

37

HEADQUARTERS

PHILRYCOM

CLAIMS SERVICE

2-66

HISTORY & ACTIVITIES
RAINBOW REGIMENT
MALAKAS DIVISION

Butangas
4th M.D.

Plaged History

STATISTICS BRANCH

RFD

HISTORY & ACTIVITIES - RAINBOW REGIMENT, MALAKAS DIV.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 553078

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Authority *11/1/83* 3078

2703 Fortieth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
9 October 1947

TO: The Commanding General
Philippines Boukayas Command
APO 707

Attention: Chief of Claims Service

Subject: Rainbow Regiment, Malakas Division (AUSA)

1. Enclosed herewith a letter from Colonel Mariano R. Cabarrubia, former Commander of the Rainbow Regiment, Malakas Division, (AUSA). Colonel Cabarrubia has requested that I certify to the accuracy of his report of the activities of the Rainbow Regiment in support of the United States forces during the liberation of the Philippines.

2. I am not in a position to verify the accuracy of his report of the activities of the Rainbow Regiment during the period prior to the landing operations of the Eleventh Airborne Division at Masugby, Batangas, on 31 January 1945 as I have no personal knowledge.

3. Reference Colonel Cabarrubia's report of his work after 31 January 1945, I can certify that the report is corrected to the best of my knowledge and memory. I have indicated by marginal notes by comments on his statements. (See Inclosure #2 to Colonel Cabarrubia's letter.) You will note that I have agreed with Colonel Cabarrubia's statements except for certain figures of enemy and friendly casualties. These numbers I cannot verify, but they appear to be accurate to the best of memory.

4. Colonel Cabarrubia and the Rainbow Regiment did a fine job in supporting the 11th Airborne Division, and I recommend that he and his organization be given such recompense as may be due a guerrilla organization which rendered excellent support to the United States forces.

s/ Jay D. Vanderpool
t/ JAY D. VANDERPOOL
Lieut. Col. GSC

A TRUE COPY:

Richard Kyle
RICHARD KYLE

Chief, Statistics Branch
Records and Fiscal Division

Masugba, Batangas, P. I.
27 August 1947

Lt. Col. Jay D. Vanderpool
2704 40th Street NW
Washington D. C., U. S. A.

Dear Sir:

You will doubtless remember me as the leader of one of the guerrilla units you have inducted into the 11th Airborne Division that landed at Masugba, Batangas on 31 January 1945. I was the Commanding Officer of the Rainbow Regiment, Malakas Division, AUSA. My combat battalion was recognized on 21 February 1945 under no limiting date.

I addressed this letter to you in order to ask for your help in establishing our claims for arrears in pay. The Guerrilla Affairs Division of PHILRYCON advised me to write a letter to you and ask your help in identifying my unit. Our men in the Combat battalion, the same men that had undergone hardships and privations in fighting the Japanese during the Japanese occupation are anxiously looking forward to the day when America will favorably consider our case. On your shoulders Sir, lie the hope which will men so much in our lives. It will bring rehabilitation and amelioration of our present deplorable living conditions. These men fought and risked their lives out of loyalty to America and they believe firmly in the American sense of justice and generosity.

I hope you will not fail us Sir, and extend to us the same help you gave to our brother unit, the Golden Regiment, Malakas Division. I know you will surely understand our situation. No one else could understand the guerrillas better than you because you have lived the life of one while you were engaged in your delicate and dangerous mission in the Philippines.

I am enclosing a copy of the history of our organization and the activities from its inception until the date of processing.

Permit me to extend to you our best wishes and regard and the greeting to a comrade in arm "MABUHAY".

Very sincerely yours,

s/ Mariano E. Cabarrubia
t/ MARIANO E. CABARRUBIA ASS C-70940
Colonel Infantry (Guerrilla)
CO Rainbow Regiment & Rainbow
Combat Bn, Malakas Division
(AUSA)

Enclosures:

1 copy Organizational History and Activities
of the Rainbow Regiment and Combat Battalion.

Incl #1
Ltr to CG Philrycon

Basic from Cabarrubia, Srta Col.

A TRUE COPY:

Richard Kyle
RICHARD KYLE
Chief, Statistics Branch
Records and Fiscal Division

HEADQUARTERS
11th Airborne Division
APO 468

25 March 1945

Col. Mariano W. Cabarrubia
Rainbow Regiment, Guerrillas
Balayan, Batangas

Dear Colonel Cabarrubia:

I was glad to receive your letter of March 19th. As I mentioned to you in our conversation of a recent date, I am not concerned with what might have occurred in the past, but am interested only in what goes on at the present time. When one does his job in good faith and to the best of his ability, there should be no cause to worry about what his enemies might be saying to his back.

You and your men have done a grand job since becoming attached to my division. You have killed lots of Japs, and have been the source of much important intelligence information. Keep up the good work.

Major Schloth, the Officer in charge of Guerrilla activities of the division, advises me that your men have been paid and I assure you that as long as your good work continues, you and your men will be taken care of.

Sincerely,

(SGD.) J. M. SWING
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

c/ Luis R. Fontanilla
t/ LUIS R. FONTANILLA
1st Lt. WPC (AF)
Detachment Commander
Balayan, Batangas


26 June 1947.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to CERTIFY that _____
is one of the Members of the Rainbow Regiment referred to
in the above mentioned letter of Major General Swing.

MARIANO W. CABARRUBIA
Col. Inf. P.A., Demobilized
ASN -0-70949

A TRUE COPY:


RICHARD KYLE
Chief, Statistics Branch
Records and Fiscal Division

DECLASSIFIED

Authority A/100853078

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
RAINBOW REGIMENT, MALAKAS
DIVISION, AUSA

FIRST ORGA-
NIZATION OF
GUERRILLAS

As early as May 1942, escaped USAFFE and civilians began organizing resistance groups. The lack of arms and close vigilance of the enemy prevented the early consolidation of the different units. However, intense and effective propaganda was vigorously conducted to keep the faith of the people and to bolster their morale. Intelligence work, sabotage, securing of arms and training were secretly done and the various groups were finally consolidated on a solid basis.

THE EARLY
ORGANIZERS

The early organizers in western Batangas comprising of the municipalities of Balayan, Tuy, Nasugbu, Lian and Calatagan were the following:

- Major Rodolfo G. Bahia of Balayan, Batangas, 1st Lieutenant in the USAFFE
- Major Amador Deguito of Balayan, Batangas, a very active and dynamic leader
- Major Vicente Calingasan of Tuy, Batangas, a well known leader and former mayor of Tuy
- Major Jose T. Unson of Balayan, Batangas, a prominent citizen and influential leader
- Colonel Mariano H. Cabarrubia of Balayan, Batangas, with residence at Nasugbu, Batangas, Capt. USAFFE, a distinguished Army Officer.

CABARRUBIA
CHOSEN AS
THE LEADER

Colonel Mariano H. Cabarrubia was a former officer of the Philippine Constabulary of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. He is well known officer with a distinguished record. He had been assigned in western Batangas and people in all walks of life liked him. He was naturally looked upon as the logical leader in the region. He became the adviser of the FAIT units in western Batangas and eventually the CO. He was planted in the Constabulary by Colonel Jorge Espina, CO, FAIT, Batangas province in order to secure arms and ammunitions vitally needed and to gather intelligence reports about the Japanese activities. He was also S-2 of the Fil-American Irregular Troops of Hugh Straughn (0-2515) for Batangas.

ORGANIZA-
TIONAL
PHASES OF
RAINBOW
REGIMENT

The RAINBOW REGIMENT, Malakas Division, AUSA, had undergone five phases of organization. The first phase was from May 1942 to 30 April 1943. The organization was authorized and affiliated to Col. Hugh Straughn (0-2515) of the Fil-American Irregular Troops. The second phase was from 1 May 1943 to 23 June 1944 when the organization was formally transferred under the FAIT for the province of Batangas. The third phase was from 24 June 1944 to 23 September 1944 when the organization was named Cabarrubia Guerrilla Unit. The fourth phase was from 24 September 1944 to 31 January 1945 when the organization was renamed the "RAINBOW REGIMENT", Malakas Division, AUSA. The last phase was from 1 February 1945 to 13 June 1945 when the organization was attached to the United States Army through Major Jay D. Vanderpool.

CONTACT WITH
COL STRAUGHN
AND AUTHORI-
ZATION TO OR-
GANIZE

Major Rodolfo G. Bahia and Major Amador Deguito organized two battalions at Balayan, Batangas. In the early part of August 1942, Major Amador Deguito went to the Sierra Madre mountains to contact Colonel Hugh Straughn (0-2515) founder and CO of the Fil-American Irregular Troops. He was able to contact the Colonel at his mountain hideout. He was authorized

to organize units in western Batangas and affiliate them to the FAIT. On 15 August 1942, the Battalions of Majors Bahia and Deguito became the Bahia-Deguito battalions under the Fil-American Irregular Troops of Hugh Straughn (O-2515).

ADDITIONAL
BATTALIONS

In the municipality of Tuy, Vicente Calingasan organized a battalion and he became the CO with the rank of Major. The unit was affiliated to the FAIT. In Masugbu, Mariano H. Cabarrubia who had barely returned from the prison camp of Capas, organized a battalion and placed Petronilo Sapico, Chief of Police, as the CO with the rank of Major. Members of the different battalions in Balayan, Tuy and Masugbu came from the five municipalities comprising the western Batangas region.

CONSOLIDA-
TION OF THE
FAIT UNITS
OF WESTERN
BATANGAS

On 28 April 1943, Colonel Cabarrubia was ordered by the CO of the FAIT for Batangas to consolidate the units of the Fil-American Irregular Troops of Hugh Straughn in western Batangas. On 1 May 1943, the different battalions were consolidated and became the 6th Regiment of the Fil-American Irregular Troops of Hugh Straughn (O-2515) for Batangas under the overall command of Jorge Espina. The Bahia-Deguito Battalions became the 1st Bn, the Tuy Battalion of Vicente Calingasan became the 2nd Bn with Calingasan as CO with the rank of Major and the battalion at Masugbu became the third battalion with Major Sapico as the CO. Thus the FAIT in the western region was formally transferred to the FAIT for the province of Batangas. Due to his meritorious services, Mariano H. Cabarrubia was appointed on 1 June 1943 as the CO of all the units of Batangas FAIT in western Batangas with the rank of Colonel. On 15 December 1943, due to the rapid expansion of the unit in Balayan, a regiment was created for Balayan alone. Colonel Cabarrubia organized the three battalions into a regiment and placed at the command of Major Mariano L. Martinez who was later promoted to the grade of Colonel. The commanding officers of the different battalions were: Major Rodolfo G. Bahia (alias Roman Gomez) for the 1st Bn, Major Amador Deguito (alias Ador Dionisio) for the 2nd Bn and Major Jose T. Unson (alias Isagani Maglaya) for the 3rd Bn. Colonel Cabarrubia and Major Martinez served under the aliases of Jose Javier and Lorenzo San Juan respectively.

COL. CABAR-
RUBIA APPOINT-
ED CO OF CON-
SOLIDATED
UNITSESTABLISH-
MENT OF DIP-
FERENT CPs

CPs were established for the regiment and the different battalions. For Masugbu, the CP was at Tala while for Tuy it was at Bayudbod. The regimental CP for the new regiment at Balayan was at the house of Capt. Francisco Hernandez. For the 1st Bn it was at Navotas and the 2nd Bn was at E. nits. The CP for the 3rd Bn was located at the barrio of Calaoocan. Col Cabarrubia established different CPs located at Munting Indang, Tuzalin, Munting Latag and Eay Igtiw at Masugbu and at Pitak in Tuy. The combat companies were to be found in these CPs and the combat patrols always report to the nearest one in their zones of operations.

CONTACT WITH
MAJ. PHILIPPS
OF SWPA AND
6th MD

In the latter part of December 1943, through Captain Francisco Hernandez, Major Bahia was contacted by operatives of Major L. H. Philipps who came from GHQ, SWPA and arrived at Paluan, Mindoro on 13 November 1943. A few days later, Colonel Cabarrubia was contacted at his HQ by Captain Emilio Macabuang, representing Major Philipps and Lt. Marcelino Mosquera of Peralta's 6th Military District. The two operative gave several "Australian" grenades to the Colonel and cigarettes and chocolates with "I shall return" MacArthur. The enthusiasm of the guerrillas was stirred and the morale of the organization rose higher. In exchange, important intelligence reports were given and cooperation and help assured. When

SUPPLIES GI-
VEN

SECURITY AND
INFORMATION

a radio transmitting and receiving station was established by Major Philipps at Cape Santiago, Calatagan, Batangas under the care of the "Major Philipps Unit" of Captain Macabuang, the combat unit of the organization aided in maintaining its security. Valuable military information were furnished. Many Japanese ships were sunk by United States submarines during the operation of this station.

JAPANESE RAIDS
AND EXECUTIONS
OF LEADERS

On or about the middle of March 1944, the Japanese conducted a general raid in Mindoro and Batangas. An American Harold Guentner, one of the Americans we had sent to Mindoro through Capt. Macabuang, was caught and brought back to Batangas. Majors Bahia, Deguito, Calingasan and Capt. Demetrio Hernandez of our unit in western Batangas were arrested by the Japanese. Major Bahia and Deguito and Captain Demetrio Hernandez were executed while Major Calingasan was released a few months later. Col. Cabarrubia was also arrested but was released because no one would identify him as a guerrilla. Col. Espina and Major Tuguigui were also arrested and both were later killed. All the officers of the unit were apprehended and on 4 April 1944 were arrested and imprisoned in the Japanese garrison at Masugbu. Col. Cabarrubia hastily prepared the combat unit to rescue the imprisoned officers but the attack was not consummated because the officers were later released. Although freed from prison, the Japanese maintained close watch on the movement of the guerrilla officers. In spite of the close watch of the Japanese, the different battalions were reorganized and active again in spite of the loss of the leaders. The battalions at Balayan that lost two of the leaders reorganized and selected Major Jose T. Unson as the leader. On the other hand Col. Cabarrubia reorganized also the battalions at Masugbu and Tuy. Thus the organization was again active.

MASS ARRESTS
OF OFFICERS

REORGANIZATION
OF THE
UNITS AFTER
JAPS ARRESTS
EXECUTIONS

FAIT, WESTERN
BATANGAS BE-
CAME CABARRU-
BIA GUERRILLA
UNIT

On 20 June 1944, the FAIT of western Batangas became the "CABARRUBIA GUERRILLA UNIT" under the command of Col. Mariano H. Cabarrubia. The Cabarrubia Guerrilla Unit was composed of five battalions. The different battalions are: 1st Bn, Masugbu, under Major Petronilo Sapico; 2nd Bn, Tuy, under Major Vicente Calingasan; 3rd Bn, Lian, Tuy and Calatagan, under Major Antonio Mendoza; 4th Bn, Balayan, under Major Jose T. Unson and 5th Bn, Balayan, under Major Arsenio Malabayabas. The CPs of each battalion was located as follows: 1st Bn at Tala, Masugbu; 2nd Bn at Bayubod, Tuy; 3rd Bn at Bolbok, Tuy; 4th Bn at Ermita, Balayan and Calacanan, Balayan and 5th Bn at Cauturan and Canda, Balayan.

CP LOCATION

CABARRUBIA
UNIT RENAMED
RAINBOW REGI-
MENT.

On 24 September 1944, the Cabarrubia Guerrilla Unit was renamed the "RAINBOW REGIMENT", Malakas Division, AUSA. The good work began in 1942 continued to be performed with added energy and determination. The unit had made contact with another party from Mindoro that succeeded Major Philipps. The party was under the command of Lt. Commander George F. Rowe (alias Nicholson). Members of the unit helped in maintaining security of another radio station established at Mt. Luya, Calatagan, overlooking Balayan Bay. Major Calingasan accompanied Sgt. Gerald Berg of Commander Rowe's party in Photographing Corridor from Patungan. At this time, the Rainbow Combat unit composed of three hundred well armed men was very active in patrolling the western region giving protection to the helpless inhabitants from Japanese atrocities and from activities of outlaws.

LANDING OF
THE AMERI-
CANS AT MA-
SUGBU

On 31 January 1945, the 11th Airborne Division landed at Masugbu, Batangas. At that time the combat unit had been engaged fighting the Japanese following the "combat order" for all guerrillas issued by Major Jay D. Vanderpool, Colonel Ca

CABARRUBIA
REPORTED TO
MAJ. VANDER-
POOL

barrubia reported to Major Vanderpool. Colonel Cabarrubia reported to Major Vanderpool at hour 1000 and presented his unit including the combat companies of three hundred fully armed men. Through Major Jay D. Vanderpool, the Rainbow Regiment was attached to the United States Army until 13 June 1945 when the combat unit was processed at Camp Murphy, Quezon City.

ACTIVITIES OF THE UNIT BEFORE THE LANDING
OF THE AMERICANS

The activities of the organization may be divided into five parts corresponding to the different phases of organization.

FROM MAY 1942 to 30 APRIL 1943

Soon after the organization of the different battalions, the members engaged in propaganda work. This was of prime importance and carried out for two reasons. First, to keep the faith of the people and bolster their morale. Second, to counteract the Japanese propaganda. The activities as actually performed may be outlined as follows:

1. 10 August 1942 - Captain Genon Ilao and Lt. Ceferino C. Deguito of the unit helped four Americans to get away to Mindoro. Captain Ilao carried food and medicine to the American hideout. The Americans were sheltered by the Lopez family of Balaayan. The names of the Americans are Major William F. Harris, USMC, Thumblor A. Armstrong, Edward Whitcomb and Reid C. Chamberlain. They left in a 30 ft sailboat.
2. Major Anglor Deguito contacted Col. Hugh Straughn (O-2515) at the Sierra Madre mountains and was given authority to organize unit on 15 August 1942.
3. Intelligence work-
 - (a) Observation and notation of different Japs installations, fortifications, concentrations and supplies.
 - (b) Making maps and sketches of different enemy positions.All information of vital importance is transmitted to the HQ of Col. Straughn either by courier or through Major Deguito personally.
4. Sabotage-
 - (a) Destruction of Japanese equipment, transportation facilities and communication lines.

Often times to their great annoyance, the Japs found out that their trucks and other vehicles would not go or some of their equipment missing. The Japs however vent their anger upon the civilians calling them "dorobe".
 - (b) Elimination of Japanese spies
The most hated persons by the guerrillas and civilians were the spies employed by the Japans. Whenever possible, they were eliminated

and their arms confiscated

(c) Ambusing and waylaying of Japs

Although there was an instructions to avoid combat with the Japanese, we cannot resist attacking them when we saw them in small numbers or two to ten in a patrol. In fact this was one of the best source for securing arms.

5. Securing arms-

The initial arms of the unit consisted of thirty five (35) rifles secured by members of the unit and twelve (12) rifles bought for the unit. The combat detachment started with forty seven arms.

(a) By buying

The unit was able to buy twelve rifles at once which were given to the combat detachment. They were also used in training of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.

(b) Confiscation from captured Japanese soldiers and spies.

(c) Surrendered arms to the Constabulary

The Constabulary was the main source of arms and ammunitions of the guerrillas. Arms surrendered to the Constabulary were given to the unit if they were serviceable. If the arms were not serviceable, they were surrendered to the Japanese. Sometimes, we had to look for destroyed rifles and revolvers to exchange for the good ones in order that the Japs may not detect what was done. In fact all constabulary under Col. Cabarrubia who was planted there were guerrillas.

6. Canvassing of men-

Joining the unit was purely voluntary. However, since many wanted to join, careful physical examination was resorted to and we had to limit the number due to food supply and to avoid discovery by the Japanese kempetal. Men that can stand the hardships of mountain life were selected.

7. Training-

A program of training was carefully laid out in order to give adequate training to large number of members as possible without being discovered

(a) Officers - They were trained at the Regimental CPs or at the CP of Col. Cabarrubia

(b) Non-commissioned officers and enlisted men- They were trained at their respective battalion CPs.

8. Combat patrols-

(a) Combat patrols were sent to the different regions in the western Batangas. The very first action was an attack on a Jap patrol of five men north of ²Malico Junction. All Japs were killed and five rifles and ammunitions captured.

(b) Ambushing of a Jap patrol of seven men and two unknown spies. All were killed and seven rifles and two revolvers were captured.

The combat unit of the organization was formed on 10 October 1942 by Colonel Mariano H. Cabarrubia. It was called the "Trigger Squad" because they went out by squads on patrols. The members were hardy volunteers and veterans, brave, daring and level headed. This unit grew up as the arms increased and finally became a battalion that caused worry and terror

among the Japanese.

The problem of food supply was at first hard. However, the people soon realized the value of the unit and cooperation was established. The rich owners of haciendas gave unqualified support to our unit thru Lt. Col. Jose Eusebio of the Ramos y Cia; Eusebio family thru Lt. Don Jacobo Eusebio of the Ayala y Cia, and other big families of Balayan and Tay.

FROM 1 MAY 1943 TO 24 JUNE 1944

By this time the FAIT in the western Batangas region being affiliated directly to Col. Strachan (042515) was consolidated and formally became a part of the BATANGAS FAIT of Colonel Hugh Strachan under the overall command of Col. Jerome Sepina.

1. Securing of arms and ammunitions-

(a) Bought from Batuan

It came to the attention of the guerrilla leaders that there were many rifles hoarded and hidden by civilians and guerrillas at Batuan. Representatives were sent to the region in order to buy arms. Fifty rifles were bought and transported to Lian by bancas. From Lian the arms were easily transferred to the regional commanders GPs.

(b) Arms surrendered to the Constabulary

The Japanese at this time conducted an intensive campaign for the surrender of arms held by civilians especially licensed arms during the Commonwealth time. Those arms surrendered to the Constabulary if serviceable found their way into the hands of guerrillas while the unserviceable ones were given to the Japanese.

(c) Hand grenades and pistols from Major Phillips

On 20 December 1944, Captain Estelito Macabugan representing Major Phillips contacted Major Rodolfo S. Bahia through Captain Francisco Hernandez, my liaison officer. Supplies such as cigarettes, candies and chocolates with wrappers marked "I shall return" - MacArthur and medicines were given to the battalion. Two days later, Captain Macabugan and Lt. Marcelino Mosquera of Feralta's 5th MD contacted Col. Cabarrubia at his HQ. Several hand grenades and supplies like those given to Major Bahia were given to the Colonel. Pistols were given to Major Galimanan by members of this party. The supplies though very little proved to be of high moral value for they strengthened the faith of the people in America and the determination to resist the enemy at all cost.

(d) Confiscated arms from Japanese soldiers and Japanese spies

From time to time small Jap patrols were waylaid and attacked and their arms confiscated. Occasionally, spies employed by the Japanese were captured and their arms confiscated.

2. Intelligence work-

Intelligence work was done intensively throughout the region and intelligence reports about other region were furnished the HQ of Colonel Cabarrubia from the Division HQ of FAIT at Batangas and from neighboring guerrillas of other affiliations. Intelligence reports were submitted regularly every week to the Division S-2 and transmitted to Batangas. Matters of grave

importance were sent hastily.

(a) Colonel Cabarrubin furnished Capt. Macabug and Lt. Rosquera vital military information which were transmitted to Major Philipps at Mindoro and then to SITA in Australia.

(b) Captain Lorenzo Salvez was sent to Mindoro as liaison officer with Major Philippe party.

(c) Important military information relayed to Capt. Macabug in charge of the radio station established by Major Philipps at Cape Santiago, Calatagan, Batangas. Captain Macabug was CO of his unit in Calatagan named "Major Philipps Unit" in honor of Major Philipps. (Unit's name kept a secret. We addressed or referred to Major Philipps as "Taco") Captain Macabug and his men were often protected by combat patrol from the organization when engaged in delicate missions assigned him.

(d) Making of a secret map containing indications of Japs movements, locations of fortifications, armaments and supplies and terrain of the different localities.

3. Sabotage-

(a) Prevention of the success of the Japanese sugar and cotton industries. Every possible means was done to prevent the success of these industries. The cotton plants were treated with adulterated fertilizers prescribed by the Japs so that they either die or grow freely. Prevention of success of the sugar industry was also done and combat and security patrols of the organization allowed civilians to steal Japanese sugar and alcohol.

4. Combat patrols-

The organization by this time maintained two combat companies engaged maintaining peace and order at different municipalities, protecting sabotage squads and sometimes intelligence operatives. Japanese patrols were sometimes attacked and their arms taken.

(a) For protection of civilians in the towns as well as the barrios from Japanese atrocities and from outlaws. Sometimes, Japanese went out to pillage the people both in the towns and in the barrios. At other times bands of outlaws tried to rob the people and what was worst was that they represented themselves as guerrillas. Often times, bands of unknown men would ask for contributions either in money or foodstuffs for the support of guerrillas. Such if not prevent will create a bad name for the guerrillas and it will lose the people's cooperation.

(b) Elimination of spies in Japanese employ and ambushing of Japanese patrols. There were occasions when Japs were caught and liquidated. Japanese patrols of small numbers were often attacked. Spies were eliminated. Later on the Japanese began to learn their lessons and they sent out large patrols or groups of patrols. Finally, they established a garrison of strong force at the Sugar Central in Lantawan, Masagba.

5. Special activities-

(a) Sending of Americans to Major Philipps HQ in Mindoro on 31 January 1943. The Americans were Major Robert Kramer, Army Engineer, Patrick Melody and Eugene Jorgensen.

Major Deguito of our unit and Col. Jose Lopez Hernandez of the Rillo-Nery Unit decided that it would be safe to send to Mindoro the three Americans hiding

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at Lopez property near the foot of Mt. Batulao. The evacuation to Mindoro was engineered by the following officers: Col. Manzano and Capt. Marciano Ilagan of the Killo-Mery Unit and Majors Deguito, Unson, Capt. Ilae, Lt. Ceferino C. Deguito and Sgt. Francisco de Swia of our unit. At the instance of Captain Emilio Macabang, representing Major Philippe, Capt. Francisco Hernandez headed a strong combat patrol sent by Col. Cabarrubia to maintain security at all cost. Captain Macabang received the Americans at Mindoro.

(b) Evacuation of Harold Gwentner to Mindoro American soldier had been hiding under the protection of Major Calinasan. He was sent to Mindoro accompanied by Tomas Panaligan and escorted by Captain Macabang and Sgt. Clemente Pantoja, the famous courier of Major Philippe and later Commander Rowe.

6. Training-

(a) Enlisted men were trained in small groups at their respective battalion CPs in order to evade detection.

(b) Officers were trained at the CP of the regional commander Col. Cabarrubia under his personal command and other experienced officers. Special men for combat duties were also trained in this CP using both Springfield, Enfield and Japanese rifles.

7. Arrests and executions of leaders-

About the middle of March 1944, Majors Bahia, Deguito, Calinasan and Capt. Demetrio Hernandez were arrested. Prior to their arrests, raids were conducted by the Japanese at Mindoro and Calatagan and followed by the mass arrests in the whole province of Batangas. The American, Harold Gwentner, was captured in Mindoro and brought back to Batangas. Major Philippe was killed by the Japs near Abra de Ilog, Mindoro while our liaison officer's faith could not be ascertain. Captain Macabang was also arrested. Majors Bahia and Deguito as well as Captain Demetrio Hernandez were executed. Colonel Cabarrubia was arrested but was released because nobody would identify him as a guerrilla. Col. Espina and Major Targui were arrested and subsequently killed.

On 4 April 1944, all officers of the PAIT western Batangas were arrested and imprisoned in the Masugba Garrison. Colonel Mariano N. Cabarrubia prepared the two combat companies to attack the Japanese Garrison in order to rescue the officers. A two pronged attack was planned. One company will attack from the east starting from the HQ at palico. The other company will attack from the north starting from the CP at Manting Indang. The attack was not consummated however because the Japanese finally released the officers.

8. Reorganization-

When the officers were released about the middle of April 1944, they found out that their leaders were killed. Even the Division CO, Jorge Espina, was killed. In spite of the close vigilance of the Japanese, the officers selected Major Jose T. Unson as the CO for Balayan. Col. Cabarrubia reorganized the units at Tay Masugba and Lian. He consolidated the units and placed them under his personal command. Hence the organization never ceased to function from the date of inception in 1942 until the present time although it had undergone several phases of organization.

FROM 24 JUNE 1944 TO 23 SEPTEMBER 1944

Beginning 24 June 1944, the organization was named "Carrabaria Guerrilla Unit". The organization retained that name until 23 September 1944 when it was again changed. The activities during this period are outlined below.

1. Intelligence work-

- (a) Intensified gathering of military information of same.
- (b) Making sketches of Japs positions and maps showing location of Japanese installations. The information were furnished to operatives of other units who came to the region.
- (c) Furnishing important information to operatives of Commander Rowe (alias Commander Nicholson) at Mindoro.
- (d) On 1 September 1944, Major Calingasan accompanied Sgt. Gerald Berg of Rowe's outfit in Mindoro in his mission of photographing Corrigidor from Patangan.
- (e) Organization's outfit at Balayan contacted Rowe's party through Capt. Macabug of Major Philipps Unit who was reporting to Rowe.

2. Sabotage-

- (a) On 4 July 1944, a detachment led by Captain Maglunog sabotaged the Japanese installation of machineries for the cotton industry at Balayan resulting in the ruin of the machines and destruction of the installation. Other sabotage work such as stealing the jute sacks and other equipment were made by the members. With the cooperation of Ex-USAFVES employed by the Japs from the time of their release from Capas, such destruction was wrought upon the Japanese property.
- (b) Destruction of Japanese communication lines and transportation equipment. Our men used to sabotage the tracks and other vehicles to impend Japs transportation and communications.
- (c) On 5 September 1944, Capt. Francisco Hernandez and Lt. Pradencio del Rosario with a small patrol sabotaged the gun emplacement at Sampiro. Result: The gun crashed and resulting in the death of a Japanese officer and wounding of many soldiers.

3. Combat patrols-

- (a) On 4 July 1944, a combat patrol led by Major Damian Cunanan intercepted a Japanese patrol on its way to Lian at boundary of Tay and Lian. Eleven Japanese were killed and nine rifles and ammunition captured. Three men of Major Cunanan were seriously wounded.
- (b) On 1 August 1944, a combat patrol under Major Calingasan attacked a Japanese patrol at Toong. Tay and seven Japs were killed. Seven rifles were also captured.
- (c) On 23 August 1944, a combat patrol led by Major Bonifacio Cunamay encountered a Japanese patrol at the bend of the road of the Tagaytay highway near Aga. The Japs were caught unaware and they

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Authority: A/VDS 33078

lost 17 men and left behind twenty three rifles and plenty of ammunitions. The Japs were very bitter at the outlaws that were operating at Tagaytay who often held both civilian and Japanese tracks.

- (d) Small combat patrols were regularly sent to different municipalities to preserve peace and order and to prevent the Japanese from getting supplies.
- (e) Small patrols sent out to protect sabotage and intelligence squads.
- (f) Strong combat patrols to keep out the outlaws from infiltrating into the region and to combat the Japanese patrols whenever possible to do so.

4. Training-

The same program of training adopted before was followed.

5. Special activities-

From 8 September 1944 to 17 September 1944, upon order of Colonel Mariano M. Cabarrabia, 127 firearms, all ammunitions and supplies of the Constabulary detachment at Palico were secretly carried to the regimental CP of Col. Cabarrabia. When the transfers of arms and supplies were completed, all officers and men of the Constabulary at Palico numbering 110 and headed by Colonel Cabarrabia defied the Japanese. They left for the mountain hideouts. The Japanese garrison at Masugba sent a strong detachment against them the day they left, 17 September 1944; it was repulsed and the Japs driven back. From that day frequent skirmishes occurred between Japanese patrols and Cabarrabia's Combat battalion.

FROM 24 SEPTEMBER 1944 TO 31 JANUARY 1945

This period covered the time when the organization was re-named "RAINBOW REGIMENT," Malakas Division, AUSA, until the landing of the Americans at Masugba, Batangas on 31 January 1945. After that date, the Rainbow Regiment was inducted into the United States Army by Major Jay D. Vanderpool and placed under his order. The activities under this period is outlined as follows:

1. Intelligence work-

- (a) Intensified intelligence work carried out especially at Masugba and along the sea coasts of the region.
- (b) A complete, detailed and elaborate map of the region covering Masugba to Lwery was prepared indicating the Japanese positions, fortifications, installations, strengths and dispositions of men in each position, armaments and supplies. The terrains, trails and other details were indicated.
- (c) Important military information relayed to radio station at Mt. Luya and security patrol always maintained to protect that station.
- (d) In the early part of January, a courier from Major Jay D. Vanderpool brought an order for Colonel Cabarrabia to a conference but due to his illness at the time, he requested Col. Villadolid, another ranking Officer of the Malakas Division to represent him.
- (e) On 24 January 1945, Cpts. Francisco Hernandez and Lorenzo Galvez of our unit together with Capt. Macabug were contacted by Sgt. Donald

Ash at Cape San Pedrino. The Americans arrived by PT boat. The important map referred to in (b) was delivered to Sgt. Donald Ash. Lt. Del Rosario on order of Capt. Hernandez headed a strong patrol and cut all the telephone lines of the Japanese at Balayan, Tay and Calaca.

Arrangement was made whereby the American will attack the naval base of the Japs at Sampiro and the Rainbow Combat Battalion will attack from the land. The plan did not materialize because (1) the messenger was delayed on the way and (2) Captain Salvez was killed in an encounter with a Japanese patrol at Talibayog, Calatagan.

2. Combat patrols-

- (a) On 25 September 1944, Colonel Cabarrubia intercepted a Japanese patrol at Pawalim and killed five Japanese and wounding several more. The Japs retreated leaving five rifles and ammunitions and five grenades.
- (b) Strong combat patrols were sent to different municipalities to counteract Japanese moves and prevent lawlessness.
- (c) Strong highway patrols maintained to ambush Japanese. Highway patrols had often engaged isolated groups of Japanese and Japanese patrols on the Tay-Balayan road, Tay-Lian-Calatagan Road, Nasugbu-Tay road and Tagaytay highway. In the long run the Japanese sent armored cars and heavily armed trucks. Many Japanese lives and arms were lost to the highway patrols. The bridges of Palico, Cacauman and Baybud were saved by the patrols from Japanese demolition squads. These bridges proved important to the 11th Airborne Division when they advanced to Manila after landing at Nasugbu.
- (d) On 20 January 1945, a strong detachment headed by Captain Silvino Tolentino attacked the Japanese garrison at Nasugbu. The Japanese suffered a casualty of six killed and several wounded. A sergeant in Capt. Tolentino's detachment was wounded.
- (e) On 27 January 1945, a strong Japanese patrol intercepted Capt. Lorenzo Salvez and his party at Talibayog, Calatagan, and in the encounter, Capt. Salvez was killed.
- (f) A strong advanced patrol headed by Capts. Teodoro Maglunog and Francisco Hernandez went to Baha, Calatagan, ahead of Col. Cabarrubia's combat company. This patrol of nineteen men tried to rescue Captain Salvez and his party. The patrol was encircled by Japs coming from Sampiro and Santiago on Pagaspas Bay. Capt. Hernandez with two companions eluded the Japs and reached Balayan to report to Col. Cabarrubia. Capt. Salvez's men escaped the Japs encirclement and sailed for Camp Nimitz in Mindoro, HQ of Commander Rowe.
- (g) All battalions were alerted for combat actions
- (h) Following an attack order issued by Major Jay D. Vanderpool for the guerrillas, the Rainbow Regiment went into action. Major Vicente Ca-

lingasan and Major Damian Cumanan attacked a heavy Japanese concentration at Toong, Tay. The Japs were caught by surprise and lost many men at the initial attack. They soon recovered and resisted fiercely. With superior number and arms, the attack was repulsed and our men retired to the CP at Babilad. Another patrol attacked the Japanese stationed at the three bridges on the Tagaytay highway and the Japanese demolition squads were dispersed. The Japanese retreated northeastward to Aga, the Jap Stronghold.

3. Sabotage-

- (a) On 1 November 1944, a detachment under Capt. Theodore Maglanog, accompanied by Lt. Victoriano Yapchayco, dynamited the naval gun emplacement of the Japs at Mt. San Pedrino. The extent of the damage could not be ascertained but it was a fact that the gun was never used even during the attack at Sapiro.

On 31 January 1945, soon after the landing of the 11 Airborne Division at Masagba, Batangas, Colonel Cabarrabia reported to Major Jay D. Vanderpool at ten o'clock in the morning. He had with him at the time two companies of fully armed men numbering three hundred (300). Of the arms used, one hundred sixty one (16) were Springfields, Enfields, Browning Automatic Rifles and a few carbines. The rest numbering one hundred and twenty nine (129) were Japanese rifles and several revolvers captured from Japanese soldiers and spies. This does not include side arms used by the officers which were their personal property.

The combat battalion alone was responsible for inflicting a total casualty of one hundred nineteen (119) Japanese killed and captured of one hundred and twenty nine (129) arms. This does not include the arms captured by the different battalions which were used at their respective CPs.

SUMMARY OF
MEN AND ARMS
OF COMBAT COM-
PANIES

SUMMARY OF
ENEMY CAS-
UALTIES &
ARMS CAPTURED

(END OF PRE-LANDING ACTIVITIES)

s/ Mariano H. Cabarrabia ^{Public A}
t/ MARIANO H. CABARRABIA ASN O-70940
Colonel Infantry (Guerrilla)
CO Rainbow Regiment & Rainbow
Combat Battalion, Malakas Division
(AUSA)

A TRUE COPY:

RICHARD KYLE
Chief, Statistics Branch
Records and Fiscal Division

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *ND 853078*

RAINBOW REGIMENT
MARIKAS DIVISION (AUSA)

ACTIVITIES DURING ATTACHMENT TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Before the American landing at Masugbu, Batangas, Philippines, an attack order was issued for all guerrillas.

30 JANUARY 1945
IN THE FIELD

ATTACK
ORDER

SUBJECT: ATTACK ORDERS
TO : ALL GUERRILLAS

(Excerpts)

TWO EIGHT JANUARY PD
VANDEERPOOL FROM MACARTHUR PD
ALL GUERRILLAS WILL ATTACK UPON NOTIFICATION
REPEAT NOTIFICATION FROM THIS HQ PD DESIRES YOU COORDI-
NATE ALL GUERRILLAS WEST OF LAOUNA DE BAY END

(Followed Instructions A to J)

(J) CABARRUBIA AND BOHON WILL ATTACK AND DESTROY ALL THE ENEMY FORCES ALONG THE IMPROVED ROAD OF BALAYAN (INCL) LEMERY (INCL.). HE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ROAD. PATROLLING WILL BE DONE IN TUY. ALL ENEMY FORCES WILL BE ATTACKED WHEN ENCOUNTERED.

(Followed by Instructions No.3 to 16)

s/ Jay D. Vanderpool
t/ JAY D. VANDERPOOL
Major, 88C
Co-ordinator

COMPLIANCE
TO THE ORDER

In compliance with this order, the Rainbow Regiment attacked the Japanese concentrations at the barrico of Tuy but was repulsed. Other combat patrols attacked the Japanese bridge detachments at the three bridges of Palico, Casawan and Bayudhod. The Japanese were driven and the bridges saved from destruction. Patrols were sent to Balayan and the 4th Bn was ordered to mobilize and go into action.

AMERICAN
LANDING & CABARRUBIA REPORTED TO VANDERPOOL

On 31 January 1945, the 11th Airborne Division landed at Masugbu, Batangas. At hour 1000, Colonel Mariano H. Cabarrubia, accompanied by Majors Ceferino Inciong and Bonifacio Cunamay reported to Major Jay D. Vanderpool at the ground floor of the Municipal Building of Masugbu. One Regiment of five battalions consisting of four thousand men (4,000) with two fully armed companies of three hundred (300) officers and men was presented for service. Request made for more arms. Major Vanderpool ordered that the men must be assembled the following day.

On 1 February 1945, Major Jay D. Vanderpool informed Colonel Cabarrubia that henceforth the Rainbow Regiment is attached to the United States Army and that it will receive direct orders from him. The following orders were given:

ATTACHMENT
AND ORDERS

1. PROTECT THE RIGHT FLANK OF THE 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION ADVANCING TOWARD MANILA
2. SECTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM PALICO JUNCTION TO TUY AND BALAYAN BOTH TOWNS INCLUSIVE.
3. LIBERATE TUY BY HOUR 1200, 2 FEBRUARY 45.
4. DRAW ALCOHOL RATION FOR FUEL OF TRUCKS ASSIGNED TO HAUL THE SUPPLIES OF THE RAINBOW REGIMENT; 600 LITERS A WEEK FROM CENTRAL AZUGARRERA DON PEDRO.

On 1 February 1945, strong combat patrols were placed along the right side of the Masugbu-Tuy and Masugbu-Tagaytay roads to protect the right flank of the 11th A/B Division.

On 2 February 1945 early in the morning, the combat battalion advanced along the highway from Palico Junction to Tuy. Two assault platoons dispersed the Japs resistance along the highway and killed two Japs. The Japanese retreated southward then veered to the west. Tuy was occupied before the hour 1200. CP was established at the municipal building where the American flag was hoisted. Civilians asked to return. Patrols sent to all direction from Tuy to detect enemy locations. Major Vanderpool's orders were accomplished.

BATTLE OF
MALIBU-PALING-
KARO

On 3 February 1945, strong Japanese concentrations at the barrios of Malibu and Palingkaro were attacked by the combat battalion. The enemy was routed. Twenty six (26) Japanese were counted dead and one (1) captured. Said battalion was under the personal command of Colonel Mariano H. Gabarrubia. The captured Jap was turned over to the Hq of the 11th A/B Division. The following were captured from the JAPS: One (1) 77 mm howitzer, one (1) mortar, thirty three rifles, three (3) cartloads of supplies and mine (9) hoisted. The capture Jap revealed the locations of land mines along the road to Calatagan. The action eliminated the menace of a Japanese attack on the right flank of the American Army.

SUMMARY OF
JAPS KILLED
AND CAPTURED
WHILE HQ WAS
AT TUY

The Rainbow Regiment maintained strong combat patrols along the road from Palico Junction to Tuy and from Tuy to Balayan. Patrols engaged the Japanese in combat actions in the barrios of Tuy and east of Tagaytay highway. During the period from 1 February to 16 February 45 when the HQ of the Rainbow Regiment was at Tuy it had accounted for fifty (50) Japanese dead, three (3) captured and turned over to the HQ of the 11th A/B Division and various arms and supplies from the enemy.

LIBERATION
OF BALAYAN
AND PREPARA-
TION FOR DEFENSE

On 16 February 1945, the Guerrilla Hq at Tagaytay City thru Capt. Schoemer ordered Colonel Mariano H. Gabarrubia to liberate Balayan and hold it all cost. At 3:00 PM the town of Balayan was liberated. Different sectors of defense were prepared against Japanese attack which may come from the west (Sampiro stronghold) or from the east (Wakubak fortification). Barrio folks and other civilians were urged to stay within the perimeter of defense. CP was established at the Periculture Building and the American flag was raised for the first time in three years. The Japs repeatedly attacked the town but were always repulsed. In the evening of the same day (11:00PM) a strong force of Japanese attacked in the west from Binabang river. The Japs were repulsed. One Japanese found dead in the morning and a civilian was killed by the Japs.

JAPS ATTACKS
FROM THE WEST
AND EAST RE-
PULSED

On 17 February 1945, the Japs in a big and strong force launched the attack at 12:30 PM. They used mortars, machine guns and rifles. After an exchange of fire for one and half hour, the Japs retreated in the direction of Sampiro. The enemy suffered a casualty of twenty five. A force of thirty Japanese, vanguard of a strong force from Wakubak tried to penetrate the eastern sector. The enemy retreated and turned the house of Jose Lopez Mansano.

After two weeks of operation, the Commanding General of the 11th Airborne Division found out that he has forty two thousand (42,000) guerrillas in the area. To feed them will exhaust the supply of the army in two weeks. On 19 February 1945, the following memorandum to Guerrilla Units was released:

MEMORANDUM: Guerrilla Troops

AUTHORITY TO
ORGANIZE COM-
BAT COMPANIES

UNITS INDUCTED BY
MAJOR VANDERPOOL
IN THE AREA HUN-
TERS ROTC
RAINBOW REGT, AUSA
RILLO-NERI UNIT
GAGALAC UNIT
LICOFA UNIT

1. Purpose:- The purpose of this memorandum is to prescribe the operation of Guerrilla Troops within the 11th Airborne Division zone of responsibility.
2. Composition:- Only those Guerrilla Units authorized and inducted by this headquarters (through Major Vanderpool) will be recognized.
3. Organization:- Authorized guerrillas will be organized into companies with numerical or alphabetical designations, administered in accordance with pertinent United States Army regulations.
4. Armament and Equipment: -Only members of Guerrilla Units recognized by this headquarters are authorized to carry weapons and use U.S. equipment. Identification credential needed (excerpt)
5. Operation:-(a) Guerrilla companies will be attached to regiments by division order.
(b) Initially, each infantry battalion will have one guerrilla company attached for operations, administration and supply. Ultimately guerrilla battalions of four companies each will be organized and subject to call of the Philippine Army.
(c) Formal administration records (MR's, Sick Books, etc.,) will be maintained by each company.
6. Unauthorized:- Commanders are directed to confiscate all weapons and government property found in possession of unauthorized Filipino groups or individuals within their zone of responsibility.

By command of Major General
SWING:

s/ Alex Williams Jr.
t/ ALEX WILLIAMS JR.
Colonel GSC.
Chief of Staff

GUERRILLA UNITS
CONFERENCE

Following this order, Captain Schooner, Guerrilla Coordinator at Tagaytay City, called a conference of all representatives of the Guerrilla Units inducted by Major Vanderpool, GSC. On 22 February 1945, the following units were ordered to organize corresponding combat companies:

AUTHORIZED
STRENGTH FOR
UNIT CONCERNED

Hunters ROTC - Staff with three combat companies
Rainbow Regiment - Staff with two combat companies
Rillo Neri Unit - Staff and a company
Gagalac Unit - Staff and a company
Licopa Unit - Staff and a company

COMBAT ROSTERS

It was further agreed in the conference that all roster of troops of the combat companies will be submitted on or before 3 March 1945. Together with the roster of the combat companies, the Unit commanders were required to submit and Alphabetical Roster of Troops for the members who were disbanded effective 5 March 45, so that whatever compensation or remuneration the US government will give in the future, those claims may be adjusted accordingly.

DISBANDED
MEMBERS

In compliance to this order the Rainbow Regiment submitted the required rosters. The CO expressed his regret that the services of the rest of his men were dispensed with. The Rainbow Regiment operated with the authorized strength.

On 26 February 1945, the following instruction was issued by Major Jay D. Vanderpool.

GENERAL GUERRILLA HEADQUARTERS
Central Luzon

26 FEB. 1945

SUBJECT : LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS
TO : ALL GUERRILLA UNITS OF THIS COMMAND

TRANSFER OF
COMMAND FROM
MAJOR VANDER-
POOL TO 11TH
A/B DIRECT

1. Due to the fine combat record established by the Guerrilla Organizations in this area, Major General Swing, Commanding General of the 11th Airborne Division has directed that all of the Guerrilla Units now under this Command be attached to his division immediately.

2. All Guerrilla Organization will be immediately attached for Command, rations and supply as indicated below:

ATTACHMENT TO
11TH A/B UNIT

Attached to 187 AB Inf. (Col. Hidebrand)
Markings Fil-American (Erne)
AUSA Golden and Rainbow Regts
(Followed by other attachments and Instructions 3 to 17)

s/ Jay D. Vanderpool
t/ JAY D. VANDERPOOL
Major, GSC

After this instruction, the Rainbow Regiment was attached to the 187th AB Inf. of the 11TH Airborne Division and draw rations from same.

ATTACKS ON
THE MAKUKAK
STRONGHOLD

On 21 February 1945, the first attack at the Makukak stronghold was begun. The rainbow Regiment was reinforced by an ROTC Hunters detachment under Major Sebal. The Japs position was shelled by a mortar. The men advanced from the west and the south. In spite of intense enemy fire the first line of defense was occupied. On account of darkness and advantageous position of the enemy, the attack was not pushed through. Several Japanese were killed and wounded three of them counted in the outer defenses. On our side three were seriously wounded. The attack was resumed four days later but it was called off on account of the interference of another unit.

On 5 March 1945, the 158th Regimental Combat Team established HQ at Balayan and the guerrilla units in the area passed to its command.

HEADQUARTERS
158TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
APO 70

4 March 1945

GUERRILLA
CONTROL PAS-
SED TO 158RH
RCT

TO: Commanding Officer, 187th F/G Regiment, 11th A/B Division
APO 468

1. General Guerrilla Command in the Palayan Area, pass to control to the CG 158th RCT per VOUG 11th A/B Division effective 00011 5 March 1945.

2. Hunters ROTC; Rainbow Regiment, AUSA; Rillo-Meri Unit, Gagalac Unit, Licopa Unit pass to control of General Guerrilla Command per VOUG 11th A/B Division effective 00011 5 March 1945.

For the Commanding General:

a/ ROBERT BLIEDEN
t/ ROBERT BLIEDEN
Major Infantry
S - 2

The same day, the CO of the Rainbow Regiment received the following attack orders from Major Blieden.

ATTACK ORDERS
FOR RAINBOW
REGIMENT

1. ATTACK SAMPIRO AND TAKE ENEMY POSITION ESPECIALLY GUN EMPLACEMENTS.
2. FURNISH 25 MEN TO SPEARHEAD THE ADVANCE TO LESERY UNDER MAJOR IAT.
3. FURNISH 25 MEN TO MOPUP ENEMY POSITION AT MAKUKAK.

COMPLIANCE
TO ORDER

The first battle of Sampiro began at 00011 when a company of Rainbow Combat Bn under Colonel Mariano H. Cabarrubia established his company 800 meters from the enemy positions. He was accompanied by twenty Americans under Lt. L. Nivels who will direct the artillery fire from the town five kilometers away. The shelling started at 11 o'clock until noon. At 2:00 o'clock, the assault began. The first gun emplacement was captured in spite of the enemy resistance. The firing pin of the canon was removed by Lt. Nivels. Due to the approach of night, the company prepared to retire. Enemy reinforcements arrived from Calatagan and Mt. Pintong Itim. Our side sustained heavy casualties with two missing and ten wounded, one dying later on. Seven Japs dead were accounted for.

FIRST BATTLE
OF SAMPIRO

Lt. Venancio Daquigan spearheaded the advance to Lesery. One of his men was seriously wounded and brought to the Leyten Hospital by plane. Another twenty five men under Lt. Manigas mopped up the Japanese position at Makukak. A patrol at Nagahis under Maj. Calingasan attacked the Japs killing two of them but his men suffered a casualty of one dead.

On 8 March 1945, the second attack order for Sampiro was received for the following day.

SECOND AT-
TACK ORDER
FOR SAMPIRO

1. PREPARE LARGEST NUMBER OF MEN AVAILABLE FOR COMBAT ACTION AT SAMPIRO
2. TAKE SAMPIRO AT ALL COST
3. OPERATION OFFICER - MAJOR KILLING

SECOND ATTACK
ON SAMPIRO

The second attack at Sampiro was made on 8 and 9 March 1945. The attacking force was composed a company of Americans under Capt. Green, a company of the Rainbow Regiment under Col. Mariano H. Cabarrubia and a company of Hunters ROTC under Lt.

SAMFERO TAKEN
AND POSITION
DESTROYED

Col. Juanito Ferrer. The commanding officer was Major Killing. On the first day of the attack the Japanese position was not taken. The force had to bivouac for the night at the village. On the second day after a heavy artillery barrage, the assault was started in the afternoon. The Rainbow Regiment, occupying the right flank and near the mountain side advanced and reached the first gun emplacement in spite of the fierce resistance. to the next gun emplacement which was also captured. The Americans destroyed the canons. The Rainbow Regiment sustained a casualty of two killed and one wounded while a total of seventy six (76) Japanese were killed.

MOOPING UP
OPERATIONS
AND PATROLLING

From 10 March to 27 March 1945, the date the guerrilla control passed to Lt. Col. James Farren, CO, 152nd AA Bn, our unit engaged mainly in mopping up operations, sending patrols against the Japs and guarding the bridges. On the same period, we had killed twelve Jap, captured five and lost one man in action. From 27 March to 5 April 1945 our unit was engaged in patrolling the whole sector of responsibility comprising the towns of Balayan, Tuy, Lian and Calatagan. Our combat patrols accounted for two Japs killed.

BATTLE OF
PATOGO

Beginning 6 April 1945, the area was under the command of the Guerrilla Headquarters at Teal, Patangas, under Lt. A. P. MacDonald. The Rainbow Regiment was assigned the biggest sector of responsibility covering the region west of the road from Balayan to Tuy comprising of the municipalities of Calatagan, Lian, Tuy and Balayan. Activities were confined to sending out patrols, mopping up operations on designated sectors, guarding bridges and helping other units at the called of the Guerrilla HQ.

On 8 May 1945, Capt. Tibay of the Gold Area Unit asked for reinforcement because his patrol at Patogo was outnumbered by the Japs. A platoon under Captain Cunamay was sent to help. On 9 May 1945, the battle of Patogo commenced. Captain Tibay and Capt. Cunamay attacked the Japs in the vicinity of Patogo. The Rainbow detachment killed fourteen Japanese on its flank. The enemy resisted fiercely with TM, MGs of light and heavy caliber, rifles and grenades. Superiority of number and fire power forced the guerrillas to withdraw. In the engagement, two of our men were killed and Captain Cunamay was hit by a grenade and brought to the US Army hospital.

OPERATIONS
WITH OTHER
UNITS

Besides taking care of our sector of responsibility, our men were engaged in mopping up operations in other sector. Our unit participated in the campaign at the Calaca area and at the Cahil-Maragtagat operations. The last mopping up operation engaged to by the unit was from 6 June to 8 June 1945 when our unit helped in the Cahil-Maragtagat operation. Our detachment was able to account for eleven Japs killed with no casualty on our side.

PROCESSED AT
CAMP MURPHY

The Rainbow Regiment was ordered to report to Camp Murphy on 13 June 1945. In the morning of that day trucks of the United States Army picked the battalion consisting of two companies and the staff. All arms and equipment were brought. Upon arrival at Camp Murphy, the arms were turned over to the proper authority.

SEQUENCE OF
ATTACHMENTS
UNDER THE
11TH A/B DI-
VISION

The Rainbow Regiment was attached to the 11th Airborne Division of the United States 6th Army through Major Jay D. Vanderpool on 1 February 1945. On 26 February 45, the Rainbow Regiment was attached for Command, ration and supplies to the 187th AB Inf. under Col. Hildebrand. On 5 March 1945 the Regiment passed to the control of the 158th RCT. On 27

March 1945, it was attached to Col. Farren's 152nd AA Bn. On 6 April 1945 the command of the Balayan Area passed to the control of Lt. A. P. MacDonald of the Guerrilla Headquarters at Taal, Batangas. The Rainbow Combat Battalion remained under this control until 13 June 1945 when it was processed. The date of recognition was 21 February 1945.

SUMMARY OF
CASUALTIES
OF THE ENEMY
and our men

During the operations under the United States Army, the Rainbow Regiment was able to inflict upon the enemy the following casualties: Killed Japanese --199; Captured --9. Many arms and supplies were also captured. On the other hand, the casualties we suffered were the following: Killed in action -- 6; Wounded -- 17. (All figures based on the S-2 Reports submitted to the U. S. Army during period of attachment) The arms captured from the enemy during this period were turned over to the United States Army officers.

During the entire operation of the Rainbow Regiment from the time of inception in 1942 until the last date of attachment to the 11th Airborne Division on 13 June 1945, it had accounted for 318 Japs killed and 9 captured. On our side it was hard to determine the casualties during the operations against the Japs for whenever our operatives failed to return to the mountain GP he may either be caught by the Japs and executed or just missing. There was an unwritten code among our underground that any one caught should not involve any one else but heroically face the consequences alone. If any one squealed and live, he will forever be an outcast or be eventually liquidated;

s/ Mariano H. Cabarrubia
t/ MARIANO H. CABARRUBIA ASN C-70940
Colonel Infantry (Guerrilla)
CO Rainbow Regiment & Rainbow
Combat Battalion, Malakas Division
(AUSA)

A TRUE COPY:

RICHARD KYLE
Chief, Statistics Branch
Records and Fiscal Division

2304 Fortieth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
9 October 1947

TO: Commanding General
Philippine-Ryukyus Command
APO 707 (Manila)
Philippines

Attention: Chief of Claims Service

Subject: Saulog Guerrillas

1. Inclosed herewith is a copy of a letter from Colonel Lorenzo Saulog, former Commanding Officer of the Saulog Guerrillas. As you will note, Colonel Saulog has requested that I verify that he and his Saulog Guerrillas were organized guerrilla troops.

2. Colonel Saulog is known personally to me. He attended several conference prior to the landing operations of the 11th Airborne Division at Nasugby, Batangas, which I held with the several guerrilla commanders in the area immediately south of the city. At these conference, we patched up differences between the various organization and prepared plans in support of the coming operations by the United States forces.

3. During the attack on Manila, Colonel Saulog's combat unit was employed on the right flank of the 11th Airborne Division. He held the right flank against numerous counter-attacks by the enemy. This organization, by holding the right flank and protecting the rear lines of communication enabled the attacking infantry regiments to employ their entire strength at the point of the wedge being driven into the city.


4. The Saulog Guerrillas were also extensively used during the attack on Manila to comb out all of the Japanese snipers who filtered through the lines every night and cut the lines of communication at daybreak.

5. The Saulog regiment did a good job for the 11th Airborne Division. The unit was employed along-side of the U. S. Army rifle companies and held up their end of the load. I recommend that Colonel Saulog and the Saulog Guerrillas be credited for the work that they did in support of the United States forces in the Liberation of the Philippines and receive such reward as may be deemed appropriate for organizations who participated in the tactical operations.

/s/ J. D. Vanderpool
/t/ J. D. VANDERPOOL
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

1 Incl:
Letter from Colonel Lorenzo Saulog

A TRUE COPY:


RICHARD KYLE
Chief, Statistics Branch
Records and Fiscal Division

Malagasang Primero, Imus, Cavite
September 19, 1947

Lt. Col. Jay D. Vanderpool
2304 40th Street NW
Washington, D. C.
United States of America

My dear Col. Vanderpool:

I hope you have not forgotten me. Since your departure from the Philippines, I have not heard from you.

Well, how are you getting along, Colonel? I Hope you are doing fine.

In this connection, I wish to inform you that my unit, commonly known as SAULOG GUERRILLAS is not as yet recognized. Will you kindly help me facilitate the recognition of my unit in the way of writing to the Commanding General, PHILRYCOM, Manila, requesting for the recognition of any Unit? I hope you will grant me this favor.


All letters you sent to me were already at AFWESPAC (PHILRYCOM) but the officer in charge of recognition of guerrillas has not given credit to your letters.

Hoping for your prompt favor, and please write me too of the action taken of the above matter.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Lorenzo Saulog
/t/ LORENZO SAULOG
Colonel
Commanding Officer
Saulog Guerrillas

A TRUE COPY:


RICHARD KYLE
Chief, Statistics Branch
Records and Fiscal Division

HISTORY & ACTIVITIES - RAINBOW REGIMENT, MALAKAS DIV.

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