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TITLE : VOLCKMAN HISTORY
ORIGIN : HQ USAFIP NORTH LUZON CAMP SPENCER
DATE : 26 NOV. 1945
AUTHENTICITY : CARBON SIGNED
SOURCE : LIVING CLAIMS SECTION PROJECT "J"
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DECLASSIFIED Authority A/V DSSSOR

HEADQUARTERS USAFIP NORTH LUZON CAMP SPENCER

26 November 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment of Date of Recognition of "UNITED STATES ARIED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, NORTH LUZON"

THRU : Commanding General, American Forces Western Pacific

TO : Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC, APO 500

ATTN : Chief of Staff

- 1. Request that recognition be accorded the component of the "UNITED STATES ANNED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, NORTH LUZON", commanded by Colonel N W VOLCKLANN (1) a regular pert of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East throughout the war, or (2) if this request can not be granted, request that the component parts be recognized as a regular parts of the UNITED STATES ARRED FORCES IN THE FAR EAST during the periods of their activation or organization. By "recognition" is meant classification as (1) Army of the United States Troops, or (2) Philippine Army Troops.
- 2. Inclosed as Emilbit "A" appears a chart for further details showing the dates of organization and other pertinent information regarding the various units of UNITES STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, NORTH LUZON, as compiled from available data to support request ands above.
- a. "Requested Date of Recognition" indicated in chart is based on the best available evidence found to date. See corresponding exhibits inclosed which are indicated after such unit in the Chart.
- b. Under column 3 in the chart is "Bate of Redesignation, Inactivation or Reorganization of some of the units. Data are based on exhibits attached which are best evailable information on hand. If necessary, also request that orders be issued by higher headquarters redesignating, inactivating or reorganizing the units. This headquarters has already issued such orders because of necessity.

NOTE: * - indicates units redesignated

** - indicates units inactivated

*** - indicates units reorganized

and XX"

as enumerated by various commanders of units of "Marre policies" and property of the state of th

3. At the present time, this organization has been recognized as of 9 January 1945, by latter, subject: "Recognization of Guerrilla brits, Recagnization, Glitch Long, and April 1945 (True Extract Course Bright Long, Stath Long, Stath

4. A brief history of the United States ismed Forces in the Philippines, Earth Luson, subsitted for the purpose of supporting the requests made in paragraph 1, above, follows:

about Petrumy, 1942, the United States Ecress in the Philippines in about Petrumy, 1942, the United States Ecress in the Philippines were given the separate designation of "United States Armed Porces in the Philippines", and placed under Licutement General Jonathan Whiteright's command. This fact is mentioned to establish the criterions of a command called "United States Armed Forces in the Philippines". The facts mentioned below will attempt to establish in brief -

(1) That a considerable number of units and individuals of recognized USAFFE units were cut off in Horth Luxon during the priod free the outbreak of the war to the beginning of the battle of Estamns

(2) That salid the battle of Estaen started, higher and the started and the started and the started higher and the started and other started and the started and started and and start

(3) That these units that were authorized, organized and functioned to the limit

of their capabilities under the senior American or Filipino unsurrendered officer throughout the war (1941-1945 inclusive):

(4) That when General Wahmright surrendered and issued orders for all units in the Philippines to surrender the existing units in North Luzon surrendered only to a minor degree although the senior communities did surrender;

That the reason the units in North Luzon only partially surrendered was because senior officers who did not surrender doubted the validity of General Wainwright's surrender orders and the surrender orders of senior officers in North Luzon on the grounds that orders were given by General Wainwright after he was in the hands of the enemy. Also in a speech General Wainwright made over a Jap controlled Manila radio station, he stated in gist "circumstances beyond my control caused me to order now the surrender of the forces under General Sharp (in the Visayan Islands), Colonel Horan and Colonel Warner".

(6) That after the partial surrender of units in North Luzon, a message was received by one of the units in North Luzon from Genoral MeaCatthur? Headquarters which definitely made General Weimwright's surrender orders, at least as far as that unit was concerned, illegal; (See Exhibit WW inclosures attached thereto.)

(7) That after the surrender of Corregidor, at least one (1) additional Regiment was authorized in North Luzon by General MacArthur's

Headquarters;

(8) That other whits not specifically authorized by higher headquarters were formed in North Lusen on orders of the senior officer as was possible and as the situation made it necessary or advisable;

(9) That all units authorized by higher headquarters and those formed on orders of the senior officer in North Luzon functioned

continuously;

(10) That after the surrender of Corregidor, authorized units in North Luzan continued to function independently until they were brought under effective centralized command; (11) and, finally, that therefore the units in North Luzon maintained continuous existence and operations against the enemy in North Luzon from 1941 to 1945, inclusive, and therefore should be accorded recognition throughout their periods of activation as regular USAFFR (AUS or PA) troops and not as guerrillas.

b. Between 8 December 1941 and 24 December 1941. parts of or all of the following USAFFE units were committed in action against the enemy in North Luzon or were in North Lagons

> 11th Infantry Division (PA) Provisional Buttalion, 43rd Infantry (PS)

Troop C. 26th Cavalry (PS)

71st Infantry Regiment (PA) A Tank Destroyer Battalion

some were not)

91st Infantry Regiment (PA) A Detachment of the Philippine Department

Air Warning Company Various Philippine Constabulary Units (Some of which were a part of UBAFFE and

e. Between 8 December 1941 and 24 December 1941, the enemy cut Highway 11 (from Reserio to Bagnio) and High-way 6 (from Bewang to Bagnio) and the reads from Dagnio to Bontoc (on 25th December 1941), and from Bangue to Bagabag were demolished. Those factors made it impossible for some of the units sentioned in paragraph 4, above, which had retreated or withdrawn to or were in Baguio to carry out orders received by Lt Col JOHN P HORAK, senior renking commander in the Baguio area, to rejoin (by road) the main body of USAFFE. which at the time was retreating or withdrawing to Bataan in accordance with the provisions of the "Grange Plan" (a plan for the defense of Luzon formulated senetime prior to the outbreak of the war). As a consequence, it dol Horan elected to attempt to carry out his orders by withdrawing to the East utilizing trails rather than roads. Two (2) columns marched out from Baguio toward Highway 5. The northernmost column took the route Baguio-Bokod-Bobok-Pampang-Aritao. The southernmost column took the route Baguic-Twin-River-Lused Sawmill-Dayaka-Pampang-Imugan-Santa Fe-Carranglan. After leaving Baguio, Col Horan received instructions from higher headquarters to "Save your command. Take to the mountain trails", It is not known for certain whether he was able to transmit these orders to Lt Col BONESTT, the officer in command of the northern column, but it is believed he was unable to. However, Col Horan elected to attempt to still carry out his orders to rejoin the main body of USAFFE until he reached Highway

No. 5 with the southarm column only to find that the enemy had out that also. Tothber of the columns were able to got through to rejoin the main body of the USAFFE in their entirety. As consequence, there were in North Husen many USAFFE units, some of which were badly disorganized, and may straggies who were separated from the main body of USAFFE which by the first part of January, 1942, had withdrawn into Bataan.

d. Two (2) officers, namely Lt Col JOHN P HORAN and Major EVERETT WARNER, independently from each other, set about the task of reorganizing the units that had been dis-Organized and cut off in Morth Luxon. On or about 15 January 1942, Lt Col Horan, senior ranking officer in North Luzon, issued a general order being the senior ranking Usaffe officer in Morth Luzon, be assumble command of all Usaffe troops in North Luzon and authorized unit commanders to recruit men to maintain their units to full strongth, to attach members of units that no longer existed and to commandeer army equipment in the hands of civilians, (See Exhibit "D" etteched hereto), He, at the time, was not in contact with higher headquarters or with Major Warner. Meanwhile, Major Warner had reorganized the troops that were disbanded or cut off in or came to the Province of Nueva Viscaya. He later contacted higher headquarters by radio and received authority to organize the 14th Infantry, PA. It is believed he received this authority in January 1942. Col Moran at first reorganized the 43rd Infantry (PS) (See Exhibit "B" inclosed) and set about expanding it into two (2) battalions. He subsequently received authority by ra-dio to organize the 121st Infantry (PA) as of 5 april 1942 (See Exhibit "C" attached hereto).

rity from Coll Horan to least Coll Horan began operating indepandently against the enemy in North Lazon in the province of Gasgyan, Major Pracegor's unit was Troop C. 20th Gavalry (F6), (See Enthiti '68" attached hereto). Major Panegar assumed he had authority to maintain his unit up to strength, that is, to replace men who became casualties. During January and Pabruary, 1942, it is believed Major Fanegar was able to make reports on his activities through Major Warner's transmitter.

f. From the above facts, it can be seen that during the period that the Bettle of Beteau was going on, there were operating in North Lucen against the enemy the following recognized units of Wampfe to the limit of their capabilities:

(1) 1st and 2nd Battalions, 43rd Inf (PS)

2) 121st Infantry Regiment (PA) 3) Troop C, 26th Cavalry (PS) 4) 14th Infantry Regiment (PA)

4rc

g. Shorthy after the surrender of Corregidor, orders were received by Gol Horan, Commanding Officer, 121st infantry (PA) and Commanding Officer, United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon; Major (Lt Col) Warner, Commanding Officer, 14th Infantry (PA); and Major Gitter, Commanding Officer, 43rd Infantry (PS) troops, through various sources that they were to surrender with their commands, All of the above named commanders surrendered with at least part of their commands with the axception of Praeger who refused to surrender. Also the surrender of the 121st Infantry, 14th Infantry (PA) and the 43rd Infantry (PS) troops was far from complete. In each of these organizations, there were senior officers who doubted the validity of the surrender orders. As a consequence, in each of these organizations, the senior ranking unsurrendered officer issued orders directing that there would be no further surrender and assumed command of the organization. The senior ranking unsurrendered officer of the 121st Infantry, PA, was Captain WALTER CUSHING; of the 14th Infantry, Major GUILLERMO MAKAR; of the 43rd Infantry (PS), Colonel PARKER CALVERT (then Captain).

h. Thus, it can be seen that in spite of surrender orders, each of the recognized USAFFE units in North Luzon continued in existence and continued to operate against the enemy within its capabilities after the surrender of Corregidor. Sometime in the later part of June, 1942, a radiogram was received by the 14th Infantry (PA) from Headquarters, SWPA, (Signed MacARTHUR), relieving the 14th Infantry (PA) from General Wainwright's command and placing it directly under Headquarters, SEPA. PRIOR & to the surrender of Corregidor, and as a reward for not surrendering, redesignating the 14th Infantry (PA) as the 14th Infantry (AUS). (See Exhibit "Mu"attached hereto). Subsequently, about two hundred of its members were assigned AUS serial numbers. At the time no other unit in North Luzon was on contact with Headquarters, SWPA, or Headquarters, SWPA, was not fully appraised of the situation in North Luzon and bence the other recognized USAFFE units were not given such orders. However, it is believed that such orders would have been forthcoming had there been contact. When most of the recognized units were notified of the contents of the above-mentioned radiogram, it was assumed or at least hoped that they enjoyed a similar status. In effect, the radiogram received by the 14th Infantry (PA) legalized its not surrendering even should the surrender orders have been valid.

i. In May, 1942, Ools Martin Hoses and Arthur K Hoble, having secaped from Bataen, made their way to Horth Lazon, staying in the vicinity of Bokod, Benguet, it Province, P. I. At first, these officers rested and took no active parts in the activities in Rorth Luzon. However, meanwhile, they were acquainting themselves with the situation, In July, 1942, Gol Moses authorized a Lioutenant RUFINO BALWHE (an escapes from the lith Division in Batqan) to reorganize the 2nd Battelion, 11th Infantry, Ph.

i. Col Parker Calvert, then captain, was assigned to the 43rd Infantry (PS) at the outbreak of the war. In Carranglan, Mueva Ecija, on 1 January 1942, he, with another of-ficer, an American enlisted man and a Latvian civilian, was granted sutherity by Col Heran to attempt to rejoin the main body of USAFFE that was withdrawing to Bataan. He (Col Calvert) was unsuccessful in accomplishing this mission. He returned to North Luzon after having made his way as far south as Montalban, Rizal, in March, 1942 Captain Calvert made his way as far as Matenin, Bontoc. There, on or about 29 May 1942, he received confirmation of the rumors regarding the surrender of Gol Horan. There by telephone call from Major Leo F Giitter, he received orders to surrender himself and the Detachment of men under him. He doubted the validity of the orders to surrender. The only solution he could see to the orders he had received was to stall for time agreeing to surrender at a later date. He received authority from Major Glitter, 43rd Infantry [F3] to proceed south to contact the Detachment of the 43rd Infantry [F8] and miscellaneous other men who had reported to Captain Calvert while at Lusod Sawmill and whom he had left there under the command of 1st Lleutenant ARTHUR P MUNTHY, 43rd Infantry (PS). Captain Calvert proceeded south arriving in the vicinity of Bokod, Benguet, on or about 9 June 1942, there contacted Lt Col Martin Moses and Lt Col Arthur K Noble (escapees from Bataan) and told them of the surrender of Col Horen, the planned surrender of Major Glitter with a part of the 43rd Infantry (PS) on or about 1 June 1942 at Talubin, Bontoc, of his orders to surrender, and reported to Col Moses for duty and instructions. However, he (Moses) advised him (Colvort) not to surrender, to disperse temporarily the remaining men under his command (the men left with 1st Lt Arthur P Murphy). At the time both Cols Moses and Noble considered themselves officers in North Luzen having no commmand status. Captain Calvert, en route south to Boked, contacted at Hapao, Ifugao, a PS soldier (Sergeant GEROWIMO CARO) and directed him to advise scouts in the vicnity to await instructions from him regarding Major Giitter's surrender orders. (It is believed Sergeant Gamo transmitted these orders). Sometime in the later part of July or first part of August, Captain Calvert assumed command of the remnants of the 43rd Infantry (FS) redesignating the unit as the "Detachment, 43rd Infantry (FS)" as of 1 June 1942 (the date date of ditter's surrender). The men, Captain Calvert assumed command of, were "all unsurrendered PS soldiers of the 43rd Infantry (PS)". He believed that there were about sixty (60) unsurrendered men in Ifugao and Bontoc who were unsurrendered. In his own Detachment, there were about forty (40) men who were undergoing training

at this time. We had recruited more men and a few additional unnurrandered PS soldars had reported to this. In the later this reported to this. In the later this reported to this. In the later this result is a superficient of the province, to excert Captain Galvert and the troops he had agreed to surender to the Japanese in Beguio. Captain Calvert was not, however, present at the designated meeting point. Major ditter, however, cause on to Boinced, Hr Province, and there found Captain Calvert and again ordered his to surrender, threatening him with court martial action if he did not. Captain Galvert permitted Major Colitate to return to Reguio o Septem Lauret permitted Major Colitate to return to Reguio o Septem Lauret permitted Major Colitate to return to Reguio o Septem had 1942 with a part of the lateralitate, 43rd Infantry (PS). Major Citter enroute back to Reguio, disaprace several men of Captain Calvert's command with the plan of surrendering the arms to the Japanese. However, the plan was themsried by a group of American Civilians who fired upon Major Cititer upon his return to Raguio causing Major Cititer to absende cargadors and all except hisself.

k. In September, 1942, Col Moses authorized the reorganization or organization of the following units:

(1) Headquarters Company, 12th Infantry, PA. (See Exhibit "J".)

(2) Unit Commanded by a Lieutement FISH whom

(3) Moses commissioned, (See Exhibit "4".)
Guerrilla units in Southern Benguet and
Northern Pangasinan placed under the command of let it FREECH. (See Exhibit "4".)

1. Also, in September, 1942; Col Moses ordered a limited offensive against the enemy to begin October 15, 1942 for the purpose of harmssing the enemy's communications and of getting supplies. This offensive was taken part in by the following units which accepted orders from Col Moses: (See Exhibit Wf.)

(1) 2nd Bn, 11th Infantry Regiment (PA)

(2) LAPHAM'S Guerrillas (3) CUSHING'S Guerrillas

(4) 121st Infantry Regiment (FA) units in Ilocos Sur and La Union under the command of 1st Lt GEORGE M BARNETT.

(5) Detachment, 43rd Infantry (PS)

(6) Lieutenant FISH's Unit (7) Headquarters Co, 12th Infantry Regiment (PA)

a. The date as of which Col Moses assumed command of units in North Lucon cannot definitely be fixed as no orders or testimony on the matter are available. An indication

of the approximate date can be gleaned from the fact that Col Moses authorized the organisation of the 2nd Mathalion, 11th Infantry (PA) on or about 12 July 1942 (See Exhibit "7") and the letter attached herets, dated 19 September 1942, to Captain Bernett. (See Exhibit "7"). From the above facts, it is believed that Gole Moses and Moble did not know exactly what their status were in not having surrendered on orders to Switch when their status were in not having surrendered on orders to Switch when the status were the not having surrendered on orders to Switch when the status were the not having surrendered on orders to Switch when the status were the not become a regimental commander in Batan, they shorthly decided to reorganize their respective Toggiments, the 12th Infantry Regiment, 75, and the 2nd FC Infantry Regiment, 75, and the 2nd FC Infantry Regiment.

n. In Hovember, 1942, Cols Messs and Hoble made their way north passing through the Provinces of Ifugao, Bontoc, Kalinga and Apayao. Col Moses contacted Mejor Freeger in Apayae and with his transmitter, in Formany and March, 1943, contacted Headquarters, SFRA, and received orders confirming his (Moses) acts since arriving in Horth Lucan and authorizing his (Moses) acts since arriving in Horth Lucan and authorizing his to reorganize the 12th Infentry Raginent (PA). He also received orders in gist which were as follows:

(1) Lay low (2) Perfect organization and training

(3) Gather and transmit intelligence information (4) Law plans for future action againt the enemy (5) Take action as you deem necessary (See Exhibit (8))

c. thile in Irugeo, Col Moses authorized a Captain Manalo whom he appointed a Major to organize a battalion the designation of which is not known. This unit may have been part of the 2nd FC Regiment that was being reorganized by Col Moble. Government of the companies of the

p. While in Kalinga, Col Moses authorized a Major all al Raschie to organize a unit the designation of which is not known. This unit was also thoroughly disorganized by the chemy. Its commanding officer was captured. (See Exhibit "O".)

q. The orders received by Col Moses from Headquarters, SEFA, were transmitted to all units commanded by them. (See Exhibit "PO, and Exhibit "QQ").

r. In June, 1942, Cols Moses and Noble were captured by the enemy in a barrio near Lubuagan, Kalinga.

s. Col (then Major) RESSELL W VOLCKMANN, an escapee from Batean, and a member of the 11th Division (FA) who had arrived in Morth Luzon in September 1942, and who was the next senior unsurrendered officer in Morth Luzon, assumed command

of the units commanded by Col Moses as of 1 June 1943.

t. Major Volckmann continued to carry out the orders which had been transmitted to Col Moses in February and March, 1943.

u. During the period Col Moses was in command of forces in North Luzon, it became necessary to use code names for units and persons so the actual designation of whole command under his was never made clear. In other words, it was not clear even after contact was established with Meadquarters, SNFA, in Pebruary and Harch 1943, whether the forces were recognized as "United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon", or as guerrila units.

v. After Major Volckmann took command of USAFIP, HI, some organisation of the units was necessary which was accomplished. The major units, namely: the Lelst Infantry (PA) and the 14th Infantry (PA) continued to function. In addition during the period from 1 June 1943 to date, the following units were authorized and formed:

1) 15th Infantry Regiment (PA) 2) 11th Infantry Regiment (PA) 3) 66th Infantry Regiment (PA)

(3) 66th Infantry Regiment (PA) (4) An MP Battalion

(5) A Replacement and Casualty Battalion (6) An Engineer Battalion

(7) A Quartermaster Battalion

(8) Various necessary Headquarter Units

NOTE: (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) were organized after 9 January 1945. Recognition for them is not requested.

w. The 66th Infantry Regiment (PA) was formed from the Detachment, 43rd Infantry (PA), the 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry (PA), and the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry (PA). (See Chart for further details.)

x. Efforts were made by Major Volcimann to contact Major Praeger but it was not until the middle part of 1944 that it was definitely established that Major Praeger had been captured, and tha, most of his unit (Troop C. 26th Cavalry (PS) had been captured, had surrendered or been dispersed. (See Exhibit 'BB').

y. As has already been implied, the units which Col Moses authorized be organized by Capt Manalo and Major Ali Al



Raschid ceased to exist.

- 2. Thus, it can be seen that from the outbreak of the war up to the present date, there has been an organization in North Lagon, mest of the component parts of which have been recognized units authorized by proper higher headquarters.
- an. The organization commanded by Volckmann was designated, from the first time he assumed occamend, "WHITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, HORTH LUZON" and later, "UNITED STATES ANMED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, MORTH LUZON." (See Exhibit WO, attached hereto.)
- 5. In support of the request made in paragraph 1, above, the following additional remarks are made:
- as. The units in North Luson were at all times consents these officers assumed authority to expecte command upon the death, capture or surrenter of their immediate superior officers. It is believed that the action of an officer in assuming command in a combat area gives him the authority to reorganize existing units and to form new units as the aftern itsery situation requires. As a matter of fact, it is believed that it would be the duty of an officer assuming command to reorganize existing units and to activate new units as necessary. The following faces must be constantly borne in sind in appreciating that IF, North Lusent.
 - (1) Communications during 1941, 1942, 1943 and the first part of 1944 with higher headquarters were spasmodic and poor;
 - (2) Communications during 1941, 1942 and the first part of 1945 between units of UBAFEP, North Euron, were also spamedic and poor, thus, saking it difficult for the senior commander and subordinate commanders of large units to exercise more than nominal command;
 - (3) Units were not resupplied with assumittion or any other type of supplies in any quantity mutil late 1944 and 1945, thus making any sustained offensive or defensive action difficult at best;
 - (4) Units subsisted and drew other supplies "Off the country".
- 6. The date that recemition is accorded to component parts of USAFIP, North Lamon, anterially affects the payant for goods and services received from the outbreak of the war to date. Listed below are some of the anters that remain unsatude thich are closely related to the recognition date:

a. Settlement of claims as regards -

1) Payment for subsistence.

(2) Payment of money borrowed.(3) Payment for materials received (engines,

(4) radios, medicines, trucks, etc.)
Payment of death benefits and insurance
to families of soldiers killed in action.

(5) Payment of death benefits that may be due families of civilians killed while actively assisting the organization.

(6) Payment of disability benefits due soldiers wounded in action or due to soldiers who incurred disability otherwise in line of duty.

(7) Payment of disability benefits that may be due to civilians who incurred disability while actively assisting the organization.

(8) Payment of back pay due soldiers and civilians who were members of or employed by the organization.

(9) Award of Decorations to officers and enlisted men and civilians who accomplished acts of bravery or service that were outstanding prior to the recognition date accorded this organization.

(10) Claims arising from negligence committed by officers and enlisted men of this organization before the present date of recognition.

(11) Claims for personal injuries of civilian members of this organization before the date of recognition.

(12) Claims arising out of loss of personal property in barractes, in the field, captured by the enemy, destroyed to prevent its being captured by the enemy. Bary members of this organization lost a freat portion of their personal belongings under the above circumstances. Reimburement is ordinarily made in peace ties for such losses of personal property under Amy Regulations 25-100 even though the loss coursed in peaceful travel from one station to another. These cannot be paid if they occurred to members of this organization before the date of reconstition.

(13) Claims for which there is at present no legal bases of payment but which should be precessed and placed in shape and presented to the Compress of the United States. These claims arise from the death, torture and personal injury to civilians by the enemy for

aiding this organization for giving information to this organization and for refusing to divulge information to the Japanese Military.

b. As it now stands, payment can be and is now being made to soldiers of this command and civilians who furnished supplies or sorvices after January 9, 1945, the date of the January 8 and the state of the January 8 and the date of the January 8 and the cate had, payment can not be made to soldiers who served with this organization or civilians who furnished supplies during the long hard days of Januares occupation when the progress of American forces returning to Luzen was not fully apparent.

7. The arbitrary setting of the date of recognition at a late date works to the prejudice of soldiers who earlier joined this organization and were killed in action.

- 8. If it is necessary in order to come to a decision regarding the request made in paragraph 1 above, it is recommended that the following persons be interviewed for further information:
- a. Col John P Horan Now in the U.S.A. Address probably available at the 29th Replacement Depot in Manila, or can be reached and/or summoned, c/o The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.
- b. Col Russell W Volckmann Commanding Officer, United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon, Gamp Spencer (Darigayos, Luna, Le Union, P.I.).
- c. Col George M. Barnett Guerrilla Affairs Officer, Headquarters, USAFIP, NL, Camp Spencer.
- d. Col Parker Calvert Infantry Commander, Headquarters, USAFIP, NL, Camp Spencer.
- e. Col. Robert H Arnold At present in U.S.A.
 Can be reached c/o The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.
 Mailing Address: 109-20 192nd Street, Hollis, New York, U.S.A.
- f. Col Arthur P Murphy At present in U.S.A. Can be reached c/o The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. Mail-

ing Address: Unknown.

- g. Sergeant Geronimo Gane, 43rd Infantry (PS), 29th Replacement Depot, Manila, Philippines.
- h. Sergeant Andres Quipan, 43rd Infantry (PS), 29th Replacement Depot, Manila, Philippines.
- It Gol Rosule A Manriques, F-1074, PA. This officer may be reached and summoned of The Adjutant General, Headquarters, Philippine Army, Manila, Philippines.
- j. Major Minton, formerly 26th Gavalry (PS), c/o The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.
- k. Major Jones, formerly 26th Gavalry (PS), c/o The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.
- 1. Col Donald D. Blackburn At present in U.S.A. Can be reached c/o The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.
- m. Maj Arturo Dincong, at present on duty with this organisation.
- n. 2nd Lieut Saphia N. Al Raschid, ANG, at present on duty with this organization.
- 9. The following recommendations are made in connection with request of paragraph 1 above:
- a. That recognition be extended to component parts of USAFIF, NL, as indicated in draft order inclosed and marked Exhibit
- b. That after and if recognition is extended as requested that (1) claims of officers and enlisted men now serving with this Gommand, or formerly serving with this command for (a) back pay and (b) disability benefits (pensions) be more without delay and that these claims be handled by organizations based on recognition date of organizations, except that certain leniency be accorded on cases where claimse maintains his service with organization started prior to recognition date of unit or maintains his service with the organization lasted longer than existence of unit based on recognition date. (The necessity for this is due to slowness of communication during 1942, 1943 and 1944: (2) That claims of civilians including families of men claiming back pay, gratuity pay and insurance of a deceased soldier be promptly paid; (3) That all claims be processed and paid through the USAFIP, NL, Claims Section which will be supplemented with personnel from this command and American officers and enlisted men furnished by higher headquarters which have already been verbally requested by Col Russell W Volckmann from Beadquarters, AFWESPAC: (4) That funds be made available for the settlement of all types of claims: (5) That claims which higher headquarters cannot authorize the Claims Section.

Authority NNDSS3078

poarry, ML, to make payment on, be forwarded promptly to higher headquarters for processing and payment; and (6) That all paid claims be reviewed promptly by higher headquarters.

RUSSELL W VOLCKMANN Colonel, Infantry, Aus Commanding

51 Enels:

Exhibit "A" to "Z"

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