

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 883078

No. 73

14th INFANTRY

No. 73

10/1/83
C. J. ...

No. 73

AFFIDAVIT

DISTRICT OF CEBANATUAN)
 NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCE) ss
 PHILIPPINES)

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, an officer authorized by law to administer oaths, one Warren Arthur Minton, Captain, Cavalry, Army of the United States, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says: -

"I certify that I am Warren Arthur Minton, O-362251, Captain, Cavalry, Army of the United States, with residence in the United States at 219 West Nevada Street, El Paso, Texas;

That I desire to give this statement which covers my knowledge of the activities and plans of Lieut-Colonel Everett Lauman Warner, O-125572, Field Artillery, Army of the United States, and Commanding Officer Fourteenth Infantry, Philippine Army, USAFFE, to which Regiment I was assigned from Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (FS) and served as Commanding Officer First Battalion, also as Adjutant;

That my reason for submitting this affidavit is that I desire to confirm the report of his activities that I know Lieut-Colonel Warner has written personally and truthfully, and to offset and overcome if possible certain misrepresentations that one United States Army officer and one or two Philippine Army officers, through envy perhaps or desire for each his own respective personal glory, have tried to make against Lieut-Colonel Warner, some of these misrepresentations having taken place directly within my knowledge and observation;

That I first became personally acquainted with Lieut-Colonel Warner while he was a Major Field Artillery and on detached service at Camp John Hay, P. I., from the Provisional Field Artillery Brigade, Philippine Scouts, Fort Stotsenburg. Our first meeting was at Lusod Saw-mill, Benguet, Mountain Province, December 26, 1941 upon the occasion of the ordered evacuation from Camp John Hay of our Forces; that at Lusod Saw-mill Major Warner received from Lieut-Colonel John P. Horen, late Commanding Officer at Camp John Hay, verbal orders to precede him (Colonel Horen with troops of the 43rd Infantry, P. S.) over the mountain trail to the east and when reaching Aritao, Nueva Viscaya Province, to inform him (Lieut-Colonel Horen) whether or not the road (National Route Number Five) was free of enemy troops to the south and whether there was transportation available to move him and the troops with him, south; that Major Warner carried out this mission endeavoring to keep contact with Lieut-Colonel Horen and that near Kayspe Lieut-Colonel Horen, about 60 kilometers behind Major Warner, without advising or warning Major Warner, turned and proceeded southeast through Imagen toward Belete Pass, and there to Road Five;

That Japanese forces at midnight December 28th, 1941, occupied San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and prevented all movement south of our Forces which Major Warner made effort to advise Lieut-Colonel Horen concerning, he (Major Warner) having reached Aritao early on the afternoon of December 29th, 1941;

That on January 1st, 1942, Lieut-Colonel Horen with a portion of his troops and two of his officer personnel, namely Captains Leo Gitter and Cameron

Starnes, came north through Aritao and expressed to Captain Manuel P. Enriquez, 11th Division Staff, Philippine Army, that he did not desire Major Warner now to report to him (Colonel Horan) but to advise Major Warner to carry on with his work in charge of Philippine Army troops; that Lieut-Colonel Horan then moved north and spent the night of January 1st with us - Troop "C" 26th Cavalry, P. S., at Bambang - about twelve kilometers north of Major Warner's position, then moved north to Kiangnan, Ifugao, Mountain Province;

That Major Warner meantime just prior to and upon arriving in Aritao on the afternoon of December 29, 1941, came upon several hundred cut off troops - units of the Philippine Army, some of whom said that their commanding officers had disbanded them and directed them to proceed to their homes; that Major Warner after making effort to contact Lieut-Colonel Horan with the news of the Japanese occupation of San Jose to the south, took charge of the loose Philippine Army elements, ordering them to remain under himself until further definite information and orders could be obtained;

That in command of the advance party of my troop ("C" 26th Cavalry, P.S.) I preceded that troop over the trail just behind Major Warner's party, arrived in Aritao just behind him and met and talked with him in Aritao where I learned and could observe what he was doing; that I considered his efforts to be well worth while and of importance to the aid of both law, order and good morale of both soldiers and citizens in Nueva Ecija;

That Major Warner obtained and erected on or about January 9, 1942, a transmitting and receiving radio with which it contacted our High Command and reported the situation as it concerned those of our forces which to his knowledge were cut off from proceeding south and were now in proximity to him; that General MacArthur replied by radiogram dated January 13th authorizing Major Warner to operate support trenches in the hills, directing him to send information by every possible means and authorizing him to organize the troops to meet his needs; that shortly following, General MacArthur authorized Major Warner to sign checks for legitimate expenses for subsistence and other necessities for his troops; that later General MacArthur commended Major Warner for his energetic action in north Luzon and on February 12th by paragraph 4, Special orders 22, promoted Major Warner to Lieut-Colonel;

That I joined Major Warner with a portion of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) and about 250 Filipinos (some already in the Philippine army) under my command and Major Warner placed me in command of his Provisional First Battalion where he had originally intended to place Major Ralph B. Fraeger, Cavalry; that on February 14, 1942, with a strength of 1600 or over, Lieut-Colonel Warner's command was officially designated by General MacArthur - the Fourteenth Infantry, Philippine Army - with such Philippine Scouts and Americans as were with us, attached;

That I was the first American commissioned officer to join with Lieut-Colonel Warner - while he was still a Major - and as such as were such together in conference, on reconnaissance and in operations; that Lieut-Colonel Warner took me at all times into his confidence and that I believe I know better than anyone else his plans and purposes in all of his decisions and actions; that I remained with him through surrender and was taken out of prison camp with him by the Japanese Army to force the surrender of certain elements of the 14th

Infantry not yet surrendered, this was from September 12 to December 1942;

That short of ammunition, automatic and heavy weapons as we were, also individual equipment and medicine, Lieut-Colonel Warner inspired and held together the regiment when no other officer therein, I believe, could have done so; that his attitude to both his troops and to the civilian population was one of always extreme fairness and that I believe he has the love and respect of all the right thinking officers, enlisted men and civilians who knew him; that I have heard Filipino Army officers tell him that Filipinos particularly liked him and I have heard his kindness praised by Spaniards and Filipinos alike;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner's policy was to keep up the morale of both the troops and the civilian population by assisting the people to preserve law and order through their own provincial and municipal officials without declaring martial law, and by letting them know that his troops were there to help and not to bring suffering to them; that he likewise strongly advised and encouraged the officials to remain in office and to thereby serve their people rather than to evacuate in the path of the incoming Japanese forces and thereby bring into power those who had not the interests of the citizens at heart first; that in some instances the Japanese Army permitted to remain or appointed to office certain citizens that Lieut-Colonel Warner had previously urged to serve, in other instances this was diametrically the opposite;

That first for Governor Quirino of Nueva Vizcaya, then later for Governor Vissays of Isabela and for Governor Adduru of Cagayan, Lieut-Colonel Warner, over the Regimental radio, contacted President Manuel L. Quezon with respective problems of each and returned to these officials President Quezon's return reply or solution with authority to act; that emergency script currency, for one thing, was authorized, and that in another instance Lieut-Colonel Warner had a circuit judgeship, which was vacated by death in Isabela Province, refilled by Presidential appointment so that numerous prisoners in jail overlong awaiting trial could be properly tried and other cases on the docket disposed of legally and officially; that in addition, Lieut-Colonel Warner inducted into USAFFE such Constabulary elements as were within his contact, reinforced them where necessary and requested permission of our High Command that he be permitted to use the Constabulary in civil law enforcement where possible and not in the battle-line unless necessary; that General MacArthur approved this and informed Lieut-Colonel Warner that such policy was in keeping with the plan of the High Command;

That it is evidenced that the civil population thought well of Lieut-Colonel Warner in that the Governing Commission of Nueva Vizcaya Province - the Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Third Member, officially named and recorded the adjacent valley (of the Addalam River) west, to the southern portion of the Cagayan River valley, and called for a period of time the Kong Kong Valley - officially named this valley the Warner Valley; that Third Member Leandro Rosario verbally informed him that the province wished to make him a present of a strip of timberland in this valley, and stated that an official letter would come confirming all of this; that Japanese occupation, however, shortly after this, prevented completion of this plan and the ceremonies that were to take place concerning it;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner in his capacity as Regimental Commander frequently called meetings of provincial and municipal officials of Nueva Vizcaya,

Isebels and Cagayan Provinces to discuss with them matters of importance pertaining to the well-being of the people and the relationships of troops toward civilians and vice versa; that at such a meeting in March Lieut-Colonel Warner advised the increased planting of food in place of the large tobacco planting usually done, and advised that should Japanese occupation occur, the people to remain in their homes and accept gracefully and without resistance the enemy's occupation provided that by such time our forces had not received additional help from the United States, nor have help near in sight;

That because of inability to send help in the form of ammunition, automatic weapons and medicines in the quantities requested, General MacArthur directed Lieut-Colonel Warner not to fight enemy forces that could overpower and destroy his own but to harass and to contact small patrols that could be overpowered; that in this same message General MacArthur told Lieut-Colonel Warner that his energetic action pleased him (General MacArthur) greatly and commended him (Lieut-Colonel Warner) and his entire command;

That unless he believed it to be of importance to the cause, Lieut-Colonel Warner after some earlier demonstrations of retaliation on towns and barrios by planes, made effort to guide harassing missions to points not too near a community and that after the bombings of Bagabag and Bayombong by enemy planes in an effort to destroy our troops, Lieut-Colonel Warner and I made an extended reconnaissance of positions in wooded areas where we constructed our own camps and air-landing field; that, in all, the Regiment constructed four camps, two air-landing fields and a ship dock or pier in the Casiguran Bay - two of the camps, the air fields and dock construction being under my direct supervision; that the First Battalion under my command had the largest strength of personnel, reaching at one time 800 and over and this being my battalion I used soldier-labor in hours that would not interfere with drill and military training; that we planned and were soon to be ready on construction of good trails east from our positions over the Sierra Madre Mountains to the Casiguran Bay where, if help and supplies could come by boat, we could use my 300-pony pack train with pack carriers we had constructed for them;

That both Lieut-Colonel Warner and I believed that all of these installations and more that we had in mind would be of value to our forces when, if, and as additional help came and Lieut-Colonel Warner requested of our High Command numerous times that a plane come and land where we had prepared a suitable field and bring along a staff officer to report on what we had accomplished so that our High Command could direct us whether to continue or not our program of expansion;

That upon completion of my Battalion's main camp near Sinuanguan Norte barrio (but hidden in a huge bamboo grove south of this place) and our first air-landing field in the barrio Felatian and Sinuanguan Sur area, Lieut-Colonel Warner backed my plan and suggestion to hold a review, competitive drill exhibition and field day and to invite the public, this we did on March 4, 1942 and the day proved highly successful. The review, drills and athletics were full of spirit, the camp was admired and the results of everything were highly favorable to the morale of both soldiers and citizens of whom there about 8000 present; that no Japanese planes flew overhead during the

- 5 -

day though we could have hidden most of the crowd from view had they come;

That after the Tuguegarao attack of January 13th, in which I and my Philippine Scout troops participated as did all of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS), many Filipino Reservists not before able to report for duty, and volunteers, came to join us; that Lieut-Colonel Warner, wishing to gain results from the training of our Scouts, designated most of the recruit training to my Battalion; that were obliged on March 15th, however, by direct order from higher authority, to discharge about 500 men after two months of the best training we were able to give them with our limited equipment and ammunition, and that upon discharging them we gave each a certificate attesting to his training;

That, as before mentioned, Lieut-Colonel Warner maintained contact between President Quezon and the Provincial Governments of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Viscaya Provinces;

That during activities and operations in north Luzon prior to the ordered surrender of our Forces we were able to recapture from the enemy certain loot in the form of dry-goods dress material and a truckload of salt; that this was all distributed to Filipino citizens who needed it; that, further, certain funds were taken from the enemy powers that were in Nueva Viscaya and returned to Chinese merchants who had been forced to pay a weekly indemnity thereto; that it is believed Lieut-Colonel Warner will cover these items in his report;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner constantly impressed on his officers and men the necessity of reporting promptly worthwhile activity and news and the importance of making truthful and not exaggerated reports; that to facilitate news reaching our headquarters quickly from intelligence and combat patrols sent out, Lieut-Colonel Warner succeeded in procuring some carrier pigeons; that these were about ready to put into use when the surrender of our forces was ordered;

That as time went on without help coming, Lieut-Colonel Warner doubted the ability of our forces in Bataan to hold so that he and I made some plans together; that, in addition to the four well-hidden camps and the air field we had constructed in the south Cagayan River Valley, we constructed near Casiguran a second air-landing field and in the Casiguran Bay a sizeable ship dock or pier. Had our forces been able to hold out or could we have avoided General Wainwright's surrender order later, we would have constructed trails passable with pack animals over the Sierra Madre Mountains and connecting with Casiguran Bay;

That further, Lieut-Colonel Warner planned to erect at suitable points transmitting and receiving radio sets and to establish through them direct contact with Hawaii and the United States; that, in addition, if Bataan surrendered, we planned to break up the larger groups into effective small groups and scatter them so that they could be fed because we realized that Bataan's surrender would bring the enemy in large numbers after us and into our subsistence routes; that, in addition, we planned to cover outlying territory and organize new harassing groups, wherever this seemed advisable; we planned further to organize effective operating bases at certain points in

the so-called "Unexplored Territory";

That activities of our patrols and military information was reported by our Headquarters to our High Command as it came in and was evaluated;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner had some differences with Major Manuel P. Enriquez who up until March 1st, 1942, had been Colonel Warner's Executive Officer, these differences coming about because Enriquez had on several occasions sent his personal messages on the radio against Lieut-Colonel Warner's orders; that Lieut-Colonel Warner at about this time designated Major Guillermo Nekar as his Executive Officer, and placed him in direct charge of the radio;

That on the night of April 10th General Jonathan M. Wainwright, commanding USAFFE forces in the Philippines, notified Lieut-Colonel Warner that General King, April 9th, had surrendered our Forces in Bataan to enemy divisions and warned Lieut-Colonel Warner to be on the lookout for them (enemy divisions now;

That about March 25th Lieut-Colonel Warner had received from General Wainwright permission to be away from the Regiment from fifteen to thirty days effective April 15th for the purpose of inspecting installations on the east coast (the dock in Casiguran Bay and six field nearby) and of making a reconnaissance in the unexplored territory; that permission had been asked and granted in this instance to place Major Nekar in command of the Regiment during Lieut-Colonel Warner's trip; that Lieut-Colonel Warner had three times requested Major Nekar's promotion to Lieut-Colonel up to this time;

That despite Lieut-Colonel Warner's strict orders that official radio news be not made known outside the radio station it is believed that Major Nekar saw to it that certain civilian officials appeared at our Regimental Headquarters on the morning of April 11th, 1942, in connection with the radio-gram from General Wainwright concerning the surrender of General King in Bataan; that leading this civilian detail were Governor Visaya and Provincial Treasurer Juan Silvestre who was spokesman, also the Third Member, the major of Jones and others; that the mission of this delegation proved to be to request Lieut-Colonel Warner with other Americans to hide away from the Regiment; that at first Lieut-Colonel Warner with others of us respected the sincerity of such a suggestion or request and were inclined to honor it but later we became convinced that this was all part of a cheap, put-up political scheme of Major Nekar's to make it appear that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I with other Americans had deserted the Regiment while he (Nekar) proved to be the hero who stuck by, refused to obey the surrender order of both General Wainwright and Lieut-Colonel Warner and built up a political prestige for himself by forcing the Japanese forces to capture him; that shortly after Nekar was captured (he had been promoted to Lieut-Colonel about April 15th) I personally saw and talked with him and he (Lieut-Colonel Nekar) proudly said to me, quote: "this had made me famous enough that I will be elected President of the Philippines." unquote; that it was Lieut-Colonel Warner who finally surrendered the regiment;

That returning to what happened within our Regiment after General Wainwright warned Lieut-Colonel Warner to expect Japanese attention to be now

- 7 -

turned toward us, the following is recorded: First, that Lieut-Colonel Warner immediately called a meeting of his Staff, his Battalion Commanders and their staffs, for the purpose of discussing his plans and to order the execution of them; that this meeting was called for ten o'clock A.M., April 11th, and Major Manuel P. Enriquez, commanding the Second Battalion, failed to appear or to be represented; that information reached Lieut-Colonel Warner about 15 days later in the person of Captain George T. Scholey from Colonel John P. Horen's Regiment; the 121st Infantry, that he (Scholey) had seen Major Enriquez while coming through Bayombong and that Enriquez was very excitedly engaged in disbanding and scattering his own troops. This was about April 12th;

That at the officers' meeting called for ten o'clock A.M., April 11th, Lieut-Colonel Warner brought to our attention two facts, namely: First, that any considerable movement of Japanese troops from the south toward us would cut off our food supplies. We now had approximately 1000 troops assigned and attached; that secondly, any effort on our part to make a stand as a Regiment would surely bring disastrous defeat because of our extremely small quantity of ammunition and limited automatic weapons, that we had no heavy weapons;

That almost before the meeting had closed, our patrols to the south informed us that 3000 Japanese troops were headed from the south, were now in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and would proceed north into Nueva Viscaya and Isabela the following day;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner now met with Major Nakar and the following was decided upon -

1. That Captain Minton's - the First Battalion - would be moved east over the Sierra Madre Mountains and distributed in Casiguran and through the barrios on the Casiguran Bay and those north in the Isabela Province near the east coast;
2. That the Headquarters troops under Major Nakar would occupy in small groups the outlying barrios in the far southern Cagayan Valley and west throughout the Warner (formerly Kong Kong) Valley of Nueva Viscaya;
3. That the second battalion under Major Manuel P. Enriquez would occupy scattered positions in Nueva Viscaya within reach of Bayombong, Belate Pass and far enough west on trail into Benguet Province to contact Bagio;
4. That all troops would remain under the orders of specified officers and non-commissioned officers;
5. That in the barrios the soldiers remaining would keep their arms hidden and would assist the farmers to grow food;
6. That the best-qualified officers and enlisted personnel for harassing contact would be selected from all groups and stationed at vantage points away from the barrios as much as possible;
7. That Lieut-Colonel Warner would take along with him all

- 8 -

American personnel and would use such portions of the unexplored territory in Isabela Province as he considered advantageous;

8. That Major Nekar would make use of such unexplored territory in Tayabas Province as he needed, he having claimed experience in this territory while with the Philippine Constabulary;

9. That the Regimental radio would remain until further arrangements under Major Nekar's direction while Captain Minton and Lieut-Colonel Warner made an effort to acquire and erect a more portable set and, if possible, two sets. With these we could also establish contact between Battalions and Lieut-Colonel Warner wanted to arrange contact directly with the United States Hawaii and Australia;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner sent a radiogram on April 11th to General Wainwright stating that now our food supply was endangered, that we were scattering troops to assist farmers, that our assembly point would be Jones, Isabela, that he (Lieut-Colonel Warner) was ordering the Americans in the Regiment to join with him and that he was going to make effort to join United or Allied forces elsewhere; that the wording of the telegram was aimed to mislead and to cover up from the local news-spreaders and gossipers - who would be sure to spread the contents of Lieut-Colonel Warner's message; that Lieut-Colonel Warner believed that General Wainwright would issue orders covering any change in the situation that he wished Lieut-Colonel Warner to make and that the understanding between Lieut-Colonel Warner and Major Nekar whom he left in charge of the radio was that Major Nekar would forward to him any instructions from General Wainwright. Lieut-Colonel Warner told Major Nekar that he would notify him (Nekar) of his movements;

That on the morning of April 12 we began moving my Battalion to Pinapagan, all but two Americans with the Regiment accompanying Lieut-Colonel Warner and me there;

That on the morning of April 14th we started eastward over the Sierra Madre Mountains toward Casiguran; that already I had a detail of about 70 men there working on the ship dock and the air field, and that I reached there (Casiguran) on April 19th; that Lieut-Colonel Warner reached Calabagan on the lower Casiguran Bay the same date and established temporary headquarters in barrio Dipsadu, then at the school house at Dinslanan;

That on or about April 21st Captain George T. Scholey, 1st Lieut-Dean Nicholson (mining engineers commissioned), Sergeant Barkaway and two Chinese sergeants - all from Colonel John F. Horant's Regiment, the 121st Infantry - joined me in Casiguran; that these officers and men came of their own accord and not on the invitation of any of us;

That in Casiguran Captain Scholey's group helped us condition for travel a small launch formerly belonging to a nearby Japanese lumber concession;

That on April 23rd Scholey's group joined me with Corporal Quinley, Private John Rusch and Corporal Tiroo Umpehan of my Regiment on the launch and we went down the Casiguran Bay where on April 24th we picked up Lieut-

- 9 -

Colonel Warner, Sergeant Coyle and Corporal Altamero at Dinlunan and set out for Palanan Bay arriving there at Sibang Island on the morning of April 26th; that Lieut-Colonel Warner instructed certain detachments of our troops to hike up the coast and join us in Palanan, which they did, totalling about 35. Some others were sent back to Pinappagan with messages from Lieut-Colonel Nekar (promoted about April 15th) giving him information to radio General Wainwright about our activities; that after this time we did not get any direct information from Lieut-Colonel Nekar though Lieut-Colonel Warner sent him a number of coded messages;

That around the Balanan area Lieut-Colonel Warner worked on ways and means of establishing power to operate one of the two radios we had available but were unable to get into operation due to lack of a generator sufficiently strong;

That we had a small radio receiving set (commercial) over which we heard some news though our batteries were weak and we had no way of recharging them;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner now detailed me in charge of a small group of Filipinos and Americans to cross over the Sierra Madre again to contact Lieut-Colonel Nekar with messages to General Wainwright and after they were sent to get the generator from our Regimental radio in Lieut-Colonel Nekar's care, then to bring same back to use at a place in the Sierra Madre where we'd have water power available - also to bring back the broken Palanan post radio generator now reported to be in Ilagan on its way to Manila for repair;

That I left Lieut-Colonel Warner on my mission on May 5th and upon the surrender of Corregidor he got the information over the small commercial receiving set and sent it after me; that in the announcement of General Wainwright calling organizations outside of Corregidor he (General Wainwright) called for the surrender of Lieut-Colonel Nekar with our forces rather than for Lieut-Colonel Warner. This we learned later from Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka, General Wainwright's representative, was because Lieut-Colonel Nekar had previously informed General Wainwright that he (Nekar) did not know Lieut-Colonel Warner's whereabouts - which was entirely untrue because Lieut-Colonel Nekar knew at all times what Lieut-Colonel was doing and his location; that at Pinappagan where Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka was later hunting Lieut-Colonel Nekar, Nekar was hidden out in the town while his friends seemed only too anxious to start Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka after Lieut-Colonel Warner, telling him his location; that this is the beginning of where we discovered that instead of Lieut-Colonel Nekar cooperating with Lieut-Colonel Warner in carrying out a workable plan which would be to the best advantage of all concerned, Lieut-Colonel Nekar instead tried to make himself quite a hero in the eyes of the Filipinos and tried to appear that the Americans had deserted the Filipinos and that he (Nekar) had courageously remained by; that later on also Nekar tried to encourage certain Americans who contacted him to remain with him, then later became frightened and tried to get the Americans to leave him - the very plan and advice that Lieut-Colonel Warner had given in April; that Lieut-Col Warner's only reason for himself and Americans leaving

- 10 -

the Cagayan Valley was to save suffering by the people at the enemy's hands and because Lieut-Colonel Warner's maxim, i.e., "A live soldier is worth more to his country than a dead one or a prisoner", he tried to locate his troops so as to enable them to do something of value. He felt that from the beginning we had been unable to do much;

That now Japanese forces were heavily in the Cagayan Valley and in all the important towns such as Jones, Echague, Cuyayan, Ilogan, with the Japanese flag now flying in larger towns away from the main highways such as San Mariano, Isabels, etc.;

That on my trip to contact Lieut-Colonel Nekar whom we still believed to be south of Jones I planned to detour the Japanese forces in Jones; that not far north of Jones however I came upon two small groups of troops of our Regiment who had remained behind with Lieut-Colonel Nekar; that each of these groups gave me information to the effect that Lieut-Colonel Nekar had disbanded his troops and had gone to Mountain Province; that other Filipinos whom I inquired of, likewise verified this information as correct;

That near San Mariano I succeeded in getting only a small automobile generator sufficient to recharge dry cells but not to operate the radio transmitter;

That on my return I picked up the copy of General Weinwright's surrender order to Lieut-Colonel Nekar and Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka's personal letters to him from Filipinos entrusted by Colonel Kalakuka to deliver these to Lieut-Colonel Nekar; that these I brought back to Lieut-Colonel Warner returning to his headquarters at near barrioc Dimatican on May 25th;

That by now Captain George Scholey and party in Palanan had purchased for \$65.00 and were putting into condition for sailing a 15-foot boat with outrigger and Scholey planned to try to get away from Luzon thereby and if possible reach the Chinese coast, hiking inland in an effort to contact friendly forces; that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were invited to go along and concerning this we had a conference together with the following decision: Lieut-Colonel Warner decided that he would remain in Luzon to do what he could in keeping radio contact with higher headquarters and in organizing effective harassing groups insofar as ammunition could be procured, that since I was anxious to try to reach the China coast he would entrust to me certain records that we wished to get to our lines and a full report of his plans which he also hoped I could get to where it could reach our Headquarters in the Far East, that also was prepared for me to take along a request to our High Command from Lieut-Colonel Warner to remain out in an effort to carry out his plans;

That the boat was in readiness to leave Palanan on the morning of June 6th, stocked with provisions for seven men for about seventy days, when on the night of June 5th a messenger (one of our soldiers) arrived from Lieut-Colonel Theodore Kalakuka, JMC, (General Weinwright's representative sent out on Japanese order) in San Mariano, which messenger brought to me for Lieut-Colonel Warner and the rest of us General Weinwright's order to surrender; that along with this came an explanatory letter from Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka stating by refusing to surrender we would be subject

- 11 -

to charges of desertion and that in addition Lieut-Colonel Warner's failure to surrender would prevent the Japanese Command from agreeing to the surrender terms and would open the way to possible mistreatment of our already surrendered troops; that Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka further stated that General Weimwright's surrender was authorized by Washington and that he (Kalakuka) had seen President Roosevelt's radiogram of authorization himself;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner, Captain Scholey and I all decided to drop our other plans and to obey the surrender order chiefly on account of the prisoners already surrendered; that up to this time we had all decided not to surrender at any cost;

That because Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka stated that personal illness would detain him a few days in San Mariano (about 5-days hike from us) he requested us to contact him there and I left in June 6th for San Mariano to inform Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka that Lieut-Colonel Warner, Captain Scholey and the soldiers with them would be in San Mariano by June 14th; that on this date Lieut-Colonel Warner arrived with some troops, others having deserted after being ordered by Lieut-Colonel Warner to accompany him to San Mariano where he would discuss surrender terms;

That in San Mariano Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka informed him that General Weimwright held him (Lieut-Colonel Warner) still in command of the 14th Infantry and responsible for the surrender of the unit; further, that General Weimwright meant it that he wanted Lieut-Colonel Warner to surrender; that Lieut-Colonel Warner before contacting Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka but hearing appeals over the radio for the surrender of Lieut-Colonel Naker, had prepared and sent in code to Lieut-Colonel Naker by a Filipino civilian - one Trinitario Pintang - a written message instructing Naker not to surrender; that Pintang on his way to Lieut-Colonel Naker in Pinappagan told Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka when they met in San Mariano that he had this message for Naker and that Kalakuka said he would deliver it whereupon the Filipino turned it over; that Kalakuka then decoded the message and thereafter mistrusted Lieut-Colonel Warner's intention to surrender;

That the surrender was to take place in Echague - Japanese designated capital of Isabela - and on the way there we were joined in San Antonio by Major Eugene C. Jacobs, Medical Corps, who had previously joined our Regiment and was on his way to join Lieut-Colonel Warner in Palanan;

That we surrendered in Echague to Japanese Colonel Yoshizawa on June 19th and were questioned, then detained with a Japanese horse-drawn Field Artillery unit at the former Second Isabela Cadre barracks in Echague until July 20th. Meantime the number of our Filipino officers and men surrendered was small and the Japanese commander desired to have more turn in; that Lieut-Colonel Warner offered to make an effort to get Lieut-Colonel Naker and Major Enriquez with more men if permitted to try without Japanese soldiers to contact them; that at first the Japanese authorities seemed to favor this but later declined; that meantime Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka was sent out again after these officers whom Lieut-Colonel Warner was required to send surrender orders in writing; that a note from Lieut-Colonel Warner by way of Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka to 1st Lieut. Leandro Rosario of Lieut-Colonel Warner's staff brought in Lieut. Rosario with about 200 officers

and men, and Rosario on Lieut-Colonel Warner's advice surrendered;

That after this surrender Japanese Staff Lieutenant Sasaki told Lieut-Colonel Warner that he need not be longer concerned with Lieut-Colonel Nekar and Major Enriquez and their men surrendering - that Japanese troops would surely be successful in capturing them; that here Lieut-Colonel Warner asked that if possible they be given a chance to surrender if contacted, and that their lives be spared, which was promised;

That on July 19th we were put in trucks with Japanese troops and brought to Cabanatuan Prison Camp where we Americans were left and the Filipino soldiers with us were taken presumably to Camp O'Donnel;

That late in August Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were called to Japanese Headquarters at Prison Camp and thoroughly questioned as to all of our movements since the outbreak of the war; that at the termination of the questioning Lieut-Colonel Warner was told that our radio was operating and in communication with Australia; and that he and I would be taken out with Japanese forces to assist in capturing Lieut-Colonel Nekar and the radio;

That twice more Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were questioned and on September 12th, 1942, we were taken out of camp and taken again to Echague, Isabela; and that here Lieut-Colonel Warner was held until October 9th as a hostage with the Japanese troops at the Cadre barracks while I was taken by the Japanese Army military police into some of the barrios south of Jones, Isabela;

That sometime near the middle of September, I learned later, the Japanese located and captured the radio which at the time was buried in Pinappagan; that on or about September 28th or 29th on the information of a Filipino policeman of Jones, believed to be antagonistic to Lieut-Colonel Nekar, the Japanese forces captured Nekar in a cave in the Sierra Madre foothills near barrio Minuri Isabela;

That I learned later Lieut-Colonel Warner was not ever permitted to see Lieut-Colonel Nekar but was sent south in the Cagayan Valley with Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka and Lieut-Albert Ziegler who had been assisting him to bring back about 500 officers and men of the 14th Infantry who, learning that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were being held as hostages, voluntarily surrendered; that now Major Enriquez and his troops still remained out and Lieut-Colonels Warner and Kalakuka were taken to Bayombong it is believed to try to get them in; that both these officers however as well as Lieut-Ziegler separated from them at Jones and sent to Echague, were taken ill with cerebral malaria, Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka dying on October 31, 1942 in Bayombong and Lieut-Ziegler died November 8, 1942. Lieut-Colonel Warner got better and was returned to Cabanatuan Prison Camp December 6, 1942, after I had been returned about November 24th;

That after Lieut-Colonel Nekar was captured and brought to Jones, Isabela, on or about September 29th and later on in Baguio I saw him and once had a slight opportunity to talk with him. It was at this time that

- 13 -

what he said to me had in it a ring of insincerity and condemnation of Lieut-Colonel Warner, of me and the other Americans when as a matter of fact all of his actions bore out what we had done what we had agreed to do for the best interests of the service and of the Filipino people, whom we could do no better for under existing circumstances; that Lieut-Colonel Naker tried his best later to rid himself of Americans who tried to remain with him after Lieut-Colonel Warner, the other Americans and I took up headquarters in the Palanan district;

That in prison camp during Lieut-Colonel Warner's absence, Colonel John F. Horan spent considerable time and conversation trying to belittle and under-rate Lieut-Colonel Warner's efforts;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner held command of the 14th Infantry of which I commanded the 1st Battalion, until the Japanese accepted surrender officially;"

(Signed) WARREN ARTHUR MINTON,
(Typed) WARREN ARTHUR MINTON,
Captain, Cavalry,
Commanding 1st Bn, 14th Inf

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of September, 1942, at Military Prison Camp No. 1 of the Philippine Islands, Cabanatuan, Province of Nueva Ecija, P. I.

(Signed) PETER KOSTER,
(Typed) PETER KOSTER,
Major, JAGD,
Judge Advocate.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

ORIGIN AND BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ENRIQUEZ GUERRILLAS

On 23 December, 1941 the forces in Baguio were ordered to take the Mountain Trail via Bontoc through Nueva Vizcaya in order to avoid the enemy blocking the Kenon and Naguilian Roads. The US forces were under the command of Colonel John P. Moran, USA, then the CO of Camp John Hay. A majority of the troops passed through Bukod, Mt. Province while the rest passed through Kiangan to Nueva Vizcaya. Somewhere in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, the American Officers (There were two other CoIs.) decided to disband their forces as they were informed that the Japs had already reached Tuguegarao and San Jose, Nueva Ecija and were on their way to Nueva Vizcaya.

Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez, OSC, then G-2 of the 11th Div who was one of those cut off in Baguio decided to go against the orders to those American officers and instead collected all the men and arms he could gather. The men were mostly from the remnants of the 11th and 12th Inf Regiments, personnels of the District Headquarters, 1st MD and some men from the Command and Staff School in Baguio.

A Battalion was organized by the then Capt. Manuel P Enriquez together with Capt. Edmundo Navarro, then 2nd Lieut. The 1st Bn Staff was organized as follows:

- CO # Capt. Manuel P Enriquez
- Ex-0 2nd Lieut Edmundo G Navarro
- S-1 & Adj. 2nd Lieut Melito P Bulan
- S-2 3rd Lieut Honorio Quines
- S-4 3rd Lieut Manuel T Nery

All these officers were regular officers and under their guidance and supervision, the Battalion took shape again as a regular fighting outfit. This organization took place about the early days of January, 1942. While in the process of training, Major Everett I. Warner, 88th EA (PS) who was Provost Marshall of Camp John Hay arrived at the CP with one (1) EM. Captain Manuel P Enriquez called his staff officers together and they decided to invite Maj Warner to command the Battalion. At first Maj Warner refused stating that he did not know much about the functions of a Bn CO. Upon being assured that he will be assisted by all the Filipino Officers he accepted the position offered to him as Bn. CO. In the meantime Captain Guillermo Nekar with the Bn arrived at Aritao and joined forces with Captain Manuel P Enriquez. There was a drastic changed of organization with the addition of this Bn so that the following setup was made.

- Regimental CO Maj Everett I. Warner
- Ex-0 Capt Manuel P Enriquez
- Regt'l Adj and S-1 2nd Lieut Edmundo G Navarro
- S-2 2nd Lieut Melito P Bulan
- S-3 2nd Lieut Fernan China
- S-4 3rd Lieut Manuel T. Nery

This "history" appears to contain many omissions & misstatements.

See details of Edmundo G Navarro in Reg. 2nd Archives 872

CO, Hq Bn 2nd Lieut Edmundo G Navarro
 CO, 1st Bn 1st Lieut Warren Minton
 CO, 2nd Bn Capt Guillermo Nakar

When Lieut Edmundo G Navarro left Baguio City, he brought with him the District Radio Transmitter, having been the District Adjutant of the 1st Military District. With this radio, our unit was able to get in contact with General MacArthur in Corrigidor. As we were using the "First Guerilla Regiment" as our units name, Gen MacArthur authorized our unit to be called the "14th Inf" and promoted several officers in rank.

The saga of the "14th Inf" is recorded with GHQ, SWPA. It is a record of brilliant leadership and commendable fighting. After the surrender of Gen. Wainwright, the "14th Inf" continued fighting as a unit and did not surrender inspite of GHQ's order to surrender to the enemy. At the time of surrender, the Regimental Staff read as follows:

CO Lt. Col Guillermo Nakar
 Ex-O Maj Manuel P Enriquez
 Adj & S-1 1st Lieut Arturo Dincang
 S-4 1st Lieut Juanario A Longno
 CO, Hq Bn Capt R. H. Arnold
 CO, 1st Bn 1st Lieut Fermin Obina
 CO, 2nd Bn Maj Manuel P Enriquez

Upon the fall of Bataan, the American Officers left the regiment with Lieut Col Werner with the pretext of going to Casiguran, Tayabas to contact an American submarine. Maj Nakar who replaced Maj Enriquez as Ex-O, was promoted by Wainwright and made the CO. Maj Enriquez then was made the Ex-O. No orders were made regarding the appointment of the other officers due to persistent raids by the Japs who were swarming them all over Cagayan Valley.

On the last week of June 1942 the 14th Inf was able to contact SWPA and was followed by radio message from Gen MacArthur received on 29th June 1942 which partly read as follows:

Lt Col Nakar

The courageous and splendid resistance maintained by you and your command fills me with pride and satisfaction stop it will be my privilege to see that you and your Officers and men are properly rewarded at the appropriate time stop

MacArthur

On 14th July 1942 the message of Gen MacArthur was received directing Col Nakar that he may induct the Philippine Army Troops under his command into the Army of the United States (AUS) effective 14th July 1942. Thus Col Nakar, Maj Enriquez and their men stop to exist as PA Officers and men and became integral part of the Army of the United States.

Col Nakar was captured in a cave near Minury in Jones, Isabela on the 29th September 1942. Major Manuel P Enriquez took over the command of the 14th Inf AUS vice Lt Col Nakar and was promoted to the temporary rank of Lt Col effective 29 September 1942 by Martin Moses, Lt. Col USA.

Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez continued defying the Japs in Nueva Vizcaya and Pangasinan until 13th April 1943 when he and some men were forced to surrender to the enemy after being surrounded by a Bn of Japanese at Tube, Benguet, Mt. Province.

Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez was released by the Japanese Military Police in Baguio after his surrender to attract his men but with a condition that if they find him again doing things against the Japanese Forces, they will execute him without any trial. However Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez was not undaunted by this threat as he called a meeting of all officers in Baguio about June 1943 and instructed them that the resistance was to continue but in a more passive manner. It was understood by all his officers that they will carry instructions just as if he had not surrender.

To enable the men in the mountains to carry on the resistance, it was decided that a store be established in Baguio to facilitate those concerned to collect money, food, clothing and medicine without the enemy suspecting the real purpose of the organization. Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez with the aid of Capt Jose Ma Alvarez, an influential Business man from Manila and member of Macoco, got the permission of the Japanese MP to put up the store which was to be a subsidiary of the Macoco and named it the Macoco Store. The MP's believing that this was to help those "misguided elements" authorized its formation. The store flourished inspite of the restrictions placed upon it by the MP's as a majority of the population of Baguio knew somehow or the other that these was for the benefit of those in the field, so that they bought goods lavishly from that store. All members were formerly ~~Ex~~-USAFFE and Guerrillas and with Col Enriquez as manager the store became one of the most successful in the City. This store also became the message center for all instructions emanating from and going to Col Enriquez.

The following formed the personnel of that store;

Col Manuel P Enriquez	Manager
Lt Col Nestor P Reinoso	Asst Manager
Capt Santiago J Resurreccion.	Treasurer
1st Lieut Antonio Estepa	Bookkeeper
Capt Emiliano Ramirez	Salesman
Capt Antonio Garcia	-do-
Capt Felizardo Tanabe	-do-
Capt Emilio Borroneo	-do-
1st Lieut Melanio Lara.	-do-
1st Lieut Francisco de Leon	-do-
2nd Lieut Andrew Douglas	-do-
2nd Lieut Miguel G Velasco...	-do-

M/Sgt Proceso Banez	Salesman
M/Sgt Tillo	-do-
T/Sgt Federico Castaneda	-do-
S/Sgt Guillermo Tanabe	-do-
S/Sgt Antonio Mina	-do-
Miss Aolga Muller	Cashier
Mrs. Romana Duty de Gallardo	-do-

Col Manuel P Enriquez and some of his officers and men were put in the concentration camp in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija in August 1943 but were paroled on October 17, 1943.

After Col Enriquez' parole from the concentration camp on Oct 17, 1943 he reorganized his staff as follows:

Col Manuel P Enriquez	CO
G-1 & Adj Gen	Maj Edmundo G Navarro
Asst G-1	Capt Pedro D Dulay Jr
Asst Adj Gen	Capt Felizardo Tanabe
G-2	Lieut Col Nestor P Reinoso
Asst G-2	Capt Jose Ma Alvarez
G-3	Lt Col Manuel T Flores
Asst G-3	Capt Vicente Cepete
G-4	Lt Col Simson Valdez
Asst G-4	Capt Antonio Garcia

His field Officers as far as can be remembered were as follows:

CO, All PG Units	Col Claro Lizardo
CO, Kibangan Sector	Lt Col Gregorio Manalo
CO, Cagayan Valley Regt	Col Marcelo Adduro
CO, Bontoc Sector	Maj Ali Al-Raschid
CO, Ilocos Sector	Maj Madamba
CO, 14th Inf Regt	Lt Col Fouulo Manriquez
CO, N. Vizcaya Sabotage Bn	Maj Ramon Alcaraz

With the formation of his staff and designation of his Commanders in the Field the Enriquez Guerrillas started functioning again efficiently as any well organized unit in the Philippines. Monthly rosters of Officers and Men were transmitted thru the Nacoco Store. A radio transmitter was brought from Manila to Baguio by Maj Ali Al-Raschid, then Chief of Police of Baguio City. Intelligence reports were prepared and transmitted to either Panay or Negros but those rosters and intelligence reports did not reach their destination for reasons related in the following paragraph:

A man by the name of Franco Vera Reyes who turned out to be a Japanese Spy succeeded in enlisting his services with the organization by having himself introduced by an American Officer by the name of Capt Bill Arthur. With a War Department Identification Card, several copies of 1942 and 1943 magazines on Australian Hand Grenade several 1942 ammunition and letters of Commander Chick Parsons, he was able to convince Col Enriquez that he just arrived from Australia and was brought by a submarine to act as the Chief Liaison and Intelligence Officer for all Guerrillas. For secrecy's sake he asked that he be known thereafter as CIO-12. He apparently had plenty of cash with him and his first gesture was to give the organization \$15,000.00. He was therefore able to get the secrets

of the unit. In justice to Col Manuel P Enriquez decision to accept Reyes as a genuine representative from Australia, be it known that the identity of Franco Vera Reyes was first checked with the mother in law of Commander Chic Parsons, as Mrs Jurice who verified the penmanship of Commander Parsons. Other Americans were also investigated and among those who testified to the veracity of Franco Vera Reyes were Mrs Rev Stagg, Miss Wilt of Emanuel Hospital and some of the members of Mrs Staggs' church.

Franco Vera Reyes was a talkative man and when he started telling stories every one of them was checked. Capt Jose Ma Alvarez was able to verify his stories about Messrs Zobel and Elizalde and both disclaimed any knowledge of Franco Vera Reyes. Maj Edmundo G Navarro was able to dig into his former records before the war and found out that he was a former embezzler and a crook who took advantage of the mining boom. Capt Vicente Cepte was able to verify from Gen Vicente Lim the stories told by Vera Reyes and which never happened. Other organizations who were introduced to Vera Reyes started to investigate his activities and found that he was playing a double face game. By this time Vera Reyes had given about sixty thousand pesos in receipts to organization which were exchanged for Japanese war Notes and out of this he got about Thirty Thousand Pesos.

A hasty conference was called wherein it was decided that the important members of the command be made to take advantage of the Amnesty Proclamation given by Laurel's Puppet Government. This was arranged by Minister Quintin Paredes, Assemblyman Florencio Aquino and Ramon Mitra with the secretary to the President Mr. Pedro Sabido in order to save the whole organization from being identified by the Japanese Military Police. This did not prevent the arrest which transpired a week later. The first to be arrested was Capt Alvarez followed by Col Enriquez who had just arrived from Tayabas with Capt Antonio Garcia. Lt Col Reinoso and Capt Cepte and all the members of the Macoco store in Baguio were arrested. Mrs Enriquez was included in this arrest. Those who were able to flee were Lt Col Manuel T Flores, Capt Edmundo Navarro, Lt Col Simmon Valdez, Lt Enrique Tayag, Capt Felizardo Tanabe, Capt Emilio Borrero and Capt Antonio Garcia. This survivors fled to different Provinces and joined up with different units but some were never included in recognized rosters. Others went in hiding and were not able to contact their former units. Those who were caught and later released after a few months in prison were so weak and sick that they became inactive.

Col Enriquez and some of his men were reported executed in Fort Mac Kinley by the Japs on or about 30 August 1944.

BRIEF HISTORY, 14TH INF AUS

The 14th Inf is a group of scattered troops of the USAFFE consolidated in Nueva Viscaya province on or about the first week of January 1942.

Gathering what was left of the 1st Bn, 71st Inf, 71st Div, Capt. Guillermo Nakar, Commanding Officer of the gallant battalion, withdraw toward Baguio pursued by an overwhelmingly superior enemy force. Finding Baguio already captured and occupied by the enemy, this intrepid warrior proceeded across the Cordillera mountains overcoming all odds and difficulties that are inevitably attendant on jungle trails, and arrived at A. itao, Nueva Viscaya, about January 8, 1942. Captain Nakar found that Capt. Everret L. Warner and Capt Manuel P. Enriquez were already trying to organize stragglers from the 11th Division, 26th Cav (PS), the Headquarters of the 1st Military District who were unable to proceed to Bataan in view of the capture and occupation by the enemy of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and with a few civilian volunteers who were also mustered or inducted into the service of Major Everret Warner. These three gallant leaders undaunted by their being cut off from the USAFFE TROOPS at Bataan, pooled their men together numbering about 800 and formed themselves into a Unit which was temporarily designated 1st Provisional Guerrilla Regiment by USAFFE HQ. Contact with USAFFE HQ was established by radio which was brought down from HQ, 1st Military District, Camp Henru T. Allen, Baguio City by Sgt Jose Cabanero with the help of native cargadores.

This regiment as it will be seen later, was redesignated 14th Inf., USAFFE. The original set up was as follows:

Regimental Commander - - - Major Everret L. Warner
Ex O and OO, Hq Bn - - - - Capt Manuel P. Enriquez
Rgt'1 Adj & CO, 1st Bn - - - 1st Lt Warren A Minton
CO, 2nd Bn - - - - - - - - Capt Guillermo Nakar

The location of the different Command Posts were as follows:

Rgt'1 CP & Radio Station - - - Sto. Domingo, Bambang, Nueva Viscaya
1st Bn - - - - - - - - - Dupax, Nueva Viscaya
2nd Bn - - - - - - - - - Compo, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya

Radiographic contact was made with the General Headquarters of Gen MacArthur. Gen MacArthur's Headquarters cognizance of the existence of the 1st Guerrilla Regiment and the courageous and unique motives which gave the birth, resulted in the promotion of Capts Warner, Nakar and Enriquez to Major and the commission of Sgt Jose Cabanero to 3rd Lieutenant about the third week of January 1942. The regiment was made to understand that its principal mission was to harass the enemy and gather enemy information but that it was to preserve its organization by discreetly avoiding direct contact with the enemy. In other words, its mission was combat intelligence. For this purpose the following assignments of sectors were made: Major Nakar and his battalion from Balete Pass to Bato Ferry; Headquarters and 1st Battalion - from Bato Ferry inclusive to Aparri. Itching for action, the 1st Bn on or about 13 Jan 1942, raided Tuguegarao, Cagayan. This raid was undertaken in conjunction with Capt Praeger's 26th Cav (PS), contingents of the 71st Inf, and few civilian volunteers among them was Francis A. Camp, later on commissioned. The splendid results of this action were the killing of not less than 100 Japs,

and the destruction on the ground of 3 Jap planes. General Headquarters, USAFFE, was so pleased with the results that it commended and decorated all the Officers and MN that participated in the raid. There were minor subsequent engagements of the troops and casualties inflicted on the enemy could not be determined in view of the lack of means of verification attendant an hit-and-run tactics. Enraged by these intermittent engagements and fervently desirous to exploit the rich sources of food supplies in the Cagayan Valley, the Japanese Imperial Forces made a determined effort to push thru and destroy the USAFFE forces thereat. This was about the 3rd week of January, 1942, and the 2nd Bn then under Major Nakar was occupying defensive positions from Bambang to Balete Pass. Then there were reports from Regimental Headquarters to the effect that the Japanese were coming to the Cagayan Valley in two columns, - one thru Highway No. 5 and the other thru the Baguio-Kiangon road. In the last week of January, minor contacts with the feelers of the advancing Japanese Columns up the San Jose-Balete Pass road were made by the outposts of the 2nd Battalion. At this time, there was an increase of aerial reconnaissance by the enemy. On or about the 25th of January, 1942, a message from Major Warner was received by Major Nakar, to proceed to Bayombong with all his troops to assume command of the regiment in view of the illness of both Major Warner and Major Enriquez. Major Nakar, seeing the great possibility of hitting the enemy hard from his vantage positions, requested deferment of the carrying out of the order. The order being repeated the next day was ignored by Major Nakar. A third order was received on or about the 27th in compliance of which Major Nakar pulled out his headquarters and men from San Fernando and all the position they occupied and proceeded to Bayombong, leaving only about a platoon under Lt. Januario Longno to cover the withdrawal.

The 2nd Battalion troops arrived at Bayombong in the morning of the 28th and Major Guillermo Nakar immediately assumed command. A brief conference of the Regimental Staff developed to the issuance of an order to move the troops to Isabela. In view of the meagerness of the means of transportation, the available trucks and other vehicles shuttled the troops to Isabela. On the 29th of January, the advance party of the Jap column was engaged by Lt Longno and his men at Bambang, destroying one truck and one command car and killing 49 troops (Nips). While this engagement was taking place, the movement towards Jones continued. On the same day, Nipponese reconnaissance planes flew over Bagabag where Nakar's troops were still in bivouac. The following day 7 planes bombed Bagabag and Bayombong, hitting the Home Economics Building and the market. Fortunately the troops were already far on their way toward Isabela having moved at night on 28th January 1942.

Upon arrival at Jones, Isabela, on or about 2 Feb 42, the regimental headquarters was established at Masaya where Lt Col Warner assumed command, putting back into operation the Radio Transmitter thereat. The 1st Battalion under Capt Minton encamped in Sinauangan, the 2nd Battalion under Major Nakar at Daligan. Radio contact with the USAFFE Headquarters was resumed upon which a message was received directing Lt Col Warner to cease the use of 1st Guerrilla Regiments and designated the unit as the 14th Inf. USAFFE.

Shortage of arms, ammunition, medicine and other supplies was beginning to effect the operations as well as the health of the regiment. In response to radiographic appeal for supplies, two planes dropped on 16 February 1942, a box of medicine, 2 boxes of ammunition Cal 50, two pairs of shoes for Col Warner and Capt Minton and an envelope containing a CODE and other instructions. Telephone communication for intelligence purposes was established in the

province of Isabela, Nueva Viscaya and part of Cagayan under Lt Ambrocio operated and maintained with members of the Regiment and in some place by volunteer guards.

The 1st Bn under Capt Minton which was mostly composed of civilian volunteers spent its time in training its men. The HQ BN under Major Enriquez sent out a few combat reconnaissance patrols and guarded the Regt'l CP. The 2nd Bn under Major Nakar was busy harassing the enemy and maintaining Telephone communication.

The following important events happened between February 15, 1942 to the fall of Bataan, April 9, 1942:

A. - HQ BN under Major Manuel P. Enriquez:

1. - Maintenance of the radio contact with Hq Gen MacArthur and later with Gen Wainright and sending in important intelligence information gathered by the intelligence and combat patrols.
2. - Recapture of Bayombong and killing of Miyamoto, Japanese Military Administrator for Nueva Viscaya province on the middle of March, 1942.
3. - Gathering of arms and ammunition from civilians.

B. - 1st Bn under Capt Minton:

1. - Training of Men:
2. - Collecting of arms and ammunition
3. - Constructing an airstrip at Palacian, Jones, Isabela

C. - 2ND BN under Major Guillermo Nakar:

1. - Sending combat intelligence patrols
2. - Capture of 5 Japs at San Luis, Gordon, Isabela by a patrol led by Lt Fermín Obina, Lt, Bueno and Acting Officer Ricardo Ambrocio, later on commissioned:
3. - Raids by the Men of Lt Januario Longno, Lt Nabunga and Lt Rosario between Arifao and Sta Fe on the following dates; 30 January 1942, 12 February 1942, 18 March 1942 and 7 June 1942.
4. Second raid in Tuguegarao under Lts Obina, Dingcong, Reyes and 24 men on or about March 24, 1942. Result: Isp Guard House was burned, killed and wounded on undetermined numbers of Japs;
5. Capture of 1 Jap soldier south of Aparri by Lt Francis A. Camp in the last week of February 1942;
6. The killing of the 6 Jap prisoners by Lt Col E. Warner Capt Minton for attempting to escape during the 1st v

March 1942:

7. Collecting of arms and ammunitions from civilians.

D. - Redesignation of Units, 14th Inf in the Middle of March 1942:

1. Regt'l Commander still Lt Col E. L. Warner:
2. The 2nd Bn became the HQBN and Major G. Nakar became Regt'l Ex C and CO, HQBN.
3. The HQBN of Major Enriquez became the 2nd Bn under Major Manuel P Enriquez:
4. The 1st Bn under Capt Minton (no change):
5. The Regimental GP moved to Usol, Jone, Isabela:
6. The 2nd Bn under Major Enriquez moved to recaptured Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya:

E. - Promotions:

As far as I can remember, the following officers were promoted by Radiogram:

Rank and Name	TO	DATE	AUTHORITY
Major Everret L. Warner	: Lt Col :	February 1942:	Gen MacArthur
1st Lt Warren Minton	: Captain:	February 1942:	Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Tosoro Reyes	: 1st Lt :	10 Feb 1942 :	Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Januaryo Longno	: 1st Lt :	10 Feb 1942 :	Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Thomas Acop	: 1st Lt :	10 Feb 1942 :	Gen MacArthur
2nd Lt Fernan L. Obina	: 1st Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Arturo Dingcong	: 2nd Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Eulogio Bueno	: 2nd Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Jose Cabanero	: 2nd Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Antonio Castro	: 2nd Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Enrique Crus	: 2nd Lt :	25 March 42 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Benjamin Perdido	: 2nd Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Julian Ferdiguero	: 2nd Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Alfonso Sta Ana	: 2nd Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Pedro Vea	: 2nd Lt :	25 Mar 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Proilan Nericco	: 1st Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Froilan B. Parado	: 1st Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Leonardo Rosario	: 1st Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Nomeriano Valdepenas	: 1st Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Lope Cabautan	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Vicente Garag	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Ulpiano Domingo	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Mariano Evengleista	: 2nd Lt :	14 April 42 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Alejandro Putad	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Floro Remos	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Juan Sabalboro	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Antonio dela Cueva	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942 :	Gen Wainwright

3rd Lt. Rogerio Diesto	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt. Roman Licayan	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt. Juan Coma	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt. Pedro Mabunga	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt. Vicente Matias	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt. Gervasio Reyes	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt. Joel Senot	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt. Prescillano Velasco	: 2nd Lt :	14 Apr 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt. Manuel T. Nery	: 1st Lt :	February 42	: Gen MacArthur

F. - Commissions:

As far as I can remember, the following commissions were made by radio:

Civ Dr. Celso Mesa	: 1st Lt DC :	April 1942:	Gen Wainwright
Civ Dr. Vicente Florida	: 1st Lt MC :	April 1942:	Gen Wainwright
Civ Dr. Miguel Castro	: 1st Lt MC :	April 1942:	Gen Wainwright
Civ Ricardo B. Ambrocio	: 3rd Lt :	5 Mar 1942:	Gen MacArthur
Civ Leandro Rosario	: 2nd Lt :	5 Mar 1942:	Gen MacArthur
Civ Francis A. Camp	: 2nd Lt :	March 1942:	Gen MacArthur
Sgt Harley F. Heib	: 2nd Lt :	March 1942:	Gen MacArthur

Capt Robert H Arnold, SC (USA) reported and was assigned with the 14th Inf as S-2 and Signal Officer on 10 April 1942.

As a result of the surrender of Bataan, Lt Col E L Warner, Capt Minton and some of the 1st Bn Officers and Men left on 12 April 1942 for Casiguran, Tayabas, after Col Warner had sent a radiogram requesting Gen Wainwright to send a destroyer to pick him up at Casiguran Bay. Gen Wainwright radioed back directing Col Warner to stay with his command. This message was sent by rush messengers to Casiguran but Col Warner, Capt Minton and other Americans had already boarded a reconditioned Jap launched with the intention to go to China.

Major Guillermo Naker was promoted Lt Col on or about 13 April 1942 and assigned CO 14th Inf by Gen Wainwright; Capt R. H. Arnold became the CO HQBN; 1st Lt Obina, Actg CO and Ex O, 1st Bn and Major Manuel P. Enriquez, CO, 2nd Bn. 2nd Lt Arturo Dingcong was assigned Regimental Adjutant and was promoted 1st Lt on or about 25 April 1942 together with 1st Lt Edmundo Navarro, Ex O, 2nd Bn on same date by Gen Wainwright.

On the fall of Corregidor, no radiographic instructions were received from Gen Wainwright. Our signal officer Lt Jose Cabanero reported that the Radio Station of Corregidor stopped all of a sudden and was no longer on the air. Radio broadcasts from KFI, San Francisco, commented that the order of surrender of Gen Wainwright which was broadcasted did not sound like the natural voice of Gen Wainwright and further said that if it was Gen Wainwright, he was forced to do it or that he did it under duress. Jap planes dropped surrender leaflets addressed to Lt Col Naker. Lt Col Theodore Kalakuka was sent to contact Col Naker in order to make him surrender but Col Naker had already decided to continue the fight and never to surrender. At this time the HQBN, less one Company was in the Reg't 1 CP at Casiguran, Tayabas.

Jones, Isabela with "A", "O" and 1/2 of "D" Company in around the surrounding barrios of Jones. One company of the HQBN under Capt Alfonso Beguno was in Cabagan, Isabela, the other half of the "D" Co. under Lt Francis A. Camp as at Tuso, Cagayan and "B" Company under Lt Jenuario Longo was as San Fernando, Bambang, Nueva Viscaya. The whole of the 2nd Bn under Major Enriquez was spread out from Santiago, Isabela, to Bambang Nueva Viscaya with headquarters near Bayombong.

In view of the scarcity of food, the lack of sufficient arms, ammunitions and medicine, and in order to easily hide the men and at the same time facilities the gathering and relaying of enemy information for higher headquarters, Lt Col Nakar ordered that the Officers and Men not actually needed in the Regt'l GP, be tactically dispersed. Each officer sent out was given a list of the men under him. The men were instructed to report secretly to their officers at least thrice a week or as often as situation demands. The officers were instructed to submit a S-2 information at least three times a week to the nearest contact station. A series of contact stations was already in operation where they were going to. All a Station knows is that it will only relay a message to the next station and nothing more.

On 13 May 1942, the Regt'l Staff, Radio Station, and around 70 MM and 10 Off moved upstream the Cagayan River and established its headquarters in a small clearing about 5 Kms from Donabato, Pinappagan, Nueva Viscaya on 15 May 1942.

The period from 15 May 1942 to 15 June 1942 was devoted to the setting up of the Radio Transmitter and receiver under Lt Jose Cabanero with the help of Capt Arnold and Sgts Lebrojo and Domingo. Officers were assigned in the gathering of S-2 information were sent out to perfect the intelligence set up as well as the contact and relay station system. In the meantime the units under Lt Camp in the Cagayan and northern Isabela province and those under Major Enriquez and Lt Longo in the province of Nueva Viscaya were destroying bridges and harassing the enemy who by this time had become too free and careless and in their movements making him an easy prey to our small mobile patrols.

On 16 June 1942, the Radio transmitter set was set into operation and the delicate task of contacting a friendly station began. After long and careful deliberation on the procedure to be followed and the messages and to be sent in order to deny an enemy station from knowing our real identity and location and at the same time positively determine that we were in contact with a friendly station, the following plan was put into action: Our station was given a call name which sounded like a Java word. It was to send a general call and upon contact with another station, it will ask for the time and then give a message asking the name of the wife of an officer whose ASN was so and so (This ASN was the SN of Capt Robert H Arnold, USA) It will further request that the word Mabuay be broadcasted over station KGEE, San Francisco. In the last week of June 1942, contact was made by our station and the above procedure was followed. The time was given by the station was contacted pointed Darwin, Australia as its location. However, we were still in doubt. But, about two days later, the name of the wife of Capt Arnold and the word MABUHAY was broadcasted over KGEE in the evening. This was followed by a Radio message from Gen MacArthur received on 29 June 1942 which partly read as follows:

"LT COL NAKAR:

THE COURAGEOUS AND SPENDID RESISTANCE MAINTAINED BY YOU AND YOUR COMMAND FILLS ME WITH PRIDE AND SATISFACTION STOP IT WILL BE MY PRIVILEGE TO SEE THAT YOU AND YOUR OFFICERS AND MEN ARE PROPERLY REWARDED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME STOP X X X X MY AFFECTION AND BEST WISHES

MacARTHUR"

In a radiogram, Col Nakar reported the strength of the regiment which was as far as I can remember 62 officers and 960 enlisted men plus 3 officers and 140 enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary who were attached.

In one of the first messages from Gen MacArthur the mission of the 14th Inf was specified and that was to obtain and transmit intelligence information to GHQ, SWPA. In order to accomplish this end, Col Nakar asked for \$5,000.00 to be expended solely for intelligence purposes. This request was approved by Gen MacArthur. On the strength of this authority, civilian S-2 agents were employed with salaries ranging from \$5000 to \$150.00. However, these agents were never paid on account of the fact that no funds should be obtained locally. Intelligence coverage was expanded to include as far south as Manila and as far north as Aparri. S-2 reports were sent to Gen MacArthur covering all kinds of information about enemy movements, installations, concentrations as well as the kind of treatment the Filipino and American prisoners of War was receiving in the concentration camp. The men and officers sent out for S-2 work also carried with them a one-page mimeographed newspaper called "SPIRIT OF BATAAN" and signed MATANGLAWIN (Hawks Eye). This paper did not only serve as the only means by which the people were informed of the true happenings of the war but also warned the civil population from aiding the enemy in any form.

On 14 July 1942 a message from Gen MacArthur was received directing Col Nakar that he may induct the PA troops under his command into the Army of the United States effective 14 July 1942. This same radiogram contained the pay and allowances of US Army personnel from Pvt to Colonel. Same radiogram also had the ASN Block for officer and Enlisted Men to be assigned to the 14th Inf AUS which are as follows: - For Officers - O-888070 to O-888169; for enlisted men - 10626000 to 10626999. This was immediately circularized to the Officers and men of the regiment (See inclosure) and the officers and men in the regimental command Post and vicinity were immediately inducted into the AUS and given ASN. Capt Fermin Obina and Lt Julian Perdegueros were delegated and sent out for the induction of the men and officers of the HQBN and 1st Bn while Major Manuel P Enriquez was delegated to induct the 2nd Bn which was at that time spread out in Nueva Viscaya and eastern Pangasinan. In view of the distance and the difficulties of transportation and communication the induction was slow and delayed specially in the units of the 2nd Bn. Col Nakar however, in order to be fair to all ordered that all induction be dated 14 July 1942. Because of this he sent a message to SWPA stating that all officers and men were inducted into the AUS on 14 July 1942. Lists of all officers and enlisted men inducted into the AUS with their ASN were kept in the Regimental CP together with the oaths of office for officers.

The present discrepancies in the assignment of ASN for officers can be traced in this manner: In the first place the officers ASN as was first received by us had only two 8's or only O-88070 - O-88169. Take my case

as an example, I was given ASN O-88079 as a First Lieutenant and was recommended for promotion with the same ASN. Wehn the correction was made to 888070, I was already promoted Captain and another seniority list was made. I was this time assigned ASN 888075. I was therefore using ASN O-888075 until I was given an extract copy of my SO Promoting me to Captain wherein my ASN was O-888079. This is true with almost all the officers. The only thing to do now is to inform all the officers to use the first ASN given them adding one more 8 or to reassign serial numbers to officers whose serial numbers were not reported by radio to GHQ, SWPA.

In the last week of July 1942, a radiogram from GHQ, SWPA was received inquiring as to where personnel could be landed to contact the 14th Inf AUS. This message was answered requesting information as to how the personnel will be landed - by parachute from a plane or by submarine. Meanwhile a patrol was immediately sent to Casiguran, Tayabas to establish an outpost and a reception point to receive the personnel if they will be landed by submarine.

Radiogram was received promoting the following officers effective 2nd August 1942 to ranks as follows:

<u>TO BE MAJOR</u>	<u>TO BE 1st LT</u>
Capt Robert H. Arnold	2nd Lt Harley P. Hoib
<u>TO BE CAPTAIN</u>	2nd Lt Honorio Quines
1st Lt Fermin Obina	2nd Lt Julian Perdigueros
1st Lt Arturo Dingcong	2nd Lt Eulogio Bueno
1st Lt Tesoro Reyes	2nd Lt Francis A. Camp
1st Lt Jenuario Longno	2nd Lt Benjamin Perdido
1st Lt Juan Asuncion	2nd Lt Antonio Castro
	2nd Lt Jose Cabanero

The following civilians who were long serving the unit acting as officers were as far as I can remember commissioned 2nd Lt in the Army of the United States on or about 9 August 1942.

Hospicio Tabilangan
Mario Gonzales

One of the last messages received on 12 August 1942 from GHQ, SWPA before the Radio Station was dismantled due to the reports that the enemy had located the station and was sending patrols to capture it was one which asked for the order of battle of the Japanese Army in the Philippines. This message was never answered. The radio set, after SWPA was duly notified that contact will be resumed on the 27th or 28th of August 1942, was dismantled and together with complete set of records was placed in a big Galvanized Iron tank and buried in the ground near the edge of the forest. Two other sets of records were oiled placed in small cans, and buried about 200 to 500 yards inside the forest.

Beginning the first of July of 1942, the Japanese Imperial Army after it failed to get any results in inducing Col Naker to surrender, launched the most intensive and systematic mopping up operations against the troops of Col Naker in the Cagayan Valley. These operations were conducted by Infantry troops, planes, Japs and Filipino MP's and Genaps and was marked with indiscriminate bombing, imprisonment of suspected persons, torture

and atrocities of the highest order. However, the Japs did not gain much headway in the gaining of correct information about the whereabouts of Col Nakar and his troops. In retaliation of the atrocities committed by the Japs and partly because of the increased obstacles to be overcome in the securing of valuable S-2 information, our patrols had to fight it out with the Japs resulting to more torture and brutalities and later on during the last week of July some civilians and enlisted men who had a little more knowledge than they should have concerning the 14th Inf AUS were captured, Lt Leandro Rosario one of the few officers who were able to visit Col Nakar in our Regt'l CP at Domabato, Pinappagan, Nueva Viscaya surrendered to the Japs in Bayombong and was reported to have been very close to the Japs. These events lead to the dismantling of the radio station and the burying of the records as was previously mentioned. On or about 25 August 1942 approximately two companies of Japs occupied Pinappagan, Nueva Viscaya. Two days before the arrival of the Japs however, Col Nakar issued orders that no fighting should be done in Pinappagan and that everybody should pretend to be civilians. Lt Jose Cabanero was left near the place where the radio and records were buried and I with Major Arnold, Lt Heib, two other American soldiers and around 35 MM about half of whom were sick of Malaria, encamped about 5 kilometers from our regimental CP. A day before the Japs arrived at Pinappagan, Col Nakar left for a barrio near Jones, Isabela. His intention was to watch the Japanese more closely in order to be able to determine what the Japs know about Pinappagan and their plans. On 28 August 1942 the Japs left Pinappagan for Jones but returned two days later with a bigger force and with Lt. Antonio Castro and another soldier by the name Colcol as prisoners. On the 13 of September our old regimental CP was raided by the Japs guided by Colecol. Finding the camp empty, the Japs burned all the shelters. My group moved out to another secret place known only to 2 or 3 civilians. But one of our contact men by the name of Del Rosario, a PC soldier, was captured without our knowledge and after he was tortured, he guided the Japs to our bivouac area on 14 Sept 42. Early on the morning of 15 Sept my camp was raided and after a short encounter between the Japs and our men that covered our withdrawal, 1 and 2 of my soldiers who were sick were surrounded in a thick bush taken prisoners. Sgts Pablo Villanobles and Mayoga who were too sick to run stayed behind and fired at the Japs until they were killed. Casualties on the side of the Japs could not be determined.

I was taken to the Jap garrison at Pinappagan and was investigated and tortured as I refused to give any information. Only the people of Pinappagan, Major Arnold, and Colonels Warner and Kalakuka who later on visited me in the cell could tell how I was tortured as a result of my refusal to give out the secrets of the regiment. On 17 September 1942 Lt Leandro Rosario arrived at Pinappagan with Col Ide and a regiment of Japanese soldiers. Rosario delivered speeches telling the people that they should cooperate with the Japs and reveal the secrets of the 14th Inf.

An important fact here has to be mentioned as it was responsible for the capture of Col Nakar, the radio, the records, and the surrender of some of the officers and men. This fact was that Lt Rosario founded the town of Pinappagan and his words were very much respected by the people. However, the people tried hard to keep the secrets of the 14th Inf until Rosario and the Japs gave out an ultimatum that all will be killed if no one will tell the truth about the radio and Col Nakar. The

people softened and with the squealing of an Aglipayan priest by the name of Castillo the radio was located and dugged out by Rosario and the Jps on or about the last week of September 1942. The capture of Col Nakar in a cave near Minuri, Jones, Isabela on 29 September by the Japs with the help of Sabaluca, chief of police of Jones) and 300 Ganaps followed. Lt Rosario once boasted to me in my prison cell that he was going to get a medal from the Emperor for the capture of Col Nakar and his radio. Lt Rosario and his co-spies who received medals for the capture of Col Nakar and the radio did wear their medals but they all disappeared before the US Army returned to the Philippines to give them a chance to assert that they were not spies, traitors nor collaborators.

The other two sets of records buried in the forest were according to reliable information also found by the Japs in one of their excavation patrols to our CP in which colonels Warner and Kalakuka were present. The Japs in these excavation patrols used from 200 to 300 civilians with an equal number of Japs and with crowbars and sharpened sticks combed the vicinity of our old CP for buried records, supplies, equipment, and valuables. They did this for almost two weeks and at the end of this period, they got practically everything except the buried can where the radio tubes, crystals, codes and other important parts of the radio set were placed. This can was later on accidentally dug out by civilians about 2 years after but the contents were already decayed.

On 23 October 1942, all the Japs in Pinappagan moved down to Jones, Isabela with all their prisoners namely: Lt-Colonels Warner and Kalakuka, Lts Zeigler and Antonio Castro, the two soldiers who were captured with me, Judge Catalino Valbuena of Pinappagan who was our S-2 agent and who never squealed in spite of the severe torture he received from the Japs, and myself. Judge Valbuena and the two soldiers were lynched on the way 5 Kms north of Pinappagan and before we reached Jones, Lt Castro and I were taken each by four Japs their rifles with fixed bayonets to the Gagayan River. When the Japs were about to bayonet me, I broke down loose and run. I heard four shots and then I dove to the river and swam with the current downstream. I successfully evaded the Jap and Ganap guards on the way and reported back to the camp of Major Arnold and the following day 24 Oct 1942 at Pinappagan, Nueva Viscaya. From 24 October 1942 to September 1945, Maj Arnold commanded the remnants of the 14th Inf, AUS who were hiding and had never surrendered between Jones, Isabela and Pinappagan, Nueva Viscaya; This group consisted of 8 officers namely: Major Arnold, Lts Harley F Heib, Leonardo Galina, Gervacio Reyes, Enrique Cruz, Pedro Vea, Benjamin Aviles, myself and about 60 enlisted men. This group under Major Arnold was always busy evading the enemy. This was because in the rosters that the Japs were able to capture, they could tell that there were many more officers who were not yet accounted for including Major Arnold, Lt Heib, and Pvt Mangemelli all Americans. The enemy which sometimes reach as many as 800 Japs and Ganaps were always busy patrolling Jones and Pinappagan until August of 1944 when the last garrison of Japanese and PC soldiers was pulled out of Pinappagan. In this extended mopping up operations the Japs suffered much as many died of malaria and equipment and supplies were destroyed or lost especially when they have to cross the rivers during the floods.

Units of the 14th Infantry, under Lt Joaquin Duncan fought the Japs in the Mallig region of Isabela until the middle of 1943 when it had to suspend its operations due to lack of arms and ammunitions. Lt Francis A Camp in Gagayan also carried on the fight until he was captured sometimes

in 1943. The 2nd Bn under Major Manuel P Enriquez continued de. in eastern Pangasinan and Nueva Viscaya. When Maj Enriquez surrend. the Japs at Baguio on 13 April 1943, Capt. Romulo A Manriquez who had jo the 2nd Bn and was at this time the Ex O, assumed command of the 2nd Bn. The 2nd Bn under Capt Manriquez (now a Lt-Colonel and studying at Fort Leaven- worth) continued the fight and grew into a little less than a regiment so that when Col Russell W. Volckmann organized the USAFIP, NL command, the 2nd Bn, 10th Inf, AUS became the 14th Inf, USAFIP, NL.

In January, 1944 Major Arnold received a message from Col Volckmann requesting him to report to Col Volckmann's Headquarters. Major Arnold, however, was not able to get out of Pinappagan due to the presence of large enemy troops still around Pinappagan and Jones. In the first week of Octo- ber 1944 situation eased up and Maj Arnold seeing the need for more men, inducted around 40 men into the Army of the United States. These men were picked in recognition of their loyalty and the great sacrifice they had made for the preservation of the 14th Inf, AUS.

Sometimes in the middle of October, 1944 Maj Arnold left our unit in Pinappagan and Jones in order to confer with Col Volckmann as to who should command the 14th Inf. Maj Arnold's intention was to get back the command of the 14th Inf inasmuch as he was the most ranking officer left after Col Naker was captured. The outcome of the conference was however, the assign- ment of Maj Arnold as CO, 15th Inf, USAFIP, NL and the incorporation of the remnants of the 14th Inf, AUS which were under me at that time into the 14th Inf, USAFIP, NL on 28 October 1944. From hereon the activities of the remnants of the 14th Inf, AUS who had joined the 14th, 11th, 66th, and 15th Inf Regts of USAFIP, NL can be gathered in the battles that those regiments fought in the liberation of the Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Viscaya, Pangasinan and Ilocos provinces of Northern Luzon.

The 14th Inf, AUS lost its identity with the organization of the USAFIP, NL as the scattered officers and men could no longer be grouped together in view of the presence of spies and Japs, the need for immediate action, and in order to avoid friction among the different regiments to which officers and men of the 14th Inf AUS had joined. In my humble opin- ion the officers and men of the 14th Inf, AUS under Col Guillermo Naker had made a worthy contribution in the organization and successfull oper- ations of the various units of the USAFIP, NL command under Col Volckmann especially in the 14th, 11th, and 15th Infantry Regiments.

a/ Arturo Dingcong
t/ ARTURO DINGCONG
Captain, Inf, AUS
O-838079

A TRUE COPY:

Note: Original file is attached in the 201 file of Major Arturo Dingcong, AUS, at Proj "J".

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS
15th Infantry, P.A.
Luna, La Union

16 September 1945

SUBJECT: 14th Infantry
TO : Lieut-Colonel PARKER CALVERT
Infantry Commander, USAFIP, NL

1. In compliance to your query regarding certain facts of the 14th Infantry while I was connected with this organization, the following information is furnished:

2. In the early part of April 1942, I was assigned to the 14th Infantry, PA, by Headquarters, USFIP. At that time, Lieut-Col. Everett Warner was the C.O. Lieut-Col. Guillermo Nakar was the E.O. Lieut-Col. Warner however, had already left for Casiguran where he intended to get a boat so as to reach China. He was accompanied by Capt. George Scholey and Lieut. Nicolson as well as two chinamen. Col. Warner, however, is understood to have gotten off the boat at Palanan and later surrendered to the Japs. Capt Scholey, Lieut. Nicolson and the two chinamen were reported to have been captured by a Jap submarine off Aparri.

3. After Lieut.-Col. Warner had left his command, Lieut.-Col Nakar became the C.O. and I was made C.O. of the Headquarters Bn. After the fall of Corregidor, Col Nakar contacted thru one of his officers by Lieut.-Col. Kalakua in an attempt to have him surrender. Col. Nakar was persuaded not to surrender but as an alternative disbanded all but about 200 of his 800 men and some of his approximately 80 officers. The Regt 1 CP then moved up the Cagayan River from the vicinity of Jones to the vicinity of Pinappagan where radio contact was established with SWPA at the later part of June 1942. Som after this, Gen Mac Arthur in a radiogram to the C.O. 14th Infantry, PA, announced that, as a reward for not surrendering the unit, the 14th Infantry would be inducted into the AUS. About 200 men and 40 officers were so inducted into the AUS in July 1942.

4. In September 1942, communication with SWPA was ended when a large Japanese force located our radio and CP, attached us and captured the radio set. Col Nakar was not at the Regt 1 CP at the time but he was captured shortly after. After that time, I assumed command of all soldiers and officers who were not yet disbanded or captured or killed. In June 1944, I heard of another branch of the 14th Infantry operating under Major Enriquez who was under Col. Volckmann. Contact was established as soon as possible. I understand that Major Enriquez, who had been C.O., 2nd Bn., 14th Infantry, PA, did not surrender until a later date and after the capture of Lieut.-Colonel Nakar, claimed to have been the C.O. of the 14th Infantry. I do not know how many troops he had initially but I do know that most of his troops, except the Visayan soldiers

soldiers numbering about 60, had been disbanded upon orders from Lieut.-Col Nakar immediately after the fall of Corregidor. Major Enriquez had been promoted to Major, PA, early in 1942 but he received no subsequent promotion thru the 14th Infantry altho he claimed that he should have assimilated the rank of Lieut.-Colonel because he had been G-2 for the 11th Division at the outbreak of the war and had only been a Captain.

5. Enclosed herewith are two letters from Lieut. Col. Guillermo Nakar after his surrender to the Japanese ~~xxx~~ entreating his soldiers and officers to surrender.

/s/ R. H. Arnold
/t/ R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, AUS, 15th Infantry, P. A.
Commanding

Aa

Encls:
Two letters of Lieut-Col. G. Nakar

A TRUE COPY:

/s/ Parker Calvert
/t/ PARKER CALVERT
Lt Col, Infantry, AUS
Infantry Commander, USAFIP NL

HEADQUARTERS AFWESPAC
Check Sheets

Do not remove from attached sheets

File No. GSXRP Subject: Status of 14th Inf (PA)

(1)

FROM: Chief, Adj Br TO: Dir, Rec Pers Div DATE: 25 Mar 46
THRU: Legal Off

1. Summarized below is the story of the 14th Inf (PA), based on a narrative of Capt ARTURO DINGCONG, former Regtl Adj, attached hereto (Incl 1, Tab A). The following developments in the organization's history are pertinent to a proper determination of its status:

- a. In the early part of Jan 42, remnants of various PA units withdrawing from northern and western Luzon met in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. Cut off from the USAFFE forces to the South, these units pooled their strength of some 800 men and were reformed as the 1st Provisional Guerrilla Regt under Lt Col EVERETT L. WARNER. Subordinate officers were: Maj MANUEL P. ENRIQUEZ, Ex Off and CO, Hq Bn; Capt WARREN A. MINTON, Regtl Adj and CO, 1st Bn; and Lt Col GUILLERMO NAKAR, CO 2d Bn.
- b. In Feb 42, Gen MacARTHUR's hq redesignated the unit as the 14th Inf (PA).
- c. Upon the surrender of Bataan, Lt Col WARNER and a few of his officers and enlisted men left for Casiguran Bay with the intention of making their way to China. The Regt was thereupon placed under the command of Lt Col NAKAR by order of Gen WAINWRIGHT.
- d. Following the surrender of Corregidor, officers and men not actually needed in the Regtl CP were "tactically dispersed" and instructed to gather and transmit intelligence to designated officers. About 70 enlisted men and 10 officers accompanied the Regl Staff when the hq was moved to Pinappagan on 13 May 42. Meanwhile, mobile patrols in the Cagayan, Northern Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya provinces, under Maj ENRIQUEZ, Lt CAMP and Lt LONGNO, were engaged in sabotage and harrasing the enemy.
- e. On 29 Jun 42 rad contact was established with Australia. SWPA outlined the Unit's mission as one of gathering and transmitting intelligence. The current strength of the Regt was reported as follows: 62 officers and 960 enlisted men, 3 Officers and 140 enlisted men of the PC attached.
- f. On 14 Jul 42 Col NAKAR received a rad from Gen MacARTHUR authorizing induction of the ~~px~~ PA personnel under his command into the

Status of 14th Inf (PA) (cont'd.)

AUS. Same rad authorized issuance of army serial numbers from the following blocks: 10626000 to 10626999 for enlisted men and O-88070 to O-888169 for officers.

g. Some difficulties were encountered in completing the induction process because units of the Regt were scattered over a wide area. According to Capt DINGCONG:

"...the officers and men in the regimental Command Post and vicinity were immediately inducted into the AUS and given ASN. Capt FERMIN OBIMA and Lt JULIAN PERDEGUEROS were delegated and sent out for the induction of the men and officers of the Hq Bn and 1st Bn while Major MANUEL F. ENRIQUEZ was delegated to induct the 2nd Bn. which at that time was spread out in Nueva Vizcaya and Eastern Pangasinan. In view of the distance and the difficulties of transportation and communication the induction was slow and delayed, especially in the units of the 2nd Bn. Col NAKAR, however, in order to be fair to all ordered that all inductions be dated 14 July 1942. Because of this he sent a message to SWPA stating that all officers and men were inducted into the AUS on 14 July 1942..." (Note: The three officers mentioned in quotation have not survived.)

h. Errors were also made in the assignment of army serial numbers, particularly in the case of officers, so that numerous discrepancies now exist.

i. In Jul the Japanese forces launched an offensive against the 14th Inf and succeeded in capturing the Regtl Cp, rad apparatus and records. Some of the officers and men surrendered along with Col NAKAR on 29 Sep 42. Capt DINGCONG himself was ambushed and captured on 15 Sep 42.

j. Following NAKAR's surrender, the organization dispersed, a few of its component units operating independently of each other. the Hq group, consisting of some 60 enlisted men and 7 officers, came under the command of (then) Maj R. H. ARNOLD, the ranking AUS officer. Upon his escape from the Japanese on 23 Oct 42, Capt DINGCONG reported to Maj ARNOLD. This unit remained intact, thought relatively inactive in the vicinity of Pinappagan until 28 Oct 44, when it was incorporated within the reorganized 14th Inf under USAFIP, NL. About 40 additional enlisted men were inducted into the AUS by Maj ARNOLD during the first week of Oct 44.

k. Other 14th Inf units operating independently were: a group under Lt JOAQUIN DUNOAN which fought in the Mallig region until mid-43, when operations were suspended because of a shortage of arms and ammunition; and a unit under Lt FRANCIS A. CAMP in Cagayan, active until its CO was captured some time in 1943.

l. A larger group consisting of remnants of the 2d Bn, 14th Inf, co continued resistance in eastern Pangasinan and Nueva Vizcaya under the command of Maj MAN

Status of 14th Inf (PA) (cont'd)

command of Maj MANUEL P. ENRIQUEZ UNTIL HIS surrender on 13 Apr 43, when it was taken over by its Ex Off, (then) Capt ROMULO A. MANRIQUEZ. This unit gradually developed into almost full regt strength and, in Oct 44, was reorganized as the 14th Inf under USAFIP, NL. It was at this time also that the eastern branch of the Regt, which had been under ARNOLD's command, was incorporated within the reorganized 14th Inf.

2. Inclosed statement of Lt Col R. H. ARNOLD (Incl 2, Tab B), former CO of the Hq Bn and leader of the eastern branch of the Regt following NAKAR's surrender (see par 1j, above), contains these additional data:

a. After the fall of Corregidor, Lt Col NAKAR was persuaded ✓ not to surrender. As an alternative, he disbanded "all but about 200 of his 800 men and some of his approximately 80 officers."

b. When SWPA, as a reward for his refusal to surrender, authorized NAKAR to induct the personnel of his command into the AUS, about 200 men and 40 officers were so inducted.

c. After NAKAR's surrender, ARNOLD "assumed command of all soldiers and officers who were not yet disbanded or captured or killed." The statement continues: "In June 1944, I heard of another branch of the 14th Infantry operating under Major MANRIQUEZ who was under Col VOLCKMANN. Contact was established as soon as possible. I understand that Major ENRIQUEZ, who had been Co. O., 2nd Bn., 14th Infantry, PA, did not surrender until a later date and, after the capture of Lieut.-Colonel NAKAR, claimed to have been the C.O. of the 14th Infantry. I do not know how many troops he had initially but I do know that most of his troops, except the Visayan soldiers numbering about 60, had been disbanded upon orders from Lieut.-Col. NAKAR immediately after the fall of Corregidor..."

3. Confirmation of statement referred to in par 1f, above, is contained in C/N, dated 25 Jun 45, which originated in the GA Sec, USAFFE TG (incl 3, Tab C). In par 3 thereof, a message from MacARTHUR to NAKAR, dated 12 Jul 42, is quoted as follows:

"ALL OFFICERS PHILIPPINE ARMY YOUR FORCE APPOINTED OFFICERS ARMY US IN PA GRADES NOW HELD EFFECTIVE ON DATE OF ACCEPTANCE STOP ALL THIRD LIEUTENANTS APPOINTED SECOND LIEUTENANTS STOP YOU MAY ENLIST ALL PA SOLDIERS YOUR FORCE IN ARMY US IN GRADES NOW HELD IN PA STOP..."

In par 4 of same C/N, reference is made to NAKAR'S reply, dated 15 Jul 42, stating: "Officers of 14th Inf PA accepted commission in USA and EM of this regiment all enlisted in USA as of July 14, 1942."

4. In reply to an inquiry by this Div, the only information re the 14th Inf available at GHQ AFPAC is a rad from MacARTHUR to NAKAR, dated 16 Jul 42, stating that the organization "retains designation as 14th Inf PA despite the fact that personnel now belong to Army of the United States" (Incl 4, Tab D).

5. Incls 5 and 6 (tabs E and F) represent memoranda to officers and enlisted men of 14th Inf, dated 14 Jul 42, signed by (then) 1st Lt ARTURO DINGCONG, Regtl Adj, and Lt Col GUILLERMO NAKAR, CO, respectively, announcing that authority had been received to enlist all enlisted men and appoint all officers in the AUS. Incl 7 (Tab G) is another memo of 14th Inf Hq, dated 5 Aug 42, outlining the procedure to be followed in enlisting personnel in the AUS.

6. While it seems clear from the foregoing that the personnel of the 14th Inf on active duty on or about 14 Jul 42 was given AUS status as a reward for continuing its resistance against the enemy, no authentic information is available as to the exact or even approximate strength of the Regt at that time. Data now in our possession contain these discrepancies:

a. There is the testimony of Capt DINGCONG (see par 1e) that on 29 Jun 42, when rad contact was established with Australia, the strength of the 14th Inf was reported to be 62 officers and 960 enlisted men. The fact that about two weeks later SWPA issued a block of 1000 army serial numbers for enlisted and 100 for officers lends support to this allegation.

b. Lt Col ARNOLD contends that after the fall of Corregidor all but 200 of NAKAR's 800 men and some of his 80 officers ere disbanded (see par 2a, above). Capt DINGCONG's version of the same development is stated thus: "In View of the scarcity of food, the lack of sufficient arms, ammunition and medicine, and in order to easily hide the men and at the same time facilitate the fathering and relaying of enemy information for higher headquarters, Lt Col NAKAR ordered that the officers and men not actually needed in the Regtl CP be tactically dispersed..." (page 6, Incl 1).

7. Even greater confusion exists as to the number of enlisted men and officers actually enlisted or appointed in the AUS. The most concrete evidence of such inductions now available exists in the form of six rosters prepared in the course of the past few months by Capt DINGCONG (Incls 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, Tabs H, I, J, K, L and M). After cataloguing the names on these rosters and eliminating duplicate listings, they were found to total about 398 enlisted men and 69 Officers. It is believed that for the most part this group can be considered as eligible for confirmation as AUS personnel. Because of the confusion involved, it is not considered wise to confer AUS status automatically upon all personnel whose names appear on DINGCONG's rosters. While the rosters may be used as a guide, each individual's affidavit and supporting documents will have to determine the decision made in each case.

Status of 14th Inf (PA) (Cont'd.)

8. One of these rosters includes the names of 62 enlisted men "recruited by then Maj ARNOLD" (incl 12). Presumably, this group is the same one referred to by Capt DINGCONG in par 1j, above, as having been enlisted in Oct 44. Lt Col ARNOLD did not have the authority to recruit or enlist men in the AUS. Unlike the case of Trp C, 26th Cav (PS), which was authorized by SWPA to maintain its strength and therefore enlist replacements, the only authority SWPA extended to Lt Col MAKAR in Jul 42, as clearly stated in the rad itself (see par 3 of incl 3), was to induct enlisted men and appoint officers in the AUS already under MAKAR's command. Had SWPA intended to grant authority to enlist personnel in the 14th Inf as replacements were needed, it is believed that the 12 Jul rad would have been as clear on the point as the rad to Maj PRAEGER to Trp C, 26th Cav (PS). It is therefore recommended that the group of men enlisted by Lt Col ARNOLD, as well as others who were not under MAKAR's command on 14 Jul 42 but were inducted later, be processed as PA and not AUS personnel.

9. In addition to the six rosters submitted by Capt DINGCONG, two others have come to the attention of this Div. On (Incl 14, Tab N) is an original roster representing the make-up of Co "B", 1st Bn, 14th Inf under Lt J. A. LONGINO, as of 30 Jun 42, or about two weeks prior to the receipt of authority from SWPA to enlist 14th Inf Personnel in the AUS. Only 18 Names on this list appear on any of DINGCONG's rosters, but it is conceivable that men in this unit may have been enlisted in the AUS. The second list (Incl 15, Tab O) contains names of military personnel now serving with PA units who claim to have been "regular members of the 14th Inf (AUS)." Of the persons listed, only 7 names are to be found on one or more of DINGCONG's rosters. It is believed that in the case of these two groups the wisest course to follow would be to consider each case on its merits with the view of determining whether or not the individuals involved were actually inducted into the AUS. Such a determination will be greatly simplified after their affidavits and all supporting documents are available for study. The burden of proof, however, should rest with the claimant.

10. It is apparent that a wide discrepancy exists between the number of men allegedly on duty at the time rad contact with Australia was established and the number accounted for in the rosters described in par 7, above. Further investigation will be necessary before this discrepancy can be removed. The problem to be solved is the exact strength of the 14th Inf at the time authority was received to enlist its personnel in the AUS and, complementing this, the number of men, if any, who were on duty in areas removed from the Regtl CP but who may have been enlisted at a later date on the basis of the same authority.

11. This Div has already contacted Lt Cols ARNOLD and MANRIQUEZ, each of whom commanded remnants of the Regt independently of the other after MAKAR's and ENRIQUES's surrender, in order to gain a clearer perspective of the history of the 14th Inf and, particularly, to reach a definite conclusion as to the exact number of men actually inducted into the AUS. Unless this is conclusively determined, this Div may

Status of 14th Inf (PA) (Cont'd)

find itself swamped with claims to AUS status from personnel in the 14th Inf who joined that organization after Jul 42. It will be noted, in this connection, that the Station List of recognized guerrilla units, 10th MD, dated 5 Jan 45, gives the strength of the 14th Inf after 9 Jan 45 as 110 officers and 2648 enlisted men. It is therefore believed that while the group of men listed on rosters now in the possession of this Div can be processed at this time, further investigation must be made to determine the actual number of enlistments in the AUS made in Jul 42. After the necessary data is obtained, appropriate action can be taken in all cases still unprocessed. In the course of processing the first group, undoubtedly additional light will be thrown on the problem of whether AUS enlistments were actually effected in units separated from the 14th Inf Regt1 Cp.

12. It is to be noted that among the personnel now ready for processing, some officers and enlisted men were given promotion after contact with Australia was broken and after the 14th Inf was reorganized under USAFIP, NL. It is believed that all claims to promotions should be adjudicated on the same basis as that employed in the case of other AUS personnel who served with the guerrillas. In the case of enlisted men, acceptable evidence of promotion will be submitted. In the case of officers, each claimant will be required to submit admissible evidence of promotion and proof that duties performed were commensurate with grade claimed. Claims of officers will also be verified with guerrilla leaders concerned. In the case of enlisted men duly inducted into the AUS and later appointed officers in the guerrillas, it is believed that such persons should be offered the choice of retaining their enlisted AUS status or accepting their guerrilla appointments in the PA.

13. Because of the errors made in the assignment of serial numbers to officers of the 14th Inf, and because some of the enlisted men have forgotten their army serial numbers, it is believed that further confusion will be avoided by reassigning army serial numbers to those officers and enlisted men whose status in the AUS is confirmed from a new block of serial numbers.

14. In view of the considerations set forth above, the Chief, Adj Br, recommends that:

a. All PA enlisted men who served with the 14th Inf in Jul 42 and can submit acceptable evidence indicating induction into the AUS be confirmed as AUS personnel.

b. All PA officers on duty with the 14th Inf in Jul 42 be processed as AUS personnel, provided that incontrovertible evidence of appointment and/or subsequent promotion is presented, irrespective of the fact that their names may appear on the of DINGCOM's rosters. Burden of proof will at all times rest with the claimant.

c. Any enlistments in the 14th Inf made after Jul 42,

Status of 14th Inf (PA) (Cont'd.)

when it is clear that such enlistments were effected without authority, be regarded as PA inductions and processed accordingly.

d. Enlisted men confirmed in the AUS who later accepted guerilla appointments be allowed to choose between continuance of AUS enlisted status or acceptance of appointment in PA.

e. Upon Confirmation, new army serial numbers from blocks authorized to this Division be assigned to each person concerned.

f. In order to expedite processing of 14th Inf personnel, the Chief, Adj Br, be granted authority to determine grades of 14th Inf officers claiming AUS status on the basis of evidence submitted without forwarding each case to the Dir for consideration and approval.

15. While processing of 14th Inf personnel whose names are available in this Div is under way, this Branch will continue its investigation to determine actual strength of 14th Inf and number of AUS inductions effected in Jul 42, as suggested in pars 10 and 11, above. Upon completion of same, appropriate action will be taken.

s/t P. B. H., JR.

15 Incls:

- Incl 1 - Brief History, 14th Inf
- Incl 2 - Ltr, ARNOLD, incls w/d
- Incl 3 - C/N, CA Sec, USAFFE TG w/1 incl
- Incl 4 - 1st Ind, APPAC, to Msgform, this hq, w/1 incl
- Incl 5 - Memo, 14th Inf, dtd 14 Jul 42
- Incl 6 - Confidential Memo, dtd 14 Jul 42
- Incl 7 - Memo, 14th Inf, dtd 5 Aug 42
- Incl 8 - DINGCONG Roster No. D-1
- Incl 9 - DINGCONG Roster No. D-2
- Incl 10 - DINGCONG Roster No. D-3
- Incl 11 - DINGCONG Roster No. D-4
- Incl 12 - DINGCONG Roster No. D-5
- Incl 13 - DINGCONG Roster No. D-6
- Incl 14 - Roster, "B" Co, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
- Incl 15 - Roster M

A TRUE COPY:

GEORGE R PHILIP
Captain CAV
Dir, Investigation Br

Unfortunately, Lt Severino Antiporda, Sgt Corpuz and one private of his command were killed in action during the raid on the Jap garrison at Tayug, Pangasinan. On the side of the Japs, 11 of the 12 men composing the garrison were killed. After this raid, 2d Lt Gregorio Montejo assumed command of Company "G" and remained thereon until 12 April 1943 when the 3d Bn, 14th Infantry, was organized in eastern Pangasinan.

In Aug 1942, "G" Co was formed by Capt Amos, 1st Inf, 14th In. This Co was captured in Oct 1942, and went out of existence. No Co "G" was reformed until Nov 42 at the outbreak of the war.

*Det JMC
Company "G" 14th In
1725 1st Bn 14th In
1725 1st Bn 14th In*

7. On 29 April 1942, a truckload of Japs from the enemy garrison at Asingan, Pangasinan, recaptured the towns of Tayug, San Nicolas and Natividad from the hands of the 14th Infantry. The raid described in the preceding paragraph hereof was, as far as I knew, the first combat activity ever made by elements of the 14th Infantry in eastern Pangasinan since I joined this unit.

8. On 16 April 1942, two days after the raid at Tayug, Pangasinan, I returned to Colonel Nakar's headquarters at Bete, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, to deliver a report from Lt Gregorio Montejo, the new CO, "G" Co, 14th Infantry. Soon after the recapture of the towns of Tayug, Natividad and San Nicolas by the Japs, another guerrilla leader named Major Miguel Acosta established his headquarters in eastern Pangasinan. To consolidate its forces for a more effective action against the enemy, Headquarters, 14th Infantry, ordered its Co "G" to leave eastern Pangasinan, proceed to Nueva Vizcaya, and operate in the rear of the mother unit along Highway No. 5 to the south.

By 16 April, the bulk of 2d Lt. was disbanded or dispersed

9. In the early part of June 1942, I participated in ambushing a Jap convoy at Piut, Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija, this ambushade having been led by Sgt. Marcelo S. Quines, brother of Det Comdr Lt Honorio S. Quines. In this ambush, we killed 32 Japs, of whom 2 were believed to be officers because of their sabers and silver stars in their insignias. There was no casualty on our side.

10. On or about the middle of July 1942, I participated in another ambushade personally commanded by Det Comdr, Lt Honorio S. Quines on Highway No. 5 at Capintalan, Sta Fe, Nueva Vizcaya. In this encounter 56 killed and several wounded were accounted for, of whom 3 were believed to be officers. Aside from this, we also destroyed two enemy south-bound trucks loaded with rice, and other supplies.

*Det Comdr Quines
with his boys - probably
NW of Dec 42*

11. This incident made the enemy furious. Caranglaan and other points along Highway No. 5 occupying the rear of the 14th Infantry's area of operations were, for some time, the seat of an intensive mopping-up activity conducted by the enemy. Because of this enemy operation, I was ordered by Lt Honorio S. Quines to take a platoon of Co "E" across the hills to Pangasinan and locate a suitable bivouac area for our men in case the situation grew worse. From Capintalan we went to eastern Pangasinan and located an improvised camp in the western slopes of the Caraballo mountains just above the barrio of Batchelor, Natividad, Pangasinan. After putting my platoon in this new bivouac, I left for Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija, via Imugan, Nueva Vizcaya.

12. At Bete, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, on 24 July 1942 I overtook Lt Honorio S. Quines who was on his way to Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija, to induct the men of Co "E", 14th Infantry, into the Army of the United States. In the school building

Dangerous rays no!

*Copy to [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]*

of Bete, soon after my arrival, I was inducted into the Army of the United States with the rank of sergeant. My induction with this rank was a surprise to me, but Lt Honorio S. Quines informed me that my promotion to the rank of sergeant was received by him on 1 July 1942, effective on the same date. At that instance, Lt Quines handed to me my promotion order and paper of induction into the Army of the United States.

13. In the evening of 24 July 1942, Lt Honorio S. Quines, his bodyguards and myself left Aritao and proceeded to Camp Talatalan, Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija, via Sta Clara, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. On 28 July 1942, as soon as all the men of Co "E", 14th Infantry, were inducted into the Army of the United States, we left for eastern Pangasinan. We reached the camp of Co "G", 14th Infantry, under Lt. Gregorio Montejo at Delumpinas, San Nicolas, Pangasinan, at midnight of 29 July 1942. The following day Lt Honorio S Quines, Lt Fernando Lopez, myself and some EM of Co "G" proceeded to Batchelor, Natividad, Pangasinan. Here my platoon of 23 EM, of Co "E", were inducted by Lt Honorio S. Quines into the Army of the United States.

14. On or about the middle of August 1942, Lt Honorio S. Quines, myself and my platoon left our bivouac in the hills of Batchelor, Natividad, Pangasinan, and proceeded to Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija, by taking the trails across the mountains to Capintalan on Highway No. 5, with the intention of ambushing Jap convoys along the way. However, our plan was foiled by the enemy, in that we were forced to take a detour toward Piut, Nueva Ecija. Here we had to lie low for some time, because the Japs intensified their mopping-up operations in the southern sector of Nueva Vizcaya. These enemy operations spread to the provinces of Isabela, Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan. Unhappy incidents followed this enemy activity and demoralized a big portion of our men, especially when Colonel Guillermo Nakar was captured at Pinagpagan, Jones, Isabela, in the latter part of Sept. 1942.

15. To escape destruction following the capture of Colonel Nakar, Lt Honorio S. Quines moved with my platoon to eastern Pangasinan. The rest of Co "E" were left in Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija, under Sgt Marcelo S. Quines and Sgt Douglas Lopez. From September 1942 up to the early part of 1943, the mopping-up operations of the enemy were furious. During this period, many officers and enlisted men of the 14th Infantry surrendered when their families were taken as hostages by the enemy, and still more were either captured or killed in sporadic encounters with enemy patrols.

Engaging in Manila

16. Our stay in eastern Pangasinan during this period, with Det Comdr Lt Honorio S. Quines, was devoted to intelligence work, organization, and training of our men.

17. At about the latter part of October 1942, Lt Honorio S. Quines left Pangasinan and went to Manila to join Major Mamel Enriquez who became CO, 14th Infantry, after the capture of Colonel Guillermo Nakar. The principal purpose of the Lt Quines' trip to Manila was to get instructions from Major Enriquez regarding an intelligence network to be established over the area assigned to Co "E" which covered the northern part of Nueva

Ecija, the southern section of Nueva Vizcaya, and all of eastern Pangasinan. Lt Quines left me behind to take command of the boys during his absence, with instructions however to see or meet him at the Crystal Arcade on the Escolta, Manila, every 15th and 30th of the month so as to keep him posted on the military situation within this sector. However, during the days that followed, practically everyone in the guerrilla forces was compelled by circumstances to lie low, except in cases where action was necessary to promote the resistance movement, so that I failed to meet or see Lt Honorio S. Quines at the designated place on such dates. In this connection it must be mentioned that on 12 December 1942 Camp Talatalan, at the little hamlet of Burgos, Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija, was raided by the enemy. The Japs captured all the records of Co "E" prior to this date. After this raid, the entire personnel of Co "E" moved to eastern Pangasinan.

18. Thinking that Det Comdr, Lt Honorio S. Quines was also captured by the enemy when I failed to see or hear anything about him after he left for Manila, I joined on 7 December 1942 the outfit of Capt Pedro Balagot who was Chief, G-2 Section, USFIP, NL. From this date up to 1 April 1943 when I met Major Romulo A. Manriquez, my work was practically all dealing with intelligence. Meanwhile, I was also cooperating with other guerrilla units or groups operating in eastern Pangasinan, especially with the area counter-intelligence organizations initiated in May 1942 which was to become a little later the Pangasinan Anti-Crime Service under the command of Lt Colonel Alfredo E. Balingao. As operative of Colonel Balingao's staff guerrilla CIC, which functioned presumably as a civilian police auxiliary of the local administration in eastern Pangasinan, I could thus easily secure the information needed by G-2, USFIP, NL, under the overall direction of Lt Colonel Martin Moses, AUS, regarding enemy movement, personnel, arms, fuel and supplies obtaining in eastern Pangasinan and adjacent areas.

19. When Capt Pedro Balagot, surrendered to the enemy in January 1943, I got in contact with Lt Silvestre Marinas, Executive Officer, and Lt Fernando Lopez, Junior Officer, of Co "G", 14th Infantry, under Lt Gregorio Montejo. Adjustment of my problems were made, so that from the latter part of January 1943 to the latter part of March 1943 I was attached to Co "G" for temporary duty.

20. Unexpectedly, Major Romulo A. Manriquez who succeeded to the command of the 14th Infantry, came to eastern Pangasinan in the latter part of March 1943. He was critically ill of malaria at Tayug, Pangasinan, and was in danger of being captured by the Japs because he was within the area of intensive enemy mopping-up operations. I lost no time to locate the Major just as soon as I heard of his presence in the vicinity. I met him and invited him to come up with me to Batchelor, Natividad, Pangasinan, where he would be much safer than at Tayug or elsewhere. I informed him that Lt Colonel Alfredo E. Balingao, who was himself a guerrilla leader coordinating guerrilla intelligence activity in eastern Pangasinan, was the guerrilla-planted mayor of Natividad and deputy governor of the area. With my assurances, Major Manriquez consented to come up with me to my house at Batchelor. As soon as I had given him quarters at Batchelor, I utilized the personnel of Co "E", 14th Infantry, to serve as runners to warn me whenever or just in case Jap patrols came to the place where Major Manriquez was being kept.

21. Convinced that he was safe in this new hideout, Major Manriquez immediately set to organize the 3d Bn and two companies of the 1st Bn, 14th Infantry, in eastern Pangasinan. The 2d Bn of the unit was stationed in Baguio; the 1st Bn, in Isabela.

22. Before completing the organization of the 3d Bn, 14th Infantry, in eastern Pangasinan, Major Manriquez sent me to Manila to locate Lt Honorio S. Quines and Lt Saturnino Dumlaog. It was a difficult mission to locate these officers, but around the middle of July 1943 I succeeded in meeting them. I informed them of the presence of Major Romulo A. Manriquez in Natividad, Pangasinan, and of the organizational work being done by him. These officers came to Pangasinan and reported to the Major for duty. Both were promoted to the rank of captain. Capt Honorio S. Quines was assigned CO, 3d Bn, 14th Infantry, and Capt Saturnino Dumlaog as ExO thereof.

23. The first company organized in eastern Pangasinan during this period of reorganization of the 14th Infantry was Co "L". I was assigned as first sergeant of this company on 1 April 1943 and subsequently commissioned 2d Lieutenant thereof on 12 April 1943. Upon my promotion to the rank of 2d Lt, Sgt Panfilo P. Fernandez was promoted to 1/Sgt and given my former assignment in the company. In this connection, it should be remarked that Company "L", 14th Infantry, was organized on 1 April 1943, but Major Romulo A. Manriquez made it appear officially on record as of 12 April 1943, so as to conform to the date of surrender of Major Manuel Enriquez to the enemy and accordingly the date when Major Romulo A. Manriquez validly assumed command of the 14th Infantry, USAFIP, NL.

24. My commission to the rank of 2d Lt, 14th Infantry, on 12 April 1943 and my promotion to 1st Lt thereof on 1 November 1943 were confirmed by Special Order No. 44, HQS USAFIP, NL, dated 11 August 1944.

25. During the first week of February 1943, the Japs conducted another mopping-up operation in central and northeastern Pangasinan and captured some guerrilla operatives whose information, squealed in the torture rooms of the enemy garrison, led to the capture of Capt Honorio S. Quines, CO, 3d Bn, 14th Infantry, at Natividad, Pangasinan, by one Capt. Ohto, commander of the Jap garrison at Tayug, Pangasinan, at dawn of 13 February 1944.

26. From 10 April 1942 to July 1943 -- that is, starting from the date of my enlistment in the 14th Infantry -- Co "E" thereof had seen several changes of command from Capt Honorio S. Quines and up. When Capt Honorio S. Quines was made CO, 3d Bn, this unit, 1st Lt Marcelo S. Quines assumed command of Co "E". When Capt Honorio S. Quines was captured, his brother Lt Marcelo S. Quines was also captured in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and subsequently killed by the enemy. The command of Co "E" then passed to Lt Douglas Lopez. But Lt Lopez was also captured while he was conferring with one Capt Hidalgo of the bureau of constabulary at San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and was likewise killed by the enemy. After the death of Lt Lopez, the company was put under the command of Lt Lorenzo Sevilleja, with Lt Cirilo Bravo as the executive officer thereof. Then on 16 October 1944, Lt Lorenzo Sevilleja was relieved of his command and this company, redesignated Co "I", 14th Infantry, was placed under me. I was CO,

Co "I", 14th Infantry, USAFIP, NL, during the period from 16 October 1944 to 10 January 1945. For a clearer picture of the varied career of Co "E", 14th Infantry, it seems pertinent to include here the designations given to it by the different regimental commanders:

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Regimental Commander</u>
Organized Co "E"	Col Guillermo Nakar
Co "E" to Co "F"	Major Manuel Enriquez
Co "F" to Co "I"	Major Romulo A. Manriquez

27. Below is a list of EM who formed the detachment of Co "E" 14th Infantry, stationed in eastern Pangasinan:

Sgt Velasco, Francisco	Pvt Asuncion, Pedro
Sgt Asuncion, Rosalio C	Pvt Pugal, Artemio
Opl Acosta, Francisco	Pvt Mendoza, Emilio
Opl Nestor, Monico	Pvt Nigos, Felix
Pfc Canonizado, Jose Sr	Pvt Castro, Tiburcio
Pfc Nerviza, Estanislao	Pvt Medrano, Agaton
Pfc Gapasin, Wilfredo	Pvt Langit, Rizalino
Pfc Motas, Pedro	Pvt Melmda, Nicasio
Pvt Mico, Ambrosio	Pvt Mercado, Pedro
Pvt Lozano, Lope	Pvt Viloria, Alfonso
Pvt Oriel, Lorenzo	Pvt Miranda, Federico

The above-named EM were the same EM who were with me in Co "E", 14th Infantry, under the command of Capt Honorio S. Quines as of April 1942. One enlisted man is not included in this partial list of personnel of said company, because I can not recall his name.

28. Soon after the capture of Capt Honorio S. Quines on 13 February 1944, I was designated Actg Bn Comdr, 3d Bn, 14th Infantry, by Major Romulo A. Manriquez. I held this assignment until 31 May 1944 when Capt Saturnino Dumlaog relieved me. On 1 June 1944, I was assigned 3-1 and Adjutant, 3d Bn, 14th Infantry. I held this assignment until my appointment as CO, Co "I", 14th Infantry, on 16 October 1944. On 10 Jan 1945, I was relieved of my command and reassigned CO, Co "F", 14th Infantry, stationed at Panupdupan, Kiangan, Mt Province. I was relieved of this command on 25 March 1945 and reassigned Regtl Supply Officer, 14th Infantry, holding this assignment until 20 Nov 1945. During the period from 21 Nov to 6 Dec 1945, I was assigned to the 1st Bn, 23d Inf, PA. Then on 7 Dec 1945 I was assigned on temporary duty with the Claims Service, AFWESPAC, with station at Camp Spencer, La Union.

29. On 15 May 1946, I reported to the 5th Repl Depot, USA, APO 701, for processing re my AUS status, by virtue of Special Orders No. 102, par. 7, dated 7 May 1946, HQ USAFIP AREA COMD, 2d Inf Div, PA.

30. Finally, I returned to Camp Spencer, La Union, on 1 June 1946 and I was assigned to GCM No. 1 until my honorable discharge from military service on 10 June 1946, as per Special Orders No. 116, par 9, dated 4 June 1946, Hqs 2d Inf Div, PA.

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

19 March 1946

SUBJECT: Corrections, Additions and Comments
on History of Guerrilla Movement in
North Luzon

TO : Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC
Attention: AC of S, G-2
(Thru Channels)

EXTRACT

* * * * *
14TH INFANTRY AND COORDINATED COMMAND - 1942 (NAKAR)

The principal error in this section is the mention of co-ordinated North Luzon command which was never exercised nor attempted to be exercised by any commanding officer of the 14th Infantry. The 14th Infantry (FA) was organized principally from troops who had retreated from Baguio over the mountains in December, 1941, under the command of Lt Cols Bonnett, Moses and Noble and had been disbanded at Aritao upon receipt of a false report that Highway No. 5 was blocked by the enemy at Balete Pass. This error was later discovered but only a small number of the troops were recovered in time to accompany Lt Cols Bonnett, Moses and Noble to Bataan. Among the troops left behind was Major (bhen Captain) Manuel P. Enriquez, who immediately started organizing them. Shortly afterwards Lt Col (then Major) Warner arrived on the scene. Warner had been Provost Marshal at Camp John Hay at the outbreak of the war and was not a very good officer, being quite addicted to liquor. During the opening days of the war he had continuously neglected his duties and had been drunk most of the time. When orders were received to evacuate Baguio he was in a drunken stupor and could not accompany the main body from Baguio. He sobered up the next day and followed and arrived at Aritao. Here Enriquez, doubtless believing that there would be an advantage in having an American Officer in command, requested Warner to assume command of the forces being organized. Later, Lt Colonel (then Captain) Nakar arrived from the west. These three, Enriquez, Warner and Nakar, formed a sort of a team in the organization of the 14th Infantry. Enriquez did the organizing, Nakar harassed the Japs attempting to enter the Cagayan Valley from the south while Warner's contribution seems to have been limited to consuming a quart of whiskey a day. Thru a radio at Bayombong, contact was established with Corregidor and the 14th Infantry was authorized and organized. Though there was a contact of sorts between Warner &

and Col Horan in Bontoc, Warner never acknowledged Horan's authority.

Following the fall of Bataan, the enemy entered the Cagayan Valley in force and forced the 14th Infantry to split into two parts; one group under the command of Enriquez moved westward into western Nueva Vizcaya and eastern Benguet. The rest of the unit under Warner and Nakar moved eastward into eastern Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela. At this Point, Warner sent a radiogram to Corregidor requesting for a cruiser to come to Palanan to pick him up, and he then deserted his command and proceeded to Palanan to await the boat. General Wainwright, however, is reported to have sent back a reply to the effect that there was no cruiser available nor would there be one available and for Warner "to get the hell back to his command". Warner then returned to the Cagayan Valley and later surrendered when contacted by Col. Calicuka, representative of General Wainwright. During Warner's absence, Nakar had been joined by Major (then Captain) Robert Arnold who had come southward from Col. Horan and had been assigned to the 14th Infantry on orders from Corregidor. Nakar and Arnold continued to operate a radio and, after the fall of Corregidor, made contact with Australia. At this time, according to statements of Arnold, the portion of the 14th Infantry under the command of Nakar was designated as the 14th Infantry (AUS) and all of the officers and men were inducted into the Army of the United States via radio and were assigned AUS serial numbers. During this period other units in North Luzon, seeking to establish contact with the outside, sent some messages to Nakar which they requested he transmit for then to higher headquarters. Nakar's transmission of some of such messages is evidently the reason for the assumption that he was exercising some sort of coordinated command in North Luzon. In late 1942, Nakar was captured, the radio was destroyed and Arnold assumed Command of the remnants of the eastern branch of the 14th Infantry. This unit did not prosper and its numbers steadily declined until when Arnold was contacted by HQ, USAFIP, North Luzon, in late 1944, its strength amounted to about the strength of one company, which was merged with the western branch of the 14th Infantry at that time. (190 men)

The western portion of the 14th Infantry continued to carry on in a fairly successful manner inspite of the difficult living conditions and food and built up a fairly strong organization. However, following the enemy mopping up operation in 1942, Enriquez deserted his command and traveled with a few other officers to the vicinity of Tuba, Mt. Province, where in April 1942, upon representations from his wife, he voluntarily surrendered to the enemy.

Upon Enriquez' surrender Lt Col (then Major) Romulo A. Manriquez, next senior officer, assumed the command of the 14th Infantry, and continued to organize and develop the regiment until it was almost full strength. This western branch of the 14th Infantry maintained contact with and accepted the command of HQ USAFIP, North Luzon, from the time of its organization. In late 1944, Manriquez' agents established contact with Major Arnold in eastern Isabela. To avoid the delicate situation arising out of the fact that Major Arnold outranked Manriquez as commanding officer of the 14th Infantry, Major Arnold was transferred to take command of the newly organized 15th Infantry in Ilocos Norte.

HEADQUARTERS "B" COMPANY
1ST BATTALION, 22ND INFANTRY (PA)
Luna, La Union

3 April 1946

SUBJECT: Activities of "G" Co., 14th Inf., (AUS)

TO : CO, 14th Infantry (AUS)

1. The "G" Co., 14th Inf. (AUS) composed of remnants of the 91st Infantry (USAFPE) who fought at Sison and Pozorrubio, Pangasinan and was reorganized on December 26, 1941 at San Nicolas, Pangasinan. Its reorganization continued up to the time when the late Lt. Severino Antiporda, who was under orders of the late Major Manuel P. Enriquez (then the CO, 2nd Bn. 14th Inf (AUS), contacted my unit and handed me orders from the Bn. Comdr re operations against the enemy.

2. Plans for the operations to recapture Natividad, Tayug, and San Nicolas, Pangasinan were made. Lt. Gregorio Zipagan was to operate at Natividad, Lt. Antiporda at Tayug and for my Detachment was San Nicolas. The coordinated attack took place on 14 April 1942 at 0430 hrs. Lt. Antiporda and Sgt. Palma were killed. Food Supplies and clothing that were captured were distributed to civilians and others were used by the soldiers. After this first raid, Lt. Zipagan and the men of the late Lt. Antiporda reported to the CP of the 2nd Bn at Nueva Viscaya while other enlisted men joined my outfit at San Nicolas.

3. Our troops were able to reoccupy Tayug, Pangasinan for around 15 days inspite of constant enemy counter attacks. On or about May 1, 1942, orders were received by me to report to Bn Hq at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. Capt. Miguel Acosta, CO, army of the Agno, temporarily took command of my unit at San Nicolas and Sgt Francisco Casiano of the Tayug Detachment. During my absence the enemy launched a strong counter attack on or around May 10, 1942 at Tayug. Our troops who were short ammunitions could not resist the enemy who were well equipped and superior in number. The Tayug Detachment retreated to San Nicolas and made another line of resistance thereat together with the San Nicolas Detachment but the enemy did not go further on their operations. No casualty was sustained on our side but three (3) Japs were killed.

4. Upon arrival from the BN CP on June 1, 1942, I reorganized my unit to its full strength as per orders from the Bn Comdr. My CP moved from Bo. Sta Maria to B. Dalumpinas, San Nicolas, Pangasinan. Rigid training of the men particularly the civilian volunteers was conducted. Information of enemy strength in occupied towns, location of enemy supply and ammo depots together

with their communication lines and enemy activities were furnished to Higher HQ through civilian Intelligence Agents and Informers.

5. Ambushing and harassing the enemy still went on regardless of our hardships. On July 7, 1942 a combat patrol under Sgt. Francisco Casiano encountered the enemy at the vicinity of Tayug. Two Japs were killed and one enlisted man on our side was killed. On July 12, 1942 rush order was received by me to report at CP 2nd Bn. situated at Babdi, Pingkian, Nueva Vizcaya. Upon arrival thereat, the Bn Comdr showed me the radiogram from General McArthur giving an AUS status to the 14th Infantry. Another radiogram was shown to me that of Colonel Nakar to GHQ accepting the AUS status as of July 14, 1942. After my induction into the AUS at Babadi together with the other personnel thereat, I was given authority to induct my EM into the AUS. This induction was made in July 25, 1942 at Dalumpinas, San Nicolas, Pangasinan.

*Denigong
and radio
man Catalino
Adonings say
will be
received 14 July*

6. Lt Silvestre Mainas, the Ex. O. of the Co. was assigned to command the Detachment at Natividad, Pangasinan. His mission was to protect the Co. Hq from the enemy approaching via Natividad-San Nicolas road. Training of the men was compulsory and submissions of daily S-2 reports was required of him.

7. On the early part of September 1942, lay low orders were received from the Bn Comdr. This was due to intensive operations of the enemy against the hiding elements. Our activities were devoted to training and intelligence operations. Our reports were submitted to Bn CP thru special runners and messengers. Two of our runners, Pvts. Alberto Diza and Mariano Handoc were captured and killed by the enemy at Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya while delivering reports to the Bn Cp at Nueva Vizcaya on September 12, 1942.

8. The "G" Co. continued its mission until December 14, 1942 when the Co. CP was raided by Japs from Nueva Vizcaya with Constabulary men and spies. Slight resistance was encountered by the enemy. Pvts. Manuel Fontanilla and Calixto Boncato were captured and killed by the enemy. Enemy casualty was unknown. After the raid the men were dispersed and reorganization was made until February 1, 1943 when another contact was made with HQ, 14th Inf. At this contact the "G" Co. was redesignated to "H" Co., then to HQ, Serv Co and finally to Combat Co. up to the time the 14th Infantry was inactivated on November 15, 1945.

/s/t/ GREGORIO P. MONTEJO
Captain Inf. AUS
(Former CO, "G" Co., 14th Inf. (AUS))

A TRUE COPY:

GEORGE R PHILIP
Captain CAV

HEADQUARTERS AFWESFAC
Check Sheet

Do not remove from attached sheets

File No. 1471 Subject: Investigation of ENRIQUEZ, Manuel.

(1) Investigation TO: AUS Section 20 June 1946
Section

The circumstances of this case are; Transmitted herewith is 201 file of Manuel P. Enriquez, former PA officer allegedly appointed in the AUS.

Request an investigation be made to determine whether subject's activities subsequent to 12 April 1943 warrant his being considered a deserter.

Further request that report of investigation be submitted to this section before 15 June 1946.

Brief History of 14th Infantry, AUS, by Capt. Arturo Dingcong, AUS, C-888079.

A. Dingcong states that:

- 1) Original set-up of 14th Infantry, USAFFE was:
Reg CO--Major Everett L. Warner
Ex O & CO, HQBN--Capt. Manuel P. Enriquez
CO, 2nd Bn--Capt. Guillermo Nakar
CO, 1st Bn--1st Lt. Warren Minton.
- 2) Radiographic contact with GHQ, SWPA? resulted in promotions of Capt. Warner, Nakar, and Enriquez to major in January 1942.
- 3) Redesignation of Units, 14th Infantry, in mid-March 1942.
Reg. CO--Lt. Col. Warner
2nd Bn. became HQBN and Major Nakar became Reg. Ex O
and CO, HQBN.
HQBN became 2nd Bn. under Enriquez.
1st Bn. under Capt. Minton.

B. In early 1942 Enriquez was proving hard to get along with. This is brought out by the fact that he was demoted, so to speak, from Executive Officer and succeeded in those duties by Nakar. Further light is directed upon this matter by Minton, CO, 1st Bn., 14th Infantry, in his affidavit (on file in AUS Section). Minton states: "... Lieut-Colonel Warner had some differences with Major Manuel P. Enriquez who up until March 1st, 1942, had been Colonel Warner's Executive Officer, these differences coming about because Enriquez had on several occasions sent his personnel messages on the radio against Lieut-Colonel Warner's orders; that Lieut-Colonel Warner at about this time designated Guillermo Nakar as his Executive Officer, and placed him in direct charge of the radio....."

Concerning Enriquez' surrender.

A. Facts of the surrender, according to evidence presented, show that Lt. Col. Enriquez surrendered to the Japanese forces at Baguio on 12 April 1943 with about 20 men. He later tried to persuade others to surrender.

B. Sources of evidence.

1) Col. Russell W. Volckman, O-19537, Commanding USAFIP-ML.

a) 6th Ind. 18 August 1945 from Eq. USAFIP, ML to Chief of Staff, FA: "Due to the fact that Major Manuel F. Enriquez deserted his command, the 14th Infantry, FA, and voluntarily surrendered to the enemy in April (1943), and due to the fact that this surrender had most severe effect upon the morale and organization of the 14th Infantry, FA and due to the fact that after his surrender and parole by the enemy Major Enriquez attempted to assume command of all units of North Luzon causing a great deal of confusion and trouble in this command, this headquarters can not recommend favorable consideration of any guerrilla status of this officer. s/t R. W. Volckman, Colonel, Inf., AUS, Commanding."

b) Radiogram from Col. Volckman to AFPAC, dated 31 October 1945 states that Volckman recommends subject's alleged promotion be recognized and that he further recommends termination of subject's status as an officer as of 12 April 43 "the date which he deserted his command and voluntarily surrendered to the enemy and later exerted effort to induce other personnel to surrender."

c) Summary of an interview with Col. Volckman by WO R. F. Miller (see 201, Enriquez).

d) A History of Guerrilla Activities of 14th Infantry FA, for period during which Lt. Col. R. A. Manriquez was connected with the organization. This history is signed by Manriquez, who succeeded Enriquez in command of the 14th Infantry, FA, and who served under Enriquez prior to subject's surrender. A copy of this history is on file with AUS Section. Following are extracts from this history by Manriquez: "...Enriquez deserted the command upon his surrender to the Japs on 12 April 1943 at Baguio. Manriquez assumed command When Enriquez gave himself up to the enemy on 12 April 1943, most of the officers and men of his newly organized 3rd Bn. went with him...." After subject's surrender and release and after he organized the MACOCO store in Baguio, Manriquez had this to say of the subject and his "MACOCO" unit: "...this organization for awhile created a friction with the USAFIP, ML, for Enriquez kept insinuating of his command status of the Northern Luzon units when he considered himself the senior officer of Northern Luzon notwithstanding his surrender status.."

e) THE TRIBUNE (true copies of all articles mentioned here are enclosed with this report.)

1 April 3, 1943--an article concerning the surrender of guerrillas in Northern Luzon. Major Enriquez' name is listed (this is nine days before his official surrender.)

2 April 27, 1943--article, which states his good feeling for the Japanese.

3 April 26, 1943--articles concerning Enriquez' surrender, his families gratitude, his urging others to surrender, and two pictures. One picture shows subject seated, in civilian clothing, with Japanese officers; second picture shows subject with his family.

f) NIPPON TIMES, Tokyo, 3 June 1943. This article is much the same as those appearing in the Tribune. A copy of this article appears in subject's 201.

g) A roster of the 14th Infantry, USAFIP, NL, dated 2 October 1943 at Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, signed by Maj. Arturo Dingcong; "List of officers in the 14th Infantry USAFIP, when it was Federalized into the Army of the United States, 14 July 1943 as per radiographic instructions from GHQ, SWPA..... 3. Enriquez, Manuel P. Major O-888071 surrendered 12 April 1943....."

3. Status of subject after April 12, 1943.

A. Reference is again made to Volckman's attitude toward subject in which Volckman recommends that subject be given no status as an officer after 12 April 1943.

B. Further reference is made to Manriquez' signed history of the 14th Infantry, IA, in which he states: "...Major Enriquez learned of the capture of Col. Nakar about the 3rd of October 1943 from his wife in Baguio who was taken by the Japs to Isabella to identify Nakar which she did...." From available information, subject's wife was apparently used as a tool by the Japanese in both Nakar's and Enriquez' surrenders. Col. Volckman himself (see 201) had reason to believe that Mrs. Enriquez was at least partially responsible for Enriquez' surrenders. Subject's wife resided in Baguio, and, according to her own affidavit, her husband was released the very day he surrendered and proceeded to set up the Necoco store in Baguio. It is apparent that subject lived with his wife during this period and that he received monetary gain from the store. These facts tend to show that the subject was not actually "missing" or "missing in action" after 12 April 1943, since he was living at home under normal conditions.

C. In February 1944, at which time subject was supposedly arrested for guerrilla activities and later executed, he was, for a time, imprisoned in Bilibid with other officers, who were affiliated with him in THE Nacoco business. Among these officers were: 1st Lt. Francisco de Leon, Captain Thomas Acop, Lt. Joel Senot, and Sgt. Miguel Velasco. Derogatory information concerning the above as listed in CIG files under 100708X--Civ. Blacklist is as follows:

1. Francisco BeLeon--spy.
2. Capt. Thomas Acop--Acop's Place, Tublay, Spy, informer.
3. Joe Senot--Guisad, Baguio, Scrap Iron dealer
4. Manuel Enriquez--Lt. Col.; Commanding remnants of 14th

Inf. FA after capture of Col. Nakar; captured in Manila January 1944; reported free in Manila and taking his 3d "Spiritual Training" course at

Cabanatuan.

5. Miguel Velasco--GST member, Jap Regiment (not constabulary)

This evidence shows that those affiliated with the Macoco store in Baguio apparently had other businesses and dealings with the Japanese. It was during this same period (immediately after the origin of the Baguio store April 1945) that the subject was actively attempting to cause other guerrilla as to surrender.

4. Concerning subject's promotion to Lt. Col.

A. General Orders #1, USAFIP, NL, dtd 1 Oct. 42: "Subject to confirmation by the Commanding General, United Nations Forces in the Far East, Major Manuel F. Enriquez, G-1450 (PA) is hereby promoted to the temporary rank of Lieutenant Colonel effective September 29, 1942...."

B. Volckman recommends recognition of G. O. #1 above.

C. No evidence has been presented to show that above promotion was ever confirmed by an authorized party; however subject apparently wore the rank of Lt. Col. and was known as Lt. Col. Enriquez from the date of said promotion until his surrender on 12 April 1943.

5. Concerning subject's AUS status

A. According to Dingcong in his "Brief History, 14th Infantry, AUS:

1) The 14th Infantry contacted Gen. MacARTHUR in Australia on or about 29 June 1942.

2) On or about 14 July 1942 a message from MacARTHUR was received directing Col. Nakar that he might induct the PA troops under his command into AUS effective 14 July 1942.

3) Subject was commanding officer of the 2nd Bn. 14th Inf. PA with the rank of Major (PA) at the time AUS inductions were effective.

E. From available evidence it would appear that the subject was inducted into AUS as of 14 July 1942 with the rank of Major. He subsequently assigned an AUS serial number from a block authorized by Gen. MacArthur; namely Q-888071.

6. Summary of Investigation.

A. Prior to 12 April 1943. It is believed:

- 1) that subject was an active guerrilla until his surrender to the Japanese Imperial Forces in April, 1943.
- 2) That subject was inducted into AUS as of 14 July 1942.
- 3) That subject was promoted to Lt. Col. as of 29 Sept. 1942 by Colonel Moses, subject to confirmation.

B. Subsequent to 12 April 1943. It is believed:

1) That subject deserted his command on that date, that he did so without warning other officers within his or higher commands, that he further attempted to cause others to join him in surrender, and that upon his release in Baguio he caused confusion and depressed morale among the guerrilla units of Northern Luzon.

2) That subject lived in Baguio with his family, operated the Macoco store there, and led a normal life.

3) That after 12 April 1943 his attempted guerrilla activities were more detrimental than beneficial to those guerrillas who had not surrendered.

4) There is no evidence that subject was arrested in early 1944 for guerrilla activities. Rather does the evidence point out that he and his associated of the Macoco store were agents for the Japanese as well as for the guerrillas and that they dealt in scrap iron, cable, and "information." Their own misconduct might well have caused their arrests.

C. Concerning pay to Esperanza Enriquez, widow of subject.

1) The widow has already been paid the sum of 18,083.71 pesos by RA.

Base pay (1 April 42 to 30 August 44)	113,808.87
Quarters Allowance (same date)	<u>4,274.84</u>
	18,083.71

2) The widow has received pay due the rank of major for a period of 29 months. However, according to evidence herewith submitted, Enriquez is believed not to have been in any status after 12 April 1943. This would mean that the widow has been paid 17 months pay for the period after 12 April 1943. If subject's promotion to Lt. Colonel is confirmed, the differential in pay would begin as of 29 September 1943, and all pay would stop as of 12 April 1943. The widow would still have received a larger amount of pay than would be due her.

BBH/BJH

Initialed: BJB

A TRUE COPY: 20 Sept 49

John L. Goode
JOHN L. GOODE
1st Lt INF
Chief, Investigation Section

Original is in 201 file of Manuel Enriquez

United States Forces in the Philippines
HEADQUARTERS, GUERRILLA FORCES IN NORTHERN LUZON

IN THE FIELD
October 1, 1942

GENERAL ORDERS)

No. 1)

1. Due to existing circumstances and the reported capture by the enemy of Lt-Colonel GUILLERMO NAKAR, Inf., the 14th Infantry (PA) is hereby placed under the Headquarters of the Guerrilla Forces in Northern Luzon for tactical and administrative purposes, effective September 29, 1942.

2. Subject to confirmation by the Commanding General, United Nations, Forces in the Far East, Major MANUEL P. ENRIQUEZ, O-1450 (PA) is hereby promoted to the temporary rank of Lieutenant Colonel effective September 29, 1942.

3. Lt-Colonel MANUEL P. ENRIQUEZ (PA) is designated Commanding Officer, 14th Infantry (PA) vice Lt-Colonel G. NAKAR effective September 29, 1942.

s/t MARTIN MOSES
Lt-Colonel, USA
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

s/t MARTIN MOSES
Lt-Colonel, USA

A TRUE COPY: August 10, 1945

/s/ Jose Velasco
/t/ JOSE VELASCO
1st Lieut., Inf., PA
Civil Affairs Officer
66th Inf., PA, USAFIP, NL

CERTIFIED TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

A TRUE COPY: 20 Sept '49

John L. Goode
JOHN L. GOODE
1st Lt, INF

s/ L. M. Rushmore
t/ L. M. RUSHMORE
1st Lt., INF

Chief, Investigation Section

Original is in the 201 file of Manuel Enriquez

BRIEF HISTORY, 14TH INF AUS

The 14th Inf is a group of scattered troops of the USAFFE consolidated in Nueva Vizcaya province on or about the first week of January 1942.

Gathering what was left of the 1st Bn, 71st Inf, 71st Div, Capt Guillermo Nakar, Commanding Officer of the gallant battalion, withdrew toward Baguio pursued by an overwhelmingly superior enemy force. Finding Baguio already captured and occupied by the enemy, this intrepid warrior proceeded across the Cordillera mountains overcoming all odds and difficulties that are inevitably attendant on jungle trails, and arrived at Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, about January 8, 1942. Captain Nakar found that Capt Everret L Warner and Capt Manuel P Enriquez were already trying to organize stragglers from the 11th Division, 26th Cav (PS), the Headquarters of the 1st Military District who were unable to proceed to Bataan in view of the capture and occupation by the enemy of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and with a few civilian volunteers who were also mustered or inducted into the service by Major Everret Warner. These three gallant leaders undaunted by their being cut off from the USAFFE troops at Bataan, pooled their men together numbering about 800 and formed themselves into a Unit which was temporarily designated 1st Provisional Guerilla Regiment by USAFFE HQ. Contact with USAFFE HQ was established by radio which was brought down from HQ, 1st Military District, Camp Henry T Allen, Baguio City by Sgt Jose Cabanero with the help of native cargadores.

This regiment as it will be seen later, was redesignated 14th Inf., USAFFE. The original set up was as follows:

- Regimental Commander - - - Major Everret L. Warner
- Ex O and CO, Hq Bn - - - - - Capt Manuel P. Enriquez
- Regt'l Adj & CO, 1st Bn - 1st Lt Warren A Minton
- CO, 2nd Bn. - - - - - Capt Guillermo Nakar

The location of the different Command Posts were as follows:

- Regt'l CP & Radio Station -- Sto Domingo, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya
- 1st Bn - - - - - Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya
- 2nd Bn - - - - - Comon, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya

Radiographic contact was made with the General Headquarters of Gen MacArthur. Gen MacArthur's Headquarters cognizance of the existence of the 1st Guerilla Regiment and the courageous and unique motives which gave its birth, resulted in the promotion of Capts Warner, Nakar and Enriquez to Major and the commission of Sgt Jose Cabanero to 3rd Lieutenant about the 3rd week of January 1942. The regiment was made to understand that its principal mission was to harass the enemy and gather enemy information but that it was to preserve its organization by discreetly avoiding direct contact with the enemy. In other words, its mission was combat intelligence. For this purpose the following assignments of sectors were made: Major Nakar and his battalion from Balete Pass to Bato Ferry; Headquarters and 1st Battalion - from Bato Ferry inclusive to Aparri. Itching for action, the 1st Bn on or about 13 January 1942, raided Tuguegarao, Cagayan. This radi was undertaken in conjunction with Capt Praeger's 26th Cav (PS), contingents of the 71st Inf, and few civilian volunteers among them was Francis A Camp, later on commissioned. The splendid re-

sults of this action were the killing of not less than 100 Japs, and the destruction on the ground of 3 Jap planes. General Headquarters, USAFFE, was so pleased with the results that it commended and decorated all the Officers and EM that participated in the raid. There were minor subsequent engagements of the troops but casualties inflicted on the enemy could not be determined in view of the lack of means of verification attendant on hit-and-run tactics. Enraged by these intermittent engagements and fervently desirous to exploit the the rich sources of food supplies in the Cagayan Valley the Japanese Imperial Forces made a determined effort to push thru and destroy the USAFFE forces thereat. This was about the 3rd week of January, 1942, and the 2nd Bn then under Major Nakar was occupying defensive positions from Bambang to Balete Pass. Then there were reports from Regimental Headquarters to the effect that the Japanese were coming to the Cagayan Valley in two columns, - one thru Highway No. 5 and the other thru the Baguio-Kiangan road. In the last week of January, minor contacts with the feelers of the advancing Japanese Columns up the San Jose Balete Pass road were made by the outposts of the 2nd Battalion. At this time, there was an increase of aerial reconnaissance by the enemy. On or about the 25th of January, 1942, a message from Major Warner was received by Major Nakar, to proceed to Bayombong with all his troops to assume command of the regiment in view of the illness of both Major Warner and Major Enriquez. Major Nakar, seeing the great possibility of hitting the enemy hard from his vantage positions, requested deferment of the carrying out of the order. The order being repeated the next day was ignored by Major Nakar. A third order was received on or about the 27th in compliance with which Major Nakar pulled out his headquarters and men from San Fernando and all the position they occupied and proceeded to Bayombong, leaving only about a platoon under Lt. Januario Longno to cover the withdrawal.

The 2nd Battalion troops arrived at Bayombong in the morning of the 28th and Major Guillermo Nakar immediately assumed command. A brief conference of the Regimental Staff developed to the issuance of an order to move the troops to Isabela. In view of the meagerness of the means of transportation, the available trucks and other vehicles shuttled the troops to Isabela. On the 29th of January, the advance party of the Jap column was engaged by Lt Longno and his men at Bambang, destroying one truck and one command car and killing 49 troops (Nips). While this engagement was taking place, the movement towards Jones continued. On the same day, Japanese reconnaissance planes flew over Bagabag where Nakar's troops were still in bivouac. The following day 7 planes bombed Bagabag and Bayombong, hitting the Home Economics Building and the market. Fortunately the troops were already far on their way toward Isabela having moved at night on 28th January 1942.

Upon arrival at Jones, Isabela, on or about 2 Feb 42, the regimental headquarters was established at Masaya where Lt Col Warner assumed command, putting back into operation the Radio Transmitter thereat. The 1st Battalion under Capt Minton encamped in Sinauangan, the 2nd Battalion under Major Nakar at Daligan. Radio contact with the USAFFE Headquarters was resumed upon which a message was received directing Lt Col Warner to cease the use of 1st Guerrilla Regiment and designated the unit as the 14th Inf. USAFFE.

Shortage of arms, ammunition, medicine and other supplies was beginning to effect the operations as well as the health of the regiment. In response to radiographic appeal for supplies, two planes dropped on 16 February 1942,

a box of medicine, 2 boxes of ammunition Cal 30, two pairs of shoes for Col Warner and Capt Minton and an envelope containing a CODE and other instructions. Telephone communication for intelligence purposes was established in the provinces of Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya and part of Cagayan under Lt Ambrocio operated and maintained with members of the Regiment and in some places by volunteer guards.

The 1st Bn under Capt Minton which was mostly composed of civilian volunteers spent its time in training its men. The HQBN under Major Enriquez sent out a few combat reconnaissance patrols and guarded the Regtl CP. The 2nd Bn under Major Nakar was busy harassing the enemy and maintaining Telephone communication.

The following important events happened between February 15, 1942 to the fall of Bataan, April 9, 1942:

- A. - HQ BN Under Major Manuel P. Enriquez;
 - 1. - Maintenance of radio contact with HQ Gen MacArthur and later with Gen Wainright and sending in important intelligence information gathered by the intelligence and combat patrols.
 - 2. - Recapture of Bayombong and killing of Miyamoto, Japanese Military Administrator for Nueva Vizcaya province on the middle of March, 1942.
 - 3. - Gathering of arms and ammunition from civilians
- B. - 1st Bn under Capt Minton:
 - 1. - Training of men;
 - 2. - Collecting of arms and ammunition.
 - 3. - Constructing an airstrip at Palacian, Jones, Isabela.
- C. - 2nd BN under Major Guillermo Nakar:
 - 1. - Sending Combat intelligence patrols.
 - 2. - Capture of 5 Japs at San Luis, Cordon, Isabela by a patrol led by Lt Fermín Obina, Lt Bueno, and Acting Officer Ricardo Ambrocio, later on commissioned;
 - 3. Raids by the Men of Lt Januario Longno, Lt Mabunga and Lt Rosario between Aritao and Sta Fe on the following dates; 30 January 1942, 12 February 1942, 18 March 1942 and 7 June 1942.
 - 4. - Second raid in Tuguegarao under Lts Obina, Dingcong, Reyes and 24 men on or about March 24, 1942. Result: Jap Guard house was burned, killed and wounded an undetermined number of Japs.

5. - Capture of 1 Jap soldier south of Aparri by Lt Francis A Camp in the last week of February 1942;
 6. - The killing of the 6 Jap prisoners by Lt Col E Warner and Capt Minton for attempting to escape during the 1st week of March 1942:
 7. - Collecting of arms and ammunitions from civilians.
- D. - Redesignation of Units, 14th Inf in the Middle of March 1942:
1. - Regt'l Commander still Lt Col E L Warner;
 2. - The 2nd Bn became the HQ BN and Major G Nakar became Regt'l Ex O and CO, HQBN
 3. - The HQBN of Major Enriquez became the 2nd Bn under Major Manuel P Enriquez;
 4. - the 1st Bn under Capt Minton (no change);
 5. - The Regimental CP moved to Usol, Jones, Isabela.
 6. - The 2nd Bn under Major Enriquez moved to recaptured Bayombong, Naeva Vizcaya;
- E. - PROMOTIONS:

As far as I can remember, the following officers were promoted by radiogram;

RANK AND NAME	TO	DATE	AUTHORITY
Major Everret L. Warner	Lt Col	February 1942	Gen MacArthur
1st Lt Warrner Minton	Captain	February 1942	Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Tesoro Reyes	1st Lt	10 Feb 1942	Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Januarico Longno	1st Lt	10 Feb 1942	Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Thomas Acop	1st Lt	10 Feb 1942	Gen MacArthur
2nd Lt Fermin L Obina	1st Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Arturo Dingcong	2nd Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Eulogio Bueno	2nd Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Jose Cabanero	2nd Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Antonio Castro	2nd Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Enrique Cruz	2nd Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Benjamin Perdido	2nd Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Julian Perdigueros	2nd Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Alfonso Sta Ana	2nd Lt 2	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Pedro Vea	2nd Lt	25 Mar 1942	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Froilan Norico	1st Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Leandro Rosario	1st Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Nomeriano Valdepenas	1st Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Lope Cabauatan	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Froila B Parado	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright

3rd Lt Vicente Carag	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Ulpiano Domingo	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Mariano Evangelista	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Grn Wainwright
3rd Lt Alejandro Futad	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Floro Ramos	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Juan Sabalboro	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Antonio dela Cueva	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Rogerio Diesto	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Toman Licayan	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Juan Goma	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Pedro Mabunga	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Vicente Matias	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Gervacio Reyes	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Joel Senot	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Prescillano Velasco	2nd Lt	14 April 1942	Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Manuel T. Nery	1st Lt	February 1942	Gen MacArthur

F. - Commissions:

As far as I can remember, the following commissions were made by Radio:

Civ Dr. Celso Mesa	1st Lt	DC	April 1942	Gen Wainwright
Civ Dr. Vicente Florida	1st Lt	MC	April 1942	Gen Wainwright
Civ Dr. Miguel Castro	1st Lt	MC	April 1942	Gen Wainwright
Civ Ricardo B. Ambrocio	3/rd Lt		5 Mar 1942	Gen MacArthur
Civi Lean dro Rosario	2nd Lt		5 Mar 1942	Gen MacArthur
Civ Francis A. Camp	2nd Lt		March 1942	Gen MacArthur
Sgt Harley F. Heib	2nd Lt		March 1942	Gen MacArthur

Capt Robert H Arnold, SC (USA) reported and was assigned with the 14th Inf as S-2 and Signal Officer on 10 April 1942.

As a result of the surrender of Bataan, Lt Col ^B L Warner, Capt Minton and some of the 1st Bn Officers and Men left on 12 April 1942 for Casiguran, Tayabas, after Col Warner had sent a radiogram requesting Gen Wainwright to send a destroyer to pick him up at Casiguran Bay. Gen Wainwright radioed back directing Col Warner to stay with his command. This message was sent by rush messengers to Casiguran but Col Warner, Capt Minton and other Americans had already boarded a reconditioned Jap launch with the intention to go to China.

Major Guillermo ^Aakar was promoted Lt Col on or about 13 April 1942 and assigned CO 14th Inf by Gen Wainwright; Capt R H Arnold became the CO HQ BN; 1st Lt Obina, Actg CO and ExO, 1st Bn and Major ^Aaniel P Enriquez, CO, 2nd Bn. 2nd Lt Arturo Dingcong was assigned Regimental Adjutant and was promoted 1st Lt on or about 25 April 1942 together with 1st Lt Edmundo Navarro, Ex O, 2nd Bn on same date by Gen Wainwright.

On the fall of Corregidor, no radiographic instructions were received from Gen Wainwright. Our Signal Off. Lt Jose Cabanero reported that the Radio Station at Corregidor stopped all of a sudden and was no longer on the air. Radio broadcasts from KGEI, San Francisco, commented that the order of surrender of Gen Wainwright which was broadcast did not sound like the natural voice of Gen Wainwright and further said that if it was Gen Wainwright, he was forced to do it or that he did it under duress. Jap planes dropped

surrender leaflets addressed to Lt Col Nakar. Lt Col Theodore "alakuka was sent to contact Col Nakar in order to make him surrender but Col Nakar had already decided to continue the fight and never to surrender. At this time the HQ BN, less one Company was in the Regtl CP at Qimmallabasa, Jones, Isabela with "A", "C", and 1/2 fo "D" Company in around the surrounding barrios of Jones. One Company of the HQ BN under Capt Alfonso Baguno was in Cabagan, Isabela, the other half of the "D" Co. under Lt Francis A Camp was at Tuao, Cagayan, and "B" Company under Lt Januario Longno was at San Fernando, Bambang Nueva Vizcaya. The Whole of the 2nd Bn under Major Enriquez was spread out from Santiago, Isabela to Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya with the headquarters near Bayombong.

In view of the scarcity of food, the lack of sufficient arms, ammunitions and medicine, and in order to easily hide the men and at the same time facilitate the gathering and relaying of enemy information for higher headquarters, Lt Col Nakar ordered that the Officers and men not actually needed in the Regtl CP, be tactically dispersed. Each Officer sent out was given a list of the men under him. The men were instructed to report secretly to their Officers at least thrice a week or as often as situation demands. The Officers were instructed to submit S-2 information at least three times a week to the nearest contact station. A series of contact station was already in operation in which a contact station did not know where the messages were coming from or where they were going to. All a Station knows is that it will only relay a message to the next station and nothing more.

On 13 May 1942, the Regtl Staff, Radio Station, and around 70 EM and 10 of moved upstream the Cagayn River and established its headquarters in a small clearing about 5 Kms from Domabato, Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya on 15 May 1942.

The period from 15 May 1942 to 15 June 1942 was devoted to the setting up of the Radio Transmitter and receiver under Lt Jose Cabanero with the help of Capt Arnold and Sgts Lebrojo and Domingo. Officers who were assigned in the gathering of S-2 information were sent out to perfect the intelligence set up as well as the contact and relay station system. In the meantime the units under Lt Camp in the Cagayan and northern Isabela province and those under Major Enriquez and Lt Longno in the province of Nueva Vizcaya were destroying bridges and harassing the enemy who by this time had become too free and careless in their movements making him an easy prey to our small mobile patrols.

On 16 June 1942, the Radio transmitter set was set into operation and the delicate task of contacting a friendly station began. After long and careful deliberation on the procedure to be followed and the messages to be sent in order to deny an enemy station from knowing our real identity and location and at the same time positively determine that we are in contact with a friendly station, the following plan was put into action: Our station was given a call name which sounded like a Java word. It was to send a general call and upon contact with another station, it will ask for the time and then give a message asking the name of the wife of an officer whose ASN was so and so (This ASN was the SN of Capt Robert H Arnold, USA) It will further request that the word Mabuhay be broadcast over station KGEI, San Francisco. In

the last week of June 1942, contact was made by our Station and the above procedure was followed. The time given by the station we contacted pointed Darwin, Australia as its location. However, we were still in doubt. But, about two days later, the name of the wife of Capt Arnold and the word MABUHAY was broadcast over KGEI in the evening. This was followed by a Radio message from Gen MacArthur received on 29 June 1942 which partly read as follows:

"IF COL MAKAR:

THE COURAGEOUS AND SPLENDID RESISTANCE MAINTAINED BY YOU AND YOUR COMMAND FILLS ME WITH PRIDE AND SATISFACTION STOP IT WILL BE MY PRIVILEGE TO SEE THAT YOU AND YOUR OFFICERS AND MEN ARE PROPERLY REWARDED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME STOP X X X X X MAY AFFECTION AND BEST WISHES.

MacARTHUR"

In a radiogram, Col Makar reported the strength of the regiment which was as far as I can remember 62 officers and 960 enlisted men plus 3 Officers and 140 enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary who were attached.

In one of the first messages from Gen MacArthur the mission of the 14th Inf was specified and that was to obtain and transmit intelligence information to GHQ, SWPA. In order to accomplish this end, Col Makar asked for ₱5,000.00 to be spent solely for intelligence purposes. This request was approved by Gen MacArthur. On the strength of this authority, civilian S-2 agents were employed with salaries ranging from ₱50.00 to ₱150.00. However, these agents were never paid on account of fact that no funds could be obtained locally. Intelligence coverage was expanded to include as far south as Manila and as far north as Aparri. S-2 reports were sent to Gen MacArthur covering all kinds of information about enemy movements, installations, concentrations as well as the kind of treatment the Filipino and American prisoners of War was receiving in the concentration Camp. The men and officers set out for S-2 work also carried with them a one-page mimeographed news paper called the "SPIRIT OF BATAAN" and signed MATANGILAN (Hawks Eye). This paper did not only serve as the only means by which the people were informed of the true happenings of the war but also warned the civil population from aiding the enemy in any form.

On 14 July 1942 a message from Gen MacArthur was received directing Col Makar that he may induct the PA troops under his command into the Army of the United States effective 14 July 1942. This same radiogram contained the pay and allowances of US Army personnel from Pvt to Colonel. Same Radiogram also had the ASN Bolck for officer and enlisted men to be assigned to the 14th Inf AUS ~~and given ASN~~. which are as follows: - For Officers- O-88070 to O-888169; For Enlisted Men - 10626000 to 10626999. This was immediately circularized to the officers and men of the regiment (See inclosure) and the officers and men in the regimental Command Post and vicinity were immediately inducted into the AUS and given ASN. Capt Fermin Obina and Lt Julian Persegueros were delegated and sent out for the induction of the men and officers of the Headquarters BN and 1st Bn while Major Manuel P. Enriquez was delegated to induct the 2nd Bn which was at that time spread out in Nueva Vizcaya and eastern Pangasinan. In view of the distance and the difficulties of transportation and communication the induction was slow and delayed specially in the units of the 2nd Bn.

Cbl Nakar however, in order to be fair to all ordered that all induction be dated 14 July 1942. Because of this he sent a message to SWPA stating that all officers and men were inducted into the AUS on 14 July 1942. Lists of all officers and Enlisted Men inducted into the AUS with their ASN were kept in the Regimental CP together with the oaths of Office for Officers.

The present discrepancies in the assignment of ASN for Officers can be traced in this manner; In the first place the officers ASN as was first received by us had only two 8's or only O-88070 - O-88169. Take my case as an example, I was given ASN O-88079 as a First Lieutenant and was recommended for promotion with the same ASN. When the correction was made to 888070, I was already promoted Captain and another seniority list was made. I was this time assigned ASN 888075. I was therefore using ASN O-88075 until I was given an extract copy of SO promoting me to Captain wherein my ASN was O-888079. This is true with almost all the officers. The only thing to do now is to inform all the officers to use the first ASN given them adding one more 1 or to reassign serial numbers to officers whose serial numbers were not reported by radio to GHQ, SWPA.

In the last week of July 1942, a radiogram from GHQ, SWPA was received inquiring as to where personnel could be landed to contact the 14th Inf AUS. This message was answered requesting information as to how the personnel will be landed - by parachute from a plane or by submarine. Meanwhile a patrol was immediately sent to Casiguran, Tayabas to establish an outpost and a reception point to receive the personnel if they will be landed by submarine.

Radiogram was received promoting the following officers effective 2nd August 1942 to ranks as follows:

TO BE MAJOR	TO BE 1ST LT
Capt Robert H Arnold	2nd Lt Harley F Heib
TO BE CAPTAIN	2nd Lt Honorio Quines
1st Lt Fernin Obina	2nd Lt Julian Perdigueros
1st Lt Arturo Dingcong	2nd Lt Eulogio Buene
1st Lt Tesoro Reyes	2nd Lt Francis A Camp
1st Lt Januario Longno	2nd Lt Benjamin Perdido
1st Lt Juan Asuncion	2nd Lt Antonio Castro
	2nd Lt Jose Cabanero

The following civilians who were long serving the unit acting as officers were as far as I can remember commissioned 2nd Lt in the Army of the United States on or about 9 August 1942:

Hospicio Tabilangan

Mario Gonzales

One of the last messages received on 12 August 1942 from GHQ, SWPA before the Radio Station was dismantled due to the reports that the enemy had located the station and was sending patrols to capture it was one which asked for the order of battle of the Japanese Army in the Philippines. This message was never answered. The radio set, after SWPA was duly notified that contact will be resumed on the 27th or 28th of August 1942, was dismantled and together with complete set of records was placed in a big Galvanized Iron tank and buried in the ground near the edge of the forest. Two other sets of records were oiled

placed in small cans, and buried about 200 to 300 yards inside the forest.

Beginning the first of July 1942, the Japanese Imperial Army after it failed to get any results in inducing Col Nakar to surrender, launched the most intensive and systematic mopping up operations against the troops of Col Nakar in the Cagayan Valley. These operations were conducted by Infantry troops, planes, Japs and Filipino MP's and Ganaps and was marked with indiscriminate bombing, imprisonment of suspected persons, torture, and atrocities of the highest order. However, the Japs did not gain much headway in the gaining of correct information about the whereabouts of Col Nakar and his troops. In retaliation of the atrocities committed by the Japs and partly because of the increased obstacles to be overcome in the securing of valuable S-2 information, our patrols had to fight it out with the Japs resulting to more torture and brutalities and later on during the last week of July some civilians and Enlisted Men who had a little more knowledge than they should have concerning the 14th Inf AUS were captured. Lt. Leandro Rosario one of the few officers who were able to visit Col Nakar in our Reg'l CP at Domabato Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya surrendered to the Japs in Bayombong and was reported to have been very close to the Japs. These events lead to the dismantling of the radio station and the burying of the records as was previously mentioned. On or about 25 August 1942 approximately two companies of Japs occupied Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya. Two days before the arrival of the Japs however, Col Nakar issued orders that no fighting should be done in Pinappagan and that everybody should pretend to be civilians. Lt Jose Cabanero was left near the place where the radio and records were buried and I with Major K Arnold, Lt Heib, two other American soldiers and around 35 EM about half of whom were sick of Malaria, encamped about 5 kilometers from our regimental CP. A day before the Japs arrived at Pinappagan, Col Nakar left for a barrio near Jones, Isabela. His intention was to watch the Japanese more closely in order to be able to determine what the Japs knew about Pinappagan and their plans. On 28 August 1942 the Japs left Pinappagan for Jones but returned two days later with a bigger force and with Lt. Antonio Castro and our old regimental CP was raided by the Japs guided by Colcol. Finding the Camp empty, the Japs burned all the shelters. My group moved out to another secret place known only to 2 or 3 civilians. But one of our contact men by the name of Del Rosario, a PC soldier, was captured without our knowledge and after he was tortured, he guided the Japs to our bivouac area on 14 Sept 42. Early on the morning of 15 Sept my camp was raided and after a short encounter between the Japs and our men that covered our withdrawal, I and 2 of my soldiers who were sick were surrounded in a thick bush and taken prisoners. Sgts Pablo Villanobles and Mayoga who were too sick to run stayed behind and fired at the Japs until they were killed. Casualties on the side of the Japs could not be determined.

I was taken to the Jap garrison at Pinappagan and was investigated and tortured as ~~xxx~~ I refused to give any information. Only the people of Pinappagan Major Arnold, and Colonels Warner and Kalakuka who later on visited me in my cell could tell how I was tortured as a result of my refusal to give out the secrets of the regiment. On 17 Sept 1942 Lt Leandro Rosario arrived at Pinappagan with Col Ide and a regiment of Japanese soldiers. Rosario delivered speeches telling the people that they should cooperate with the Japs and reveal the secrets of the 14th Inf.

An important fact here has to be mentioned as it was responsible for the capture of Col Nakar, the radio, the records, and the surrender of some of the officers and men. This fact was that Lt Rosario founded the town of Pinappagan and his words were very much respected by the people. However the people tried hard to keep the secrets of the 14th Inf until Rosario and the Japs gave out an ultimatum that all will be killed if no one will tell the truth about the radio and Col Nakar. The people softened and with the squealin^g of an Aglipayan priest by the name of Castillo the radio was located and dugged out by Rosario and the Japs on or about the last week of September 1942. The capture of Col Nakar in a cave near Minuri, Jones, Isabela on 29 September by the Japs with the help of Sabaluca (chief of police of Jones) and 300 Ganaps followed. Lt Rosario once boasted to me in my prison cell that he was going to get a medal from the Emperor for the capture of Col Nakar and his radio. Lt Rosario and his co-spies who received medals for the capture of Col Nakar and the radio did wear their medals but they all disappeared before the US Army returned to the Philippines to give them a chance to assert that they were not spies, traitors nor collaborators.

The other two sets of records buried in the forest were according to reliable information also found by the Japs in one of their excavation patrols to our CP in which Colonels Warner and Kalakuka were present. The Japs in these excavation patrols used from 200 to 300 civilians with an equal number of Japs and with crowbars and sharpened sticks combed the vicinity of our old CP for buried records, supplies, equipment, and valuables. They did this for almost two weeks and at the end of this period, they got practically everything except the buried can where the radio tubes, crystals, codes, and other important parts of the radio set were placed. This can was later on accidentally dug out by civilians about 2 years after but the contents were already decayed.

✓ On 23 October 1942, all the Japs in Pinappagan moved down to Jones, Isabela with all their prisoners namely: Lt-Colonels Warner and Kalakuka, Lieutenants Zeigler and Antonio Castro, the two soldiers who were captured with me, Judge Catalino Valbuena of Pinappagan who was our S-2 agent and who never squealed in spite of the severe torture he received from the Japs, and myself. Judge Valbuena and the two soldiers were bayoneted on the way 5 kms north of Pinappagan and before we reached Jones, Lt Castro and I were taken each by four Japs their rifles with fixed bayonets to the Cagayan River. When the Japs were about to bayonet me, I broke loose and ran. I heard four shots and then I dove to the river and swam with the current downstream. I successfully evaded the Jap and Ganap guards on the way and reported back to the camp of Major Arnold the following day 24 October 1942 at Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya. From 24 October 1942 to September 1944, Maj Arnold commanded the remnants of the 14th Inf, AUS who were hiding and had never surrendered between Jones, Isabela and Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya. This group consisted of 2 officers namely: Major Arnold, Lts Haley F Heib, Leonardo Galima, Gervacio Reyes, Enrique Cruz, Pedro Vea, Beja min Aviles, myself and about 60 enlisted men. This group under Major Arnold was always busy evading the enemy. This was because in the rosters that the Japs were able to capture, they could tell that there were many more officers who were not yet accounted for including Major Arnold, Lt Heib, and Pvt Mangemelli all Americans. The enemy which sometimes reach as far as 800 Japs and Ganaps were always busy patrolling Jones and Pinappagan until August of

1944 when the last garrison of Japanese and BC soldiers was pulled out of Pinappagan. In this extended mopping up operations the Japs suffered much as many died of malaria and equipment and supplies were destroyed of lost expecially when they have to cross the rivers during floods.

Units of the 14th Infantry under Lt Joaquin Duncan fought the Japs in the Mallig region of Isabela until the middle of 1943 when it had to suspend its operations due to lack of arms and ammunitions. Lt Francis A Camp in Cagayan also carried on the fight until he was captured sometimes in 1943. The 2nd Bn under Major Manuel P Enriquez continued defying the Japs in eastern Pangasinan and Nueva Vizcaya. When Maj Enriquez surrendered to the Japs at Bagulo on 13 April 1943, Capt Romulo A Manriquez who had joined the 2nd Bn and was at this time the Ex O, assumed command of the 2nd Bn. The 2nd Bn under Capt Enriquez (now a Lt Colonel and studying at Fort Leavenworth) continued the fight and grew into a little less than a regiment so that when Col Russell W Volckmann organized the USAFIP, NL command, the 2nd Bn, 14th Inf, AUS became the 14th Inf, USAFIP, NL.

In January, 1944 Major Arnold received a message from Col Volckmann requesting him to report to Col Volckmann's Headquarters. Major Arnold, however, was not able to get out of Pinappagan due to the presence of large enemy troops still around Pinappagan and Jones. In the first week of October 1944 situation eased up and Maj Arnold seeing the need for more men, inducted around 40 men into the Army of the United States. These men were picked in recognition of their loyalty and the great sacrifice they had made for the preservation of the 14th Inf, AUS.

Sometimes in the middle of October, 1944 Maj Arnold left our unit in Pinappagan and Jones in order to confer with Col Volckmann as to who should command the 14th Inf. Maj Arnold's intention was to get back the command of the 14th Inf inasmuch as he was the most ranking officer left after Col Nakar was captured. The outcome of the conference was however, the assignment of Maj Arnold as CO, 15th Inf, USAFIP, NL and the incorporation of the 14th Inf, USAFIP, NL on 28 October 1944. From hereon the activities of the remnants of the 14th Inf, AUS who had joined the 14th, 11th, 66th, and 15th Inf Regts of USAFIP, NL can be gathered in the battles that these regiments fought in the liberation of the Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan and Ilocos provinces of Northern Luzon.

The 14th Inf, AUS lost its identity with the organization of the USAFIP, NL as the scattered officers and men could no longer be grouped together in view of the presence of spies and Japs, the need for immediate action, and in order to avoid friction among the different regiments which officers and men of the 14th Inf AUS had joined. In my humble opinion the officers and men of the 14th Inf, AUS under Col Guillermo Nakar had made a worthy contribution in the organization and successful operations of the various units of the USAFIP, NL command under Col Volckmann especially in the 14th, 11th, and 15th Infantry Regiments.

/s/t/ ARTURO DINGCONG
Captain, Inf, AUS
O-888079

A TRUE COPY:
22 October 48

CO, Hq Bn 2nd Lieut Edmundo G Navarro
 CO, 1st Bn 1st Lieut Warren Minton
 CO, 2nd Bn Capt Guillermo Nekar

When Lieut Edmundo G Navarro left Baguio City, he brought with him the District Radio Transmitter, having been the District Adjutant of the 1st Military District. With this radio, our unit was able to get in contact with General MacArthur in Corrigidor. As we were using the "First Guerrilla Regiment" as our units name, Gen MacArthur authorized our unit to be called the 14th Inf and promoted several officers in rank.

The saga of the "14th Inf" is recorded with GHQ, SWPA. It is a record of brilliant leadership and commendable fighting as a unit and did not surrender in spite of GHQ's order to surrender to the enemy. At the time of surrender, the Regimental Staff read as follows:

CO Lt Col Guillermo Nekar ✓
 EX-O Maj Manuel P Enriquez ✓
 Adj & S-1 1st Lieut Arturo Dingcong ✓
 S-4 1st Lieut Juanario A Longno ✓
 CO, Hq Bn Capt R H Arnold
 CO, 1st Bn 1st Lieut Fermin Obina
 CO, 2nd Bn Maj Manuel P Enriquez

Upon the fall of Bataan, the American Officers left the regiment with Lieut Col Warner with the pretext of going to Casiguran, Tayabas to contact an American submarine. Maj Nekar who replaced Maj Enriquez as Ex-O, was promoted by Wainwright and made the CO. Maj Enriquez then was made the EX-O. No orders were made regarding the appointment of the other officers due to persistent raids by the Japanese who were swarming them all over Cagayan Valley.

On the last week of June 1942 the 14th Inf was able to contact SWPA and was followed by radio message from Gen MacArthur received on 29th June 1942 which partly read as follows:

Lt Col Nekar

The courageous and splendid resistance maintained by you and your command fills me with pride and satisfaction stop it will be my privilege to see that you and your officers and men are properly rewarded at the appropriate time stop

MacArthur

On 14th July 1942 the message of Gen MacArthur was received directing Col Nekar that he may induct the Philippine Army Troops under his command into the Army of the United States (AUS) effective 14th July 1942. Thus Col Nekar, Maj Enriquez and their men stop to exist as PA Officers and men and became integral part of the Army of the United States.

Col Nakar was captured in a cave near Minury in Jones, Isabela on the 29th September 1942. Major Manuel P. Enriquez took over the command of the 14th Inf AUS vice Lt Col Nakar and was promoted to the temporary rank of Lt Col effective 29th September 1942 by Martin Moses, Lt-Col, USA.

Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez continued defying the Japs in Nueva Viscaya and Pangasinan until 13th April 1943 when he and some men forced to surrender to the enemy after being surrounded by a Bn of Japanese at Tuba, Benguet, Mt Province.

Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez was released by the Japanese Military Police in Baguio after his surrender to attract his men but with a condition that if they find him again doing things against the Japanese Forces, they will execute him without any trial. However Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez was not undaunted by this threat as he called a meeting of all officer in Baguio about June 1943 and instructed them that the resistance was to continue but in a more passive manner. It was understood by all his officers that they will carry instructions just as if he had not surrender.

To enable the men in the mountains to carry on the resistance, it was decided that a store be established in Baguio to facilitate those concerned to collect money, food, clothing and medicine without the enemy suspecting the real purpose of the organization. Lt Col Manuel P Enriquez with the aid of Capt Jose Ma Alvarez, an influential Business man from Manila and member of Nacoco, got the permission of the Japanese MP to put up the store which was to be a subsidiary of the Nacoco and named it the Nacoco Store. The MP's believing that this was to help those "mis-guided elements" authorized its formation. The store flourished inspite of the restrictions placed upon it by the MP's as a majority of the population of Baguio knew somehow or the other that these was for the benefit of those in the field, so that they bought goods lavishly from that store. All members were formerly EX-USAFPE and Guerrillas and with Col Enriquez as manager the store became one of the most successful in the City. This store also became the message center for all instructions emanating from and going to Col Enriquez.

The following formed the personnel of that store:

Col Manuel P Enriquez	Manager
Lt Col Nestor P Reinoso	Asst Manager
Capt Santiago J Resurreccion...	Treasurer
1st Lieut Antonio Estepa	Bookkeeper
Capt Emiliano Ramirez	Salesman
Capt Antonio Garcia	-do-
Capt Emilio Borromeo	-do-
Capt Felizardo Tanabe	-do-
1st Lieut Melanio Lara	-do-
1st Lieut Francisco de Leon...	-do-
2nd Lieut Andrew Douglas	-do-
2nd Lieut Miguel C Velasco	-do-

M/Sgt Proceso Banaez	SALESMAN
M/Sgt Tillo	DO
M/Sgt Federico Gastaneda	DO
M/Sgt Guillermo Tanabe	DO
S/Sgt Antonio Mina	DO
Miss Olga Muller	CASHIER
Miss Romana "uty De Gallardo.....	DO

Col Manuel P Enriquez and some of his officers and men were put in the concentration camp in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija in August 1943 but were paroled on October 17, 1943.

After Col Enriquez' parole from the concentration camp on Oct. 17, 1943, he re-organized his staff as follows:

Col Manuel P. Enriquez	CO
G-1 & Adj Gen	Maj Edumundo G Navarro
Asst G-1	Capt Pdero D Dulay Jr
Asst Adj Gen	Capt Felizardo Tanabe
G-2	Lieut-Col Nestor P. Reinoso
Asst G-2	Capt Jose Ma Alvarez
G-3	Lt Col Manuel T Flores
Asst G-3	Capt Vigente Cepte
G-4	Lt-Col imson Valdez
Asst G-4	Capt Antonio Garcia

His field Officers as far as can be remembered were as follows:

Co, All PG Units	Col Claro Lizardo
Co, Kiangnan Sector	Lt Col Gregorio Manalo
Co, Cagayan Valley Regt	Col Marcelo Adduro
Co, Bontoc Sector	Maj Ali Al-Raschid
Co, Ilocos Regt	Maj Madamba
Co, 14th Inf Regt .	Lt Col Romulo Manriquez
Co, N. Vizcaya Sabotage Sq.	Maj Ramon Alcares

With the formation of his staff and designation of his Commanders in the Field the Enriquez Guerrillas started functioning again efficiently as any well organized unit in the Philippines. Monthly rosters of Officers and Men were transmitted thru the Macoco Store. A radio transmitter was brought from Manila to Baguio by Maj Ali Al-Raschid, then Chief of Police of Baguio City. Intelligence reports were prepared and transmitted to either Panay or Negros but those rosters and intelligence reports did not reach their destination for reasons related in the following paragraph:

A man by the name of Franco Vera Reyes who turned out to be a Japanese Spy succeeded in enlisting his services with the organization by having himself introduced by an American Officer by the name of Capt Bill Arthur. With a War Department Identification Card, several copies of 1942 and 1943 magazines an Australian Hand Grenade Several 1942 ammunition and letters of Commander Chick Parsons, he was able to convince Col Enriquez that he just arrived from Australia and was brought by a submarine to act as the Chief Liaison and Intelligence Officer for all Guerrillas. For secrecy's sake he asked that he be known thereafter as CIO-12. He apparently had plenty of cash with him and his first gesture was to give the organization \$15,000.00. He was therefore able to get the secrets.

of the unit. In justice to Col Manuel P. Enriquez decision to accept Reyes as a genuine representative from Australia, be it known that the identity of Franco Vera Reyes was first checked with the mother in law of Commander Chic Parsons, a Mrs Jurica who verified the penmanship of Commander Parsons. Other Americans were also investigated and among those who testified to the veracity of Franco Vera Reyes were Mrs Rev Stagg, Miss Wilt of Emanuel Hospital and some of the members of Mrs Staggs' church.

Franco Vera Reyes was a talkative man and when he started telling stories every one of them was checked. Capt Jose M. Alvarez was able to verify his stories about Messers Zobel and Elizalde and both disclaimed any knowledge of Franco Vera Reyes. Maj Edmundo G. Navarro was able to dig into his former records before the war and found out that he was a former embezzler and a crook who took advantage of the mining boom. Capt Vicente Gepte was able to verify from Gen Vicente Lim the stories told by Vera Reyes and which never happened. Other organizations who were introduced to Vera Reyes started to investigate his activities and found that he was playing a double face game. By this time Vera Reyes had given about six ty thousand pesos in receipts to organization which were exchanged for Japanese war Notes and out of this he got about Thirty Thousand Pesos.

A hasty conference was called wherein it was decided that the important members of the command be made to take advantage of the Amesty Proclamation given by Laurel's Puppet Government. This was arranged by Minister Quintin Paredes, Assemblyman Florendo Aquino and Ramon Mitra with the secretary to the President Mr. Pedro Sabido in order to save the whole organization from being identified by the Japanese Military Police. This did not prevent the arrest which transpired a week later. The first to be arrested was Capt Alvarez followed by Col Enriquez who had just arrived from Tayabas with Capt Antonio Garcia. Lt Col Reinoso and Capt Gepte and all the members of the Nacoco store in Baguio were arrested. Mrs Enriquez was included in this arrest. Those who were able to flee were Lt Col Manuel T. Flores, Capt Edmundo Navarro, Lt Col Simon Valdez, Lt Enrique Tayag, Capt Felizardo Tanabe, Capt Emilio Borromeo and Capt Antonio Garcia. This survivors fled to different Provinces and joined up with different units but some were never included in recognized rosters. Others went in hiding and were not able to contact their former units. Those who were caught and later released after a few months in prison were so weak and sick that they became inactive.

Col Enriquez and some of the men were reported executed in Fort McKinley by the Japs on or about 30 August 1944.

Certified True Copy.

James S. [unclear]
Claims Section Investigator.

22 June 48.

No. 73

No 73

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 2882025