

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 88-074

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883078

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-858 PENTAGON

CLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED BY: [illegible] ON: [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 84288307P

REPORT OF OPERATIONS

OF

LIGHT FORCE

MARCH 12, 1942 - APRIL 9, 1942

48-4150-23

APR 12 1942
21-4877 (AKF)
[Signature]

ANNEX VI

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NA006307

2225 Munitions Building
Washington 25, D. C.
29 January 1946

Subject: Report of Operations of the Luzon Force 22 March - 9 April 1942 in
Brevity Submitted.

To: General Jonathan M. Wainwright, USA, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

I. ORGANIZATION: The Luzon Force was organized 12 March by a General Order of United States Army Forces in the Far East with Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright in command. On 21 March 1942, General Wainwright, having been promoted Lieutenant General, assumed command of United States Forces in the Philippines and Major General E. P. King, Jr., assumed command of the Luzon Force pursuant to the oral instructions of the Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines. Later confirmed by General Orders, United States Forces in the Philippines.

The reorganization of the General and Special Staff, Luzon Force, necessitated by the transfer of several officers to the staff of the United States Forces in the Philippines, was immediately undertaken upon the assumption of command on 21 March and completed on 23 March 1942. The staff consisted of what was left of the original Luzon Force Staff and of officers who had served on the United States Army Forces in the Far East Staff or Philippine Department Staff. No change was made in the organization of the two Corps or the Service Command.

II. MEDICAL, SUPPLY AND PERSONNEL:

A. (1) The report of the Surgeon, Luzon Force, indicates that the defensive combat efficiency of the Luzon Force had been reduced more than 75% during the final weeks. This was due to malnutrition, scurvy, malaria and intestinal infections and infestations. These men on a duty status were incapable of any long sustained physical effort. Malnutrition had made troops particularly vulnerable to disease. By 1 March 1942 individuals had used up their reserve and they were deteriorating rapidly in the physical sense and by 1 April the combat efficiency was rapidly approaching the zero point.

The half ration was inaugurated 6 January. In terms of energy units the ration averaged 2000 calories during January, 1900 calories during February and 1000 calories during March. The nature of the terrain in which the defense of Bataan was conducted requires, conservatively estimated, an energy output of from 3500 to 4000 calories per man per day. By 1 March serious muscle wasting was evident. The ration was deficient in vitamins A, B and C and beri-beri became universal. This, in combination with malnutrition, was the cause of thousands of hospitalizations.

Bataan is a malarial infested region. The supply of quinine was inadequate for prophylaxis and by 1 March there were 500 daily malarial admissions to hospitals and by 1 April this had reached the rate of 1000 cases daily.

A serious shortage of drugs for treatment of all types of dysentery and hookworm was existent during the Bataan campaign. Convalescence from all disease was slow due to the inadequate diet and blood building drugs. At the time of surrender there were over 12000 patients in rear area hospitals.

(2) The ailment of nerve fatigue became prevalent due to constant enemy bombing, shelling and the absence of any counter activity, particularly in the air, on the part of our forces. During the early stages of the defense it was noted that Philippine Army stragglers in rear areas kept their arms and

equipment and could be rallied and returned to the front. However, during the latter stages of the defense, stragglers carried neither arms nor equipment and it was impossible to return them to the front except by force. They were early and physically exhausted, as well as mentally uncapable to further combat duty. It had been impossible to relieve front line troops and send them to quiet areas in the rear for rest periods. There was no quiet area in Batuan due to incessant enemy bombing and strafing.

B. GENERAL SUPPLY

(1) The lack of necessary clothing, blankets and shelter was also pronounced. Great numbers of front line troops were without these and underwear. Raincoats and blankets were almost universally non-existent for all troops. There was no available stock from which replacements could be made or reserves established.

(2) After the evening loss of rations 8 April there was less than two days reduced rations left on Batuan. All troops on Batuan had been on a one-half ration since 3 January 1942. On 15 March the ration had been further reduced from approximately a one-half ration to a one-third ration. It was raised to a one-half ration again on 5 April 1942. (It must be remembered that considering the frequency with which front line troops were separated from their organizations, half rations, in fact, meant that the individual soldier averaged considerably less than one-half the prescribed ration.)

C. PERSONNEL

On April 2 the population of Batuan was approximately as follows:

I Corps - - - - -	28,000	
II Corps - - - - -	32,600	
Luzon Force Reserve - - -	5,200	
Service Command - - - -	11,500	
Total Military - - - - -		78,100
Civilian Employees - - -	6,000	
Civilian Refugees - - - -	20,000	
Total Civilian - - - - -		26,000
GRAND TOTAL - - - - -		104,100

III. OPERATIONS

Note: For trail and defensive position references, see map attached hereto, Annex No. 1.

A. Period 24 March - 2 April 1942, inclusive. During the period 24 March - 2 April, inclusive, operations of the Luzon Force were as follows:

(1) The intense hostile aerial activity which began 15 March continued and grew in intensity both in the front line areas of both Corps and in the Service Command Area. Front lines and vital rear installations were subjected to heavy bombing and front lines to frequent shelling and counter battery fire. Vigorous patrolling by infantry units was continued. However, the enemy had established a screen which was difficult to penetrate and only meagre information was obtained as to enemy installations and troops in rear of this screen. The reduced ration had so reduced the combat efficiency for the entire force that it was less than 25% efficient.

Beginning about 15 March observers in the II Corps reported large enemy truck and material movement south from Lusa junction and west from ANKAY. A few troops were observed. Artillery and tanks were observed in some of these movements. This continued for a period of approximately ten or twelve days, with both day and night movement. G-3 estimated a building up of a large enemy offensive in front of the II Corps with probably a holding attack in front of the I Corps, as well as a possible water envelopment of either or both Corps flanks.

On the night of 27-28 March sections of the outpost line of the 21st and 41st Divisions (Sub-Corps 2) were subjected to heavy enemy mortar and small arms fire and driven in by enemy infantry. That part in front of the 21st Infantry was later restored after heavy hand to hand fighting. However, the enemy pressure continued on the front of the 21st and 41st Divisions and the G-2 of these units was driven in on the night of 29-30 March. During the period 30 March to 2 April the entire front of the 21st and 41st Divisions was under constant enemy pressure.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: ND 683678

(2) Under the probability that all possible II Corps beach defense troops would be needed to assist in stopping a break-through of the front line, all Service Command troops, such as Quartermaster, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare and Signal Corps Depot and maintenance units within the II Corps area were assigned beach defense sectors. Organization commanders of these service units were required to make a reconnaissance of trails leading to assigned sector in order to determine the shortest route to the sector. An occupation of the beach sectors was made under cover of darkness in a practice maneuver on or about 28 March.

B. OPERATIONS: 3 April - 9 April, inclusive.

(1) Diagrammatic disposition of Forces 1800 hours, 2 April 1942. (For additional data see Map, Annex No. 1.)

West Sub-Sector		East Sub-Sector			Sub-Sector D			Sub-Sector C			Sub-Sector B	
91st	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th
X	X	PC				X			X		Prov	
			II								AC	FA

I Corps Reserve II Corps Reserve Luzon Force Reserve
 424th Inf. (PS) 374th Inf. (PA) 112d Inf. (US) - plus Prov.
 204th Cav. (PS) (Less 1 Bn.) 57th Inf. (PS) Tank Group.
 NOTE: The 14th Engineers (PS) and 8034 Engineers (US) (Less one Co.) were assembled in Luzon Force Reserve & April 1942.

(2) Chronological record of operations 3 April - 9 April 1942, inclusive.

(a) 3 April - The enemy concentrated extremely heavy artillery fire (the heaviest by far of any artillery fire in any battle to date in the P.I.), as well as aerial bombardment, on the front of the 41st Division, II Corps, starting at 0900 hours and continuing until 1630 hours. In the late afternoon an infantry attack drove the 42d Infantry out of its MHR and it occupied its MRL. During the night 3-4 April, hostile artillery continuously shelled the front and rear areas of the 41st and 21st Divisions.

The Commanding General, II Corps, released the 33d Infantry (PA) (Less one Bn.) to the sub-sector commander, Sub-Sector D, to fill the gap caused by the withdrawal of the 42d Infantry.

Only minor actions took place on the I Corps front the night of 3 April.

(b) 4 April - On the 41st Division front, at daylight, large flights of low flying enemy bombers bombed and machine gunned the front line. A coordinated attack was launched through the gap created by the rearward movement of the 42d Infantry and both the 42d Infantry and the 43d on its right gave way in complete rout. By 0900 hours, 4 April, the 41st Division (except the 41st Infantry) had completely disintegrated and all attempts to rally and reorganize the scattered personnel were totally unsuccessful. The hostile attack, supported by intense and heavy artillery fire and aerial support, moved against the 21st Division. By noon the 21st Division had refused its left flank and became partially disorganized. On the front of the I Corps the 2d Philippine Constabulary abandoned a portion of its MHR under severe shelling and bombing but it was later reestablished.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, had ordered the 11st Infantry (US) to move under cover of darkness the night 3-4 April to a position in readiness in the vicinity of the junction of Trails 10 and 2. The Provisional Tank Group (Less two companies supporting I Corps) was placed in direct support of the II Corps.

On 4 April at 1000 hours the 31st Infantry (US) was released to the II Corps. The 45th Infantry (PS) (Less one Bn.) was relieved from assignment to I Corps and ordered to move east along Trail 8 to junction of Trails 8 and 29 where it was released to the II Corps. The 57th Infantry (PS) was ordered to move under cover of darkness the night 4-5 April to the vicinity of LAMMO. All

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 863079

engineer work was stopped and the 14th Engineers (PS) and the 809d Engineers Bn. (US)(less one Co. at Corregidor) were ordered to assemble immediately prepared for combat.

The Commanding General, II Corps, moved the 31st Infantry (US) north on Trail 2 to the SAN VICENTE RIVER where it was released to Sub-Sector D. The 45th Infantry (PS)(less one Bn.) was also released to Sub-Sector D in the late afternoon. The Commanding General, Sub-Sector D, was directed to use the 31st Infantry (US), the 45th Infantry (PS)(less one Bn.), reinforced by one tank company, and all other available sub-sector troops and counter attack from the east and west of MT. SAMAT to initially reestablish the ICL and later the IER.

The I Corps front had but little activity. The right flank of the Corps front line was refused by placing the 2d PC on a switch position extending southeast.

(c) 5 April - Hostile pressure continued to the south and to the east of the 1st Division front supported by a large number of tanks. The 23d and 23d Infantry had meanwhile withdrawn to a line 1300 yards north of Trail 429; at this point they broke in complete disorder and the entire 21st Division ceased to exist. All attempts to locate any of the troops of the 21st Division were wholly unsuccessful. The counter attack ordered by the Commanding General, II Corps, on 4 April was launched shortly after daylight, 5 April, but was unable to advance beyond a few hundred yards. The 45th Infantry (PS)(less one Bn.) attacked north down Trail 29. The 33d Infantry (PA)(less one Bn.) attacked north on Trail 429 in the GREENE RIVER VALLEY. The 31st Infantry (US) attacked northwest near the junction of Trails 44 and 429. All contact with the 33d Infantry (PA)(less one Bn.) had been lost and was never regained. This unit had completely disappeared in this attack and was never heard of again. The 45th Infantry (PS)(less one Bn.) was stopped astride Trail 29 about 2500 yards south of the original ICL. The 37th Infantry (PS) was released during the day to the Commanding General, II Corps, and in turn released by II Corps to the Commanding General, Sub-Sector D. The Commanding General, Luzon Force, ordered Commanding General, II Corps, to hold the general line of the east bank of the SAN VICENTE RIVER.

The I Corps front was still inactive.

(d) 6 April - By 1400 hours hostile forces advanced rapidly south up Trail 6 and cut off the Commanding General, Sub-Sector D, the 45th Infantry (PS)(less one Bn.) and the remaining troops of the 1st Infantry (PA) from the II Corps. The Commanding General, II Corps, placed all troops of Sub-Sector D, east of Trail 6, under command of the Commanding Officer, 37th Infantry (PS) and also released the 201st and 203d Engineer Battalions from Corps Reserve to Commanding Officer, 37th Infantry (PS), and ordered him to occupy and hold the east bank of the SAN VICENTE RIVER within his sector. The Commanding General, II Corps, ordered the 31st Infantry (US) to the east bank of the SAN VICENTE RIVER between the 37th Infantry (PS) and remaining Sub-Sector D troops. The Commanding General, Luzon Force, released the 809d Engineers Battalion (less one Co.) to the II Corps and ordered the 25th Cavalry (PS) to move under cover of darkness to the vicinity of the junction of Trails 10 and 2 in the II Corps sector. The hostile attack continued with particularly heavy pressure to the east. The 31st Combat Team (PA) and the 31st Division (PA), less 31st Infantry (PA) and 35d Infantry (PA)(less one Bn.), disintegrated and disappeared into the jungle. The Commanding General, Sub-Sector D, was ordered to attack east along Trail 8 with the 45th Infantry (PS) and attached tanks and reestablish contact with the II Corps. After this attack failed, the Commanding General, Luzon Force, attached the Commanding General and staff, Sub-Sector D, the 45th Infantry (PS)(less one Bn.) and the remnants of the 1st Infantry (PA) to the I Corps.

(e) 7 April - The hostile attack between Trails 6 and 2 struck the 201st and 203d Engineer Battalions and both battalions disintegrated and disappeared into the jungle. The 37th Infantry (PS) was enveloped from the west (left) flank and forced to withdraw to the vicinity of the junction of Trails 10 and 2. All Philippine Army troops west of Sub-Sector D were in complete

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EAO 135078

front or had disappeared. All trails and roads leading south were choked with Philippine Army stragglers without arms, ammunition, or equipment. The Commanding General, Luzon Force, released, during the morning, the 14th Engineers (PS) and 25th Cavalry (PS) to the II Corps and ordered the Commanding General to hold the general line of the MAMALA RIVER where the Commanding General, Sub-Sector C, assumed command of all front line units.

The hostile attack continued east, and by successive envelopments forced withdrawal from all prepared positions in Sub-Sector B and prevented the occupation of positions on Trails 28 or 30. The Commanding General, II Corps, ordered organized units remaining to occupy and hold the general line of MAMALA RIVER. The Troops of Sub-Sector A broke and fled under concentrated artillery fire and heavy aerial bombing. There was no hostile infantry pressure on this front. All reserves of the II Corps, Luzon Force and I Corps had been committed by dark, 7 April. The Commanding General, Luzon Force, ordered II Corps to withdraw the 4th PG from beach defense positions and see it to support front line units. The Commanding General, I Corps, was ordered to assemble the 1st PG from beach defense and prepare to move the regiment by water to the front of the II Corps. At about 1600 hours orders were received from the Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines, for the Luzon Force to attack with the 11th Division (PS) due east across the PASTIGAN RIVER. This order was immediately delivered by G-3, Luzon Force, in person to Commanding General, I Corps. The Commanding General, I Corps, stated that due to illness and the weakened physical condition of the men of the 11th Division such an attack was not feasible and success impossible. The Commanding General, I Corps, discussed this attack with the Commanding General, Luzon Force, and Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines, and stated that his troops were in poor physical condition and could not cross the PASTIGAN RIVER gorge and be in condition to attack, due to malnutrition and sickness. The execution of this order was left to the discretion of the Commanding General, Luzon Force, and it was determined that had such an attack been launched all communications with assault units would have been lost due to lack of communication equipment.

The I Corps was then ordered to initiate a withdrawal the night of 6-8 April to a position along the BUNANGAS RIVER, in four phases, in order to prevent the envelopment of its right (east) flank.

Due to continued hostile pressure by superior enemy forces and flanking action on the left (west) flank of the MAMALA RIVER position (II Corps), the occupation of that position had to be abandoned and the troops during the hours of darkness, 7-8 April, occupied the ALANGAN RIVER line.

(1) 8 April - By 0900 hours, 8 April, the 31st Infantry (US), 57th Infantry (PS), 26th Cavalry (PS), 14th Engineers (PS) and parts of the 803d Engineers Battalion and a few remnants of Philippine Army troops had occupied the ALANGAN RIVER line. By 1500 hours, that date, the left (west) flank of the position had been enveloped by a strong enemy force. The entire position was at that time subjected to an intense enemy aerial bombardment and artillery concentration under which the hostile attack supported by tanks also penetrated the east center of the position. Due to the above, enemy actions, the troops occupying the ALANGAN position were forced to withdraw under constant enemy pressure.

By direction of the Commanding General, Luzon Force, the Commanding General, Sub-Sector C, had been placed in direct command of all front line troops on the ALANGAN RIVER. He was ordered to occupy and hold a defensive line along the LAMBO RIVER, following his forced withdrawal from the ALANGAN RIVER. At this time he had at his disposal the following troops: 57th Infantry (PS), 803d 26th Cavalry (PS), 800; 14th Engineers (PS), 400; 31st Infantry (US), 140; total, approximately 1360 officers and men. All of these units were somewhat disorganized and control was difficult, due to darkness, jungle and scarcity of trails. Radio and wire communications were completely out. No organization of the ground was possible.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, ordered the movement of the 1st PG immediately after dark to CASCASAN where it was released to II Corps and advanced as far as BATAVE AIR FIELD. The Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade (anti-aircraft) was ordered to destroy all anti-aircraft equipment not practical for use as infantry weapons, form as infantry, occupy and defend the high ground immediately south of the BATAVE AIR FIELD.

The Commanding General, I Corps, had attacked east along Trail 8 early on the morning of 8 April with the 45th Infantry (PS), reinforced. This attack was driven back by a double envelopment by the enemy. Soon after dark 8 April all communications with front line units of II Corps, except by messenger, were cut, there being only one wire line after 1600 hours. Soon after dark 8 April the Commanding General, II Corps, informed the Commanding General, Luzon Force, that the LAMAS RIVER position had been turned from the west and that all units were withdrawing in some disorder.

At about 2300 hours orders were received from Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines, to attack with the I Corps in the direction of CLEGGAPO. The I Corps was at that time executing a rearward movement to the KEMARIGAN RIVER line and the Commanding General, I Corps, informed the Commanding General, Luzon Force, that the physical condition of his troops was such that the greatest distance he could move unopposed was about five kilometers and that an attack against an energetic enemy was impracticable and any degree of success highly improbable. Compliance with the order to attack was deemed impossible, and the order to attack was not transmitted.

At this time all available reserves of the Luzon Force and both Corps had been committed. The II Corps had completely disintegrated and no longer existed as a fighting unit and all of its organized resistance completely exhausted. The enemy had open passage to the south in the path of which was General Hospital No. 2, with thousands of patients. All roads and trails to the south and southwest and west were jammed with stragglers and refugees pursued by Japanese infantry columns and tanks, as well as constant bombing and strafing by low flying enemy bombers. The destruction of all artillery, ammunition and engineer material, radio equipment, etc., was ordered completed by 0600 hours, 9 April, at which time a flag of truce was sent forward to the Japanese Command.

IV. ARTILLERY

A. When the Luzon Force was organized (12 March) the artillery with the Force was as follows:

Unit	I CORPS	
	Armament	Mission
11th F. A. (PA) - - - -	10 - 75mm guns - - - -	Right Sub-Sector
24th FA (PS) - - - -	8 - 75mm guns - - - -	General Support
	4 - 2.95" Mt. guns - -	
2d Bn, 88th FA (PS) - - - -	8 - 75mm guns - - - -	Beach Defense
71st F. A. (PA) - - - -	2 - 75mm guns - - - -	Beach Defense
	4 - 2.95" Mt. guns - -	
91st F. A. (PA) - - - -	8 - 75mm guns - - - -	Left Sub-Sector
86th F. A. Bn. (PS) - - - -	8 - 155mm guns (OPF) - -	General Support
(Less Btry. 3)		
Btry. G, 301st F. A. - - - -	2 - 155 Howitzers - - - -	General Support
Provisional Bn., CAC - - - -	6 - 155mm guns (OPF) - -	General Support
II CORPS		
21st F. A. (PA) - - - -	24 - 75mm guns - - - -	Sub-Sector A & Beach Def.
31st F. A. (PA) - - - -	8 - 75mm guns - - - -	Sub-Sector C
41st F. A. (PA) - - - -	16 - 75mm guns - - - -	Sub-Sector D
	8 - 2.95" Mt. guns - -	
51st F. A. (PA) - - - -	8 - 75mm guns - - - -	Sub-Sector C
301st F. A. (PA) - - - -	16 - 155mm guns (OPF) - -	General Support
(Less one platoon How)		
Btry H, 86th FA (PS) - - - -	4 - 155mm guns (OPF) - -	General Support
1st Bn, 24th FA (PS) - - - -	8 - 75mm guns - - - -	Sub-Sectors A & B
	4 - 2.95" Mt. guns - -	
1st Bn, 88th FA (PS) - - - -	8 - 75mm guns - - - -	Sub-Sectors A & B

ARMY ARTILLERY

Unit	Armament	Mission
Regt. 4, CAC (PA)	1 - Sea Coast gun, fixed	Coast & Beach Defense
Prov. Group, Self-Propelled Arty.	27 - 75mm guns	Reinforcing Corps Art. & Beach Defense
200th CAC (AA)	75mm guns	AI Defense
315th CAC (AA)	75mm guns	AI Defense

In addition to the above there were 31 naval guns, ranging from one pounder to 3-inch, allocated to the two Corps and employed for beach defense.

B. All units of the Philippine Army artillery were very deficient in fire control, communication equipment and motor transportation. The great shortage of field wire and radio equipment especially, operated to reduce the efficiency of the units. To a great extent this was further aggravated by the difficult terrain and absence of any air observation.

C. When the enemy intensified his aerial activity about 15 March he made a decided effort to neutralize our artillery by subjecting any battery located to intense bombing attack and counter battery fire. This counter battery was executed by 75mm and 150mm guns and the 105mm howitzers. As the enemy had unrestricted use of both plane and balloon observation in addition to the usual terrestrial observation, his fire was very effective. While losses of material due to these attacks were not very great, the constant cutting of wire lines, shelling of CP's and battery positions lowered to a considerable extent the efficiency of our artillery support.

D. When the enemy launched his attack early in April, the disintegration of the Infantry of the 41st Division (PA) permitted the penetration of the 41st Field Artillery positions resulting in the loss of two battalions of 75mm guns and six 2.95" guns. Similarly the 31st Field Artillery lost all its guns on 7 April. The 31st Field Artillery displaced to the rear on the night of 7 April and was never in action again.

E. The Provisional Battalions of Self-Propelled Mount Artillery were divided between the two Corps and operated as anti-tank and general support artillery. Due to the lack of proper communication and fire control equipment, maximum effectiveness was never obtained from these very powerful and mobile weapons.

F. The 200th and 315th CAC (AA) were in position covering the several airfields and rear installations, with one battery of 3" guns and two batteries of 75mm guns in position in the forward areas. When the retirement of the II Corps on 7 April left the entire front uncovered these two regiments were used as infantry to cover the front on the right of the I Corps and on the night of 8-9 April were the only organized units between the enemy and our rear areas which had not been outflanked.

G. Orders were issued directing the destruction of all artillery material and important items of equipment during the night of 8-9 April. This was in most cases accomplished.

H. RECAPITULATION: The defeat and the capitulation of the Ison Force was largely a tactical defeat caused by the general principle of attrition without replenishment.

I. The total losses during the period 1-9 April, inclusive, are unknown due to the complete breakdown of organizations. It is known that approximately 45000 Philippine Army and Philippine Scout prisoners and 9200 American prisoners were at Camp O'Donnell during the period 10 April - 4 June, inclusive. The exact number of killed, wounded and missing after 2 April is unknown due to absence of complete and reliable information after that date. The exact number of Filipino-American troops who have died in Japanese prison camps or who may have escaped is also unknown.

B. It is estimated that the enemy had in Indochina a minimum force of three fresh combat divisions totalling at least 50,000 men and a possible maximum of five combat divisions plus the necessary command and service troops. These troops were experienced, fully equipped and in excellent physical condition. The above, with enemy air operations almost twenty-four hours daily without opposition, gave the enemy a combat superiority of greatly higher proportion than was actually needed to cause the capitulation of Indochina.

C. The defensive strength of the various units of the Laos Force on 2 April 1962 was as shown in Annex Bv. 2. This was the approximate paper strength and includes those men absent sick in hospitals and those missing from other causes. As heretofore stated (see Section II, par. 4 (1)) the effective combat strength of all units was less than 25% of the total ~~unit~~ strength. Approximately 30% of the unit strength was absent sick in hospitals and missing. The combat efficiency of the GFF remaining on duty status was so low as to render them but 25% efficient due to local hospitalizations, malnutrition, prevalent beri-beri, hookworm and recurrent malaria.

D. The Laos Force Staff consisted of the following:

Commanding General	Major General E. P. King, Jr., MS
Aides	Major Wade C. Cochran, PA, MS Captain Annelle G. Thibault, ADC (Cav)
Chief of Staff	Brigadier General Arnold J. Fank, GSC, MS
G - 1	Colonel Floyd Marshall, GSC (Inf)
G - 2	Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Holland, GSC (Inf) Major Charles F. Shearn, SER Major Nelson V. Raynes, SER Captain Raymond E. Bines, FD First Lieutenant Albert Schickling (PA)
G - 3	Colonel James V. Collier, GSC (PA) Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Mack, GSC (Inf) Major Marshall Hart, GSC (Inf)
G - 4	Colonel Roy C. Hiltom, GSC (Inf) Lieutenant Colonel Arthur L. Shreve, GSC (PA)
Artillery Section	Colonel Everett C. Williams, PA Colonel William E. Corbitt, PA Colonel Ralph Hirsch, PA Lieutenant Colonel Guy H. Stubbs, GAC Major Philip C. Lussen, Jr., PA Colonel Charles S. Lawrence, GAC Colonel Richard G. Rogers, GAC
Quartermaster	Colonel Michael Quinn, GSC
Traffic Control	*Colonel George T. Hirsch, CD
Transportation Officer	Major Heston S. Maxwell, CD
Ordnance	Major William J. Latimer, Jr., CD *Colonel Henry H. Stimson, CE Major William A. Gray, CE
Engineer Section	Major Albert J. Kinosh, PA Colonel Joshua A. Stansell, SC Major Robert T. Jackson, SC
Signal Section	Colonel Oliver M. Bell, ED Colonel Harold W. Clasky, MC Major Joseph F. Peters, ME
Inspector General	Lieutenant Colonel Earl T. Kalstead, AGD
Medical Section	Major George Britt, AGD
Adjutant General Section	*Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton, GSC Colonel Lawrence S. Carroll, AC Lieutenant Colonel Alfred C. Oliver, CE
Chemical Officer	
Air Officer	
Chaplain	

*Indicates officer functioned in a dual capacity, being also a staff officer assigned to USFV.

E. P. King
E. P. KING, JR.,
Major General, USA

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MDDB 307P

GENERAL RECORD TWO

REPORT OF G-1

1. Strengths -

a. The Luzon Force consisted of approximately 75,000 enlisted men, 6,000 civilian employees and 4,500 officers during the latter part of March and the first week of April 1942 when the Japanese Imperial Army launched its attack.

b. Of the foregoing enlisted personnel, approximately 11,000 were American, 8,000 Philippine Scouts and 56,000 Philippine Army. The number of American officers totalled approximately 1,500 and the number of Philippine Army, approximately 3,000.

c. It is estimated that between 25% and 40% of the total strength of the Force was entirely non-effective due to illness from malaria, dysentery and malnutrition; another 35% were only semi-effective. The first of April a total of 7,000 men were in the three general hospitals and 4,000 afflicted with illness of a less serious nature were being cared for in a provisional hospital in the I Corps area. Hundreds were ill in divisional clearing stations, etc.

d. The following is the approximate strength of the Philippine Army Divisions and the other major units of the Luzon Force at the time of the attack by the Japanese Imperial Army 3 April 1942:

UNIT (PA)	STRENGTH (PA)	STRENGTH (US)	STRENGTH (PHIL)	STRENGTH (SC)	STRENGTH (TOTAL)		
Phil. Army Hq.	1500	14th Infrg.	800	3rd AFy.	700	Adm. Serv. Corps	2500
1st Div.	4000	43rd Inf.	2000	32d St. P. A.	1100	Hq. I Corps	800
2nd Div.	3000	37th Inf.	2000	803d Infrg.	480	Hq. II Corps	800
11th Div.	3300	26th Cav.	850	Prov. Tr. Gp.	1100	Hq. Phil. Div.	1000
21st Div.	3500	24th P. A.	620	aa. Infrg.	1650	Hq. Luzon Tro.	300
31st Div.	4400	23d P. A.	360	201st Infrg.	340	31st Inf(US)	1700
41st Div.	3900	28th P. A.	620	202d Infrg.	260	Serv. Cdn.	11500
51st Div.	3500	28th P. A.	620	Gen. Hosp. 1st	800	Prov. AC Regt.	1300
71st Div.	2900						
91st Div.	6200						
Total	43800		8770		6430		19600

Total Military 79100
 Civilian Dep. 6000
 GRAND TOTAL 85100

STRENGTH OF SERVICE COMPANIES

UNIT	STRENGTH	UNIT	STRENGTH
Patient's Hosp. 1 & 2	4500	Hq. Serv. Cdn. (Phil. Dept.)	50
Motor Trans. Serv.	500	Engineer Depot	25
31 Distribution	500	Convalescent Camp	250
Provost Marshall	225	Ordnance Shop	500
Stockade, Prisoners of War	60	Medical Depot	15
Signal Corps Hq.	700	Miscellaneous	175
Total	12000	Total	1015

GRAND TOTAL 11500

ESTIMATED SICK AND WOUNDED - 8 APRIL 1942

General Hospitals 1 and 2 - 10000
 Sick & Wounded in Field Hospitals - 9000
 Sick & Wounded in Forward Aid Stations - 2000
 Total Sick and Wounded 21000

2. Casualties: - The number of battle casualties sustained by the Luzon Force during the Japanese attack and up until noon 9 April could not be determined due to the disorganized condition of the combat units following the attack. It is believed that the number of killed and wounded was not excessive but that the number of missing was heavy. By 10 May 1942, 8000 American enlisted men and 1300 American officers had reported to the Prisoner of War Concentration Camp at Camp

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 863078

O'Donnell and approximately 14000 Philippine Army and Philippine Scouts had reported at this camp. An undetermined number of the American officers and enlisted men with the Luzon Force were evacuated to Corregidor during the night of 6-9 April 1962; estimated at approximately 250 officers and men.

3. Civilian Refugees: -

a. The exact number of Philippine civilian refugees in the Batan area is unknown. On 1 April 1962 the United States Army was issuing rations to between 15,000 and 18,000 refugees in the four civilian evacuee camps. Hundreds of civilian refugees, to whom rations were not provided by the United States Army, were in the hills of Batan.

b. The four evacuee camps were operated by the civil officials of Batan. The Commanding General, Luzon Force, through the Commanding General, Service Command, exercised control over sanitation, the issuance of rations and the location of camp sites, only.

4. Appointment and Promotion of Officers: -

a. Authority to appoint American enlisted men and civilians as temporary officers in the Army of the United States was delegated to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, by the War Department. Likewise the same authority was delegated by the President of the Philippine Commonwealth for the appointment of temporary officers in the Philippine Army.

b. All recommendations for appointment originating with subordinate commanders were submitted to the Commanding General, Luzon Force, for recommendation and forwarding to the Commanding General, USFP. It was the policy to recommend qualified American enlisted men, who had served for at least thirty days with the unit to which assignment was contemplated after they were commissioned, for appointment as officers and duty with the Philippine Army or other combat units. A limited number of qualified Philippine Scout enlisted men were recommended for appointment as officers and for duty with the Philippine Army and Philippine Scout units. The recommendation of a Philippine Army enlisted man for appointment as a temporary officer in the Philippine Army was exceptional because the number of Philippine Army Reserve officers, either on an active duty or on inactive status, were recommended for appointment as officers only under exceptional circumstances. Such officers appointed from civil life were appointed to fill some specific vacancy in the services and not for command of combat units.

c. Recommendations for the temporary promotion of officers were submitted to the Commanding General, Luzon Force, who forwarded them with appropriate recommendation to the Commanding General, USFP. It was the policy to recommend an officer for promotion only when such promotion would give such officer the grade authorized by applicable tables of organization or in the absence of tables of organization the grade commensurate with the responsibility and duty he was performing. In making recommendations for promotion the seniority of the officer, length of active service and manner of performance of assigned duties were taken into consideration.

5. Prisoners of War - Captured Japanese soldiers were treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention as far as the situation would possibly permit. The sick and wounded were hospitalized in a separate ward in General Hospital No. 1. Here they received the same food, care and treatment as the American and Filipino patients. Other prisoners of war were confined in the Prisoner of War Detachment which was operated under the supervision of the Commanding General, Service Command. On 9 April there were approximately sixty Japanese Prisoners of War in the Batan Area.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: #A096307F

4. The following is a table of estimated American officers and enlisted men on Betton as of 1 April 1942:

UNIT	OFF	E. M.	TOTAL	UNIT	OFF	E. M.	TOTAL
Hq. I Corps (PA) - - -	13	313	326	Ordnance - - - - -	13	100	113
Tiat Div. (SF Sec) - -	137	890	987	Signal Corps - - - -	13	95	110
Hq. II Corps (PA) - - -	52	372	424	Chemical War. Serv. -	4	6	10
AA Brigade - - - - -	110	1539	1649	Lucom Force Mtr. Trns	21	35	56
31st Infantry (SB) - -	83	1825	1683	Veterinary Hospital -	7	14	21
Task Group - - - - -	65	980	1045	Gen. Hosp. No. 1 - - -	30	180	210
Prov. A.C. Regt. - - -	85	1399	1484	Gen. Hosp. No. 2 - - -	40	310	350
803d Infr. Bn. - - - -	21	460	481	45 & 46 Peak Trains -	3		3
Air Corps - - - - -	135	1035	1240	Marine Air Warr. Serv. -	1	20	21
A.C. attnd. Ord. - - -	20	600	620	S.P.M. artillery - - -	30	90	120
Hq. Lucom Force - - - -	47	80	127	F. A. Brigades - - - -	83		83
Hq. Serv. Command - - -	31	22	53	14th Engineers - - - -	20		20
Hq. Co., Phil. Dept. - -	2	40	42	14th Med. Bn. - - - -	22		22
Provost Marshall - - -	11	135	146	45th Inf. (PS) - - - -	55		55
Engineers - - - - -	28	17	45	37th Inf. (PS) - - - -	21		21
Quartermaster - - - -	22	119	141	26th Cav. (PS) - - - -	21		21
Total	894	9535	10530	Total	436	895	1265
				GRAND TOTAL	864	9534	10530
					1310	10406	11974

Note 1: Hq. Phil. Div. is included in II Corps.

Note 2: Total Officers and Enlisted Men arrived at O'Donnell - 9122
 Reported fled to Corregidor - - - - - 290
 Admissions to Hospital last day - - - - - 1526
 Total accounted for - - - - - 10767
 Total original strength - - - - - 11776
 Killed in battle or on Death March or in Hills - 949

FLOYD MARSHALL
 Colonel, GSC (Inf)
 Asst. Ch. of Staff, G-1

ARMY NUMBER THREE

REPORT OF 2-2

1. During the attack on the ABUGAY position the enemy made landings on the west coast of BATAAN at LAGUNAHAYAN and QUINMAN Points and in the area between the ABUGAY and SALUDAN Rivers, these being a part of a plan for continuing the attack against the I Corps.
2. Because of successful enemy infiltration to positions behind our lines, a planned withdrawal from the ABUGAY position was made. All elements completed this withdrawal by daylight of the 26 January 1942.
3. The enemy followed the withdrawing forces and gained contact on the new line. There was little pressure on the front of the II Corps, but an enemy force of a battalion or more infiltrated down the IGUL River valley and was there cut off and destroyed. By 14 February this situation was cleared up and the enemy ceased offensive activity temporarily on the front of both Corps.
4. As a result of the actions up to this time elements of at least two divisions had been identified as operating in BATAAN.
5. About 1 March a considerable amount of ship movement in and out of SUBIC BAY was noted. This continued during the remainder of the campaign but was most pronounced in the early part of March. About that time the enemy began an effective blockade of our supply lines using SUBIC BAY as a base. At this time also there began to be indications that the enemy would adopt an offensive attitude. On 6 to 9 March the enemy re-established contact on the front of the II Corps and on 10 March made a small local attack on the OPIN. On 11 March the enemy started to build a counterreconnaissance screen on the front of the I & II Corps.
6. By 11 March the II Corps called attention to certain factual data and other information indicating probable offensive action by the enemy. These included noted increases in air and artillery activity, observed truck traffic and troop movements into the forward areas, increases patrol activities and strengthening of enemy screening forces. Civilian refugees also reported supply build up in rear areas and warnings to evacuate areas of probable military activity.
7. From 11 March to about 4 April, ^{OPIN} the I Corps was under daily bombing and shelling; most of this being apparently intended to put its artillery out of action, although there was some bombing and strafing in forward areas. During this time there was no important pressure by ground forces. By 12 March the enemy screen was completely effective on the front of the I Corps. ^{AND II Corps.}
8. By 14 March a continuous systematic movement of supplies into the area opposite the II Corps had been reported and on 14, 15, 16 and 17 March the movement of several regiments into the area was reported. Most of these disappeared into cover opposite SUBIC BAY, II Corps. About this time, also large vehicular movements were noted, as many as 300 trucks being observed moving into the area in one day.

9. On 19 March, when General King assumed command, he stated to members of his staff his conclusion that an enemy attack in the near future could be expected. At that time there were indications that the two identified divisions had been reinforced by new troops and that the enemy strength was not less than three divisions, less combat losses; that the enemy artillery strength had been materially increased since the ANOUAT action; that the enemy had been building up supplies beyond probable ordinary needs; and that the enemy was not unaware of our own supply deficiencies. The enemy had also issued a continued propaganda attack, based on the hunger and loss of morale, with a formal demand for the surrender of the command, which stated the Japanese could either take BAHAM by force or allow it to fall by starvation.

10. On 23 March the enemy brought into the area 54 twin motorized bombers, which type had not been reported operating in the area since early in January, and some additional dive bombers. The bombing in the rear areas was extremely heavy from that date until 3 April. This was apparently intended to disrupt traffic and communications and to interfere with supply installations. During this period also, there was heavy bombing of the artillery areas in both Corps and some bombing of forward areas.

11. On 24 March an observation balloon was seen on ANOUAT RIDGE, indicating the presence of heavier artillery in that area.

12. About 24 March an enemy order for reconnaissance of MOUNT SAMAT area fell into our hands. When translated it indicated with considerable exactitude the probable enemy plan for attack of the area. By the 27th, the enemy force in front of the II Corps was estimated as a division; by the 30th, 4 regiments plus tanks; by the 31st, the enemy strength was estimated to have increased to 5 regiments. During this time there were several feeler actions against units of BAKER B, II Corps.

13. On 2 April the bombings in the II Corps shifted from the rear areas to the front lines. On 3 April, after heavy artillery and bombing preparation, the enemy struck the 42nd Infantry and by the night of the 3rd an enemy force had reached the junction of Trails 8 and 29. On 4 April the 1st and 42nd Infantry were attacked, tanks being used. Tanks got in rear of the 2nd DIVISION, which withdrew to the north slopes of MOUNT SAMAT. On 5 April the enemy broke thru the 2nd DIVISION and late that night made contact on Trails 64 and 44 with the 2nd Infantry (SB), which was moving up to counterattack. By the morning of 6 April the enemy had taken MOUNT SAMAT and cut Trail 6. That day the enemy hit the left of COMBAT TEAM 51 with tanks and Infantry. By the morning of the 7th our line was withdrawn to a position southeast of the SAN VICENTE River. An attempt by General Leung to break through from the west on Trail 8 was not successful. By night the enemy had forced the withdrawal of our troops to Trail 2 and 10. On the 8th the line of the ALAGANAN River was established, but after dark the troops, badly disorganized, were south of the LAMBO River. There the campaign ended.

14. The enemy apparently used parts of two divisions in the attack on the II Corps. A penetration to the south to cut Trail 8 was followed by a sweep to the southeast, capturing MOUNT SAMAT and rendering unusable our entire position.

15. During the entire action on the front of the II Corps there was very little ground pressure on the I Corps. The bombing and shelling of the I Corps artillery positions virtually ceased for three days and 21's on the front lines was not intense. Apparently it was not considered necessary to make even a holding attack on that Corps, although there are indications that a strong force was on that front prepared to take advantage of any movement that might be made to assist the II Corps.

5

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526

16. Apparently at least three divisions were used, one on front of I Corps, two in action on front of II Corps. It is believed a fourth division was in reserve if needed. Probably the entire Japanese force on Luzon was equivalent to five divisions. Additional artillery strength was also indicated.

17. Combat reports indicate that the enemy coordination of dive bombers, tanks and infantry was excellent. The physical condition of our own troops alone would have given the enemy an enormous advantage and the enemy material was markedly superior in quantity.

Comments: The principal weakness of our G-2 set-up was lack of agencies to gain information of activities behind the enemy counter-reconnaissance screen. At no time were we able to get sufficient aerial reconnaissance missions flown, because of lack of equipment. The only agency we had for obtaining information of enemy supplies, troop concentrations, etc., in rear of the enemy combat zone was ineffectively operated and the quality of the average information obtained was so poor as to cast doubt upon the accuracy of all of it. However, after the war was under way, there was no chance to set up such a system as would have operated efficiently.

This lack of definite information had no material bearing on the outcome of the campaign, since we had not the resources to have taken advantage of the most accurate information.

FRANK L. HOLLAND
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Asst. Ch. of Staff, G-2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NAID56307F

SMALL BOMBER FORCE

REPORT OF G-3

1. a Major General H. P. King, Jr., assumed command of the American-Philippine Forces on Bataan, designated as the Luson Force, on 21 March 1942. The American-Philippine Forces on the Bataan front were disposed as follows:

b. I Philippine Corps, Major General Albert H. Jones, Commanding on the West; II Philippine Corps, Major General George H. Parker, Commanding on the East. Boundary between Corps: the general line: PARTIDIAN RIVER - MT. MARITIMES - PARIDIAN RIVER. Divisions were in line from left to right (west to east) as follows:

c. I Corps: 91st Division (PA), with 91st Infantry (PA) and 92d Infantry (PA) attached; 1st Division (PA); 11th Division (PA); 2nd Philippine Constabulary Regiment. 49th Infantry (PS) and 26th Cavalry (PS) as Corps Reserve. Southern Sector beach defenses were manned by Air Corps units, 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment and 3d Battalion, 89th Field Artillery (PS).

d. II Corps: 41st Division (PA); 21st Division (PA); 31st Combat Team (remainder of 31st Division (PA), about one regiment); 31st Division (PA), less 31st Infantry (PA) and 33d Infantry (PA), less one battalion; Provisional Air Corps Regiment (US), strength about 1300; 31st Infantry (PA). Corps Reserve consisted of the 201st and 203d Engineer Battalions (PA) and 32d Infantry (PA), less one battalion. Southern Sector beach defenses were manned by the 2d Division (PA) (less 1st and 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiments) with a company of tanks and a battery of self-propelled mount artillery.

e. Luson Force Reserve consisted of the 57th Infantry (PS), 31st Infantry (PS), 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) and the 803d Engineer Battalion (PS). Both Engineer battalions were employed on road and air field maintenance.

2. Additional Japanese heavy bombers and dive bombers were noted over Bataan about 15 March. Increased and intensified bombing of the front line and of rear area installations was started on or about 20 March. As many as fifty-four heavy and light bombers were over the Bataan area at one time; bombing was almost continuous from early morning to late afternoon, particularly of the front line and artillery positions.

3. a. Early 3 April the Japanese forces launched a drive against the left of the II Corps. By afternoon the 41st Division had withdrawn in confusion and Division officers were unable to assemble the Division. The 31st Infantry (US) was ordered to move under cover of darkness from bivouac area west of LAMAO to position of readiness in the vicinity of Junction of Trails 10 and 2. The tank group, less two companies in I Corps, was ordered in direct support of II Corps.

b. On the morning of 4 April the attack reached the left of the 21st Division. 31st Infantry (US) was released to the command of II Corps. 45th Infantry (PS) relieved from I Corps about 1600 hours and ordered to move east on Trail 8 across the PARTIDIAN RIVER to Trail 29, prepared to move north to block Japanese advance south between PARTIDIAN RIVER and ST. SIMON. 57th Infantry (PS) ordered to move under cover of darkness to position of readiness in concealed area west of LAMAO. 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) and 803d Engineer Battalion (US) ordered to assemble.

c. 5 April
d. 5 April. 21st Division completely disintegrated and all contact lost with any of its elements. 45th Infantry (PS) ordered to move north on Trail 29. 57th Infantry (PS) released to II Corps. Commanding General, II Corps, ordered to hold the east bank of the SAN VICENTE RIVER.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NA 283078*

g. 6 April. 51st Combat Team and 51st Division, less 51st Infantry, disintegrated and disappeared. 45th Infantry (PS) and 803d Engineer Battalion (US) released to command of Commanding General, II Corps. 26th Cavalry (PS) relieved from command of Commanding General, I Corps, and ordered to move under cover of darkness to assembly position in vicinity of the Junction of Trails 10 and 2. At about 1600 hours orders were received from Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines, to attack due east across the PARTINGAN RIVER with the 11th Division (PA) and cut off any enemy south of MT. SUGAT. This order delivered to Major General Jones by G-3. General Jones stated that it was absolutely impossible to carry out the order. 11th Division could not be withdrawn from the front and marched across the PARTINGAN CREEK as the men were not physically able to make such a move due to malnutrition because of short rations. General Jones called Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines, and made the above statement. Orders for 11th Division to attack were rescinded.

h. 7 April. 26th Cavalry (PS) and 14th Engineers (PS) released to the command of the Commanding General, II Corps, and II Corps ordered to hold the general line: MANGLA RIVER. 4th Philippine Constabulary Regiment ordered to move immediately after dark from beach defenses to LAJAO prepared to occupy defensive line as ordered by Commanding General, II Corps.

i. (1) 8 April. Provisional Air Corps Regiment, 51st Infantry (PA) and remainder of II Corps troops forced to withdraw. Commanding General, II Corps, ordered to gather all available troops and hold the high ground along the LAJAO RIVER. Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade ordered to destroy equipment, form an infantry and occupy a defensive line along the high ground just south of the CARGANAN AIR FIELD. I Corps ordered to withdraw to previously reconnoitered position about five kilometers south of Corps front in order to perfect its fight. Soon after dark the Commanding General, II Corps, informed the Force Commander that he was unable to hold the LAJAO RIVER position as his left was being turned.

(2) At about 2300 hours orders were received from Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines, to attack with the I Corps in the direction of OGBONAPO. I Corps was at that time moving to the rear. Major General Jones stated that due to the physical weakness of his men the greatest distance he could move unopposed was about five kilometers and an attack against an energetic enemy almost an impossibility.

(3) All available reserves had been used. II Corps was completely disintegrated and all its resistance gone. The only defensive line left in the entire II Corps area was that occupied by the Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade, with the 26th Cavalry (PS) on its left, along the high ground just south of the CARGANAN AIR FIELD; a total of about 3000 officers and men.

J. W. COLLIER,
Colonel, GSC,
Asst. Ch. of Staff, G-3.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NIJ 3078

SECRET

REPORT OF G-4

1. General Supply Situation - Upon arrival on Batasan and for the period covered by this report, the administrative order covering administrative details was in operation for use of the Lesson Force which was then occupying the Reserve Battle Position (Pilar-Bagac Road). Prior to 20 March certain supplies had been found to be critically inadequate. All troops on Batasan were operating on one-half ration since about 6 January 1942 and further reductions were to follow.

b. Forage for animals was about exhausted.

2. Gasoline and lubricants for motor vehicles were inadequate in appropriate grades and gasoline had been placed on a command control basis. Daily issues of gasoline for motor vehicles was to be further reduced.

3. The operation of G-4 Section on Batasan for the period covered by this report, therefore, was more in the nature of rationing inadequate supplies than that of its normal function of securing, storing, issuing, etc., of supplies.

4. Class I Supplies - As stated above, troops on Batasan were operating on half rations and had been reduced in combat efficiency on this account. As subsistence supplies decreased and notice was received from Corregidor that no additional subsistence supplies were available to us from other sources, further reductions were made periodically in order to prolong the period of defense. (See Exhibit 1, attached, for ration reductions). In order to increase our inadequate subsistence supplies, efforts were made with some success to bring in supplies of rice and other foodstuffs from the southern islands of the Philippine Group through the ever tightening Japanese blockade. The "Legassi" made several such trips before it was reported as captured about 15 March. Also, several rice mills were put up and operated on Batasan to utilize the paddy on hand. This paddy was exhausted prior to 20 March. To add to the meat components, there were 2500-3000 carabao slaughtered on Batasan between 6 January and 8 April. Toward the latter part of this period and after forage for animals was exhausted, the horses of the 2nd Cavalry (P) (about 200) and about 40 pack mules were slaughtered for food on a priority basis. About 500-600 of the slaughtered carabao were sent to Corregidor for storage in the cold storage plant, and later returned to Batasan for issue to troops. Rice being the chief component of food, all other supplies which were inadequate were rationed to last for the period that rice could be made to last. About 20 March it was seen that supplies could be made to hold out until 12 April and reports to Headquarters, United States Forces in the Philippines, were made to this effect. In addition to the means mentioned above to increase rations on hand, efforts were being made for several days prior to surrender to salvage a large amount of flour reported sunk on a ship at MURKIN. The Regular Army units brought with them into Batasan extra quantities of foodstuff from Fort McKinley and Fort Ditsenburg. These were taken up and redistributed.

5. Class II Supplies -

a. Organization and individual equipment. Many units of the Philippine Army had reached Batasan with an inadequate supply of organization and individual equipment. These troops had not received proper training in property responsibility and the importance of supplies. Much of their property was abandoned during their withdrawal to Batasan. Many of these troops in combat positions had only the scanty clothing worn by them during withdrawal. A large percentage of them had neither raincoats, blankets, nor shelter halves for ordinary comfort. Small arms, including automatic weapons, were abandoned by them and new supplies were called for to make up deficiencies. Salvage detachments were organized and some clothing and equipment were made available for release by this means. No additional stocks in any appreciable amounts were available. For status of other items of organization equipment, see appropriate heading below. Regular Army units were very well equipped with Class II supplies.

4. Class III Supplies: - Gasoline and Lubricating Oils.

a. As stated above, supplies which were inadequate were issued on a control basis and in such a way as to last as long as substitute supplies could be made to last. Gasoline issues were accordingly reduced from daily issues of about 8000 gallons per day to about 3000 gallons per day during this period. This reduced fuel greatly restricted necessary operation of motor vehicles and heavy construction (road) machinery. Gasoline was not available for use in ambulances to evacuate sick personnel from combat areas during this period. To better this condition, use was made of surplus aviation high octane gasoline to mix with kerosene and low octane gasoline, for use in combat tanks and in motor vehicles.

b. Lubricating oils, both in quantity and appropriate grades, were inadequate. It was not practicable to change motor oil in vehicles after long use on account of this scarcity.

c. On date of surrender there remained about 11000 gallons of motor fuels and very little lubricating oil of useable grade.

5. Class IV Supplies: - Special Equipment.

a. Engineer Supplies: The Engineers were very well equipped and functioned well in road construction, trail construction, construction of airfields, docks, operation of a sawmill, etc. The most serious shortage in their service was equipment needed by combat troops for field fortifications. Barbed wire, sand bags and entrenching tools were inadequate. Shortage in heavy machinery and in motor fuels and oils greatly handicapped operations of the Engineers. Building materials for protection from rainy weather (shelter materials) were quite inadequate.

b. Ordnance Supplies: Loss of fire arms, including automatic weapons, was high. This caused a shortage of automatic weapons in some organizations. Adequate supply of mortars and 50-caliber machine guns had never been available.

6. Class V Supplies: - Ammunition.

At date of surrender, small arms and artillery ammunition for an additional thirty days was available at prior rate of consumption.

7. Transportation: a. The Motor Transport Service, as such, was organized

about 21 March 1942 at the time of designation and organization of the Lagoon Force. Prior to this time, Regular Army units, in general, were well equipped with transportation while Philippine Army units had only improved and inadequate means of transportation composed of commandeered commercial vehicles. After (about) 21 March a limited number of vehicles were assigned to all units which were entitled to them by basic allowances and the remaining vehicles were organized into a few regiment Motor Transport Service. Companies A and B, 12th Air Regiment (TR), formed the nucleus of the 1st Regiment, MTR. The 2d Regiment was formed from the Air Corps TR units as a nucleus. One TR company of Air Corps was used in the 4th Regiment. All other motor transport units were made up of commercial vehicles operated by civilian drivers. These civilian drivers gave satisfactory service. The Motor Transport Service, had a total of about 1300 vehicles of which about 200 were military vehicles and the remainder commercial.

b. Spare parts for motor vehicles were adequate for the number of vehicles which were able to operate on the reduced gasoline allowances.

c. Motor greases were about exhausted during this period.

d. Distilled water for use in motor batteries having been exhausted prior to 21 March, the Chemical Warfare Service came to our aid and supplied this water by aid of some of its chemicals.

e. In general, although motor transportation was rapidly deteriorating for lack of lubrication of proper kind, this service was ahead of the motor fuel supply in meeting transportation requirements.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: BA2883078

f. Many motor vehicles, including, commercial motor busses, were destroyed immediately prior to the surrender.

g. Destruction of supplies: - In compliance with orders, supplies, except subsistence and certain motor vehicles, were destroyed just prior to surrender.

ROY C. HILKIN,
 Colonel, GSC (Inf)
 Asst. Ch. of Staff, G-4.

EXHIBIT A.

SUBSISTENCE STATUS - BATAAN, P. I. - 1942

1942	Month	Day	Phil	Am	Pol	Ind	Mal	Ind	Mal	Ind	Mal	Total	Comments
Jan	1-5	12	0	0	25	12	0	0	0	0	0	37	100 lbs. Phil.
Jan	6	0	0	10	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	20	23.25:23.25
March	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Fresh Meat - Dried third day: 6 ounces.
March	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
March	23-31	11.44	0	0	10	11.22	11.22	0	0	0	0	33.88	13.5: 13.5
Apr	1-5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(Fresh meat every third day: 6 ounces)
Apr	5-8	2.88	0	17	20	2.44	2.44	12	11.9	0	0	38	(double last issue)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND 883079*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND883078*