39156410 | 7/10 | Dys. |
| " | Marvin Everts | 20943827 | 7/16 | " |
| PFC. | Lloyd G. Cole | 20900697 | 7/30 | " |
| Pvt. | Clayton M. Miller | 37006304 | 7/22 | Mal. |
| " | George A. Christy | 20720291 | 7/18 | Dys. |
| " | Robert E. Overstreet | 20900738 | 8/5 | Diphtheria |
| " | Guy O. Miller | 37006330 | 8/15 | " |
| " | Jack W. Tucker | 20937841 | 8/26 | Dys. |
| PFC. | Eldon I. Engbretson | 39156780 | 9/12 | Dys. |
| Pvt. | La Mar A. Woodson | 39078821 | 9/21 | " |
| 1st Sgt. | Charles W. Rockwell | 20720279 | 9/28 | Dys., Mal., Malnu. |
| Pvt. | James A. Sapp | | 9/30 | " " " |
| Pvt. | Robert L. Miller | 20900731 | 10/8 | " " " |
| PFC. | Emery O. Monroe | 20720309 | 10/16 | Dys., Malnu. |
| Pvt. | Henry D. Bordner | 39601669 | 10/20 | Beriberi |
| T/Sgt. | Allan D. Lang | | | Last seen in San Fernando enroute to O'Donnell. |
| Sgt. | Gerald D. Foley | | | KP 167.8 - 4/8/42. |
| Pvt. | George L. Apsa | | | " " " |
| PFC. | Kenneth A. Becher | | | Last known to be in San Fernando Hosp. |
| PFC. | Joseph L. Smith | | | Died enroute to O'Donnell - 4/14/42. |
| Pvt. | Clair A. Pickle | 20943024 | | Died at Caban. Aug. - Malaria. |
| PFC. | Clarence E. Rodell | 20944391 | | San. Fer. Sept - " |
| Pvt. | Harry F. Barker | 37025852 | | O'Donnell ? - " |
| " | Robert A. Brown | 39378181 | | " ? - Dys. |
| " | Charles R. Smithly | 20933299 | | " ? - Cer. Mal. |
| Mr. Sgt. | Floyd W. Bickmore | 20900643 | | Died at Caban. 10/28/42 - Pelegra, Beriberi, Malnu., Heat. |

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Co. "A", 194th Tank Bn.

| Recap: | Off. | E.M. | Total |
|-----------------------------|------|------|-------|
| Died enroute to Odonel | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Missing " " " | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Shot on detail (Batangas) | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Died Hosp. #1 (Bataan) | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Died at Odonel & Cabanatuan | 0 | 36 | 36 |
| | 0 | 42 | 42 |

Str. 4/9/42 - 5 Off. - 128 E.M. Strabel * 12/26/41

Recap. of 194th Tank Bn. to 11/1/42

| | Off. | E.M. | Total |
|---------------------------|------|------|-------|
| Killed in action | 2 | 7 | 9 |
| Missing " " " | 1 | 9 | 10 |
| Died enroute to Odonel | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Shot on detail | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Hosp. in Bataan (died) | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Missing enroute to Odonel | 0 | 15 | 15 |
| Killed enroute to " " | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Missing at Odonel | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Odonel & Cabanatuan | 1 | 105 | 106 |
| | | 143 | 148 |

Str. 4/9/42 - 33 Off. - 430 E.M. 7/4

- S. Sgt. Pearl Cleveland - 20700307 - 7/10 - Dys. *
- Pvt. Claude W. Herron - 20149134 - 7/9 - Dys. *
- PFC. Harvey L. Finch - 20700228 - 7/8 - " *
- Corp. Kenneth G. Thomas - 37025881 - 7/14 - Mal.
- PFC. Varne G. Campbell - 37025834 - 7/11 - " *
- Corp. Clute Gilmer - 20700232 - 7/11 - Dys. *
- Pvt. Alvin E. Sjulstad - 37025797 - 7/10 - Dys. *
- S. Sgt. Byron L. Veillette - 20700193 - 7/11 - Mal. *
- Pvt. Andrew J. Kelly - 37026128 - 7/12 - Dys. *
- Pvt. Henry P. Moske - 37025713 - 8/15 - Mal. *
- Pvt. Delbert Valtott - 39231797 - 9/2 - Dys. *
- PFC. Billy Brown - 20700221 - 9/7 - Cer. Mal. *
- Pvt. George Jacob - 9/15 - Dys. *
- PFC. Vince L. Saltsco - 20700397 - 9/29 - Mal., Malino. *
- Pvt. Wallace W. Goodrich - 20700233 - 10/3 - Dys., Mal. *
- PFC. Martin E. Carter - 20950128 - 10/2 - Dys., Mal., Malino. *
- Sgt. Paul A. Saarinen - 20700211 - 10/8 - Dys., Saugras * *
- PFC. John B. Tapscott - 39676178 - 10/10 - Dys. *
- Pvt. J. J. Bernarde - 39038457 - 7/11 - Dys. *

Pvt. Arvid Danielson - 12/8/41 - wounded - Pvt in Ft. Stoenberg Hosp.
 Pvt. Wesley Kalligan - Stoenberg Gen. Hosp. (Australia #)
 Pvt. Kruseau - Last seen in hosp. O'Donnell.

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Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:
Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Co. "A", 194th Tank Bn.
Missing in action:

| | REF. | R.N. | TOTAL |
|----------------------|------|------|----------|
| 2d Lt. James A. Hart | | | 12/27/41 |
| Gus Bender * | | | 12/26/41 |
| Gerald Bell * | | | 12/26/41 |
| Rudolph Bolstad | | | 12/27/41 |
| Richard E. Davis | | | 12/27/41 |
| Howard Gattie * | | | 12/27/41 |

Killed in actions: Sgt. Herbert Strobel * 12/26/41

Missing on O'Donel Hike:
Julius Knudson - April, Last seen Lubao.
Doerck " " " "

Odonel:

Pvt. Harold Snell 5/23 - Dys. *
" John Latagne 5/27 - "
" Wilmer Franck 5/26 - "
" Kenneth A. Haroldson - 37025275 - 5/29 - Dys.

Cabanatuan:

Corp. James Clevenger 6/6 - Dys. *
PFC Wallace Lee 6/10 - " *
PFC Dwight E. Maxson 37025752 - 6/14 - Dys.
Sgt. Howard Larson 6/17 - Dip. *
Pvt. Russell S. Garrison 39006535 - 6/28 - Mal.
PFC Adrian J. Coulter 37025747 - 7/4 - "
S. Sgt. Pearlle Clevenger 20700207 - 7/10 - Dys. *
Pvt. Claude W. Herron - 20149134 - 7/9 - Dys.
PFC. Harvey L. Finch - 20700228 - 7/8 - " *
Corp. Kenneth G. Thomas - 37025881 - 7/14 - Mal.
PFC. Verne G. Campbell - 37025834 - 7/11 - "
Corp. Claude Gilmer - 20700232 - 7/11 - Dys. *
Pvt. Alvine Hjulstad - 37025797 - 7/10 - Dys.
S. Sgt. Byron L. Veillette - 20700193 - 7/11 - Mal. *
Pvt. Andrew J. Kelly - 37026128 - 7/12 - Dys.
Pvt. Henry P. Noska - 37025713 - 8/15 - Mal.
Pvt. Delbert Talbott - 39231797 - 9/2 - Dys.
PFC. Billy Brown - 20700221 - 9/7 - Cer. Mal. *
Pvt. George Jacob 9/15 - Dys.
PFC. Wince L. Salsbee - 20700257 - 9/29 - Mal., Malnu. *
Pvt. Wallace F. Goodrich - 20700233 - 10/3 - Dys., Mal. *
PFC. Martin H. Carter - 20950128 - 10/2 - Dys., Mal., Malnu.
Sgt. Paul A. Saarinen - 20700211 - 10/8 - Dys., Gangrene *
PFC. John B. Tapaszi - 39676178 - 10/10 - Dys.
Pvt. J. J. Bernardo - 39002457 - 7/11/ - Dys.

Pvt. Arvid Danielson - 12/8/41 - wounded - Put in Ft. Stotsenburg Hosp.

Pvt. Wesley Kelligan - Stornberg Gen. Hosp. (Australia ?)
Pvt. Brusseau - Last seen in hosp. O'Donnell.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:
 Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller

| Recap: | Off. | E.M. | Total |
|---|------|------|-------|
| Killed in action | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Missing " " " | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| Missing enroute to ODOANEL - shell fire from Corregidor | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Missing at ODOANEL - 2 E.M. | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Died at Odonel & Cab. - 11/1/42 & Japan | 0 | 30 | 30 |
| | 1 | 39 | 40 |

Str. 4/9/42 - 6 Off. - 95 E.M. 20900648 - Mal.

Sgt. Jack D. Brink - 20900693 - 6/15 (Detail)

Shot on details:

Pvt. Earl S. Smith 20900751 - 7/16

Cebu/Manila

Pvt. David J. Zamascillo - 20900723 - Dys.

PFC. Allan W. Herbert - 20900704 - 6/18 - Dys.

Pvt. William J. Greene - 396623 - 7/6 - "

Sgt. Victor L. Cooney - 20900679 - 7/6 - "

PFC. Clyde M. Grayson - 20900715 - 7/3 - Mal.

Sgt. Robert M. Mitchell - 20900653 - 7/9 - Dys.

PFC. Joseph H. Thoy - 20900755 - 7/7 - Mal.

Pvt. Dorsney W. Fashao - 20900718 - 7/13 - Dys.

Pvt. Clifford G. Stevens - 20900798 - 7/12 - Mal.

PFC. Francis P. Barrette - 20900692 - 7/11 - "

Pvt. Joseph E. Willrodt - 20900760 - 7/14 - Dys.

Corp. Harold D. McDonald - 20900734 - 7/28 - Sins thrombosis

Pvt. John H. White - 20900759 - 8/9 - Dys.

Pvt. Dean F. Cedarblom - 20900696 - 6/19 - Dys.

Pvt. James S. Fleener - 20900706 - 9/6 - "

Pvt. Fred R. Yeager - 20936122 - 9/26 - Mal.

PFC. Joseph G. Elmer - 20900764 - 9/27 - Dys., Mal., Malna., Abscon

Sgt. Carl F. Abbott - 20900645 - 10/3 - Mal., Malna.

Pvt. Eugene Rawson - 20900742 - 10/10

Pvt. Wesley L. Coopersen - 20900695 - 11/3 - Dys.

PFC. Walter Martella - Died in Hosp. - Linay

PFC. James McLean - killed in action

Pvt. Eugene Zingheim - Last seen at Lubao

" Virgil Seibert - Miss. in action since 12/26/41

Sgt. Glenn D. Brock - Wounded in action 12/26/41

Pvt. John Alves - Last seen at Mt 168 - 4/9/42

PFC. Robert Eales - Miss. in action 12/26/41

PFC. Martin Cahill - Hosp. on Corregidor Jan. 41

Pvt. Edward N. DiBenedetti - PWR - Manila 12/31/41

" James Hicks - Miss. in action 12/26/41

1st Lt. Ray W. Bradford - Killed by shell fire at Cebu/Manila 4/12/42

2d Lt. Robert F. Goodman - killed in action 12/26/41

Reported by (Sgt. Keith Dihevis - Died at O'Donnell-Bay, 42 - Dys.

1st Sgt. Saccone (Pvt. Daniel E. Gray - Died

" W. M. Kennedy - Died in Hosp. #1 - Dys.

" Ralph L. Smith - Died

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Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Co. "C", 194th Tank Bn. Off. Lt. Total
 Missing in action: 3 E.M.
 Killed in action: 1 Off. 2 E.M.
 Killed enroute to Odonel - shell fire from Corregidor - 1 Off.
 Missing " " " " - 2 E.M.
Odonel:
 Sgt. Russell E. Cunningham - 4/25 - Cer. Mal.
 Corp. Orrin H. Eaton - 5/29 - Dys.
 S. Sgt. Manuel J. Bernardo, Jr. 20900648 - Mal.
Bataan:
 Sgt. Jack D. Brink - 20900693 - 6/15 (Detail)
 Shot on detail:
 Pvt Earl G. Smith 20900751 - 7/16
Cabanatuan:
 Pvt. David J. Juaramillo - 20900723 - Dys.
 PFC. Allen W. Eckert - 20900704 - 6/18 - Dys.
 Pvt. William J. Greene - 396623 - 7/6 - "
 Sgt. Victor L. Gosney - 20900679 - 7/6 - "
 PFC. Clyde M. Grayson - 20900715 - 7/3 - Mal.
 Sgt. Robert M. Mitchell - 20900653 - 7/9 - Dys.
 PFC. Joseph H. Thorp - 20900755 - 7/7 - Mal.
 Pvt. Dorsey W. Foshae - 20900710 - 7/13 - Dys.
 Pvt. Clifford G. Stevens - 20900750 - 7/12 - Mal.
 PFC. Francis F. Barretto - 20900692 - 7/11 - "
 Pvt. Joseph E. Willrodt - 20900760 - 7/14 - Dys.
 Corp. Harold D. McDonald - 20900734 - 7/28 - Sinus thrombosis
 Pvt. John H. White - 20900759 - 8/9 - Dys.
 Pvt. Dean F. Cedarbloom - 20900696 - 8/19 - Dys.
 Pvt. James H. Fleener - 20900708 - 9/6 - "
 Pvt. Fred R. Yeager - 20936122 - 9/26 - Mal.
 PFC. Joseph G. Zinani - 20900764 - 9/27 - Mal., Malnu., Abcess
 Sgt. Carl F. Abbott - 20900645 - 10/3 - Mal., Malnu.
 Pvt. Eugene Rawson - 20900742 - 10/10
 Pvt. Worley L. Cosperson - 20900695 - 11/3 - Dys.
 PFC. Walter Martella - Died in Hosp. - Limay
 PFC. James McLeon - killed in action
 Pvt. Eugene Zingheim - Last seen at Lubao
 " Virgil Seibert - Miss. in action since 12/26/41
 Sgt. Glenn D. Brokaw - Wounded in action 12/26/41
 Pvt. John Alves - Last seen at KM 168 - 4/9/42
 PFC. Robert Bales - Miss. in action 12/26/41
 PFC. Martin Cahill - Hosp. on Corregidor Jan. 41
 Pvt. Edward N. DiBenedetti - PGH - Manila 12/31/41
 " James Hicks - Miss. in action 12/26/41
 1st Lt. Ray W. Bradford - Killed by shell fire at Cabcaben 4/12/42
 enroute to O'Donnell
 2d Lt. Robert F. Needham - killed in action 12/26/41
 Reported by (Sgt. Keith Dihewis - Died at O'Donnell-May/42 - Dys.
 1st Sgt. Saccone (Pvt. Daniel E. Gray - Died
 " W. M. Hennesy - Died in Hosp. #1 - Dys.
 " Ralph L. Smith - Died

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

| Recap: | Off. | E.M. | Total |
|-----------------------------|------|------|-------|
| Killed in action | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Missing in action | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Killed enroute to Odonel | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Missing " " " | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Shot on detail | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Died at Odonel & Cabanatuan | 0 | 24 | 24 |
| | 2 | 32 | 34 |

Str. 4/9/42 - 5 Off. - 94 E.M.

Medical Detachment, 194th Tank Bn.

Cabanatuan:

Pvt. Lawrence E. Moranda 37026111 - 6/11 - Dys.

PFC. Robert W. Hirst 6569362 - 7/5 - Diphtheria

Pvt. Frederick P. Bartik 39228406 - 9/12 - Beriberi, Malnu.

Recap: Off. E.M. Total

Died at Cabanatuan 0 3 3

Str. 4/9/42 2 Off. - 17 E.M.

... by lunch on train - good.
 Sent 20 to Osaka Hospital during this period. Heard 7 died. At
 Osaka P.O.W. Camp, 3 died during this period. Deaths of 2 on
 Kasu Bay. 12/11/42 - Scrotoets. 12/25 - first bath since since
 leaving Philippines. All of us terribly lousy. Rotten lousy!

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Died enroute to Japan on Nagato Maru:

- Lt. Wood 11/8/42
- Lt. Danka 11/12/42
- Major Trussdale 11/16/42
- Sgt. Howard 11/22/42
- 2 Marines & 1 Navy 11/21/42
- Lt. Johnson 11/23/42

1500 Amer. on ship.
 2300 Japs. " " "

Left Cabanatuan 11/5 - 3:00 A.M.

Arr. Manila 5:00 P.M. 11/5 - Boarded ship 5:00 P.M. 11/6. Sailed 11:00 A.M. 11/7. On 11/11 anchored at Takao, Taiwan. Sailed 7:00 A.M. 11/15. Anchored 6:00 P.M. 11/15. Sailed 5:00 P.M. 11/18. Anchored Moji 3:00 P.M. 11/23. Docked Moji 5:00 P.M. 11/24. Debarked 6:00 P.M. 11/25. Lined us up in 100 man companies. I was given a co. We marched to large Auditorium where we had to take shoes off - unheated. Served box lunch of rice & fish, etc. - very good but cold & tea. About 8:30 marched to Ferry. Debarked & waited for train. Entrained at 11:45 P.M. 11/25. Detrained & took trolley 6:30 P.M. 11/26. Detrained 8:30 P.M. 11/26. Hiked to & arrived Tawagawa P.O.W. Camp 10:00 P.M. 11/26. What a Thanksgiving Day! Box lunches on train - good. Sent card home 12/1/42. 22 died at Tawagawa from 12/1/42 to 1/15/43. Sent 20 to Osaka Hospital during this period. Heard 7 died. At Osaka P.O.W. Camp, 34 died during this period. Deaths of 2 on Xmas Day. 12/11/42 - Overcoats. 12/26 - first bath since since leaving Philippines. All of us terribly lousy. Rotten lousy!

and to post out guides enroute from there into various areas. Trilateral routes to be used thru Manila to avoid traffic congestion and to keep strength of movement from becoming too public. Movement started on schedule and proceeded very smoothly. Motoristic police, in Manila, worked under supervision of Liaison Officer by relay so that every unit arriving was met by relay who were immediately took them in charge & proceeded w/o delay. Good credit for the movement belongs to - G. S. P. and the Recon. Platoon. I left the Calasmit Bridge area at 2:30 P.M., inspected bridges, etc - enroute, and arrived at Buntinlup Bivouac area at 5:00 P.M. All elements except two tanks, were in the area by 7:30 P.M. The two tanks referred to had motor trouble which was handled by the Re. Recon. Platoon. They were brought into the bivouac area the next morning. No enemy activity except high bombing planes.

Sunday, Dec. 15th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Started Recon. Platoon on exhaustive recon. of Gen. Liza's area. I contacted South Luzon Force Co. & acquired them w/ details, etc. & had conference w/ General Parker. I took 3rd & 4th Bns. Then visited Gen. Liza's Hq. & made a study of routes to bivouac.

xxx. Ending at Gen. Jones' Hq. finally got something to eat here. This was about 9:00 P.M. Night very dark - no lights & raining. Continually being stopped & challenged by Filipino guards, some self appointed, drunk with authority and stopping every vehicle every few feet. Had conference with Gen. Jones. Sunday, Dec. 14th. Finally reached Ft. McKinley at 3:00 A.M. after extricating our car from the ditch where it went due to poor vision - rain. Found vacant room in barracks on floor to sleep. Breakfast at 6:30 A.M. in general mess. Gen. Weaver issued orders to move bn. into Muntinlupa area today. Also decided to move one company in Taygayty area so as to be closer to Masugbu beach. Started for Calumpit Bridge area immediately after breakfast. North or Manila, two M.P. cars, filled w/ catholic nuns & M.Ps., over took our two half-tracks. They were travelling at about 80 mph. Our speed 40 mph. In attempting to pass us they used poor judgement. The lead car shot along side us, hit the right hand shoulder, and the mud caused control to be lost & threw the car directly in the path of our lead half-track in which I was riding. Our driver swung right and miraculously missed the car which then plunged over the left shoulder of the road, rolled down the embankment and landed right side up in a wet rice patty. Stopped all vehicles. Car was a complete wreck but occupants unharmed. Transferred passengers into the other car and luckily found another north bound car who took the rest. The M.Ps. were taking the nuns to Baguio. We continued on our way and arrived at our bivouac area about 10:00 A.M. Called staff & Co. Comdrs. together & issued movement orders to start at 12:30 P.M. - to be by platoon w/half hour interval between platoons. Recon. Plat. to start immediately to make arrangements with police of Manila for piloting of units thru city from Rizal Monument to Ft. McKinley and to post our guides enroute from there into bivouac area. Stipulated two routes to be used thru Manila to avoid traffic congestion and to keep strength of movement from becoming too public. Movement started on schedule and proceeded very smoothly. Motorcycle police, in Manila, worked under supervision of Recon. Officer by relay so that every unit arriving was met by relay who were immediately took them in charge & proceeded w/o delay. Much credit for the movement belongs to S. O. P. and the Recon. Platoon. I left the Calumpit Bridge area at 2:30 P.M., inspected guides, etc - enroute, and arrived at Muntinlupa Bivouac area at 5:00 P.M. All elements except two tanks, were in the area by 7:30 P.M. The two tanks referred to had motor trouble which was handled by the Bn. Main. Platoon. They were brought into the bivouac area the next morning. No enemy activity except high bombing planes.

Monday, Dec. 15th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Started Recon. Platoon on exhaustive recon. of Gen. Lim's area. I contacted South Luzon Force Hq. & acquainted them w/details, etc. & had conference w/General Parker. I took S-2 & S-3 w/ms. Then visited Gen. Lim's Hq. & made a study of routes to Masugbu

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beach area returning to bivouac area for supper. Made study of Recon. Plat. report & incorporated info. on map. Received authorization from Gen. Weaver to move one company to Tamaytay area. Ordered Co. "C" to move at daylight next morning, taking company rear echelon w/ them. Main. Plat. busy

Tuesday, Dec. 16th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Recon. Platoon active on mission. Sent S-1 & Bn. Mr. Sgt. to Ft. Stot. to pick up necessary records, etc. & to close Hq. This was done. Took S-2 & visited Gen Jones Hq. Got our plan for attack movement to Nasugbu & Batangas Beach areas & acquainted Co. Comdrs. w/details. Recon. reports studied & incorporated on maps. Had to use gasoline station maps as military maps very difficult to in. Main. Platoon as usual. Co. "C" made movement on schedule. Concentration Camp near Muntinlupa and made arrangements for telephone communication w/Manila (USAFPE). Had S-2 w/me. Supper w/Major Shewy & his staff. Shewy C.O. of Con. Camp.

Wed, Dec. 17th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Insp. Co. "C" bivouac area.....made final plans for supplying combat elements.....Nasugbu & Batangas areas. Recon. Platoon finished info. incorporated on maps. Ordered them into Gen..... Recon. starting tomorrow S-2 org. police detail to iskey & loose women. Nite guards shot at flashlight.....lling. Light did not reappear, guard arrested Filipino tonight who was prowling around our installations. Took him into Muntinlupa - turned over to Constabulary who locked him up -

Thursday, Dec. 18th. Recon. Platoon mission. Took S-2 on recon. of new road which will make it much easier for Co. "C" to enter Gen. Jones' area. Road will be completed in about two days. ... reported a number of flares at nite in their vicinity. Unable to catch anyone but shot at some and succeeded in stripping them. Arrested young woman in Muntinlupa area. Very well educated. She made it a point of visiting our installations & asking very pertinent questions. Sent S-2 w/her to G-2 in Manila. Developed she was a live suspect. Left her there. S-2 came back and the young woman was back shortly after. Investigated reason for her release & got rather loose jointed story at G-2 office of legal right to hold her or some such reason. Never was able to get the truth. Bn. Comm. Off. tuned in on an enemy radio station somewhere in our locality. Reported same to Signal Off. & G-2 - Manila who promised immediate action with directional finders, etc. Never heard any more from it. Incorporated recon. data on maps. No enemy activity except high bombing planes.

Friday, Dec. 19th. Co. "C" reported one of their trucks w/battery equip., etc. mysteriously burned today. Driver & occupants questioned closely. The truck had just returned from a trip. No one had been smoking. Integrity of these soldiers such as not to doubt the story. Fire started in the back end & set fire to

... report by ... and not attempt to ...
 ... of the ...

gasoline drums. No chance to save anything. 5th Columnists could have tossed ignited material in back end of truck as it passed. Recon. Plat. on mission. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Sent Bn. Personnel Off. to Finance Office at Stots. to straighten out allotments, pay records, etc. He completed this & returned next morning. Talked to Group Hq. at Manila by phone from Bilibid Con. Camp.

Saturday, Dec. 20th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Recon. Plat. on mission. Co. Comdrs. & Staff on recon. of routes - Gen. Lim's & Jones' areas. Visited Hq. South Luzon. Daily, we received by messenger, reports, etc. from USAFFE & South Luzon Force Hq. Incorporated recon. data on maps.

Sunday, Dec. 21st. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Reports & news indicate action shortly. Japs active in Legaspi area & heavy transport movement up north. Much conjecture as to where main effort will be made. Recon. detail on mission. Incorporated daily on maps. Co. Comdrs. recon. routes etc. S-2 & myself visited Gen. Lim's Hq.

Monday, Dec. 22nd. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. S-2 and myself visited Gen. Jones' Hq. Had dinner there. Recon. Plat. on mission. Received telephone call from Group Hq. for me to report at 5:00 P.M. to Manila. Took S-3. Arrived 6:00 A.M. Had dinner w/Gen. Weaver & Staff. Asked to make recommendation for use of Bn. in event we would go north, based on two propositions - In withdrawals to take offensive action as the rear most elements or to adopt checkerboard tactics and take up successive positions in withdrawing. I told Gen. Weaver that was absolutely no opportunity to take any offensive actions as we were canalized to roads with innumerable bridges which would act in the whole as perfect tanktraps. Therefore, if we were to be used at all it would be my recon. for the second proposition. He agreed and said to be ready to move. Enemy seemed to be putting two forces in Luzon south & north. Returned to Muntinlupa at 9:00 P.M.

Tuesday, Dec. 23rd. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Recon. Plat. on mission. Inspected bn. & checked all details for movement.

Wednesday, Dec. 24th. Held Recon. Plat. in area because of news & reports. At 10:00 A.M. received telephone call from Manila (Group) which ordered bn., less Co. "C" to proceed back north to Agno River and take up positions along the south bank from Highway 5 to Highway 13 about 50 miles until 192nd Tank Bn. arrived when we would take from Carmen to Highway 13. 25 miles & only 30 tanks and 8 half-tracks. Co. "A" ordered to proceed up Highway 5. Balance up Highway 3. Org. line by platoons. Movement by Plat. 1st echelon left 1:00 P.M. I left 2:00 P.M. Co. "C" to remain at Tagaytay to South Luzon Force. Co. "A" bombed near San Jose. Bal. of units arrive O.K. My C.P. at San Manuel. Arrived at 7:00 P.M. Rear echelon at Gerona. Arrived 6:30 P.M. No other enemy activity except enemy planes observed bombing and strafing Clark Field & Ft. Stotsburg in afternoon went up highway. Did not attempt to bother U.S. Police, escorted us thru Manila. *by machine, etc., but no use.*

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller: (cont'd)

Dec. 25th: 4:00 AM, accompanied by S-2, proceeded to rear echelon at Gerona. Checked installations. 192nd rear echelon here also packed in a mass - a perfect target for hostile aircraft. Our outfit not so hot but not nearly as bad as 192nd. Had breakfast, raised hell and left for C.P. at San Manuel at 6:30 AM. Mass was just starting. What a feeling! Went up to Agno river and checked on combat units. Back to C.P. At about 1:00 PM orders to report to Gen. Weaver at Carmen. Reported and found him just east of Carmen. Gist of Weaver's conversation: "Enemy pushing south. Our forces withdrawing. Line to be held on Agno river. (See map). 192nd Tank Bn. will take over from Carmen east along north road and river bank to Highway 5? just as soon as they can get into position. 194th to organize line from Carmen westerly to Highway 13. To be especially alert for attempted enemy river crossing." I asked whether Highway 3 was inclusive for us. Reply was "Yes". I then called attention to several things as follows: (a) Distance from Carmen to Highway 13 about 25 miles. We had left one company in support of South Luzon Force. This left us w/only 2 companies or 6 platoons or 30 tanks. Impossible to have anything east of Hy. 3. (b) That the Alcalá Road parallel Agno River westerly for about miles, then crossed river to the north. Impossible to reach Hy. 13 except by this route. That impossible to traverse terrain w/tanks cross country, where road turns north to bridge, west to Hy. 13. That after troops had established Agno River line, bridge would be blown and tanks would be in a rat trap with no back door to get out of. Only way out was way they came in. (c) That the tanks would be pill boxes and therefore a perfect target for artillery and mortar fire. I therefore recommended that the Bn be held in vicinity of San Manuel out of hostile fire until a use was developed for tanks. However, no change of orders was made except that it was agreed we could put nothing east of Hy. 3. Company Commanders were given the orders and dispositions made w/Co. A on right and Co. D on left w/Lt. Spaulding and 5 M.T. on extreme left flank. Organization was perfected by platoons (see map). Dispositions were checked by myself, S-2 and S-3. At 9:00 PM S-3 and myself visited the C.P. of North Luzon Force which was located in vicinity of Alcalá and which moved later that night to Bamam. We acquainted them w/our plans, etc. Info. gathered fr. them was to the effect that our troops were pretty well decimated and disorganized and were building up the Agno River line as fast as troops could be collected. Reached C.P. at San Manuel at 11:30 PM.

Dec. 26th: Orders brot by messenger at 6:00 AM for me to report to Hq. No. Luzon Force at Bamam at once for consultation of use of tanks when Bamam River line is occupied. Accompanied by S-2, we arrived at 8:00 AM. Gen. Wainright briefly told me that the Bamam River line would be occupied during the withdrawal and he wanted a tank plan for offensive action on that line. Tried to explain about dykes in rice paddies, etc., but no use. We then

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

consulted w/G-3 and left for San Manuel. Put S-2 in charge of recon. of Bambang area but as we already had made it before war was declared, knew it to be useless. Arrived San Manuel 11:30 AM. Heavy firing from vicinity Carmen. At 1:00 AM, accompanied by S-3, went up to line. Had to stop at outskirts of Carmen and proceed by foot due to hostile mortar and artillery fire registering on Carmen and west. Found right plat. of Co. "A" had been receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire all morning. Enemy had made numerous appearances on north bank of river, setting up mortars and attempting river crossings which had been frustrated by the tanks. The enemy received numerous casualties. Lack of high explosive 37mm. amm. for our guns was felt, particularly against enemy personnel and hidden mortars. One S.P.M. was working in this area and did considerable damage to enemy but also drew his fire among the tanks. Amm. truck of S.P.M. was hit and burning intensely with exploding amm. flying all over. Very few infantrymen on the line. They were effecting what was to become a common occurrence of "Volunteer evacuation" - "looking for my companion." I halted some that I saw and brot them back up to the line but as soon as my back was turned, they departed again. S-3 and myself checked tank positions and found they had been compelled to move from time to time because of mortar and artillery registrations finding them. This was bad enough but added to their difficulties was low flying hostile planes searching for them. I walked toward one of the tanks and when an explosion occurred and something hit my helmet quite a hard blow, stunning me somewhat, which I found afterwards to be the limb of a tree blown off by the explosion. A mortar shell had hit in the tree right above the turret of the tank. I saw smoke issuing from the turret and then someone shouting inside to open the front doors. I immediately went to the front and helped the driver open it up. As it opened, the body of the tank commander, Sgt. Strobel, fell over past the driver. His left arm was blown completely off and his face was blown off fr. the eyes on down including his entire chin. I pulled him out and laid him on the ground and then aided the driver to get out. He was wounded in the foot. The other two members of the crew were completely dazed and shocked but otherwise unhurt. The explosion had blown downward into the open turret. I then went to the road, a short distance away, and luckily caught a truck being driven by a Filipino who had several other wounded Filipinos in the body of the truck. We loaded our two wounded men and were dispatched immediately to the aid station but Stobel died on the way. I then detailed Dodson (one of the crew members) to drive the tank out on the road and under cover which he did. However, the explosion had blown a hole thru the armor plate above the motor and part of the motor had been blown away. It was my intention to have Bn. Main. come up after dark w/wrecker and tow it back. Just about this time S-3 and Capt. Burke came up and we discussed the situation. From what he said and what I saw the rest of the afternoon plainly indicated that the enemy would probably try something

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

soon in that particular area. The intense mortar and artillery fire in this sector was incessant until darkness. We left about 5:00 PM after instructing Capt. Burke that I had no further orders but that I would return that night w/something definite and to pass this along to "D" Co. Burke called my attention to a fact that due to the absence of friendly infantry it would be necessary for 2 men from each tank to take up positions on the river bank at dusk to properly watch the river in their area, also that he was greatly concerned w/the vast amount of river bank he could not watch which had no infantry along it. When the S-3 and myself arrived at the spot where we had parked our peep we could find no trace of it. There was, however, another peep in the vicinity which had run into something and was in bad shape but we managed to get it started and left Carmen for the C.P. About 1/2 Km. south it heated up and refused to go any farther. A truck came along later which pushed us to the C.P. arriving at about 6:30 PM. Gen. Weaver and Major Pettit were waiting for me. I recounted the happenings at the front and stated that, in my opinion, the enemy would try something in that area. I requested infantry support. (Insert: My telling Weaver the 192nd and rest of groups had org. lines on E and W south road instead of north road and river bank.) From knowledge gained that AM fr. No. Luzon Force, I knew another withdrawal was scheduled but did not know just when. My question to the Gen., therefore dwelt on the time for the withdrawal. He was very hazy and illusive on the subject and avoided answering. It took just about 1/2 hour to get a direct answer. Finally he said "You will cover the withdrawal of the troops in your sector and will start your withdrawal at 5:00 AM tomorrow." I asked for inf. support but could get no answer. I then recommended we withdraw with the troops but could get no answer. My next question was "Has the 192nd Tank Bn. received this order?" Weaver: "They have not but they will." "And they will withdraw starting 5:00 AM tomorrow also?" "Yes." This ended the gist of the conversation and the Gen. departed going south. S-3 and myself then procured some supper which had been saved for us from the ration truck. As we were finishing supper or about 7:30 or 7:45 PM a tank came down the road and before we could stop it went past the C.P. It should be explained here that the night was fairly dark with just enough light for the pavement to show up. Following this at about 2 or 3 minutes came another tank which I stopped. The tank commander, Sgt. McComas related as follows: "Our platoon was in practically the same position as in the afternoon with the exception of moving a little closer to the river bank. Two men fr. each tank had been posted on the river bank while the other two remained in the tank. Capt. Burke had been checking tank positions and had been suddenly fired upon while he was on the road (see Burke's statement). Lt. Costigan, Plat. Leader, had been outside his tank checking his platoon when firing started. He immediately called to his tank to return the fire which was done. Considerable fire came

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

fr. vicinity of Carmen indicating quite a sizable force. He then called his platoon and rushed into Carmen. The enemy must have been in possession of the town for some time as they had put in a hasty road block. on the map and had either a mortar or anti-tank gun set up in the intersection of Hy. 3 and the Alcala Road. Also the town contained great numbers of the enemy. The tanks negotiated the road block somehow and had all their guns firing as they went thru the town! (Insert, in conversation w/-Weaver about how I called his attention to the fact that the riverbank east of Carmen and the northerly road were not held nor was the line there. The line was along the southerly road thus allowing the enemy to make a crossing of the river unhampered. He admitted knowledge of this but still insisted on the 5:00 AM order.) Sgt. McComas's tank had been seriously hit in the rear, one cylinder being blown out completely. I ordered him to proceed immediately to the rear echelon. The motor was functioning, but, naturally, not very good. The 3rd tank came down the road and I stopped that and held it. The 4th tank of this platoon, we found later missed the turn in Carmen and proceeded east, later running into rear of 192nd and returned to us later. The 5th tank was the one which was disabled that afternoon, referred to previously. Capt. Burke's tank had had a thermite bomb placed on it while coming through Carmen. Two of the crew, Bell and Bender, had been sent to check on tank positions near Carmen and had not returned when the fighting started. Just south of Carmen, the bomb burned thru the armor plate and dropped thru into the amm. rack causing the amm. to explode. The tank was abandoned and immediately after caught fire. The Jap mortar and anti-tank guns in the intersection fired continuously at the tanks as they passed thru. Just previous to this excitement, info. came in to the C.P. that 2 trainloads of the P.A. (Gen. Brower's Div.) was to be evacuated that night and we would have to protect the grade crossing, which was way to the south. Thus it was mandatory that Hy. 3 be held. Immediately formed a road block consisting of the tank fr. "A" Co. I had held, my own tank, the other staff tank, and a half-track I had at the C.P. Just a few minutes later, Lt. Gordon Peck, with 2 S.P.M.'s came down the road. I stopped him and he said he had been flanked out of Carmen by heavy fire and had turned off the Alcala Road to the south and luckily hit a sugar cane field, blindly forged across country and came out on Hy. 3 just north of San Manuel (see map). I ordered one S.P.M. into position so that the 75mm. gun could be fired and the other in support of my half-track. After this, a few Filipino stragglers came down the road highly excited and hysterical. I held them and finally found an N.C.O. who appeared fairly intelligent and calm. I explained the situation and ordered him to form a line north of the road block to give us local security and an outpost. This he did. While all this was going on, I had my radio opr. working continuously to contact the rest of my Bn. on the Agno river to warn them of what had happened and to be

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):
Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

ready to start, at dawn, south, cross country, and if they had to, to follow the railroad grade (see map) so as to reach Hy. 3 below Carmen. It would be slow work but might serve the purpose and get the equip. out of the rat trap. Whether the static was man made, nature's own or combination of both we could not tell but it was bad to say the least. As soon as I saw we were going to have trouble contacting, I ordered my S-2 to proceed to the rear with the following mission: (a) To notify Tank Group of the situation. (b) To notify Hq. No. Luzon Force of the situation. (c) To go himself or someone else whom he might designate to Tarlac, thence northerly on Hy. 13 to our left flank half-tracks and try to radio our combat units from there and if impossible to proceed easterly, on foot if necessary, and get the info. thru which could have easily been done. (See Map). S-2 left about 10:00 PM (see Spoor's statement). At about 11:00 PM, General Brower drove up from the south bound for Carmen and the Alcala Road. I acquainted him w/the situation of which he had had no info. Also w/what I had done. He wanted to make a recon. up there in a tank! I explained the asininity of such a thing and he acquiesced. He agreed fully w/what I had done and then reminded me of the two trainloads of Filipinos who were due to withdraw from the west. Also he wanted the Filipinos, who had formed local security for me, to start south as soon as possible. I promised I would send them shortly as the moon had risen by then and visibility was good. I asked him to check the bridges to the south and give the engrs. instructions not to blow any until I gave the order. He agreed to do this, which we later found he did do and departed soon thereafter. At this point, to clarify the situation, the details of dispositions of troops to our right and the orders given them, which we learned days and even months after, should be set down at this time. It will give a clearer picture and eliminate the fog of war under which we were laboring. At the identical time of my conversation w/Gen. Weaver (between 6:30 and 7:00 pm), our right, resting on Carmen, was left wide open by the withdrawal of the troops in that area, namely, the 192nd Tank Bn. and the composite inf. elements. The 192nd having received no orders from Tank Group, accepted the orders of Gen. Stevens, who commanded that area. His orders were substantially as follows: "The withdrawal will start at 7:00 PM, Dec. 26th, the 192nd Tank Bn. will cover the withdrawal". It must be remembered that the original orders from Gen. Weaver left Hy. 3 open for the 194th Tank Bn. Therefore all troop withdrawals east of Carmen traveled east - away from us. Major Robert Besson, C.O. of a P.A. Bn. was supposed to be in position astride Hy. 3. He had placed one company from Carmen east. This time he visited one company area to check on it. It was nearly dark and in nearing the river bank he noticed some men standing there. He started to chide them for not being in their fox holes when he was suddenly hit on the head and knocked unconscious and taken prisoner by the enemy. Probably the reason why he was not shot was because the enemy wanted

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

secrecy at that time. He later determined that his company had all voluntarily evacuated. Also, he states, that at 6:20 PM, he distinctly heard tanks moving east from Carmen which was later confirmed. The withdrawal of troops east of Carmen started about 6:40 PM. It would therefore appear that the enemy had been watching for the withdrawal and had been ready to cross the river unopposed. It must be remembered also that the south, east and west roads, had been occupied by our troops and not the north of river bank road. Major Besson, later that nite was taken by the enemy to the river crossing and forced to go to the north side of the river. The crossing was about 2000 yards east of Carmen and was marked by white flags. It was easily fordable at this point. Major B. was already a prisoner, held (tied up) at the intersection of Hy. 3 and Alcala Road when Lt. Costigan's platoon came thru. He states that Carmen was full of the enemy and must have received quite a number of casualties. Why he was not hit by the fire fr. our tanks, he considers a miracle. He says he could have stuck out a hand in either direction and caught the tanker's 37mm. shells. It should be remembered that we had no H.E. shells - only A.P. He also states that the two tanks of the 192nd Tank Bn. stationed closest to Carmen pulled out to the east sometime in the early afternoon because of close registration of artillery and mortar shells. He says there were no officers of the 192nd in that area which I can also substantiate. He further states the river crossing is between 1000 and 2000 yds. east of Carmen and that he was struck on the head by a gun butt and not rendered unconscious but was stunned. He says Japs landed first at Vigen on 12/10 and then at Dalmortis, that Gen. Wainright wanted to attack (there were only about 2000 Japs at Vigen at the time) but he had to submit his plans to Mac by order, and it had to go to Manila w/the usual delays, etc. and by the time it came back, many developments had taken place which changed the picture completely. He also says that the supposed repulse of the Japs at Lingayen played up in the newspapers, was all pure bunk, that the Filipinos saw lights out in the Gulf and fired at them at nite - looked like the 4th of July - purely Filipino hysteria. That he was a reserve Bn. and was put on the Agno River to cover the withdrawal and because of being a reserve Bn. Capinpin took all their automatic rifles away and gave them to other units thus putting them on the firing line w/o any! That the Alcala Road was just about impassible in spots between Alcala and Carmen because of shell holes and that is the reason why the Filipinos west of Carmen were evacuated by two trains (the ones we protected) instead of using Hy. 3. Lt. Costigan reported to Gen. Weaver at San Miguel and tried to tell his his story. The General immediately grew almost hysterical which was usual whenever under pressure, called Costigan a coward, ordered him to return immediately and fight like a man, together with a great deal more incoherency. Costigan started out. The General ordered everyone within sight or in hearing to do all kinds of things. Instead of attempting to help out, when if we ever needed a level headed commander,

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

we needed one then, he went berserk and ordered all traffic stopped on the road. He even ran out and turned vehicles and troops around to send them to the front, calling them names and yelling threats etc. These vehicles and troops were no part of the tank group and were operating under orders fr. their commanders. This made no difference. Gen. Weaver had suddenly gone hysterical according to eye witnesses. He had taken command so it seemed of the Fil-American Forces. This is the turmoil Capt. Spoor found himself in when he reported to Gen. Weaver on his way to fulfill the important mission I had assigned to him.

Co. "C" reported that he had been ordered by Lt. Col. _____ of the 1st Bn. to following the combat vehicles of my Co. "C" in the Salinas area. I thought that this was wrong & wanted to check w/ma. Co. "C" had been put w/ Lt. Col's _____ command for movement to Calcutit but GRAFF had issued orders for them to revert to my command on arrival. Co. _____ was out of order. The Salinas area was a hot spot. I allowed the combat elements of Co. "C" to proceed to assist the 192nd Tk. Bn. but ordered Bradford to proceed w/rear echelon to join the rear echelon which was done. By dusk, all north bound traffic had cleared. The 30. Bn. Force had w/drawn successfully & only the combat elements in the Salinas area remained across the bridge. No attempt had been made to blow it. About 8:00 P.M. /12/31/ Gen. Weaver & Pettit arrived at my Co. I was given path of office of Lt. Col. Weaver ordered me to take my Co., Incl. Co. "C", into the area east of San Fernando that night, assist our troops there and to cover all w/drawals into Matamor. Contact was made w/Co. "C" & the necessary orders issued. The Gen. lost for the bridge site & my Bn. moved into the assigned area w/o mishap. It was a quite moonlit night. In checking the Bn., I found that my comm. half-truck containing the best radio, ops. & my comm. off. were missing. They had been perked at the Calcutit bridge. Contact was made by radio & found they were still there. The comm. off. stated Gen. Weaver had ordered it. I naturally wanted, at least, my comm. off. so I instructed him to see the Gen. immediately if he were still in the area & present my report. In a little while he reported back, by radio, that the Gen. had ordered he remain. I never saw him again until 3 days later which put me to great inconvenience. The day of 1/1/42 was quiet. Orders came for a w/drawal to Oaxaca for that night & we to cover it in the Mexico area. The 11th Inf. (FG) were the last troops to clear which occurred at about midnite 12/1-2/42. We were to wait at San Fernando until 192nd Tk. units cleared thru us to Calcutit which was done. Some of the bridges were blown ahead of 192nd between Calcutit and San Fernando but the hysterical blowers did such a good job that the tanks crossed the bridge w/o any trouble! At about 2:00 A.M. we cleared San Fernando & the bridge was blown. The town was full of Gen. Col. Handgrenades were tossed at us from the alley ways. No casualties or damage resulted.

It was impossible to catch any of them as we were the only friendly must also use the bridge. Therefore sent S-2 to inquire into the situation & issued special orders to my bridge detailment and to stop any such action until I myself gave the clearance & to shoot any one who might make the attempt. I also sent my Comm. Off. to actually take post at the bridge so that we might make the most of the radio. Our bivouac was some dist. fr. the bridge because of available cover. S-2 reported back that Col. Skeery, of Engr. Off., was in the vicinity & would guarantee nothing as to when he would order the bridge blown. S-2 had explained our mission & informed him of my special orders to the bridge detailment but he reported the Col. seemed to be in a very nervous state of mind & made no reply. In the 1st afternoon, Lt. Bradford, commanding rear echelon Co. "C" reported that he had been ordered by Lt. Col. ----- of the S.P.M's. to following the combat vehicles of my Co. "C" in the Baliwag area, & that he thought this was wrong & wanted to check w/me. Co. "C" had been put w/Lt. Col's. ----- command for movement to Calumpit but USAFFE had issued orders for them to revert to my command on arrival. Col. ----- was out of order. The Baliwag area was a hot spot. I allowed the combat elements of Co. "C" to proceed to assist the 192nd Tk. Bn. but ordered Bradford to proceed w/rear echelon to join Bn. rear echelon which was done. By dusk, all north bound traffic had closed. The So. Lu. Force had w/drawn successfully & only the combat elements in the Baliwag area remained across the bridge. No attempt had been made to blow it. About 8:00 P.M. /12/31/ Gen. Weaver & Pettit arrived at my C.P. I was given oath of office of Lt. Col. Weaver ordered me to take my Bn., incl. Co. "C", into the area east of San Fernando that nite, assist our troops there and to cover all w/drawals into Bataan. Contact was made w/Co. "C" & the necessary orders issued. The Gen. lost for the bridge site & my Bn. moved into the assigned area w/o mishap. It was a bright moonlight nite. In checking the Bn., I found that my comm. half-track containing the best radio, opr. & my comm. off. were missing. They had been posted at the Calumpit bridge. Contact was made by radio & found they were still there. The comm. off. stated Gen. Weaver had ordered it. I naturally wanted, at least, my comm. off. so I instructed him to see the Gen. imme. if he were still in the area & present my request. In a little while he reported back, by radio, that the Gen. had ordered he remain. I never saw him again until 2 days later which put me to great inconvenience. The day of 1/1/42 was quiet. Orders came for a w/drawal to Gusgua for that nite - we to cover it in the Mexico area. The 11th Inf. (PA) were the last troops to clear which occurred at about midnite 12/1-2/42. We were to wait at San Fernando until 192nd Tk. units cleared thru us fr. Calumpit which was done. Some of the bridges were blown ahead of 192 between Calumpit and San Fernando but the hysterical blowers did such a good job that the tanks crossed the bridge w/o any trouble! At about 2:00 A.M. we cleared San Fernando & the bridge was blown. The town was full of 5th Col. Handgrenades were tossed at us from the alley ways. No casualties or damage resulted.

It was impossible to catch any of them as we were the only friendly troops & were in our vehicles. Alley ways, etc. were dark. The new line was to be established along the between Guagua and Porac. We were to remain on the main highway near Guagua with a small combat unit east of Guagua. The 192nd Tank Bn. to be on the line w/their right resting on Guagua. We covered the withdrawal w/o incident arriving at our position on S. W. edge of Guagua about 4:00 A.M. 1/2/42. One plat. Co. "C" under command of Capt. Moffitt was put w/the outpost at Betif. No enemy activity was observed this day. Gen. Weaver & Major Pettit visited our position that day. Fair cover was available but our position on the highway was not conducive to tank action to say the least. Being aware of our responsibility to provide local security, I had ordered two road blocks to Lubao - one to watch the Sexmoan Road & the other to watch the Florida - Le Blanca Road. Thus, our rear would be protected fr. either the east or the west. The block consisted of tanks & half-tracks. Gen. Weaver had seen these two block & asked what they were for. I explained & he immediately said they were unnecessary as the Sexmoan route was impossible for the Japs to get thru & as we were on the right flank, the Florida Le Blanca Block was superflous. He also went on to state that it was frittering away combat vehicles. I did not argue and inasmuch he had not ordered them removed, I changed the subject.

was participated in by 1 tank plat. of 1 of my co. which set up a road block at that particular time. The enemy had landed on the W. coast of Co. Luzon, so. of Manila. This plat. was ordered to make a combat recon. The plat. proceeded rapidly down the road. Apparently the enemy was not expecting this type of contact. The plat. came upon them in what proved to be a position for which they wanted to launch an attack. They were here in large numbers w/antitank guns, M.G., mortars, etc. The tanks were successful in this operation, taking the enemy by complete surprise & employed quite a number of heavy guns & a.s.g. although they lost 1 tank in the operation. This however delayed the attack & allowed the Jap forces to withdraw w/o incident, w/o interference, according to plan. This same tank co. also had another affair some time later. One half-track & crew fr. the co. was detailed to accompany a recon. patrol so as to protect it. During the recon. the party was ambushed by the enemy. The half-track was hit & the crew which including a locally born. It was an effective recon. as determined that the recon. party was ambushed & the half-track had been hit in several places & the crew was followed up their file by a determined tank & disarmed the enemy. Returning to the half-track, they returned to the main force & the half-track was repaired & returned to our line & was in use. This co. also participated in the recon. of the Sexmoan Road which was done when they returned to the Sexmoan Road & were ordered to withdraw the remnants of the Sexmoan Road block.

On 1/1/42 I was ordered to form a road block on the main highway at Guagua. I personally supervised & supervised the block. The enemy there is reported every night & it is coming on so that we are to allow a successful withdrawal of the main force in this

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Written at Zentsuji 2/15/44 at request of Japanese.

When war was declared, I knew what our mission (in the Phil.) was to be. That mission was to delay and divert the enemy in his campaign which would naturally cause him to tie up enormous quantities of munitions, other supplies & equip., shipping & men. Thus he would be unable to use this force elsewhere until released from that particular task. Our mission was successfully completed but more so than I ever dreamed possible because (1) the negligible amount of arms, equip., etc. in the Phil., (2) the small number of Amer. there, (3) the poorly equipped & trained Phil. Army, and (4) the obviously superior equip., training & numerical strength of the Imperial Japanese Army. I am not familiar w/the entire campaign but only w/that part of it in which my unit participated.

We were first initiated into the war at Clark Field which was bombed by the Japanese on Dec. 8, 1941 at about 12:30 P.M. I did not witness what actually occurred on the field as my unit (194th Tank Bn.) was in positions surrounding Clark Field w/the mission of repelling any air-bourne inf. which might try to land. In this affair the tankers shot down 2 enemy fighters.

The next affair was in So. Luzon in the latter part of Dec. & was participated in by 1 tank plat. of 1 of my co. which was on detached service at that particular time. The enemy had landed on the E. coast of So. Luzon, so. or Manila. This plat. was ordered to make a combat reconn. The plat. proceeded rapidly down the road. Apparently the enemy was not expecting this type of combat. The plat. came upon them in what proved to be a position for which the enemy expected to launch an attack. They were here in large numbers w/artillery, anti-tank guns, M.G., mortars, etc. The tanks were successful in this operation, taking the enemy by complete surprise & destroyed quite a number of heavy guns & m.g. although they lost 2 tanks in the operation. This however delayed the attack & allowed the So. Luzon Force to w/draw northward, w/o interference, according to plan. This same tank co. also had another affair about this same time. One half-track & crew fr. the co. was detailed to accompany an officer reconn. patrol so as to protect it. During the reconn. the party was ambushed by the enemy. The half-track engaged the enemy ambush returning a deadly fire. It was so effective & the crew so determined that the reconn. party was enabled to safely withdraw. The half-track had been hit in several places & disabled so the crew followed up their fire by a determined rush & dispersed the ambush. Returning to the half-track, they dismounted all the m.g., set the half-track on fire & returned safely to our lines w/all the guns. This co. also successfully covered the w/drawals of the So. Luzon Force northward into Bataan when they returned to me & aided in our operations - protecting the w/drawals of the No. Luzon Force into Bataan.

On 12/26 I was ordered to form a road block on Hy. No. 3 just so. of Carmen. I personally commanded & supervised the block. Our orders were to repulse enemy units who might be coming so. on this Hy. so as to allow a successful w/drawal of the Phil. Army in this

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

sector. At about 3:00 A.M. 12/27, an enemy motorized column left Carmen on the hy. proceeding so. We opened fire at close range & cont'd. the fire for about 15 or 20 min. The fire was extremely accurate & deadly. The fight was over in a short time. It was impossible to tell what damage was done at nite & we had been ordered to be at Gerona by daylight which was further so. & was where the next line was to be estab. Up to this time, the enemy had pushed his drive down this hy. but all pressure on this part of our line now suddenly ceased & the main push was on our right flank, down thru what can be termed the Cabanatuan Area. We covered w/drawals down thru Tarlac & then I was ordered to protect & hold the big bridge at Calumpit. The So. Luzon Force was now w/drawing northward & the bridge was important as it not only was to serve this force but also our forces in the Cab. area which was slowly withdrawing southward & protecting the w/drawal of the So. Luzon Force into Bataan. A detach. of anti-aircraft was also put on this mission. Enemy aircraft continually tried to bomb this bridge but were not successful. 2 enemy planes were shot down. The So. Luzon Force w/drew into Bataan as per plan. The No. Luzon Force slowly w/drew southward inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. One of my Co. was located at Balivag (no. of Calumpit). They caught an enemy tank unit just going into some woods & destroyed fr. five to 8 tanks. It was impossible to determine the exact no. as it was dusk & of course a tanker can see very little fr. within a tank.

One of my reconn. half-tracks had an interesting experience w/some 5th columnists. 5 of them were discovered at various points surrounding one of our amm. dumps. They were in the act of shining mirrors up in the air so that enemy planes could pick up the flashes & thus bomb the dump. Needless to say there was no more shining of mirrors.

The Phil. Army gave a good acct. of themselves in the w/drawals into Bataan despite their untrained & poorly equip. state. This was particularly true east of S. Fernando, in the Mexico Area. They actually succeeded in making a counter-attack on a large scale, caused numerous casualties to the enemy, & drove him out of his various positions. They occupied these positions & held them until the line was reformed at Guagua-Porac. This had been a very intricate maneuver. The No. Luzon Force not only had to cover the w/drawal of the So. Luzon Force thru Calumpit S. Fernando on their way into Bataan but had to take a turning movement on their w/drawal so as to bring their forces fr. the Cab. Area into the S. Fernando-Guagua-Lubao-Bataan axis of w/drawals. Any mil. man will appreciate the difficulties of a movement of this type especially when it is realized that the enemy, had complete air superiority. This was done successfully to say the least. Our artillery support was entirely inadequate as was our mortars for the simple reason that we sadly lacking in the weapons of war. Also those weapons we did have, for the most part, were of World War I vintage.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

I was now ordered to cover the right flank of our forces on the Guagua-Pirac line & to hold the flank until our forces could withdraw south thru it's left flank & establish a line so. of Lubao. I posted a road block at Lubao which is so. of Guagua, so as to take care of any surprise attack against us coming fr. Sexmoan. This block proved to be a very important factor. A strong enemy column, supported by artillery, pushed toward Lubao that afternoon (about Jan. 4) fr. Sexmoan. The road block completely repulsed the column causing it to entirely abandon it's mission. Our forces, having safely w/drawn, I now ordered my unit into position south of Lubao & in advance of where our main line was being formed. I was also given another unit to aid me that nite. At about 2:00 A.M. the enemy attacked using smoke. However the wind was not favorable & it blew back over enemy lines. I was bright moonlight. We held a very strong position astride the main hy. The attacking enemy was plainly visible & it was fairly easy to adjust our fire on the target. On our right the enemy attacked in masses. Our field of fire was excellent as it was open fields. We were under cover along a creek bed which had quite a number of trees along it. One of my off. performed a feat that nite which will illustrate the spirit of my entire unit. Tracer bullets had set fire to the dry grass in front of our position. The fire was growing larger and threatened to expose our tanks by its light and also to perhaps force us to evacuate those positions fr. the danger of setting fire to the vehicles. This off., w/o hesitation, ran into the fire area & stamped it out w/his feet & coat. He was entirely visible to the enemy & fire was heavy. The fire put out, he started back for his tank but was hit by enemy bullets. His crew rescued him but about a week later he died. The battle cont'd. for about an hour more when the enemy suddenly ceased his attack & w/drew. Having completed my mission, I ordered the w/drawal to our new main line of resistance accord. to plan. The enemy must have suffered tremendous casualties because we saw nothing of him the following day & nite whatever. Our retrograde movements into Bataan went smoothly & per schedule. A temporary line was established at the no. end of Bataan & was held until the main line at Abucay-Hacienda-Orion was thoroughly estab. Fr. this time on until Jan. 24, my unit did beach defense (no action), patrol activity, driving out enemy patrols & snipers, & maintenance work. One action was participated in by one of my co. in the area of no. of Cagac. It merely assisted in straightening out the main line & pushing the enemy north a short distance. This was done w/very little difficulty.

As stated in the beginning, our mission in the Phil. was to delay the enemy as much as possible. In the latter part of Jan., it became apparent that a better delaying action could take place if we occupied our reserve line (Pilar-Bagac) farther to the south. By occupying this line, we could shorten our lines of comm., reduce mileage on transportation vehicles, thus saving on fuel, main., etc. Also the position was strong & excellent observation was obtainable.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

Food was running short & the reduction of every effort possible was mandatory. The w/drawal started on 1/24 & was completed by dawn of 1/26. I was ordered to cover the w/drawal. The nite of 1/24-25, heavy fighting was in progress in the vicinity of the Hacienda. Both Amer. & P. Scout Inf. took part in this. I also put in some tanks. At about 3:30 A.M. my tanks put themselves between our troops & the enemy & the w/drawal was completed. The next day, 1/25, I was ordered to occupy a line in advance of our new main line. We made no contact w/the enemy whatever that day. However, I doubt if he knew exactly what had happened because I saw enemy planes bomb positions that had been occupied by our troops the day before. We stayed in this position all that day & then moved a little further south that nite & took up new positions. It was thought that the enemy would make a large scale attack the next day, 1/26. This was true. A large contingent landed on the west shore of Bataan which was eventually cleaned up but which my unit did not take part. However, in conjunction w/this landing, the enemy, in force, pushed down just to the west of where we were in position. I had also been allotted some artillery to use as I deemed fit. We opened fire at about 10:30 A.M. Our position was excellent & fr. the very start, it was apparent that the enemy attack was doomed to failure. We took the enemy completely by surprise & was able to fight w/o moving a single vehicle. It was the most important & most successful operation we had participated in. By noon, it was all over. The enemy must have lost tremendously. He threw everything he had but our position & determination was too strong. It was impossible for us to know definitely just how bad he had suffered as enemy aircraft had just then picked us up & was about to bomb. Up to this time, they had not bothered us. I ordered the w/drawal & it started. Airplanes bombed us all the way back to our lines but it was not effective. One bomb hit a half-track w/bomb splinters but it failed to disable it and caused no casualties. Another bomb ripped a fender on one of the tanks but nothing further. We knocked one plane down w/our m.g..

Our new position (Pilar-Bagac Line) proved itself very strong indeed. We heard nothing fr. the enemy for more than a week. I was ordered to handle beach defense on the E. shore of Bataan & also to support the front line in that section. We had no action. We sent our men out into enemy territory ea. day on patrols. Our artillery was extremely active & broke up enemy concentrations frequently. It soon became apparent that the enemy invasion force had early spent itself. We could tell this fr. the positions he evacuated & his attacks which became weaker. However, we were becoming weaker also. We had been on half rations ever since coming into Bataan & it was necessary to curtail even further. Also other supplies were running low. Therefore it was impossible for us to make any counter-attack except local ones. We knew, in March, that another enemy invasion force was coming in and that it would only be a question of time before the end would come. Our artillery was becoming inaccurate due to the barrels being burned up. However it was still giving a good account of itself.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

On April 3, at about 3:00 P.M., the enemy attacked w/artillery & planes. We had no planes whatever. Flight after flight of bombers came over dropping bombs on a particular sector of the front line. Tremendous artillery concentrations fell in this same sector. It was literally blown out. And we had hardly anything to throw back. I was ordered to take one co. & proceed over the mts. and aid the 45th Inf. (P.S.) in a counter attack. The attack was put on at 6:00 A.M. April 6th. By 5:00 P.M. no one had gained any ground in this area. The unit had one mortar and 6 shells which they had been saving. Thus it can be seen how ill equipped we were. It was decided to use the 6 shells & follow them up w/a tank attack although it was all jungle. This was done but it was unnecessary for the tank attack. Excellent observation was obtained for the mortar fire & it completely demoralized the enemy in this sector.

(illegible) However at 7:00 P.M. we received orders to w/draw. The enemy pressure to the east of us, was too strong & to have held our position would have meant a salient which could not be defended. We w/drew & held until the general surrender order was received.

I had the opportunity of seeing some of the tremendous enemy force which had been thrown against us, after being made a prisoner. Guns of all calibers & equipment until we wondered more & more how our poorly equipped people had stood up for so long against it. But we had accomplished our mission. We had taken more than 400 enemy prisoners who had been treated just as good as our own troops. The Japanese commanders admitted this and were very pleased about it at that time. We had delayed and diverted enemy forces to the maximum. His original invasion force had failed. He had been compelled to send in another task force of truly major proportions. We had done all that could humanly be done for our country & we are proud of the record. To have resisted further would have been the height of foolishness & would have accomplished nothing.

James B. Long - Last seen in San Fernando enroute to O'Donnell.

Archie B. Noley - " " EP 167.8 - 4/8/42.

George L. Stepp - " " " "

Joseph A. Swober - Last known to be in San Fernando Camp.

Robert A. Smith - Died enroute to O'Donnell - 4/14/42.

John E. Nickle - 20943004 - Died at Caban, Bay. - Valeria.

Thomas E. Rodell - 20944101 - " " Enn. Fer. Capt - "

Ray T. Barber - 37025852 - " " O'Donnell - "

Robert L. Brown - 19178131 - " " " " - 1 - Cpl.

Robert M. Saffely - 20911949 - " " " " - 2 - Cpl. Supt.

Robert W. Dickerson - 20906542 - Died at Caban, 10/28/42 -
 Valeria, Maribor, Malina, Neg.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Hq. Co. Cont'd. - Odonel:

MR Pvt. Robert Wiring - 20931792 - 6/6 - Mal.
 Pfc. Robert E. Emsay - 20900675 5/27-Dys.

Cabanatuani

Pvt. Alvin C. Brod - 39601688 - 6/9 - Inanition
 Eddie M. King - 20945456 - 6/14 - Dys.
 PFC. Louis J. W. Yager - 20720286 - 6/7 - Mal.
 Donald J. Reilly - 20900684 - 7/1 - "
 Mario Mirko - 39478896 - San Fernando - Mal.
 John H. Bloomquist - 39378193 - " - "
 Pvt. Glenn L. White - 37037364 - 7/5 - Dys.
 Corbin N. Buell - 37006445 - 7/4 - Mal.
 Ralph C. Wiliford - 20932906 - 7/7 - Dys.
 Sst. Howard C. Barry - 39378190 - 7/12 - Mal.
 Pvt. John P. Lawson - 39231831 - 7/12 - "
 Frank H. Condon - 39156410 - 7/10 - Dys.
 Marvin Everts - 20943827 - 7/16 - "
 PFC. Lloyd O. Cole - 20900697 - 7/30 - "
 Pvt. Clayton M. Miller - 37006304 - 7/22 - Mal.
 George A. Christy - 20720291 - 7/18 - Dys.
 Robert B. Overstreet - 20900738 - 8/5 - Diptheria
 Guy O. Miller - 37006330 - 8/15 - "
 MR Jack W. Tucker - 20937841 - 8/26 - Dys.
 PFC. Eldon I. Engbretson - 39156780 - 9/12 - Dys.
 PVT. La Mar A. Woodson - 39078821 - 9/21 - "
 1st Sgt. Charles W. Rockwell - 20720279 - 9/28 - Dys., Mal., Malnu.
 Pvt. James A. Sapp - 9/30 - " " "
 PVT. Robert L. Miller - 20900731 - 10/8 - "
 PFC. Emery O. Monroe - 20720309 - 10/16 - Dys., Malnu.
 Pvt. Henry D. Bordner - 39601669 - 10/20 - Beriberi
 T/Sgt. Allan D. Lang - Last seen in San Fernando enroute to O'Donnell.
 Sgt. Gerald D. Foley - " " KP 167.8 - 4/8/42.
 Pvt. George L. Abapo - " " " " "
 PFC. Kenneth A. Bocher - Last known to be in San Fernando Hosp.
 PFC. Joseph L. Smith - Died enroute to O'Donnell - 4/14/42.
 Pvt. Clair A. Pickle - 20943024 - Died at Caban. Aug. - Malaria.
 PFC. Clarence E. Rodell - 20944391 - " San.Fer. Sept - "
 Pvt. Harry F. Barker. - 37025852 - " O'Donnell ? - "
 Robert A. Brown - 39378181 - " " ? - Dys.
 Charles R. Smithly - 20933299 - " " ? - Cer. Mal.
 Mr. Sgt. Floyd W. Bickmore - 20900643 - Died at Caban. 10/28/42 -
 Pelegra, Beriberi, Malnu., Heat.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

| Recap: | Off. | E.M. | Total |
|---------------------------------|------|------|----------|
| Died enroute to Odonel | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Missing " " " | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Shot on detail (Batangas) | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Died Hosp. #1 (Bataan) | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Died at Odonel & Cabanatuan | 0 | 36 | 36 |
| | 0 | 42 | 42 |
| Str. 4/9/42 - 5 Off. - 128 E.M. | | | 12/26/41 |

| Recap. of 194th Tank Bn. to 11/1/42 | Off. | E.M. | Total |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|-------|
| Killed in action | 2 | 7 | 9 |
| Missing " " " | 1 | 9 | 10 |
| Died enroute to Odonel | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Shot on detail | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Hosp. in Bataan (died) | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Missing enroute to Odonel | 0 | 15 | 15 |
| Killed enroute to " " | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Missing at Odonel | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Odonel & Cabanatuan | 1 | 105 | 106 |
| Str. 4/9/42 - 33 Off. - 430 E.M. | 5 | 143 | 148 |

- Sgt. Pearlis Clavenger - 20700207 - 7/10 - Dys. *
- Pvt. Claude W. Herron - 20140134 - 7/9 - Dys. *
- PFC. Wadway L. Finch - 20700228 - 7/8 - " *
- Corp. Kenneth G. Thomas - 37025351 - 7/14 - Mal.
- Pvt. Verne G. Campbell - 37025834 - 7/11 - " *
- Corp. Claude Gilmer - 20700232 - 7/11 - Dys. *
- Pvt. Alvino Hjulstad - 37025797 - 7/10 - Dys.
- S. Sgt. Byron E. Veillette - 20700198 - 7/11 - Mal. *
- Pvt. Andrew J. Kelly - 37026128 - 7/12 - Dys.
- Pvt. Henry P. Nooka - 37025713 - 8/15 - Mal.
- Pvt. Delbert Valhott - 39231797 - 9/2 - Dys.
- PFC. Billy Brown - 20700221 - 9/7 - Ser. Mal. *
- Pvt. George Yeab - 9/15 - Dys.
- PFC. Mirco L. Galbee - 20700257 - 9/19 - Mal., Malnu. *
- Pvt. Wallace F. Goodrich - 20700233 - 10/3 - Dys., Mal. *
- Pvt. Martin R. Carter - 20950128 - 10/2 - Dys., Mal., Malnu.
- Sgt. Paul A. Searfimen - 20700211 - 10/8 - Dys., Cabagran * *
- Pvt. John V. Tapassi - 39676178 - 10/10 - Dys.
- Pvt. J. J. Bernarde - 39002457 - 7/11/ - Dys.
- Pvt. Arvid Danielson - 12/8/41 - wounded - Put in Ft. Stotsenberg Hosp.
- Pvt. Wesley Kellison - Stornberg Gen. Hosp. (Australia ?)
- Pvt. Prusseau - Last seen in hosp. O'Donnell.

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Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:
 Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

| Notes | Off. | E.M. | Total |
|--|------|------|----------|
| Co. "A", 194th Tank Bn. | | | |
| Missing in action: | | | |
| Missing | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Missing enroute to O'DONEL | 1 | | 1 |
| Missing at O'DONEL | 0 | | 0 |
| Died at O'DONEL & Cab. - 11 | 0 | | 0 |
| 2d Lt. James A. Hart | 1 | | 12/27/41 |
| Gus Bender * | 0 | | 12/26/41 |
| Gerald Bell * | 0 | | 12/26/41 |
| Rudolph Bolstad | 0 | | 12/27/41 |
| Richard E. Davis | 1 | | 12/27/41 |
| Howard Gattie * | 0 | | 12/27/41 |
| Killed in action: | | | |
| Sgt. Herbert Strobel * | | | 12/26/41 |
| Missing on O'Donel Hike: | | | |
| Julius Knudson - April, Last seen Lubao. | | | |
| Doerck " " " " | | | |

Odonel:

- ✓ Pvt. Harold Snell 5/23 - Dys. *
- ✓ " John Latagne 5/27 - "
- ✓ " Wilmer Franck 5/26 - "
- ✓ " Kenneth A. Haroldson - 37025275 - 5/29 - Dys.
- Cabanatuan:
- ✓ Corp. James Clevenger 6/6 - Dys. *
- ✓ PFC Wallace Lee 6/10 - " *
- ✓ PFC Dwight E. Maxson 37025752 - 6/14 - Dys.
- ✓ Sgt. Howard Larson 6/17 - Dip. *
- ✓ Pvt. Russell S. Garrison 39006535 - 6/28 - Mal.
- ✓ PFC Adrian J. Coulter 37025747 - 7/4 "
- ✓ S. Sgt. Pearlle Clevenger 20700207 - 7/10 - Dys. *
- ✓ Pvt. Claude W. Herron - 20149134 - 7/9 - Dys.
- ✓ PFC. Harvey L. Finch - 20700228 - 7/8 - " *
- ✓ Corp. Kenneth G. Thomas - 37025881 - 7/14 - Mal.
- ✓ PFC. Verne G. Campbell - 37025834 - 7/11 - "
- ✓ Corp. Claude Gilmer - 20700232 - 7/11 - Dys. *
- ✓ Pvt. Alvine Hjulstad - 37025797 - 7/10 - Dys.
- ✓ S. Sgt. Byron L. Veillette - 20700193 - 7/11 - Mal. *
- ✓ Pvt. Andrew J. Kelly - 37026128 - 7/12 - Dys.
- ✓ Pvt. Henry P. Noska - 37025713 - 8/15 - Mal.
- ✓ Pvt. Delbert Talbott - 39231797 - 9/2 - Dys.
- ✓ PFC. Billy Brown - 20700221 - 9/7 - Cer. Mal. *
- ✓ Pvt. George Jacob 9/15 - Dys.
- ✓ PFC. Wince L. Salsbee - 20700257 - 9/29 - Mal., Malnu. *
- ✓ Pvt. Wallace F. Goodrich - 20700233 - 10/3 - Dys., Mal. *
- ✓ PFC. Martin H. Carter - 20950128 - 10/2 - Dys., Mal., Malnu.
- ✓ Sgt. Paul A. Saarinen - 20700211 - 10/8 - Dys., Gangrene *
- ✓ PFC. John B. Tapaszi - 39676178 - 10/10 - Dys.
- ✓ Pvt. J. J. Bernarde - 39002457 - 7/11/ - Dys.
- ✓ Pvt. Arvid Danielson - 12/8/41 - wounded - Put in Ft. Stotsenburg Hosp.
- ✓ Pvt. Wesley Kelligan - Stornberg Gen. Hosp. (Australia ?)
- ✓ Pvt. Brusseau - Last seen in hosp. O'Donnell.

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Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Co. "C", 194th Tank Bn.

Missing in action: 3 E.M.
Killed in action: 1 Off. 2 E.M.
Killed enroute to Odonel - shell fire from Corregidor - 1 Off.
Missing "enroute" Odonel - 2 E.M.

- Odonel:
- Sgt. Russell E. Cunningham - 4/25 - Cer. Mal.
- Corp. Orrin H. Eaton - 5/29 - Dys.
- S. Sgt. Manuel J. Bernardo, Jr. 20900648 - Mal.

- Bataan:
- Sgt. Jack D. Brink - 20900693 - 6/15 (Detail)
- Shot on detail:
- Pvt Earl G. Smith 20900751 - 7/16

- Cabanatuan:
- Pvt. David J. Juaramillo - 20900723 - Dys.
- PFC. Allen W. Eckert - 20900704 - 6/18 - Dys.
- Pvt. William J. Greene - 396623 - 7/6 - "Seibert, Malnu.
- Sgt. Victor L. Gosney - 20900679 - 7/6 - "
- PFC. Clyde M. Grayson - 20900715 - 7/3 - Mal.
- Sgt. Robert M. Mitchell - 20900653 - 7/9 - Dys.
- PFC. Joseph H. Thorp - 20900755 - 7/7 - Mal.
- Pvt. Dorsey W. Foshee - 20900710 - 7/13 - Dys.
- Pvt. Clifford G. Stevens - 20900750 - 7/12 - Mal.
- PFC. Francis P. Barretto - 20900692 - 7/11 - "
- Pvt. Joseph E. Willrodt - 20900760 - 7/14 - Dys.
- Corp. Harold D. McDonald - 20900734 - 7/28 - Sinus thrombosis
- Pvt. John H. White - 20900759 - 8/9 - Dys.
- Pvt. Dean F. Cedarbloom - 20900696 - 8/19 - Dys.
- Pvt. James H. Fleener - 20900708 - 9/6 - "
- Pvt. Fred R. Yeager - 20936122 - 9/26 - Mal.
- PFC. Joseph G. Zinani - 20900764 - 9/27 - Dys., Mal., Malnu., Abscess
- Sgt. Carl F. Abbott - 20900645 - 10/3 - Mal., Malnu.
- Pvt. Eugene Rawson - 20900742 - 10/10
- Pvt. Worley L. Cosperson - 20900695 - 11/3 - Dys.
- PFC. Walter Martella - Died in Hosp. - Limay
- PFC. James McLeon - killed in action
- Pvt. Eugene Zingheim - Last seen at Lubao
- " Virgil Seibert - Miss. in action since 12/26/41
- Sgt. Glenn D. Brokaw - Wounded in action 12/26/41
- Pvt. John Alves - Last seen at KM 168 - 4/9/42
- PFC. Robert Bales - Miss. in action 12/26/41
- PFC. Martin Cahill - Hosp. on Corregidor Jan. 41
- Pvt. Edward N. DiBenedetti - PGH - Manila 12/31/41
- " James Hicks - Miss. in action 12/26/41
- 1st Lt. Ray W. Bradford - Killed by shell fire at Cabcaben 4/12/42 enroute to O'Donnell
- 2d Lt. Robert F. Needham - killed in action 12/26/41
- Reported by (Sgt. Keith Dihewis - Died at O'Donnell-May/42 - Dys.
- 1st Sgt. Saccone (Pvt. Daniel E. Cray - Died
- " W. M. Hennesy - Died in Hosp. #1 - Dys.
- " Ralph L. Smith - Died

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Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

| Recap: | Off. | E.M. | Total |
|-----------------------------|------|------|-------|
| Killed in action 4/2 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Missing in action 1/16/42 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Killed enroute to Odonel | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Missing " " 1/21/42 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Shot on detail 1/21/42 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Died at Odonel & Cabanatuan | 0 | 24 | 24 |
| | 2 | 32 | 34 |

Str. 4/9/42 - 5 Off. - 94 E.M. boarded ship 5:00 P.M. 11/7/42. Sailed 11:00 A.M. 11/7. On 11/11 anchored at Takao, Taiwan. Sailed 11:00 A.M. 11/12. Medical Detachment, 194th Tank Bn. Sailed 5:00 P.M. 11/23. Docked Moji 5:00 P.M. 11/23.

- Cabanatuan:
 ✓ Pvt. Lawrence E. Moranda 37026111 - 6/11 - Dys. in 100 man com-
 ✓ PFC. Robert W. Hirst 6569362 - 7/5 - Diphtheria & Auditorium where
 ✓ Pvt. Frederick P. Bartik 39228406 - 9/12 - Beriberi, Malnu, since 8

Recap: very good but cold. Off. E.M. Total marched to Perry. Detacked & waited for train. Detained at 11:45 P.M. 11/23. Died at Cabanatuan alley 05:30 P.M. 11/23. Detained 8:30 P.M. 11/26. Moved to & arrived Tagawa P.O.W. Camp 10:00 P.M. 11/26.

Str. 4/9/42 2 Off. - 17 E.M. Box lunched on train - good. Sent card home 12/1/42. 22 died at Tagawa from 12/1/42 to 1/15/43. Sent 20 to Osaka Hospital during this period. Heard 2 died. At Osaka P.O.W. Camp, 34 died during this period. Deaths of 2 on Iwas Bay. 12/11/42 - Overcasts. 12/25 - first bath since since leaving Philippines. All of us terribly lousy. Gotten lousy!

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Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller:

Died enroute to Japan on Nagato Maru:
 Lt. Wood 11/8/42
 Lt. Danka 11/12/42
 Major Truesdale 11/16/42
 Sgt. Howard 11/22/42
 2 Marines & 1 Navy 11/21/42
 Lt. Johnson 11/23/42
 1500 Amer. on ship.
 2300 Japs. "
 Left Cabanatuan 11/5 - 3:00 A.M.
 Arr. Manila 5:00 P.M. 11/5 - Boarded ship 5:00 P.M. 11/6. Sailed
 11:00 A.M. 11/7. On 11/11 anchored at Takao, Taiwan. Sailed
 7:00 A.M. 11/15. Anchored 6:00 P.M. 11/15. Sailed 5:00 P.M.
 11/18. Anchored Moji 3:00 P.M. 11/23. Docked Moji 5:00 P.M.
 11/24. Debarked 6:00 P.M. 11/25. Lined us up in 100 man com-
 panies. I was given a co. We marched to large Auditorium where
 we had to take shoes off - unheated. Served box lunch of rice &
 fish, etc. - very good but cold & tea. About 8:30 marched to
 Ferry. Debarked & waited for train. Entrained at 11:45 P.M.
 11/25. Detrained & took trolley 6:30 P.M. 11/26. Detrained 8:30
 P.M. 11/26. Hiked to & arrived Tawagawa P.O.W. Camp 10:00 P.M.
 11/26. What a Thanksgiving Day! Box lunches on train - good.
 Sent card home 12/1/42. 22 died at Tawagawa from 12/1/42 to 1/15/43.
 Sent 20 to Osaka Hospital during this period. Heard 7 died. At
 Osaka P.O.W. Camp, 34 died during this period. Deaths of 2 on
 Xmas Day. 12/11/42 - Overcoats. 12/26 - first bath since
 leaving Philippines. All of us terribly lousy. Rotten lousy!

and to post our guides enroute from there into bivouac area.
 Stipulated two routes to be used thru Manila to avoid traffic
 congestion and to keep strength of movement from becoming too
 public. Movement started on schedule and proceeded very smoothly.
 Motorcycle police, in Manila, worked under supervision of Recon.
 officer by relay so that every unit arriving was met by relay
 men who immediately took them in charge & proceeded w/o delay.
 Much credit for the movement belongs to -S. O. P. and the Recon.
 Platoon. I left the Calumpit Bridge area at 2:30 P.M., inspected
 guides, etc - enroute, and arrived at Banting Bivouac area at
 7:30 P.M. All elements except two tanks, were in the area by
 7:30 P.M. The two tanks referred to had motor trouble which was
 handled by the 2d. Main. Platoon. They were brought into the
 bivouac area the next morning. No enemy activity except high
 bombing planes.
 Monday, Dec. 15th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes.
 Started Recon. Platoon on exhaustive recon. of Gen. Lin's area.
 I contacted South Luzon Force Hq. & acquainted them w/Situation,
 etc. & had conference w/General Farmer. I took 3-C & 3-D w/Gen.
 Then visited Gen. Lin's Hq. & made a study of routes to Saugan

xxx. Ending at Gen. Jones' Hq. finally got something to eat here. This was about 9:00 P.M. Night very dark - no lights & raining. Continually being stopped & challenged by Filipino guards, some self appointed, drunk with authority and stopping every vehicle every few feet. Had conference with Gen. Jones. Sunday, Dec. 14th. Finally reached Ft. McKinley at 3:00 A.M. after extricating our car from the ditch where it went due to poor vision - rain. Found vacant room in barracks on floor to sleep. Breakfast at 6:30 A.M. in general mess. Gen. Weaver issued orders to move bn. into Muntinlupa area today. Also decided to move one company in Taygayty area so as to be closer to Nasugbu beach. Started for Calumpit Bridge area immediately after breakfast. North or Manila, two M.P. cars, filled w/ catholic nuns & M.Ps., over took our two half-tracks. They were travelling at about 80 mph. Our speed 40 mph. In attempting to pass us they used poor judgement. The lead car shot along side us, hit the right hand shoulder, and the mud caused control to be lost & threw the car directly in the path of our lead half-track in which I was riding. Our driver swung right and miraculously missed the car which then plunged over the left shoulder of the road, rolled down the embankment and landed right side up in a wet rice patty. Stopped all vehicles. Car was a complete wreck but occupants unhurt. Transferred passengers into the other car and luckily found another north bound car who took the rest. The M.Ps. were taking the nuns to Bagulo. We continued on our way and arrived at our bivouac area about 10:00 A.M. Called staff & Co. Comdrs. together & issued movement orders to start at 12:30 P.M. - to be by platoon w/half hour interval between platoons. Recon. Plat. to start immediately to make arrangements with police of Manila for piloting of units thru city from Rizal Monument to Ft. McKinley and to post our guides enroute from there into bivouac area. Stipulated two routes to be used thru Manila to avoid traffic congestion and to keep strength of movement from becoming too public. Movement started on schedule and proceeded very smoothly. Motorcycle police, in Manila, worked under supervision of Recon. Officer by relay so that every unit arriving was met by relay who were immediately took then in charge & proceeded w/o delay. Much credit for the movement belongs to -S. O. P. and the Recon. Platoon. I left the Calumpit Bridge area at 2:30 P.M., inspected guides, etc - enroute, and arrived at Muntinlupa Bivouac area at 5:00 P.M. All elements except two tanks, were in the area by 7:30 P.M. The two tanks referred to had motor trouble which was handled by the Bn. Main. Platoon. They were brought into the bivouac area the next morning. No enemy activity except high bombing planes.

Monday, Dec. 15th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Started Recon. Platoon on exhaustive recon. of Gen. Lim's area. I contacted South Luzon Force Hq. & acquainted them w/details, etc. & had conference w/General Parker. I took S-2 & S-3 w/me. Then visited Gen. Lim's Hq. & made a study of routes to Nasugbu

gasoline drums. No chance to save anything. 5th Columnist
beach area returning to bivouac area for supper. Made study of
Reconn. Plat. report & incorporated info. on map. Received high
authorization from Gen. Weaver to move one company to Tamaytay
area. Ordered Co. "C" to move at daylight next morning, taking
company rear echelon w/ them. Main. Plat. busy
Tuesday, Dec. 16th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes.
Reconn. Platoon active on mission. Sent S-1 & Bn. Mr. Sgt. to
Pt. Stot. to pick up necessary records, etc. & to close Hq. This
was done. Took S-2 & visited Gen Jones Hq. Got our plan for
attack movement to Nasugbu & Batangas Beach areas & acquainted
Co. Comdr. w/ details. Recon. reports studied & incorporated
on maps. Had to use gasoline station maps as military maps very
difficult to in. Main. Platoon as usual. Co. "C" made
movement on schedule. Concentration Camp near Muntin-
lupa and made arrangements for telephone communication w/ Manila
(USAPFE). Had S-2 w/me. Supper w/ Major Shewy & his staff. Shewy
C.O. of Con. Camp.
Wed, Dec. 17th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes.
Insp. Co. "C" bivouac area. made final plans for supply-
ing combat elements. Nasugbu & Batangas areas. Recon.
Platoon finished info. incorporated on maps. Ordered
them into Gen. Recon. starting tomorrow S-2 org. police
detail to whiskey & loose women. Nite guards shot at
flashlight. Willing. Light did not reappear, guard arrested
Filipino tonight who was prowling around our installations. Took
him into Muntinlupa - turned over to Constabulary who locked him
up opportunity to take any offensive actions as we were civilized
Thursday, Dec. 18th. Recon. Platoon mission. Took S-2 on recon.
of new road which will make it much easier for Co. "C" to enter
Gen. Jones' area. Road will be completed in about two days. ...
... reported a number of flares at nite in their vicinity. Unable
to catch anyone but shot at some and succeeded in stripping them.
Arrested young woman in Muntinlupa area. Very well educated.
She made it a point of visiting our installations & asking very
pertinent questions. Sent S-2 w/her to G-2 in Manila. Developed
she was a live suspect. Left her there. S-2 came back and the
young woman was back shortly after. Investigated reason for her
release & got rather loose jointed story at G-2 office of legal
right to hold her or some such reason. Never was able to get the
truth. En. Comm. Off. tuned in on an enemy radio station some-
where in our locality. Reported same to Signal Off. & G-2
Manila who promised immediate action with directional finders,
etc. Never heard any more from it. Incorporated recon. data
on maps. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Co.
Friday, Dec. 19th. Co. "C" reported one of their trucks w/ bat-
tery equip., etc. mysteriously burned today. Driver & occupants
questioned closely. The truck had just returned from a trip.
No one had been smoking. Integrity of these soldiers such as not
to doubt the story. Fire started in the back end & set fire to
..... went up highway. Did not attempt to bother U.S. Police,
escorted w/ thru Manila.

-2-

-3-

gasoline drums. No chance to save anything. 5th Columnists could have tossed ignited material in back end of truck as it passed. Recon. Plat. on mission. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Sent Bn. Personnel Off. to Finance Office at Stots. to straighten out allotments, pay records, etc. He completed this & returned next morning. Talked to Group Hq. at Manila by phone from Bilibid Con. Camp.

Saturday, Dec. 20th. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Recon. Plat. on mission. Co. Comdrs. & Staff on recon. of routes - Gen. Lim's & Jones' areas. Visited Hq. South Luzon. Daily, we received by messenger, reports, etc. from USAFFE & South Luzon Force Hq. Incorporated recon. data on maps.

Sunday, Dec. 21st. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Reports & news indicate action shortly. Japs active in Legaspi Area & heavy transport movement up north. Much conjecture as to where main effort will be made. Recon. detail on mission. Incorporated daily on maps. Co. Comdrs. recon. routes etc. S-2 & myself visited Gen. Lim's Hq.

Monday, Dec. 22nd. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. S-2 and myself visited Gen. Jones' Hq. Had dinner there. Recon. Plat. on mission. Received telephone call from Group Hq. for me to report at 5:00 P.M. to Manila. Took S-3. Arrived 6:00 A.M. Had dinner w/Gen. Weaver & Staff. Asked to make recommendation for use of Bn. in event we would go north, based on two propositions - In withdrawals to take offensive action as the rear most elements or to adopt checkerboard tactics and take up successive positions in withdrawing. I told Gen. Weaver that was absolutely no opportunity to take any offensive actions as we were canalized to roads with innumerable bridges which would act in the whole as perfect tanktraps. Therefore, if we were to be used at all it would be my recon. for the second proposition. He agreed and said to be ready to move. Enemy seemed to be putting two forces in Luzon south & north. Returned to Muntinlupa at 9:00 P.M.

Tuesday, Dec. 23rd. No enemy activity except high bombing planes. Recon. Plat. on mission. Inspected bn. & checked all details for movement.

Wednesday, Dec. 24th. Held Recon. Plat. in area because of news & reports. At 10:00 A.M. received telephone call from Manila (Group) which ordered bn., less Co. "C" to proceed back north to Agno River and take up positions along the south bank from Highway 5 to Highway 13 about 50 miles until 192nd Tank Bn. arrived when we would take from Carmen to Highway 13. 25 miles & only 30 tanks and 8 half-tracks. Co. "A" ordered to proceed up Highway 5. Balance up Highway 3. Org. line by platoons. Movement by Plat. 1st echelon left 1:00 P.M. I left 2:00 P.M. Co. "C" to remain at Tagaytay to South Luzon Force. Co. "A" bombed near San Jose. Bal. of units arrive O.K. My C.P. at San Manuel. Arrived at 7:00 P.M. Rear echelon at Gerona. Arrived 6:30 P.M. No other enemy activity except enemy planes observed bombing and strafing Clark Field & Ft. Stotsenburg in afternoonwent up highway. Did not attempt to bother U.S. Police, escorted us thru Manila.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller: (cont'd):

12 Dec. 25th: 4:00 AM, accompanied by S-2, proceeded to rear echelon at Gerona. Checked installations. 192nd rear echelon here also and packed in a mass - a perfect target for hostile aircraft. Our outfit not so hot but not nearly as bad as 192nd. Had breakfast, raised hell and left for C.P. at San Manuel at 6:30 AM. Mass was just starting. What a feeling! Went up to Agno river and checked on combat units. Back to C.P. At about 1:00 PM orders to report to Gen. Weaver at Carmen. Reported and found him just east of Carmen. Gist of Weaver's conversation: "Enemy pushing south. Our forces withdrawing. Line to be held on Agno river. (See map). 192nd Tank Bn. will take over from Carmen east along north road and river bank to Highway 5? just as soon as they can get into position. 194th to organize line from Carmen westerly to Highway 13. To be especially alert for attempted enemy river crossing." I asked whether Highway 3 was inclusive for us. Reply was "Yes". I then called attention to several things as follows: (a) Distance from Carmen to Highway 13 about 25 miles. We had left one company in support of South Luzon Force. This left us w/only 2 companies or 6 platoons or 30 tanks. Impossible to have anything east of Hy. 3. (b) That the Alcalá Road parallel Agno River westerly for about 10 miles, then crossed river to the north. Impossible to reach Hy. 13 except by this route. That impossible to traverse terrain w/tanks cross country, where road turns north to bridge, west to Hy. 13. That after troops had established Agno River line, bridge would be blown and tanks would be in a rat trap with no back door to get out of. Only way out was way they came in. (c) That the tanks would be pill boxes and therefore a perfect target for artillery and mortar fire. I therefore recommended that the Bn be held in vicinity of San Manuel out of hostile fire until a use was developed for tanks. However, no change of orders was made except that it was agreed we could put nothing east of Hy. 3. Company Commanders were given the orders and dispositions made w/Co. A on right and Co. D on left w/Lt. Spaulding and 5 M.T. on extreme left flank. Organization was perfected by platoons (see map). Dispositions were checked by myself, S-2 and S-3. At 9:00 PM S-3 and myself visited the C.P. of North Luzon Force which was located in vicinity of Alcalá and which moved later that night to Bamam. We acquainted them w/our plans, etc. Info. gathered from them was to the effect that our troops were pretty well decimated and disorganized and were building up the Agno River line as fast as troops could be collected. Reached C.P. at San Manuel at 11:30 PM.

12 Dec. 26th: Orders brot by messenger at 6:00 AM for me to report to Hq. No. Luzon Force at Bamam at once for consultation of use of tanks when Bamam River line is occupied. Accompanied by S-2, we arrived at 8:00 AM. Gen. Wainright briefly told me that the Bamam River line would be occupied during the withdrawal and he wanted a tank plan for offensive action on that line. Tried to explain about dykes in rice paddies, etc., but no use. We then

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

consulted w/G-3 and left for San Manuel. Put S-2 in charge of recon. of Bambang area but as we already had made it before war was declared, knew it to be useless. Arrived San Manuel 11:30 AM. Heavy firing from vicinity Carmen. At 1:00 AM, accompanied by S-3, went up to line. Had to stop at outskirts of Carmen and proceed by foot due to hostile mortar and artillery fire registering on Carmen and west. Found right plat. of Co. "A" had been receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire all morning. Enemy had made numerous appearances on north bank of river, setting up mortars and attempting river crossings which had been frustrated by the tanks. The enemy received numerous casualties. Lack of high explosive 37mm. amm. for our guns was felt, particularly against enemy personnel and hidden mortars. One S.P.M. was working in this area and did considerable damage to enemy but also drew his fire among the tanks. Amm. truck of S.P.M. was hit and burning intensely with exploding amm. flying all over. Very few infantrymen on the line. They were effecting what was to become a common occurrence of "Volunteer evacuation" - "looking for my companion." I halted some that I saw and brot them back up to the line but as soon as my back was turned, they departed again. S-3 and myself checked tank positions and found they had been compelled to move from time to time because of mortar and artillery registrations finding them. This was bad enough but added to their difficulties was low flying hostile planes searching for them. I walked toward one of the tanks and when an explosion occurred and something hit my helmet quite a hard blow, stunning me somewhat, which I found afterwards to be the limb of a tree blown off by the explosion. A mortar shell had hit in the tree right above the turret of the tank. I saw smoke issuing from the turret and then someone shouting inside to open the front doors. I immediately went to the front and helped the driver open it up. As it opened, the body of the tank commander, Sgt. Strobel, fell over past the driver. His left arm was blown completely off and his face was blown off fr. the eyes on down including his entire chin. I pulled him out and laid him on the ground and then aided the driver to get out. He was wounded in the foot. The other two members of the crew were completely dazed and shocked but otherwise unhurt. The explosion had blown downward into the open turret. I then went to the road, a short distance away, and luckily caught a truck being driven by a Filipino who had several other wounded Filipinos in the body of the truck. We loaded our two wounded men and were dispatched immediately to the aid station but Stobel died on the way. I then detailed Dodson (one of the crew members) to drive the tank out on the road and under cover which he did. However, the explosion had blown a hole thru the armor plate above the motor and part of the motor had been blown away. It was my intention to have Bn. Main. come up after dark w/wrecker and tow it back. Just about this time S-3 and Capt. Burke came up and we discussed the situation. From what he said and what I saw the rest of the afternoon plainly indicated that the enemy would probably try something

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

soon in that particular area. The intense mortar and artillery fire in this sector was incessant until darkness. We left about 5:00 PM after instructing Capt. Burke that I had no further orders but that I would return that night w/something definite and to pass this along to "D" Co. Burke called my attention to a fact that due to the absence of friendly infantry it would be necessary for 2 men from each tank to take up positions on the river bank at dusk to properly watch the river in their area, also that he was greatly concerned w/the vast amount of river bank he could not watch which had no infantry along it. When the S-3 and myself arrived at the spot where we had parked our jeep we could find no trace of it. There was, however, another jeep in the vicinity which had run into something and was in bad shape but we managed to get it started and left Carmen for the C.P. About 1/2 Km. south it heated up and refused to go any farther. A truck came along which pushed us to the C.P. arriving at about 6:30 PM. Gen. Weaver and Major Pettit were waiting for me. I recounted the happenings at the front and stated that, in my opinion, the enemy would try something in that area. I requested infantry support. (Insert: My telling Weaver the 192nd and rest of groups had org. lines on E and W south road instead of north road and river bank.) From knowledge gained that AM fr. No. Luzon Force, I knew another withdrawal was scheduled but did not know just when. My question to the Gen., therefore dwelt on the time for the withdrawal. He was very hazy and illusive on the subject and avoided answering. It took just about 1/2 hour to get a direct answer. Finally he said "You will cover the withdrawal of the troops in your sector and will start your withdrawal at 5:00 AM tomorrow." I asked for inf. support but could get no answer. I then recommended we withdraw with the troops but could get no answer. My next question was "Has the 192nd Tank Bn. received this order?" Weaver: "They have not but they will." "And they will withdraw starting 5:00 AM tomorrow also?" "Yes." This ended the gist of the conversation and the Gen. departed going south. S-3 and myself then procured some supper which had been saved for us from the ration truck. As we were finishing supper or about 7:30 or 7:45 PM a tank came down the road and before we could stop it went past the C.P. It should be explained here that the night was fairly dark with just enough light for the pavement to show up. Following this at about 2 or 3 minutes came another tank which I stopped. The tank commander, Sgt. McComas related as follows: "Our platoon was in practically the same position as in the afternoon with the exception of moving a little closer to the river bank. Two men fr. each tank had been posted on the river bank while the other two remained in the tank. Capt. Burke had been checking tank positions and had been suddenly fired upon while he was on the road (see Burke's statement). Lt. Costigan, Plat. Leader, had been outside his tank checking his platoon when firing started. He immediately called to his tank to return the fire which was done. Considerable fire came

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Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

fr. vicinity of Carmen indicating quite a sizable force. He then called his platoon and rushed into Carmen. The enemy must have been in possession of the town for some time as they had put in a hasty road block. ~~on the map~~ on the map and had either a mortar or anti-tank gun set up in the intersection of Hy. 3 and the Alcala Road. Also the town contained great numbers of the enemy. The tanks negotiated the road block somehow and had all their guns firing as they went thru the town! (Insert, in conversation w/-Weaver about how I called his attention to the fact that the river bank east of Carmen and the northerly road were not held nor was the line there. The line was along the southerly road thus allowing the enemy to make a crossing of the river unhampered. He admitted knowledge of this but still insisted on the 5:00 AM order.) Sgt. McComas's tank had been seriously hit in the rear, one cylinder being blown out completely. I ordered him to proceed immediately to the rear echelon. The motor was functioning, but, naturally, not very good. The 3rd tank came down the road and I stopped that and held it. The 4th tank of this platoon, we found later missed the turn in Carmen and proceeded east, later running into rear of 192nd and returned to us later. The 5th tank was the one which was disabled that afternoon, referred to previously. Capt. Burke's tank had had a thermite bomb placed on it while coming through Carmen. Two of the crew, Bell and Bender, had been sent to check on tank positions near Carmen and had not returned when the fighting started. Just south of Carmen, the bomb burned thru the armor plate and dropped thru into the amm. rack causing the amm. to explode. The tank was abandoned and immediately after caught fire. The Jap mortar and anti-tank guns in the intersection fired continuously at the tanks as they passed thru. Just previous to this excitement, info. came in to the C.P. that 2 trainloads of the P.A. (Gen. Brower's Div.) was to be evacuated that night and we would have to protect the grade crossing, which was way to the south. Thus it was mandatory that Hy. 3 be held. Immediately formed a road block consisting of the tank fr. "A" Co. I had held, my own tank, the other staff tank, and a half-track I had at the C.P. Just a few minutes later, Lt. Gordon Peck, with 2 S.P.M.'s came down the road. I stopped him and he said he had been flanked out of Carmen by heavy fire and had turned off the Alcala Road to the south and luckily hit a sugar cane field, blindly forged across country and came out on Hy. 3 just north of San Manuel (see map). I ordered one S.P.M. into position so that the 75mm. gun could be fired and the other in support of my half-track. After this, a few Filipino stragglers came down the road highly excited and hysterical. I held them and finally found an N.C.O. who appeared fairly intelligent and calm. I explained the situation and ordered him to form a line north of the road block to give us local security and an outpost. This he did. While all this was going on, I had my radio opr. working continuously to contact the rest of my Bn. on the Agno river to warn them of what had happened and to be

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

ready to start, at dawn, south, cross country, and if they had to, to follow the railroad grade (see map) so as to reach Hy. 3 below Carmen. It would be slow work but might serve the purpose and get the equip. out of the rat trap. Whether the static was man made, nature's own or combination of both we could not tell but it was bad to say the least. As soon as I saw we were going to have trouble contacting, I ordered my S-2 to proceed to the rear with the following mission: (a) To notify Tank Group of the situation. (b) To notify Hq. No. Luzon Force of the situation. (c) To go himself or someone else whom he might designate to Tarlac, thence northerly on Hy. 13 to our left flank half-tracks and try to radio our combat units from there and if impossible to proceed easterly, on foot if necessary, and get the info. thru which could have easily been done. (See Map). S-2 left about 10:00 PM (see Spoor's statement). At about 11:00 PM, General Brower drove up from the south bound for Carmen and the Alcala Road. I acquainted him w/the situation of which he had had no info. Also w/what I had done. He wanted to make a recon. up there in a tank! I explained the as-in-nity of such a thing and he acquiesced. He agreed fully w/what I had done and then reminded me of the two trainloads of Filipinos who were due to withdraw from the west. Also he wanted the Filipinos, who had formed local security for me, to start south as soon as possible. I promised I would send them shortly as the moon had risen by then and visibility was good. I asked him to check the bridges to the south and give the engrs. instructions not to blow any until I gave the order. He agreed to do this, which we later found he did do and departed soon thereafter. At this point, to clarify the situation, the details of dispositions of troops to our right and the orders given them, which we learned days and even months after, should be set down at this time. It will give a clearer picture and eliminate the fog of war under which we were laboring. At the identical time of my conversation w/Gen. Weaver (between 6:30 and 7:00 pm), our right, resting on Carmen, was left wide open by the withdrawal of the troops in that area, namely, the 192nd Tank Bn. and the composite inf. elements. The 192nd having received no orders from Tank Group, accepted the orders of Gen. Stevens, who commanded that area. His orders were substantially as follows: "The withdrawal will start at 7:00 PM, Dec. 26th, the 192nd Tank Bn. will cover the withdrawal". It must be remembered that the original orders from Gen. Weaver left Hy. 3 open for the 194th Tank Bn. Therefore all troop withdrawals east of Carmen traveled east - away from us. Major Robert Besson, C.O. of a P.A. Bn. was supposed to be in position astride Hy. 3. He had placed one company from Carmen east. This time he visited one company area to check on it. It was nearly dark and in nearing the river bank he noticed some men standing there. He started to chide them for not being in their fox holes when he was suddenly hit on the head and knocked unconscious and taken prisoner by the enemy. Probably the reason why he was not shot was because the enemy wanted

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):
secrecy at that time. He later determined that his company had all voluntarily evacuated. Also, he states, that at 6:20 PM, he distinctly heard tanks moving east from Carmen which was later confirmed. The withdrawal of troops east of Carmen started about 6:40 PM. It would therefore appear that the enemy had been watching for the withdrawal and had been ready to cross the river unopposed. It must be remembered also that the south, east and west roads, had been occupied by our troops and not the north of river bank road. Major Besson, later that nite was taken by the enemy to the river crossing and forced to go to the north side of the river. The crossing was about 2000 yards east of Carmen and was marked by white flags. It was easily fordable at this point. Major B. was already a prisoner, held (tied up) at the intersection of Hy. 3 and Alcalá Road when Lt. Costigan's platoon came thru. He states that Carmen was full of the enemy and must have received quite a number of casualties. Why he was not hit by the fire fr. our tanks, he considers a miracle. He says he could have stuck out a hand in either direction and caught the tanker's 37mm. shells. It should be remembered that we had no H.E. shells - only A.P. He also states that the two tanks of the 192nd Tank Bn. stationed closest to Carmen pulled out to the east sometime in the early afternoon because of close registration of artillery and mortar shells. He says there were no officers of the 192nd in that area which I can also substantiate. He further states the river crossing is between 1000 and 2000 yds. east of Carmen and that he was struck on the head by a gun butt and not rendered unconscious but was stunned. He says Japs landed first at Vigen on 12/10 and then at Dalmortis, that Gen. Wainright wanted to attack (there were only about 2000 Japs at Vigen at the time) but he had to submit his plans to Mac by order, and it had to go to Manila w/the usual delays, etc. and by the time it came back, many developments had taken place which changed the picture completely. He also says that the supposed repulse of the Japs at Lingayen played up in the newspapers, was all pure bunk, that the Filipinos saw lights out in the Gulf and fired at them at nite - looked like the 4th of July - purely Filipino hysteria. That he was a reserve Bn. and was put on the Agno River to cover the withdrawal and because of being a reserve Bn. Capinpin took all their automatic rifles away and gave them to other units thus putting them on the firing line w/o any! That the Alcalá Road was just about impassible in spots between Alcalá and Carmen because of shell holes and that is the reason why the Filipinos west of Carmen were evacuated by two trains (the ones we protected) instead of using Hy. 3. Lt. Costigan reported to Gen. Weaver at San Miguel and tried to tell his his story. The General immediately grew almost hysterical which was usual whenever under pressure, called Costigan a coward, ordered him to return immediately and fight like a man, together with a great deal more incoherency. Costigan started out. The General ordered everyone within sight or in hearing to do all kinds of things. Instead of attempting to help out, when if we ever needed a level headed commander,

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

we needed one then, he went berserk and ordered all traffic stopped on the road. He even ran out and turned vehicles and troops around to send them to the front, calling them names and yelling threats etc. These vehicles and troops were no part of the tank group and were operating under orders fr. their commanders. This made no difference. Gen. Weaver had suddenly gone hysterical according to eye witnesses. He had taken command so it seemed of the Fil-American Forces. This is the turmoil Capt. Spoor found himself in when he reported to Gen. Weaver on his way to fulfill the important mission I had assigned to him.

Co. "G" reported that he had been ordered by Lt. Col. [redacted] of the 1st AF to follow the combat vehicles of my Co. "G" in the Salway area. I thought that this was wrong & wanted to check w/Gen. Weaver. Co. "G" had been put w/ Lt. Col. [redacted] command for movement to Calumpit but USAFFE had issued orders for them to revert to my command on arrival. Lt. Col. [redacted] was out of order. The Salway area was a hot spot. I assigned the combat elements of Co. "G" to proceed to assist the 102nd Ft. Inf. but ordered Bradford to proceed w/other elements to join Gen. Weaver's echelon which was Gen. [redacted]. By that time, all north bound traffic had closed. The 8th Inf. Force had withdrawn successfully & only the combat elements in the Salway area remained across the bridge. No attempt had been made to blow it. About 5:00 P.M. /12/31/ Gen. Weaver & Pettit arrived at my O.P. I was given a map of office of Lt. Col. Weaver ordered me to take my Co. [redacted] into the area east of San Fernando that night, assist our troops there and to cover all w/drawals into Malinao. Contact was made w/Co. "G" & the necessary orders issued. The guns lost for the bridge side & my Co. moved into the assigned area w/o mishap. It was a quite routine thing. In checking the area, I found that my comm. half-truck containing the best radio, ops. & my comm. off. were missing. They had been posted at the Calumpit bridge. Contact was made by radio & found they were still there. The comm. off. stated Gen. Weaver had ordered it. I naturally wanted, at least, my comm. off. so I requested him to see the Gen. issue, if he were still in the area, present by request. In a little while he reported back by radio that the Gen. had ordered he remain. I never saw him again until 3 days later which proved to be great inconvenience. The top of [redacted] was quiet. Orders were for a w/drawal to [redacted] that night - so to cover it by the Manila area. The 11th Inf. (1st) were the last troops to clear which occurred at about midnight 12/1-2/42. We were to wait at San Fernando until 102nd Ft. units cleared thru as fr. Calumpit which was done. Some of the bridges were blown ahead of 1st between Calumpit and San Fernando but the hysterical blowers did such a good job that the tanks crossed the bridge w/o any trouble. At about 3:00 A.M. we cleared San Fernando & the bridge was blown. The town was full of 5th Col. Handgrenades were scattered us from the wiley ways. No casualties or damage resulted.

must also use the bridge. Therefore sent S-2 to inquire into the situation & issued special orders to my bridge detailment to stop any such action until I myself gave the clearance & to shoot any one who might make the attempt. I also sent my Comm. Off. to actually take post at the bridge so that we might make the most of the radio. Our bivouac was some dist. fr. the bridge because of available cover. S-2 reported back that Col. Skeery, Engr. Off., was in the vicinity & would guarantee nothing as to when he would order the bridge blown. S-2 had explained our mission & informed him of my special orders to the bridge detailment but he reported the Col. seemed to be in a very nervous state of mind & made no reply. In the 1st afternoon, Lt. Bradford, commanding rear echelon Co. "C" reported that he had been ordered by Lt. Col. ----- of the S.P.M.'s. to following the combat vehicles of my Co. "C" in the Baliwag area & that he thot this was wrong & wanted to check w/me. Co. "C" had been put w/ Lt. Col.'s. ----- command for movement to Calumpit but USAFFE had issued orders for them to revert to my command on arrival. Col. ----- was out of order. The Baliwag area was a hot spot. I allowed the combat elements of Co. "C" to proceed to assist the 192nd Tk. Bn. but ordered Bradford to proceed w/rear echelon to join Bn. rear echelon which was done. By dusk, all north bound traffic had closed. The So. Lu. Force had w/drawn successfully & only the combat elements in the Baliwag area remained across the bridge. No attempt had been made to blow it. About 8:00 P.M. /12/31/ Gen. Weaver & Pettit arrived at my C.P. I was given oath of office of Lt. Col. Weaver ordered me to take my Bn., incl. Co. "C", into the area east of San Fernando that nite, assist our troops there and to cover all w/drawals into Bataan. Contact was made w/Co. "C" & the necessary orders issued. The Gen. lost for the bridge site & my Bn. moved into the assigned area w/o mishap. It was a brite moonlite nite. In checking the Bn., I found that my comm. half-track containing the best radio, opr. & my comm. off. were missing. They had been posted at the Calumpit bridge. Contact was made by radio & found they were still there. The comm. off. stated Gen. Weaver had ordered it. I naturally wanted, at least, my comm. off. so I instructed him to see the Gen. imme. if he were still in the area & present my request. In a little while he reported back, by radio, that the Gen. had ordered he remain. I never saw him again until 2 days later which put me to great inconvenience. The day of 1/1/42 was quiet. Orders came for a w/drawal to Guagua for that nite - we to cover it in the Mexico area. The 11th Inf. (PA) were the last troops to clear which occurred at about midnite 12/1-2/42. We were to wait at San Fernando until 192nd Tk. units cleared thru us fr. Calumpit which was done. Some of the bridges were blown ahead of 192 between Calumpit and San Fernando but the hysterical blowers did such a good job that the tanks crossed the bridge w/o any trouble! At about 2:00 A.M. we cleared San Fernando & the bridge was blown. The town was full of 5th Col. Handgrenades were tossed at us from the alley ways. No casualties or damage resulted.

It was impossible to catch any of them as we were the only friendly troops & were in our vehicles. Alley ways, etc. were dark. The new line was to be established along the between Guagua and Porac. We were to remain on the main highway near Guagua with a small combat unit east of Guagua. The 192nd Tank Bn. to be on the line w/their right resting on Guagua. We covered the withdrawal w/o incident arriving at our position on S. W. edge of Guagua about 4:00 A.M. 1/2/42. One plat. Co. "C" under command of Capt. Moffitt was put w/the outpost at Betif. No enemy activity was observed this day. Gen. Weaver & Major Pettit visited our position that day. Fair cover was available but our position on the highway was not conducive to tank action to say the least. Being aware of our responsibility to provide local security, I had ordered two road blocks to Lubao - one to watch the Sexmoan Road & the other to watch the Florida - Le Blanca Road. Thus, our rear would be protected fr. either the east or the west. The block consisted of tanks & half-tracks. Gen. Weaver had seen these two block & asked what they were for. I explained & he immediately said they were unnecessary as the Sexmoan route was impossible for the Japs to get thru & as we were on the right flank, the Florida Le Blanca Block was superflous. He also went on to state that it was frittering away combat vehicles. I did not argue and inasmuch he had not ordered them removed, I changed the subject.

... participated in by I tank platoon of 1 of my co. which was an detached service of that particular line. The enemy had moved to the S. west of St. Luzon, Co. or Manila. This area was ordered to have a water pump. The platoon proceeded rapidly down the road. Apparently the enemy was not expecting this type of combat. The platoon was then in what proved to be a position for which the enemy expected to launch an attack. They were down in large numbers with artillery, anti-tank guns, M.G., mortars, etc. The tanks were successful in this operation, taking the enemy by complete surprise & destroyed quite a number of heavy guns & M.G. Although they lost 2 tanks in the operation, this however delayed the attack & allowed the 1st tank platoon to withdraw northward, w/o interference, reentering its line. This same tank co. also had another affair about this same time. The half-track & crew fr. the co. was detailed to accompany an armored recon. patrol so as to protect it. During the patrol the party was attacked by the enemy. The half-track engaged the enemy without returning a deadly fire. It was so effective & the crew so determined that the patrol party was enabled to safely withdraw. The half-track was bogged in several places & disabled as the unit followed up their line by a determined effort & destroyed the enemy. Returning to the half-track, they disabled all the M.G. of the half-track as line & returned safely to our line w/all the guns. This co. also successfully covered the withdrawal of the 1st tank platoon northward into Lubao then they returned to our line in our operations - protecting the rear of the 1st tank platoon from the enemy.

On 1/2/42 I was ordered to form a road block on the main highway of Guagua. I personally supervised the operation. The officers were to regulate enemy traffic who might be caught on the highway so as to allow a successful withdrawal of the 1st tank platoon in this

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Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller: (cont'd)

Written at Zentsuji 2/15/44 at request of Japanese.

When war was declared, I knew what our mission (in the Phil.) was to be. That mission was to delay and divert the enemy in his campaign which would naturally cause him to tie up enormous quantities of munitions, other supplies & equip., shipping & men. Thus he would be unable to use this force elsewhere until released from that particular task. Our mission was successfully completed but more so than I ever dreamed possible because (1) the negligible amount of arms, equip., etc. in the Phil., (2) the small number of Amer. there, (3) the poorly equipped & trained Phil. Army, and (4) the obviously superior equip., training & numerical strength of the Imperial Japanese Army. I am not familiar w/the entire campaign but only w/that part of it in which my unit participated.

We were first initiated into the war at Clark Field which was bombed by the Japanese on Dec. 8, 1941 at about 12:30 P.M. I did not witness what actually occurred on the field as my unit (194th Tank Bn.) was in positions surrounding Clark Field w/the mission of repelling any air-bourne inf. which might try to land. In this affair the tankers shot down 2 enemy fighters.

The next affair was in So. Luzon in the latter part of Dec. & was participated in by 1 tank plat. of 1 of my co. which was on detached service at that particular time. The enemy had landed on the E. coast of So. Luzon, so. or Manila. This plat. was ordered to make a combat reconn. The plat. proceeded rapidly down the road. Apparently the enemy was not expecting this type of combat. The plat. came upon them in what proved to be a position for which the enemy expected to launch an attack. They were here in large numbers w/artillery, anti-tank guns, M.G., mortars, etc. The tanks were successful in this operation, taking the enemy by complete surprise & destroyed quite a number of heavy guns & m.g. although they lost 2 tanks in the operation. This however delayed the attack & allowed the So. Luzon Force to w/draw northward, w/o interference, according to plan. This same tank co. also had another affair about this same time. One half-track & crew fr. the co. was detailed to accompany an officer reconn. patrol so as to protect it. During the reconn. the party was ambushed by the enemy. The half-track engaged the enemy ambush returning a deadly fire. It was so effective & the crew so determined that the reconn. party was enabled to safely withdraw. The half-track had been hit in several places & disabled so the crew followed up their fire by a determined rush & dispersed the ambush. Returning to the half-track, they dismounted all the m.g., set the half-track on fire & returned safely to our lines w/all the guns. This co. also successfully covered the w/drawals of the So. Luzon Force northward into Bataan when they returned to me & aided in our operations - protecting the w/drawals of the No. Luzon Force into Bataan.

On 12/26 I was ordered to form a road block on Hy. No. 3 just so. of Carmen. I personally commanded & supervised the block. Our orders were to repulse enemy units who might be coming so. on this Hy. so as to allow a successful w/drawal of the Phil. Army in this

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

sector. At about 3:00 A.M. 12/27, an enemy motorized column left Carmen on the hy. proceeding so. We opened fire at close range & cont'd. the fire for about 15 or 20 min. The fire was extremely accurate & deadly. The fight was over in a short time. It was impossible to tell what damage was done at nite & we had been ordered to be at Gerona by daylight which was further so. & was where the next line was to be estab. Up to this time, the enemy had pushed his drive down this hy. but all pressure on this part of our line now suddenly ceased & the main push was on our right flank, down thru what can be termed the Cabanatuan Area. We covered w/drawals down thru Tarlac & then I was ordered to protect & hold the big bridge at Calumpit. The So. Luzon Force was now w/drawing northward & the bridge was important as it not only was to serve this force but also our forces in the Cab. area which was slowly withdrawing southward & protecting the w/drawal of the So. Luzon Force into Bataan. A detach. of anti-aircraft was also put on this mission. Enemy aircraft continually tried to bomb this bridge but were not successful. 2 enemy planes were shot down. The So. Luzon Force w/drew into Bataan as per plan. The No. Luzon Force slowly w/drew southward inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. One of my Co. was located at Balivag (no. of Calumpit). They caught an enemy tank unit just going into some woods & destroyed fr. five to 8 tanks. It was impossible to determine the exact no. as it was dusk & of course a tanker can see very little fr. within a tank.

One of my reconn. half-tracks had an interesting experience w/some 5th columnists. 5 of them were discovered at various points surrounding one of our amm. dumps. They were in the act of shining mirrors up in the air so that enemy planes could pick up the flashes & thus bomb the dump. Needless to say there was no more shining of mirrors.

The Phil. Army gave a good acct. of themselves in the w/drawals into Bataan despite their untrained & poorly equip. state. This was particularly true east of S. Fernando, in the Mexico Area. They actually succeeded in making a counter-attack on a large scale, caused numerous casualties to the enemy, & drove him out of his various positions. They occupied these positions & held them until the line was reformed at Guagua-Porac. This had been a very intricate maneuver. The No. Luzon Force not only had to cover the w/drawal of the So. Luzon Force thru Calumpit S. Fernando on their way into Bataan but had to take a turning movement on their w/drawal so as to bring their forces fr. the Cab. Area into the S. Fernando-Guagua-Lubao-Bataan axis of w/drawals. Any mil. man will appreciate the difficulties of a movement of this type especially when it is realized that the enemy, had complete air superiority. This was done successfully to say the least. Our artillery support was entirely inadequate as was our mortars for the simple reason that we sadly lacking in the weapons of war. Also those weapons we did have, for the most part, were of World War I vintage.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

I was now ordered to cover the right flank of our forces on the Guagua-Pirac line & to hold the flank until our forces could withdraw south thru it's left flank & establish a line so. of Lubao. I posted a road block at Lubao which is so. of Guagua, so as to take care of any surprise attack against us coming fr. Sexmoan. This block proved to be a very important factor. A strong enemy column, supported by artillery, pushed toward Lubao that afternoon (about Jan. 4) fr. Sexmoan. The road block completely repulsed the column causing it to entirely abandon it's mission. Our forces, having safely w/drawn, I now ordered my unit into position south of Lubao & in advance of where our main line was being formed. I was also given another unit to aid me that nite. At about 2:00 A.M. the enemy attacked using smoke. However the wind was not favorable & it blew back over enemy lines. I was bright moonlight. We held a very stron position astride the main hy. The attacking enemy was plainly visible & it was fairly easy to adjust our fire on the target. On our right the enemy attacked in masses. Our field of fire was excellent as it was open fields. We were under cover along a creek bed which had quite a number of trees along it. One of my off. performed a feat that nite which will illustrate the spirit of my entire unit. Tracer bullets had set fire to the dry grass in front of our position. The fire was growing larger and threatened to expose our tanks by its light and also to perhaps force us to evacuate those positions fr. the danger of setting fire to the vehicles. This off., w/o hesitation, ran into the fire area & stamped it out w/his feet & coat. He was entirely visible to the enemy & fire was heavy. The fire put out, he started back for his tank but was hit by enemy bullets. His crew rescued him but about a week later he died. The battle cont'd. for about an hour more when the enemy suddenly ceased his attack & w/drew. Having completed my mission, I ordered the w/drawal to our new main line of resistance accd. to plan. The enemy must have suffered tremendous casualties because we saw nothing of him the following day & nite whatever. Our retrograde movements into Bataan went smoothly & per schedule. A temporary line was established at the no. end of Bataan & was held until the main line at Abucay-Hacienda-Orion was thoroughly estab. Fr. this time on until Jan. 24, my unit did beach defense (no action), patrol activity, driving out enemy patrols & snipers, & maintenance work. One action was participated in by one of my co. in the area of no. of Gagac. It merely assisted in straightening out the main line & pushing the enemy north a short distance. This was done w/very little difficulty.

As stated in the beginning, our mission in the Phil. was to delay the enemy as much as possible. In the latter part of Jan., it became apparent that a better delaying action could take place if we occupied our reserve line (Pilar-Bagac) farther to the south. By occupying this line, we could shorten our lines of comm., reduce mileage on transportation vehicles, thus saving on fuel, main., etc. Also the position was strong & excellent observation was obtainable.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

Food was running short & the reduction of every effort possible was mandatory. The w/drawal started on 1/24 & was completed by dawn of 1/26. I was ordered to cover the w/drawal. The nite of 1/24-25, heavy fighting was in progress in the vicinity of the Hacienda. Both Amer. & P. Scout Inf. took part in this. I also put in some tanks. At about 3:30 A.M. my tanks put themselves between our troops & the enemy & the w/drawal was completed. The next day, 1/25, I was ordered to occupy a line in advance of our new main line. We made no contact w/the enemy whatever that day. However, I doubt if he knew exactly what had happened because I saw enemy planes bomb positions that had been occupied by our troops the day before. We stayed in this position all that day & then moved a little further south that nite & took up new positions. It was that that the enemy would make a large scale attack the next day, 1/26. This was true. A large contingent landed on the west shore of Bataan which was eventually cleaned up but which my unit did not take part. However, in conjunction w/this landing, the enemy, in force, pushed down just to the west of where we were in position. I had also been allotted some artillery to use as I deemed fit. We opened fire at about 10:30 A.M. Our position was excellent & fr. the very start, it was apparent that the enemy attack was doomed to failure. We took the enemy completely by surprise & was able to fight w/o moving a single vehicle. It was the most important & most successful operation we had participated in. By noon, it was all over. The enemy must have lost tremendously. He threw everything he had but our position & determination was too strong. It was impossible for us to know definitely just how bad he had suffered as enemy aircraft had just then picked us up & was about to bomb. Up to this time, they had not bothered us. I ordered the w/drawal & it started. Airplanes bombed us all the way back to our lines but it was not effective. One bomb hit a half-track w/bomb splinters but it failed to disable it and caused no casualties. Another bomb ripped a fender on one of the tanks but nothing further. We knocked one plane down w/our m.g..

Our new position (Pilar-Bagac Line) proved itself very strong indeed. We heard nothing fr. the enemy for more than a week. I was ordered to handle beach defense on the E. shore of Bataan & also to support the front line in that section. We had no action. We sent our men out into enemy territory ea. day on patrols. Our artillery was extremely active & broke up enemy concentrations frequently. It soon became apparent that the enemy invasion force had early spent itself. We could tell this fr. the positions he evacuated & his attacks which became weaker. However, we were becoming weaker also. We had been on half rations ever since coming into Bataan & it was necessary to curtail even further. Also other supplies were running low. Therefore it was impossible for us to make any counter-attack except local ones. We knew, in March, that another enemy invasion force was coming in and that it would only be a question of time before the end would come. Our artillery was becoming inaccurate due to the barrels being burned up. However it was still giving a good account of itself.

Notes of Lieutenant Colonel Miller (cont'd):

On April 3, at about 3:00 P.M., the enemy attacked w/artillery & planes. We had no planes whatever. Flight after flight of bombers came over dropping bombs on a particular sector of the front line. Tremendous artillery concentrations fell in this same sector. It was literally blown out. And we had hardly anything to throw back. I was ordered to take one co. & proceed over the mts. and aid the 45th Inf. (P.S.) in a counter attack. The attack was put on at 6:00 A.M. April 6th. By 5:00 P.M. no one had gained any ground in this area. The unit had one mortar and 6 shells which they had been saving. Thus it can be seen how ill equipped we were. It was decided to use the 6 shells & follow them up w/a tank attack although it was all jungle. This was done but it was unnecessary for the tank attack. Excellent observation was obtained for the mortar fire & it completely demoralized the enemy in this sector.

(illegible) However at 7:00 P.M. we received orders to w/draw. The enemy pressure to the east of us, was too strong & to have held our position would have meant a salient which could not be defended. We w/drew & held until the general surrender order was received.

I had the opportunity of seeing some of the tremendous enemy force which had been thrown against us, after being made a prisoner. Guns of all calibers & equipment until we wondered more & more how our poorly equipped people had stood up for so long against it. But we had accomplished our mission. We had taken more than 400 enemy prisoners who had been treated just as good as our own troops. The Japanese commanders admitted this and were very pleased about it at that time. We had delayed and diverted enemy forces to the maximum. His original invasion force had failed. He had been compelled to send in another task force of truly major proportions. We had done all that could humanly be done for our country & we are proud of the record. To have resisted further would have been the height of foolishness & would have accomplished nothing.

Surr. April 3
 Left April 18

N.P.S. 28
 164.5


Mariveles

• Lina - lost Equipment Train (East)

• Lamas (own food) Manila

Bay

Bataan



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