

No. 77

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Authority NND 883078

DIARY OF MAJOR WM. J. PRIESTLEY

71st INFANTRY (PA)

NORTH LUZON FORCE I PHILIPPINE

CORP SOUTH LUZON FORCE

BATAAN FORCE - II-  
PHILIPPINE CORPS

No. 77

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EXTRACT FROM NOTEBOOK #1 - DIARY OF MAJOR Wm. J. PRIESTLEY

71 ST. INFANTRY (PA)

The 71st. Infantry, (PA) was inducted into the service of the United States on September 1st 1941. Headquarters Battalion was inducted at Magallon, Negros Occidental, the 1st and 2nd Battalions at Fabrica, Negros Occidental, and the 3rd Battalion at Camp Leon Kilat (Dumaguete) Negros Oriental.

Lt. Colonel Donald V. Bonnet assumed command of the regiment, 1st Lt. Edward Dale, Executive Officer. The several battalions were nominally commanded by Philippine Army personnel with 1st Lt. Aguila commanding Hq's. Bn., 1st Lt William Nacar with the 1st Bn., together with 1st Lt. Abbot Chase Buyers, 1st Lt William Nacar with the 1st Bn., 1st Lt. J. A. Seay senior instructor, and 2nd Lt. Thomas Spechard assistant instructor. In the 2nd Bn., 1st Lt., Jose V. H. Banson Commanding, Captain C.F. Healy, senior instructor, 2nd Lt. W. C. Porter assist and instructor Captain Eugene Hicks was senior instructor of the 3rd Bn. and 2nd Lt. Albert Erickson as his assistant and the Philippine Army officer unknown.

The regimental headquarters was established in Magallon, the 2nd Battalion moved to the P. A. Cadre building at Mambucal and intensified training was immediately commenced. The first Battalion remained at Fabrica.

Training Memorandums from Visayan-Mindanao Headquarters at Cebu were followed as closely as possible; but only with great effort due to lack of all but the most rudimentary equipment (Machine guns were not equipped with spare parts, steam condensing devices, or clinometers), the inefficiency, and inadequate P. A. QMC, and Ordnance Supply. Firing ranges were non-existent, a large percent of the Non Commissioned Officers could neither read nor write, and furthermore could not be reduced, nor could privates re-made Non Commissioned Officers upon recommendation of the Company and Battalion commanders until a very late date. Confusion was further heightened by the several dialects spoken within the companies, platoons, down to the very squads.

Resentment, and uncertainty upon the part of P. A. officers as to the actual extent of the authority of the American instructors. It was finally cleared up by and order placing American commissioned personnel in direct command of the units they had been assigned to; at the same time authority was granted regimental commanders to issue orders reducing non-commissioned officers and making new ones. Unfortunately the changes were made after the commencement of hostilities.

On October 24, 1941 the regiment sailed from Negros in battalion units, and arrived at Camp O'Donnell, Tarlac on October 26, 1941. Here it was planned that the entire 71st Division be assembled. At this time the 71st Engineer Bn. was also in camp, and Lt. Col. Bennett acted as Post Commander. In the early part of November, Colonel Sellick, F. A. took com-

History of 71st Infantry (PA) continued:

mand of the division which then consisted of the 71st Infantry, 72nd Infantry, one Bn. 71st Field Artillery, and 71st Engineer Bn.

Routine training continued until the outbreak of war when rush trips to Fort Stotsenburg were necessarily made to procure such elemental necessities as gun barrel packing, steam condensing devices, belt loading machines, and spare parts, and spare parts and barrels for the Cal. 30 Maching Guns, delivery of these items having not been made by P. A. Ordnance although repeatedly requisitioned since the second week of September.

The 71st Infantry upon the outbreak of hostilities was immediately moved north of Manaoag, Pangasinan to go into USAFFE reserve (all available elements of 71st Division assembled then).

The movement from O'Donnell to Manaoag being uneventful except for a division traffic jam, two miles long, in broad daylight (4:00 PM) on the Manila - North highway to San Miguel. Vehicles were jammed bumper to bumper, and under observation of enemy aircraft.

At noon December 20, the 71st Infantry less Headquarters Battalion, less the third Battalion, moved to Naguilian, Pangasinan, via Baguio, and the third Battalion, plus headquarters Battalion moved to Bauang, Pangasinan to report to the Commanding Officer, 13th Infantry (P.A.)

At midnight, December 20, the 1st Bn. was ordered to secure all trails near Naguilian leading to Baguio, and the 2nd Bn. was ordered to proceed to a point 7 kilometers East of Naguilian and from that point at dawn to commence an attack in the direction of San Fernando, La Union. Before 1:00 AM, the following morning that order was rescinded due to the appearance of naval and transport units in the Lingayen Gulf.

The 1st Bn. was ordered on to beach defense from Bauang north about 500 yards, and tie their right flank in with some elements of the 11th Division (P.A.)

The 2nd Bn. less "F" Co, and one section of "H" Co. was to hold the bridge south of Bauang on the Manila - North Road and provide flank security for all elements north of their positions.

By 8:30 AM of that morning the troops along the beach were forced to withdraw to Bauang and up the highway to Naguilian. "F" Co, and the Machine Gun Section from "H" Co. constituted the rear guard, and engaged the enemy about 5 kilometers east of Bauang.

The Regimental C. P. had been moved into Naguilian and upon the arrival of the rear guard in that town, the 71st Infantry, and all accompanying Units moved to Baguio.

History of 71st Infantry (PA) continued:

Meanwhile the 3rd. Bn 71st Infantry plus Hqs Bn. arrived at Bauang on the night of the twentieth and found a guide who directed them back to the bivouac area, south of Rosario. Major Hicher was severely wounded making a reconnaissance in this area.

The afternoon of the 21st was one of confusion, disorder, and indecision of Camp John Hay. About 1:30 AM of the 22nd it was decided that the 71st Infantry and fragments of other P. A. troops would evacuate Baguio via Trinidad Valley - Buhod - Pinkian - Aretao, and attempt to reach USAFFE lines that existed somewhere from Cabanatuan to Fort Stotsenburg, Colonel Horan, and one troop of the 26th Cavalry (PS), dismounted, Co's "A & B" 43rd Inf. (PS) and various fragments of P.A. units remaining in Baguio still undecided as to what steps to take.

The column cleared Baguio about daylight and consisted of about twenty civilian busses, three S.P.M. and about three ton and a half Government trucks.

The column reached Buhod sawmill in groups varying from single cars to five or more busses the main body being bivouaced by 8:00 PM. The general consensus of opinion at that time being that a trail existed from Buhod to Aretao, which would enable the half-trucks to pass with the aid of some extensive brush and timber clearing.

The next morning a telephone call from Colonel Horan at Camp John Hay ordered all units to return for the defense of Baguio. Major Mores, Lt. Porter and two enlisted men in a  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton weapons carrier and one .30 cal. M.G. constituted the advance guard. The advance guard arrived in Baguio long before the column due to the fact that the 55 Kilometers from Baguio to Buhod was a narrow, and very difficult trail for the heavy vehicles. The advance party found Camp John Hay enjoying peace and quiet, a garrison air prevailing and meals were still served regularly in the messes.

Before the head of the following column reached Baguio orders from USAFFE were received ordering the evacuation of that city. Upon the arrival of the column it was immediately refueled and sent back.

The morning of the 24th the 71st, and accompanying unit were again in Buhod. Here it was ordered that all vehicles and all food, and equipment that could not be carried would be destroyed and the column would leave for Aretao immediately.

The column bivouaced at Pinkian, and arrived at Aretao about 3:00 AM the morning of the 26th.

At 7:00 AM that morning permission was given any casual officers to attempt to join USAFFE Forces somewhere below Balete pass, and it was thought that that pass was held by the enemy. Several Americans attempted the run, and made it unobscured.

History of 71st Infantry (PA) continued:

(The American Officer not belonging to the 71st had remained at Pinhian with their troops.)

The 71st Infantry marched due West to Dupot when it received word that trucks had arrived at Aretao to carry them to the USAFFE lines, and the regiment immediately back tracked to Aretao where it found the necessary transportation to carry it to safety. Colonel Gunell had contacted the 91st Division by telephone and the trucks had arrived.

The 71st loaded on to the trucks, were carried to Bivouac area to Mexico, Pampanga, and on the 28th of December arrived at a division assembly area in the immediate vicinity of Camp Juan Olivares, Pampanga.

On December 31st the 71st Infantry relieved the 91st Infantry at Baliuag, Bulacan, and on the afternoon of the 31st was forced to retire to the west bank of the Calumpit river.

After the Baliuag engagement contradictory orders had sent a great part of the regiment of Lubao, and the remainder of the regiment was also on its way to Bataan when it was stopped at Calumpit Bridge.

The 71st was reorganized into squads, platoons and companies and was displaced north of the bridge. Various other P.A. units (Among them the 72nd which had been driven out of Cabanatuan) taking the south sector.

The enemy attacked at 2:00 PM, Jan 1, 1943, and all USAFFE elements withdrew about 4:30 PM.

The regiment went into bivouac at Colis Bataan for about three days, then took up a position, as an interior regiment, at Hermosa. The Japanese artillery promptly knocked our artillery out and USAFFE troops withdrew behind the Hacienda Abucay line.

The 71st Infantry went into Bivouac for about four days on trail "11", and then took up a 13,000 yard beach defense from Saysaigon ridge to the Payragan river.

Three days later the 2nd Bn. was taken off beach defense to patrol along the Abo-Abo river during the withdrawal from the moron-abucay line.

After three days patrolling the 2nd Bn. took up a front line position with a 1200 yard front, flanked by the 72nd Infantry on the left, and the 91st Infantry on the right. Shortly afterward the 2nd Bn. was attached to the 92nd Infantry for tactical purposes. (The entire regiment had been attached to the 91st Division for some time.)

About March 6th the 2nd Bn. was relieved on the front line due to the high percent of casualties due to malaria and malnutrition, and was replaced by the 3rd. Bn., The 2nd Bn. took the 3rd Bns. beach sector, and one company of constabulary was assigned to the left flank of the regiment. No other changes in position were undertaken.

CERTIFIED TRUE EXTRACT:

s/ Ruth H. Essary  
 t/ RUTH H. ESSARY  
 Captain WAC

North Luzon Force - I Philippine CorpsBrief Outline of Activities Prior to and During War

On Dec 7, the North Luzon Force was ordered to man the beaches of North Luzon and to carry out other disposition as follows: 11th Div. from Dagupan North with no night limit, 21st Div. West from Dagupan around Bolinao Pt. to Dasao Bay exclusive, 31st Div. from Dasao Bay to Subic Exclusive, 1st Bn 45th PS with about 1 Bn. of PG at Bagac, 71st Div at O'Donnell under USAFFE, 91st Div at Cabanatuan USAFFE control.

At Stotsenburg: 2 tank Bns (192d & 194th) USAFFE control, 12 Btvs SPMs USAFFE control, 26th Cav. Corps control - N.L.F. Reserve. All art'y units were under USAFFE control (i.e. units of F.A. Brigade) 24th FA (23d FA), 86th & 88th - Bty A was force res. N.L.F. One Bn of 86th was under N.L.F. control on Lingayen Gulf: 1 reg. near San Fabian, 2d near Dagupan, 3d near Lingayen and 4th West of the Agno R. near Labrador. At that time there were no NLF Engr or Sig. troops. They grew as they and equipment become available- the latter of which was for the most stolen here and there. 1 Bn. 12th Inf. was in the Cagayan Valley in PA training camps- Aparri, Tuguegarao, Gamu and Echague when war broke out. In addition 2 Cas 43d Inf were at Baguio .

On Dec. 8 as War broke there was no immediate change in disposition except in the Cagayan Valley where it was intended that all troops in the PA camps there would assemble in Aparri and Tuguegarao. The group in Aparri, however, scattered and ran at the outbreak and all units were assembled at Tuguegarao.

Except for bombings of Baguio, Ilagan, Tuguegarao, Aparri, Iba, Clark Field etc. there was no hostile activity in North Luzon until Dec. 10 when eight transports landed in Lingayen Gulf near Vigan and a simultaneous landing of about a regiment was made at Aparri (Gonzaga). Of the first the first contingent part of the troops affected landings at Laoag and the enemy at Aparri, immediately moved up the valley to secure the landing field at Tuguegarao. Following the deparcation at Vigan and Laoag during Dec 10-16 further beach heads were established at Agoo and San Fernando, the landings in all cases being practically unopposed by our own troops or art'y.

On about Dec 15th or 16th, a Bn of the 12th Inf and a Bn of the 13th Inf were sent to the vicinity of San Fernando, La Union, to block the coastal plain corridor to the South. General Wainwright desired to attack to the N. immediately and requested that the 71st and 91st be released to him for that purpose, the attack to be supported by tanks and SPMs. His request was not granted, however, and not until the threat strengthened N. of S.F was the 71st Div released to N.L.F., the 71st Inf. going N. to support the 2 Bns of the 12th & 13th Inf.

The 1st Armed Clash occurred near Tagudin on Dec. 15th or 16th when an enemy patrol was ambushed by Lt. Williams (since killed). The clash was a victory for Am-Fil forces and the enemy withdrew with 16-18 casualties. Just prior to this clash one troop "C" of the 26th Cav. dismounted and motorized was dispatched to Bontoc to block all roads leading S. and plans were made for demolition of all Mt. roads if withdrawal became necessary (dem. carried out).

After the initial encounter the enemy pushed down in force out-flanking the right of the defenders and cutting them off. The A-F force, however, - 71st Inf & 2 Bns. of 12th & 13th plus SPMs under Lt. Col. Ganahl escaped to Baguio thru the Mts. and later rejoined the NLF at San Fernando Pampanga via Balete Pass. Following this "J" flanking move the 91st Div was released to the NLF and it and the remains of the 71st Div. took over the right flank of NLF on the right of the 11th Div - the general boundary with the 11th Div. being Hiway #3. In the meantime on about Dec. 12 one Bn of the 33d Inf. was sent to reinforce the Bn of 45th Inf at Bagac and on the 14th the 31st Div was taken from the NLF and assigned to the Bataan Force. In connection with landings on the North - none were made in the S. or N shores of Lingayen Gulf. On one occasion transports came within range of one 86th FA gun pos., were fired upon - 2 vessels being reported hit with one set on fire, but no further attempt to approach the S. or N. beaches was made.

On about Dec. 12 NLF - CP moved from Stotsenburg to Baman when the former became untenable due to heavy bombing - all woods in the vicinity being used for cover. Later, just after the 31st Div. was released to the Bn. Force, the NLF - Cp was moved to Alcala on the Agno R. When the threat developed at San Fernando one Bn of tanks and 6 Bty's of SPMs were placed in support - (not attached as they should have been) of NLF. Many command difficulties were brought about by the "support" status of art'y SPMs and tanks instead of being "attached".

As pressure increased from the N. and the enemy pushed down the coast and order to withdraw to the S. was given, the plan being to withdraw on successive phase lines to a final positive on the Baman-Arayat line. The routes of withdrawal were - 91st Div astride Hiway #7, 11th Div on its right roughly along hiway thru Dagupan until it joined #3, the 71st Div & 91st on the right E of hiway #3, the 71st Div & 91st on the right E of #3 (bdy. San Fabian, Manaog, and Urdaneta - thence generally E of #3 to the Pampanga R.)

The 1st Phase Line occupied was generally Binalonan-San Carlos-Aguilar, the 2d Phase Line from Tayug to Urdaneta to a point N of Mangaterem on Hiway #7, the 3d Phase Line along the Agno R. from Tayug, Bayambang to a point just N of San Clemente, the 4th Phase Line from San Jose, Guimba, to Hiway #7 just N. of Tarlac and the Final Phase Line at Baman-Arayat.

The tactics employed in withdrawal were to hold during the day and withdraw during the night to - a covering shell being left to withdraw after daylight. All withdrawals were executed under pressure, and in many instances in great confusion, according to scheduled, the final phase line being held until the SLF cleaned San Fernando. The initial enemy threat developed into a flank move to threaten our right flank. The 71st Div broke under pressure and the 26th Cav was rushed in until the 91st Div could get there. The 26th experienced heavy fighting in Damortis, Rosario, Pozorrubio, Binalonan, and at Tayug - withdrawing from Binalonan to Tayug.

In the meantime the 91st Div had formed abreast of the 11th Div. on the Agno R. and the 26th Cav. was withdrawn to Mexico to reorganize. From then on throughout those withdrawal the 91st Div bore the brunt of the attack contact being made throughout but with no strong threat. It was estimated

that 3 J. Divs. were employed along the immediate front. Heavy fighting took place at Tayug, Cabanatuan (art'y setting fire to the town - heavy dead there), Gapan, Baliuag, Floridel, and Calumpit. The major engagement occurred at Carmen- Villasis (Besson captured on 25th) when our forces lost several tanks and suffered many casualties.

While the 11th & 21st Divs. held on the Arayat-Bambam line the Arayat bridge was blown and the 91st Div was left on the E of the R. on Hiway #5 to protect the withdrawal of the SLF at Calumpit. The 41st Div under Gen. Jones was placed in support of the covering force with Gen Jones in command. The 71st Div was practically reorganized at San Fernando and assisted on covering the crossing. When the SLF cleared the River the covering force consisting of 91st consisting of 91st, 41st and 71st Divs. withdrew N. of Calumpit and into Bataan, the bridge being blown behind them. The 11th & 21st Divs. executed wheeling movements and occupied the Guagua-Porac defensive position. When the Arayat & Calumpit bridges were blown the "Js" were cut off temporarily E of the Pampanga R. and further assault was held up slightly. However, their advance continued shortly and on Jan 4 or 4 a force estimated at 2 Divs attacked along the front of the Guagua-Porac position. The initial "J" effort was made on our left at Porac on the front of the 21st Div. its men performing nobly and its art'y firing point blank to repulse the enemy positions, and the major portion of the line was retaken. The main effort then shifted to the right of our line against the 11th Div which broke after heavy fighting forcing the withdrawal of the 21st Div. During this action the 71st Div, 31st Inf (US) and the 26th Cav had organized and occupied the Layac Jet pos. as a block force to block Rte #7 from Olongapo and guard against an enemy threat from the West.

In the Cagayan Valley as the "Js" landed E of Aparri the raw Bn. in training there retreated in disorder as far as Ilagan. Col. Townsend was sent to org. them and collect whatever force available. He gathered most of the Bn. and about 500 additional PA & PC reservists giving him a force of about 1000 men, with which he started N. from Ilagan in two columns astride the Cagayan R. to attack and seize the airfield at Tuguegarao. Before that objective was reached, however, the order was given for the withdrawal of the Lingayen Gulf forces which necessitated the withdrawal of the Cagayan force also as S. Jose on Hiway #5 was uncovered. The Cag. force affected the withdrawal successfully and rejoined the NLF at San Fernando on about Dec. 28th or 29th.

In the Mt. Prov. the troop of the 26th Cav and 2 Cos of the 43d Inf. were cut off in the Mts. and remained there to fight guerilla warfare. Of this force only 8 officers are known to have surrendered.

As general remarks on the Ling. Valley campaign the "Js" used all arms including Inf, horse Cav, art'y and tanks, As far as is known the Cav did not operate N of the Pampanga R.

After withdrawing thru Layac the NLF withdraw into N. Bataan and about Jan 6 it became I Philippine Corps consisting of 31st Div on the beach from vicinity of Mauban Pt. S. to vicinity of Babo Pt. 45th Inf organizing reserve battle position generally along the Pilar-Bagac Road, the 1st PA Div (Regular) occupying the main battle pos. from S of Moron to Natib, the 91st Div in Corps res. reorganizing preparatory to relieving the 45th Inf from



the res. battle pos. The 11th & 21st Divs were temporarily with the I Corps and the 26th Cav was still missing working its way thru the mts. to rejoin about \_\_\_\_\_ .

About Jan 16 an enemy threat developed S from Olongapo an initial force of about 300 Js being present. A troop of the 26th Cav was dispatched to Moron to meet the threat and after a stiff battle the enemy retreated N. On about Jan 18 it appeared in force and attacked the Moron Natib Pos. It was while this threat developed that the 31st Div was withdrawn from the beaches by USAFFE order and assigned to II Corps, the 91st Div replaced the 31st Div on the beaches leaving no Corps res. except the 26th Cav., the 45th Inf. having gone to USAFFE control. The 11th Div was sent to replace the 31st Div. shortly after the 71st Div cameover.

On Jan 21st the attack on the Moron -Natib position grew serious and a general withdrawal to the res. battle pos. just S. of the Pilar-Bagac road was ordered. A strange "J" thrust at Mt. Natib had enveloped the 1st Div right flank forcing it to withdraw along the beach in great confusion, and was able to reform later due to the lack of a concerted follow up by the enemy. Had the attack been pressed our entire line would have been threatened, including the res. battle pos. The 91st Div. affected its withdrawal in an orderly manner.

The reserve battle pos. with its right boundary running from the Pantingan R. valley inclusive to Mt. Mariveles inc. was occupied with the 11th Div. on the right (left bdy. tr #7), 91st Div from trail #7 N to Bagac then S. along the coast, the 2d PC, which had joined during the Moron-Natib battle occupied the beach S of the Binuangan R. The 26th Cav. and the 71st Div. being reorganized, were in Corps reserve.

In the midst of the withdrawal from the Moron-Natib pos. the enemy on about Jan 23d made alanding on Tangasawayan Pt. At the time the N Section of the Service Command area was incorporated in the I Corps, Gen. Sellick was released and demoted to Col. and Col. Pearce was promoted to Brig. Gen. and place in command. At about the same time the 1st Div. had been reorganized sufficiently to take over a short part of the front just N of trail #7, the 91st Div. occupying the remainder of the main front to Bagac, the 71st Div on the coast from Bagac-Binuangan R., 2d P.C. from Binuangan R. S. to Canas Pt. (Agloloma R.) Am. Air Corps units S to Longos-Cawayan Pt., the Marines and Navy organized into Naval Bn., operating on Tangasawayan Pt. The 57th Inf was released to Gen Pierce's control on about Feb. 1 and its units were instrumental in wiping the enemy out on Langasawayan Point (2d Bn), Anyasan Pt (1st Bn) and Canas Pt (2d & 3d Bns) . The 8th Inf. operated successfully on Agloloma & Quinanan Pts.

On Jan 28th what appeared to be a desultory attack on Bagac occurred but failed. Later patrol reports indicated that it was a general attack broken by our artillery - several hundred dead being found in that area. In conjunction with that action landings were made over a period of days on Agloloma, Quinanan, Anyasan, and Canas Pts. Each of these was engaged and by Feb. 11 the entire W coast was cleared of enemy. The 57th Inf., the 1st and 3d Bns, 45th Inf., the 2d P.C. and Am. Air Corps units of the 5th interceptor Command all participated in mopping up. It is estimated that about 800 J

were killed, they being members of the veteran Tanai group, at least a full regiment having been employed there by the "Js". In addition it is known that a large preparation of the barges used to reinforce these elements of "Js" were sunk by a combined art'y and aircraft attack. Based on this action it is believed that an entire "J" regiment attempted to cut the W road and had the attempt been made in greater force our entire defense of Bataan would have been seriously threatened. About 100 Js escape from Quinauan Pt and got inland where they harassed our rear areas during week of Feb. 8-15 finally being annihilated by a troop of the 26th Cav under Maj Blonning and units of the 71st Div.

During the beach encounter on about Feb 6 an attack was made on our front in the vicinity of the Gual R. It was later learned that this was part of a major effort to have commenced on Jun 28 but which was delayed for some reason, and it appears that the landings on the W coast were designed cut the N road and create a diversion - with the main effort and attack beginning on Jan 28, but, unknown to us, having been broken up.

The Gual R attack was apparently another piecemeal effort of a major offensive. It developed into an engagement of large proportions and but for immediate concerted action by our front line units our res. battle position might have been broken. A large penetration was affected thru the 1st Inf S.E. up the Gual R. and reached the Jct. of Trails #5 & 7 leaving the enemy in control of both trails. In reducing this large pocket the 1st Bn 45th Inf, Co "A" 194th Tank Bn., 2 Bns of the 91st Div, 1 Bn 1st Div, 1 or 2 Cos, 2d P.C. and a composite Bn of the 51st Div. were effectively employed. These units (plus Cos "C" & "G" of 11th Inf & about 1 Bn of 1st Inf) cut off and surrounded the "Js" in a large sack roughly 1000 yds in radius. It was reduced by steps involving close hand to hand fighting and futile attempts of the enemy to break thru. Gen Jones commanded the action (after initial efforts of Gen. Brawer proved ineffective) against the

Gen Jones had joined the I Corps and assumed command of the Left Sub Sector consisting of the 1st Div, 91st Div. & 71st Div (71st Div combined with 91st Div) in line from R - J. The right Sub Sector consisting of the 2d P.C (moving up from beach pos) W of Pantingan, and the 11th Div. under Gen. Braucher. The South Sub Sector (formerly N section of Service Command) commanded by Gen Pierce, was made up of 1st P.C., Am. Air Corps (6th Interceptor Command units, 2d Anti Tank Bn. P.A. and some small miscellaneous units.

The S. Sub Sector Hq. consisted of remnants of 71st Div. Hq, from which command Gen. Sellick had been relieved but had taken over Service Command before he was reduced. His Hq. then became that of the S. Sub-Sector. Part of the 71st Div Art'y and part of the 2d Bn. 88th FA were assigned to this Hq. Maj Herrick was assigned as Signal Officer.

The Left Sub Sector, commanded by Col. Rodman, after Gen Jones, was supported by 2d Bn. part of the 24th F. A, 1 Bn 86th FA, a Prov. Bn of the 91st C.A. (seacoast defense), a battery of 301st F.A. (155 Howitzer, 2 guns), 5th Inf (USAFFE control), 26th Cav. (Corps Res), a battery of 501st A.A and 194th Tank Bn (USAFFE control)

After the Qual rocket engagement until the final phase of the war contact with enemy was in the form of patrol action and skirmishes. Prior to March 15 our patrols could venture at will N. W; at Mt Natib, Bagac and end of trail #7 the enemy could always be contacted but E of that they could roam at will.

After March 15, the "Js" pushed out a screen and our patrols encountered difficulties. We learned definitely that the enemy was bldg. a motor road from the vicinity of KP 158 to the E generally parallel to & N of the Pilar Bagac road. Interpretation of patrol reports indicated an enemy outpost line of about 5 Bns from Bagac to the Pantingan R indicating a strong force to the rear.

When the attack started on the II Corps on April 3 there was an intense air bombardment of the main line and art'y positions. This bombardment began on April 1 and lasted until April 5 after which all enemy efforts were directed at the II Corps. About April 6, when the II Corps had withdrawn to the S. and uncovered our complete right, flank and the II Corps was ordered withdraw to a pos. S. of the Binuangan R. was ordered and was in its 2d day when the surrender took place.

An attack on the night of 7-8 was ordered by Gen. Wainwright thru Gen. King- to the E by the I Corps. However, due to the withdrawal in progress with itd disorganization and the physical condition of the men (60% ineffective) and pressure on the OPT made this contemplated attack a suicidal effort and the order was cancelled. In place of that a similar attack N toward Olongapo was suggested. Such an attack was equally suicidal. Gen King and Gen. Jones, even more or, were opposed to these plans and neither order was carried out the 1st being countermanded on the right of the 9th.

Upon surrender the 11th Div. broke completely and was in a disorganized pos. Other units were kept well in hand. The destructions of equipment proceeded according to schedule. The surrender took place at the I Corps CP on the right of the 10th - the day of 9-10 being spent waiting. The morning of the 11th the Corps Hq proceeded to Mariveles and there joined the death march.

In brief comment- the loss and destruction of material before the final phase was resched was criminal. Large amounts of supplies were left at Stotsenburg and no effort was made to get them out when transportation was available. Many busses and other transportation with Divs during withdrawal could have been used. There was tremendous loss of food and ammunition due to carelessness and lack of foresight. Lack of communication equipment was atrocious due to lack of foresight before war was started. The officer personnel due to various contributive factors such as the "Trump", (average Lt. Cols, sent in great number to the Ids), selection in all branches without qualification, Filipino "political promotions etc. was not what it might have been. However, many young officer place in responsible position performed more than creditably.

South Luzon Force - Bataan Force - II Philippine Corps

Brief Outline of Activities Prior to and During War.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities on about Sept 1 a SLF Hq in skeleton form was created and functioned briefly. This Hq consisted of Brig. Gen. Geo. Parker, Lt. Col. O O Wilson, Lt. Col. H. D. Johnston, Capt. Arthur Christensen and Capt. Homer Uglow. Units to be included under this command were not inducted until somewhat later and the troops thus received practically no training before the war started. Only two regiments the 42d & 52d Infs. were inducted on Sept 1 and no others immediately thereafter.

The elements of the command were drawn up as follows: Nov 1 - 41st & 51st Infs. mobilized and started training, Nov. 24th - 43d & 52d Infs., 41st F.A. and 41st & 51st Engrs. On Dec 1 the 41st and 51st Med. Bns., Signal Cos, Hq & Hq Cos, & QM Service Co. so that on Dec 8 the state of the SLF was: 41st Div complete less 1 Anti Tank Bn. 51st Div complete less 1 Anti Tank Bn & 51st F.A., and 1st & 2d P.C. (inducted in Mid. Nov. and assigned for training only) released at beginning of war.

The 41st & 51st Divs. were inducted and trained in S. Luzon, what little training they did have and at the outbreak of war they were sent to their defensive positions on the beaches. The boundary between division running along a general line thru Lemery & Pancipit Rs, - Id. in Lake Taal - Tagaytay and Las Pinas inclusive to the 41st Div. The rest of the coastline was defended by the 51st Div with the Manila Bay sector unoccupied due to location of the fortified Ids. On Dec 20th the 1st Reg Div was assigned to the beaches between Infanta & Mauban inclusive and was given the road net in rear of it.

On about Dec 12 the Japanese landed at Legaspi after previously bombing Davao, Legaspi, Nichols Field, Cavite and sections in the MILF territory and started to move N towards the main part of Luzon by rail & by road. Units of the 52d Inf were sent S to meet them - one Co. along the road and one Bn was split up - its elements being given different missions - to contact and delay the enemy as long as possible, destroy bridges and military equipment and impede the progress of the enemy as much as they were able.

The Second Phase of SLF activities began on Dec 24 when the enemy landed in force at Atimonan and Mauban. The units of the 52d sent S encountered many adventures of war not covered here, some being out off and breaking thru- others making their way N to

join their organization later. On the afternoon of Dec. 24 Gen Parker's Hq. was moved to Bataan and the Bataan Force consisting of the 31st Div 41st Div, parts of the Phil Div., Hq and other misc. units. Gen Jones took command of the SLF upon Gen Parker's departure (his Div. the 41st having reverted to the Bataan Force).

By the night of Dec 24th the "Js" had crossed the Mts. at Atimonan to Malibay and at Mauban had reached the zig-zag at Sampalog. The enemy from Atimonan advanced in successive states and by nightfall of the 25th were at Lucena, Tayabas, 26th Candalaria, 27th Ticao and on the night of 27-28 contact was broken in that area as the troops were ordered to Bataan. At Mauban the 1st Inf less 1 Bn retreated to positions on the Laguna-Tayabas boundary night of Dec. 25, Louisiana 26th broke contact on the 27th and withdrew to Bataan via Pageanjan, Sta Cruz, Los Banos, and Manila. One Bn at Tignauan remained there until the 28th with no contact and withdraw on the 28th. The regiments in the SLF were reshuffled on the night of the 27th and were shuttled into Bataan - no contact being made with the enemy. By Dec 31st Gen. Jones and his Hq. had arrived at Plaridel & contacted Gen. Wainwright. By order of USAFFE Gen Jones was put in command of remains of the 71st & 91st Divs, then at Baliuag and stayed there to cover the withdrawal of the SLF thru them Dec 31st -Jan 1. By morning of the 1st those units and Gen Jones arrived in Bataan and the SLF ceased to exist. (Note: Assg'd to SLF prior to this date and moved to Tagaytay pos. was the Prov. Constab. Brigade. Three days were absorbed moving in and thru move out- no contact being made with the enemy. )

As part of the 3d Phase of the SLF the Bataan Force existed from Dec. 24-Jan 6 its function having been to organize the position in Bataan and assist in their occupancy.

By the night of Jan 5-6 the last elements of the SLF had withdrawn into Bataan leaving the covering force at Layac Jct. exposed to the enemy. Organized from right to left in line the pos. contained the 71st Div, 31st Inf(US), and 26th Cav. At 8:00 A Jan 6 our art'y sighted the enemy and began to register on them and at 9:00 A.J. art'y appeared on the road to be reinforced by other art'y units soon thereafter and a fierce art'y dual ensued. The "Js" also bombarded portion of the 31st Inf line with superior fire and by nightfall the right of the 31st and part of the 71st Div had pulled back. At about 10 P. the entire line was ordered withdrawal behind the Abucay position which movement was executed in great confusion. The 26th Cav, not receiving the order was cut off and withdraw through the Mts. One Bn of the (23d) F.A was badly shot up and lost all but one gun. The 1st Bn of the 88th FA retreated in order saving all guns.

The Main Battle Position previously organized, was occupied

originally by the II Philippine units from right to left 57th Inf, 1st Division and 31st Div. the 57th turning its flank on the beach at Mabatang and the 51st Div tying in with the I Corps at Mt. Natib. This position was shelled almost constantly daily particularly on the left flank of the 1st Div. and the right of the 51st Div. The Js effected a penetration in that sector and between the 1st Div. and 57th Inf left and the 31st Inf (US) and 45th Inf (PS) were sent in to counter attack at Abucay hacienda, the 1st Div being sent in to reinforce the MLR on the front of the 1st Div. The counter attack was successful, heavy casualties being inflicted on the enemy and mopping up operation were in progress when the retreat in the I Corps Sector made a withdrawal from the Main Battle Position to the Reserve Orion-Bagac pos. necessary. Some Js had infiltrated thru the II Corps, however, and it is probable that they might have cut thru the reserve Orion-Bagac pos. had the withdrawal not been made.

The withdrawal was accomplished with a considerable confusion during which aggressive action by "J" art'y, air corps and ground troops might have ended the war before the end of January. The position was occupied and divided into subsectors as follows from the beach near Limay- North to Orion- to the Pantingan: SS-A under Col. Irwin - 31st Inf, PA, PA Air Corps Bn, and PA Training Cadre; SS-B - Col. Doanes - Prov. Regt. U.S.A. Air Corps, SS-C - Gen Blumel - 41st Inf (to March), 31st Div less 31st & 33d Infs, 51st Combat team, SS-D - Gen. Lough - 21st Div on Right - 41st Div. on left and 33d Inf on extreme left flank prior to Mar. 1 after which it become Corps reserve and the 41st Inf went from SS-C to SS-D. The Philippine Division, part of which was to have occupied the front line was broken up as Corps and Army Reserve and was employed piecemeal wherever necessity dictated. Its Hq continued to exist under Gen. Lough but never until the final futile effort was it brought together in any attempt at concerted effort.

The Reserve Battle Position was further prepared and fortified after occupancy - lowlands flooded, trenches dug, camouflage created, barbed wire strung etc & patrol action was constant but not pressure was exerted until the first of April. Here as in the I Corps the "Js" entrenched and awaited reinforcements.

Toward the latter part of March enemy truck, tank and artillery columns were sighted on the roads and near areas and it was obvious that an offensive had been planned. This push came beginning April 3 at about 8 A with intensive shelling, dive bombing, high level bombing and a general attack in the 42d Inf areas and by nightfall these units had retreated in confusion down trails #6 and #29 to trail #8, the 42d Inf completely disintegrating and disappearing. The 43d Inf was contacted by Gen Lough and ordered to reorg. and moved back up #6 on April 4. However, it was again hit by mass artillery, broke up and disappeared. The 41st Inf. not so hard hit moved N along the road and was not attacked in force. On the night of April 4, the 33d Inf in Corps Res. along Tr

#44, about 1 Km N of #6 & #44 was order N to reinforce the line, but was not heard from thereafter. On April 4th "J" tanks appeared along the Pilar-Bagac road, some started down trail #28 and went back, and a number worked down the Pilar -Bagac Road behind the MLR of the 21st Div along the Talisay R. The 1st Div then withdrew under pressure to the RRT on the slopes of Mt. Samat. In the face of these attacks and withdrawal by the night of Apr 4 the line existed with a large salient in SS-D and units were located as follows: 1st Inf on extreme left astride trail #29, a large Jap on its right to the 21st Div on the forward slopes of Mt. Samat, 51st CT, 32d Inf, Prov. AC Regt; 31st Inf PA AC Bn and the PATC. The 31st Inf US had been ordered from its bivouac area to Jct of trs #2 & #10 on April 4 and was in that area that night.

On April 5 the enemy moved down tr #6 and across the face of Samat and by night they had control of trail #64 to the CP of the 21st Div. and were working up the E slope of Mt. Samat. The extent of the penetration by the "Js" was not known exactly and a counter attack involving the 45th Inf (PS) up Trail #29 with tank support and the 31st Inf (US) up astride #44, thence up #64 to #44 - then up #4 to reinforce and establish the line. Before this could be accomplished in April 6 remnants of the 21st Div came thru the 31st Inf pos. and heavy fire was received from the enemy on Mt. Samat. Heavy pressure on the front and left of the 31st Inf forced its withdrawal to the S. bank of the San Vicente by nightfall of the 6th. The enemy also forced his way up trails #6 & #44 in April 6, the 1st Bn 57th Inf having been order to Jct #8 & #44 to be at disposal of Gen. Lough. Before the 57th Bn could reach Gen Lough, however, his Hq was cut off by the enemy on Trail 8 and the Bn of the 57th was forced to take up a defensive position behind the San Vicente R. at the Jct #8 & #44. The tank support of the 45th Inf arrived late and that unit was forced S on trail #29 and into the I Corps sector.

Thus by nightfall of April 6th situation was almost hopeless. On the extreme left the 45th Inf counter offensive up tr #29 was nipped and it, with Gen Lough's Hq. was cut off from II Corps. The "Js" had routed the 1st Div and followed it up trails #6 & #44 where the 1st Bn 57th encountered the enemy and held them N. of the San Vicente at Trail Jct #8 & #44. On the San Vicente a large gap existed and then the 31st Inf (US) had gone into pos. connecting with the 51st CT of Gen Blumel on its right flank. Our arty had been overwhelmed and silenced and the 1st FA guns had all been captured.

On April 7 an attempt was made to organize a defensive line along the Patoc trail (#46) with 201st and 202d Engrs filling the gap between the 57th (2d Bn. in pos. with 1st Bn night of April 6) and 31st Inf

(US) and SS-C units. The 26th Cav and 14th Engrs also moved up, the 26th at Jct. #2 & #10 being turned over to Gen. Blumel & the Engrs. to Col. Tilly who was with the 57th Inf CP and its 3d Bn. attached to SS-C and Gen. Blumel. The "Js" followed up their aggressive move of the 6th and not only cut trail #46 but staged a separate attack in the 32d Inf area in the right half of SS-C forcing the withdrawal of the 51st GI, along with the 31st (US) to the S bank of the San Vicente and extend a line with the 3d Bn 57th Inf, & 21st & 31st Engrs. The 201st & 301st Engrs. had failed to arrive at their position on the Patoc Trail before the enemy cut it and those units were scattered & disintegrated. Thus Gen. Blumel decided to continue the withdrawal to the S bank of the Mamala R where, after consultation with commanders of the 26th Cav, 57th Inf, 31st Inf (US) and Engrs, he decided to withdraw all elements to the Alangan R. which long retreat was affected before dawn of the 8th.

April 8th found the line held behind the Alangan R. in a confused state due to hasty retreat and mistaken routes of withdrawal. It was obvious from the outset that this position was untenable. All 37 mm guns and automatic weapons had been lost, nearly all 155 mm. were of ammunitions, In addition the men were almost completely exhausted by the long marches and days without food, The 26th Cav. which had moved from #2 & #10 to #2 & #46 covered the withdrawal of other units & then withdrew to the above pos. itself.

It was intended that new position would be occupied with the 26th Cav, 57th Inf and 31st Inf in line & the 14th Engrs in reserve, but due to a mistake in retiring between new and old trails #20 a scramble ensued and the line was established with the 26th Cav and 14th Engrs. astride Trail #20, 31st & 57th to E of old #20 - a big gap to the 803d Engrs, PAC, 31st Inf PA and the 4th FC, (the 4th FC and 803d Engrs having been brought up during the night)

During the morning of the 8th Js bombed the line heavily and the 4th FC and the 31st Inf PA pulled out. Enemy tanks & Inf followed up quickly down trail #20 and soon surrounded the position so that by the night of the 8th the entire line was untenable and further withdrawal become necessary. Orders were confused as were the troops who scattered badly. The bulk of them escaped down new #20- others cross country. Col. Tilly, Col. Brady & Col. Saint of the 57th Inf, 31st Inf & 14th Engrs respectively managed to gather parts of their commands by the morning of the 9th. At 3 A, Maj. Christenson Ass't G-3 for II Corps met Gen. Blumel at Jct of #12 & #20 received order to surrender. Gen. Blumel was ordered to take up a position behind the Emao R. but instead he left a screen and moved troops the rear where surrender came later that day.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

a/t/ Ruth H. Essary  
RUTH H. ESSARY  
Captain WAC



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