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REPORT OF OPERATIONS  
OF  
SOUTH LUZON FORCE,  
BATAAN DEFENSE FORCE, &  
II PHILIPPINE CORPS  
IN THE  
DEFENSE OF SOUTH LUZON  
AND BATAAN

FROM

8 DECEMBER 1941 TO 9 APRIL 1942

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Annex V.

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REPORT OF

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE W PARKER JR

FORMERLY COMMANDING

THE SOUTH LUCAS FORCE, THE BATAAN SEVENTH FORCE

AND THE

II PHILIPPINE CORPS

FROM 8 DECEMBER 1941 TO 9 APRIL 1942



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INTRODUCTION

On 10 June 1942, the Japanese had assembled at Tarlac, Tarlac, Philippine Islands, all the American General Officers and Colonels who had been captured on Batavia or Corregidor. Among these were the Commanders and some of the Staff Officers of all the larger units of the South Luzon Force, the Batavia Defense Force, and the II Philippine Corps.

In conference with these officers, I prepared a narrative report, all copies of which were later confiscated by the Japanese. Some notes were preserved, however, which form the basis of this report. It is accurate in its main features.

It tells the story of a force attacked during mobilization. Initially lacking in organization and training, and woefully deficient in equipment and vital supplies throughout, it resisted the best troops of Japan until casualties, sickness, and lack of food and ammunition forced it to yield to a superior force.

Mobilization Status of the South Luzon Force, 8 December 1961.

Organization.

The organization of the South Luzon Force on 8 December 1961 consisted of the following units.

Headquarters South Luzon Force

41st Division

51st Division

Staff Luzon Force.

The Headquarters South Luzon Force on 8 December 1961 was organized as follows.

Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr.,	Commanding
Captain John Haiger	Aide
Major Thomas H. Darpley, Jr.	Adjutant General
Major Ovid G. Wilson	Asst C/S - G-1
Major Dennis E. Moore	Asst C/S - G-2
Captain Arthur G. Christensen	Asst to Asst C/S, G-2
Lt Col Howard D. Johnston	Asst C/S - G-3
Major Albert C. Wolfe	Asst to Asst C/S, G-3
Major John H. Bennett	Asst C/S - G-4
Major Hal C. Granberry, Inf.	Signal Officer
Captain William C. Chesworth	Engineer Officer
Lt Col Arthur L. Grove	Artillery Officer
Major W. Hinton Drummond	Surgeon
Lieutenant Nicholas M. McMillen	Air Liaison Officer
Lt Col E. L. Berry	Quartermaster and Ordnance

This staff had only recently been formed. Throughout the period 1 September, the date of initial mobilization of Philippine Army units, to the latter part of November, there were few officers available, and I had gone through the very active period of initial mobilization and training with a very meager staff, consisting of five officers and two enlisted men.

The above staff was augmented after December 6, as officers or enlisted personnel became available. A Headquarters and HQ Company was eventually formed consisting of a mixture of American MPs, retired Philippine Scout soldiers returned to active duty and Civilian Cooks and Houseboys. Trained technicians were almost totally lacking throughout. Frequent changes in personnel were made to meet existing emergencies.

The following officers served as Chiefs of Staff as shown.

Colonel Stewart C. McDonald December 6 - December 24

Colonel Louis R. Dougherty December 25 - January 25

Brigadier General Arnold J. Funk January 25 - March 2

Colonel Charles L. Steele from March 2 to April 9.

Mobilization of Units.

The units of the South Luzon Force had been mobilized and inducted as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Date</u>
41st Division Headquarters & Hq Co Signal Co, Ord Co (HQ)	Dagaytay	17 Nov 41
41st Infantry	Dagaytay	2 Nov 41
42d Infantry	Dagaytay	1 Sep 41
43d Infantry	Dagaytay	24 Nov 41
41st Field Artillery	Dagaytay	24 Nov 41
41st Engineer Battalion	Dagaytay	1 Oct 41
41st Medical Battalion	Dagaytay	17 Nov 41
41st QM Service Company	Dagaytay	17 Nov 41
41st Motor Transport Company	Dagaytay	17 Nov 41
41st Division Headquarters & Hq Co Signal Co, Ord (HQ)	Sancti Spiritus, Istanga	17 Nov 41
41st Infantry	Sancti Spiritus	2 Nov 41
52d Infantry	Sancti Spiritus	1 Sep 41
53d Infantry	Rosario	24 Nov 41
41st Field Artillery One battalion each at	Sancti Spiritus Sancti Spiritus Rosario	15 Dec 41

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Date</u>
1st Engineer Battalion	Santo Tomas	20 Oct 41
1st Medical Battalion	Santo Tomas	1 Dec 41
1st QM Service Company	Santo Tomas	17 Nov 41
1st Motor Transport Company	Santo Tomas	17 Nov 41

Personnel

Under the Table of Organization, Philippine Army, the Divisions were organized as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Officers and men</u>
Three (3) Infantry Regiments (approx 1400 each)	4200
One (1) Artillery Regiment	Approx 1000
One (1) Anti-Tank Battalion	" 600
One (1) Engineer Battalion	" 600
One (1) Medical Battalion	" 600
One (1) Quartermaster Battalion	" 600
Div Hq & Hq Co, Sig Co, Ord Co (Inf) Motor Truck Co	" 600
	Total 8200 X

Of this total approximately 500 were officers.

In each division of my force about 40 U. S. Army Officers and 20 U. S. Army or Philippine Scout Non-Commissioned Officers were assigned. In the 41st Division they were instructors, while in the 51st Division the officers were assigned to command to include battalions.

The 41st Division was practically at full strength in personnel at the outbreak of hostilities. The Anti-Tank Battalion, due to lack of equipment was never organized as such but the personnel was absorbed in other units. The personnel of the 41st Division was from Batangas Province or its environs and spoke the Tagalog dialect.

The 51st Division had about two-thirds strength in their Infantry Regiments. Due to lack of equipment the Anti-Tank Battalion was absorbed in other units and two battalions of the 51st Field Artillery were formed into a provisional Infantry Battalion.

The enlisted men of the 61st Division were from the Ilocos Peninsula and spoke the Ilocosian dialect while the majority of the officers spoke only Tagalog.

As time progressed civilian labor was used extensively whenever available as vehicle drivers and as laborers in construction of roads and defense installations and to augment the Service Units. The numbers varied from 1000 to 2000 in my force.

#### Training.

Prior to 1 September 1941, a thirteen-week schedule of basic training had been prepared for all Philippine Army units. This schedule called for 90 days, of eight hours daily, each week. It stressed physical development, training with basic weapons, scouting and patrolling and small unit operations. After this thirteen weeks of basic training had been completed, further schedule of battalion and regimental training had been prepared.

On 8 December one regiment in each division, namely the 42d and 52d Infantry had completed their thirteen weeks basic training. The 61st and 62d Infantry had completed five weeks of the training period and the 41st and 51st Infantry had received no training at all. The 61st Field Artillery, mobilized on 24 November, had just begun their training while the 61st Field Artillery was not mobilized until after the declaration of war and due to the shortage of equipment, only two batteries of this unit were ever to function as artillery. The remainder of this unit was organized and trained after the war began as a provisional Infantry Battalion.

Cadre Camps had been established on 1 September for officers and key non-commissioned officers in units not yet mobilized as follows.

61st Division - Candelaria - Major E. T. Lewis

61st Division - Davao - Major J. H. Bennett

Engineers of all Units - Camp Murphy - Captain William Gay

Signal of all Units - Ft William McKinley - Col. Murphy

Medical of all Units - Ft William McKinley - Col. Donkeworth



By this method, limited training was given key personnel, but training of technicians was very inadequate.

In all of the training, many obstacles were encountered. In the 51st Division, for instance, the enlisted men spoke the Ilocosian dialect, the Filipino officers spoke only Tagalog in many instances, and the American instructors spoke neither, while the Filipino spoke little English.

At some period during the preceding five years, the units of the Philippine Army presumably had received five and one-half months of training. This was never apparent. The training had been done under their own Filipino officers, had consisted largely of close order drill, and was to prove of little value.

Training facilities and equipment were almost non-existent, target ranges were hurriedly improvised but many units went into battle without ever having fired their basic arm.

#### Equipment.

Infantry. The basic infantry weapons were the Enfield Rifle, the Browning Automatic Rifle, the Browning Water-cooled Machine Gun, and the three-inch Stokes Mortar (obsolescent type).

There were no spare parts available and many of the weapons were found to be incomplete upon unpacking at the warehouse, where they had been long stored.

The well-known structural weakness of the Enfield Rifle (weak extractor) put many rifles out of action early in the war as there were no replacement. Lack of spare parts for machine guns made many of these ineffective. Fully 70% of the mortar ammunition proved to be duds.

Field Artillery. The basic weapons for the Field Artillery were the British 75-mm's with wooden wheels and some 2.95 pack (mountain guns). No transportation was available other than improvised commandeered vehicles. The Field Artillery was also lacking many vital fire control instruments.

All of the above shortages were requisitioned from the United States

immediately upon their discovery in September, but were never to arrive.

Individual Equipment. The Filipino soldier was equipped with a light paper tropical helmet, fatigues clothes, and rubber-soled, canvas shoes. Full field equipment was lacking in many essentials, such as blankets, shelter-halves, etc. There were no replacements for these items, so many soldiers were shortly barefooted and ragged.

Signal Equipment. The only signal equipment available was that necessary to provide communication within a Command Post. A few radio sets with limited ranges were issued, but lack of trained operators made this means very unreliable.

At the beginning of mobilization during the months of September, October and November, units of my force were scattered in small encampments over the province of Batangas, and the entire lower Rizal Peninsula, with one unit on the Island of Masbate. Control and supervision were exceedingly difficult.

Transportation. A few government sedans were eventually issued to my force, sufficient for the General Officers. Otherwise, commandeered cars, trucks, and busses were the only transportation facilities available. Lack of trained personnel forced the use of civilian drivers and mechanics in most instances. These were most unreliable, often deserting their vehicles at any sign of danger and, as many of the vehicles were in a poor state mechanically, transportation problems greatly hampered movement and operations.

Supply. Initially two systems of supply were in effect, one for the American soldier and the other for the Filipino. After the outbreak of the war, any supplies available were issued without regard to the system. Many supplies were procured locally and the amount was largely dependent on the initiative and energy of the individual supply officer.

Immediately after the outbreak of war, supply depots for my force were established by USAFFE at Los Baños, Laguna de Bay, and Tanawan, Batangas. However units were supplied from any installations available.

Operations of South Luzon Force.

(See Appendices No's E and F)

Initial Mission. The initial mission assigned the South Luzon Force was to prevent a landing. In the event a landing was made, it was to counter-attack and destroy the landing force.

The Defensive Area. The area assigned the South Luzon Force for defense included all of Southern Luzon, south of the Northern boundary Rosario-Manila-Pillilla-Infanta (inclusive) to the line Padre Burgos-Atimanan (inclusive). This latter line (south boundary) cut the bottle-neck into the Bicol Peninsula at its narrowest point. Higher authority had made the decision not to defend the Bicol Peninsula due to the extent of the peninsula and the inadequacy of the troops available.

General Description of Area. The area assigned the South Luzon Force included 200 miles of possible landing beaches. It was ninety miles wide at its widest point and sixty miles in depth.

The area was generally characterized by a good network of all weather roads, crossing over numerous rivers and streams. Many bridges in this area were of permanent stone construction making their destruction by the material available exceedingly difficult.

One railroad ran from Manila South. At Calamba a spur ran to Lee Bano. At Malvar it forked, the right (west) fork going to Batangas and the left (east) fork leading into the Bicol Peninsula, where it ended at Davao.

Several distinct terrain features in this area created many bottle-necks. Its area included five bays all to be considered possible landing places.

Detailed Study of Bays: Negosbo, Malayan, and Batangas Bays were considered the most probable landing places, due to their proximity to Manila and the road net leading thereto.

An all-weather road followed the beach on Masagua Bay from Masagua Point to Calatagan, on Malayan Bay to S. Luis, and on Batangas Bay from

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Mahini to Detangas. From this beach highway that practically traversed the beach line of these three bays, several all-weather highways led into improved routes leading to Manila. This area included the terrain features of the Pico-de-Loro Mountain Mass, Mt. Intalan, Dagyatay Ridge, Lake Nail, and the western edge of Laguna de Bay. These formidable obstacles created many bottlenecks which would canalize forces operating in this area to the road net.

Duyobas Bay. Several all-weather roads led from the beach to Highways No. 1 and 28 leading into Manila. This area included the mountain mass, Mt. Bumbao. Many streams, the rugged terrain, and the Laguna de Bay would confine forces operating in this area to the roads and terrain adjacent thereto.

Lanun Bay. Only three roads led from points along this fifty-miles of beach, one from Atienza, one from Mahan, and one from Tigman. All of these traversed very rugged terrain, through many defiles and with experienced troops would have been easily defended.

The Navy had stated that a landing on this beach was improbable at this time of the year due to monsoons rendering the waters unsuitable for landing operations.

Initial Assignment of Troops to Sectors:

Sectors were assigned as follows: Boundary between Sectors  
Lanun-Binan (both to 31st Division).

Right (West) Sector - 31st Division

Northern Boundary - Rosario (inclusive) - Binan (exclusive)

Left (East) Sector - 31st Division

Northern Boundary - Binan-Pitilla-Infanta (all inclusive)

Southern Boundary - Padre Burgos-Infantina (both inclusive)

Operations South Luzon Force Prior to 24 December 1941.

On 26 November 1941, I received instructions from the Commanding General USAFFE that diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating rapidly and to alert all troops and be prepared to meet a surprise attack. X

I immediately dispatched staff officers to General Lita, (Philippine Army), Colonel Jones, and Lieutenant Colonel Hunter, (then commanding the 51st Infantry at Maraga) with the following orders:

- (1) Establish beach patrol twenty-four hours daily, immediately.
- (2) Prepare plans to move your troops without delay and defend beaches within your sector in case of a surprise landing.

Prior to 8 December 1941, additional warnings were received from USAFFE of possible Japanese surprise landings. My Division Commanders were ordered to occupy the most vulnerable areas within their division sectors, to start preparation of beach defense positions, erect obstacles at both high and low water levels, and to start outbreaching. Within the containment areas, construction of near-by trenches were ordered to protect personnel in case of surprise air attack. Plans were made to move the 456 Infantry and 526 Infantry by civilian transportation to critical points.

A Provisional Battalion, 60th Field Artillery (100-mm guns), Major Winfield Scott, Commanding, operating under USAFFE control, occupied their camp position and were engaged in reconnaissance and preparation of battle positions for the defense of Maraga, Malapan, and Betangas Bays, the most probable points of attack within South Luzon Force Sector.

About 8:00 AM, 8 December 1941, I was notified by telephone at my quarters at Fort McKinley that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. Staff officers were dispatched to my Division Commanders with orders to alert their divisions and to effect their war plans.

About 9 December, a flight of reconnaissance planes, Philippine Air Corps was attached to the South Luzon Force. Two planes were dispatched <sup>per</sup> twice each day to detect any invasion force. The planes/dispatched late

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each afternoon and at daylight each morning. One covered a possible invasion force against the Infante-Arimona Coast Line, and the other possible invasions against the Maragu, Palayan, Mutanga, Taybas Bay Areas.

On 12 December 1941, a telegram from the railroad Station Master at Legaspi reported Japanese transports with naval escort off Legaspi Atoll. This force, later estimated as a reinforced Brigade, landed unopposed and immediately started moving to the northwest. Information on the progress of this movement was reported by telegraph by the railroad civilian employees. After the troops had been unloaded, the Japanese immediately started loading all available rice and oil supplies. Orders were issued to remove all available railroad equipment and for all Americans to withdraw to Manila.

Colonel Jones was ordered to dispatch Engineer Detachments to Rizal Peninsula to prepare railroad bridges and highway bridges for demolition. Colonel Casey, USAFFE Engineer Officer, was requested to have railroad civilian employees destroy railroad bridges near Sipsit in order to delay enemy advance to the north.

Further construction in cantonment areas was ordered discontinued, and Engineer troops were ordered to start intensive combat training, with particular emphasis on training of demolition teams and construction of road blocks.

On 14 December, I moved my Command Post from Fort William McKinley to Hinas. At this time I ordered my Engineer Officer (Major Chenoweth) to rush to completion the construction of the road between Tagaytay City and Talisey in order to expedite the movement of reserve units from one division sector to the other.

Commercial telephone and telegraph facilities within my sector were meager, especially within the 41st Division Area. For instance to contact the 41st Division Command Post, it was necessary to call through commercial lines in Manila or to use special or scheduled messenger service. Adequate

signal personnel and equipment were not available. A Major of Infantry was appointed as Signal Officer. My personal request for a qualified Signal Officer was refused by USAPVE. Maintaining control of troops deployed over an area of approximately 2000 square miles and with a coast line of approximately 250 miles, placed a great burden on our meager signal personnel.

By 17 December, contact was made at the railroad bridge near Haguy. A demolition detachment of the 51st Engineer Battalion was fired on by a Japanese detachment, while preparing a railroad bridge near Haguy Camarines for destruction. On learning of this contact, I ordered Colonel Jones to send not to exceed one battalion, reinforced by Engineer Demolition Detachments, into Bicol Peninsula to contact and delay the enemy advance. Both the highway and railroad were ordered to be covered.

About 18 December, Company "C", 10th Tank Battalion was ordered into the South Luzon Force Sector. I recommended that this unit be used on the beaches. This unit was under the control of USAPVE and Colonel Weaver, the Tank Force Commander, recommended that the tanks be held in mobile reserve in the vicinity of Sampaloo, Cavite. This recommendation was approved by USAPVE. On 18 December, I was promoted to Major General A.J.S. Colonel A. M. Jones was promoted to Brigadier General A.J.S.

On 19 December, a Japanese Force, estimated as an Infantry Battalion was reported to be in Sigloc, and Japanese patrols were moving via highway towards East and north on the railroad towards Haguy.

On 20 December, a provisional Battalion (Self-propelled Howitzers), four batteries, Lieutenant Colonel David S. Babcock, Commanding, was attached to the South Luzon Force and ordered to Corps Reserve in the vicinity of Santa Tomas. The status of the Artillery in my Corps was now as follows:

1st Division Sector:

- 1st Field Artillery (organic) consisting of:
  - 2 Battalions 75mm guns - 16 guns
  - 1 Battalion 8.95 MT guns - 8 guns
- 80th Field Artillery (76) consisting of:
  - 1 Battalion (less one battery) 160mm - 4 guns

31st Division Sector:

✓ 31st Field Artillery (organic) consisting of:

1 Battalion 75mm guns - 8 guns

80th Field Artillery consisting of:

1 Battery 160mm guns - 2 guns

Corps Reserve in the vicinity of Santa Tomas:

1 Battalion of Self-Propelled 75mm guns - 16 guns.

The Field Artillery was disposed in sectors as follows:

31st Division Sector:

31st Field Artillery:

1 Battalion at Loosbin (Masabo Bay)

1 Battalion at Dama (Malayan Bay)

1 Battalion at Dasaan (Malayan Bay)

80th Field Artillery (160mm guns):

1 Battery (2 guns) Masabo (Masabo Bay)

1 Battery (2 guns) Dasaan (Malayan Bay)

31st Division Sector:

✓ 31st Field Artillery (1 Battalion equipped as Field Artillery)

All on Dyabas Bay

80th Field Artillery:

1 Battery at Dasaan (Malayan Bay)

The artillery was disposed to cover most vital landing places with the exception of Lamon Bay. The lack of artillery in this area, particularly at Atimonan caused me considerable worry.

On December 20 my artillery officer made a reconnaissance at Atimonan and surveyed positions there. I sent him to Manila on December 22, to request two 160mm howitzers of the newly formed 301st Field Artillery from USMARPAC for that sector. This request was refused. This area was so important to me however, that I sent him again on the 25th of December reiterating my request with the strongest arguments possible. The request was again denied.



In the meantime USAFFE had issued an order confining the action of the Self-Propelled-Mount Battalion to the defense of road blocks. After a conference with General King, USAFFE Artillery Officer, this order was amended to allow this unit freedom of action under my orders.

On 22 December, the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, (Regular) Division arrived at Paganjan Laguna and was attached to the South Luzon Force. The general line Mueha-Inaban (with inclusive) was established as the southern boundary of the sector assigned to the 1st Infantry Regiment (Philippine Army, Regular Division). This unit was ordered to relieve the troops of the 2d Battalion, 82d Infantry, at Infanta, Tigman, and Mueha. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, Philippine Army, relieved the troops at Mueha, Tagalas. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, Philippine Army, relieved the troops at Infanta and Tigman Tagalas. The 1st Infantry, Philippine Army, (less 2d and 3d Battalions) was held in reserve near Paganjan. The 3d Battalion, 82d Infantry, when relieved, was moved to Malibay. The relief was completed about 0200 PM 23 December.

About 5:00 PM 22 December, contact was made on the highway near Hinabog and the Japanese troops were forced to withdraw about ten kilometers. Supply of our troops in the Misol Peninsula was becoming serious due to the stretch of highway that had not been completed north of Sumlong and the deep mud encountered.

The reconnaissance plane dispatched on the evening of 22 December on its usual reconnaissance east of Infanta and Atimman failed to return. This was the last plane available to us. The other two had already been destroyed.

On 23 December, the Pyrotechnical Battalion (Self-Propelled Mounts) and the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army (Regular) Division were ordered by USAFFE to move to San Fernando, Tarlac, and revert to the control of the Commanding General, North Luzon Force.

General Jones was ordered to return the 2d Battalion, 82d Infantry to its original sector and the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, was ordered to assemble at Paganjan, preparatory to its movement to San

**Fernando.**

This relief started after dark 23 December. The Provisional Battalion (Self-Propelled Mounts) started its movement after dark the night 23-24 December. All troops in the Nicol Peninsula were ordered to withdraw north of the line Padre Burgos-Atinman, and this move was in progress during the night 23-24 December.

At 2:00 AM 24 December, the G-2, 51st Division reported that the Japanese had effected a landing at Atinman. After daylight it was reported that forty Japanese transports with naval escort were at Atinman and that twelve transports with naval escort were in Lamm Bay, off Iloilo. Landings were reported at Iloilo and at Sian.

In view of the changed situation, USAFFE was requested to return the Provisional Battalion (Self-Propelled Mounts) and to revoke the movement order of the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army. The Battalion (less 1 Battery) Self-Propelled Mounts was returned and was ordered back to Marikina and attached to the 51st Division. USAFFE approved my request that the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, remain attached to the South Luzon Force. The 2d Battalion, 486 Infantry was again released to General Jones who ordered it back to Marikina.

The enemy established a beach-head at Sian about midnight 23-24 December, and then made their main landing at Atinman. They effected their landing at Iloilo about 4:00 AM, 24 December. As stated above, the last of the three reconnaissance planes available to us failed to return from the afternoon reconnaissance on 23 December. Request for reconnaissance missions by USAFFE on 23 December were disapproved due to the few planes available and due to more important missions to be performed elsewhere. The Philippine aviators had flown under the most hazardous conditions since 8 December, and deserve the highest commendations for their excellent service.

The enemy force that landed at Atinman was estimated to be a reinforced Division. The force which landed at Iloilo was estimated to be a Brigade.

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The enemy, after landing at Sian, moved north on Atimona and along the railroad towards Paire Burges. The troops under Colonel Cordere were cut off. Several officers, including Colonel Cordere, and a few men succeeded in rejoining their regiment, having moved by boat or canoe from Fitele on Takapas Bay. Colonel Cordere with a small party destroyed the railroad cut at Paire Burges. The destruction of bridges on the railroad proved to be most effective. It took the Japanese over a year to make necessary repairs before a train could run between Maile and Logangi.

At 10:00 AM 24 December, I received orders from USAFFE to move the 41st Division, by motor, at once to Abouay, Bataan, to turn command of the South Luzon Force over to Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, and to move to Bataan with my headquarters, establish the Bataan Defense Force, and organize the defense on the Abouay-Michael line in accordance with the provisions of HHO #6.

A staff officer was dispatched to the Commanding General of the 41st Division to advise General Lin of the move. The necessary transportation was provided by my G-4, who, assisted General Lin in the movement.

I turned over the following staff officers to General Jones for staff duty at the new South Luzon Force Headquarters:

Colonel S. C. MacDonald, Infantry, G/S  
Lt. Col. Arthur L. Shreve, Field Artillery, G-3  
Captain Arthur G. Christensen, G-2  
Captain Frederick L. Berry, Field Artillery, Artillery Officer

At noon 24 December, I turned command of the South Luzon Force over to Brigadier General Jones, and left for Abouay, Bataan, arriving there at 8:00 PM, same date. On arrival I assumed command of the Bataan Defense Force, relieving Brigadier General Maxm S. Lough.

Operations of South Luzon Force 24 December 1941 to 1 January 1942.

(See Appendix No. 2)

Operations of Luzon Defense Force (24 December 1941 to 6 January 1942)

(See Appendix No. 4)

Mission of the Luzon Defense Force

The mission of the Luzon Defense Force was to organize and defend the Luzon Peninsula, as far south as the Service Command area.

Area Assigned for Defense

Northern Boundary: Main Battle Position-The general line Abucay-Mt. Matib-Muban.

Southern Boundary: The Alangan River-Mount Mariveles-Pagayaman River (all inclusive).

Eastern Boundary: Approximately 10 miles of shore line of Manila Bay between Abucay and Quinsay Point (both inclusive).

Western Boundary: Approximately 10 miles of shore line along the China Sea between Muban and the Pagayaman River (both inclusive).

The distance from Abucay to Muban along the Main Battle Position was approximately 10 miles. The terrain of the Luzon Defense Sector was very rugged except for a narrow strip varying from one to three miles wide along Manila Bay between Abucay and Crim. Mt. Matib, with an elevation of 4222 feet dominated that portion of the sector north of the Pilar-Dagac Road. It was heavily wooded and cut by many deep ravines.

Mount Mount and Mount Mariveles (elevation 4700 feet) were the outstanding terrain features south of the Pilar-Dagac Road. The three mountains formed a mountain range running generally down the middle of the sector. All the terrain south of the Pilar-Dagac Road was heavily wooded or covered by thick jungle growth, except the small area between Pilar and Pandan.

The main streams emptied into the South China Sea or Manila Bay. The main streams which drained the Eastern slope of Mount Matib were the Calaguiman River, the Salantay River, and the Abe Aio River which emptied into the Salanga River. The ground west of Mt. Matib sloped abruptly to the west coast. The streams emptied directly into the China Sea. The

Maldia, Baga, and Limutan Rivers drained the Southern slope of Mount Saant.

A good all-weather two way road (East Road) ran along the east coast from Abony to Mariveles, and another from Pilar to Baga through the broad gap in the mountain range between Mount Matib and Mount Saant. There was a good dry weather road (West Road) between Mariveles and Horn. An improved one way road ran from Abony to Abony Hacienda. No other communications existed except narrow trails. Horn was connected with Olango by a trail along the coast.

Because of the limited road net, it was evident that, unless additional landings were made, the main force of the Japanese attack would fall against the eastern half of the Main Battle Position. Heavy landings were possible at any place within the sector from both the China Sea and Manila Bay. Because of the road crossing the peninsula from Baga, this point was considered especially vulnerable to enemy landings. The all-weather two way road from Olango to Iayo Junction was another possible route of approach for enemy movements.

#### Organization of the Luzon Defense Force Area

The Luzon Defense Force Area was organized into:

- (1) The Main Battle Positions: The general line Abony-Mt Matib-Hughes.
- (2) The Reserve Battle Positions: The general line Orion-Mt Saant-Baga.
- (3) The Beach Defenses.

The Area was divided into the East Sector and the West Sector. The boundary between sectors was Mt Matib-Maldia River-Jantigan River (all to West Sector). Brigadier General Maxm S. Lough was assigned to command the East Sector, and Brigadier General Clifford Blumel was assigned to command the West Sector, pending the arrival of Major General J. M. Hainwright. In general those troops composing the North Luzon Force were assigned the West Sector. Since the main effort of a Japanese attack was expected to be made against the East Sector the mass of troops were assigned

to this sector as the troops arrived in Liaison.

ORDER OF ARRIVAL AND TROOP ASSIGNMENT

Upon my arrival in Liaison the only troops then in my area were the Philippine Division (PD) (less the 67th Combat Team and one Battalion, 68th Infantry (PI)), Brigadier General Lough Commanding and the Provisional Air Corps Regiment (organized as an Infantry Regiment) Colonel Harrison H.C. Richards Jr., Commanding.

The order of arrival of units was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Movement Started</u>	<u>Movement completed</u>
51st Division (DA)	2:00 PM 24 December	night 26-27 December
41st Division (DA)	2:00 AM 25 December	28 December
67th Combat Team (PI)	30 December	30-31 December night
1st Regular Division (DA)	27 December	31 December
51st Division (DA)	night 31 December	1 January
1st Bde (PI) (later 2d Bde)		
1st (DA)	1 January	6 January
11th Division (DA)	night 5-6 January	6 January
51st Division (DA)	night 5-6 January	6 January
71st Division (DA)	10:00 PM 2 January (to covering force position)	7 January
20th Cavalry (PI)	night 5-6 January (to covering force position)	8 January

The 80th Field Artillery, 301st Field Artillery, Self-Propelled Mounts, and tanks arrived intermittently during the period 26 December - 6 January. Assignment of troops to sectors was as follows:

To East Sector: 41st Division (DA), 67th Combat Team (PI), 51st Division (DA), 11th Division (DA), 51st Division (DA), 80th Field Artillery, 301st Field Artillery.

To West Sector: 51st Division (DA), 67th Combat Team (less one battalion), 1st Division (DA) Regular, 51st Division (DA), 71st Division (DA), 20th Cavalry (PI).

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#### Organization of Main Battle Position

The Main Battle Position was occupied from left to right by: 57th Combat Team, 41st Division (RA), 41st Division (RA) (less 2nd Infantry), Provisional (Infantry) Battalion, 31st Field Artillery, 1st Regular Division (RA).

Work on the Main Battle Position astride the East Road near Abney was started on 24 December by the 41st Infantry (RA) (less one battalion). On 25 January this unit moved to Celles to help prepare the Covering Force position. Work was continued on the 30th December by the 47th Infantry (RA). This unit occupied and completed the organization of a sector approximately 2000 yards wide extending west from Manila Bay. (That portion of the Main Battle Position astride Mt. Matib between the left of the 41st Infantry (RA) and Mt. Hilangman approximately 2000 meters was not organized for defense but was covered by patrols. The terrain in this area was extremely difficult, traversed by deep gorges and covered with dense jungle. It took two days to travel from the occupied portion of the west sector front to the left flank of the 41st Division. Contact between sectors was never satisfactorily established.)

The MRL on the right ran through the barrio Kabatang to a point approximately 2000 yards west of Abney Islands, and on the left from the beach just north of Mahan to Mt. Hilangman. The OPL on the east ran along the Kalaguiman River and on the west along the Maglalayong River. The MRL on the right was about 400 yards north of Abney and on the left flank it ran through Mahan Point. That portion of the Main Battle Position that was occupied was protected by a double apron barbed wire obstacles. A mine field was laid in the left of the 47th Infantry sector. Bridges on the East Road in front of the MRL were destroyed. Fields of fire were cleared and work on trenches, gun emplacements, command posts, etc. was speeded up to the maximum of physical endurance.

Despite the fact that the men were not equipped with individual entrenching tools and that each division had only about fifty picks and shovels and very few axes in the Engineer Battalions, they made a very formidable defensive line by using their bayonets and even most men made as entrenching tools. Too much praise cannot be given them for their tremendous effort in organizing the Main Battle Position.

On arrival in Iloilo the 41st Division (DA) was initially assigned that portion of the MGR extending from the left of the 51st Infantry (DA) to Mt. Natib. All three regiments of the 41st Division were employed on the position in order (from right to left): 41st Infantry, 42d Infantry, 43d Infantry.

On 5 January the 51st Division (less 52d Infantry on beach defense) relieved elements of the 41st Division (DA) on the Main Battle Position west of Abucay Hacienda. The 41st Division troops which were relieved by the 51st Division was used to strengthen the new 41st Division Sector, which now extended only as far west as Abucay Hacienda. The 51st Division employed both the 51st Infantry and 52d Infantry Regiments on the Main Battle Position. The 51st Infantry occupied a sector of 2100 yards extending west from the Abucay Hacienda. The 52d Infantry occupied a sector defending a front of over 2000 yards on the left of the 51st Infantry.

On the arrival of the 51st Division in Iloilo the 52d Infantry (DA) and a provisional battalion of the 51st Field Artillery, armed with rifles, two (2) Cal. .50 machine guns and four (4) caliber .30 machine guns were assigned to organize the Mt. Silangan-Naban portion of the line. On arrival of the 1st Regular Division (DA), the 52d Infantry (DA) was relieved, and the 1st Regular Division (DA) occupied the left of the Main Battle Position and completed the organization thereof.

Supporting Artillery Iloilo Defense Force.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Mission</u>
11th F.A. (DA)	10-75mm guns	East Sector Beach Defense
51st F.A. (DA)	24-75mm guns	East Sector Beach Defense
51st F.A. (DA)	8-75mm guns	West Sector-Main Battle Position and Beach Def.
41st F.A. (DA)	16-75mm guns 8-2.92 in guns	East Sector, Direct Support 51st Division
51st F.A. (DA)	8-75mm guns	East Sector, Direct Support 51st Division



<u>Unit</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Mission</u>
71st F.A. (RA)	3-75mm guns 4-2.00's M2 Guns	Covering Force, later West Sector
91st F.A. (RA)	3-75mm guns	West Sector
1st Bn, 204th FA (PW)	3-75mm guns 4-2.00 M2 Guns	East Sector, Street Sup- port 45th Infantry
2d Bn, 204th FA (PW)	3-75mm guns 4-2.00 M2 Guns	West Sector, Direct Sup- port 45th Infantry
1st Bn, 286 FA	12-75mm guns	Covering Force
2d Bn, 286 FA	3-2.00 M2 Guns	West Sector, Main Battle Position
80th FA Bn (PW)	12-160mm guns GPF	East Sector General Support
301st F.A. (RA)	12-160mm guns GPF	East Sector General Support
75th Bn 92d CAC	3-120mm guns GPF	West Sector Beach Defense

The two Provisional Battalions Self-Propelled Artillery, 27-75mm guns (less one battery) were employed in the East Sector as anti-tank and general support artillery. One battery was assigned the West Sector with a similar mission. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Provisional Artillery Brigade (PW) operated a "Fire Control Center" within the East Sector.

In addition to the above, emplacements for 31 naval guns ranging from one pounders to 3 inch, were started for beach defense. This work was under USMARPAC control.

The Reserve Battle Position

The Reserve Battle Position at this time was scarcely more than a line on the map. The Provisional Air Corps Regiment, Colonel Harrison H.C. Richards, A.C. Commanding, started organization of that portion of the Reserve Battle Position astride the East Road just north of Puking early in January.

The 45th Infantry (PW) was directed to lay out and organize the Reserve Battle Position within the West Sector, but the difficulties of the terrain were such that only a small portion of the position was completed

before the 45th Infantry was employed elsewhere.

The Beach Defense

In the East Sector the 27th Infantry (IN) was assigned that portion of the beach from Albany to Puerto Rizos. The 22d Infantry (IN) Colonel Cordery Commanding, was assigned the sector from Puerto-Rizos to Limay (both inclusive). The 2d Regular Philippine Division occupied the sector on the right of the 22d Infantry (IN). On 11 January the 11th Division, Brigadier General William E. Brougher, Commanding, relieved the 22d Infantry and the 2d Infantry (IN) rejoined the 21st Division (IN) on the Main Battle Position.

The 11th Infantry (IN) was assigned and occupied the sector along the beach between Puerto Rizos and Orion (exclusive). The 12th Infantry (IN) covered that portion of the beach between Orion and Limay, (both inclusive). The 13th Infantry (IN) was held in reserve near Balanga.

The artillery of the 21st Division (IN) was attached to the 11th Division (IN) in order to strengthen the beach defense. The 11th Division (IN) remained on beach defense until 23 January, at which time it was assigned to I Corps.

In the West Sector the 21st Division (IN) was assigned the mission of defending the beach from the EEL to Sayocan Point (inclusive). One battalion of the 45th Infantry (IN) covered Sagoc Bay. The Regiment (less two battalions) was in reserve near the junction of the Pilar-Sagoc Road and the road leading to Moron. (The 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (IN) was covering the beach at Mirivale).

Bataan Defense Force Reserve

Shortly after midnight 5-6 January the 21st Division having withdrawn into Bataan was assigned a bivouac area in the vicinity of Dutil. It was assigned as Bataan Defense Force reserve.

Reorganization of Units on Arrival in Bataan

The Philippine Army Divisions with the exception of the 21st Division

(2A) and the 41st Division (2A) were badly disorganized and depleted because of constant enemy pressure and the normal difficulties encountered in a withdrawal by untrained troops and inadequate transportation. The 51st Division and 41st Division had not been in combat. It was necessary to place the disorganized divisions in bivouac areas for rest and reorganization before they could be used on the preparation of their assigned defensive sectors. On arrival in Bataan, the 51st Division was initially assigned a bivouac area along the trail leading west from Lissy. The 11th Division was assigned a bivouac area in the vicinity of Ouliel. The 51st Division was assigned a bivouac area about two miles east of Legas, south of the Pilar-Legas Road. Several days were spent in reorganization and reconnaissance by the key personnel of these divisions.

The Covering Force Action at Laysan Junction

On 2 January 1942, USAFFE ordered the Commanding General North Luzon Force to organize a covering force at Laysan Junction and upon completion of the organization to turn the command of the covering force over to me. The troops allotted for this mission were the 71st Division (2A), the 51st Infantry (2A), the 20th Cavalry (2A), the 1st Battalion, 208th Field Artillery (2A), and the 1st Battalion, 206th Field Artillery (2A). Brigadier General W. A. Sillcock was placed in direct command of this force.

The 71st Infantry (2A) occupied the south bank of the Galite River from Almon to a point just north-west of Galite. The 71st Infantry (2A) was in the position previously prepared by the 51st Infantry (2A). This prepared position was astride the West Road just north of Galite and about 1000 yards south of the Laysan Junction bridge. It extended about 600 yards west of the West Road. The 1st and 2d Battalions extended the line to the south-west. The disposition set forth above left a wide gap between the left of the 51st Infantry (2A) and the nearest hill mass about 2000 yards away. The 20th Cavalry (2A) was assigned to cover this gap and protect the left (west) flank of the covering force. The 1st Battalion, 206th Field

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Artillery and 1st Battalion, 60th Field Artillery from positions west of the Best Road supported the 31st Infantry (US). The remnants of the 71st Field Artillery (2A) supported the 71st Division (2A).

The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry was held in reserve about 1000 yards southwest of Oulis.

The 71st Division (2A) was badly disorganized and consisted of the remnants of the 71st Infantry and 72d Infantry. The 31st Infantry (US) had not been in combat. The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) had not completely recovered from the bombing it had received on Corregidor a week previously. The 2d Cavalry (2A) was organized into a horse squadron, a motorized squadron, and one Headquarters Squadron.

The position in general lent itself to a good defense. It was on high ground and had good fields of fire. Some work had been done on the position on 28 and 29 December. On 30 December the 31st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) was moved to the zig-zag on the Dimpuphan-Olangape Road. It returned by 4:30 PM 4 January and spent the remainder of the 4th and all the 5th January on preparation of the position. The 71st Division (2A) worked on the position from 2 to 5 January (inclusive). The 20th Cavalry (2A) arrived on the position during the night 5-6 January.

On 2 January Colonel Sherry sent one of his Engineer Officers to report to General Galloek to assist in the organization of the position. An inspection on 3 January by Colonel Sherry disclosed that little work had been completed. Some wire had been constructed, trenches dug, and gun emplacements constructed. The line occupied was over extended. Early on the morning of 5 January the highway and railroad bridges over the Oulis River were destroyed by the North Luzon Force engineers. The Commanding General, North Luzon Force turned the command of the covering force over to me about 6:00 AM, 5 January on orders of the Commanding General, USAFFE.

By 10:30 AM, 5 January, the Japanese had moved their artillery into

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position in the vicinity of Sabo and started shelling our position. All during the morning additional hostile artillery including 105mm howitzers came up, went into action and pounded our front line infantry positions, as well as severely punishing our artillery. Early in the action the 71st Field Artillery (FA) was hit. Several guns were destroyed and the Field Artillery suffered numerous casualties. This unit promptly dispersed and ceased to exist as a fighting unit, leaving the brunt of the fighting to be borne by the two Field Artillery (FA) battalions.

These two asset units put up a good fight in the face of tremendous odds. Not only were they outgunned by heavier caliber guns, but they were outnumbered five to one. To add to their troubles, Japanese observation planes were flying unobserved continually over their positions and they were forced to change positions often. We had no 150mm guns within supporting distance of the covering force. By 2:00 PM three out of four guns in one battery of the 224 Field Artillery (FA) had been knocked out. The one remaining gun carried on the fight alone. The other battery was also in difficulty. The ammunition train was hit and blown up. Prime movers were disabled, and the battery suffered severe casualties. The 224 Field Artillery (FA) lost all its guns except one during this engagement. It ceased to exist as a fighting unit on 6 January. The 88th Field Artillery (FA) which was in more covered terrain was badly hammered, but did not suffer as great a loss.

About 2:00 PM, Japanese infantry units were observed crossing the Culo River. Additional units were approaching from the north. At 4:30 PM a heavy infantry attack was launched against our position with the main blow falling near the junction of the 31st Infantry (RI) and the 73d Infantry (RI). The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry was forced back causing a gap. Two companies of the 31st Infantry (RI) left the field of battle without orders. These companies were brought back in meters and the Company Commanders relieved. The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry (RI) counterattacked and restored the line.

The 71st Infantry (TA) was overextended along the Gulla River and a breakthrough there had only a short distance to go in order to cut the East Road and imperil the remainder of the force. No reserves remained.

Japanese troops continued to move south into assembly positions north of the Gulla River. It was evident that the enemy was planning another attack against the position. At 8:00 PM, General Selleck informed me that unless he was reinforced by infantry and artillery he could not hold the position. My artillery officer informed me that we could not send more artillery to support a counter-attack at dawn as we could not occupy a position after dark and fire without daylight reconnaissance. At 10:00 PM, 6 January I ordered General Selleck to withdraw the covering force during the night 6-7 January.

Through a failure to decode the message ordering the withdrawal, the 25th Cavalry (TC) was not aware of the withdrawal of the remainder of the covering force. On 7 January this unit was forced to withdraw across country. It joined the I Corps on 9 January after a most difficult march. After the withdrawal the 71st Division was attached to the I Corps and the 51st Infantry (US) withdrew to bivouac area on the Orion-Out-Off, two kilometers west of Orion.

On withdrawal, contact was lost with the enemy.

The First Battle of Ibatan (Abney - Mt. Matib Position)

(See Appendix No. 2)

Change in Designation of Headquarters

On 7 January in accordance with orders from Commanding General SHAFFR the Ibatan Defense Force was discontinued and the North Ibatan Force and South Ibatan Force were redesignated the I Philippine Corps and II Philippine Corps respectively.

All troops previously assigned to the West Sector Ibatan Defense Force were assigned to I Philippine Corps, Major General J. M. Wainwright commanding.

All troops previously assigned to the East Sector Ibatan Defense Force were assigned to II Philippine Corps, Major General George H. Parker Jr., Commanding. The boundary between I Corps and II Corps was the same as the boundary between the East Sector and West Sector Ibatan Defense Forces.

The I Corps was ordered to maintain contact with the II Corps.

Mission II Philippine Corps

The mission II Philippine Corps was to defend that portion of Ibatan previously designated as the East Sector Ibatan Defense Force.

General Situation

After the withdrawal of the covering forces on the night of 6-7 January, contact with the enemy was lost. On the 7th and 8th of January, the enemy continued its advance to the south, pushed out reconnaissance units, and developed its forces for attack on our Mt. Matib Position. Japanese infantry, cavalry, artillery, and motor units were observed moving to the south on the East Road, between Grand and Samal. Contact was regained on 9 January. Japanese patrols maintained numerous contacts with our outpost on the 9th and 10th of January. The first attack was made on the night 10-11 January against the left of the 57th Infantry (IN) Sector. Thereafter, the Japanese attacks against the II Corps Position were piecemeal and successively progressed to the west in an effort to locate and envelope our left flank. It was soon evident that they preferred to attack over rough terrain and through thick jungles rather than to attack over the narrow strip of good terrain astride

the East Road which was strongly covered by fire. On 7 January I moved my command post to a point on the trail 2 miles west of Lima.

Operations in 87th Infantry Sector

On 8 January the 87th Infantry was occupying the right sector of the Main Battle Position with the 1st and 2d Battalions on the MLR. 2d Battalion on the left, the 2d Battalion on the MEL. The 1st Battalion, 24th Field Artillery (RA) was in direct support. Two battalions, 41st Field Artillery (RA) were in positions to give support on call. Contact was made by reconnaissance patrols on 9 January. On the afternoon of 10 January the CLR was driven in. On the night 10-11 January a Japanese force estimated as one battalion attacked the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry. The attack was repulsed.

On the night 11-12 January the enemy again attacked the 87th Infantry Sector. Heavy shelling was intense. The enemy attack reached our MLR. On 12 January the 21st Infantry (RA) was attached to the 87th Infantry.

At 4:30 AM, 13 January the Japanese again attacked with great fury. The enemy made a dangerous salient into the left of the 87th Infantry (PG) sector. The 21st Infantry (RA) counterattacked, but made little progress. The morale in the 87th Infantry at this time was very low. Colonel Clarke was relieved and about noon, 13 January, Colonel Arnold J. Funk, was placed in command of the 87th Infantry (PG). Colonel Funk after a personal reconnaissance of his sector, ordered a counterattack by the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry (PG) at 3:00 PM. The MLR was restored by dark. The change in regimental commanders did much to raise morale. During the night 13-14 January the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry relieved the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry.

On 14 January the enemy launched an attack against the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry at 10:00 AM. By 12:30 PM, this battalion had been forced out of the MLR. Again the 2d Battalion was used to counterattack and restore the MLR. On 15 January the 22d Infantry was attached to the 87th Infantry and on the night 14-17 January the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry was relieved by the 22d Infantry. About 25 January the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry (RA) was relieved by the 22d Infantry (RA). The enemy pressure against the 87th Infantry Sector had lessened since 16 January and moved to the west. Because of the threat of an envelopment of the left (west) flank of the Main Battle Position, the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (PG) was relieved about 20 January.



by the 20 Battalion, 41st Infantry and the 87th Infantry assembled in reserve south-west of Abosoy, prepared to move to the left of the battle line to meet a threatened envelopment of the left (west) flank of the Main Battle Position.

Operations in 41st Division (DA) Sector

The 41st Division (DA) held its sector until ordered to withdraw. Brigadier General Viciote LIA, and Colonel Malcolm V. Fortier deserve the highest possible commendation for their superior leadership. The 41st Division's outstanding performance of duty in action, in withstanding continuous assaults by superior forces was largely due to the untiring efforts and superior military knowledge and ability of Colonel Fortier. This officer served with outstanding honor and distinction, and his efforts were reflected in the actions of the 41st Division (DA).

Enemy pressure started against the 41st Infantry (DA) Sector on the night of 10-11 January. Repeated attacks and counter-attacks continued until the 16th of January, with the 41st Infantry (DA) holding its MLR after each counter attack.

By 15 January the Main enemy pressure had reached the 42d Infantry. This unit was forced to the MRL and the 25d Infantry (DA) was ordered to report to the Commanding General, 41st Division on the night 15-16 January as 41st Division Reserve. Counterattacks by the 42d Infantry (DA) and elements of the 25d Infantry (DA) restored the MLR within the 42d Infantry (DA) Sector.

The 43d Infantry (DA) received the heaviest enemy attacks of any regiment in the 41st Division. By 16 January its left was exposed because of the disintegration and rout of the 41st Division (DA). The heavy pressure against this unit had made it necessary to strengthen its sector with the 25d Infantry (DA). During the period 14-16 January all three battalions, 25d Infantry (DA) were singly committed to the main battle position, supporting the 43d Infantry (DA).

On the 16th January, continued enemy pressure had forced the 43d Infantry to refuse its left flank from the MLR to the MRL. Heavy fighting had forced the battle line within a hundred yards of the Regimental Command Post.

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Lieutenant Colonel E. T. Lewis, Senior Instructor, 656 Infantry, refused to move his Command Post to the rear. By his conspicuous gallantry and calm manner displayed at this critical time, he succeeded in holding his position until the arrival of the Philippine Division for the counter-attack on the 27th of January.

Operations in 81st Division (DA) Sector

Between 8-11 January the 81st Division (DA) strengthened its position. Improved dispositions, completed communication installations, and intensified reconnaissance to the front and left flank. Contact with the I Corps on 28 March was never established although numerous efforts were made to do so.

At 2000 PM, 11 January the 82d Infantry (DA) (less 1st Battalion and one company, previously destroyed in South Luzon) rejoined the Division and was assigned to Division Reserve.

On 12 January the enemy attacked and opened a gap on the right of the 81st Infantry (DA) Sector. The 82d Infantry (DA) counter-attacked and regained some ground. Colonel Loren P. Stewart was killed. Colonel Young was assigned to command the 81st Infantry (DA). On 13 January hostile pressure increased on the front of the 81st Infantry (DA), and by noon that unit showed signs of weakening. The Commanding General, 81st Division (DA) ordered the 81st Infantry (DA) to withdraw to the high ground on the north bank of the Lavantan River.

On 14 January, under continued hostile pressure the 81st Infantry (DA) withdrew to the south bank of the Lavantan River. Rush elements of the 82d Infantry (DA) as could be released were returned to normal control so as to reconstitute a Division Reserve.

On 15 January all division reserves and all other available troops were committed in order to maintain the new line on the south bank of the Lavantan River.

At this time the I Corps was notified of the critical nature of the situation and additional troops for II Corps Reserve were requested of the Commanding General, USMPC. The 81st Division (DA) was ordered to move to the vicinity of Guitol as II Corps Reserve.

About midnight 15-16 January I ordered the Commanding General, 51st Division (DA) to again counter-attack at daylight 16 January to reestablish his LER on the north bank of the Irawatan River. The 2d Battalion, 51st Infantry (7A) was ordered to report to the Commanding General, 51st Division (DA) at 4:00 AM, 16 January to assist in the counter-attack. This battalion never reported.

At daylight, 16 January the attack was launched. By 9:00 AM, some advance had been made, but a dangerous gap had been created between the 51st Infantry (7A) and the left of the 456 Infantry (DA). By 1:00 PM the enemy began infiltrating through the gap and at the same time succeeded in penetrating between the 51st Infantry (7A) and 524 Infantry (DA). Thus the 51st Infantry (7A) was doubly enveloped. All 51st Division (DA) reserves were employed but failed to stop the enemy advance. The entire front of the 51st Infantry (7A) disintegrated and the troops routed. The 524 Infantry (DA) was ordered to fall back to the left rear and protect the right of the I Corps.

By 5:00 PM, the Commanding General, 51st Division (DA) had formed a covering force astride the Cutil Trail near Hill 1620 and started reorganizing his division.

The Counter-Attack by the Philippine Division

The disintegration of the 51st Division (DA) created a critical situation which threatened the Main Battle Position. Unless the 51st Division (DA) Sector could be regained, it was evident that my left flank would be enveloped and the position would be lost. I ordered the Commanding General, Philippine Division to counterattack at daylight 17 January to regain the LER within the 51st Division (DA) Sector.

On the morning of the 17th, the 51st Infantry (US) moved into position west of the Macanda and attacked in a northerly direction, with the 2d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left. The 2d Battalion advanced a short way and was stopped by heavy hostile resistance, leaving a gap between this battalion and the 41st Division (DA) on its right. The 1st Battalion, 51st Infantry (US) pushed its attack successfully to the Main Line of Resistance, thus leaving a gap between the 1st Battalion and the 2d Battalion on its right rear.

The 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry attacked on the left of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US), and also reached the MZ. It was in contact with the 31st Infantry (US), but not in contact with the rest of the 46th Infantry (US). The country was very broken, and wooded. Contact was extremely difficult to maintain between units as they went forward. The 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry (US) was attached to the 31st Infantry (US) and was the left element on the Albany-Hit Natib line. Their left (west) flank was exposed. On the night of 17-18 January, the 46th Infantry (US) (less 2d Battalion) moved into the gap between the 41st Division (AR) and the 31st Infantry (US). On 18 January the 31st Infantry (US) failed to make any advances. At 4:00 PM, the 1st Battalion 46th Infantry (US) attacked from a position on the right of the 31st Infantry (US) in a direction slightly west of north and by 6:00 PM reached its objective on the MZ. However when it reached it, it was in contact with neither the 41st Division (AR) on its right nor the 31st Infantry (US) on its left rear. There was a gap of about 1000 yards on its right and one of about 1800 yards on its left. The 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry (US) was moved into a position in reserve behind the interval between the 31st Infantry (US) and the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry (US).

On 18th January the 31st Infantry (US) continued its effort to dislodge the enemy from the Huelens pocket. My request for tank support was refused. Early in the day the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry was withdrawn to regain contact with the 31st Infantry. Later in the day the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry (2d Battalion on the left) again attacked to the north and reached the MZ. After this successful attack there still remained a gap of about 700 yards between the 46th Infantry units and the 41st Division. Contact patrols were sent out by the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry to cover this gap and contact was established and maintained thereafter.

On 20 January there was brisk action throughout the day in the Huelens pocket, but no material change developed. The enemy succeeded in infiltrating about one company through the line and in rear of the 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry (US). This hostile force was assailed by the 31st Infantry (US), 46th Infantry (US), and some elements of the 41st Division (AR), but managed to escape on the night of the 20-21, leaving behind a large number of dead.

On 21 January the pressure against the 31st Infantry (US) was increased greatly and it was evident that the enemy was preparing to effect a movement around the left flank from the direction of Mt Natib. The 31st Infantry (US) made strong efforts to dislodge the enemy but with no success.

At 3:00 PM, the 1st Battalion, 48th Infantry (US) was moved to the east so as to make contact with the 41st Division (RA), and the line was refused to the south-west towards the Abucay-Guastanda Road and thus present a uniform front to the threatened attack from the direction of Mt Natib.

The 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry (US) was ordered to conform to this movement and make contact with the 31st Infantry (US) on its left. However it failed to fully complete the movement and make the contemplated change of front and contact. It stopped short of the desired position and left a gap between its left and the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US).

On 22 January the situation on the left flank grew worse. Repeated attacks and counter-attacks took place, but no material gains were made. On the contrary the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) was forced to withdraw from the MGR to a position south of the Abucay-Guastanda road and facing Mt Natib.

The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) withdrew to the rear and made contact with the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) on its right along the Abucay-Guastanda Road. But there still was a gap between its left flank and the 1st Battalion 31st Infantry (US), which was south of the road. The 5d Battalion, 48th Infantry (US), which was still attached to the 31st Infantry (US) had been on the MGR and on the extreme left and abreast of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US), was withdrawn through the gap between the 3d and 1st Battalions, 31st Infantry (US), and placed in the 31st Infantry (US) reserve. It made several counter attacks to stop the enemy who was making determined efforts to penetrate the MGR.

It was now evident that the MGR in the 31st Division (RA) Sector could not be restored by the Philippine Division.

#### Operations in the Rear Area

On 18 January the 31st Division, (RA), was attached to II Corps and ordered

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to move to Guitol in Corps Reserve. The leading elements arrived at Guitol at 10:00 AM, 15 January, and completed the movement during the night 16-17 January. About midnight 16-18 January the 5th Infantry (IA) was moved to the Abony-Iti Hottel line as 1st Division (DA) reserve.

During the period 15-21 January stragglers of the 1st Division (DA) were assembled north of Guitol and reorganized into three Infantry Regiments at greatly reduced strength. A covering force consisting of the remnants of the 1st Infantry (IA) and the 1st Engineer Battalion (EA) constituted the covering force on Hill 1620. Hostile raiding patrols frequently moved north along the Abony-Iti River Valley and harassed the 1st Division (DA) in their bivouac area and the 1st Division (DA) in its reorganization area. One Battalion, 1st Infantry (IA) was placed in position to cover this river valley.

On 20 January the 1st Infantry (IA) and 1st Engineer Battalion (EA) (Colonel Young Commanding) were ordered to advance north-west astride the Guitol Trail and seize the junction of the Guitol-Abony-Iti Trails. The advance progressed slowly against little resistance until almost at the junction when strong pressure developed.

On 21 January this force pushed forward against heavy hostile resistance and secured its objectives during the afternoon. About 9:00 PM, 21 January a Japanese force attacked the 1st Division (DA) from the east and north. The 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry (IA) was ordered to counter-attack at 7:00 AM, 22 January. The attack was launched but the enemy had withdrawn during the night.

On 22 January the enemy attacked the front of the covering force, 1st Division (DA) cutting rearward communications and supply. The enemy captured Hill 1620. An attempt was made by the covering force to retake Hill 1620 but was unsuccessful. During the night 22-23 January the covering force withdrew via the heavily jungled slopes of Mt. Itiwan, and thence generally south to the 1st Division (DA) reorganization area north of Guitol.

On 23d January an attack was launched from the south to retake Hill 1620. The enemy had withdrawn from his position and the attacking force continued its advance until stopped by hostile resistance astride the Guitol Trail about one

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kilometer northwest of Hill 1480. A new covering force consisting of the remnants of the 524 Infantry (IA) and a detachment of the 526 Infantry (IA), Colonel Postwright, Commanding, was put in position near the junction of the Guitel and Malange Trails, with instructions to hold.

The troops north of Hill 1480 were ordered to withdraw into reserve under cover of darkness the night of 23-24 January. At about 0100 JK the enemy attacked Colonel Postwright's force. Finding itself surrounded on three sides it withdrew down the Abo-dbo River Valley. The 526 Infantry (IA) detachment reported to the nearest commander in the I Corps and remained there. The 524 Infantry (IA) was badly scattered. Colonel Young was placed in command of a force which held a position astride the Guitel Trail north of Guitel protecting the 51st Division (IA) reorganization area. The hostile advance was stopped there that evening.

Withdrawal to Reserve Battle Position

(See Appendix No. 4)

The Reasons for Withdrawal

On 22 January Major General Sutherland, Chief of Staff, USAFFE, visited my Command Post west of Limay. After a discussion of the situation General Sutherland decided a withdrawal from the Abucay-Mt Natib Position was essential. The reasons for the withdrawal at this time were apparent:

- (1) Disintegration of the 51st Division (DA), which had left a gap in the Main Battle Position for six (6) days.
- (2) Failure of the counterattack by the Philippine Division to reestablish the MIA within 51st Division (DA) Sector.
- (3) Unknown strength of the enemy that had penetrated into the Abucay River corridor through this gap.
- (4) Loss of contact between I and II Corps.
- (5) All reserves of I and II Corps had been committed except elements of 51st Division (DA).
- (6) Possible envelopment of Abucay-Mt Natib position thus making a later withdrawal impossible.
- (7) The enemy was in the rear of the Main Battle Position in the I Corps Sector.

The Reserve Battle Position

The outstanding terrain feature of the Reserve Battle Position was Mt Samat, with an elevation of 1800 feet, which dominated the position and afforded excellent observation over the entire Corps front.

The Cebu River corridor and the Talisay River corridor afforded excellent avenues of approach leading from the north into the position. The area in general was covered with dense jungles and traversed by deep gorges. The right half of the position had excellent fields of fire. The East Road and the Pilar Dupas Road were the only highways leading into the position. Both were on flat terrain and subject to excellent observation. Trails #2 and #4 on the east slope and Trails #20 and #22 on the west slope of Mt Samat were the main



trails leading south into the area. The rivers drained generally to the north east or east. The width of the II Corps Sector along the Reserve Battle Position was approximately 12,000 yards.

Plan of Withdrawal

The salient features of the withdrawal plan were:

- (1) The withdrawal to start after dark night 22-24 January and to be completed by daylight 25 January.
- (2) Withdrawal of service installations and heavy artillery was to start night 22-24 January, and to be completed by daylight 25 January.
- (3) A covering force, Brigadier General Maxm S. Lough, Commanding, to be established along the General Line Nam-Duyang-Dam-Oudal. Troops in order from left to right one third (1/3) 21st Infantry (US), one-third (1/3) 87th Infantry (FG), 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (RA), 234 Infantry (RA), remnants of 21st Division (RA). Withdrawal to this line to start at 7:00 PM night 24-25 January. Tanks and S.F.L. to support covering force. Withdrawal of covering force to start at 11:30 PM night 25-26 January and to be completed by daylight 26 January.
- (4) A shell consisting of one rifle company and a platoon of machine guns for each front line battalion and battery of 75mm guns for each front line regiment was to start withdrawal at 2:00 AM 26 January.
- (5) Withdrawal of front line units to start night 26-28 January.
- (6) Reserve Battle Position to be divided into four sub-sectors from right to left.

Sub-sector "A" - Colonel Charles L. Steele, Commanding Troops: 21st Combat Team.

Sub-sector "B" - Colonel Irvin W. Doane, Commanding Troops: Provisional Air Corps Regiment.

Sub-sector "C" - Brigadier General Clifford Stoenel, Commanding Troops: remnants of 21st Division (RA), 21st Division (RA).

Sub-sector "D" - Brigadier General Maxm S. Lough, Commanding Troops: 21st Division (RA), 21st Division (RA), 87th Infantry (FG).

(7) 48th Combat Team to I Corps via Filar-Huag Road.

- (d) 11th Division (RM), to I Corps via Pilar-Sagua Road.
- (e) Command Post II Corps to point on trail two miles west of Imao.

Changes in Plans of Withdrawal

late in the afternoon 26 January orders were received from USAFFE that the 31st Infantry (US) and 67th Infantry (PO) would not occupy sectors on the Reserve Battle Position, but would be held in Army Reserve. Since the movement order had been issued, reconnaissance of positions made, supplies and ammunition dumped on positions and movement already started, it was strongly requested that the changes in orders be cancelled. The request was refused.

The 33d Infantry (RA) was assigned the sector previously assigned the 67th Infantry (PO). The 67th Infantry (PO) was ordered to move to bivouac area just north of Imao. The 31st Infantry (RA) was ordered to occupy the sector previously assigned to the 31st Infantry (US). The 31st Infantry (US) was ordered to bivouac area west of Imao. Inasmuch as some elements had already started their movement these changes necessitated the crossing of units in motion and resulted in some confusion. However the movement was completed as ordered.

At 2:00 PM 26 January it was learned that through a failure to notify the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" of the change in orders for the 33d Infantry (RA) a gap was left in Sub-sector "C" astride Trail #2. It was urgent that the gap at this important part of the IER be filled immediately. The covering force had been withdrawn, no cut post existed, and the tanks which had delayed an advancing enemy regiment had returned from that action via Crim Out-off about noon. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" while on a personal reconnaissance of his sector discovered the error and immediately closed the gap with his reserve battalion, (2d Battalion, 33d Infantry (RA)). I ordered the Commanding General Sub-sector "C" to send one regiment (less one battalion) to strengthen Sub-sector "C". The 41st Infantry (RA)(less one battalion) was the unit designated and it arrived in Sub-sector "C" at 4:00 PM 27 January.

Change in Rear Boundaries

Prior to the withdrawal to the Reserve Battle Position the rear boundary of the II Corps had been the line Alangan River-El Marivales (both inclusive).

The withdrawal order of USAFFE removed this boundary, extended the boundary between the II and I Corps to Garcia Point, and relieved Brigadier General Allan C. McBride, Service Command, Philippine Department, from responsibility for defense of the rear area. The 2d Regular Division (RD), Brigadier General Francisco Comanding was assigned to the II Corps.

The units of the 2d Regular Division (RD) at this time were: The 4th Infantry (PC), Lieutenant Colonel Jalandoni, Commanding. This unit was armed with M1918 Rifles, and after its arrival in Iloilo was provided with approximately fifty-five (55) Air Corps light air cooled machine-guns, .30 caliber, and four (4) .50 caliber machine guns. The 1st and 2d Infantry Regiments (PC) organic units of the 2d Regular Division (RD) had previously been attached to the I Corps. The 2d Field Artillery (PC) Lieutenant Colonel Alba, Commanding, was organized primarily from Philippine ROTC students (approximate strength 600), was armed with M1918 Rifles and was provided with approximately twenty (20) light, air cooled, machine-guns.

Attached to the 2d Division (PC) was a detachment of the Philippine Off Shore Patrol, (approximate strength 200), and was armed with the M1918 Rifle and seven (7) light air cooled machine guns.

New Beach Defense Sectors were assigned as follows:

ISL to Limay (inclusive) - 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Wolfe, Commanding.

Limay (exclusive) to Losanin River (inclusive) - Provisional Regiment consisting of 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry (PC), the Off Shore Patrol and the 2d Field Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Garcia, Commanding.

Losanin River (exclusive) to Garcia Point (inclusive) - 4th Infantry (PC) (less 2d Battalion) Lieutenant Colonel Jalandoni, Commanding.

Sub-sector "E" Reserve. The 2d Engineer Battalion, on call. (This unit normally used on various engineer projects within the II Corps area under supervision of my Corps Engineer Officer.)

Supporting troops for Sub-sector "E":

Six (6) Batteries of the 21st Field Artillery (RD)

Six (6) Search light units.

Six (6) Naval guns.

About 10 February arrangements were made with Brigadier General McBride for approximately 600 Service Troops to serve as a reserve for Lieutenant Colonel Garcia's Sector. A similar reserve composed of approximately 600 men of the 5th Interceptor Command, 300 Air Corps Engineers, 300 men from Headquarters Company HPM, and 100 men from the Quartermaster Bakery was organized and assigned to Lieutenant Colonel "Landsmi's Sector. These units were organized into combat units and given considerable combat training.

On 29th January the 184th Tank Battalion was assigned a primary mission along the beach from Paden Point to Limay (inclusive). This unit had a contingent mission to support Sub-sectors "A" and "B". The 184th Tank Battalion was assigned a primary beach mission from Limay (exclusive) to Okubahn and a contingent mission to support Sub-sectors "C" and "D".

The Self-Propelled Howitzers had similar beach defense missions.

#### Artillery with II Corps

The artillery with the II Corps at this time was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Mission</u>
21st Field Artillery (FA)	14	75-mm	Sub-sectors A & B
31st Field Artillery (FA)	6	75-mm	Sub-sector C
41st Field Artillery (FA)	16	75-mm	Sub-sector D
41st Field Artillery (FA)	6	2.95 MC	Sub-sector D
61st Field Artillery (FA)	6	75-mm	Sub-sector C
201st Field Artillery (FA) (less 1 Platoon 150-mm Howitzers.)	16	150-mm	General Support
Howy "B" 20th Field Artillery (FO)	4	150-mm GAF	General Support
1st Bn., 14th Field Artillery (FO)	6	75-mm GAF	Sub-sectors A & B
1st Bn., 24th Field Artillery (FO)	4	2.95 M40	Sub-sectors A & B
1st Bn., 30th Field Artillery (FO)	6	75-mm	Sub-sectors A & B
Naval Gun	approx - 12	1 pounder Beach Defense to 3 inch	

Defense of Criss-Ik Summit Position 28 January 1942-2 April 1942

Operations in Sub-sector "D" 28 January - 21 March

The morning of 28 January found all units assigned to Sub-sector "D" in or entering their assigned Sub-sector and engaged in organizing and strengthening their positions.

The troops garrisoning the Sub-sector were all Philippine Army units and consisted of the 1st Division (2A), Brigadier General Mateo Cuyopin, commanding, and the 2nd Division (2B), Brigadier General Vicente Lin, Commanding, and the 23d Infantry (2A) (until 5 March) Major Stanley Holmes, Commanding.

Initially the 1st Division (2A) employed two regiments in the defense of its assigned position. The 22d Infantry (2A) was on the right (east) and the 23d Infantry (2A) on the left (west). The 23d Infantry (2A) was designated as Corps Reserve. It remained in position in the 1st Division (2A) position however, to be employed as the reserve of that division on orders from II Philippine Corps.

Brigadier General Max Lough was assigned to command Sub-sector "D" and used the General and Special Staffs of the Philippine Division to perform similar functions in Sub-sector "D" and the Philippine Division Service Units continued to function in those capacities in Sub-sector "D".

Sub-sector "D" was on the extreme west of my Corps. Initially no roads other than Carabou trails led into this sector. It was characterized by very rugged terrain and dense tropical undergrowth. The construction of necessary roads, communication facilities and subsequent supplying of this force of over fourteen thousand men required almost superhuman effort by all concerned. The results accomplished by the Philippine Division General and Special Staffs and of the Service Units were particularly outstanding.

Probably due to the very heavy casualties that he had suffered in overcoming the main battle position, the enemy was able to follow up the advantage he gained by our withdrawal. He advanced very cautiously and allowed contact with our main forces in this sector to be broken off for two or three days.

The first contact was by small combat patrols and gradually increased to reconnaissance in force. Daily local combat during the early part of

February occurred along the entire front of this sub-sector. Frequently reconnaissances in force which varied in strength from a company to a battalion were made. In these encounters severe losses were inflicted on the enemy by our troops, and their losses would have been greatly increased had our troops been equipped with modern hand grenades, infantry mortars, and adequate automatic weapons.

The effectiveness of our artillery during this period was hardly be overestimated in breaking up hostile concentrations, destroying formations, and frustrating attacks. It was without doubt the weapon that the enemy feared most.

On 23 February the enemy made a general retirement all along the front of the II Corps and thereafter, except for minor patrol actions and constant aerial reconnaissance, there was little activity in sub-sector "D" until the latter part of March.

Operations in Sub-sector "D" 26 January - 31 March

About 7:00 PM, 26 January, the advance elements of the enemy reached the MLR, and established a pocket. After dark, 27-28 January, the enemy again attacked the MLR at this point and was again repulsed. The enemy estimated, as an infantry battalion, entrenched in and around a bamboo thicket astride Trail 98 where Trail 98 crosses the Pilar River, about seventy-five yards north of our MLR.

The 41st Infantry (RM) (less one Battalion) relieved the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (RM) (less Company "E") during the morning of 26 January. The 2d Battalion, 41st Infantry (RM), with Company "G", 22d Infantry (RM) and Battalion Headquarters Battery, 31st Field Artillery (RM) attached, occupied the MLR, covering a front of 1000 yards east of Trail 98. The 2d Battalion, 41st Infantry (RM) (less Company "G") occupied the RML.

On the night 28-29 January after a hostile artillery preparation of about one hour, the enemy launched an attack supported by artillery, machine-guns, and mortar fire. The main effort was directed at Trail 98. The fighting was brisk and at close quarters. Every hostile attempt to penetrate our line was

repulsed. Fighting continued throughout the night, along the entire front of Sub-sector "C". This attack was the main effort made by the enemy within the II Philippine Corps prior to their attack on 3 April. Captured documents indicated that the elements of three Japanese Regiments were employed in this attack; that the Japanese were short of artillery; that the direction of their attack was southwest; and that their mission was to drive our troops into Manila Bay near Limay.

On 28 January, I ordered General Blumel to counterattack, drive the enemy north, and re-establish our original OPLR. A counterattack was launched at 1:00 PM, 28 January, supported by artillery fire. Some advance was made, however the advance was halted by enemy fire from near the junction of Trail #6 and the Orin Sub-Off. Sub-sector "C" artillery could not reach this area. I attached a battery of 2.00's to Sub-sector "C" and ordered another counter-attack. This counter-attack was launched at 8:00 AM, 2 February. It encountered much resistance and progressed slowly. The attack was resumed on the morning of 3 February, and the bamboo thicket was taken. Hundreds of dead Japanese were counted. The enemy withdrew to a position along the Talisey River.

The outpost was still some distance behind the location designated. On 5 February another attempt to advance the outpost gained but little ground. From 6-20 February the enemy in Talisey Valley was harassed day and night by irregular and intermittent artillery fire, and constant, vigorous patrolling. On 21 February an attempt was made to dislodge the enemy from the valley and on the night 22-23 February, he withdrew from the valley. The designated outpost line was now occupied.

From 23 February until after the middle of March, a comparative quiet period existed in Sub-sector "C". Constant patrolling to maintain contact was carried out.

Operations in Sub-sector "D" 28 January - 21 March

Sub-sector "D" was occupied by a Provisional Infantry Regiment, strength approximately 1400, made up of Air Corps personnel (American), Colonel I. E. Dowe, Infantry, Commanding. Other than intermittent bombing and patrol actions, no enemy contact was made in this sector during this period.

Operations in Sub-sectors "A" and "B" 21 January - 21 March

Sub-sector "A" extended on the right of Sub-sector "B" to the beach and along the beach to Lamy. Sub-sector "B" extended from Lamy along the beach to Gorda (southern-most point on boundary between II and I Corps). Sub-sector "A" maintained contact by vigorous patrolling in its sub-sector and intermittent bombing occurred in both sub-sectors. The main enemy operation in these sub-sectors during this period, however, was harassing action from Manila Bay.

During the period 21 January - 2 April, the enemy intermittently shelled the beach positions at night by 75-mm pieces mounted on barges in Manila Bay. S-2 information disclosed that a large number of barges were being constructed in Manila. These activities indicated a probable intention of the enemy to attempt an envelopment of IV Corps from Manila Bay.

An off-shore patrol was organized using launches powered with outboard motors. Acting in conjunction with a small fleet of "mosquito boats", Philippine Army, under USAPFL, this patrol skirmished nightly with the enemy harassing force. Two enemy barges were sunk.

No material damage was done by this harassing action other than the demoralizing effect on the green Filipino troops.

Reorganization of Main Battle Position

After the withdrawal of the enemy on 23 February, the main battle position was reorganized and strengthened.

In Sub-sector "D", the 23d Infantry was relieved on 3 March and placed in Corps Reserve along Trail #64 on the left rear of Sub-sector "C". The 41st Infantry was returned to Sub-sector "D", and took up the position formerly occupied by the 23d Infantry. The 41st Infantry was released to the Commanding General Sub-sector "D" and was placed on the left flank of the 41st Division.

In sub-sector "C" the 41st Division had been depleted to about 2600 men and officers. To reduce overhead and make more men available for the front lines, this unit was reorganized into the 41st Combat Team of four Infantry Battalions and two Batteries of Field Artillery. Engineer, Medical and Service units were reduced and all possible personnel was armed with the rifle for front line duty.





Headquarters USAFFE ordered through reconnaissance by Commanders of the 21st Infantry (IG) and the 45th and 87th Infantry (IG) (USAFFE Reserve) of all routes in my corps.

Upon the formation of the Loan Force on 12 March, the Commanding General ordered practice maneuvers for the actual occupation of the beach defense in Sub-sector "E" by the Service Units, relieving the 2d Regular Division (RM) to be available for counter-attack missions.

Enemy Starts Developing for Attack

From about 13 March, the enemy activity increased daily. Intense aerial activity commenced on 16 March and grew in intensity both in the front line areas and in the rear installations. Vigorous patrolling by my infantry units continued, but the enemy had established a screen that was difficult to penetrate.

Beginning about 12 March, I had daily information of large enemy truck and material movement south from Ipan Junction and west from Abosay. Troops, artillery, and tanks were observed in these movements. This continued for a period of fourteen days, both day and night.

It was evident that the enemy was massing his infantry, artillery, ammunition, and supplies, in front of Sub-sector "E". Since Mt Samat was the dominating terrain feature within my sector, with excellent corridors leading south, on each side of Mt Samat, it was believed that the enemy would launch his attack with Mt Samat as his initial objective. This opinion was verified by the capture of a detailed order for a reconnaissance in force taken from a dead Japanese officer by personnel of the 43d Infantry (RM) on the night of 24-25 March. From the mass of information available I estimated that an enemy attack could be expected at any time after 26 March and that the main effort would be launched against the front of Sub-sector "E". I so reported to the Commanding General, USMIF on 10th March.

Physical Condition of Personnel

Although this period has been characterized as comparatively quiet, the physical condition of the personnel of my command had deteriorated at an

starving rate. The ration had continued to be cut so that during the month of March, the troops were barely getting a one-fourth ration. In the terms of calories, they were receiving less than 1000 per day. Medical authorities stated that 1500 were needed to perform the barest functions of life. By 1 March serious muscle wasting was evident and by the latter part of March the combat efficiency was rapidly decreasing.

Letuan is a malarial infested region. Lack of Quinine had brought the hospitalization for malaria to 500 daily by 1 March and 1000 daily by 1 April.

Due to lack of vitamins, beri-beri was flagrant and increasing. Dysentery and diarrhea were extremely prevalent and due to the weakened condition of the men, the epidemic could not be controlled.

After 15 March the ailment of nerve fatigue due to incessant bombing and the absence of any counter activity, particularly in the air, rapidly increased.

Due to lack of gasoline or transportation, great numbers of the sick could not be evacuated but lay in the forward area and caused a further strain to the Commanders of the fighting troops.

The supply of needed clothing had long been exhausted, and a large part of the troops were barefooted and clad in rags.

I estimated that the combat efficiency of my troops was 20% by 15 March. Each day it was lessening and by 1 April it was materially lowered.

#### Operations in Sub-sectors 21 March 1942 - 2 April 1942

Sub-sectors "A", "B", and "C" continued fairly quiet as far as operations by ground troops was concerned. Heavy patrol activity had increased however in Sub-sectors "A" and "C".

In Sub-sector "C" three easy raids were staged in this area on the nights of 21-22 March, 27-28 March, and 30-31 March. The first two raids were repulsed at the OPL with heavy enemy casualties but the OPL broke under the force of the third raid, and a section of it retired beyond the MRL. The easy however failed to come through the gap it created.

In Sub-sector "B" during the day of 28 March, a hostile force of about

a regiment exerted severe pressure against the 424 Infantry in the center of the 41st Division Sector which caused the CPDR to give way in the afternoon. Counter-attacks restored the position by heavy hand-to-hand fighting.

On 30-31 March and 1 April the pressure of the enemy steadily increased. It was apparent that he had returned with a serious offensive purpose and with fresh shock troops, strongly reinforced with artillery, tanks, mortars, automatic weapons, and air support. The 21st Infantry (IA) withdrew its CPDR to a point 150 yards from its MZ to tie in with the 424 Infantry (IA) on its left.

During the night 1-2 April the 21st Division withdrew its CPDR on the right to a point about halfway between New Malaga and the MZ. The 21st Combat Team in Sub-sector "C" accordingly withdrew the left of its MZ to maintain contact.

On April 2, the 424 Infantry's CPDR and MZ broke under a terrific bombing attack but the MZ was restored before nightfall.



up his concentrations of troops, and inflicting severe losses. One of the batteries remained in position and fired until they were changed and captured by the enemy.

The 21st Infantry (IA) was heavily attacked during the day, but managed to hold its position. However, it refused its left flank in order to meet a thrust from the west and to make contact with any friendly troops on that flank.

The sick and wounded were assembled at the junction of Trails #6 and #6B, and every effort was made to evacuate them as rapidly and as safely as possible.

The 23d Infantry (IA) (less 1 Battalion) which since the 24 of March had been in II Corps Reserve, was released to the Commanding General of Sub-sector "D", and was ordered into position on the Catman River, west of Mt Summit. This unit took up position astride Trail #6D near the junction of Trails #6D and #6. A defended road block was constructed at the sig-tag on Trail #6D to prevent advance of enemy tanks. The Battalion deployed along the Catman River was attacked during the night 3-4 April.

The Anti-tank Company, 21st Infantry (IC) (4-27mm guns) was attached to Sub-sector "C" and took up position astride Trail #6I for anti-tank defense.

The 21st Infantry (IG) was notified of the attack on the 41st Division (IA), front, and warned that early movement could be expected.

During the night 3-4 April a hostile landing supported by 75-mm guns on barges was attempted against Sub-sector "A" near Pandan Point. This attempted landing was repulsed by our artillery fire.

In Sub-sector "C", the 21st Combat Team (IA) was ordered to prepare a position facing west. This line extended from the point where the MLR crossed the Pilar River to the MLR. It was west of and covered Trail #E.

4 April. At daylight large flights of low flying enemy bombers, bombed and strafed the front lines. A coordinated attack, supported by heavy artillery fire and tanks was directed against the left (west) flank of the 21st Division (IA). Under pressure of this attack, the 21st Infantry (IA), crumbled and the

23d Infantry (IA) refused its left flank to the KML to meet the threat on its left and rear.

The Battalion of the 23d Infantry (IA), which was deployed along the Catman River, was withdrawn to the junction of Trails #429 and #6. It received enemy pressure from its front and right (rear) flank during the day and night 4-6 April.

The 45th Infantry (IS), less one battalion; the 51st Infantry (IS), and the Provisional Tank Group (less two companies supporting the I Corps) were released to the II Corps.

The 51st Infantry (IS), was ordered to move to assembly position near junction of Trails #10 and #2. The 45th Infantry (IS)(less one battalion) assembled near Trails #6 and #29.

The 57th Infantry (IS), was ordered by Lt Col Furze to Lamon.

I released the 51st Infantry (IS), the 45th Infantry (IS)(less one battalion), and a company of tanks to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "D" and ordered him to counter-attack to reestablish the KML within the 41st Division Sector.

All engineer troops were ordered to stop engineer work and assemble for combat. An attempt was made to reorganize the scattered elements of the 43d and 42d Infantry Engineers. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis succeeded in assembling about two hundred men of the 43d Infantry (IA) near the junction of Trails #6 and #2. Lieutenant Colonel McDonald was able to assemble only fifty men of the 42d Infantry (IA). The men of the 42d Infantry (IA) were attached to the 43d Infantry (IA).

Elements of the 41st Division Field Artillery remained in action in Sub-sector "D" and remnants of the 41st Infantry now under I Corps were in position on the Hartigan River.

The 41st Combat Team withdrew its OPFL to the Pilar-Inago Road. Increased artillery fire was received in Sub-sector "C". There was no change in Sub-sectors "A", "D", and "E".

At 1400 H, 4 April, the 45th Infantry (IS) then in Army Reserve on Sagsayan Ridge, started its movement to assembly position near the junction of Trails #6 and #29.

During the night 4-5 April, the 21st Infantry (IG) moved from its bivouac area one and one-half miles west of Lanna to assembly position near the junctions of Trails #8 and #10.

5 April. Hostile pressure supported by about thirty tanks continued against the left of the 21st Division (DA). The 23d Infantry (RA), followed by the 22d Infantry (RA), withdrew with some semblance of order during the afternoon to a line 1600 yards north of Trail #49. This exposed the left (west) flank of Sub-sector "C" to attack. Combat Team 51 occupied its previously prepared position (being west and covering Trail #8). The remainder of troops in Sub-sector "C" held on the JLE. The 21st Division (DA) and Combat Team 51 areas were heavily bombed and shelled throughout the day. Contact between the 21st Division (DA) and Combat Team 51 was lost. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" requested permission to withdraw to the east bank of the San Vicente River. I ordered him to withdraw his left flank and regain contact with the 21st Division (DA). Later in the day the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" again requested to withdraw to the east bank of the San Vicente. I ordered him to hold his present position.

The 23d Infantry (RA) (less one battalion) was heavily engaged in its position near the junction of Trail #49 and #8. Heavy pressure was being received on its front and both flanks. The 27th Infantry (IB), was released to II Corps and was assigned to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "D". The Commanding General, Sub-sector "D" issued orders for the counter-attack, at his command post 800 yards west of Trails #6 and #8. The plan of attack included the following:

- (1) Initial objective: JLE of Sub-sector "D"
- (2) Time of attack: 0700 AM, 6 April
- (3) 21st Infantry (IG), move to assembly position near junction of Trails #49 and #6 and attack north on Trail #8.
- (4) The 33d Infantry (RA), (less one battalion) to attack north on Trail #49.
- (5) The 48th Infantry (IB) (less one battalion) supported by one tank company to attack north on Trail #8.



- (6) The 21st Division (DA), was to attack between Trails #6 and #29.
- (7) The 87th Infantry (US), in Sub-sector Reserve.
- (8) A thirty minute artillery barrage to precede the attack.

The Commanding Officer, 21st Infantry (US), issued his attack order at 4:00 PM, 6 April at his Command Post on the Iloilo River near Trail #6. He ordered the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (US) to move at once, 6:00 PM, 6 April, to secure Trails #64 from Trail # 2 to #29. Remainder of the 21st Infantry (US) to move after dark to the junction of Trails #64 and #29. The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry (US) passed through the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (US) at midnight 5-6 April and ran into enemy resistance just west of the junction of Trails #64 and #29. Heavy firing was heard from the 21st Division (DA) area. The enemy had enveloped the remnants of the 21st Division (DA) in a night attack and it had completely disintegrated. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis with the remnants of the 42d Infantry (DA), and the 43d Infantry (DA) (about 250 men) moved north on Trail #6 and attempted to relieve the 21st Field Artillery (DA) troops. This effort was repulsed.

8 April. At 1:45 AM, 8 April, Colonel Uhrig accompanied by two Philippine Army Colonels of the 21st Division (DA) arrived at the Command Post, 21st Infantry (US), and told the Commanding Officer, 21st Infantry (US) (Lieutenant Colonel Brady) that the 21st Division (DA) had completely disintegrated. Lieutenant Colonel Brady failed to launch his attack as ordered. Communications with Sub-sector "D" were broken. In explaining his action to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C", he stated that he had only 600 men, and if the attack had gained its objective, they were insufficient to hold the NGL of the 21st Division (DA). The artillery barrage supporting the planned attack was fired as scheduled. An enemy force estimated as a regiment advancing east of 2d Samat hit the 21st Infantry (US), while it was still deployed in attack formation. The mission of the 21st Infantry (US) was changed by G-3, Sub-sector "D" to hold junction of Trails #64 and #29 at all cost.

The 23d Infantry (DA) (less one battalion) was forced out of its position near junction of Trails #6 and #29. The remnants of this unit led by Major Holmes, withdrew south-east across country and attempted to rejoin our forces

east of the San Vicente. They found themselves completely cut off by Japanese troops. They then broke up into small parties, and made their way to the north through the Japanese lines. The 33d Infantry (IA)(less one battalion) ceased to exist after this date. Contact with the 33d Infantry (IA) had been lost on 4 April and was never regained. This unit never received the attack order of the Commanding General, Sub-sector "D". The 45th Infantry (IA)(less one battalion) supported by one company of tanks attacked north on Trail #29. It was stopped astride Trail #29, about 2500 yards north of Trail 8.

By 2:00 PM, the enemy advancing south on Trail #6 and west thereof, reached Trail #6, and cut off Headquarters Sub-sector "D", the 45th Infantry (IA) and the remnants of the 41st Infantry (IA) from the remainder of the Corps. At 7:00 PM, the 45th Infantry (IA)(less one battalion) was withdrawn south on Trail #29 to Trail #6, and placed in position facing east astride Trail #6, around midnight 6-7 April. This unit was ordered to attack east on Trail #6 early 7 April to reestablish contact. The remnants of Sub-sector "L" east of Trail #6 were placed under the Commanding Officer, 67th Infantry (IA). The Commanding Officer, 67th Infantry (less one battalion) with the remnants of the troops of Sub-sector "L" was ordered to secure the junction of Trails #6 and #8. The 201st and 202d Engineer Battalions (IA) were attached to the 67th Infantry (IA). Communications were frequently disrupted by enemy artillery fire.

The Commanding General Sub-sector "L", asked again for permission to withdraw to the east bank of the San Vicente River. I ordered him to occupy a line on the second ridge west of the San Vicente River. This was the line held by the 51st Infantry (IA). Combat Team 51 was ordered to take position on the right of the 51st Infantry (IA), and to prolong the line to the North. The 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry (IA), and the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry (IA) were ordered to march to the west and extend the line to the north of Combat Team 51. This forced the withdrawal of the outposts of Combat Team 51 and 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry (IA), and caused the left portion of the 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry (IA) to give up its IIR. Enemy tanks on the Pilar-Sagua Road were driven off by the anti-tank weapons of the 51st Infantry (IA).

Artillery shelling and air bombardment in Sub-sector "C" was intensified. The 11st Infantry (IS) and troops of Sub-sector "C" were forced back to the San Vicente River.

At 4:00 PM, 5 April, I ordered the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" to form a line and to hold the east bank of the San Vicente River. The 11st Infantry (IS) and one battalion, 57th Infantry (IS), were attached to Sub-sector "C". The Commanding General, Luzon Force, released the 3004 Engineer Battalion (US) and the 26th Cavalry (PC) to II Corps. These units did not arrive on 6 April.

No change in Sub-sectors "A", "B", and "D". Excessive straggling by Philippine Army troops, who abandoned their arms and equipment, was increasing hourly.

7 April. In Sub-sector "D", the 48th Infantry (IS) (less one battalion) supported by one company of tanks attacked at daylight 7 April to the east along Trail #6 to reestablish contact with the 57th Infantry (IS). The 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry (IS), made the attack to the east. The 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry (IS) secured the junction of Trails #6 and #8. The 1st Battalion 48th Infantry (IS), withdrew to a defensive position along the Pangasinan River astride Trail #6. Headquarters Sub-sector "D", and all Sub-sector troops west of Trail #6 were placed under command of I Corps.

An enemy attack between Trails #6 and #8 struck the 201st and 3004 Engineer Battalions (IA) before they were in position. These units broke and withdrew in disorder. An envelopment of the left, south-west, flank of the 57th Infantry (IS) caused its withdrawal.

The 3004 Engineer Battalion (US) was released to the II Corps by the Commanding General, Luzon Force, and was attached to the 57th Infantry (IS).

In Sub-sector "C" continued pounding by air and artillery in conjunction with renewed Infantry attacks caused the disintegration of all Sub-sector "C" Philippine Army troops. All Trails to the rear were heavily choked with stragglers who had abandoned their arms and ammunition. The 11st Division (IA) which on the nights 26-27, 27-28, and 28-29 January had stopped the enemy and on 3 February had counter-attacked and driven him from its immediate front, had by lack of clothing, equipment, food, and medicine, been reduced to a Generalized

and uncontrollable mob. About 90% of the Philippine Army were without shoes. Their one uniform was worn out. Officers and men were suffering from malnutrition, and the majority of them were ill with malaria and dysentery or both and should have been in the hospital. It was now evident that it was impossible to expect or force any further combat service from these units. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" repeatedly endeavored to organize successive positions astride Trail #2. Each position was shelled, bombed and outflanked by the enemy. The 20th Cavalry (PS) then near the junction of Trails #20 and #4, were attached to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C". The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" was ordered to organize and hold a line along the Ikalala River.

The 20th Cavalry (PS) was deployed astride Trail #20 on the south bank of the Ikalala River. Elements of the 31st Infantry (US), 87th Infantry (PS), 14th Engineers (PS) and 8000 Engineers (US) were in an assembly position near Trail #20 about one and one-half miles south of the Ikalala River. The enemy held a portion of Trail #20 between this point and the 20th Cavalry (PS) under fire. Due to continued hostile pressure by superior enemy forces, and flanking action on the left (west) flank of the Ikalala River, the occupation of the position had to be abandoned, and the troops during the hours of darkness 7-8 April occupied the Alangan River line.

Sub-sectors "A" and "B" were ordered to conform.

Troops of Sub-sector "B" (4th PG) taken from their beach defenses and released to Commanding General, Sub-sector "C".

The Command Post, II Corps was moved to KP 167 1/2 East Road during the night 7-8 April.

The II Corps artillery was displaced to the rear and was never in Sub-sector "C" action again.

8 April. By 2:00 AM, 8 April, the Alangan River line was occupied by remnants of the following units, from right to left, 4th PG, 31st Infantry (US), Provisional Air Corps Regiment, 8000 Engineers (US), 87th Infantry (PS), 31st Infantry (US), 20th Cavalry (PS) and 14th Engineers (PS). The Commanding General

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Sub-sector "C" (Brigadier General Clifford Hessel) had personally supervised the organization under great difficulties. He had been placed in direct command of all front line troops and deserves the highest possible commendation for his fearless unswerving energy and initiative displayed throughout the operations since 3 April.

All of these units were disorganized and greatly depleted in strength. Control was difficult due to the thick jungle, scarcity of trails, and lack of adequate signal equipment, and personnel. Radio and wire communications were completely out. No organization of the ground was possible. The strength of the entire position did not exceed 2000 men and officers.

During the morning, a Jap observation plane discovered the 27th Infantry (PI) and the 21st Infantry (US) and dropped incendiary bombs on the dry cogon grass and bamboo thickets. A fire ensued and hampered considerably the occupation of the position. During the afternoon a similar incident occurred in the 21st Infantry (PI) sector causing this unit to break and flee.

Self-Propelled-Mounts and Tanks were ordered to cover the avenue of approach. Lieutenant Colonel Gessell and Smythe reported to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" and asked what assistance could be given. They were ordered to make a reconnaissance and submit their recommendation for employment of these weapons. The reconnaissance was made, but no Self-Propelled-Mounts or Tanks arrived on the position.

A defended road block on Trail #20 constructed by the 14th Engineers (PI) effectively stopped an enemy tank attack.

By 2:00 PM, the left (west) flank of the position had been enveloped by a strong enemy force. The entire position was at that time subjected to an intense aerial bombardment and artillery concentration under which the hostile attack supported by tanks penetrated the center of the position. Shortly before dark, the 21st Infantry (US) was forced to withdraw and the 27th Infantry (PI) was being enveloped on both flanks. To hold the Alangan River was now an impossibility. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" was ordered to hold the Imane River line when forced out of the Alangan River position. The 14th Engineers (PI) withdrew south on Trail #20, covered by the 26th Cavalry (PI).

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The 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment was released to II Corps at Cebu when after dark 8 April. It was ordered to the Linao River position but never advanced beyond Natan Air Field.

By 9:00 PM, 8 April, the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" was at the crossing of Trail #20 and the Linao River with remnants of the 28th Cavalry (PB) 14th Engineers (PB), 87th Infantry (PB), and 31st Infantry (US). The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" sent out reconnaissance parties who returned with reports that the occupation of the position was not feasible. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" later informed me that it was impossible for him to occupy the Linao River position.

9 April. By midnight 8-9 April the enemy had open passage to the south in the path of which was General Hospital No. 2, with thousands of patients. All roads and trails to the south and southwest were jammed with stragglers and refugees, pursued by Japanese columns of infantry and tanks. Bombing and strafing by low flying planes was constant. All men and officers were completely exhausted. All reserves had been employed. All organized resistance had ceased. The II Philippine Corps which had taken the main blow of the Japanese pressure since 8 January ceased to exist as a fighting unit.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, ordered the destruction of all artillery, ammunition, radio, engineer, and other equipment, except transportation by 6:00 AM, 9 April, at which time a flag of truce was sent forward on the East Road to the Japanese Command.

Surrender of the Headquarters II Corps took place on the morning of 9 April at Corps Command Post at KP 167 1/2 East Road. The troops surrendered piecemeal where found by the enemy.

  
GEN. M. P. SERRANO  
Major General, United States Army.

CITATIONS

GENERAL ORDER  
NO. 14

WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington, March 2, 1942

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The South Luzon Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action. Attacked on December 24, 1941, when in a state of partial mobilization and training, in the province of Ilocos, Philippines, the South Luzon Force withstood repeated assaults by greatly superior forces. When forced to withdraw because of a double envelopment, this force maintained complete cohesion while executing difficult delaying actions. Threatened with destruction by an attack on its rear, it threw out a covering force, halted the enemy advance, and eluded the trap, accomplishing an extremely difficult movement into the Ilocos Peninsula on January 1, 1942.

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The II Philippine Corps, United States Army Forces in the Far East, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action. Attacked on January 7, 1942, in the Ilocos Peninsula, it withstood continuous assaults by superior forces supported by waves of unopposed medium and dive bombers operating over front lines and artillery positions. Its flank having been turned by a hostile penetration on Mount Natib, it executed skillfully conceived counter-attacks with significant effect, thus making possible its successful withdrawal to a prepared battle position on January 26, 1942.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIALS:  
J. A. ULIO  
Major General  
The Adjutant General

GENERAL ORDER  
NO. 22

WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington, April 23, 1942

Citation of units of both military and naval forces of the United States and Philippine Governments.—As authorized by Executive Order 9075 (see II, Bull. 11, W.D., 1942), a citation in the name of the President of the United States, as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction, is awarded to all units of both military and naval forces of the United States and Philippine Governments, engaged in the defense of the Philippines since December 7, 1941.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIALS:  
J. A. ULIO  
Major General  
The Adjutant General.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority E.O. 13526

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APPENDIX NO. 2

OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH ARMY FORCE FROM

24 DEC 41 TO 1 JAN 42 DATE INCLUSIVE

BRIEFING GENERAL A. M. JOHNS, COMMANDER



EVENTS PRIOR TO NOON, 24 DECEMBER 1941:

So that the proper background may be established, it is well to set forth important developments leading up to the turn-over of the command from Major General George M. Parker, Jr. to Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, at noon 24 December 1941.

Colonel Albert M. Jones, Infantry, United States Army, was relieved as instructor at the command and Staff School, USAFFE, Camp John Hay, Dagupan, M.P.P.I. and assigned to command the 51st Division, Philippine Army, 18 November 1941, and assumed command at Santo Tomas, Batangas, 19 November 1941. Brigadier General Vicente Lim, Philippine Army, was relieved as a student at the CGOS School, USAFFE, and assigned to command of and joined the 41st Division at the same time.

At the time, the cantonments of both divisions were approaching completion, the 41st Division cantonment at Tagaytay Ridge and the 51st Division cantonments at Santo Tomas, Rosario, and Banay-Banay, all in Bulangas Province. The most urgent task of the division commander was to complete the construction of the various cantonments sufficiently to provide adequate water supply, latrine, sewerage, lighting, and messing accommodations for the troops which were expected momentarily. The 51st Engineer Battalion was engaged in this construction work assisted by hired labor (civilian) under the direction of higher headquarters.

Lack of authority over the Engineer Officers in charge of this construction, labor troubles, lack of water pumps, and piping difficulties with local civilian authorities because of their insistence on employing only local labor, regardless of the scarcity of trained artisans, etc, materially delayed the Division Commander in preparing for the reception of his troops.

The 52d Infantry, Colonel Virgil H. Cordero, Commanding, was inducted about 1 September 1941 in the Misol Provinces on the southeastern peninsula of Luzon and the Island of Masbate adjacent thereto. Preliminary training was commenced at once by American Army officers and non-commissioned officers. On 26 October the regiment was assembled at Santo Tomas, and completed its three months preliminary training which consisted of company training on 1 December 1941 and started its Battalion training which continued until the declaration of war 8 December 1941.

The 51st Infantry, Colonel Loren P. Stewart Commanding, was inducted early in November in the Misol. Officers and non commissioned officer cadres started training early in October. This preliminary training was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Hunter, Field Artillery, United States Army, assisted by American Army officers and non-commissioned officers. The regiment was concentrated at Banya-Banya, Batangas, 6 December 1941.

The 53d Infantry, Colonel John H. Boetwright Commanding, was inducted in the Misol later in November and concentrated at Rosario, Batangas, on 28 November 1941. The officers and non-commissioned officer cadres had completed their months training, but the troops had had practically no preliminary training.

The 51st Field Artillery, Colonel H. F. Bearright Commanding, was inducted at See San, <sup>Tylo Bay</sup> ~~Masbate~~, early in December and started its preliminary training just before the declaration of war. Its cadres had received one months training. The only material available consisted of eight (8) wooden wheeled British 75-mm guns and there was no unit transportation of any kind, nor any fire control equipment. Two batteries began training as Field Artillery, and the remainder of the regiment was armed with rifles and started training as a provisional Infantry Battalion.

No anti-tank material being available, no anti-tank units were organized.

The 51st Engineer Battalion was unable to engage in unit training prior to 8 December because of its employment on cantonment projects.

The 51st Medical Battalion and the Service Units were inducted early in December and concentrated at Santo Tomas. No equipment or transportation other than that essential to maintain the routine supply of units in the cantonment areas, was available. The General Staff of the division had completed a six weeks course at the command and staff school, USAFFE, on 15 November, but had had no practical training in staff functioning.

The technical and administrative staffs had never been assembled before 15 November and had had no practical training in staff functioning.

Several American officers and non-commissioned officers were assigned to the division early in December for duty as instructors. They were under the control of the Commanding General, South Luzon Force, and not subject to the orders of the Division Commander. However because of a mutual agreement between the two commanders these instructors were of great assistance to the Division Commander.

FROM 1-8 COURSE

The Division Commander was engaged in reconnaissance of rifle, artillery and combat ranges in addition to supervision of the house keeping and reception, equipping, supplying, and training of the troops. All personnel had received five and one-half months individual training at some time during the preceding five years, but this training had not only been inadequate, but consisted almost entirely of close order drills, and other disciplinary training, with practically no field training. The Filipino officers themselves had little or no field training experience. They were "book" soldiers and lacked the confidence of their men. The officers were mostly Tagalogs and the men Ilocos, the one had no understanding of the other.

The Enfield rifle was the basic infantry weapon, and it was too long and cumbersome for the Bicol soldier, who is generally small in stature. There were no steel helmets, machine guns consisted of the heavy water cooled .50 caliber type with cumbersome tripods, many water pumps for the same were missing, and could not be replaced, and spare parts for rifles and machine guns were not available. The supply of ammunition for mortars (3" Stokes-obsolescent type) was quite inadequate, and at least 70% of it proved to be duds.

Many troops had to be committed to action before having had opportunity to fire on the rifle range, and none of them had had more than the barest essentials of rifle marksmanship practices. The regiment had, in strength only about two-thirds of the personnel established by Tables of Organization for Philippine Army troops.

Few leather shoes were available, so the troops were issued rubber soled, canvas low shoes which were made along American lasts and were generally too narrow for the spread toes of the Filipino. Uniforms were limited and the habitual uniform was of fatigue clothes (blue). The coconut fibre helmet was varnished and made a fine target when shining in the sunlight.

Signal equipment was very scarce and signal personnel was not properly trained. Practically no Filipino officers above the grade of captain were capable of functioning properly as staff officers and it was necessary to replace them with young inexperienced American officers and non-commissioned officers when troops went into action.

The main routes of approach to Manila, from South Luzon, were as follows:

Route 17 from Masagbu, with a branch (route 25) from Tagaytay Ridge. This is the shortest, most direct and has fewer natural obstacles than any other route.

Route 19 from Batangas, which joined Route 1 at Santo Tomas was almost as short and direct as Route 17 and had few natural obstacles.

An unnumbered Route from Batanga through Eseric and San Pablo entered Route 1 there and Route 21, just north thereof. The combination of this latter unnumbered route and Route 19 made Batanga an ideal landing place for the enemy who could advance thereby on Manila in 2 columns. Therefore the most dangerous areas in the South Sector were the Masagu and Batanga beaches, an important sector.

Routes 1 and 23, from the Taybas beaches from Hignay to Pagbilao, and from Atimonan; these were not within supporting distances of the other and traversed numerous natural obstacles such as ravines, defiles, etc. These were the longest routes. Route 23 which connected with the Masagu Road near Surban was a narrow, winding, mountain road, easily defended. Route 1 from Atimonan to Pagbilao, was a narrow road crossing an easily defended pass in Quenson National Park.

The Road from Tiguas (Infanta) to Pany (Route 21) was a narrow mountain road, easily defended.

The history of operations in South Luzon is the history of the operations of the 51st Division and attached troops, since the 41st Division never engaged with the enemy in South Luzon.

It moved from South Luzon to Abater, Bataan, commencing the movement at 2:00 AM 25 December 1941 and completed it at dark 27 December 1941, with the exception of the 43d Infantry which moved into Bataan on the 28th and 29th December.

The original mission of the 51st Division was the defense of that part of South Luzon east of a line roughly from Lemery to Bisan (both inclusive) to the line Padre Burgos- Antimonan (both inclusive). Its northern boundary was roughly a line from Bisan through Pillila to Infanta (all inclusive). This area included nearly 250 miles of possible landing places from the eastern end of Balayan Bay along Batanga and Taybas Bays, on the southern coast and Lamon Bay from Atimonan inclusive, north to include Infanta on the eastern coast.

About 1 December, the 53d Infantry was given the mission of patrolling the beaches from Lemery to Batanga, the 55d Infantry arrived in the sector 6 December and was given a similar mission from Kalakub II to Padre Burgos on Taybas Bay. When the 51st Inf-

antry arrived in the sector 6 December, it relieved the 584 Infantry and took over the patrol mission from Lemery east to Kalobkub II, and the 584 Infantry passed to general reserve at Santo Tomas and patrolled the new air field nearby, the routes in the interior of the sector and the southern and eastern shores of Laguna de Bay and Lake Taal. The 3d Battalion, 584 Infantry, with headquarters at Paganjan, Laguna, took over the patrol mission on the eastern coast from Mauban to Infanta (both inclusive). The 1st Battalion, 584 Infantry had a similar mission at Atimonan.

In the opinion of the Division Commander, the only troops in his division capable of offering any effective resistance was the 584 Infantry. Therefore he held it in general reserve so far as possible with the limited force at hand.

The only two gun batteries of light artillery were attached, one to the 51st Infantry, and the other to the 534 Infantry for beach defense. The remaining units of the 51st Field Artillery were stationed at Santo Tomas as a provisional Infantry Battalion in training and ready to augment the general reserve in an emergency. On 18 December 1941, the Japanese landed a force estimated as a reinforced brigade at Legaspi, Albay, on the eastern coast near the tip of the Bicol Peninsula. Companies "A" and "B", 534 Infantry were then ordered from Atimonan to Samulong and Gumasa respectively to outpost the highway and railroad leading in from the Bicol Peninsula.

The Manila Railroad left the highway at Sipicot Casuarines Sur and followed the highway west to Sian (just west of Gumasa) where it cut across the neck of the peninsula to Padre Burgos and followed the coast of Tayabas Bay in Pagbilao and Loena, Tayabas.

About the same date, in order to maintain the strength of the garrison at Atimonan, the 1st Battalion, 584 Infantry was ordered from general reserve to Atimonan. Specially trained detachments of the 51st Engineers were dispatched into the Bicol Peninsula under the supervision

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of Second Lieutenant Robert C. Silhavy, Engineer Reserve, United States Army, with instructions to prepare all highway and railroad bridges for destruction in order to delay any attempt of the enemy to advance into the South Luzon Sector. The 51st Engineer Battalion was relieved of contention construction projects, assembled at Santo Tomas and given intensive combat training. On 17 December, a demolition detachment of the 51st Engineer Battalion under the command of the American Instructor of the Battalion (Lieutenant Silhavy) was fired on by a Japanese detachment while preparing a railroad bridge near Bagay Casuarines Sur for destruction. The Engineers returned the fire and after demolishing the bridge held the near bank of the gorge. This was the first hostile contact. News of this engagement reached the Division Commander at Omasac when he was returning about 7:00 PM 17 December from a personal reconnaissance of the eastern end of Route 1, near K.P. 267, northeast of Sumalong, accompanied by Colonel V. H. Cordero, the reserve commander. Thereupon Colonel Cordero was given command of all troops east of the line Padre Burgos-Atimonan, and was directed to employ not to exceed one battalion of Infantry to delay the advance of the enemy to the westward. Colonel Cordero was ordered to replace, as soon as practicable, the relatively untrained companies of the 53d Infantry in that area by companies from the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry at Atimonan. At midnight 17-18 December, Company "B" 53d Infantry was outposting the railroad bridge over the river at Aloneros and Company "A", 53d Infantry, the highway bridge over the river at Sumalong with strong combat patrols along the railroad to Bagay and on the eastern end of the trail connecting Route 1 in Casuarines Nortes. Colonel A. C. Young was placed in command of the 53d Infantry (in general reserve at Santo Tomas) less detachments in the Meol, on 18 December vice Colonel Cordero.

Colonel Albert M. Jones, the Division Commander was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General (temporary) United States Army on December 19, 1961.

On 19 December 1941 it was reliably reported that the Japanese had completed concentration of a considerable force estimated as a battalion of Infantry at Sipicot and had pushed combat patrols westward on the highway and railroad to Daet and Ragay, respectively. This same date Colonel Cordero was ordered to relieve Companies "A" and "B", 53d Infantry as soon as possible and return them to Sariaya, Tayabas under the control of the Commanding Officer, 53d Infantry. This movement was completed by Dark, 23d December 1941. At that time the only troops east of the line Padre Burgos-Atimman were Companies "B" and "C", 53d Infantry, reinforced by a machine gun platoon each, and several strong demolition detachments of the 51st Engineer Battalion.

On 21 December, Colonel Cordero was ordered to march Company "B", 53d Infantry from Sumulong via Daet on Sipicot, and to move Company "C", 53d Infantry from Tagaswayan by rail east as far as possible and march on Sipicot and harass and delay the enemy. Captain Edward W. Wilkes and Lieutenant Howard K. Hanson had headed a reconnaissance patrol on Daet a few days previously. Lieutenant Matt P. Dobrinc arrived just east of Timbuyo Camerines Norte with Company "B" after a ten hour forced march at 10:00 PM 21 December and joined Captain Wilkes who had just released several Japanese civilians whom it was impractical to guard.

At 5:00 PM, 22 December, a Japanese company attacked Company "B" near Timbuyo. Company "B" was holding a strong position supported by its machine gun platoons. The enemy was defeated and pursued for about ten kilometers, suffering many losses. Captain Wilkes received a bullet wound in his left arm. Company "B" suffered about 15% casualties, but continued harassing operations. A detachment of American Air Warning troops that had been operating its equipment near Paracale, Camerines Norte under USAFFE (unknown to the Division Commander) was evacuated over Route 1 but lost all of its non-portable equipment and transportation which had to be destroyed at the end of the completed highway west of Timburgo. A number of American civilians (mining people) were also evacuated under the protection of Wilkes troops.



On 23 December 1941, the Division Commander ordered Colonel Cordero to withdraw all forces in the Micol at once to Calauag and to hold his outpost at Alconeros and Sumulong, until further orders or until forced to withdraw to Atimonan. Companies "A" and "B", 524 Infantry, were relieved at Sumulong and Alconeros and rejoined their regiment at Sariaya, by rail, by 6:30 PM December 23d. Company "D" 524 Infantry was reached by runner and withdrew at once, but was cut off from rejoining its battalion at Atimonan, when the Japanese landed at Sian, on December 23d.

Company "C", 524 Infantry, (Lieutenant Cleary) withdrew by rail arriving at Calauag about 9:30 PM 23 December. At 10:00 PM 23 December 1941, Colonel Cordero at Calauag received a message from Atimonan that twelve (12) enemy transports were seen off Atimonan. He sent Company "C" immediately by rail to Malibuy, and ordered the demolition detachments of the 51st Engineers to move all rolling stock (railroad) to Calauag and destroy all bridges behind it. He evacuated all trucks to Malibuy. Colonel Cordero proceeded to Gumaca where he caught up with Company "G", 524 Infantry, and found that it had been cut off by hostile landings at Sian about 11:30 PM, 23 December 1941. The enemy was reported to be marching from Sian on Atimonan. Colonel Cordero ordered Lieutenant Cleary to move Company "C" by bus to Pitogo on Tayabas Bay, and thence by water to Padre Burgos. Three large motor boats were commandeered at Macalalan and Company "C" embarked and set out. Two of the boats were sunk by bombs by enemy planes off Unisan with a loss of sixty (60) men. The remaining boat made Losna safely early on 25 December. Colonel Cordero and staff went by banca from Pitogo to Padre Burgos on 24 December, and discovered that the enemy had reached Malibuy and was advancing by marching along the railroad northwest toward Padre Burgos.

After destroying the railroad out at Padre Burgos, Colonel Cordero proceeded through the swamps south of Malibuy around the left of the Japanese lines and reported at Paghilao at 11:00 AM 25 December and reassumed command of the remainder of his regiment (524 Infantry)

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When the enemy attacked at Atimonan, its garrison consisted of the 1st Battalion, 584 Infantry (less Companies "B" and "C" and two machine gun platoons). No survivors of the garrison have ever turned up. Its fate is unknown. Company "B", 584 Infantry, when cut off in Camarines Norte, continued harassing operations in the Escal for several days and then was disbanded. Lts. Dobricic and Silbey took off across country and landed at Corregidor by banca, towards the end of January 1942. Lieutenant L. C. Shultz, Infantry, was killed in action in Camarines Norte.

In order to present a clear picture of future operations, of the 584 Infantry, at Malibuy, it is now necessary to consider the situation in the northeastern part of the sector. On 23 December, the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 1st Philippine Army (Regular) Division, under orders of the Commanding General (Major General George M. Parker, Jr.) South Luzon Force, arrived at Pagsanjan, Laguna, on 23 December, and relieved the 34 Battalion, 584 Infantry, taking over its subsector, which reverted to control of the Commanding General, South Luzon Force. The 24 Battalion, 1st Infantry relieved the troops at Mauban, Tayabas, and the 34 Battalion, 1st Infantry, relieved those at Infanta and Tugman, Tayabas. The 1st Infantry (less 24 and 34 Battalions) was held in reserve near Pagsanjan. The relief was completed at about 6:00 PM, 23 December. The Commanding General 1st Division (General Jones) moved the 34 Battalion, 584 Infantry to Malibuy as fast as the companies were relieved. At Malibuy the railroad rejoins Route #1 and after leaving it at Sian and crossing the neck of the peninsula to Padre Burgos. From Malibuy, reserve could be moved quickly by motor or rail to Sian, or by motor to the strong delaying positions on the eastern slope of the Quizon National Park Ridge, or to the easily obstructed railroad out at Padre Burgos. Therefore at dark, 23 December the 584 Infantry (less the 24 Battalion, still in sector reserve at Santo Tomas) was strategically located to meet any hostile landing near Atimonan. To strengthen further the defense of the Atimonan

beaches, the Division Commander sometime previously had requested higher headquarters to move two 150-mm guns to Atimonan in order to cover the channel between Atimonan and Alibot Island, thereby denying it to enemy vessels. This request had been denied on the grounds that the few available guns of the 86th Field Artillery (150-mm guns) were necessary for the defense of Masagbe, Balaan and Batangas Bays. Had these guns been in position at Atimonan the night of 23-24 December, they could have brought effective fire to bear on the hostile vessels. The relief of the 3d Battalion, 304th Infantry, by the 1st Infantry had just been completed when orders were received from the Commanding General, South Luzon Force for the immediate relief of the 1st Infantry and its concentration at Pagsanjan preparatory to its movement into Northern Luzon. The Division Commander protested this order vigorously on the grounds that the situation on the Bicol was threatening and asked that the movement be delayed. This was denied. The Division Commander then asked that the movement be postponed until the following day in order that the troops be rested and that buses and trucks be refueled and serviced after the long hauls over the mountain roads. This request was also denied, and the movement was directed to take place immediately. It was in progress when the enemy landed at Sian and Mauban that night, 23-24 December 1941. Therefore there was no reserve at Malibuy at the time of the hostile landing, and only one reinforced company (Company "A", 504th Infantry) at Atimonan. Fortunately the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, was still at Masagbe when the Japanese landed there, and it delayed the enemy advance in a position several kilometers west of Mauban. The Division Commander received first information of the hostile landing at Sian about 2:00 AM, 24 December at his Command Post at Santo Tomas. Report of the landing at Mauban was received at about 4:00 AM, 24 December. When General Jones learned that Colonel Cordero had been cut off at Guman, he immediately assigned Colonel A. C. Young to

command the 524 Infantry and ordered him to move the 524 Infantry (less 1st and 3d Battalions) at once from Santo Tomas to Malibuy and delay the advance of the enemy and if possible hold him on the prepared position on the zig-zag road through Quezon National Park, where demolitions and road blocks had been prepared previously. Colonel Young and his command arrived by bus at Malibuy at 8:30 AM, 24 December. Route #1 from Malibuy, east through Quezon National Park was subjected to heavy aerial bombardment at frequent intervals and Young's force was frequently pinned to the ground while moving forward to gain contact with the enemy. The demolitions on the Zig-zag Road failed to interrupt the road effectively and the Division Commander sent Lieutenant Robert Powell (an American mining engineer and reserve officer) with truckload of dynamite to complete the Zig-zag demolitions. Powell's truck was exploded by a shell from an enemy tank which it encountered at the foot of the Zig-zag. Powell and his men escaped by leaping from the truck into the ditches on the roadside. At 10:20 AM, 24 December, Colonel Young's Headquarters at Malibuy was severely bombed and then attacked by an infantry force preceded by light tanks and armored cars. The tanks were stopped by fire from .50 caliber machine guns, one tank and one armored car being put out of action. Young met the attack with his reserves, but the enemy infantry overwhelmed them in hand to hand encounter. Colonel Young with a number of survivors were cut off and worked their way back through the swamps through the Japanese lines and arrived at Luena, Taybas, about 9:00 PM, 25 December and reported for duty.

Major Elliott G. Babcock, American Instructor, assumed command of the 2d Battalion, 524 Infantry, and the survivors of Young's detachment, and held a delaying position on the river just west of Malibuy covering Route #1 and the Manila Railroad. This position was held until the 534 Infantry (less two Battalions on beach defense on Taybas Bay) arrived during the afternoon of 24 December and Colonel Postwright took command of the delaying forces. During the period from the 28th to the 34th of December, the 51st and 534 Infantry had

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been intensively preparing beach defense positions, entrenching, erecting obstacles, at both high and low water lines, constructing road blocks, engaging in rifle marksmanship and other urgently needed training. One battalion of each regiment was held continually in a central location in subsector reserve. Sporadic aerial bombing of Lorena, Sariayaw and the airfield at Batangas and of the railroad yards at San Pablo, were the only hostile actions in these subsectors up to 24 December. At 11:45 AM, 24 December, the Division Commander was aware of the foregoing situations as they existed at Malibuy and several kilometers west of Mauban. Colonel Boatwright was ordered by telephone to proceed at once with his reserve battalion and take up a position west of Malibuy to delay the enemy and cover the withdrawal and reorganization of the 32d Infantry. In the meanwhile, the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry (less the company at Mauban) had rejoined the regiment near Malibuy. The Division Commander estimated the enemy strength as a reinforced division. The main force first landed a beachhead unopposed at Sian, just before midnight 23-24 December, and then landed the remainder of the combat forces on the beaches to the west, including Atimonan. The force which landed at Mauban was estimated as a brigade. Both forces landed light tanks and armored cars. Eventually both forces united on Route #1, just east of Sariaya, and moved west thereon leaving a containing force opposed to the 1st Infantry (less 3d Battalion at Tiguaman) near Lusia, on Route #83 on the mountain pass. An aerial reconnaissance of the water area west of Alabat Island, off Atimonan on 23 December in order to obtain information of any enemy vessels in that vicinity just before dark, was requested by the Division Commander, and it is reported that Headquarters South Luzon Force ordered this reconnaissance performed. For some unknown reason, either the area was not reconnoitered or, the mission, if performed, failed to locate the enemy transports which must have been there, in order to appear off Atimonan as they did at 10:00 PM 23 December. The Japanese dominated the air. The few

outfitted reconnaissance planes manned by Filipino aviators, available to the Commanding General, South Luzon Force, operated under the most hazardous conditions. Probably this is the reason why the enemy transports were not discovered. Once again the Japanese, pursuant to their custom as indicated by several historical examples, attacked under cover of darkness at a point where least resistance could be expected. However the distance from their landing places to Manila Bay was so great that they lost all the advantages which they might have gained by forcing a landing against the opposition at Naguabon, Balayan, or Batangas Bays. The foregoing depicts conditions and the situation in the South Luzon Sector leading up to noon 24 December, when General Parker turned command of the South Luzon Sector over to General Jones. General Jones retained command of the 51st Division and the 1st Infantry was attached thereto at noon 24 December.

EVENTS FROM NOON 24 DECEMBER 1941 TO MIDNIGHT 1 JANUARY 1942

Command of the South Luzon Force was turned over to Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, by Major General George M. Parker, Jr., United States Army, with instructions to place the provisions of W.P.O. #8 in effect. General Parker informed General Jones, that Headquarters USAFFE had ordered him to move the 41st Division, Philippine Army by motor to Abucay, Bataan, at once. General Parker turned over the following staff officers to General Jones for general staff duty at the new Headquarters South Luzon Force, which was established at Santo Tomas, Batangas:

Colonel S. C. MacDonald, Infantry, G/S

Captain Christensen, G-2,

Lieutenant Colonel A. R. Shreve, Field Artillery, G-3

The afternoon of 24 December was spent by the new Commander of the South Luzon Force in organizing the Force Headquarters, setting forth his policies and his plans for delaying the advance of the enemy, to his new Chief of Staff, Colonel MacDonald, arranging

for the 42d Infantry to take over the defense of the 41st Division Sector, and making necessary spot decisions, preliminary to taking over personal command of the forces engaged with the enemy on the Malibay and Mauban fronts.

22 December. Early this date, General Jones established his forward command post at Sariaya with the Command Post, 53d Infantry (making use of its facilities) in telegraphic and telephonic communications with his Chief of Staff at Force Headquarters at Santo Tomas (about sixty kilometers distant) and made a P.R. of front line troops of the 53d Infantry opposing the enemy east of Pagbilao. The few American officers and non-commissioned officers under Colonel Boatwright were having great difficulty in stabilizing the relatively untrained Filipino troops who were receiving their baptism of fire. There was much waste of ammunition in firing at imaginary enemies. The leading Japanese infantry supported by light mortars and light machine-guns was very aggressive, and in spite of heavy going, continually outflanked our delaying troops. Our troops would not stand close contact with the enemy in spite of the gallant examples set by American personnel who often found themselves deserted by their troops when the enemy closed in on them. Casualties among this group were unusually heavy because of this. Their services were so vitally essential that General Jones instructed Colonel Boatwright to have them exert more caution in setting examples.

The two main avenues of hostile approach were Route #23 on Tayabas and Route #1 on Lucena. The enemy was advancing on Pagbilao on Route #1, and on Lucena via the Mauban Road. The Force Commander (General Jones) coordinated the delaying actions on both fronts in order to prevent either force from being cut off. The problem was made more difficult by the split in Route #1 at Pagbilao where a branch route led to Tayabas, and thence southwest to rejoin Route #1 just East of Sariaya. Colonel Cordaro was ordered to cover this branch route and took up a delaying position with the 53d Infantry

a few kilometers northwest of Pagbilao. Colonel Boatwright with the 534 Infantry (less two Battalions on beach defense) held the stream at Pagbilao after destroying the highway bridge. The 1st Infantry (less 3d Battalion) held a delaying position about seven kilometers west of Mauban. The motorized (half track) patrol from Company "C" 194th Tank Battalion (American) was charged with patrolling Route #23 from Tayabas to Lucban and, with maintaining contact between the 1st Infantry (Major Rumbold, American Instructor) and the 534 Infantry. This was the situation at noon December 25th. After noon, the 1st Infantry withdrew, through some misunderstanding of orders, and the Force Commander, learning of the withdrawal, personally intercepted the column (in busses) and moved it back from the vicinity of Cavinti (southeast of Pagsanjan) until stopped by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire near Barrio Pies, three miles northeast of the junction of the Mauban Road and Route #23. A half track (the reconnaissance patrol) was put out of action during this engagement, which took place just at dark about 7:00 PM, 25 December. The crew of this half track (from Company "C", 194th Tank Battalion, Captain Moffett, commanding) captured two light machine guns and put their crews out of action. A heavy machine-gun was also put out of action. One platoon of Company "C", 194th Tank Battalion was attached to the 1st Infantry at 9:00 PM, 25 December. Major Rumbold was ordered to fight delaying actions and when forced to withdraw, to fall back via Laisians to the mountain pass just north thereof and hold it until further orders.

This date the Provisional Battalion, 86th Field Artillery (155-mm guns) Major Winfield Scott, Commanding, and detachments from provisional battalion of Field Artillery, Self Propelled Mounts, Lieutenant Colonel David S. Babcock, Field Artillery, Commanding, supported the action of the 534 and 534 Infantry regiments from 24 December until withdrawn, some days later by higher authority. The 534 Infantry (less one Battalion) held in position near Pagbilao until forced to withdraw during the night 25-26 December, when it took up a position just



west of Tayabas. The 53d Infantry (less beach defenses) was forced to withdraw during the afternoon of 25 December and fought delaying actions to Lucena where it held.

26 December. The attack of the enemy on the 1st Infantry at daybreak, put the entire platoon of Company "C", 194th Tank Battalion out of action by artillery fire, killing Lieutenant Needham. Major Humbold withdrew his troops to the Luisiana position. This same date a detachment of about 375 enlisted men (mostly averaged Philippine Scouts, who had been engaged in guard, administration and supply duties at Fort William McKinley) under the command of Major McKee, were attached to the South Luzon Force. General Jones attached them to the 1st Infantry, relieved Major Humbold and placed Major McKee in command. From this date on, the 1st Infantry reinforced successfully, blocked the enemy and denied his progress to the north over Route #23. The enemy apparently left a small containing force, or flank or rear guard opposed to the 1st Infantry near Luisiana, and the bulk of his main force joined the main enemy force just east of Sariaya.

About noon, 26 December, General Jones withdrew the 3d Battalion, 53d Infantry from Tayabas Bay beaches and attached it to the Provisional Infantry Battalion (1st Field Artillery, less 2 Field Artillery Batteries, Colonel E. F. Seawright, Field Artillery, United States Army, Commanding) and ordered Colonel Seawright to take up a delaying position astride Route #1 on the eastern outskirts of Sariaya and cover the withdrawal of the 53d Infantry (Colonel Seawright) and the 52d Infantry (Colonel Cordero). A platoon of tanks was attached to Seawright's command. The withdrawal of these forces was effected by dark 26 December. Seawright held the Sariaya position until 1:00 AM, 27 December when he withdrew to Tiaong on orders of the Force Commander. These movements were made by bus. This date (26 December) the 2d Regiment, Philippine Constabulary was attached to the South Luzon Force and arrived in a bivouac area near Barrio Santiago, on Route #1, southeast of Calamba.

At 7:00 PM, 26 December, the Force Commander established his forward Command Post at Candelaria, where he ordered Boatwright to occupy a strong position with outpost along the river just east of Candelaria and main line of resistance along the west bank of the river just west of the town. It was a strong position and the bridges were prepared for destruction. Colonel Cordere was ordered to occupy a position near Lussan to cover the withdrawal of the 53d Infantry. Boatwright was expected to have little difficulty in holding the Candelaria position for at least twenty-four hours. All of the troops of the 53d Infantry on beach defense on Taybas Bay east of Kalakub II were relieved and rejoined the regiment.

27 December. Boatwright began the withdrawal from the Candelaria position during the late afternoon under some enemy pressure, and by 8:30 PM his force was in full retreat. The Force Commander, realizing the poor condition of this force ordered it to move by bus to Barrio Santiago (Southeast of Calambel) for rest and reorganization. Headquarters South Luson Force moved from Santo Tomas to Bisan on this date (27 December). All bridges on the Candelaria-Holbec-Rosaria Road were destroyed and a small flank guard was placed in the vicinity of Holbec to maintain contact with the enemy and keep the Force Commander advised of the situation.

28 December. The 52d Infantry, Colonel Cordere Commanding, held at Lussan under heavy enemy pressure until 9:15 AM, 28 December, when it was outflanked and withdrew, under orders of the Force Commander and took up position covering the left (east) flank of the main defensive position at Tiaong. Colonel Young's forces held the main position.

Up until this time, the 51st Infantry (Colonel Stewart) had been holding its beach defense position without any hostile contact. On 28 December it was withdrawn to a delaying position near Lipa, covering approaches from the east and south. All bridges in the area south and east of Lipa were destroyed.

A very strong position was prepared at Tisong, covering the defile through which Route #1 approached San Pablo. Colonel A. C. Young was given command of the troops which consisted of the 1st Battalion, 51st Infantry, the 504 Infantry (less 1st Battalion, lost in the Atimunan action and a company of the 3d Battalion, lost at Mauban), the Provisional Infantry Battalion formed from the 51st Field Artillery, a battery of the 51st Field Artillery, and all the tanks and self-propelled-mount field artillery remaining in the sector. The Force Commander had planned to hold this position strongly because of its natural and strategic advantages and because he now had sufficient strength in personnel withdrawn from the beaches to make a real stand.

The detachment of Philippine Scouts were withdrawn from the 1st Infantry and placed in a position at the road junction northwest of San Pablo to cover the roads to the north and east and to insure the protection of the rear of the Tisong position (Major McKee was in command of this detachment).

The 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry still held the beach at Tignosa and the pass on the Tignosa Ferry Road. The 1st Infantry (less 3d Battalion) with a small detachment of tanks and self-propelled - mounts artillery still held the pass on Route #83 near Luisiana.

The 2d Regiment, Philippine Constabulary, was in general reserve near Barric, Santiago.

The enemy attacked the Tisong position on the afternoon of 28 December, but was easily repulsed with some losses. Our losses were negligible. At that time probably because of the demolitions, the enemy apparently had been unable to bring his artillery and motor transport forward with the exception of motorcycles and bicycles.

Orders were received from USAFFE on the evening of 28 December to speed up the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force in order to keep abreast of the withdrawal of the North Luzon Force. The situation in North Luzon was unknown to the Commanding General South Luzon Force during this period, except for occasional news

flashes picked up on the radio, which were of little value.

29 December. The 1st Infantry (less 3d Battalion) was withdrawn to a position near Los Banos covering Route #21 south of Laguna de Bay and the 3d Battalion was withdrawn from Tiaman to Pililla so as to cover Route #21 east and north of Laguna de Bay.

Colonel Young was ordered to place his command in position astride Route #1 at Barrio Santiago (north of Santo Tomas) and also take command of the force astride Route #21 at Los Banos. The 1st Infantry (less 3d Battalion) at Los Banos and the 3d Philippine Constabulary at Santiago were attached to Colonel Young's command at the time. Young's detachment occupying the Los Banos-Santiago position consisted of the following:

- 1st Battalion, 51st Infantry,
- 3d Battalion, 53d Infantry,
- Provisional Infantry Battalion, 51st Field Artillery,
- One 3-gun Battery, 51st Field Artillery,
- Detachment Philippine Scouts (Fort William McKinley-  
Major McKee)
- 1st Infantry, (less 3d Battalion),
- 3d Philippine Constabulary Regiment.

It was intended that the elements of the 51st and 53d Infantry Regiments listed above, be relieved from Colonel Young's command in time to rejoin their normal commands for the movement into Batang. However, this was not accomplished and these units of the 51st and 53d Infantry Regiments moved into Batang under Colonel Young's command and rejoined their regiments there, near Limay, Batang.

The 53d Infantry (less 3d Battalion) moved by bus to bivouac area near Barrio, Tagig (near Fort William McKinley).

The 51st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) plus one gun Battery, 51st Field Artillery, withdrew through Colonel Young's position at Barrio Santiago, and moved by bus and marching to Alabang (south of

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Fort William McKinley) and was ordered to prepare a delaying position there.

The 52d Infantry was ordered to move by bus to San Fernando, Pampanga in compliance with orders from USAFFE to move the South Luzon Force north of the Pampanga River.

The 1st Brigade, Philippine Constabulary (less 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment) General De Jesus commanding, was attached to the South Luzon Force and was ordered to relieve the 42d Infantry (occupying beach defenses in the former 41st Division Sector) and to cover approaches to Manila via Routes #17 and #25, the 42d Infantry to move by bus to Abucay.

All the movements were initiated during the night of 28-29 December except the bus movements of the 52d and 53d Infantry Regiments, which moved to San Fernando, Pampanga, the night of 29-30 December.

Headquarters South Luzon Force moved from Bisan to Fort William McKinley the night 29-30 December.

The withdrawal of Colonel Young's force from the Tisong Position to the Santiago Position was uneventful, the enemy apparently awaiting reinforcements before renewing the attack on that strong position.

There was no hostile contact on the Los Bance position 29 December nor on the Santiago position until dark 29 December, when there were evidences of hostile patrol activities only. There was no contact in the area east of Laguna Bay, the enemy on that front remaining south of Pagsanjan on December 30.

30 December. About 10:30 AM, 30 December, Headquarters USAFFE (Colonel Traywick) ordered the Commanding General, South Luzon Force not to withdraw further unless forced to do so by hostile pressure. The Force Commander then visited Colonel Young at Santiago and made detailed plans for an ambush when the enemy should attack that strong position.

About dark that same date, Headquarters USAFFE (General Marshall) by telephone ordered the South Luzon Force (Colonel MacDonald, Chief-of-Staff-General Jones was with Young at Santiago) to push the withdrawal and insure that the entire South Luzon Force would clear the Calumpit Bridge over the Pampanga River not later than 6:00 AM, 1 January 1945, because of the rapid advance of the enemy against the North Luzon Force.

The 24 Philippine Constabulary Regiment was detached from Colonel Young's command and returned to Brigade control under General De Jesus, who was ordered to relieve all elements of the 51st Division at once and cover their withdrawal.

The 51st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) with the gun battery 51st Field Artillery, attached, Colonel Loren F. Stewart, Commanding, then at Tagig, was ordered to Floridal with the mission of covering the approaches to the Calumpit Bridge, (Pampanga River) from the east and secure the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force across the Pampanga River.

The 1st Brigade, Philippine Constabulary, was covering Route #17 and #26 at Silang and Indang (Indana) with the 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment and Routes #1 and #21 at Santiago and Los Banos with the 2d Constabulary Regiment, General De Jesus ordered his Brigade to Fort McKinley during the night of 30-31 December and to withdraw into Bataan during the night 31 December-1 January clearing the Calumpit Bridge not later than 6:00 AM, 1 January 1945. The rear guard of the 1st Philippine Constabulary cleared the Calumpit Bridge about 3:00 AM, 1 January.

31 December. The Commanding General South Luzon Force arrived with his forward echelon at Floridal at about 3:00 AM, 31 December, and established his forward Command Post in the schoolhouse there. He instructed his Chief-of-Staff by telephone to close the Command Post at Fort McKinley at once and to report to him at Floridal. At that time the bulk of the 51st Division

had cleared the Calumpit Bridge en route to Batang.

Colonel Stewart's Force was en route to Floridel. Colonel Young's Force cleared the bridge during the day.

The 51st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) plus the gun battery, (all commanded by Colonel Stewart) arrived by bus at Floridel, by Battalions, one on arriving at 6:00 AM, and the other at 9:00 AM, and was placed in a position astride Route #8, just east of Floridel, covering the approaches from the east (Baliuag) and the highway and railroad bridges over the river at Floridel. The position was occupied during the morning of 31 December.

At about 10:00 AM (31 December) Headquarters USAFFE (General Sutherland) telephoned General Jones and directed him to take over command of all forces east of the Pampanga River and to hold the Calumpit Bridge until the 1st Brigade Philippine Constabulary had cleared it, and to instruct General De Jesus to clear the bridge with his forces not later than 6:00 AM, 1 January 1942. General De Jesus was so instructed.

The 91st Division, Philippine Army, North Luzon Force, with attached units, having been forced back from Cobanatuan via Route #8, entered Baliuag about daybreak 31 December. General Jones located General Stevens (91st Division Commander) at about 8:00 AM near Baliuag and directed him to place the remainder of his division just west of Baliuag and delay the advance of the enemy. During the morning, the 71st Division, Philippine Army arrived in that vicinity and was attached to General Steven's Command. All tanks and self-propelled artillery in the area were also attached to General Steven's command.

Early in the afternoon, the 71st Infantry suddenly ambushed and withdrew to San Fernando without the knowledge of General Jones. (It appears from the records of the North Luzon Force that this movement was ordered by that Headquarters.

As soon as the withdrawal came to his attention, General Jones instructed General Stevens to stop the movement. It appears that General Stevens was not aware of the withdrawal of the 71st Infantry. At about that time, Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, Commanding General, North Luzon Force, arrived at the Forward Command Post, South Luzon Force, at Floridel. He was apparently unaware of the fact that USAFFE had placed General Jones in command of all forces east of the Pampanga River until so informed by General Jones. General Wainwright at once ordered General Stevens to stop the withdrawal of the 71st Infantry and to take up position on the west bank of the Pampanga River at Calumpit and cover the withdrawal of the 51st Infantry and attached troops.

About 5:00 PM, the tanks, supported by the self-propelled artillery, on General Jones' order, attacked the enemy in Baliuag, causing him serious damage. The attack was followed by a concentration of artillery fire which was placed on the enemy until nearly dark. The combination of the tank attack and the artillery concentration so demoralized the enemy that he made no further attempt to advance until about 4:00 AM 1 January 1942.

The 51st Infantry held in position without hostile pressure until after 3:00 AM, 1 January when it withdrew by bus and proceeded via San Fernando into Bataan.

1 January 1942. The 51st Infantry (less one Battalion) plus the battery of Field Artillery, withdrew into Bataan as indicated above.

The forward echelon of Headquarters, South Luzon Force closed at Floridel at 1:00 AM 1 January and reopened at the west end of the Calumpit Bridge shortly afterwards. General Jones remained there until the 1st Brigade, Philippine Constabulary and all other units of the South Luzon Force had cleared the Calumpit Bridge, and at 6:20 AM after the bridge had been destroyed on General Wainwright's orders, General Jones proceeded into Bataan, Headquarters South Luzon Force ceased to exist at 6:20 AM, 1 January



1942. Headquarters 51st Division (contained) in Headquarters South Luzon Force closed at Galangit at 6:00 AM 1 January and reopened on the trail leading west from Limay, Bataan, upon General Jones' arrival there about 10:00 AM, same date.

The 51st Division assembled in a bivouac area on the trail west of Limay where it rested and reorganized until 5 January when it took over the defense of the West Sub-sector of the II Philippine Corps (from Hacienda Abucay west to Mount Natib.)

CONCLUSIONS:

This account is made up from memory and after consulting with Colonel Young and Boatwright in the Karesno, Taiwan Camp, for prisoners of war, several months after the events transpired and without documentary evidence.

After the South Luzon Force withdrew across South Luzon, it demolished all highway and railroad bridges which would have facilitated the rapid advance of the enemy. Rolling stock, motor vehicles, food supplies, gasoline, etc, were evacuated whenever practicable or destroyed when necessary to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

Local inhabitants were advised through civil authorities to take to the mountains, taking food, clothing, medicines, live stock, draft animals, etc, with them, before the advance of the enemy. The Batangas, Tayabas, and Laguna Bus Companies were given ample opportunity to evacuate motor equipment and supplies.

Demolitions were so effective that it is thought that the South Luzon Force could have delayed the enemy advance on Manila for a considerable period, if necessary. The destruction of many railroad bridges undoubtedly interrupted all movement of railroad rolling stock for many months, from the Mind peninsulas into Manila.

After their baptism of fire, the Philippine Army Troops steadied down and their American Commanders were able to withdraw in an orderly manner and to control their tactical disposition effectively.

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It is the consensus of opinion of these American Commanders that the Philippine Army Troops made excellent soldiers when properly trained and led by Americans. Some Filipino officers proved themselves to be capable leaders, brave and efficient, but the great majority lacked experience and were unable to win the confidence of their men. Certainly all field and general officers should be American. Efficient company and staff officers of lower units can be developed among the more able Filipinos, but it will be a long process.

A. M. JONES  
Major General, U.S. Army

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