No 79

57th

INFANTRY REGIMENT

No. 79

No 79

Cabinet 101
Drawer 3

REFERENCE TO

57th Infantry

Extracted from Vol. I of

"TRIUMPH IN THE PHILIPPINES"

But while December 7 meant "Pearl Harbor" to most of the world, it meant "Clark Field" to the Filipinos and the Americans in the Philippines -- the date to them, halfway around the world and across the international date line, was December 8, 1941. At almost the same moment that the Japs hit Pearl Harbor, they made their attack on Clark Field in Central Luzon, only fifty miles from Manila. There they knocked out the American Far Eastern Air Force with almost the same devastating effect they dealt the U. S. Pacific Fleet 5,000 miles away.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 34

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The North Luzon Force, dispersed throughout the central and northern Luzon area,* was commanded by Major General Wainwright. It included two units of the Regular Army, the 31st Infantry Regiment and the 192d Tank Battalion, a former National Guard Organization, as well as six units of the Philippine Scouts. These were the 45th and the 57th Infantries, (PS); the 26th Cav. (PS) and the 23rd, 24th and 88th F.A. Regiments (PS). General Wainwright also had the following Philippine Army Divisions:

The 11th Reserve Division under Col. William E. Brougher, AUS

* 7-8 Dec 41

The 21st Reserve Division under Brig. Gen. Mateo M. Capinpin, PA

The 31st Reserve Division under Col Clifford Bluemel, AUS

The 71st Reserve Division under Col Clyde A. Sellech, AUS

The 91st Reserve Division under Brig. Gen Luther Stevens, AUS

The South Luzon Force was under the command of Brig. General George Parker. It consisted of one Regular Army unit, the 194th Tank Battalion; one Philippine Scout unit, the 86th Field Artillery; the 1st and the 2nd Philippine Constabulary Regiments, and three Philippine Army Divisions:

The 1st Regular Division under Brig. Gen. Fidel Segundo, PA

The 41st Reserve Division under Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim,

The 51st Reserve Division under Col. Albert M. Jones, AUS

The Visayan-Mindanao force was commanded by Col. William F. Sharp, with headquarters in Mindanao, and it contained no Regular Army units. It had one Philippine Scout Regiment, the 43rd Infantry; the 3rd Philippine Constabulary Regiment, and three Philippine Army divisions:

The 61st Reserve Division, under Col. Bradford G. Chynoweth, USA.

The 81st Reserve Division, under Col. Guy D. Fort, PA

The 101st Reserve Division, under Col. Joseph P. Vachon, PA.

There were also elements of other divisions including the 2d Infantry, the 73rd Infantry and the 93rd Infantry.

The Harbor Defense Command, consisting of Corregidor and its satellite islands, was commanded by Brig. Gen. George F. Moore and was composed of two Regular Army Regiments, the 59th and 60th Coast Artillery; two Philippine Scout units, the 91st and the 92nd Coast Artillery Regiments, and the 4th U. S. Marine Regiment, which had just been moved in from Subic Bay.

Command headquarters feared that the single blow at Clark Field had virtually decided the course of the war in the Philippines. The 26th Cavalry, bombed out of Fort Stotsenburg, moved into the nearby mountains, prepared to strike at the first enemy beach landing wherever it might come. On December 9, Nichols Field, another key army air base at Manila was bombed almost to destruction. The Japs apparently hoped to catch that part of the FEAF which had gone there for refuge. Group installation destruction, however, was all they accomplished — but that was complete.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 42, 43 & 44.

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--Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 12, 13 & 14.

57 Inf.

The Bataan Defense Force which was setting up the defense of Bataan, consisted of the 31st and the 41st Divisions of the Philippine Army and the 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment, all under Major General George Parker.*

The headquarters of the Philippine Department was converted into the Service Command for Bataan, under Brigadier General Allen C. McBride.

The NLF under General Jonathan M. Wainwright, at this point, had the 31st Infantry, Regular Army; the 45th Infantry, 57th Infantry, 26th Cavalry, 23rd Field Artillery, 24th Field Artillery, and 88th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts; the 11th Division, 21st Division, 71st Division and 91st Division, Philippine Army.

Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, commanding the SLF, had the 86th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, and the 1st and 51st Division of the Philippine Army, with artillery reinforcement.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 62 & 63.

* 24 Dec 41

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*Vol I, Troops in the Philippines, pp. 27 & 28.

*24 Jan 41

57 Inf.

Once the new line from Abucay to Moron was occupied,* the Northern and Southern Luzon Forces ceased to exist. In their places were created the 1st and 2nd Corps respectively, the 1st under General Wainwright, who had commanded NLF, and the 2nd under General Parker, who had for a short time commanded the SLF. The Corps areas were divided by a north-south line drawn generally through Mount Natib and Samat. General Wainwright's corps took the left (West) half of the main line of resistance, its left flank anchored south of Moron on the China Sea, and its right on the slopes of Mount Natib. From Mount Natib eastward to a point below Abucay, General Parker's 2nd Corps held the front. Wainwright located his command post near Bagac, on the China Sea; Parker had his headquarters below Orion, on Manila Bay.

General Wainwright established the units on his 1st Corps line as follows:

The 1st Regular Division, Philippine Army, occupied the main battle position.

The 31st Division, Philippine Army, guarded the beaches from Moron southward to the vicinity of Caibobo Point.

The 45th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, was organizing a reserve battle position along the Pilar-Bagac Road, ten to twelve miles to the rear.

* 5 Jan 42

The 91st Division, Philippine Army (to which were attached remnants of the 71st Division, Philippine Army, after it had been badly cut up at Layac Junction), was in Corps Reserve. It was reorganizing preparatory to relieving the 45th Infantry on the reserve battle position.

The 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, (cut off at Layac) was still working its way through the mountains to rejoin the 1st Corps. General Wainwright's 11th and 21st Divisions, Philippine Army, were given to the 2nd Corps. (The 11th was later returned).

On the other side of the peninsula, General Parker placed the 51st and the 41st Divisions, Philippine Army, on the main battle position, from left to right, with the 57th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, on the right flank to protect the beaches along Manila Bay.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 85, 86, 87.

57 Inf.

The Japanese attempts to break through on the right flank consisted of two separate attacks. Both of these battles together are
two separate attacks. Both of these battles together are
commonly called "The Battle of Abucay," which lasted from the twelfth of January until the twenty-fifth. The first Jap attempt to smash the 2nd Corps line was directed against the 57th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, which anchored the right flank to the Manila Bay beach.

The actual attack began on January 12, though the 57th had made initial contact with the Japanese on January 9, in a patrol action against the advance elements of the Nara Group. This preliminary skirmish took place one kilometer south of Hermosa as the Japanese put out feelers to probe the American defenses. The next day, the U.S. patrols found more Japs west of Orani. There was no heavy combat, however, until early on the morning of January 12, when strong Jap forces hit the left flank of the regimental sector. The Japs again made the mistake of advancing along the roads in close column formation and the result, as far as the American artillery men were concerned was an "artillerymen's dream."

Nevertheless, supported by heavy counterbattery fire, the Nipponese, kept coming and finally succeeded in penetrating the main battle position of the 3rd Battalion, on the left flank, on the morning of

January 13. By this time the 3rd Battalion had suffered such heavy casualties that it was no longer effective. A company of the reserve 1st Battalion counter-attacked to restore the line but the attempt failed because the counter-attacking force was too small.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 94 & 95.

57 Inf.

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 94 & 95.

57 Inf.

That afternoon,× two battalions of the 21st Infantry, Philippine Army, were assigned to the commanding officer of the 57th. One of these was ordered to take the place of K Company in the main line of resistance, while the other was ordered to the regimental reserve line. Both battalions somehow got into the reserve and the K Company withdrew from the MLR. This left a gap, of which the Japs took immediate advantage.

The situation was desperate. Colonel Arnold J. Funk, of General Parker's staff, was placed in command of the 57th Infantry and he obtained the 22d Infantry, Philippine Army, to help established the 57th's line. The 22d Infantry counterattacked on the morning of January 15 in the face of heavy shelling and aerial bombardment, suffering many casualties.

The counterattack continued, pushing forward gradually, through January 21. On that date a final assault carried several kilometers into the Japanese lines. Combat patrols went out to chase the fleeing Japs inflicted further heavy casualties. When the battle was over, the line had been restored, scores of Jap dead were counted, and much precious materials had been captured. Colonel Funk, his task successfully accomplished, turned over the 57th Infantry to a new commander, Colonel Fry and returned to his staff duties. He was promoted to Brigadier General on January 24.

×13 Jan 42

Though the line was reestablished, Olongapo had fallen on January 10 and thus a gate was provided through which reinforcements could pass to replace Japanese losses. The badly battered 57th Infantry was withdrawn to Signal Hill, to the south, to reorganize the recover. It remained in reserve until the last days of the fighting. Its section of the Abucay line was taken over by the 21st Infantry, Philippine Army.

On January 17th the Japanese, unsuccessful in their attempt to smash the line at Abucay, turned their attention to the sector at Abucay Hacienda occupied by the 41st Division, Philippine Army, launching an attack against it after a two-day artillery preparation.

The next day General Homma's headquarters received reports that elements of the Nara Group had reached a point eight kilometers southwest of Abucay, which would be approximately due south of the hacienda. Initially, the 41st Division gave ground. But time after time, between then and the twentieth, the men of the 41st succeeded by magnificent effort in retaking the lost ground, pushing back the Japanese for a distance of two miles on one occasion.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 96 & 97.

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 96 & 97.

57 Inf.

The entire Battle of the Points lasted from January 23, to February 13. Before it was over, Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units as well as the heavy mortar batteries on Corregidor were called upon to help wipe out the Japanese force. The weary 57th and 45th Infantries of the Philippine Scouts were pushed across Bataan from the Second Corps areas to help throw back the Japanese. A small detachment from the Fourth Marine Regiment, based on Corregidor was there too.

Smaller units from the Fifth Interceptor Command, the Second Philippine Constabulary Regiments, the Twelfth Infantry, Philippine Army; the 192nd Separate Tank Battalion, the Provisional Naval Battalion from the 16th Naval District, a company from the 803rd Engineers, Aviation, Regular Army, a battery from the 59th Coast Artillery Corps, Regular Army, crews from the USS Mary Ann, the USS Panay, the USS Canopus, the USS Fisheries II, and PT-35, worked to stem the invading tide. The three-weeks-long battle was a bloody and exhausting one for the Americans. For the Japanese it was a complete disaster.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 121

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 123

57th Inf

The Provisional Naval Battalion, initially charged with the task of driving off the Japs[x] was unable to carry out the mission. After four days the 2nd Battalion of the 57th Infantry arrived and was thrown into aid the Naval Battalion. Shortly thereafter, a part of the Forty Fifth Infantry arrived to help, along with the two Battalions of Field Artillery.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 123

[x] c 23 Jan 42

57th Inf.

Before the Battle of Pucot Hill was fairly well begun, another barge fleet landed a strong force at Agloloma Point at dawn on January 24. The initial landings at adjacent Quinauan Point were made at 2 A.M., on the twenty-fifth of January. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment, reinforced by a platoon of mortars, was successful in preventing immediate exploitation of the Japanese beachhead after their landing. For six gruelling days the Philippine Constabulary infantrymen were continually engaged in hand-to-hand combat. They were relieved by the 45th and the 57th Infantry Regiments of the Philippine Scouts.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 124

57th Inf Regt

Although the artillery plan was the key to the success of the Battle of Agloloma Bay, the fighting there was not without cost to the Fil-American forces. During the fight,[x] the 3rd Battalion of the Forty-Fifth Infantry, alone was cut down from six hundred to two hundred and twelve men and its senior surviving officer-in-command was a second lieutenant. The other battalions of the 45th as well as those of the 57th also suffered severely in the close-in jungle fighting. But the cost to the Japanese was much heavier.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 126

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 126

x 23-27 Jan 42

57th Inf

Anyasin Point served as the base of supply and operations for this northermost of the three Jap landings.* Their attempts to drive inland from it were never successful in getting even so far as the west coastal road. At Anyasin and Canas, the 57th Infantry bore the brunt of the fighting, as it had at Longaskawayan. It was supported by a battalion of the 45th Infantry, by the 17th Pursuit Squadron, AAP, fighting as infantry, and by a battalion of the 12th Infantry, Philippine Army.

The initial plan to drive the Japanese out of Canas-Silaiim-Anyasin area called for the 3rd Battalion of the 57th Infantry to strike along the Anyasin River Valley. The 1st Battalion of the 57th with an attached battalion of the Philippine Constabulary, was to move on the left of the 3rd Battalion through the jungle of Anyasin Point.

On the right flank of the 3rd Battalion the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Infantry extended to the north far enough to sweep the enemy from the Silaiim Point. North of Silaiim Point to Canas Point a battalion of the 12th Infantry was designated to take back the beach and hold it.

At Canas, where a small pocket of Japanese was cut off from the other force, the 17th Pursuit Squadron consisting of a mere 135 men was assigned to mop up and protect the flanks.

*27 Jan - 2 Feb, 42

The 2nd Battalion of the 57th Infantry was held in reserve. This Battalion had just rejoined the regiment after mopping up at Lonaskawayan Point. It had not been present at the Agloloma Bay Battle. Elements of Field Artillery and a few tanks from the 192nd Separate Tank Battalion were attached to the force. The tanks were used even though jungle conditions were unfavorable and the going was tough.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 127 & 128

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 127 & 128

57th Inf

The Battalion of the 57th Infantry, advancing through the jungle, was surprised and routed* when initial contact with the Japs was made but it reformed and after two days of slugging succeeded in capturing the Japanese base at Anyasin Point.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 129

* c 27 Jan 42

57 Inf.

At the northern flank of the beachhead, other Japs fought stubbornly on. The morning after the "Swimming retreat" -- February 12 -- they tore a large gap in the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Infantry. Nearly two hundred Japanese plunged through the hole. The reserve 3rd Battalion of the 57th Infantry, resting after its tough fighting all along the west coast, was called upon to keep the Japanese from taking the command post of the 57th. All but fifty to sixty of the Japs were slaughtered in the ensuing fight. Only one man of the Third Battalion was killed but when the fighting was over, his comrades found sixteen dead Nipponese soldiers in a semi-circle about his foxhole.

The Fifty-Seventh Infantry had put up a great fight but it was so badly exhausted from the siege at Longaskawayan, Agloloma and Anyasin, that it was sent to a reserve area at Signal Hill. There the remnants of the proud regiment spent seven weeks and a day as USAFFE reserve, a rest that was badly needed by the hungry, battle-worn and sick men.

Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 131 & 132.

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Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 171 & 172.

57th Inf

The 2nd Battalion of the 57th Infantry arrived on the morning of April 6 at the junction of trails 6 and 8, just in rear of what was left of the American lines south of Mount Samat. It was ordered to attack on the left of the 31st Infantry, AUS, along trail No. 2, but the 31st's attack had already been thrown back. Another battalion of the 57th Infantry was sent in to assist but eventually both battalions were forced to fall back Trail 8 to the San Vicente River where they were joined by their reserve battalion.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 173

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 173

57th Inf

The whole II Corps was ordered to withdraw that day x and to form a new line along the San Vicente River, facing generally northwest.

All day long the enemy, now firmly on Mount Samat, laid down observed artillery fire on the withdrawing elements of the Fil-American forces. The Thirty-First Infantry Regiment, Regular Army, had withdrawn to the south bank of the San Vicente River for the proposed new line where it was joined by the Fifty-Seventh Infantry. But USAFIP artillery had been silenced and a large gap existed in the hastily occupied river line. The position was untenable.

At the same time, the right flank of the I Corps was withdrawing to the south banck of the Binauangan River, where it could adjoin a new II Corps position along the Alangan River. The I Corps was still carrying out this withdrawal to the Binauangan when the surrender occurred on April 9.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 174

x 6 Apr 42

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-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 171

* 6 Apr 42

57th Inf

That morning,[x] the 57th Infantry was moved along trail 10 to attempt another new line along the Mamala River, which joins Manila Bay at Limay. Simultaneously, the 45th Infantry received orders to break contact with the enemy, withdraw by way of trail 8 and move behind the 57th Infantry, the 45th, however, was ambushed enroute and had to turn back again to the west rim of the Pantingan Valley. It remained there until the end.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 175

x 7 Apr 42

57th Inf

General Bluemel had hoped to withdraw his delaying forces to the south bank of the Mamala River on April 7. He consulted there with the commanders of the 26th Cavalry, the 57th Infantry, the 31st Infantry, US, and the 14 Engineers -- the only forces that he was able to hold on to in those last hectic days -- but he came to the decision that no effective defense could be made at that point. He then ordered a withdrawal to the south bank of the Alangan River, farther south.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 178

With the situation in the II Corps are somewhat worse than hopeless, General Clifford Bluemel personally led a few ragged remnants of Philippine Scouts and Regular Army units in attempts to stem the Jap tide at the Namala, the Alangan and the Lamao Rivers, and eventually at Cabcaben Airfield. He employed the regimental staff of the 26th Cavalry as his command group.

Early on April 8, the Fourteenth Engineers, PS, the 26th Cavalry, PS, the 31st Infantry, US, Regular Army, a part of the 57th Infantry, PS; the 803rd Aviation Engineers Battalion, US Regular Army, and the Provisional Air Corps Regiment, US Regular Army, were able to establish a line along the south bank of the Alangan River in spite of almost continuous enemy action.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 182

When the remnants of the 57th Infantry were ordered to withdraw on April 7, they found themselves completely cut off by the Japs. The regiment broke for a cross-country march, each company following a different route with the hope of reassembling again in the rear. Fragments, of two battalions finally reached General Bluemel about 10 PM on April 8 near Lamao, south of the Alangan River.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 185

57 Inf

Wording desperately in an attempt to bring a semblance of order out of the chaos that last night, Colonel Tilly of 57th Infantry, Colonel Bradley of the 31st Infantry, and Colonel Saint of the 14th Engineers, managed to gather enough of their scattered commands by the morning of April 9 to establish them on a defense line near Cabcaben air field, north of the town at kilometer Post 160. Here the remnants of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment, part of the 200th Coast Artillery, AA, and several miscellaneous units were also employed.

The casualties in the 200th Coast Artillery had been exceedingly heavy -- almost the whole unit was wiped out.

-Vol. I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 186, 187

57th Inf

EXTRACT FROM NOTEBOOK #1 - DIARY OF MAJOR Wm. J. PRIESTLEY

South Luzon Force - Bataan Force - II Philippine Corps

Brief Outline of Activities Prior to and During War

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities on about Sept 1 a SLF Hq in skeleton form was created and functioned briefly. This Hq consisted of Brig Gen. Geo Parker, Lt. Col. C O Wilson, Lt. Col. H. D. Johnston, Capt. Arthur Christensen and Capt. Homer Uglow. Units to be included under this command were not inducted until somewhat later and the troops thus received practically no training before the war started. Only two regiments the 42nd & 52d Infs. were inducted on Sept 1 and no others immediately thereafter.

The elements of the command were drawn up as follows: Nov 1 - 41st & 51st Infs. mobilized and started training, Nov. 24th - 43rd & 53rd Infs, 41st F. A and 41st & 51st Engrs. On Dec 1 the 41st and 51st Med. Bns. Signal Cos, Hq & Hq Cos, & QM Service Co, so that on Dec 8 the state of the SLF was: 41st Div complete less 1 Anti Tank Bn 51st Div complete less 1 Anti Tank Bn & 51st F. A. and 1st & 2d P. C. (inducted in Mid. Nov and assigned for training only) released at beginning of war.

The 41st & 51st Divs. were inducted and trained in S. Luzon what little training they did have and at the outbreak they were sent to their defensive positions on the beaches. The boundary between division running along a general line thru Lemery & Pancipit Rs. - Id. in Lake Taal - Tagaytay and Las Pinas inclusive to the 41st Div. The rest of the coastline was defended by the 51st Div. with Manila sector unoccupied due to location of the fortified Ids. On Dec 29th the 1st Reg Div was assigned to the beaches between Infanta & Mauban inclusive and was given the road net in rear of it.

On about Dec. 12 the Japanese landed at Legaspi after previously bombing Davao, Legaspi, Nichols Field, Cavite and sections in the BLF territory and started to move N towards the main part of Luzon by rail and by road. Units of the 52nd Inf were sent S to meet them - one Co. along the road and one Bn was split up - its elements being drawn and given different missions - to contact and delay the enemy as long as possible, destroy bridges and military equipment and impede the progress of the enemy as much as they were able.

The Second Phase of SLF activities began on Dec 24 when the enemy landed in force at Atimonan and Mauban. The units of the 52d sent S encountered many adventures of war not covered here, some being cut off and breaking thru - others making their way N to join their

organization later. On the afternoon of Dec. 24 Gen Parker's Hq. was moved to Bataan and the Bataan Force consisting of the 31st Div, 41st Div, parts of the Phil Div., Hq and other misc. units. Gen Jones took command of the SLF upon Gen Parker's departure (his Div. the 41st having reverted to the Bataan Force).

By the night of Dec 24th the "Js" had crossed the Mts. at Atimonan to Malicbay and at Mauban had reached the zig-zag at Sampaloc. The enemy from Atimonan advanced in successive states and by nightfall of the 25th were at Lucena, Tayabas, 26th Candaleria, 27th Tiaong and on the night of 27-28 contact was broken in that area as the troops were ordered to Bataan. At Mauban the 1st Inf less 1 Bn retreated to positions on the Laguna-Tayabas boundary night of Dec. 25, Louisiana 26th broke contact on the 27th and withdrew to Bataan via Pagsanjan, Sta. Cruz, Los Banos and Manila. One Bn at Tignauan remained there until the 28th with no contact and withdraw on the 28th. The regiments in the SLF were reshuffled on the night of the 27th and were shuttled into Bataan - no contact being made with the enemy. By Dec 31st Gen. Jones and his Hq. had arrived at Plaridel & contacted Gen. Wainwright. By order of USAFFE Gen Jones was put in command of remains of the 71st & 91st Divs, then at Baliuag and stayed there to cover the withdrawal of the SLF thru them Dec 31st - Jan 1. By morning of the 1st those units and Gen Jones arrived in Bataan and the SLF ceased to exist. (Note: Assg'd to SLF prior to this date and moved to Tagaytay pos. was the Prov. Constab. Brigade. Three days were absorbed moving in and thru more out -no contact being made with the enemy.)

As part of the 3d Phase of the SLF the Bataan Force existed from Dec. 24-Jan 6 its function having been to organize the position in Bataan and assist in their occupancy.

By the night of Jan 5-6 the last elements of the NLF had withdrawn into Bataan leaving the covering force at Layac Jct. exposed to the enemy. Organized from right to left in line the pos. contained the 71st Div. 31st Inf (US), and 26th Cav. At 8:00 A Jan 6 our art'y sighted the enemy and began to register on them and at 9:00 A.J. Art'y appeared on the road to be reinforced by other art'y units soon thereafter and a fierce art'y dual ensued. The "Js" also bombarded portion of the 31st Inf with superior fire and by nightfall the right of the 31st and part of the 71st Div had pulled back. At about 10 P. the entire line was ordered withdrawal behind the Abucay position which movement was executed in great confusion. The 26th Cav, not receiving the order was cut off and withdraw through the Mts. One Bn of the (23d) F.A. was badly shot up and lost all but one gun. The 1st Bn of the 88th FA retreated in order saving all guns.

The Main Battle Position previously organized, was occupied originally by the II Philippine units from right to left 57th Inf, 41st Division and 51st Div. the 57th turning its flank on the beach at Matabang and the 51st Div tieing in with the I Corps at Mt. Natib This position was shelled almost constantly daily particularly on the left flank of the 41st Div. and the right of the 51st Div. The Js effected a penetration in that sector and between the 41st Div. and 57th Inf left and the 31st Inf (US) and 45th Inf (PS) were sent in to counter attack at Abucay hacienda, the 21st Div. being sent in to reinforce the MLR on the front of the 41st Div. The counter attack was successfully, heavy casualties being inflicted on the enemy and mopping up operation were in progress when the retreat in the I Corps Sector made a withdrawal from the Main Battle Position to the Reserve Orion-Bagac pos. necessary. Some Js had infiltrated thru the II Corps, however, and it is probable that they might have cut thru the reserve Orion-Bagac pos. had the withdrawal not been made.

The withdrawal was accomplished with a considerable confusion during which aggressive action by "J" art'y, air corps and ground troops might have ended the war before the end of January. The position was occupied and divided into subsectors as follows from the beach near Linay-North to Orion - to the Pantingan: SS-A under Col. Irwin-31st Inf. PA, PA Air Corps Bn, and PA Training Cadre; SS-B - Col Doanes - Prov. Regt. U.S.A. Air Corps, SS-C Gen Bluemel -41st Inf (to March 1), 31st Div. less 31st & 33rd Infs, 51st Combat Team, SS-D- Gen Lough - 21st Div. on Right - 41st Div. on left and 33rd Inf on extreme left flank prior to Mar. 1 after which it become Corps reserve and the 41st Inf went from SS-C to SS-D. The Philippine Division, part of which was to have occupied the front line was broken up as Corps and Army Reserve and was employed piecemeal wherever necessity dictated. Its Hq continued to exist under Gen. Lough but never until the final futile effort was it brought together in any attempt at concerted effort.

The Reserve Battle Position was further prepared and fortified after occupancy - lowlands flooded, trenches dug, camouflage created barbed wire strung etc & patrol action was constant but not pressure was exerted until the first of April. Here as in the I Corps the "Js" entrenched and awaited reinforcements.

Toward the latter part of March enemy truck, tank and artillery columns were sighted on the roads and near areas and it was obvious that an offensive had been planned. This push came beginning April 3 at about 8 A with intensive shelling, dive bombing, high level bombing and a general attack in the 42d Inf areas and by nightfall these units had retreated in confusion down trails #6 and #29 to trail #8, the 42d Inf completely disintegrating and disappearing. The 43d Inf was contacted by Gen Lough and ordered to reorg. and moved back up #6 on April 4. However, it was again hit by mass artillery, broke up and disappeared. The 41st Inf. not so hard hit moved N along the road and was not attacked in force. On the night of April 4, the 33d Inf.

in Corps Res. Along Tr #44, about 1 Km N of #6 & 44, was order N to reinforce the line, but was not heard from thereafter. On April 4th "J" tanks appeared along the Pilar-Bagac road, some started down trail #28 and went back, and a number worked down the Pilar-Bagac Road behind the MLR of the 21st Div along the Telisay R. The 21st Div then withdrew under pressure to the RRT on the slopes of Mt. Samat. In the face of these attacks and withdrawal by the night of Apr 4 the line existed with a large salient in SS-D and units were located as follows: 41st Inf on extreme left astride trail #29, a large Jap on its right to the 21st Div on the forward slopes of Mt. Samat, 51st CT, 32d Inf, Prov. AC Regt; 31st Inf PA AC Bn and the PATC. The 31st Inf US had been ordered from its bivouac area to Jct of trs #2 & 10 on April 4 and was in that area that night.

On April 5 the enemy moved down tr #6 and across the face of Samat and by night they had control of trail #64 to the CP of the 21st Div. and were working up the E slope of Mt. Samat. The extent of the penetration by the "Js" was not known exactly and a counter attack involving the 45th Inf (PS) up Trail #29 with tank support and the 31st Inf (US) up astride #44, thense up #64 to #44 - then up #4 to reinforce and establish the line. Before this could be accomplished in April 6 remnants of the 21st Div came thru the 31st Inf pos. and heavy fire was received from the enemy in Mt. Samat. Heavy pressure on the front and left of the 31st Inf forced its withdrawal to the S. bank of the San Vicente by nightfall of the 6th. The enemy also forced his way up trails #6 & #44 in April 6, the 1st Bn 57th Inf having been order to Jct #8 & #44 to be at disposal of Gen. Lough. Before the 57th Bn could reach Gen Lough, however, his Hq was cut off by the enemy on Trail 8 and the Bn of the 57th was forced to take up a defensive position behind the San Vicente R. at the Jct #8 & #46. The tank support of the 45th Inf arrived late and that unit was forced S on trail #29 and into the I Corps sector.

Thus by nightfall of April 6th situation was almost hopeless. On the extreme left the 45th Inf counter offensive up Tr #29 was nipped and it, with Gen Lough's Hq. was cut off from II Corps. The "J" had routed the 41st Div and followed it up trails #6 & #44 where the 1st Bn 57th encountered the enemy and held them N. of the San Vicente at Trail Jcts #8 & #46. On the San Vicente a large gap existed and then the 31st Inf (US) had gone into pos. connecting with the 51st CT of Gen Bluemel on its right flank. Our art'y had been overwhelmed and silenced and the 41st FA guns had all been captured.

On April 7 an attempt was made to organize a defensive line along the Patoc trail (#46) with 201st and 202d Engrs filling the gap between the 57th (2d Bn. in pos. with 1st Bn night of April 6) and 31st Inf (US) and SS-C units. The 26th Cav and 14th Engrs also moved up, the 26th at Jct #2 & #10 being turned over to Gen. Bluemel & the Engrs. to Col Tilly who was with the 57th Inf CP and its 3d Bn. attached to SS-C and Gen Bluemel. The "Js" followed up their aggressive move of the

6th and not only cut trail #46 but staged a separate attack in the 32d Inf area in the right half of SS-C forcing the withdrawal of the 51st CT, along with the 31st (US) to the S bank of the San Vicente and extend a line with the 3d Bn 57th Inf & 21st & 31st Engrs. The 201st & 301st Engrs, had failed to arrive at their position on the Patoc Trail before the enemy cut it and those units were scatttered & disintegrated. Thus Gen Bluemel decided to continue the withdrawal to the S bank of the Mamala R where, after consultation with commanders of the 26th Cav, 57th Inf. 31st Inf (US) and Engrs, he decided to withdraw all elements to the Alangan R which long retreat was affected before dawn of the 8th.

April 8th found the line held behind the Alangan R. in a confused state due to hasty retreat and mistaken routes of withdrawal. It was obvious from the outset that this position was untenable. All 37 mm guns and automatic weapons had been lost, nearly all 155 mm, were of ammunitions, In addition the men were almost completely exhausted by the long marches and days without food. The 26th Cav. which had moved from #2 & #10 to #2 & #46 covered the withdrawal of other units & then withdrew to the above pos. itself.

It was intended that new position would be occupied with the 26th Cav, 57th Inf and 31st Inf in line & the 14th Engrs in reserve, but due to a mistake in retiring between new and old trails #20 a scramble ensued and the line was established with the 26th Cav and 14th Engrs. astride Trail #20, 31st & 57th to E of old #20 - a big gap to the 803d Engrs, PAC, 31st Inf PA and the 4th PC, (the 4th PC and 803d Engrs having been brought up during the night.)

During the morning of the 8th Js bombed the line heavily and the 4th PC and the 31st Inf PA pulled out. Enemy tanks & Inf followed up quickly down trail #20 and soon surrounded the position set that by the night of the 8th the entire line was untenable and further withdrawal become necessary. Orders were confused as were the troops who scattered badly. The bulk of them escaped down new #20 - others cross country. Col. Tilly, Col Brady & Col. Saint of the 57th Inf 31st Inf & 14th Engrs respectively managed to gather parts of their commands by the morning of the 9th. At 3 A, Maj. Christenson Ass't G-3 for II Corps met Gen. Bluemel at Jct #12 & #20 received order to surrender. Gen Bluemel was ordered to take up a position behind the Lamao R. but instead he left a screen and moved troops the rear where surrender came later that day.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

s/ Ruth H. Essary
t/ RUTH H. ESSARY
Captain WAC

A TRUE COPY: aum/HB

EXTRACT FROM DIARY OF MAJOR CALVIN F. CHUNN (1942)

RECOVERED FROM CABANATUAN POW CAMP NO. 1 ON 29 APRIL 1946 BY ARCHIVES SECTION, RPD.

PROJECT "J" ARCHIVES, FILE 999-2-214 BK 1.

Dec. 26-7 nite moved to Abucay-Hacienda line via Manila city. 1 truck overturned & injured some enroute. Dec. 27-deployed from Hacienda eastward. Originally 51st div. on extreme left. 42d included Hacienda), then 43d, 41st on right. Few days later line from w to e was: 51st div., 43d, 42d, 41st, 57th (PS). Lewis wired in his OPLR & had 2 phones to it. 43d had 3d Bn on left, 1st on right, 2d in res. Jan. 8-Japs hit his OPLR in early morning. It held until ordered back after 42d OP w/d. 43d OPLR killed one Jap & 42d OPK Jap ofcr & got his saber.

Jan. 9-Japs attacked at night. Jan. 12-51st w/d during day. 43d w/d its OP. 51st got no bombing nor artillery - it all fell in 43d. Jan. 12-16 terrific art. bombardment. Late afternoon of 11th the 3d Bn. 23d Inf. arrived to go in 1st Bn. pos. 8 pm. while going in on Trail Jap 105's fired 4 rounds right on trail. 75 KIA-mg co. & part of rifle co. casualties just in front of RRL. c Jan. 14-1st Bn. w/d on false order "whole line is falling back" - came from left in the line. A spy or Jap sympathizers. 7 had been K in bn CP by art. Co. C on support line stayed. Sinock & Spears KIA. (Everyone promoted except Long (?).

Jan. 13-terrific attack against 3d Bn. on left. Bn c.o. called & asked permission w/d because they were being blown out of their fox holes, & he was afraid soldiers would cave anyway. Lewis directed he stay 20 more min. till dark because Jap art, usually ceased them. It did. That night Japs penetrated the lines. Jan. 14-w/d 3d Bn. 2d Bn. 23d attached & counter attacked but got no farther than center of res. line. Capt. Hunt on OP of 41st FA fought with Inf. & KIA out 12. Body not recovered. c Jan. 15-attacked with 2 bns. of 23d on right then 1 co. 3d Bn. 2d Bn, 3d Bn, 43d. Jan. 16 31st arrived & attacked on 17th with 1st Bn on left which sacked river. 2d Bn just north of Lewis CP in center of line got nowhere & casualties fell down bank into CP. 2 Cas. 43d went farther on 2d Bn's art. & he w/d them short distance to tie in line with 2d Bn 31st & support line of 42d Inf. 3d Bn. 31st under Lewis night of 17th only. Jan. 18-45th 1st & 2d Bns. echeloned to right. attacked; 3d Bn on extreme left. 23d Inf. reld. from attachment to 43d. Jan. 19-3d Bn. 31st attacked on left of 1st Bn, 31st. 1st Bn. 43d counter attacked in 41st area. Mathews KIA, Dunn WIA. J 23-1 Bn. 23d again atchd. Jan. 24-43d assembled to move out. Original orders from Lough wanted 43d to hold & let Phil. Div. w/d. Lewis, where 43d was already forming a secondary line, requested & got the change. As started out after dark 4 Jap shells landed on trail. Jap small arms close to rear. Decided to plunge thru artillery, 4 more shells &no more. Co. E cut off but straggled in within 2 weeks. Lewis says he saw 31st Inf. on road when he reached it c 7:30 & they pulled out prematurely. (Isaw them too & agree with him).

Jan. 25-Japs had entrenched a new MLR so 43d had to fight the way in for 5 days. 43d on left of 42d. 41st Inf. (less 1 bn) attached to Bluemel. MLR along maldica river. 1st Bn on left, 3d on right, 2d in res. Reserve furnished OPLR & nearly all of 2d was on OP. Last week it required a bn & half to man OP after 42d OP w/d.

March 3-43d stayed in position & 42d moved over to left of 43d; 41st to left of 42d. 21st Inf. was on right of 43d. April 3-Japs hit 43d hardest. Began artillery 8:10 am till dark. Line held till 3:30 pm. Last definite word Lewis received was 1:30 & then phones went out. That night he w/d to western slops of Mt. Samat into bivouac. Between 400-600 casualties that day.

April 4-moved 7:30-8 am east down T 429 to T6 & south into bivouac c 1½ km. north of TJ 648. Remained there the 5th. April 6-ordered to counter attack on T6 to Samat & to recover own artillery, try to relieve Homen' 33d Inf. Failing this-to delay on T6. Met heavy resistance in vicinity of the artillery position. Surrounded on east & west. w/d (routed) down T84 18 to bank of Alangan river.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

EXTRACT FROM DIARY OF MAJ. CALVIN F. CHUNN (PAGES 120-122)
RECOVERED FROM CABANATUAN POW CAMP NO 1. ON 29 APRIL 1946
PROJECT "J" ARCHIVE 999-2-214 BK 1.
(This item refers to action near Mt. Samat, Bataan, 3 Apr.42)

That night 2d Bn. ordered move to vic. of T 44 & 8 where a new line was to be established. 1st Bn. remained in original position. 3d had w/d to T429 for anti-tank defense. Orders changed because a counter-attack was planned for 31st US & 57th PS to re-gain old line.

gfa/avm

EXTRACT FROM DIARY OF MAJ. CALVIN F. CHUNN (PAGE 118)

RECOVERED AT CABANATUAN POW CAMP ON 29 APRIL 1946

PROJECT "J" ARCHIVE 999-2-214, BK 2

(Dates are in 1942)

(Refers to action on line extending "from Mt.Natib to Hacienda", Bataan.)

April 6-3d counter attacked but soldiers ran-back when they heard shots 57th Scouts tried to hold the hungry, spiritless men in check & get them back in line but it was useless because PA simply skirted the PS on the trails.

gfa/avm

No 79.

No. 79.