

No 28

REPORT  
OF  
CMDG. GENERAL 8th ARMY  
LUZON MOP-UP OPERATION

No. 28

ARMY.

OPERATION

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AW2883078

REPORT  
*of the*  
COMMANDING GENERAL  
EIGHTH ARMY  
*on the*  
LUZON  
MOP-UP  
OPERATION



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28

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OF THE  
COMMANDING GENERAL  
**EIGHTH ARMY**  
ON THE  
LUZON  
MOP-UP  
OPERATION

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Lieutenant General R.L. Eichelberger  
Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PART ONE: Planning Phase

I The Enemy Situation----- 4

II Plans and Preparations----- 9

PART TWO: Narrative

I Clearing the CAGAYAN VALLEY-----12

II The Action in the Southern CORDILLERA MOUNTAINS----17

III Central and Southern LUZON-----31

IV Comparative Casualties-----35

PART THREE: Staff Section Reports

G-1-----38

G-2-----40

G-3-----41

Field Artillery-----41

AAA-----42

Signal-----43

G-4-----45

Quartermaster-----46

CWS-----47

Engineer-----48

Medical-----51

Ordnance-----54

Transportation-----56

MAPS AND CHARTS

Orientation----- 1

Enemy Dispositions and XIV Corps Boundaries----- 5

Allied Order of Battle Chart----- 8

Northern LUZON, Sketch Maps-----14

Southern CORDILLERA Central MOUNTAINS-----20

CAGAYAN VALLEY-----25

Destruction of Japanese, Central LUZON-----32


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# ORIENTATION MAP

## Philippine Islands

SCALE



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PART ONE  
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

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## INTRODUCTION

By the summer of 1945, the main power of the Japanese on LUZON had been broken and their tactical defeat had been accomplished by driving their forces deep into the mountains. Nevertheless, in order to complete the liberation of the island, the remaining armed troops had to be hunted down, dug out of holes and caves, and destroyed. This force was estimated at 45,000; however, surrenders and casualties since the end of hostilities indicate that the actual enemy strength was 75,000 when the Eighth Army assumed control.

The LUZON campaign had been a Sixth Army operation with the exception of the landings at NASUGBU (Mike-Six Operation) and on BATAAN (Mike-Seven Operation), which were made under Eighth Army command; these forces later passed to Sixth Army control. However, because the Sixth Army was scheduled to make the initial assault on the home islands of JAPAN by a landing on the island of KYUSHU, it was relieved of all combat missions in the PHILIPPINES, and the arduous task of mopping up on LUZON was turned over to the Eighth Army.

This report covers the period from 1 July, when the Eighth Army assumed combat responsibility for LUZON, to 20 August, when hostilities ended.

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## I. THE ENEMY SITUATION


The Japanese on LUZON were completely on the defensive at the time the Eighth Army assumed command of operations on the island. Heavy casualties, absence of resupply and reinforcements, and lack of air cover had deprived the enemy of offensive capabilities and had forced him into terrain that was unsuitable for maneuver but highly favorable for delaying action.

The overall Japanese strength on LUZON was reported as 45,000 in the estimate published on 18 June by the G-2 Section, Eighth Army. This numerically formidable garrison was not unified, however, and the tactical successes of the American troops, culminating in the drive up the CAGAYAN VALLEY to APARRI, split the enemy forces and made it impossible for the larger elements to consolidate or coordinate their defensive activities.

### The Main Japanese Force.

Most of the Japanese were in northern LUZON, with the largest force, estimated at 18,000, located in southern MOUNTAIN PROVINCE. These troops were under the command of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, chief of the Japanese forces on the island. He had withdrawn his Fourteenth Area Army Headquarters to KIANGAN, and from there he directed the remaining Japanese forces struggling to hold out in the wild, almost inaccessible CORDILLERA CENTRAL MOUNTAINS. This range, running north and south, forms the backbone of northern LUZON. The mountain chain is 200 miles long and 30 to 40 miles wide, with many peaks rising above 8,000 feet. Small areas of comparative lowland, which are separated from each other by impassable gorges, occur in the major valleys. Mountain slopes near rivers are all steep and often precipitous. Dense vegetation renders off-trail movement generally impracticable in the CORDILLERAS, and, as there are no low passes through the range, it is a formidable barrier to any movement between the CAGAYAN VALLEY and the west coast.

In addition to his headquarters troops, General Yamashita's



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force included remnants of the 105th Division, 23d Division, 2d Armored Division, 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, 19th Division, and 79th and 80th Brigades of the 103d Division. The Japanese were practically encircled by the American forces and it was expected that the enemy would resist stubbornly from cave emplacements and similar defenses. The main routes of communication in the area, Highway No. 11 on the west and Highway No. 4 on the east, were held by the enemy, and it was along these roads that the heaviest fighting was anticipated.

The Enemy East of Highway No. 5.

The remaining Japanese in northern LUZON, about 17,500 in number, were scattered in sizeable groups between Highway No. 5 and the eastern coast of the island. They held positions in the CAGAYAN VALLEY and in the difficult terrain of the SIERRA MADRE range. This mountain chain parallels the east coast of northern LUZON for about 200 miles, rising to heights of more than 6,000 feet and extending from 20 to 30 miles in width. It bars the approach to the CAGAYAN VALLEY from the east. The range is rugged and for the most part unmapped. While there are some relatively low passes only foot trails cross the range, making movement for foot troops difficult and impossible for vehicles.

Failure of the enemy to offer sustained resistance to the swift advance of the 37th Division on Highway No. 5, during June, was taken as an indication that command control of the entire CAGAYAN VALLEY had been lost. However, organized resistance was anticipated in the APARRI-BUGUEY-TUGEGARAO region, where 10,000 men of the 103d Division were withdrawing into the hills.


The 7,500 Japanese in southern CAGAYAN PROVINCE were mainly ground service troops and air force personnel, with remnants of the 10th Division and the 2d Armored Division. Faced with a critical supply problem, it appeared from reports and observations that they were making a hasty, disorganized retreat into the inaccessible

mountain country.

Other Scattered Groups.

The Japanese troops in southern and central LUZON had been reduced to remnants with little or no tactical integrity. They were in disorganized groups, moving about from place to place in search of food, concerned primarily in avoiding our patrols. There were approximately 6,500 in the area east of MANILA, and about 3,000 dispersed throughout central and southern LUZON (PANGANSINA, ZAMBALES, and BATANGAS PROVINCES and the BICOL PENINSULA).

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\* MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM C. CHASE, U.S.A.  
 COMMANDED 38TH DIVISION 1 JULY - 31 JULY  
 ASSUMED COMMAND OF 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION 1 AUGUST

## II. PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

On 31 May, General Headquarters published Operations Instructions No. 106, directing the Commanding General, Eighth Army, to relieve the Sixth Army of combat responsibility on LUZON and all other missions excepting those which pertained directly to the preparation of that Army for projected operations. On 1 July, to carry out this directive the Eighth Army was prepared to assume control of the XIV Corps and the 6th, 32d, 37th, and 38th Divisions, including numerous supporting units which had been operating on LUZON under Sixth Army command.

To regroup the American forces in the PHILIPPINES for future operations against the Japanese homeland, General Headquarters, in Operations Instructions No. 107 dated 1 June, ordered the transfer of the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team and the Americal, 40th, 41st, and 81st Divisions from Eighth to Sixth Army control as of 1 July. The Eighth Army Commander was additionally instructed to assist in training Sixth Army units for coming operations by using these units in combat as requested by the Sixth Army Commander.

In Eighth Army Field Order No. 30, dated 13 June, combat responsibility on LUZON was delegated to the XIV Corps. This corps was ordered to continue offensive operations in northern LUZON with the mission of destroying the remaining hostile forces operating there. It was to establish control over the CAGAYAN VALLEY, complete the destruction of the Japanese in central and southern LUZON, and provide for the security of those areas.

A large number of Filipino guerrilla forces were deployed throughout southern and central LUZON, and they were to be assigned missions in the mop-up operations. Because they were not organized into large combat units, these guerrillas lacked a coordinated command and were not logistically self-supporting; therefore the XIV Corps Commander requested that

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additional Sixth Army troops be made available to administer, supply, and control the guerrillas in the DINGALAN BAY area south of MANILA. For this purpose the following units were assigned to the Eighth Army for operational control only, effective 1 July:

103d Infantry (less 1st Battalion), 43d Division  
1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry, 11th  
Airborne Division  
1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division  
2d Battalion, 158th Regimental Combat Team

The XIV Corps forces also included the unit known as USAFIP, NL (United States Army Forces in the PHILIPPINES, Northern LUZON). This was a major PHILIPPINE military organization, which had been active in northwestern LUZON, where it had started as a guerrilla unit in 1942. It had been developed into a force of 21,000 men, and was commanded by Colonel Russell W. Volckmann, U.S.A. This organization included the 11th, 14th, 15th, 66th, and 121st Infantry Regiments.

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PART TWO  
NARRATIVE

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### I. CLEARING THE CAGAYAN VALLEY

The 37th Division had made an unexpectedly rapid advance northward along Highway No. 5 during the latter part of June, and in conjunction with parachutists of the 11th Airborne Division had secured control of the highway throughout its zone, from APARRI on the north to a point above ILIGAN on the south by 1 July. With the highway secured, the 37th Division's remaining missions, as stated in XIV Corps Field Order No. 17, were to push east and seize GONZAGA and SAN VICENTE, and to reconnoiter aggressively east of the highway and destroy hostile forces that were encountered. The same order assigned mop-up missions to other forces in their respective areas.

Although the enemy had been expected to make a stand near APARRI all contact had been lost during the advance of the 37th Division up the CAGAYAN VALLEY. While the attached 11th Infantry (Philippine Army) guarded the highway, the division immediately began probing east into the mountains in an attempt to fix the enemy's principal concentrations. The 129th Infantry advanced east along Highway No. 3, occupying GONZAGA without opposition on 2 July. Five miles east of GONZAGA a group of about 100 Japanese was encountered, but when artillery fire was placed on them they broke away and escaped. The drive was resumed and on 6 July patrols reached SAN VICENTE on the extreme northeastern tip of LUZON without further opposition.

In the central portion of the division's zone the 145th Infantry drove up the valleys of the PARETE and DUMMUN RIVERS. At first only scattered opposition was encountered in the DUMMUN VALLEY, and a motorized patrol advanced as far as CALAOGAN by 8 July. Other patrols astride the river continued to meet small enemy parties. In the PARETE VALLEY, however, as patrols approached within 4,000 yards of BAGGAO, Japanese groups offered stronger resistance. Advancing against minor delaying actions, and making use of artillery support and air strikes, the 145th Infantry was able to reach SINGAYAN on 9 July.

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In the southern part of the valley the 148th Infantry advanced from TUMAUNINI and TUGUEGARAO. There were scattered engagements approximately five miles east and north of both towns, but no fixed positions were found. Patrols constantly searched the area finding only a few stragglers and disintegrating groups of Japanese.

To the south, in the 6th Division zone, the 20th Infantry secured Highway No. 5 and patrolled vigorously toward SAN MARIANO, JONES, and ANGADANAN; the latter towns being seized without opposition on 4 July. Although patrols destroyed many small groups, they failed to locate any prepared positions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of the enemy were killed in skirmishes on 8-9 July in the JONES-SAN MARIANO-ILAGAN area.

During this period, the 126th and 128th Infantry Regiments of the 32d Division patrolled actively along Highway No. 5, killing or capturing many stragglers in a wide area on both sides of the highway from the vicinity of BALETE PASS north to BAGABAG.

The XIV Corps changed division boundaries in its Field Order No. 18 on 11 July, enlarging the 6th Division zone north of the MAGAT RIVER and west of the CAGAYAN RIVER north of ILAGAN. Several units from USAFIP, NL (United States Army Forces in the PHILIPPINES, Northern LUZON) were transferred from the 37th Division to the 6th Division in order to strengthen the latter's offensive in the southern CORDILLERA CENTRAL MOUNTAINS.

During the period 11-22 July action in the CAGAYAN VALLEY followed the pattern established during the previous ten days. The 6th Division continued its patrols and killed numerous Japanese in the JONES-ANGADANAN-SAN MARIANO area while the 32d Division patrols engaged in numerous minor clashes throughout its zone.

The 37th Division during this period made several small advances to the east in the DUMMUN and PARETE VALLEYS. On 13 July, the 129th Infantry relieved the 145th Infantry in the DUMMUN VALLEY and patrolled along the river meeting scattered resistance in the

# NORTHERN LUZON

PRINCIPAL U.S. DRIVES


INDICATES AREAS OF FREQUENT ENEMY CONTACT

DISPOSITIONS AS OF:

	1 JULY 1945
	11 " "
	23 " "

SCALE

0 5 10 15 20 MILES



20TH ENGR. BASE TOPO. BN. APPAC  
1945

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vicinity of CUMAO. The 145th Infantry concentrated on the PARETE VALLEY and pushed a mile east along the river following artillery and air preparations placed on delaying positions prepared by the enemy. The 148th Infantry continued to patrol the areas east of TUGUEGARAO and TUMAUIINI with only minor patrol actions.

Field Order No. 19, XIV Corps, effected another change in the division boundaries on 22 July. The 37th Division zone was extended to include the SAN MARIANO area, and the 32d Division assumed responsibility for the JONES-ANGADANAN area, relieving elements of the 6th Division east of and including Highway No. 5 in the SANTIAGO area. The 32d proceeded to patrol the entire area east of the highway from BALETE PASS north to the 37th Division boundary. Numerous, minor patrol encounters continued to be made with the enemy until hostilities ceased.

The 37th Division redeployed on 23 July with the 148th Infantry moving south to take over the SAN MARIANO area formerly controlled by the 6th Division. The 145th Infantry assumed control of the TUGUEGARAO area, and the 129th Infantry took over operations in the PARETE VALLEY while continuing its activities in the DUMMUN VALLEY and in the vicinity of GONZAGA.

In all sections of the CAGAYAN VALLEY, from the latter part of July until hostilities ceased in the middle of August, Japanese resistance took the same general form. Eighth Army troops probed into the SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS attempting to fix the location of enemy concentrations, and seldom found forces larger than a company. Attempts to surround the few large groups that were met failed as the enemy broke up into smaller bands and worked deeper into the mountains. This was the type of action which took place south of GONZAGA and north of CUMAO in the DUMMUN VALLEY, as well as in the JUNGLE MOUNTAINS area east of TUGUEGARAO.

Progress into the mountains was very slow; it was the rainy season and the rivers were flooded, the jungles were thick, and the

trails narrow and steep as they led over the rugged terrain. Small enemy groups, occupying high ground along the trails, fought constant delaying actions, resisting stubbornly until artillery, air strikes, and reinforced ground troops caused them to dissolve and move back farther in the hills, leaving many dead behind.

All offensive action stopped on 15 August with the opening of surrender negotiations by the Japanese government, but in the days that followed there were many small engagements with enemy groups who were ignorant of the proposed surrender or who refused to stop fighting. On 20 August, the Eighth Army and the XIV Corps were relieved of all assigned missions, and operations became the responsibility of the LUZON Area Command.

To clarify the picture of the resistance in the CAGAYAN VALLEY from 1 July to 15 August the following table showing the number of enemy casualties and prisoners taken is given according to area:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Japanese Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>
DUMMUN VALLEY	301	30
GONCAGA	53	10
PERABLANKA-TUGUEGARAO	286	29
SAN MARIANO	317	49

## II. ACTION IN THE SOUTHERN CORDILLERA CENTRAL MOUNTAINS

Concurrent with the destruction of the enemy in the CAGAYAN VALLEY, operations were carried out against the Japanese in the southern CORDILLERA CENTRAL MOUNTAINS, where approximately 18,000 troops were concentrated in the triangular BAGUIO-BAGABAG-BONTOC area. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commander of all Japanese troops on LUZON, directed these troops from his headquarters near KLANGAN.

The enemy had been surrounded in prior operations, and the XIV Corps plan was to block the escape routes, tighten the circle, and then destroy the remaining Japanese. To accomplish this the 6th Division was to drive north from BAGABAG along Highway No. 4 toward BONTOC; part of the USAFIP, NL, was to move east from CERVANTES to BONTOC and then swing south to meet the 6th Division; a second column of the USAFIP, NL, was to advance southeast from CERVANTES and meet the 32d Division which was to push northeast from BAGUIO along Highway No. 11. Since the southern escape routes were already blocked by the 32d Division, this maneuver was designed to effect the complete encirclement of enemy troops in the area.

### The 6th Division Drives North.

The 63d Infantry advanced along Highway No. 4, which was hardly more than a mountain trail running out along sheer cliffs and only wide enough for one way traffic. Progress was impeded by the numerous landslides and bomb craters on the road, as well as by the heavy rains. The 1st Infantry was concentrated along the highway in the rear of the 63d Infantry, while 2,500 attached guerrillas were employed in security missions. The 20th Infantry held Highway No. 5 west of BAGABAG.

On 2 July, the 63d Infantry began to encounter stubborn resistance along Old Highway No. 4 north of BULOG, and daily progress was limited to small gains. On 8 July, following a heavy artillery preparation, the 2d Battalion made a determined attack under cover



The type of difficult mountainous terrain over which our troops fought on LUZON is shown in this photograph. .



Infantrymen moving up to occupy a peak upon which an observation post is to be established.

of a smoke screen; after destroying scores of well-prepared enemy positions it seized a series of ridges northwest of HUCAB. The next day the advance was continued against delaying actions to a point 4,000 yards northwest of HUCAB.

Field Order No. 18, XIV Corps, 9 July, made slight changes in the division boundaries and directed the 6th Division to seize KIANGAN and BANAUE as quickly as possible; several Philippine Army units were transferred from the 37th to the 6th Division to assist in this attack. The 11th Infantry (less the 1st and 2nd Battalions) reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, in the CAGAYAN VALLEY, was ordered to advance south and west and seize MAYOYAO.

Advancing along Old Highway No. 4 against small arms fire and considerable shelling, the 2d Battalion, 63d Infantry, seized KIANGAN on 12 July. By this time, elements of the 3d Battalion had taken Highway No. 4 as far as the IMBULAO RIVER and assisted in the capture of KIANGAN by attacking the town from the east. Large quantities of supplies, including 60 trucks, were captured in the vicinity. Elements of the 63d Infantry pushed west toward PACDAN and south toward ANTIPOLLO against strong resistance. In the three days following the capture of KIANGAN, the enemy conducted many short counterattacks against 6th Division troops throughout the area, but were always repulsed.


In the meantime, the 1st Infantry had captured an enemy strongpoint two miles southwest of PAYATAN after a sharp engagement. From there they moved north to seize and secure a bridgehead north of the IMBULAO RIVER on Highway No. 4, and on 12 July they relieved elements of the 63d Infantry in that vicinity.

During the period 1-12 July, a total of 1,699 enemy dead had been counted; the majority of them were killed by small arms, and the rest gave evidence of the effectiveness of our air strikes and artillery fire. In addition, 167 prisoners were taken.

The 63d Infantry consolidated in the KIANGAN area, and the 1st Infantry, after conducting mop-up operations along the




# Cordillera Central Mountains





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**Southern Cordillera  
 Central Mountains  
 LUZON**


Troop Dispositions as of  
**1 July 1945**

 Pockets of enemy resistance

 Principal U.S. Drives


 Enemy Concentration

Miles





A self-propelled howitzer (M-7) fires in support of mop-up troops beyond the next ridge.



Roads were hastily constructed by combat engineers to enable artillery and supplies to be brought forward.

highway and the IMBULAO RIVER, moved north toward BANAUE on 17 July. Delaying actions retarded the advance, but BANAUE was taken three days later. On the following day, contact was established with the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, which had moved down from BONTOC. With all of Highway No. 4 under the control of American forces, the enemy within the triangle was completely surrounded. There still remained, however, a considerable force of Japanese east of the highway in the vicinity of MAYOYAO.

The 6th Division redeployed at this time with the 20th Infantry moving to the vicinity of KIANGAN from the JONES-SAN MARIANO area, while the 63d Infantry was shifted to an assembly area near BAGABAG. The 1st Infantry, the 20th Infantry, and the BUENA VISTA Regiment (Guerrilla) continued to patrol vigorously to the north and west of KIANGAN, knocking out remaining enemy pockets. The Japanese frequently conducted night attacks on our positions, but these did not indicate any major offensive capabilities.

In the meantime elements of the 11th and 14th Regiments, USAFIP, NL, attached to the 6th Division, had been moving west on two trails from SANTA CRUZ and MARSAT GRANDE on the MAGAT RIVER. Light resistance was encountered in the vicinity of LUBAO, which was taken on 20 July, and BUNHIAN was seized by the 11th with little difficulty on 25 July. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, after a difficult march south, had secured NATONIN on 24 July, making only scattered contacts on the way; leading elements of the battalion joined the Provisional Battalion of the 11th Infantry near BUNHIAN on 26 July.

The advance on MAYOYAO was begun on 26 July and two days later the 11th Infantry was heavily engaged with a strong enemy force holding the high ground northeast of the town. The fight for this position was a furious one, and the Filipinos, even though supported by numerous air strikes, did not gain a foothold on it until 1 August. The next week was filled with see-saw action as attacks and

counterattacks swept back and forth across the commanding terrain. On 7 August, 300 of the enemy were observed retreating south from MAYOYAO, and on the following day the Filipino troops entered the town without difficulty. Casualty figures attested to the fierceness of the battle; 600 Japanese were killed, but only two prisoners were taken in the 11-day action.

The 1st Infantry, patrolling east from BANAUE, took DUCLIGAN on 28 July after some desultory resistance. On 5 August, a strong combat patrol moved east from DUCLIGAN and advanced to a point 3,000 yards southwest of MAYOYAO where it was stopped by an enemy road block.

The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, advancing southwest from POLIS PASS, and the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, moving west from BANAUE, met at GOHANG on 27 July. From there the combined force pushed south toward HAPAO and BANIKI, but encountered a strong defending force which made frequent counterattacks. On the night of 1-2 August large Japanese forces stormed the American positions near BANIKI and further south near PACDAN, in a coordinated assault; these attacks were repulsed, and the enemy sustained losses of over 600 killed in the HAPAO-BANIKI area alone.

Throughout the 6th Division zone, from ANTIPOLO in the south through MOUNT PULOY to HAPAO in the north, widespread patrol actions against Japanese in prepared positions continued until hostilities ceased on 15 August. Although most of the Japanese artillery had been silenced by this time, a few 75mm rounds continued to fall on American positions, and the enemy made occasional small counterattacks.

Early in July, prisoners had indicated that the morale of the enemy was low, and that if given a chance to surrender, many Japanese would do so. A special surrender leaflet was prepared announcing that from 0900 to 1600 on 24 July all American fire would cease so that the Japanese could surrender safely. The southern CORDILLERAS were saturated with a quarter-million of these leaflets dropped

After beaching at MALABANG, where they found the guerrillas still in control, the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, started patrolling north toward LAKE LANAO and south toward PARANG to search out any remnants of the Japanese units that had previously occupied the area. Small forces in landing craft (mechanized) went ashore on BONGO and IBUS ISLANDS at H minus 15 and found them free of enemy.

At PARANG the 19th Regimental Combat Team swept ashore in a column of battalions, encountering only a few enemy stragglers as they advanced inland, and turned southeast on Highway No. 1. All bridges across the road had been destroyed, and our troops were forced to wade chest-deep streams as they raced toward the important junction of Highways No. 1 and 5, 12 miles south of PARANG. By nightfall this column had reached a point 4,000 yards north of the SIMUAY RIVER.

The 21st Infantry, less the battalion at MALABANG, followed the 19th into PARANG and probed 2,000 yards east and 3,000 yards north of the town without opposition, while the 34th Infantry remained afloat in division reserve.

The Commanding General, Eighth Army, witnessed the landings, and went ashore on R-Day to inspect both beachheads. He found operations proceeding satisfactorily and the MALABANG AIRFIELD beginning to receive traffic.

On the morning of R-plus one, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 19th Infantry, continued their southward drive along the highway. The SIMUAY RIVER was forded without opposition, the road junction was seized, and the leading elements swung east to a point 2,000 yards beyond the junction. Approximately 30 Japanese attacked our perimeter during the night, but were dispersed, leaving four of their dead behind.


Command ashore was assumed by the Commanding General, 24th Division, at 1010 on 18 April, and by the Corps Commander at 1800. The X Corps command post opened at PARANG at 1628.

# NORTHERN LUZON CAGAYAN VALLEY

DISPOSITIONS ARE AS OF  
1 JULY 1945

- XX BOUNDARIES (DIV)
- ➔ PRINCIPAL U.S. DRIVES
- ⊘ PRINCIPAL AREAS OF ENEMY CONTACT

SCALE



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1945

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concrete blockhouses, dominated the road. The Japanese entrenched here were supported by light artillery, and the guerrillas were unable to penetrate the enemy positions.

Between the drives toward SABANGAN and KM 90, the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, struck directly east to Highway No. 11, and on 6 July occupied PINGAD and nearby towns, knocking out light enemy resistance. Contact was established with patrols of the 15th Infantry moving south from SABANGAN, while the 121st Infantry, which had passed through the 15th, attacked north toward BONTOC and occupied that town on 10 July.

From BONTOC the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, turned south on Highway No. 4 and seized POLIS PASS on 18 July. Five days later a junction was made with the 6th Division at BANAUUE.

On Highway No. 11 the 15th Infantry was battling its way south from PINGAD. Strong enemy positions at LIBO HILL were systematically reduced, and the guerrillas reached MOUNT DATA on 21 July. Here they encountered a large enemy force committed to a last-ditch stand to protect KM 90, which was near the crossing of Highway No. 11 and the MANKAYAN-LOO road. Through this road junction the enemy was attempting to withdraw his forces from the north, in order to group them east of KM 90 in the vicinity of MOUNT PALUGLOKO. The Japanese were well dug in and amply supplied with mortars and automatic weapons, and they held this line stubbornly until the end of hostilities a month later.

Bitter fighting also raged north of MANKAYAN, where the 66th Infantry's advance had been stalled since 4 July. In a costly assault, supported by air strikes and artillery, the guerrilla regiment drove the enemy from his caves and pillboxes on the high ground protecting MANKAYAN and entered the town on 19 July. Between 2 and 19 July, the 66th Infantry killed 898 Japanese and captured seven.

On 18 July, XIV Corps Field Order No. 19 directed the prompt seizure of KM 90 and a drive south to meet the 32d Division in order to open Highway No. 11. After clearing MANKAYAN, the 66th Infantry



**HIT THE DIRT!** The men dash for cover as they are fired on by Japanese hidden at the base of the tree.



The men on the left flank move in for the kill, protected by the base of fire of the riflemen at the right. The position is knocked out, and the patrol goes on.





Infantrymen of the 32d Division are briefed before they move out on a small unit patrol, part of the continuous hunt for the enemy that characterizes mopping up.



Protected by covering fire of the men behind him, the lead scout is about to throw a grenade.



In a narrow diamond formation the patrol heads for enemy country.



It's a bullseye, and the scout ducks to avoid the flaming white phosphorous particles.

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marched toward KM 90 and encountered stiff opposition near BULALAGAO. Large numbers of enemy troops were concentrated at various points along both sides of the road. They were well equipped with small arms and automatic weapons and had some artillery support. The guerrillas pressed forward against stiff opposition from the Japanese in their many prepared or natural defensive positions and succeeded in occupying KM 90 on 25 July. Between NANKAYAN and the objective, the equivalent of one mountain artillery battalion was eliminated as the 66th infantry destroyed or captured fourteen 75mm mountain-type guns that the Japanese were using to oppose the advance.

The Japanese holding out in the MOUNT DATA area were by-passed by elements of the 15th Infantry who joined with the 66th 3,000 yards north of KM 90. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, had penetrated into the LOO VALLEY and was engaged with the enemy only 2,000 yards east of KM 90 on 26 July. The 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry, was sent from BONTOC to assist this drive; it was attached to the 66th Infantry and led the attack to the southeast on the KM 90-BADAYAN road. BADAYAN fell on 1 August, but the strength and tenacity of the Japanese defense prevented further substantial advances in this sector. The juncture with the 32d Division on Highway No. 11 was achieved on 29 July by elements of the 66th Infantry 8,000 yards south of KM 90.

The success of the USAFIP, NL, guerrillas in driving the Japanese from the roads into the mountains was paid for by a higher casualty rate than would have been suffered by experienced American troops under the same circumstances; for although they were aided by American artillery and planes, the Filipino forces lacked much of the special equipment required for the assault on prepared positions.

#### The 32d Division Closes in from the South.

At the beginning of the mop-up phase of the LUZON campaign, the 32d Division's 127th Regimental Combat Team was engaged in securing the BAGUIO area, which included Highway No. 11 as far north as

ACCP'S PLACE. The remainder of the division was operating along Highway No. 5 and in the CAGAYAN VALLEY.

On 9 July the 127th Regimental Combat Team was directed to secure the BAGUIO area and advance northward on Highway No. 11 until contact was established with the USAFIP, NL, guerrillas near KM 90. This maneuver was designed to open the highway as a supply route for the troops operating farther north, and to bring pressure from the south on the enemy in the KM 90-BONTOC-BAGABAG area.

The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, led the attack up the highway on 11 July, and ran into a road block manned by two enemy platoons at CAMP 30. This was knocked out with the help of self-propelled howitzers (M7's), and the advance was resumed. Elements of the leading battalion moved west off the highway and occupied ATOK against slight opposition.

The northward push of the 127th was delayed by small enemy units who made determined stands at numerous points where the terrain was especially advantageous for defense. The highway in this area passed through deep cuts and along the sides of mountains; landslides and enemy demolitions blocked the road, and our mobile guns were often unable to give the infantry direct fire support against strong points. Indirect fire and air strikes were used extensively to help drive the Japanese from their well-prepared and cleverly concealed positions.

The enemy fought back stubbornly in the vicinity of BUNGALO, where our forces advanced over precipitous terrain (with elevations of 7,000 feet) to wipe out the enemy. By 21 July elements of the 3d Battalion had reached a point 2,000 yards southwest of SENIPSIP GATE; here the advance was stalled by strong resistance that was supported by anti-tank and artillery pieces. Our troops, using tanks and self-propelled artillery, overcame this opposition on 24 July, and the remaining enemy, estimated at one company, withdrew to heights northeast of SENIPSIP GATE. This position was stormed successfully and knocked out on 28 July.

By 29 July, the 127th Regimental Combat Team had succeeded in opening the highway as far north as KM 78, where it met elements of the USAFIP, NL, forces, patrolling south from KM 90.

The next task assigned to the 127th was to clear the upper AGNO RIVER VALLEY, lying east of and parallel to Highway No. 11. The regiment had been reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry; this battalion took AMBUCLAO and BOKOK against slight resistance, and on 1 August began a sweep to the north up the valley. Both forces frequently engaged the enemy in numerous sharp clashes, but no large groups were encountered. On 8 August, the two battalions met south of BUGUIAS, and patrol activities continued in the valley until hostilities ended.

Conclusion.

On 15 August, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, directed that all offensive action cease and that only security and reconnaissance missions be conducted to locate enemy groups and induce their surrender. This date saw Eighth Army forces in complete encirclement of an estimated 12,000 Japanese in the southern CORDILLERA CENTRAL MOUNTAINS, one of the last large enemy concentrations in the PHILIPPINES. With the 6th Division on the west, the 32d Division on the south and southwest, and the USAFIP, NL, on the northeast and north the Eighth Army was prepared to close on the enemy force and destroy it completely. It can be said that the only major organized enemy force in LUZON was tactically defeated on 15 August, when hostilities ceased.

### III. CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN LUZON


#### The MANILA Area.

Mop-up operations in central LUZON consisted of widespread patrolling into mountainous areas to which enemy remnants had retreated after the main Japanese forces had disintegrated earlier in the campaign. These areas were the ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS, harboring Japanese who escaped from the battles of CLARK FIELD-FORT STOTENSENBURG and the CENTRAL PLAINS, and the southern SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAIN, held by remnants of the force which had defended the SHIMBU LINE east of MANILA.

The 38th Division assumed control of approximately 17,000 Filipino guerrillas on 1 July throughout west-central LUZON from LINGAYEN south to MANILA, and in the SIBUL SPRINGS, NORZAGARY, ANTIPOLO, and INFANTA areas east and northeast of MANILA. The division employed the 152d Infantry in the LINGAYEN-CAMLING, BAMBAN, and BATAAN areas in west-central LUZON. This regiment, using approximately 7,400 guerrillas, provided security for railroad and highway installations throughout its zone, garrisoned CORREGIDOR, and operated combat patrols into the ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS. Small encounters occurred almost daily in which numerous enemy stragglers were killed or captured.

The division's 151st Infantry operated in the area east of MANILA, and the 149th Infantry patrolled the northern part of the division zone. These two regiments employed battalions on a rotational basis to support, control, and administer guerrilla forces, and operated composite American and guerrilla combat patrols in the western foothills of the southern SIERRA MADRE range. Air and artillery support aided our forces in overcoming all organized defenses held stubbornly by small enemy groups deep in the mountains.

A force known as Anderson's Guerrilla Battalion, reinforced by an American rifle company and a field artillery battery, operated in the INFANTA area and along the east coast in the 151st Infantry



zone. Amphibious assaults by this force were made from Navy landing craft, while combat patrols probed westward into the SIERRA MADRES killing many Japanese stragglers. Small organized enemy groups were encountered along the AGOS and KALIVA RIVER VALLEYS west of INFANTA, but all determined resistance in the area was reduced with air and artillery support.

The 103d Infantry (less the 1st Battalion), 43d Division, controlled approximately 2,300 guerrillas in its zone and employed this force, augmented by United States troops, in systematic patrolling of the area lying generally between DINGALAN BAY and CABANATUAN and extending northeast to BALER BAY. The large numbers of Japanese and Formosans killed and captured in that area indicated that the enemy was endeavoring to infiltrate northward from the ill-fated SHIMBU LINE.

The 1st Battalion, 172d Infantry (43d Division), relieved the 103d Infantry on 1 August. Minor contacts continued to be made with enemy stragglers until 15 August.

The extreme seriousness of the enemy supply situation in central LUZON was clearly revealed by the examination of enemy dead who, in many cases, exhibited unmistakable signs of malnutrition and disease. Patrols found individuals and small groups who had apparently starved to death. As a further indication of the lack of food in the MARIKINA-INFANTA-DINGALAN BAY area, prisoners of war told of acts of cannibalism; in these instances it is believed that the Japanese were guilty of cannibalism only on their own dead. Prisoners of war also reported that open fighting occurred between Japanese Army and Japanese Navy personnel over the remaining food supplies in the INFANTA area.

The continuous patrol actions in central LUZON against disorganized, ill-equipped, and undernourished Japanese stragglers and remnants resulted in more than 6,300 enemy killed and found dead and more than 900 captured. The cost in American casualties was

6 killed, 31 wounded; guerrilla casualties were also extremely light.

#### The Southern Peninsula.

Filipino guerrillas, aided by a minimum number of American troops, carried out the bulk of the combat missions during the mop-up of southern LUZON. This region was divided into three zones of responsibility which were assigned to Sixth Army units under the operational control of the Eighth Army. Each unit was charged with the administration, supply, and control of the guerrillas in its respective zone.

The 1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry (11th Airborne Division), controlled approximately 2,100 guerrillas throughout the BATANGAS and CAVITE PROVINCES in southwestern LUZON.

The "Saber Force," composed of guerrillas formerly attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, was deployed in the LUCENA ANTIMONAN-MAUBAN and SANTA CRUZ areas in southeastern LUZON. It was initially controlled by the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, and later by the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, and the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry.

The 2d Battalion, 158th Infantry, was assigned the BICOL PROVINCES in southeastern LUZON and assumed control of the 3,500 guerrillas known as the "BICOL Brigade."

The action in southern LUZON consisted essentially of a series of minor patrol clashes with individuals and small bands of disorganized enemy. At no time was any organized enemy activity encountered. From 1 July to 15 August, only 134 enemy were killed and one prisoner was taken in this area. Usually the Japanese were equipped with rifles, machine guns, and small mortars, but many times our patrols encountered individuals and small groups of stragglers who bore no arms or at best carried only makeshift weapons such as clubs, knives, and spears. Signs of illness and malnutrition were in evidence with the majority of enemy. The Japanese took no aggressive action against our troops, resting content with foraging raids against outlying villages.



IV. COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES

United States casualties for the period 1 July to 15 August

were:

<u>Killed</u>		<u>Wounded</u>		<u>Died of Wounds</u>		<u>Missing</u>		<u>Total</u>	
O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
7	140	29	445	0	21	0	1	36	607

Enemy casualties were:

<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Total</u>
20,311	2,396	22,707



Shortly after the Japanese Government's surrender, a 38th Division Nisei briefs prisoners of war who are being sent out in the MARIKINA area to tell their former comrades that the war is over.



Major General Frederick A. Irving (right), 38th Division Commander, and two staff officers view a Japanese 150mm mortar captured during the LUZON mop-up.

PART THREE  
STAFF SECTION REPORTS

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### G-1 REPORT

During the period of Eighth Army control of the mop-up operations on LUZON, 1 July to 20 August 1945, this section was concerned with general personnel matters pertaining to the XIV Corps, the 6th, 32d, 37th, and 38th Divisions, and supporting troops. Prior to this time the operation had been under command of the Sixth Army.

The activities of this section were subdivided according to its four main functions; personnel, awards and decorations, civil affairs, and operations.

The usual flow of personnel transfers, reassignments, readjustment, promotions, and awards was handled in the routine way and matters pertaining to Filipino civilians were processed in accordance with existing policies.

There were no important changes in operations policies and procedures during the period. Prior to 1 July, representatives of this section and of the Sixth Army had decided upon the form of the G-1 Periodic Report, the method of reporting casualties, and other reports so that procedures would be uniform in the two armies.

Replacements for the units concerned in this operation were drawn principally from the 5th Replacement Depot on LUZON. In the seven week period this depot furnished 11,375 officers and enlisted men to Eighth Army units. Although replacements were never available in sufficient numbers to maintain all units at full strength, no combat units fell below combat efficiency because of shortage of personnel.

The strength of the Eighth Army units at the beginning and the end of the operation were as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Authorized</u>		<u>Actual</u>	
	O	EM	O	EM
1 July	4,219	72,770	3,570	69,352
15 August	4,707	78,503	4,117	76,188

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Total battle casualties were as follows:

<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>	<u>Died of Wounds</u>
0 EM	0 EM	0 EM	0 EM
7 140	29 445	0 1	0 21

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G-2 REPORT

Planning Phase:

In preparation for the Eighth Army's assumption of control over combat operations on LUZON, this section published an estimate of the enemy situation for the area as of 18 June. At that time, it was believed that the over-all Japanese strength on the island was 45,000, divided as follows: 35,500 in the northern part of LUZON and 9,500 remnants scattered throughout central and southern LUZON; and that throughout these areas the enemy was incapable of offensive action.

The enemy displayed no new tactical doctrines or methods during the seven-week campaign, and no new weapons were encountered. His only mission was to survive and, in the process, to keep as many of our troops as possible busy locating and destroying him.

The assumption of command on LUZON by this headquarters did not present many planning problems to this section. The XIV Corps, which was in tactical command, had participated in the operation under Sixth Army control and was familiar with the enemy situation.

The mapping program was well advanced because of the continuing nature of the mission. In June, two officers and three enlisted men from the Topographic Subsection of this section were placed on temporary duty with XIV Corps Headquarters to assist the corps, and arrangements were made for the corps to request photo missions directly from the Fifth Air Force.

The language detachment stationed on LEYTE was not used, but Allied Translator and Interpreter Service facilities in MANILA were made available directly to the XIV Corps. In June, an officer from the Order of Battle Subsection of this headquarters went to Sixth Army and cross-checked previously compiled data on the enemy's strength and organization.

After the Eighth Army assumed control, the Operations Subsection performed the normal functions of maintaining the enemy situation map, evaluating information, preparing reports, and disseminating

information to interested headquarters.

Enemy Casualties.

The casualties for the period 1 July to 20 August were as follows: Counted dead -- 20,311; prisoners -- 1,254 Japanese, 1,065 Formosans, and 77 Koreans; total 22,707.

Lessons Learned.

Since 20 August, approximately 63,500 Japanese troops have surrendered on LUZON, a figure far in excess of the strength which had been estimated prior to and during the operations. In estimating the effective enemy strength opposing our troops, the factor of attrition was given heavy weight. Its consideration was influenced by our heavy employment of artillery, the enemy's lack of food and medicine, the general disorganization of his supply, the absence of productive foraging, and the unfriendly country -- elements which would all cause casualties and decrease his combat efficiency. Since the end of hostilities, Japanese in all shades of physical condition have been coming out of hiding all over LUZON. Experience again demonstrates that the Japanese is hard to kill; given terrain in which to hide, he manages to survive despite the most adverse conditions.

G-3 REPORT

The activities of the G-3 Section are covered in the narrative proper.

FIELD ARTILLERY

All field artillery units were under the control of the XIV Corps. No action was required on the part of the Eighth Army Field Artillery Section, since no problems at the Army level arose.

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## ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY REPORT

Throughout the period of Eighth Army responsibility for combat operations on LUZON, 1 July to 20 August, antiaircraft artillery units were engaged solely in ground support missions. Both 90mm gun units and self-propelled automatic weapons (.50 caliber machine guns mounted on M16 half-tracks) were used, but no 40mm automatic weapons were employed.

The 90mm guns were given direct fire missions on caves and pillboxes delaying the infantry advance and indirect fire missions reinforcing field artillery fires. These weapons were particularly valuable because, while their range is greater than that of the organic division artillery, they are lighter than the corps artillery and can negotiate roads impassable for the corps weapons. Other advantages of these guns are their 360 degree traverse, their high rate of fire, and the relative ease with which their ammunition can be handled. Difficulties were incurred because of a shortage of prime movers which made it impossible to keep the 90mm guns up with the troops and the lack of a D6 bulldozer necessary in the preparation of positions. Experiences indicate that each battery should be furnished five machine guns with ground mounts and 12 or 16 sound powered telephones for communication within the perimeter defense.

The automatic weapons were successfully used to assist the infantry patrols of the 37th Division, but poor road conditions at times limited the use of their M16 half-tracks. It was found that the organic transportation was inadequate in view of the rapidly changing situation; an additional two and one-half ton truck and one-ton trailer should be made available for each battery and each one-quarter ton truck should have a one-quarter ton trailer. Additionally, these units should be issued at least one .50 caliber machine gun with ground mount per squad and one for the battery headquarters for local defense.

SIGNAL REPORT

Prior to 1 July, when the Eighth Army became responsible for LUZON operations, the Signal Officer, Eighth Army, visited Sixth Army Headquarters, and other officers of the section visited XIV Corps Headquarters to arrange details for the transfer of communications facilities to Eighth Army control.

Radio communications were established with the XIV Corps on 27 June, and the corps established radio teletype and messenger communications with the Eighth Army Message Center in MANILA. A signal supply officer from this headquarters spent the entire month of July on LUZON coordinating supply activities between the XIV Corps and the various bases involved.

In spite of the great distances between headquarters, communications were excellent, and there were no unusual difficulties concerning the supply or administration of signal units.

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#### G-4 REPORT

The Eighth Army assumed responsibility for logistical support of combat operations on LUZON from the Sixth Army on 1 July 1945, at the time when the American forces in the PHILIPPINES were being regrouped for future operations against the Japanese homeland. The troops engaged in the mop-up phase consisted of one corps of four divisions plus supporting units, among which were included Philippine Army troops and guerrilla forces. The supply points, railheads, and truckheads which the Sixth Army had used were continued in operations by the Eighth Army because the units engaged in tactical operations were too far away from the bases established by United States Army Forces Western Pacific to draw supplies directly from them.

Most of the service units that were operating these Army supply installations were to be used in the operations against JAPAN, and were to be relieved and re-equipped by 1 September; however, despite this difficulty, they continued operations with a minimum of personnel and the combat units were adequately supplied. Because of the great distances between headquarters, responsibility for logistical support of Eighth Army units on LUZON was delegated to the Commanding General, XIV Corps, in order to facilitate close supervision of supply activities. Officers from this headquarters and attached units were placed on duty at the corps headquarters to assist the corps staff, since it was not large enough, organically, to handle extensive supply functions.

In accordance with logistical directives, the Army supply points were stocked from United States Army Forces Western Pacific bases on requisition by the Commanding General, XIV Corps. Levels were limited to 30 days' supply of classes I to IV inclusive and three units of fire. Base K, LEYTE, furnished supplies for the units in southern LUZON, while those in central and northern

LUZON were supplied from Base M, SAN FERNANDO, and Bases R and X, MANILA.

Overland supply of the tactical units in the northern CAGAYAN VALLEY was not feasible initially, and they were supplied by air drops until a small supply point was opened at APARRI on 14 July. Many mine fields had required clearing before APARRI could be opened to shipping, and even then there were no docks; however, lighter gear was used successfully to discharge the relatively small quantity of supplies for the base.

When hostilities ceased on 20 August, logistical support of all units on LUZON was turned over to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Western Pacific, in order to allow the Eighth Army to prepare for the occupation of JAPAN.

#### QUARTERMASTER REPORT

No quartermaster problems arose at the army level, in view of the fact that supply was the responsibility of the Commanding General, XIV Corps.

## CHEMICAL WARFARE REPORT

Chemical Warfare troops involved in the LUZON operation during the period of Eighth Army control were:

85th Chemical Mortar Battalion  
183d Chemical Service Platoon (assigned to 37th Division)  
236th Chemical Service Platoon (assigned to 38th Division)  
237th Chemical Service Platoon (assigned to 6th Division)  
275th Chemical Service Platoon (assigned to 32d Division)

The companies of the 85th Chemical Mortar Battalion were attached as follows:

Headquarters and Headquarters Company attached to XIV Corps  
Company A attached to 6th Division  
Company B (less 1 Platoon) attached to 6th Division  
1 Platoon, Company B, attached to USAFIP, NL  
Company C attached to 37th Division

Chemical weapons and equipment used were grenades, flamethrowers, mortars, and airplane fuel tanks filled with napalm. A total of 399 napalm bombing missions were flown during this period, with 280,900 gallons of napalm expended. The 4.2 inch chemical mortars fired more than 18,000 rounds in 189 missions. White smoke grenades, both M8 and M15, were used for concealment, signalling, and for forcing the enemy out of caves. Colored smoke was effectively used for ground-air signalling.

The chemical service platoons carried out routine depot duties and maintenance work.

No sizeable quantities of enemy gas supplies were found, and there was no indication that the enemy intended to use gas offensively. There were no intensive enemy preparations for gas defense, although frequently individual Japanese continued to carry their gas masks.

The 6th Division submitted a request for a chemical mortar battalion to be added to the division as an organic unit. Due to the shortage of this type of battalion in the theater the request was disapproved.

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## ENGINEER REPORT

### Planning Phase.

Members of the Eighth Army Engineer Section augmented XIV Corps engineer personnel during the planning phase of the LUZON mop-up, and by 1 July 1945, when the operation passed to Eighth Army control, had made all road, bridge, and area assignments to engineer units. These members remained on duty with the XIV Corps Engineer during the first two weeks of July.

### Road Construction and Repair.

The repair and maintenance of Highway No. 5, from SAN JOSE north to APARRI, was the principal initial task. This was the main supply route through the CAGAYAN VALLEY, and on 3 July it was declared a 35-ton road by utilizing adequate fords and by-passes. Improvement of this route continued to be one of the major engineer efforts throughout the operation. At BALETE PASS the road required continuous engineer maintenance to clear the numerous slides and cave-ins that resulted following each rain.

Continuous heavy maintenance was also required on Highway No. 4, where corps engineer troops worked alongside the divisional engineers clearing landslides and repairing roads damaged by demolitions. Ingenuity in using half-Bailey Bridge trusses over washouts and craters was demonstrated by the 27th Engineer Construction Battalion. This method avoided extensive hillside cuts which would have delayed the tactical advance.

Highway No. 11, from BAGUIO to BONTOC, was a corps engineer assignment, while tactical secondary roads and trails were essentially a division responsibility.

It was the policy of the Corps Engineer to replace floating bridges with fixed bridges wherever possible, and numerous types of bridges were built during the operation. Fords were utilized to some extent to open main roads to maximum traffic, but in most cases these were replaced by bridges.

The following summary of bridge statistics emphasizes the

amount of engineer effort involved:

Total Bridges in XIV Corps Sector	412
Bridges constructed and repaired	125
Percentage	
Wooden Bridges	31%
Bailey Bridges	99
Steel Treadway Bridges	21 - 3,975 Feet
Ferries	5 - 774 Feet
	6

Other Engineer Functions.

Landing strips for liaison type planes were constructed by division engineers, with the exception of a few strips where corps engineers assisted. The cub strip for corps artillery planes was constructed by corps engineer troops.

The largest concentration of mines and booby traps was found in the CERVANTES-BONTOC area. A few new improvisations were discovered, but for the most part the techniques and material were similar to those encountered in previous operations.

The survey platoon of the 670th Topographic Company was assigned numerous missions which included topographical and area surveys of towns to be rehabilitated, railroad spur extensions, airfields, and general drainage. Two major mapping missions were assigned the company. One was a ten-sheet, 1:25,000 photomap series of an area southwest of APARRI; the other a four-sheet series of photostrips of Highway No. 11, north of BAGUIO. Numerous miscellaneous printing jobs, including propoganda leaflets, were completed by the company.

Water supply at times became a critical problem, because of the wide dispersion of tactical troops. For some time continuous movement of mobile and portable units was required in order to meet the water supply demand.

The chief engineer supply problem was the transportation of heavy bridge materials from bases to the corps supply point and then to the front line units. Although local materials were used where practical, regular bridge materials had to be provided in most of the cases.

Construction missions completed by the engineers included the

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preparation of troop areas, enlargement of depot facilities, installation of water towers, and improvement of drainage at airfields. Two hundred pre-fabricated buildings were received which alleviated the lumber shortage. These structures were used for mess halls, general storage, and office buildings.

Ample spare parts were supplied for repair of equipment, but the shortage of tires hampered the fullest use of cargo vehicles.

To supplement the engineer troops available, approximately 3,500 civilians were employed in engineer work during the operation.



## MEDICAL REPORT

### Planning Phase.

To insure adequate medical support for the Eighth Army phase of the LUZON operation, the Eighth Army Surgeon and his chief of operations flew to LUZON during June to confer with officers in General Headquarters, Sixth Army, and XIV Corps. It was decided that in general, the existing organization for medical support would be continued.

The following non-divisional medical units were in direct support of the XIV Corps:

- Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 135th Medical Group
- Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 70th Medical Battalion, Separate
- 3d Field Hospital
- 23d Field Hospital
- 24th Field Hospital
- 41st Field Hospital
- 43d Field Hospital
- 91st Field Hospital
- 92d Field Hospital
- 29th Evacuation Hospital, Semi-Mobile
- 25th Malaria Control Detachment
- 26th Malaria Control Detachment
- 37th Malaria Control Detachment
- 421st Malaria Survey Detachment
- 425th Malaria Survey Detachment
- 981st Medical Ambulance Company, Separate
- 61st Medical Base Depot Company
- 604th Medical Clearing Company, Separate
- 605th Medical Clearing Company, Separate
- 608th Medical Clearing Company, Separate
- 893d Medical Clearing Company, Separate
- 409th Medical Collecting Company, Separate
- 410th Medical Collecting Company, Separate
- 424th Medical Collecting Company, Separate
- 505th Medical Collecting Company, Separate
- 19th Portable Surgical Hospital
- 24th Portable Surgical Hospital
- 16th Portable Surgical Hospital
- 31st Portable Surgical Hospital
- 63d Portable Surgical Hospital

The change of control from the Sixth to the Eighth Army was effected smoothly. Many of the tasks normally necessary prior to an operation, such as inspection for combat readiness, supply, loading, and mounting, were not required in this instance as the units merely continued a previously assigned mission under a new command.

### Evacuation.

Relatively short distances and fairly good roads, but a lack of adequate air facilities, indicated ambulance evacuation for most areas. In the CAGAYAN VALLEY, however, due to the great distances involved and the relatively poor road network, all patients requiring evacuation were transported from the valley to the CENTRAL LUZON PLAIN by air. Planes operating from C-47's airstrips at BAGABAG and TUGUEGARAO were used to carry patients to ROSALES or LINGAYEN. Early in July, C-64 planes were used to evacuate patients from BALLESTEROS and GAMU. Because of the long distances involved for the C-64's, three L-5B aircraft were stationed at TUGUEGARAO to shuttle patients from outlying areas.

During July, patients were evacuated by air as shown: 540 by L-5B's, 2,811 by C-47's, and 191 by C-64's. A total of 5,903 patients were evacuated by ambulance.

### Hospitalization.

All hospitals assigned to the operation were directly under the control of the Surgeon, XIV Corps. Patients were evacuated from the corps hospitals to United States Army Forces Western Pacific hospitals on LUZON; patients from Southern LUZON were hospitalized on LETTE.

### Health Problems.

No special health problems arose among the troops who were involved in the operation. The 425th Malaria Survey Detachment examined 9,466 civilians and found only 7 per cent infected. The detachment also conducted a survey for the molluscan host of cercariae of *Schistosoma japonicum* in the area of PANGASINAN with negative results.

### Personnel Problems.

Some shortages of medical personnel existed, as has been the case during all operations in this theater, but they were never serious enough to hamper the efficiency of the medical units.

Supply.

All medical supplies were under the direct control of the Surgeon, Y.V Corps, who procured them from United States Army Forces Western Pacific depots at Base M in SAN FERNANDO, for troops in the BAGUIO area, and from Base X, for troops in the MANILA area. Medical supply points were established at SAN JOSE, BAYOMBONG, and APARRI.

Summary.

There were no problems of any importance encountered during this operation. From a medical standpoint, the operation was conducted and concluded in a highly efficient manner.

## ORDNANCE REPORT

Operations Instructions No. 106 issued by General Headquarters relieving the Sixth Army of combat responsibility on LUZON and delegating to the Eighth Army the task of eliminating the Japanese forces remaining there, assigned one corps with four divisions and a large number of supporting combat and service troops to this headquarters. The ordnance units which were actively engaged in supporting these troops during the Sixth Army phase of the operation were to continue on the same missions for the Eighth Army. Unlike most of the combat units, however, these ordnance units passed to this headquarters for operational control only.

All operations in the Southwest Pacific Area have been characterized by a shortage of ordnance units, and even at this late date the scarcity continued. In order to support the Majestic Operation being planned against southern JAPAN, the Sixth Army would require all ordnance units in the PHILIPPINES except those essential to the United States Army Forces Western Pacific for the operation of its bases; therefore, the Majestic troop list included all of the units placed under the Eighth Army for the mop-up on LUZON.

At the time the Eighth Army took over command on LUZON, redeployment of troops from EUROPE had begun. Service troops had been given a high priority, and a number of ordnance companies and battalions were already under orders for direct movement to the PHILIPPINES; because of this, it was expected that the units scheduled for the Majestic Operation would be replaced in time to allow them to be re-equipped.

Unfortunately, this program did not proceed according to expectation because most of the companies that did arrive on schedule came without their equipment. Personnel were moved on fast transports, but the tools, shop trucks, and other essential equipment followed on slow freighters which, in most cases, did not arrive in the PHILIPPINES until a month or more later. Since practically all stocks in United States Army Forces Western Pacific

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bases were needed for the Majestic Operation, the redeployed units could not begin their ordnance operations until the arrival of their own equipment.

General Headquarters had directed that the ordnance troops being used by the Eighth Army on LUZON be released to the Sixth Army not later than 1 September but, early in August, it became evident that this would cause a critical situation in ordnance support. On 8 August, the Eighth Army Ordnance Officer conferred with the XIV Corps Ordnance Officer to determine the minimum number of ordnance units necessary for the continuation of combat operations. The troop list decided upon could not provide the ordnance service that was desirable, but would serve in the emergency until the redeployed troops became available. After reaching this decision, the Sixth Army Ordnance Officer was requested to leave the units of this skeleton force under Eighth Army control until after 1 September. Quite understandably, however, this request could not be granted because very little time remained before loading for the movement to JAPAN.

In a further effort to solve this problem the Theater Ordnance Officer in MANILA was consulted, but before a satisfactory solution could be reached the crisis was relieved by the surrender of JAPAN.

The supply of ammunition and other ordnance items was continued generally in accordance with previously established procedures. In most cases, sufficient stocks were available in ordnance depots. The rugged terrain over which the fighting was taking place and the poor road net made resupply extremely difficult and air drops, especially of ammunition, had to be used to reach isolated combat units.

To expedite procurement and delivery of supplies, an officer from this section was stationed at United States Army Forces Western Pacific Headquarters in MANILA to serve as liaison officer between its bases, the units in the field, and Eighth Army Headquarters.

## TRANSPORTATION REPORT

When the Eighth Army assumed control of combat operations on LUZON on 1 July 1945, the existing transportation system was continued in use because it was operating in a well-coordinated and efficient manner. Since no planning was needed, this section functioned primarily in a supervisory capacity. Three officers and one enlisted man were sent to XIV Corps Headquarters to facilitate coordination of transportation activities.

### Water.

Fast supply vessels were used to lift supplies from MANILA and LINGAYEN to the small supply point which was opened at APARRI on 14 July. Because no port facilities were available there, all cargo had to be discharged by amphibious tractors and landing craft (mechanized). In order to support the 37th Division in its operations in the southern CAGAYAN VALLEY, landing craft (mechanized) were used for supply runs up the river from APARRI.

### Land.

Supplies were shipped by rail to the XIV Corps distributing points and organizational railheads, and from there organic motor transportation was used. Initially, the PHILIPPINE Base Section, and later Base X, was responsible for deliveries to these railheads.

### Air.

Throughout the period the lack of roads made it necessary to drop many supplies to forward elements of the 6th and 37th Divisions operating in the CORDILLERA MOUNTAINS. By arrangement with the Sixth Army, these drops were handled at first by a detachment of the 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, but after 15 July a detachment of the 13th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron took over the work. No unusual problems occurred and these units operated very efficiently.

LUZON Mop-up Distribution List

The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.	2
WD G-2 Hist Branch	1
CINCPAC, APPAC	1
CG, AFTRSPAC	1
CG, AGF	1
CG, AAF	1
CG, ASF	1
CINCPAC	1
CINCPQA	1
ComANF	1
ComTF 78	1
ComTG 78.2	1
CG, FEAF	1
CG, 13th AF	1
CG, 5th AF	1
CG, SAAC	1
CG, Tenth Army	1
CG, 14th AAA Command	1
CG, XIV Corps	1
1st Cav Div	2
12th Cav	1
8th Cav	1
5th Cav	1
CG, 6th Inf Div	1
1st Inf	1
20th Inf	1
63d Inf	1
1st FA Bn	1
CG, 32d Inf Div	1
126th Inf	1
127th Inf	1
128th Inf	1
121st FA Bn	1
CG, 38th Inf Div	1
149th Inf	1
150th Inf	1
152d Inf	1
CG, 43d Inf Div	1
103d Inf	1
172d Inf	1
CG, 11th A/B Div	1
188th Glider Inf	1
158th RCT	1
694th FA Bn	1
CG, 37th Inf Div	1
129th Inf	1
145th Inf	1
148th Inf	1
Commandant, Command & General Staff School	1
Commandant, ANSCol	1
Commandant, Armored School	1
Commandant, Cavalry School	1
Commandant, Chemical Warfare School	1
Commandant, Coast Artillery School	1
Commandant, Engineer School	1
Commandant, Field Artillery School	1
Commandant, Infantry School	1
Commandant, Ordnance School	1
Commandant, Quartermaster School	1
Commandant, Signal School	1
Dept of Mil Art & Engr, USMA	1
Amphib Trng Center, Navy 3220	1
CG, Eighth Army	1
Staff Sections, Eighth Army	20
4th Replacement Depot	1

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