23<u>d</u> FIELD ARTILLERY

No. 65

REFERENCE TO

23rd J. a.

Extracted from Vol. I of

"TRIUMPH IN THE PHILIPPINES"

But while December 7 meant "Pearl Marbor" to most of the world, it meant "Clark Field" to the Filipines and the Americans in the Philippines — the date to them, halfway around the world and across the international date line, was December 8, 19hl. At almost the same moment that the Japs hit Pearl Marbor, they made their attack on Clark Field in Central Luson, only fifty miles from Manila. There they knocked out the American Far Eastern Air Porce with almost the same devastating effect they dealt the U. S. Facific Fleet 5,000 miles eway.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 3h

The North Luson Force, dispersed throughout the central and northern Luson area, was commanded by Major General Wainwright. It included two units of the Regular Army, the 31st Infantry Regiment and the 1924 Tank Battalion, a former Mational Guard Organization, as well as six units of the Philippine Scouts. These were the 15th and the 57th Infantries, (PS); the 26th Cav. (PS) and the 23rd, 21th and 85th F.A. Regiments (PS). General Wainwright also had the following Philippine Army Divisions:

The 11th Reserve Division under Col. William E. Brougher, AUS

The 21st Reserve Division under Prig. Cen. Raton M. Capinpin, FA
The 31st Reserve Division under Col Clifford Hlussel, AUS
The 71st Reserve Division under Col Clyde A. Sellech, AUS
The 91 st Reserve Division under Rrig. Cen Lather Stevens, AUS
The 30sth Lason Perce was under the command of Prig. Concrel
Ceorge Parker. It consisted of one Regular Arry unit, the 15th
Tank Rattalion; one Philippine Scott unit, the 85th Field Artillery;
the 1st and the 2nd Philippine Constabulary Regiments, and three

The list Receive Division under Brig. Cat. Fidel Segundo, FA
The List Receive Division under Brig. Can. Vicento Lin, FA
The Slat Receive Division under Col. Albert M. Jones, AUS
The Viaquen-Minderso force was commanded by Col. Villian F.

The Viscon-Mindman force was commanded by Col. William F.
Sharp, with beadquarters in Windman, and it contained no Regular Army
units. It had one Philippine Scout Regiment, the blad Infantry;
the lad Philippine Constabulary Regiment, and three Philippine Army
divisions:

The Sist Reserve Division, under Col. Bradford G. Chynoseth, USA.
The Sist Reserve Division, under Col. Juny D. Fort, PA
The lolst Reserve Division, under Col. Joseph P. Vachon, PA.

There were also elements of other divisions including the 2d Infantry, the 73rd Infantry and the 93rd Infantry, inc.

The Harbor Defence Commanded by Brig. Con. Scores P. Moore and the matellite islands, was commanded by Brig. Con. Scores P. Moore and was composed of two Regular Army Regiments, the 59th and 60th Coest Artillery; two Philippine Scout units, the 91st and the 92nd Coest Artillery Regiments, and the 1th U.S. Marine Regiment, which had just been moved in from Subic Ray.

Command headquartery feared that the single blow at Clark Field had virtually decided the course of the war in the Fhilippines. The 26th Cavalry, boshed out of Fort Stotsenburg, moved into the nearby mountains, prepared to strike at the first enemy based landing wherever it might come. On December 9, Nichols Field, another bay any air base at Manila was boshed almost to destruction. The Japa apparently hoped to catch that part of the FWAF which had gone there for refuge. Croup installation destruction, however, was all they encouplished — but that was complete.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. h2, h3 & hh.



There were also elements of other divisions installing the 26 infantry, the First Infantry and the Size Infantry.

The lumber inchess Courant, countrains of Courage 7, Nouve and the submilles indused, was commended by Nois, Course T. Nouve and Sailliant for Courage of the Negligible force industry, the Courage the Sailliant Courage Cou

Dismond besignation, found that is story though the at Clark Plaid and virtually desirbed the course of the war is the fellippine. The Said devolute, because it is nearly set desirated and of fort Said course, something property is at the started and and the started and

what Is Tricopi to the Philippiness now hit to be blu-

23 F.a.

The Bataan Defense Force which was setting up the defense of Bataan, consisted of the 31st and the klat Divisions of the Fhilippine Army and the 2d Fhilippine Constabulary Regiment, all under Major General George Parker.

The headquarters of the Philippine Department was converted into the Service Command for Bataan, under Brigadier General Allen C. McBride.

The MLF under General Jonathan M. Waimerlebt, at this point, had the 31st Infantry, Regular Army; the 15th Infantry, 57th Infantry, 26th Cavalry, 23rd Field Artillery, 21th Field Artillery, and 86th Field Artillery, Fhilippine Scouts; the 11th Division, 21st Division, 71st Division and 91st Division, Fhilippine Army.

Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, commanding the SLF, had the 96th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, and the 1st and 51st Division of the Philippine Army, with artillery reinforcement.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 62 & 63.

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The men of Lavac had worked on their positions all during the night of January 5-6. At 8:00 AM their artillery sighted the Japanese coming down highway 7 from Lubao. They laid down a murderous barrage. Within an hour, the Japanese artillery began replying. The artillery of both sides thundered throughout the day. The 23rd Field Artillery's lone battalion was badly shot up and lost all but one of its guns. The battalion from the 88th Field Artillery, however, saved all its weapons. The 31st Infantry, in the center of the Layac line, took the bulk of the artillery punishment along with the left flank of the 71st Division. In the late afternoon, the Jap fire increased and infantry probed forward to test the American line. This was followed by a heavy infantry attack at the point where the 71st and the 31st were linked. The flank units of the two divisions began to deteriorate. The 3rd Battalion of the 31st, heretofore held in reserve, was moved up just before sunset to counterattack and fill the gap.

At 10:00 0 clock that night, however, an order was received for
the three holding units to withdraw to the Abucay line. The 71st
Division began to fall back first, while part of the 31st acted as a
covering force. The order to withdraw was relayed by radio from the
commanding officer of the 31st Infantry to the 26th Cavalry on its
left. But the message was in code and the radio code had been changed
that day without the change reaching the 26th, so that cavalry commander
could not understand it.



After a while, however his patrols reported that the 31st Infantry was moving out. By the time it was definitely determined that with-drawal was taking place, the 26th had been cut off and was out of contact with all other friendly forces. The cavalrymen withdrew to the mountains in the west, and worked their way back through the rugged jungle country to the Abucay line without assistance, an operation that took three days.

Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 90 & 91.

After a title, however the grinder reported that the line infantry and as the line infantry as a service of the file is a service of the file in a service of the service o

23 F.a,

The Layac Force was organized on the line as follows: The 71st Division, Philippine Army, consisting only of the 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments.

The 31st Infantry Regiment, United States Army.
The 26th Cavalry Regiment, Philippine Scouts.

To the rear in support were the 23rd Field Artillery,
Philippine Scouts, which had one battalion only: the 1st Battalion, 88th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, and the 71st
Division's organic artillery.

-Vol I, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 85.

South Luzon Force - Bataan Force - II Philippine Corps

Brief Outline of Activities Prior to and During Wer

Prior to the outbreak of hestilities on about Sept 1 a SLF (in skelston form was exected and functioned briefly. This Hq consisted of Brig Gen. Geo Parker, Lt. Col. C O Wilson, Lt. Col. H. D. Johnston, Capt. Arthur Christenson and Gapt. Homer Uglow. Brits to be included unter this command were not induced until semewhat later and the troops thus received practically no training before the war started. Only two registens the £40m 4.52d Infe.

were inducted on Sept 1 and no others immediately thereafter.

The elements of the command were drawn up as follows:
Nov 1 - List & Just Lafe. mobilized and started tracking, Nov. 24th 43rd & 53rd, Info. Lafe. mobilized and started tracking, Nov. 24th 43rd & 53rd, Info. Lafe.
And 53rd Mag. Bass, Signal Cos., No. 8 co., & 60 Service Co., as the List
on Bec 8 the state of the SIZ want (List Niv complete less I Acti
Tank IN 53rd Lafe Complete Lama I Acti
Zer. C. (Inducted in Mid. Nov and assigned for tracking only) released
as beginning of war.

The 42st & Slat Diva, were inducted and trained in S. Lucon what little training they did have end at the outbreak they were sent to their defensive positions on the beaches. The boundary between division running close; sensely line thru lessery & Fancipit Re. - Id. In Lake Teal. - Tegaytry and Les Pinas inclusive to the 41st Div. The rest of the cesstline was defended by the 51st Div. with Manila sector unoccupied due to location of the fortified Lie. On Dec 29th the 1st Reg Div was sasigned to the beaches between Infanta & Mauhan inclusive and was given the road net in reary of th.

On about Dec. 12 the Japanese landed at Logany after previously bothing Deveo, Legany, Hichols Field, Cavite and sections in the HF territory and started to move H towards the main part of Lunon by rail and by read. Units of the 52nd In wore sent it to meet them - one Co. slong the read and one Hm was split up - Its elements being drawn and given different missions - to contact and delay the enemy as long as possible, desired bridges and military equipment and impade the progress of the enemy as much as they were able.

The Second Press of SLF sctivities began on Dec 24 when the enemy lended in force at Atlantan and Hauban. The units of the 52d sent 3 shouthered many advantures of war not covered here, suce being out off and breaking thru - others making their may if to join their

organization later. On the afternoon of Lee. 24 Gen Parker's Hq. was moved to Estean and the Betaen Force consisting of the 31st Div. Aint Edy. parts of the 7hil Div., He and other misc. units. Gen Jones took command of the 52st upon Gen Parker's departure (his Div. the Alei having reverted to the Batean Force).

By the night of Dec 24th the "Js" had crossed the Mts. at Atimonan to Malichay and at Mauban had reached the mig-mag at Sampaloc. The enemy from Atimonen advanced in successive states and by nightfall of the 25th were at Lucene, Tayabas, 26th Candaleria, 27th Tisong and on the night of 27-28 contact was broken in that area as the troops were ordered to Batean. At Mauban the let Inf less 1 Bn retreated to positions on the Lagune-Tavabas boundary night of Dec. 25, Louisians 26th broke contact on the 27th and withdrew to Batasn via Pagsanjan, Sta. Cruz, Los Banos and Manila. One Bn at Tignauan remained there until the 28th with no contact and withdraw on the 28th. The regiments in the SIP were reshuffled on the night of the 27th and were shuttled into Batean no contact being made with the enemy. By Dec 31st Gen. Jones and his Hq, had arrived at Planidel & contacted Gen, Wainwright. By order of BSAFFE Gen Jones was put in comband of remains of the 71st & 91st Dive, then at Baliusg and stayed there to cover the withdrawal of the SLF thru them Dec 31st - Jan 1. By morning of the 1st those units and Gen Jones arrived in Bataan and the SIF ceased to exist. (Note: Assg'd to SLF prior to this date and moved to Tagaytay pos, was the Prov. Constab. Brigade. Three days were absorbed moving in and thru more out -no contact being made with the enemy.)

As part of the 3d Phase of the SIP the Batann Force existed from Dec. 2d-7mm 6 tts function having been to organize the position in Batann and assist in their occupancy.

By the night of <u>Inn total</u> the last elements of the HIF had withdrawn into Batan lasting the covering force at layer Jet. expassed to the energy. Cognized from right to left in line the pose contained the <u>That List last Unit</u> (US), and <u>Schh Car.</u> At 8100 A Jn. for our crity sighted the energy and began to register on them and at \$900 A Jn. Arthy appeared on the read to be reinforced by other arthy units soon thereafter and a finere arthy dual ensued. The "Us" also bombarded portion of the <u>Just Lint</u> with superior fire and by mightfull the <u>Thint of the Jast and party</u> of the Tist Day had pulled back. At about 10 P, the entire line use ordered withdrawal behind the Abusey position which surveient was executed in great confusion. The <u>Zuth Car</u>, not receiving the order was cut off and withdraw through the Mrs. One Mn of the (22d) Fig., was baily shot up and lost all but one gun. The lat Mn of the Schh Pa retreated in order earing all guns.



The Main Battle Position previously organised, was occupied originally by the H Failippine units from right to left NYTh Lnf, also Pivision and Slate Liv, the NYth turning its flash on the beach at Matabang and the Slate Div Meding in with the I Corps at Min. Battle Div. the Nise position was shalled almost constantly daily particularly on this particular was shalled almost constantly daily particularly on the part flash of the Alm Biv. and the Pist I may be a positive from in that mostor and battle Nise Biv. The Nise Biv. and Yhhad Shaha positive form in the total particular was and the Slate Lnf (30) and Alb Lnf (10) were sent in the counter stand. But the Slate Lnf (30) and Alb Lnf (10) were sent in the original stands and the Slate Lnf (30) and Alb Lnf (10) were sent in the original stands and the Slate Lnf (30) and Alb Lnf (10) were sent in the original stands and suppring upoperation were in progress when the retwent in the Corps better made a withdrawal from the Main Rattle Position to the Research Schemibanes pos eccessory. Sees Js hed inflitheted have the Till Corps, however, and it is probable that they night have out thru the research Original Schemibane pose, but the withdrawal for them made they are the sent thru the research Original Schemibane pose, and the withdrawal for been made.

The withdrawal was accomplished with a considerable confusion during which agrressive settion by "" a rathy, six corp; and ground troops might have ended the war before the end of Jennary. The position was occupied and divided into subsectors as follows from the beach near Liney-Spech to Orion - to the Fanningant SS-1 under Col. Irwin-Just Inf. 78, H air Corps B, and R Training Cofre; SS-2 - Col Dommer Prov. Regt. U.S.A. &ir Corps, SS-2 Gen Bluenel - Calt Inf (to Black 1) H air Ely less Jish & 37st Inf. 51st Combat Tans, SS-2 Gen Computed Line H and Computed Corps reserves and the Alst Inf wast from SS-0 to SS-D. The Philippine Corps reserves and the Alst Inf wast from SS-0 to SS-D. The Philippine Division, part of which was to have occupied the front line was broken up as Gorps and inty Reserve and was employed piecessel wherever necessatly dictated. Its Hg continued to exist under Gen. Jough but never until the final futile effort was it brought together in any attempt at concepted effect.

The Reserve Battle Position was further prepared and fortified after occupancy - loakands flooded, tremshes dug, cescultage created barbed wire strung ste & patrol action was constant but not pressure was exerted until the first of April. Here as in the I Corps the "45" entremembed and swatch drainforcesomts.

Toward the latter part of March enemy truck, tank and artillary columns were sighted on the reads and moar areas and it was obvious that an affensive had been planned. This push case beginning Auril 3 at about 8 Å with intensive shelling, dive bonding, high level bonding and a general stack in the Ada Inf areas and by nightfall these units had retreated in confusion down trails % and \$29 to trail \$6, the Ada Inf completely dissinterpraing and disappearing. The Ada Inf was contacted by Gen Lough and ordered to recorp, and moved back up \$6 on August 1.8 However, it was a gain hit by meas entillery, broke up and disappeared. The Alst Inf. not so hard hit sowed H along the read and was not attacked in force, on the night of Auril A. the 33d Inf.

in Corps Res. Along Tr #44, about 1 Km N or #6 & 14, was order M to reinforce the line, but use not heard from thereafter. On April Ath 15 tents appeared along the Pilar-Regae read, once started down train 25 tents appeared along the Pilar-Regae Read beath and the Miss of the Zhit Div along the Tailsay R. The Zit Div them withdraw under pressure to the RET on the alongs of Mis Samat. In the face of these states and sithdrawal by the night of April the line exited with a large salient in SS-D and units were located as follows: Jist Inf on extreme left. agride test 39, a large Jap on the right to the Zhit Div on the forward slopes of Mt. Samat, Lint CT, 22d Ing. Prov. AE Regis Jists Inf PA AC Bm and the PMTC. The Sist Inf Out Miss and was in that area that hight.

On April 5 the energy moved down to \$6 and scross this face of Samat and by night they and control of trail \$64 to the OP of the 21st 154; and were working up the E slope of \$8. Samat. The extent of the penetration by the "Nis" was not income exactly and a counter attack involving the \$5th Inf [F3] up Trail \$29 with tank support and the 31st Inf (US) up strids \$44\$, then sup \$64 to \$44\$. then up \$4\$ to reinforce and establish the line. Before this could be secon-plished in \$4p116 remants of the 21st ply case thru the 31st Inf poss, and heavy fire as received from the energy in Ht. Samat. Heavy pressure on the front and left of the 31st inf forced the withdrawal to the \$5. bank of the Sam Vicente by nightfull of the 6th. The energy also forced his very up trails \$6 the \$44\$, in April \$6, the let Ba 77th Inf having been order to jet \$18 the \$45\$ to be at disposal of Gen. Lough-Before the 57th Bn could reach Gen Lough, however, his Hg was cut off by the energy on Trail 3 and the Bn of the 57th use forced to take up a defensive position behind the Sam Vicente R, at the Jat \$8 the \$45\$. The tank support of the \$45th Inf arrived late and that unit was forced to an trail \$29 and into the I Corps sector.

Thus by nightfull of Agril 6th situation was almost hopeless. On the axtrame laft the 45th Inf counter offensive up Tr #89 was nipped and it, with Gen Lough's Hq. was cut off from II Gorgs. The 78 had routed the Agt bly and followed it up trails #6 & #64 where the laft ha 77th encountered the energy and held them H. of the San Yleente at Irril Jots #8 & #46. On the San Yleente a large gap existed and then the Jaki Inf (US) had goes into pos. connecting with the Jami CR of Gan Eluman on its right flank, Our artly had been overwhelmed and selenced on the Agt #8 guns had all been captured.

On April 7 an ettempt was made to organize a defensive line along the Patec trail (Mc6) with 2018t and 2028 Engre filling the gap between the 37th (28 Bm. in per. with left an inght of April 6) and 31st Inf (US) and 38st units. The 25th Gay and 14th Engre also moved up, the 25th at 1ct 12st 21D baing turned over to Gen. Slussed 1 the Engre, to Gel, filly who was with the 37th 1nf GP and its 3d Hm. attached to 52st and Gen Blussel. The 13st 7ct 12st 2 move of the 38st 3 min Slussel. The 13st 7ct 12st 2 min 1 min

5th and not only cut trell \$46 but staged a separate stack in the 32d Inf area in the right half of SS-Q feering the withdrawal of the SEA of the stage of the st

April 8th found the line held behind the Alangan B. in a confused state due to heaty retreat and mistaken rottee of studyease. It was obvious from the outset that this position was untermalle. All 37 ms guas and entomatic weapons had been lest, nearly all 155 ms, were of ammunitions, In addition the man were almost completely exhausted by the long merches and days without feed. The 26th Cqr, which had moved from \$2.8 \$10 to \$2.8 \$46 covered the withdrawal of other units & them withdraw to the showe pos. twelf.

It was intended that now position would be occupied with the 26th Lary, 57th Lar and 31st Lar in line 6 the Mith Barry in reserve, but due to a mistake in retiring between may and old trails 20 a mistake in retiring between may and old trails 20 a mistake in retiring between may and old trails 20 at Mith Barry, astroide Teal 120, 31st 2 7th to 6 of 04 20 - a big gap to the 803k Barry, PMc, 31st Lar PA and the 4th PG, (the 4th PG and 8036 Barry having been brought up during the night)

During the morning of the 6th Je bombed the Line heavily and the 4th FG and the 3th In FA pulled cut. Ensay tamks & Inf for-lowed up quickly down trail #20 and soon surrounded the position sat that by the night of the 8th the artire line was unteamble and further withdrawal become necessary. Orders were confused as were the troops who scattered bedly. The bull of these second down necessary. Orders were confused as were the troops who scattered bedly. The bull of the second down to the 57th Inf 31st Inf 6 14th Energ respectively many oil to chain or began to the first consider by the scaring of the 9th. At 3 A, Bat. Christenson Ass't G-3 for II Corps set Gen. Bluesal at Jet #12 & #20 recorded order to surrender. Gen Bluesal as accorded to the up a position behind the Lamo R. but instead he lot't a cerea and anyout troop the fram where surrenders cannot have that day.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

s/ Ruth H. Essary t/ RUTH H. ESSART Captain WAC

A TRUE COPY: wonfill

EXTRACT FROM DIARY OF MAJ. CALVIN F. CHUIN (FAGES 120-122)
RECOVERED FROM CABANATUAN FOW CAMP NO 1. ON 29 AFRIT. 1946
PROJECT "J" ARCHIVE 999-2-21A BK 1.

(Dec. 1941 and Jan. 1942)

Dec. 25-started at night for Bataan. Dec. 26-in Manila trying to buy tires for old trucks. Arrived at Balanga that night. Regt. Of established there. Batteries to positions vicinity of Abucay as anti-tank defense. Placed in groupment with 24 ff Aunder command of ft. Col. Attinson. Later 23d left with 37st Inf (US) for Hermose battle & got shot up. Afst took 23 ocetions.

g Jan. 8-moved n & w of Abucay g 1800 yds. back of MIR. g Jan. 12-supported 42d & 43d Infs. No observation except a

tree platform & 3 PA officers on MR.

Jen. 13-ertillery duel, 6 KIA in 3d Bn. by beaks. 1st Bn. on rt, 2d in center, 3d 1stf. 1st Bn. had rice stacks over gums. No other cover. Jeps used a harmless smoke shell to target in. Jones, 1st Bn. silenced 5 btys. 1 afternoon, 2d Bn had sgunners KIA when they got out of for holes. 3d bn. moved to end of Hacteder 4d, (1st tt. Davey to 3d Bn. Dec. 22/ Promotions for Infs. 19, 90, 100, Moore later). Fired rolling barrages for etacks & special missions for Inf.

Jan, 24-D Btry, fired all night as shell to cover Inf. W.d. Rest of regt, w/d at dusk to bivousc west of Orton when they steyed night of 25, Jan. 26-to positions in rear & supporting Prov. AC & 23d Inf. Support firing; little counter battery. I gun disable by fregment in tube. Ord. fixed in

2 days.

Jan. 28-Col Moore reld. & ordered to I Corps as artillery commander. Col. Martelino also to I Corps as artillery supply. Lt Col D. W. Lockwood became c.o & Capt Larry Smarr, asst.

