

APPOINTMENT & PROMOTION OF OFFICERS, VISAYAN FORCE LTR DTD 22 OCT 45, PS & AUS-1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 433626

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 883628

APPOINTMENT & PROMOTION OF OFFICERS  
VISAYAN FORCE LTR DTD 22 OCT 45  
B. G. CHYNOWITH BRIG. GEN. AUS

PS & AUS - 1

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NN033078

125

PR-D  
Ran 4/17/4

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: NND 933076

3715 Idaho Ave, N. W.  
Wash. D.C. October 22, 1945.

Subject : Appointment and promotion of officers, Visayan Force, P. I.  
(AGPR-D)

To : The A.G.O.

1. Enclosed is a message concerning appointment made by me. This is one of many similar messages received and likely to be received for some time to come. To answer each letter in detail requires a great deal of paper work on my part, since I write the replies myself. At this time I am receiving daily medical treatment and supposedly resting and recuperating. I request therefore that the following general statement be used as the basis for action of the AGO on the future cases, requiring of me only specific confirmation and pertinent data peculiar to each case

2. Circumstances surrounding appointments and promotions.

a. Dec. 8, 1941-Mar. 4, 1942 I commanded the 61st Division P.A. and the island of Panay. Mar. 4, 1942- May 17, 1942 I commanded the entire Visayan Force.

b. Luzon, being primary theater, received the bulk of the trained troops and meager equipment available. Mindanao became a secondary theater and properly received additional troops and personnel from the Visayan Islands, including my 61st and 62d Inf. reg. ments and the 61st FA. This left me raw, reserve units, inadequately led, no artillery, rifles for less than half the men; with 8 regular American officers and 30 reserve officers for the entire Visayan Force. My strength on Panay was 8700, and the entire Visayan Force 21,425. The Filipino officers and NCOs were untrained and inadequate with some exceptions. After departure of my three regiments, we raised two infantry regiments to replace them, using available officers and NCOs.

c. In Nov. 1941, General MacArthur warned me that my equipment would be inadequate and that I must improvise and get along; that my officers and NCOs were raw and not altogether suitable. He wanted to give the Filipino officers a good try-out before demotion, but I got the impression that I was authorized to make acting appointment and promotions of officers and NCOs.

d. In addition to troops requirements, we had to organize a manufacturing service, a food supply service, and civilian affairs services, for which no cadres had been provided. For example we manufactured grenades, extractors, gas masks ( for entire division) intrenching tools, shoes, uniforms, canteens, haversacks, tripods, bipods (AR), primers, reserve rations, 1st aid pouches, smokeless powder, shelter tents, matches, flash light batteries, bolos, spears, bows and arrows (!) mines, quinine, tiki-tiki and other items.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority **NND 983078**



We shipped a large consignment of intrenching tools to Bataan on the Legaspi ( captured and sunk). This service made demands on us for responsible personnel.

e. We moved into the mountains of Panay enough food to last the division for a year ( it helped maintain large guerrilla forces on this island for three years). We also gathered large supplies of food to ship to Bataan. This required a supply service ( procurement, storage, transport, and accounting ) for which no cadres had been provided.

f. After the bombing of Iloilo, Dec. 11, 1941, civil government of Panay broke down. At request of the bankers, to keep things going, we had to organize civil affairs agencies. I used civilian agencies where available, but we had to do many things ourselves, for which no cadre had been provided. For example, to prevent absolute paralysis of business, we had to manufacture three million emergency pesos. These activities were later investigated by President Quezon in person, and he gave me his unqualified approbation, although he was very sensitive to military interference. We had to do it and we needed all the responsible, intelligent, officials we could get for it, ( men who wouldn't run to the hills whenever nervous).

g. I submitted three complete lists of appointments and promotions desired. We never heard from these. In view of ship sinkings that were prevalent, we never even knew if our lists had been received or not. The radio was already excessively crowded with administrative affairs. It appeared to me entirely appropriate that I should go ahead and give temporary appointments and promotions in order to keep going somehow, with the people available on the spot. If I had sat back on my island waiting for detailed authority our activities would have been paralyzed, since Luzon was preoccupied very naturally with a death struggle against hopeless odds.

h. When I was assigned to command V.F. I was informed that some experienced officers would besent me for a staff. They never came. Conditions made it wholly impracticable for them to come. But I had to try to function. Again I couldn't wait for paper approval- I went ahead and organized what I could, by a few more civilian appointments and a few acting promotions of personnel on hand. As it was, my G of S for the VF was initially a naval officer ( wholly at sea on land ). My G-2 was a Filipino constabulary officer who went right over to the Japs when we had to surrender, and became their G-2 advisor. The whole show was a desperate makeshift in a hopeless problem. With 22000 men on ten islands, the bulk of the officers ignorant and unreliable, I had to grab wherever I could to find men who could speak english, and be trusted to do simple jobs, reliably. If we sent a Filipino officer on an officer-messenger job we never could tell if he had actually gone or not- and after the invasion a considerable percentage just went right on home. These American and British civilians whom I appointed in the emergency could be trusted to go and come back, or to organize supply, or stay where told, etc. They were reliable. That's what we desperately needed.

i. After invasion of Cebu, conditions were chaotic. My ultimate mission was to maintain guerrilla activity indefinitely. Until my arrival food had not been put in the mountains for this purpose, and after my arrival I had time only to get the food back to the

foothills. Our raw riflemen couldn't stop the Japs who had artillery, air force, tanks, and naval support. When they broke, having no food back in the mountains, we had to let most of them go to their homes. Then, with initially only 100 men under my immediate control, we had the job of organizing a service to take the food out of our foothill dumps, right under the noses of the Japs, and carry it back into the mountain area, to hide it away in dumps for guerrilla purposes. The Filipino carriers would continually get frightened by the Jap planes and either drop their loads or carry them on home. We needed courageous, responsible men who could speak english and do things. We had to give them some rank, to enable them to handle the Filipinos, and to protect them if caught by the Japs. We used them for supply, outpost, intelligence, messengers service- and planned to train them gradually for subsequent guerrilla activities at such future time as the situation would call for it. I commissioned several civilians during this period April 9- May 17th, 1942. For this I had authority of a letter of General MacArthur, in which he assigned the guerrilla mission as our ultimate mission, and in which he stated that after being cut off we were to have all necessary administrative authority. For practical purposes we were largely cut off from the beginning of the war, but after April 9th we were wholly cut off.

j. The above general statement covers the cases that I believe will arrive. It appears that somebody is reluctant to give credit for the service performed by some of these people. I have heard that some cases have been turned down. It is true that the appointments were not handled in routine fashion as per peacetime requirements. I suggest however that the regulations and rules were not written with any such situation in mind. Our isolation was stultifying. No superior ever visited my areas after the war began. Mail service broke down. Radio was crowded. I had a letter about March 1942 from (then) Brig. General Sutherland, C of S Usaffe, stating that he didn't approve of my promotions, and stating that the solution was simple- all I need do was to send my lists in and they would be approved. The facts are that I sent in three lists at least, and never got a single reaction to any of them. Never a single promotion or appointment, to my memory. I have been told that promotions were dead slow even on Luzon. In my area they were nonexistent. The war went right on. Our tasks multiplied and got more hopeless every month. I did what I thought General MacArthur would want me to do and in good faith took these people on for service, and they served in good faith and in my opinion justice demands that their service be recognized.

end of general statement

3. Specific case of Colonel Albert F. Christie, Infantry. General MacArthur had directed me to be very careful not to demote or depose Filipino officers, and to be careful not to belittle their rank, for obvious political reasons. In the 61st Division I had as C of S a former Filipino Constabulary officer, Colonel - - Quimbo. I soon found him totally inadequate for C of S. He was given a command and proved totally inadequate for it. I am told by people who knew him in staff school that his inadequacy was obvious before he came to me.



I am also informed that when the Japs invaded Panay, he disappeared, and that his subsequent conduct was under question. But he was a likeable old fellow, and I didn't want to hurt him nor to violate Gen. MacArthur's directive. Yet he was my second in command. I hated to think of what would happen if I were a casualty and he took over command. Next in rank was Colonel Christie. I then thought that I had authority to make acting promotions. I therefore appointed Col.

Christie an acting brigadier general, and next day appointed Col. Quimbo acting brigadier general and made him liaison officer with the civil government, a task for which he was well suited by nature and experience. This made him so happy that he didn't mind the reversal of rank; and it left Christie as second in command. Brig. General (then) Sutherland told me later that he disapproved of my appointment of Christie. I had no word about it from General MacArthur however. I went in March to Cebu as C.G. V.P. This left Christie with not only Quimbo but also Col. Garcia who had been unloaded from Luzon and who, Sutherland himself wrote me, was not suited for command. Christie then inherited command of the 61st Division and of Panay, a command which he performed in a very able manner. Since he was designated as acting brigadier general, the Filipino colonels were perfectly willing to serve under him. He continued in this status until surrender in May, 1942. Since he was appointed in good faith, and acted in good faith and later commanded a division, I believe that he should receive credit for holding the rank. The procedure was irregular, but the situation in the Visayans, isolated as they were, was also irregular.

4. I lost all records, but submit from memory the following list of promotions and appointments made by me. This does not preclude other cases, which I would remember if brought to my attention, but which I do not remember off-hand.

Panay

Thomas N. Powell, Sr (civilian, lawyer- died or killed as POW on Oruku Maru hell-ship- had been a reserve officer formerly- appointed by me Lieut. Colonel and assigned as Civil Administrator and later Civilian Affairs Officer- most valuable service- I am going to recommend him for DSM posthumous. (date of appt about Dec. 30, 1941)

Thomas N. Powell, Jr- captain, engineers, reserve. Promoted by me to major. Acted as Engineer of Panay and later Chief Engineer of all Visayans- in charge of all airfield construction, demolition, etc. I intend to recommend for DSM and DSC posthumous. Died as POW on Oriuku Maru. (date of promotion about January 15, 1942.)

Major - - Deter, M.C. Reserve, promoted by me to Lieut. Colonel. Chief Surgeon ~~xxxxx~~ Panay and Visayan Force. Organized hospitals on at least three islands including evacuation hospital on Panay for evacuees from Luzon. Reported lost as POW on ship out of Luzon last fall. I intend to recommend for DSM and DSC posthumous. (January 15, 1942)

F.M. Fliniau, Capt, Reserve - promoted by me to acting Lieut. Col. about January 15, 1942- acted Asst C of S 61st Div and later as C of S 61st Div and Panay Island

- - Fitzpatrick, Capt. Reserve- promoted to Lieut Col about Jan 15 1942- commanded 63d Infantry regiment

-- Greathouse Capt Inf Reserve- promoted to Lieut. Col about Jan 1



15, 1942- commanded infantry regiment and later Division Inspector.  
- Britton Capt Inf Reserve- promoted acting Lieut. Colonel  
about Jan 15, 1942 and assigned as Division Quartermaster, 61st Div.  
Capt. Nicanor Velarde, P.A.- promoted by me to acting Lieut.  
Colonel Jan 6, 1942- G-4 of 61st Division  
Capt. Macario Peralta, PA promoted by me to acting Lt Col about  
Jan 6, 1942- G-3 of 61st Div.  
Capt - - Capili P.A. Promoted by me to acting Lt Col about Jan  
6, 1942- G-2 of 61st Division.  
Lieut. - - Grino, P.A. promoted by me to acting Lt Col about  
Feb 1, 1942- commanded 65th( provisionally organized by us) Inf-ntry  
regiment

R. Goudie-S.E. Maxwell-J. mes Garder-R. Kennedy-A.M. Crichton-  
J.F. Hulme-L.W. Hooking-appt 1st Lieut Acting about Jan 9, 1942(all  
British)

John Hay appointed acting 1st Lieut about Jan 9, 1942

Walter Saul appt acting Capt about Jan 9, 1942 ( British)

R.N. Albrecht appt acting 2d Lieut. about Dec 26, 1941 (British)  
/( about April 14, 1942)

Cebu ( all of these promotions and appts were made after invasion

April 10, 1942, when we were completely cut off from USFIP)

Sgt Doyle R. Armstrong, U.S. Army appointed 1st Lieut- he was in  
charge of Message Center Visayan Force - splendid service

C.E. Wilson (W.O. Electrician USN) appointed 1st Lieut- he was  
in charge of the code section Hq V F - splendid service

Henry Talmadge appointed 2d Lieut- employed as engineer on  
water supply- and outpost work- no military qualifications

Jens Jensen ( Norwegian) appt 1st Lieut- had been employed by  
Army in charge of utilities- employed afterwards on supply, mess,  
and outpost work- no military qualifications but very faithful service

Brigvig Baardsen (Norwegian) appt 2d Lieut- prior to invasion  
was employed on demolition squad, and participated in demolitions  
in Cebu- volunteered and was appointed to protect him- served on  
supply and outpost service afterwards

- - Fenton ( Feinstein) appt 2d Lieut- before had operated  
Cebu Radio Station for the Army and also acted as censor- as broadcaster  
he incurred the enmity of the Japs- was appointed for his protection-  
served on liaison and outpost- later killed by guerrillas

Donald C. Gregg-appt Captain- had come to Cebu to act as engineer  
for army( there being no engineers on Cebu at that time)-served on  
supply and outpost work in mountains

-- Senay (Filipino) in charge of all radio communication before  
invasion- volunteered after invasion and served on communications,  
outpost, and supply- appt Captain

Emilio Osmena ( Filipino) ( 1st Lt M.C. P.A. not active)  
appointed Lieut. Colonel- in charge of all cargadores and supplies  
in mountains- designated as QM VP- extremely valuable services-  
executed by Japs for refusal to cooperate after surrender.

V.R. Browne appt Captain- prior to invasion was employed salvaging  
enemy mines and making hand grenades- was producing 5000 grenades per  
week at time of invasion- performed demolition work during invasion-  
afterwards appt Captain- outpost duty.

P.A. Bowen ( Reserve Capt in World War I) appt Captain and  
employed on supply and outpost duties in mountains - faithful service  
I believe that he died as POW

L. Howell appt Captain- served in command of supply dump and outpost camp.

Rufus H. Rogers . Major Inf Reserve- was promoted to Lieut. Col- he commanded the 83d Infantry regiment during invasion and did a very fine job in a hopeless situation.

Lyles G. Hardin . Capt Inf Reserve- promoted about April 20th 1942 to Major- commanded provisional 84th infantry regiment from this date ( its former C.O. Col. Edmands P.C., had left with my permission for Mindanao). ( This regiment occupied Busay Ridge and Cebu at time of invasion)

Crispiniano M. Laput (1st Lt, P.A.) promoted to Major, April 18th, 1942, and assigned then to command the Bohol Battalion.

Marciano O. Garces ( 2d Lt P.A.,) promoted to Captain as Executiv Officer of Bohol Bn.

Gonzalo P. Misa ( 3d Lt P.A.) commanded Brigade Hq Co and was promoted to Captain. He performed very fine service during invasion.

Emigdio V. David (Lt Col. P.A.) promoted to Col. He commanded the 82d Infantry throughout, and gave fineservice. Believed executed by Japs after surrender.

Casiano Lorenzo ( 2d Lt P.A.) was promoted to captain as result of gallantry in combat- he commanded a company throughout.

Captain Wm Miner Capt. Inf Reserve- appointed Major and recommendation for same sent through channels to USAFWE ( but believed lost in mail)- acted as communications officer Visayan Force- later on outpost duty- recommended later for decoration for heroic action

Cebu: the following were appointed by Colonel John D. Cook, QMC, Base Quartermaster Cebu before invasion, with my authority. these appointments made after invasion. These personnel had all been on duty in Cebu Quartermaster Base.

A.B. Carlton Major promoted to Lt Colonel - employed on supply  
Edward Short, 1st Lt Reserves- to Captain- employed on supply  
died on Oriuku Maru

David Affleck 2d Lt Reserves to 1st Lieut- on supply and OP work  
Carl Arenz 2d Lieut Reserves to 1st Lt

William F. Noble appointed 2d Lieut- civilian with Standard Oil Co. Participated in demolition during invasion- destroyed supplies, oil, etc. Was commissioned to protect him- but performed services after as supply and outpost.

*B. G. Chroweth*  
B.G. Chroweth  
Brig. General AUS



**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority **NND 883078**



**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority NND 983078