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16th DIVISION

24, DEC. 41.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
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24

CONTENTS

LUZON CAMPAIGN OF 16 DIVISION:

24 DEC 41 - 3 JAN 42

Mimeographed "Summary of FAKI Force Campaign", issued 5 Jan 42 by FAKI Force (16 Division) Headquarters. Extracted from bound mimeographed and handwritten "File of Incoming and Outgoing Documents", dated 5 Jan 42 - 6 Dec 42, variously issued. Set by FAKI 6460 Force (16 Division Signal Unit).

(ALANGALANG - 4 Nov 44)

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SIDNEY R. NASHBIR,
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Co-ordinator.

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SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

BIBLIOGRAPHIC SUBJECT INDEX
EMERY PUBLICATION
NO. 355

6,000 Block applies to Army
7,000 Block applies to Navy
9,000 Block applies to Air

I.G. No.	PIYLR No.		Pages
6913			
6140		Luzon Campaign of 16 Division: 24 Dec 41 - 3 Jan 42	
6913		<u>Battles</u>	
6913		5 Jan 42. "Summary of KAKI Force Campaign" issued	
6140	18,37	by 16 Div Hq contains information on debarkation, landing, dispositions, engagements through the fall of MANILA.	1-12
6915		<u>Casualties - Personnel</u>	
6915		24 Dec 41 - 1 Jan 42. Chart giving number of	
6100	16,18	casualties of units.	11
6915		24 Dec - 26 Dec 41. Chart giving names of officer	
6210	15,19	casualties and units.	12
6350	15,19,20		

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EMERY PUBLICATION
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Mimeographed "Summary of KAKI Force Campaign", issued 5 Jan 42 by KAKI Force (16 Div) Hq. Extracted from bound mimeographed and hand-written "File of Incoming and Outgoing Documents", dated 5 Jan 42 - 6 Dec 43, variously issued. Kept by KAKI 6560 Force (16 Div Sig Unit). 162 pp.

Contents: (Table of contents precedes text)

1. Debarkation, securing of beachhead, dispositions, movements and engagements through the fall of MANILA (24 Dec 41 - 3 Jan 42). 1-10
2. Two appended charts give number of casualties suffered by various units 24 Dec 41 - 1 Jan 42, and names, ranks and units of officer casualties suffered 24 Dec - 26 Dec 41. 11,12

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DOD Directive No. 8300.9
27 Sept 1959

- 4 -

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ENEMY PUBLICATION NO 355LUZON CAMPAIGN OF 16 DIVISION: 24 Dec 41 - 3 Jan 42

Cover

SERIALY OF KAMI FORCE CAMPAIGN24 December - 3 JanuaryKAMI (#1) Force (TN 16 Div.) Hq
5 Jan 42

Military Most Secret

Table of Contents

Page 2	Chapter I. Landing Engagement and Securing of Beachhead (Strategical Situation 24th - 26th).
	Chapter II. Approaching the Baysy (Strategical Situation 27th - 30th).
	Chapter III. Pursuit (Strategical Situation 31st - 1st).
	Chapter IV. Occupation of MANILA, CAVITE and BATAVIA (Strategical Situation 2d - 3d).

Chapter I. Landing Engagement and Securing of Beachhead
Strategical Situation 24th - 26th

A. DEPARTURE OF DIVISION

The division departed from the assembly point on 17 December, 1300 hours, with 24 ships of the transport ship unit. Part of the Third Fleet combined with 4 Escort Unit and headed towards LAMON Bay.

A lurking enemy submarine was detected on the morning of the 23d, but the persistent sweeping and evasive tactics of the transport ship unit prevented damage and disorder. The force entered the predetermined anchorage on the 24th, 0130 hours, and succeeded in landing at 0240 hours.

B. ESTIMATED ENEMY SITUATION

The estimated enemy situation up to the eve of the 22d, prior to our landing operation, was as follows:

1. Enemy situation on the KIGUNA (#2) Detachment front in the LOGASPI Area.

(W1) etc:-

(1) 加喜

(2) 木村

The advanced force of the KIMURA Detachment defeated approximately 50 of the enemy in the sector east of NEGROS CAMP on the 22d and advanced close to NEGROS CAMP. There was a powerful enemy force in the sector east of CALAUBOG. In addition, there appeared to be approximately 2,000 of the enemy disposed in the vicinity of RAGAY (about 20 km west of SIFOCOT), and approximately 3,000 with a railway gun in the vicinity of DEL GALLEGOS (about 24 km northwest of RAGAY).

2. Enemy situation in the vicinity of the division landing point.

There was approximately one regiment of the enemy force in the vicinity of LUCENA. Although some of the enemy appeared to be in the vicinity of SANTA CRUZ and SANTO THOMAS, the latest enemy situation was not known. The vicinity of the landing points and the coastal areas were reported to be occupied by the enemy forces which withdrew from the KIMURA Detachment Area and an enemy force which had just arrived at the front.

C. OUTLINE OF LANDING OPERATION ORDER

The HIRO (*1) Force, namely the cadre of 2 Bn, 20 Inf Regt, commanded by Lt Col TSURUHIRO (*2) will land on the shore near MAUBAN (approximately 30 km north of ATIMONAN). It will cross the mountain range without awaiting completion of the landing and will advance toward LUCBAN. One portion will advance to LUISIANA to prepare for an attack on the shore of LAGUNA DE BAY.

Page
3

The main strength of the division will land in the sector between ATIMONAN and SAIN (approximately 12 km southeast of ATIMONAN). Without awaiting completion of the landing, it will cross the mountain range and advance toward PIGBILAO; then will prepare to advance to the western sector.

The MURA (*3) Force, namely 1 Bn, 20 Inf Regt (less the 3 co, plus one field artillery cadre platoon), commanded by Maj KIMURA, will land near SAIN. Part of that force, the YAMA (*4) force (one infantry cadre company) will follow the railroad which runs from SAIN to MANILA and, under the direct control of the division will push on to MALLIBUBU. The main strength will advance rapidly towards HONDAGUA to intercept the retreating enemy in the KIMURA Detachment Area.

The SARA (*5) Force, namely the 44 Anchorage Hq, 6 Independent Engr Regt, and one cadre company of 21 Independent Engr Regt, commanded by Col SAKAMOTO (*6), will be assigned to the debarkation of the division and will co-operate in the coastal battle with armored boats.

D. STRATEGICAL SITUATION ON THE 24th

1. Main strength area.

The main strength succeeded in landing on the southeast shore of ATIMONAN on the right wing of 20 Inf Regt, and immediately wiped out approximately 500 of the enemy troops occupying positions on the beach in the vicinity of ATIMONAN.

(*1) etc:-

- (1) 廣
(2) 恒廣
(3) 村

- (4) 山
(5) 坂
(6) 坂本

The reconnaissance regiment, with front line infantrymen in the front and rear, landed in the same sector, overtook 20 Inf Regt near ATIMOMAN and rapidly advanced towards DAGBILAO. The enemy killed the regimental adjutant, one officer, and four others by taking up positions in the narrow roads and jungles of the TAYALS Mountain Range. Nevertheless, by resisting continuously, and by clever camouflage of positions and cover from which to snipe at close quarters, our troops boldly penetrated the enemy positions and advanced to the sector west of MALICBUY on or about the evening of the 24th. They destroyed the bridge and prepared an assault on the enemy position.

Page
4

After the main strength of the 20 Inf Regt defeated the enemy in the vicinity of ATIMOMAN it followed the reconnaissance unit across the steep path of the TAYALS Mountains and advanced to the sector west of MALICBUY on the night of the same day. The enemy in the vicinity of ATIMOMAN was completely annihilated by evening due to the gallant actions of our force, although sniping up was difficult and a considerable number of casualties were inflicted on officers and subordinates by the obstinate sniping of the enemy survivors concealed within the houses.

The main strength of the remaining division line force succeeded in landing with no enemy opposition, and without waiting to assemble advanced toward MALICBUY.

2. The HIRO force opened up with a violent attack at the water's edge on an enemy force of approximately 500 occupying a strong position on the beach near MAUBAN. Although our forces were developed in the prepared cross fire of the enemy, the enemy in the sector near MAUBAN was annihilated about 4630 hours, by repeated daring, fierce assaults and gallant hand-to-hand engagements. Even though our casualties numbered 92, the morale of the force soared and it rapidly pursued the defeated enemy. Before evening of the same day it advanced to a point 2 km east of SAMPALOG, and prepared to attack the enemy occupying the position on the sector east of SAMPALOG.

3. The MORA Force defeated the small enemy force in the vicinity of SAIN and succeeded in landing. One company was ordered to follow the Manila railroad, and the main strength pushed rapidly towards BONDAGUA. Approximately 40 enemy soldiers encountered near GUMACA were destroyed, and the sector southwest of CALADAG was reached before evening of the same day. Heavy casualties were inflicted upon 400 enemy soldiers occupying a position with a railway run in the sector west of CALADAG by launching a daring and violent attack followed by a decisive night attack.

The YEM Force (cadre of 1 Co, 20 Inf Regt), which advanced along the Manila railroad, defeated part of the enemy in the area 6 km southwest of SAIN, and then defeated an enemy force of about 200, 8 km east of AGBANMAN (16 km southwest of SAIN). The force immediately pursued them and in the evening advanced towards CASUYAO (5 km northwest of AGBANMAN).

4. Debarcation situation.

Page
5

Although some damage was suffered during debarcation from occasional enemy air attacks, the operation proceeded favorably and the greater portion of the line force cadre (excluding field artillery) completed debarcation by night of the same day.

5. Characteristics of the combat.

The enemy, taking advantage of the forest, sniped at our forces at close range from cleverly camouflaged positions and cover. These snipers were very difficult to detect and dispose of.

Although a considerable number of casualties had been suffered, the combat situation of the first day progressed favorably through employment of such tactics as light armored vehicle rushes, gallant assaults, etc. Thus the foundation of the plan - the securing of a beachhead and a large-scale drive across the TAYARAS Mountains - was realized.

E. STRATEGICAL SITUATION ON THE 25th AND 26th.

1. Main strength area.

The bridge east of PALSABANGAN (3 km east of PAGBILAO) was destroyed by the enemy. The reconnaissance force (one infantry company attached) opposing the enemy crossed the river and obtained a bridgehead on the far bank, facilitating arrangements for the river crossing. The main strength of 20 Inf Regt, the first line force, crossing here, made a daring assault on the enemy in the sector west of PALSABANGAN under cover of dusk, and extended the bridgehead by intermittent night attacks.

The reconnaissance unit defeated 100 of the enemy (armed with rifles) in the sector northwest of PAGBILAO and east of TAYARAS. The 20 Inf Regt defeated an enemy element in the sector west of PAGBILAO.

By morning of the 26th our forces had advanced southeast of TAYARAS and towards the sector east of LUCENA. Between evening and midnight of the same day they captured TAYARAS and LUCENA. Although part of the reconnaissance regiment was dispatched to LUCENA in an attempt to establish liaison with the HIRO Force, it encountered enemy resistance in the vicinity of LUCENA and could not effect liaison.

On the 25th the greater portion of the motorized force near LUCENA seemed to have retreated northward beyond TAYARAS. Although a strafing attack was made by a low-flying enemy airplane during the day, no damage was incurred.

Meanwhile, the engineer unit and the remainder of the advancing military strength were assigned to handling constructions for passage at the river crossing points at PALSABANGAN and east of PAGBILAO. The main strength of the division waited for their completion and, by the next morning, followed up to PAGBILAO.

Page
6

2. HIRO Force Area.

The HIRO Force defeated an enemy force of approximately 300 with guns disposed at about 10 points between the sector east of SAMPALOC and the sector east of FISA, and advanced in the vicinity of FISA on the evening of the 25th by using the narrow roads and dense woods. After a light engagement between two enemy armored cars and our light tanks, the force was concentrated near FISA and prepared for antimechanized action.

On the morning of the 26th, a mechanized enemy force of 10 tanks was encountered in the sector west of FISA. Heavy damage was inflicted on this force and on the evening of the same day our force advanced towards the sector east of LUCENA. It prepared to attack an enemy force of approximately 300 occupying the vicinity of LUCENA.

3. MURA Force Area.

On the 25th, the MURA Force, after continuous fierce assault and close combat, finally defeated and inflicted heavy damage on approximately 400 of the enemy who, with the aid of a railway gun, had planned stubborn resistance in the CALANG VICINITY.

- 4 -

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That night the MURA Force advanced towards the sector east of CALAWAG. On the 26th it advanced in a northeasterly direction and on the night of the same day, occupied KEMEDIO (4 km east of CALAWAG). Here, it almost met the advance force of the KIMURA Detachment which was moving westward from SIPOCOT.

4. KIMURA Detachment Area.

On the 26th the KIMURA Detachment was ordered to return to the command of the division.

5. Debarkation situation.

Debarkation progressed favorably. On the 25th and 26th debarkation of the field artillery unit and the medical force was completed.

6. Because of these various actions, the main strength of the division succeeded in crossing the TAYABAS Mountain Range, and the front line force succeeded in gaining a firm foothold in the area west of the range by the 26th.

Page
7

Chapter II. Approaching the Enemy

Strategical Situation 27th - 30th

A. STRATEGICAL SITUATION ON THE 27th AND 28th.

1. Main strength area.

On the 27th, since several of the bridges between TAYABAS and SARILAYA had been destroyed, the reconnaissance unit advanced on foot towards the sector east of CANDELARIA. In the afternoon it defeated a powerful enemy force in the vicinity of CANDELARIA and on evening of the same day the advance moved on to the west sector.

The enemy position with a gun in the vicinity of the river crossing point, 4 km west of CANDELARIA was penetrated by night attacks. Our forces advanced towards the line of the stream 2 km east of YLAGNO by the evening of the 28th and prepared to attack the enemy force of 600 - 700 with several guns occupying this line. On the 27th the main strength of 20 Inf Regt was preparing for a further advance while mopping up the vicinity of LUCENA. It began its movement on the evening of the 28th. The main strength advanced to the vicinity of CANDELARIA on the morning of the 29th. One element advanced towards the southwest of CANDELARIA and to the south MARCELINO GIRONO River line, and reconnoitered the enemy situation and terrain on the right bank of that river.

The engineer unit, going without sleep and rest, on the 27th and 28th was assigned to the river crossing preparations at a number of points on the road from LUCENA to CANDELARIA and at two points in the sector west of CANDELARIA.

On the 27th, the remaining element of the main strength of the division advanced to the vicinity of LUCENA. On the 28th, it consolidated its position and prepared for further movement.

On the morning of the 28th, three enemy airplanes flew overhead, but were driven off by our fire.

2. HIRO Force Area.

From dawn of the 27th the HIRO Force, with an element of the reconnaissance unit advancing from the direction of the TAYABIS, made an enveloping attack on an enemy force of approximately 300 which was occupying LUCCAN. Our force inflicted heavy casualties and captured the place just before midday.

Page
8

On the 28th, this force advanced towards LUISLARA (10 km north-northwest of LUCCAN), defeated a small number of enemy 4 km north of LUCCAN and proceeded northward. It captured LUISLARA just before midday. One element of the force proceeded from LUCCAN towards MAJAYMAY (8 km northwest of LUCCAN), defeated approximately 200 of the enemy and captured the place toward evening.

On the 28th, the main strength prepared to advance toward LUISLARA.

3. MORA Force Area.

On the 27th, the MORA Force in the vicinity of RESADIO reconnoitered the forward enemy positions and terrain. About 0900 hours on the 28th, this force met the KIMURA Detachment which was advancing westward from SIPOCOT, and immediately turned about and took up positions in the vicinity of ATIMCOAN on the night of the 28th.

4. KIMURA Detachment Area.

The KIMURA Detachment gradually drew up to the division main strength area. On the 27th, the main strength of 2 Bn, 33 Inf Regt, reached the sector east of CALMAG and the main strength of 33 Inf Regt reached the sector north of PADIG. On the 28th, 2 Bn, 33 Inf Regt reached the vicinity of LOPEZ, and the main strength of 33 Inf Regt reached the sector northeast of CALMAG.

5. Debarkation situation.

In debarking, the working unit overcame the waves and other unaccustomed difficulties, and strove to make progress. On the 27th and 28th the debarkation of forces other than the line forces and munitions was almost completed.

E. STRATEGICAL SITUATION ON THE 29th AND 30th.

On the 29th, the division attacked the enemy in the vicinity of SANTA CRUZ and TIAONG. The main strength disposed the various units according to plan, attacking the enemy centered about CALAMAN, SAN PABLO and LIPA.

Toward evening, while the reconnaissance unit and the main strength of 20 Inf Regt were preparing a night attack against the enemy in the vicinity of TIAONG, the enemy in that area gave indications of retreating. The reconnaissance unit quickly changed the attack to a pursuit on foot and the infantry regiment rapidly followed. The reconnaissance unit captured TIAONG before midnight and then prepared to alter its course towards RIPAHERU. The main strength of 20 Inf Regt overtook the reconnaissance unit about midnight and continued its pursuit towards SAN PABLO.

Page
9

The outline of the disposition at 2340 hours on the 29th was as follows:

The right flank detachment commanded by Lt Col MAKAWISHI (el).

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

(el) 810: 中西

III/201 (TN 3 Bn, 20 Inf Regt.)
 A -(#1) (TN One field artillery battery.)
 Cadre.

The advance guard commanded by Lt Col MATSUDA (#2):

16 K (TN 16 Cav.)
 8 TAs (TN 8 Independent AT Unit.)
 A -(#3) (TN One field artillery battery.)

The main forces:

201 (-1E1) (TN 20 Inf Regt less 3 Bn.)
 22A (#11=(#4)) (TN 22 FA Regt, less 2 Bn and 2 Btry.)
 16P(#5) (TN Main strength of 16 Engr Regt.)

1. Right flank detachment area.

The right flank detachment continued its pursuit during the night of the 29th, crossed the valley where the bridge was destroyed, captured SAN PAOLO on the morning of the 30th, and made preparations for a further advance. During this time there was no enemy resistance, and their retreat was surprising.

2. Situation of the advance guard.

The advance guard left TIAONG before sunrise on the 30th, met no enemy resistance en route, and concentrated its strength at RIFAHIRU*. Knowing of the absence of the enemy in the vicinity of LIPA, it occupied LIPA that night.

3. Situation of the main strength of the division.

On the 29th the main strength of the division concentrated in the vicinity of CANDELARIA and prepared for further movement. During this time preparations for making the MARAGING GIROGU River bridge serviceable were being made. On the night of the 30th, the force passed BOLBOC and by morning of the 31st was concentrated in LIPA and the sector to the south.

The MURA Force left ATINOUAN on the 29th. After a long halt in the vicinity of CANDELARIA, it concentrated in the vicinity of SARAT (8 km southeast of LIPA) on the night of the 30th and rejoined the original unit.

Page
10

The main strength of the HIBO Force captured LUISIANA on the 29th. One element captured PAYSAGHAN (3 km east of SANTA CRUZ) about midday of the 30th. During the advance towards PAYSAGHAN, the main strength garrisoned the vicinity of LUCBAN with one small element of infantry, engineers, and signalmen. The main strength passed LUCEMA and met the main strength of the division, and turned back because of the disposition of the division. The force was concentrated in the vicinity of LUCBAN the same night.

The engineer unit completed the river crossing preparations between CANDELARIA and TIAONG on the 29th. Construction for river crossing was in progress all day and night of the 30th at the point 3 km south of TIAONG and at the points 12 km south of CANDELARIA and 3 km east of BOLBOC.

NOTE: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

(#1) etc:

(1) 中

(2) 松田

(3) 中

(4) 中

(5) 主力

4. Situation of the KIMURA Detachment.

The KIMURA Detachment followed up the pursuit of the main strength of the division. On the 29th, 2 Bn, 33 Inf Regt completed assembling in the vicinity of LOPEZ and reached the vicinity of CANGDELEMA on the night of the 30th. The main strength of 33 Inf Regt then concentrated in the vicinity of LOPEZ on the 29th and 30th.

5. Debarcation situation.

The debarcation progressed favorably thenceforth, and the whole division completed debarcation about midday of the 29th. The transport unit departed on the 29th and 30th.

Page
11Chapter III. Pursuit

Strategical Situation 31st - 1st

A. PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK ON MANILA

On 31 December, the division penetrated the defenses of the enemy occupying SANTO TOMAS and the positions to the northwest. The units were disposed for the planned allout attack on MANILA.

The right flank detachment dispatched one element (one infantry company cadre) from SAN PABLO through CALAUAG toward CALBAGA in the morning to cut off the enemy's retreat. On the evening of the same day, while the main strength left SAN PABLO and progressed towards the vicinity of ALMIRAS, the YASUDA (#1) Bn (2 Bn, 33 Inf Regt) and the main strength of the 20 Inf Regt left the vicinity of LIPA and advanced towards the vicinity of TARAUMAN. The advance guard knew of the disorderly retreat of the enemy in the vicinity of SANTO TOMAS, captured SANTO TOMAS at 1830 hours and immediately went in pursuit towards CALABRA. Then, perceiving that no large enemy force lay between SANTO TOMAS and MANILA, the division immediately disposed forces for pursuit in the direction of the BUNZINLUFA - DAGULIRAS line (16 km south of CAVITE).

The plan for disposition of pursuit forces was as follows:

Pursuit unit commanded by Lt Col MATSUDA (#2):

- 16K (TN 16 Cav Unit.)
- A - (#3) (TN One battery of field artillery.)
- II $\frac{5}{8}$ 7/334 (TN 2 Bn Hq and 7 Co, 33 Inf Regt.)

The left column commanded by Maj KIMURA (#4):

- II (-2) /201 (TN 2 Bn less 2 Co, 20 Inf Regt.)

The main body:

- 201 (-II (-2)) (TN 20 Inf Regt less 2 Bn except 2 Co.)
- $\frac{5}{8}$ 5/331 (TN Regtl Hq, and 5 Co, 33 Inf Regt.)

(#1) etc:

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| (1) 安田 | (3) 中 |
| (2) 松田 | (4) 木村 |

76/56/68

B. SITUATION OF THE PURSUIT UNIT.

The pursuit unit advanced during the night of the 31st, and occupied the vicinity of CALAMBA on the 1st. It continued its rapid pursuit of the defeated enemy, and on the night of the 1st the advance force reached BUNYINLIPA and again continued its determined pursuit.

Page 12

The YAGUDA Bn (5 /II, 7/331) (TN 2 Bn Hq, and 7 Co 33 Inf Regt.) left LIPA on the evening of the 31st, passed the three-forked road west of ALAMINOS and reached SANTO TOMAS on the morning of the 1st. It continued rapid pursuit of the enemy, overtaking the main strength of the pursuit unit.

C. SITUATION OF THE LEFT COLUMN.

The left column left TAWAAN on the evening of the 31st and crossed the steep path of Hill 752 (8 km northwest of TAWAAN) on the evening of the 1st. It continued night pursuit towards B.S.M.HILLS.

D. SITUATION OF THE MAIN BODY.

The main strength of the right flank detachment reached the SANTO-TOMAS vicinity about 0100 hours on the 1st. One element reached the vicinity of CALAMBA about 0300 hours on the same day and united with the main body.

The main strength of the 20 Inf Regt left LIPA on the evening of the 31st and reached TAWAAN on the morning of the 1st. It continued its quick pursuit of the enemy, reached the sector northwest of CALAMBA on the evening of the 1st and continued its advance.

Since advance of the various wagon forces (SHIRYO NOTAI) was hardly possible due to the damaged river bridges deep in the valley, they waited for the engineer unit to complete the repair work south of TAWAAN.

E. SITUATION OF THE KIBURA DETACHMENT.

The main strength of 33 Inf Regt which had concentrated in the vicinity of LOPEZ by about midday of the 31st departed from LOPEZ at midnight. It arrived in the vicinity of TAWAAN about midday of the 1st and prepared for further movement.

Page 13

Chapter IV. Occupation of MANILA, CAVITE and BANGALAS

Strategical Situation 2d - 3d.

A. OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN PORTION OF MANILA.

On the early morning of 2 January, the pursuit unit reached PASAY at the southern outskirts of MANILA, and the advance force of the main body, the main strength of 20 Inf Regt, reached PASIG in the afternoon. The envelopment of southern MANILA was completed. About this time, disorder developed within MANILA. In recognition of the fact that restoration of public order would cause trouble if there was any delay, and to protect the supply of natural resources, the force entered MANILA at 1800 hours in co-ordination with the arrival of 48 Div in the northern part. Guards were posted immediately. The joyful voices of the Japanese residents were overwhelming.

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76/56/20

B. OCCUPATION OF CAVITE.

The left column reached southern DASH RIFLES early in the morning of the 28 in conjunction with the penetration of MANILA, and immediately one element advanced on CAVITE and captured it. The main strength concentrated in NOVELITA.

C. UNIFIED CONTROL OF THE FORCES OCCUPYING MANILA AND CAVITE.

The commanding general of the infantry group (DASH), Maj-Gen KIMURA (#1), went through LIPA on the night of the 1st, passed MUNTIN LUPA, and reached PASAY on the eve of the 2d. He immediately took command of the forces capturing MANILA and CAVITE. The commanding general of the division on the 3d assumed command of one element of the SUZUKI (#2) Regt and headquarters, and one element of the artillery regiment and its headquarters. This force drove into MANILA, completing its capture.

D. DUTIES OF ENGINEER UNIT.

The engineer unit was assigned control of the various river crossings day and night continuously for a period of 10 days. From the 11st to the 3d it was responsible for establishing five river crossings between LIPA and the sector north of CALAMBA. All were completed by 1030 hours of the 3d. Passage to MANILA was made possible for vehicles, permitting the pursuit operation of the division to run smoothly.

E. OCCUPATION OF BATAANGAS.

The force (cadre of 9 Co, 33 Inf Regt) under command of Maj HAYTORI (#3), commanding officer of 3 Bn, 33 Inf Regt, left TUGUHAN on the morning of the 2d, and with no enemy resistance captured and firmly secured BATAANGAS on the eve of the 2d.

F. CONCENTRATION OF STRENGTH IN THE VICINITY OF TUGUHAN AND LIPA.

On the 3d the division fell behind the main strength and concentrated follow-up forces in the area between TUGUHAN and LIPA.

(#1) etc:-

(1) 木村
(2) 鈴木

(3) 服部

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Appended Chart

CASUALTY INVESTIGATION CHART

DATE	FORCE CASUALTIES	2C INF REGT		MURA (#2)	16 CAV	22 PA	16 ENGR	16 TRAINS	DIV HQ	4 FLD HOSP	6 INDEP- ENDENT ENGR	21 INDEP- ENDENT ENGR	65 LC HQ	OTHER ATTACHED FORCES	CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES	TOTAL	SUMMARY
		HIRO (#1)	MAIN STRENGTH														
24 Dec	Dead	25 (2)	6 (1)	8 (2)	10 (2)	1	10			6	2	5	2	4	1	78 (6)	
	Wounded	41 (4)	9	20 (2)	18 (5)	16 (4)	5	4		14 (4)	9	11	8	9 (11)	5	167 (17)	
25 Dec	Dead	8			1											7	
	Wounded	14 (1)	1		3	1								1		20 (1)	
26 Dec	Dead	15	3	1 (1)	3 (1)											22 (2)	
	Wounded	30 (2)	8		2				1					1	1	45 (2)	
27 Dec	Dead				2											2	
	Wounded							1								1	
28 Dec	Dead				2	3										5	
	Wounded				2	4										6	
29 Dec	Dead	3			1		1									5	
	Wounded																
30 Dec	Dead																
	Wounded						3									3	
1 Jan	Dead		1													1	
	Wounded																
TOTAL	Dead	37 (2)	10 (1)	9 (2)	19 (5)	4	10	1		6	2	5	2	4	1	120 (8)	
	Wounded	85 (7)	18	20 (2)	25 (5)	21 (4)	4	7	1	14 (4)	9	11	9	11 (1)	5	240 (20)	

Notes:

- The figures in parentheses are the number of officers.
- The names of the officers killed or wounded in action are given in the following chart.

(#1) etc:

(1) 廣

(2) 村

Appended Chart

OFFICER CASUALTIES

DATE	FORCE	KILLED IN ACTION	WOUNDED IN ACTION
	20 Inf Regt	2d Lt HAMADA, Kaidō (#1) 2d Lt NAKA, Morimitsu (#2) 2d Lt Ōe, Sueso (#3) 1st Lt UENOTO, Yoshiaki (#4)	2d Lt KURAHASHI, Satoshi (#5) 1st Lt ŌZAWA, Yoshisuke (#6) 1st Lt WAKIMARE, Wataru (#7) 2d Lt SAKAI, Yasunobu (#8) 2d Lt ITO, Ren (#9)
	16 Ren Regt	Capt IKEUCHI, Hideo (#10) 1st Lt KIKUMI, Tadayoshi (#11)	2d Lt HIROMORI, Hideo (#12) 1st Lt AKAMATSU, Yoshitsugu (#13) 2d Lt KITAOKA, Keiichi (#14)
	4 Fld Hosp		1st Lt (Med) MURATA, Osamu (Died of wound) (#15) 1st Lt NOKE, Haraji (#16) 1st Lt (Med) SUZUKI, Shigenori (#17) Prob O (Med) CHIBA, Takashi (#18)
24 Dec	22 FA Regt		Capt MORITA, Shichiro (#19) 1st Lt FUKATSU, Eiji (#20) 2d Lt YAMAGUCHI, Hiroshi (#21) 2d Lt YAMAGUCHI, Noboru (#22)
	44 Anchorage Sq		1st Lt KATAOKA, Hideo (#23) 2d Lt FURUKAWA, Itaru (#24)
25 Dec	20 Inf Regt		2d Lt UENO, Kiyoji (#25) 2d Lt NAKAO, Toshio (#27)
25 Dec	20 Inf Regt	2d Lt JISHIN (#25)	
	16 Ren Regt	2d Lt SUZUKI, Fukuji (#28)	
Total		8	20

(#1) etc:

(1) 濱田恢道
(2) 難波範光
(3) 大江森雄
(4) 植本喜明
(5) 倉橋敏
(6) 小澤義輔
(7) 渡辺浩輔
(8) 酒井康彦
(9) 伊藤藤原
(10) 池内英雄
(11) 菊岡忠啓
(12) 廣森秀雄
(13) 赤松喜次
(14) 北岡啓一

(15) 村田修
(16) 野木桐次
(17) 鈴木成憲
(18) 千葉高志
(19) 森田七郎
(20) 深山津鏡次
(21) 山口浩海
(22) 山口登夫
(23) 片岡英夫
(24) 古川逸雄
(25) 自身
(26) 卯瀬喜代次
(27) 中尾利雄
(28) 鈴木福二

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