

EXTENDED SOJOURN IN THE PHIL ISLANDS; RUSSELL D. BARROS, LT COL, 91st CAC (PS) ASGMD 91st PA REGT

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EXTENDED SOJOURN IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; BY LT. COL. RUSSELL D. BARRON.

FROM 1 AUG 41 THRU 1945.

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BRIEF HISTORY OF LT. COL. RUSSELL D. BARROS

Extended Sojourn in the Philippine Islands.

14 July 1945.

TO: Recovered Personnel Section.

On August 1, 1941 I arrived in the Philippine Islands and was assigned to the 91st Coast Artillery (FS), on CORREGIDOR. During the month of August we planted approximately 641 controlled mines.

On September 1, 1941, I was assigned as Machine-gun instructor at the Philippine Army Officers Training School in ORMOG, LETYE. Two weeks later I was assigned as Commanding Officer of the Cadre Camp in GARRIGARA, LETYE.

On the 1st of November, troops in the GARRIGARA Camp boarded a ship for LUZON, then by bus to SAN MARCELIANO in ZAMBALES. The 91st Philippine Army Regiment (which I was now assigned as Senior instructor of the Infantry Battalion) stayed at ZAMBALES approximately 21 days and then we were moved to CABANATUAN, NUEVA ECJIA where the 91st Division Camp was located. Brig. General Stevens (PA) was the Division Commander and Colonel Carter (FS) was 91st Regimental Commander. American Instructors assigned to the 91st Regiment were as follows: Capt. Lockridge, Capt. Brown, Capt. Halgren, Capt. Godwin, Lieuts. Forres, Parks, Wides, Frans, Ward, Malcolm and Corporal White. The above American names are all that I can recall for the present. Col. Carter, Cpts. Lockridge, Godwin and myself are the only Americans that I know of who survived the fight that took place between POZORRUBIO and SISON, PANGASINAN. On December 23, 1941 at 1300 hours, we received orders to move out to LINGAYEN front. Enroute to our position we were bombed by five Japanese planes over the AGNAO River near VILLASIS bridge and our convoy was split. Our division convoy consisted of two PA Infantry Regiments and supporting field artillery. The 93rd Regiment failed to reach LUZON and was routed to MINDANAO. Result of the bombing, one killed and a few soldiers deserted. The majority of troops of the 91st Div reached POZORRUBIO between 2100 and 2200 that night. We moved into position in time to receive the full brunt of the Japanese attack. (It is well to state here that the 71st Div., the 26th Cavalry and the Tank unit were retreating when we moved to the front and approximately at 10 o'clock that night, the Japanese attacked).

Fighting continued throughout the night to about four o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, Dec. 24th. At that time practically all of our troops were either killed or had been pushed back as far as the mountains. During the night fighting it was impossible to tell whether you were shooting retreating PA soldiers or advancing Japs.

Col. Carter, Commanding Officer of the 91st Regt. was able to get back to our own forces and is alleged to have reported the 91st Regt. completely wiped out. It is my estimation that approximately one-half to about two thirds of the regiment was killed. Capt. Godwin, Senior Instructor of the 2nd B. 91st Regt. and myself proceeded down the GARABALD Mountain

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range to SAN JOSE, NUEVA ECIJA, thence down the SIERRA MADRE range to MONTALBAN in RIXAL. During the trip from POZORRUBIO to MONTALBAN, we met Lt. Hendricks and Lt. Whitehead (who were 26th Cavalry Officers), Mr. Lupton and Mr. Malsberry, the former a lumber man in BAGUIO and the latter a Mining Engineer. They all accompanied us to the town of MONTALBAN with the exception of Mr. Lupton who stopped at SIBUL Springs at the house of Attorney Francisco Dolgado former Resident Commissioner to the United States. I heard later that Mr. Lupton returned to the vicinity of BAGUIO. Travelling as we were through the foothills of the mountains and avoiding foraging Jap patrols, it was very difficult for us to reach our troops again. However, in MONTALBAN, we tried to secure transportation across MANILA Bay to CORREGIDOR or BATAAN. At this time, it was quite impossible to receive definite and whole-hearted cooperation from the people as they had heard so much about the Japanese atrocities. Practically everyone did not want to be near an American. After staying two weeks in MONTALBAN, Capt. Lockridge, Capt. Godwin and myself proceeded to ATIMONAN by way of LAGUNA DE BAY in hopes of being able to take a boat to CEBU, hence to BATAAN. At the time of our stay in the mountains of MONTALBAN, Capt. Calvert, Lt. Murphy and Cpl. Spencer were also living there along with many other Americans who had evacuated from Manila, seven of whom their names I remember as Mr. Lennihan, Mr. Walter, Mr. Sherrick, Mr. Mauer, Mr. Schaffer, Mr. Ferretta and Mr. Alexander. An attempt was made to organize Guerrillas at this time but failed because of the non support of the Filipinos due to fear of the Japanese and the failure of Americans to get together. At this time in MONTALBAN many Sakdalistas were running rampant and we had to keep one step ahead of them. They were later the cause of some Americans residing in that vicinity, to be killed or captured. Also at this time Capts. Lockridge, Godwin and myself issued arms to many of the Americans. These arms were left to us by PA men who wished to return to civilian life. At the time I proceeded to ATIMONAN, Capt. Calvert, Lt. Murphy and Cpl. Spencer returned to the vicinity of the Mountain Provinces. Before we proceeded south toward ATIMONAN, Lt. Whitehead, Lt. Hendricks and Mr. Malsberry had gone before us. We reached the vicinity of ATIMONAN, only to find out that a Japanese patrol had attacked Lt. Whitehead and party in which Lt. Hendricks was said to have been killed. (Lt. Hendricks was said to have had Malaria at this time and was walking without shoes, but managed to kill four Japs before he was killed. Lt. Hendricks death has not been actually verified but the story comes from a guide who supposedly led them.) During that time, ATIMONAN and vicinity seemed to be about 100% Sakdalista. It is difficult for me to believe that Mr. Malsberry and Lt. Whitehead were able to get out of that vicinity alive although it is a possibility that they did and I certainly hope so. Finding that we could not pass through the ATIMONAN bottle-neck and proceed to CEBU as we intended to do, Capt. Lockridge, Godwin and myself returned to the vicinity of ANTIPOLO, RIZAL. (During the return trip, we took a banca at PAETE to MORONG near ANTIPOLO. Enroute we were nearly captured at JALA JALA when a Japanese searchlight on shore picked us up. Note: At this time Capt. Lockridge defecated in his trousers for some reason or other and this left him on the receiving end of many a joke.)

There we met a young fellow by the name of Marcos V. Agustin (Marking), who was hiding out in a barrio. We took Marking into confidence and had him make certain contacts for us. At this time, Mr. Lennihan reappeared and asked us to go into Angelo Mine where a certain Mr. Carolchuck, who claimed he was a Colonel in the Engineer Corps of the American Army under General

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Hugh Casey, was trying to construct an airfield and radio station. In the meantime, before we went to Angelo Mine, I inducted Marking into the guerrilla as 2nd Lieutenant and told him to organize a unit in ANTIPOLO. We then proceeded to Angelo Mine and stayed in Angelo Mine, a certain lady by the name of Yay Panlillo made her way without permission into the Mine presumably to do as much help as possible, she being an ex-newspaper woman. However, Mr. Carrolchuck learned she was alleged to have broadcasted for the Japanese in Manila during the months of January and February 1942. Mr. Carrolchuck was undecided whether to shoot her as a spy or to keep her prisoner or send her out. (Yay Panlillo had Communistic tendencies which was proved by letter she had written to people in MANILA and also by her own admission.) I finally convinced him that it was necessary to let her go as it was not advisable to have a woman in Camp and also I received certain information from a Mr. Sinclair in MANILA that she was definitely was not a spy. (Mr. Carrolchuck, in the meantime placed her under arrest in quarters.) In the month of August 1942, she left Angelo Mine with a Mr. Barr and his wife and American Army corporal by the name of George Lightman. (Corp. Lightman is said to have been killed in LAGUNA the latter part of 1943.) It might be well to state here that a Filipino writer by the name of I.P. (evidently his initials) went into Angelo Mine. At the time he went to the Mine, I was stationed at the barrico of STA. DRES waiting for a money courier and had a chance to talk with this Filipino writer. To my knowledge he never came out of the mine. It was strongly rumored by Yay Panlillo that he was killed by Mr. Carrolchuck and Capt. Lockridge. There is a possibility that Mr. Carrolchuck might have had something to do with it, but it was quite impossible for me to believe that Capt. Lockridge would stoop to anything so low. There is another version of the story which states that he was killed and eaten by a "pytho" which are numerous in the Angelo vicinity. I.P. had no gun and left the camp alone. Mr. Carrolchuck, as the months went on, seemed to get more strict and more suspicious of every one, which somehow I could not blame him.

Mr. Carrolchuck had a 15,000 peso USA check on which he was receiving 500 pesos a month on, from a certain Filipino in Manila. He would send men out of the camp to different towns and to Manila to buy food, medicine and clothing, of which the Filipino couriers would come back saying they had paid very high prices for said goods which at that time we definitely knew did not cost what they stated. That was one of the reasons why Mr. Carrolchuck became hard and suspicious. Other reasons were that the Filipino boys became superstitious of Angelo Mine and many became sick with Beri-Beri and Malaria which caused them to desert one by one. This I can hardly blame them for doing.

In the month of June, Mr. Carrolchuck sent me on a mission to the vicinity of ANTIPOLO to recruit Philippine Scouts with the idea of paying them regular scout pay and also to secure as many arms and ammunition as possible to protect the project at Angelo Mine. Another reason that I was sent out was because a certain Mr. Goldsborough, a minor an ex-Marine Corporal, came to the mine and said Marking threaten to kill all the Americans in his vicinity. Mr. Goldsborough was advisor to the Hunters at this time. When I arrived at ANTIPOLO, I found out that Marking had already grouped together a band of 50 men and had already promoted himself to the rank of Captain. This promoting of himself to the rank of Captain I told him was not advisable. At that time he had two Americans with him, one by the name of Atwell and the other one a Marine Sergeant (who later went to the Mountain Provinces) and whose name I do not recall at

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at this time. It seems that Mr. Atwell and the Marine Sergeant had told a cock and bull story to Marking that they were assigned to come out from BATAAN and blow up all Japanese planes on CLARK FIELD. This Marking believed very thoroughly. At the same time, the Hunters (ROTC) under a command of Lt. "Mike" were organizing a unit in the vicinity of ANTIPOLO. However, the Japanese had a patrol near the Camp so the ROTC buried all their firearms and went back to MANILA. I decided at that time that since we needed guns in Angelo Mine, we would find the guns of the ROTC and use them until they reformed their unit. When I discovered the burial place of the guns, Mr. Atwell and the Marine Sergeant were with me. I issued them some clothing and one gun each. They returned to Marking's camp and within an hour, Marking and all his men came there and demanded a certain amount of the guns and ammunition. I told them definitely that I could not at this time afford to give them any of the guns as we needed them badly in Angelo Mine and that I had no right to give guns away that belonged to the ROTC. This made Marking antagonistic and at that time I presume he would have shot me if he had had the chance. Owing to the tense situation between Marking and myself, I decided to wait there with the guns until someone from the Hunters came to the camp. A Sergeant came and I turned over all the guns and ammunition. The following day Lt. "Mike" arrived from MANILA and there were four guns missing with some clothing. I told "Lt. Mike" that I had issued two guns to the Americans with Marking and some clothing but and that they had promised me to return them if Lt. "Mike" needed them. However, I told "Lt. Mike" that if he could spare those guns and clothing, to let the Americans keep them. Lt. "Mike" went down to see the Americans and claimed the guns. Mr. Atwell and the Marine Sergeant told Lt. "Mike" a deliberate lie by saying that I had the guns, thereby causing more antagonism in the district. Lt. "Mike" came back and reported the conference to me. I told them there was nothing I could do about it at the time, but just to stand by until something new developed. Two days later, Lt. "Mike" met Mr. Atwell and the Marine Sergeant and found them with the clothes and guns. Lt. "Mike" then came back to me, and asked me to take his unit down and raid the camp of Marking and wipe Marking's unit out. This I told them was impossible as Marking was the first guerrilla unit in the ANTIPOLO sector and it was not advisable for Filipinos to start fighting each other. (There is no doubt that Atwell and the Marine Sergeant's glib tongue was the main factor in the split between Marking, ROTC and myself. Incidentally at this time when Marking became a Captain I was outranked so to speak.) I returned back to Angelo Mine and there I contracted Malaria and beri-beri. In September, I left the mine, but before leaving I asked Mr. Carroleinuk for some quinine which he had to the amount of 500 pills. He gladly donated 3 quinine pills of which as weak as I was, I did not accept as it was better to have nothing than to have 3 pills from him at that time. Leaving Angelo Mine, it took me five days to the nearest barrie (STA. INES). (Before the war, a Filipino cargador went over that same trail carrying a 30-kilo pack in 6 hours.) The last two days of my trip on that trail, my food consisted of Catmons, a wild sour fruit growing in the forest. I stayed at SANTA INES for a period of about one month, during which I partially recovered from my sickness with the help of a mountain "practicable". At this time I met an American Sergeant who had recently escaped from CABANATUAN Prison Camp.

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His name was Sgt. Neigun. He proceeded on to a barrio of PASTE and later joined Markings Guerrillas.

Captain Godwin and Jack Connor, a miner, came out of the mine very much disgusted with Mr. Carrolchuck. Therefore, that left only Capt. Lockridge and Mr. Carrolchuck in the mine as all the Filipino laborers and cargadors and Philippines Army soldiers had deserted in the two previous months. Captain Godwin, myself and Jack Connor proceeded to a miner's camp near INFANTA where we lived with Mr. and Mrs. Renfrew until the month of December. Mr. Crawford, another Mining Engineer lived a short way down the AGUE River from the camp of Mr. Renfrew. When we reached Mr. Renfrew's camp we heard the story of Mr. Alexander being shot by the Chief of Police of INFANTA. (Mr. Alexander was a temperamental person and I believe had been discharged from the Army for that reason.

Long about November, Mr. Shaffer, Mr. Farretta, and a Sgt. Baily came back from CAMARINES NORTE where they worked with Gov. Vinsons in a guerrilla unit which retook the town of DAET from the Japanese. Governor Vinsons was captured by the Japanese. Corporal Davis, an Air Corps mechanic appeared at the camp. It seems as though the Americans at this camp who were living in close proximity to each other seemed to get a touch of the "cabin fever". The miners were under the impression that the USA and Navy had let them down and they were virtually opposed to all Army officers especially Gen. MacArthur for leaving the Philippines. Capt. Godwin, myself and Cpl. Davis after hearing that seditious sort of talk continually, decided to move down the river and maintain a camp of our own. Mr. Schaffer and Mr. Farretta went to the vicinity of TANAY and joined Markings Guerrillas and received the rank of Lieutenants. Sgt. Baily drowned in the KANWON River while trying to cross it in a small banca.

Mr. Crawford, his wife and children decided to surrender and went to the American priest in the town of TANAY to turn themselves over to the Japanese for concentration in STO. TOMAS. (Previous to this an American miner and his wife by the name of Mr. and Mrs. "Jake" Connors surrendered to the Japs.) Mr. Crawford no sooner was interned when he was made to go back to Mr. Renfrews camp and our camp to try to get us to surrender. The first time we refused, he was then sent out by the Japanese a second time. The second time Corporal Davis surrendered because of Beri-Beri. The third time, Mr. Crawford came out, he came with Mr. Ralph Crosby, a consulting engineer for Marsman's interests in the Philippines. Mr. Crawford gave a sad story that it was necessary for the Americans to surrender, otherwise, his wife and children would be killed. Mr. Crosby intimated that it was better to stay out in the mountains if one believed he could make a living. (I wish to insert here that about the month of February 1943, Mr. Carrolchuck and Capt. Lockridge came down the "Kannon" River from Angelo Mine. Capt. Lockridge stopped at

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Mr. Renfrews camp and lived with them. Mr. Carolchuck proceeded down the river after giving a nasty remark about the Americans at the camp. Mr. Carolchuck proceeded to the vicinity of the barrico of STA. IRES in RIZAL with a Filipino guide from the "Kannon" River of INFANTA. It is said that while they were sleeping in a "bahay", seven Filipino guerrillas of Markings unit crept under the house where Mr. Carolchuck and his guide were sleeping and shot up underneath the floor and wounded Mr. Carolchuck and killed one Filipino. It is said that Mr. Carolchuck staggered out of the "bahay" and opened fire on the men with his automatic rifle in which they returned fire and killed Mr. Carolchuck. A Filipino from the "Kannon" River on hearing the story that his brother was killed with Mr. Carolchuck went over to investigate and is said to have found Mr. Carolchuck's body in a "bahay" half eaten by dogs. It is my belief that Yay Panlillo instigated the killing of Mr. Carolchuck because of his alleged strictness in Angole Mine. However, as to this belief, it is very difficult to get definite proof as I understand that the men who were in on the killing of Mr. Carolchuck have been killed by the Japanese while fighting in Marking's unit. There is one man by the name of De la Rosa who was a union man for the Miner's Union and worked as he was one of the members of the party. There was also another boy by the name of Pepe Suada who is now in Col. Anderson's guerrillas in INFANTA. This De las Rosa told Pepe Suada a story about the killing.)

The Americans decided to surrender because the Japanese Commander at ANTIPOLO had written a very clear letter promising them that they would not be harmed, that they would not be interrogated nor would have to go about giving speeches. Due to sympathy for Mr. Crawford and due to the very well written promise of the Japanese Commander at ANTIPOLO, the Americans decided to surrender with the exception of myself. Capt. Lockwood, Capt. Godwin, "Jack" Connor, Mr. Renfrew and his wife went down to the town of INFANTA and surrendered to the Japanese. That left myself as being the only American in the vicinity of INFANTA.

During the month of February or March, Col. Anderson came from BULACAN to INFANTA and proceeded to MAUBAN district. After the Americans had surrendered, I then became an unofficial adviser to Col. Rader's Fil-American guerrilla unit. After about a month with that unit, I proceeded to the vicinity of MAUBAN and joined up with Col. Anderson. About a month later Lieuts. Schaffer and Farretta joined up with Anderson.

The year 1943 was the roughest year. It seemed as though the Japanese propaganda was at its height and more Filipinos had turned spies than in the year 1942. On November 14, 1943 a typhoon hit TAYABAS and southern LUZON and created a food shortage. Prices were high and still going higher. However, during this year, guerrilla forces were increasing rapidly and living was getting difficult in the mountains as the poor farmers had difficult times supporting the guerrillas. During this year, the ROTC, Rader's Fil-Americans, Usali's unit and Marking's unit were at odds with each other.

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A Chinese Kukbalajap unit moved into LAGUNA and joined in the trouble. During the latter part of 1943, Mr. Shaffer and Mr. Farretta and myself received orders from Col. Anderson to proceed north of INFANTA to a site by the name of MASANGA, and build a camp in the event that someday we would receive supplies by submarine. It was at this time that Marking's guerrillas after having lost their communication lines from MANILA and the towns between MANILA and TANAY moved over to INFANTA and the district of Col. Redor's Fil-Americans. They began to confiscate supplies from the civilians and make certain threats to the civilians. I deemed it advisable to go to Marking's camp and have a talk with them. The talk was unsuccessful as I told them that Col. Redor's organization was the original organization of INFANTA and had the support of the people. Therefore it was not a good custom for Marking to come and interfere. Marking and Miss Yay Panlillo became more antagonistic even though I had saved Miss Panlillo's life in Angelo Mine. At this time, Marking's men had made certain threats to shoot me on sight, which did not phase me in the least as I knew that if they came face to face, they would not have the nerve to do it. It was at this time that Marking circulated Guerrilla currency stating on it that his unit had Major General W. W. Fertig as advisor. This I did not believe to be true.

During the first part of January, 1944, Col. Anderson sent a certain Lt. Belle to MINDANAO to contact Col. Fertig. On 1st of April, Lt. Pettit and Lt. Shaffer proceeded to MINDANAO. On 1st of April, Lt. Farretta and I proceeded to the BICOL regions upon orders from Col. Anderson. Col. Anderson gave me definite orders not to organize Guerrillas in the BICOLS. Col. Anderson had received numerous letters from Gov. Escudero asking him to come down or send an American Officer to see if they could do anything about the Lapus-Escudero feud. On going to the BICOLS, I was highly in favor of Escudero but as I travelled further into the BICOL regions, I slowly changed my mind as there seemed to be entirely a different attitude towards Gov. Escudero the closer I got to SORSOGON. We first contacted in the BICOLS, Col. Mata's unit, then Maj. Miranda's unit (this is where I first picked up copies of Col. Zabat's threatening letters to other units.), then Col. Zabat's and then we proceeded to the island of TICAO to see Maj. Lapus. Lt. Farretta and myself were very much impressed by Maj. Lapus and his men. I then sent Lt. Farretta from TICAO island to have conference with Gov. Escudero. Lt. Farretta came back from the conference very much in favor of Gov. Escudero against Maj. Lapus. I then made an appointment with Gov. Escudero for a conference to see if I could settle the dispute between he and Maj. Lapus. The place conference was to be at Lt. Chapman's radio station on SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT. I proceeded direct to Lt. Chapman's camp and did not go by the way of IROGIN which Gov. Escudero expected I would do. I was not in favor of dances and parties and I knew that if I had reached IROGIN that is what would happen. Governor Escudero's son came up first and in a blunt and more or less insulting manner wanted to talk with me before my conference with the Governor took place. Because of this attitude, I refused him.

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He returned to the Governor and as I understand made certain unbecoming statements. Governor Escudero then came to the Camp accompanied by Dr. Soyoc and a certain Spanish national by the name of Capt. Andia. Sitting down at the conference table, Gov. Escudero sat beside me and Capt. Andia acted as the interpreter. On the other side of the table sat Dr. Soyoc and Lt. Chapman. The outcome of the conference was that Capt. Andia stated that Lt. Col. Smith in SAMAR had made Gov. Escudero 9th Military District Commander. This I told Gov. Escudero was quite impossible as Col. Smith had no authority whatsoever to appoint a Commander. I stated to Col. Escudero that Col. Smith could only recommend a Commander. At the same time, Dr. Doyoc was talking to Lt. Chapman saying that he did not want any whites over him or his men. This statement I later informed Col. Smith about in SAMAR.

In regard to the Escudero-Lapus dispute, Gov. Escudero definitely would not come to any terms with Lapus unless he could have everything his own way. This I told him was quite impossible also as what was good for one should be good for the other. After the conference was over, I sent Mr. Farretta to SAMAR to have a talk with Col. Smith. Governor Escudero then put out an order of arrest for Lt. Farretta, Lt. Gonzales and myself, stating that we were spies for the Imperial Japanese Army. Col. Smith in the meantime had taken sides against Maj. Lapus for no apparent reason. During my short stay in SORSOGON, I managed to see part of Escudero's unit and part of Lapus unit, and on my way back to CAMARINES SUR, I stopped to see Gen. Oarubio, Col. Sandico and Col. Manila. Of all the guerrilla units I have contacted, Major Lapus unit was the most military unit in the BIGOIS. There is no doubt that men of Major Lapus killed men of Escudero and vice-versa. However, it seems to me that when any killing was done, Major Lapus men were forced to do it, purely in defense and I believe that a thorough investigation into the matter will prove this. Furthermore, during all this trouble, Major Lapus was able to train approximately 500 men on the island of CAPUL. He also had more regular Army officers in his unit.

Mr. Farretta returned from Col. Smith and proceeded to Col. Anderson's camp in TAYABAS. In the meantime, Col. Anderson had received a radio and was in contact with AUSTRALIA.

In October, I received a radio, some arms and three AIB men. I then organized an Intelligence net covering the entire BIGOL Provinces. We were ordered to the Island of CATANDUANES to receive a shipment of supplies from a submarine. Enroute to CATANDUANES, I contacted Col. Turko and Maj. Padua's men. While sailing between two islands Col. Turko (Boayes) opened fire on us. I went ashore to see what it was all about and Turko proceeded to try to take a carbine from me. This I refused to let him do in no uncertain terms. Because of operational difficulties, I was not able to receive the submarine shipment and I returned to my operational area in CAMARINES SUR. An American miner by the name of Mr. Theodore Suttle came to camp after having been disarmed by Sabat's orders.

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In November, Lieutenants Wood and Ensor reported to me at my camp with four AIB men. These officers and men were a demolition team and were to stand by for further orders. On January 4th I received orders to carry out priority demolition mission against the Japanese between the town of RAGAY and CALAUG. This we succeeded in doing by blowing up a 4 span railroad bridge, caving in an overhanging embankment on the railroad tracks and removing about 3 km of tracks, thus crippling the railroad for the use of the Japanese. At this time, I sent out messages to all guerrilla units of the BIGOLS to begin sabotage and demolition work against the enemy. Also along with that message I gave certain incendiaries and time bombs. We then proceeded from our mountain camp to the vicinity of the lowlands and accomplished the blowing up of 50 to 100 drums of gasoline and oil and destroying of 9 Japanese trucks in the town of CAMALIGAN. Lieut. Wood proceeded to a bridge between BAKI and SIPOGOF and succeeded in blowing that. Also we put the guerrillas to work burning certain bridges, harassing the Japanese and planting a certain amount of booby traps on the main highways. The Japanese were now beginning to be a little cautious. In riding on trucks or walking the road at nights they would continually fire into a place of possible ambush. At this time, many of the Japanese were moving northward because of the MINDORO landing. On January 22nd I received my first air drop from GHQ in LEYTE which consisted of more radios, fire-arms, clothing, medicines, etc. Instead of forming my own guerrilla unit, I distributed these guns and supplies to other guerrilla units in the BIGOLS hoping that they might see their way in unifying so as to better harass the enemy. At this time I had to send Lieut. Richard Ensor to CAMARINES NORTE as Turko was hindering my intelligence operations. This unification of the guerrillas in the BIGOLS was absolutely impossible as every guerrilla leader wanted to be the head commander. Also practically every other guerrilla unit was at war with some other unit and there was terrific hatred between the different guerrilla units. During this time in the BIGOLS, I was carrying out intelligence work for USAFFE which caused the Japanese very much trouble. In looking back on my stay on the island of CATAVDUANES, I met a Mr. Joseph Hill, an American-Hawaiian mestizo, with whom I entrusted 1000 American dollars for approximately 15 Americans and families on Mt. ESAROG with written instructions to give each a certain amount of money. Mr. Hill at this time was running a small propaganda unit. Also during this time, all guerrilla leaders were running to TAGLOBAN, LEYTE, trying to get recognition, but from the reports that I received through the usual underground system instead of getting recognition, the guerrilla leaders made it worse for themselves as they would invariably criticize all other units to the guerrilla affairs officer in LEYTE. About February 12, General Krueger, Commanding General of the 6th Army placed Lt. William Hellist in command of guerrillas in ALBAY and BORSOGON; Lt. Woodrow Hobbs in command of guerrillas in CAMARINES NORTE and myself in command of guerrillas in CAMARINES SUR. This I believe was about the last thing the Army could do in order to try to unite the guerrillas in the BIGOL Provinces. This plan was fairly successful although the hard feelings between guerrilla units

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still exist in the BICOES and probably will exist for the next ten years.

On 1st April 1945, the 158 Regimental Combat Team landed in LEGASPI. I received orders from the 6th Army to report to Gen. McHider who was in command of the 158 RCT and avail myself and guerrillas for anything he might want us to do. The guerrillas were then assigned as bridge guards and advance scouts for the army and at this time I re-routed my intelligence to Gen. McHider's S-2 Office. It is further stated that after I had received my first airdrop, I made a small organization of approximately 70 Philippine Scouts. Soon after the landing in LEGASPI of the American forces, I planned a united guerrilla attack on the town of NAGA which is the biggest town in the BICOL Provinces. After two days of fighting, we were successful in driving the Japanese from NAGA with only small arms and the use of rifle grenades and a few captured Japanese knee mortars.

In summing up the guerrilla situation the BICOL Provinces, it is my opinion that if Col. Feralta of PANAY had not interfered with the guerrillas of the BICOL Provinces, there may have been better feeling amongst the guerrillas there. Col. Feralta first placed Maj. Lapus as temporary 5th Military District Commander and then turned around and placed Col. Zabat as temporary 5th Military District Commander. After doing this, he then wrote letters saying that he had a "hands off" policy in the BICOL Provinces, and therefore could not make amends for the troubles he started between Lapus and Zabat and also between Lapus and Escudero. I further believe that Col. Smith after having recognized Maj. Lapus for intelligence work did not handle the situation to the best advantage because at the time Maj. Smith was receiving submarine shipments in SAMAR, he could have unified the entire BICOES because of the amount of propaganda material and equipment that he had in SAMAR, if he had considered giving some to the guerrillas and laying down a definite understanding. Thus he would have paved a way north for his radios going beyond the BICOL Provinces. This he did not do and due to the fact that he first favored Major Lapus then turned about and favored Escudero he committed the same mistake as Col. Feralta of PANAY.

In regard to myself and the different guerrilla units, it was impossible for me to consider favorably their confiscating of food, materials, women, etc. from the civilians, neither could I consider their killing people who were alleged to be spies as many times the people killed were probably enemies of certain guerrilla men before the war. When poor Filipinos, who have suffered at the hands of Guerrillas comes to an American for help, the American has to either side with the Guerrillas or the poor down trodden Filipino. To my mind the poor farmer and the pro-American townspeople are the unsung heroes of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. They are the ones who gave money, intelligence reports, food, clothing, care and for Guerrillas, warned the Guerrillas of Jap patrols and died when some Guerrilla would be captured and made to talk. The townspeople had no place to run to and never knew when the Jap police would pick them up, while the guerrillas had all of the mountains to hide in.

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In giving guerrilla units advice as to army procedure and correct army behaviour, it only made guerrilla men antagonistic towards a person. The guerrillas did cooperate with the American forces in the BIGOL Provinces to a great extent. They did carry out a great deal of sabotage and demolition against the enemy. They also worked very good with me on intelligence, but it was not until General Krueger made definite Commanders in the BIGOLS that there was any semblance of unity in that region.

Major Reay, Capt. Berdell, Capt. Rutherford and Lieut. Reese are the only American or English Guerrillas that I know of who contributed outstanding help to Guerrillas in the BIGOL Provinces and assisted the 158 RCT.

I believe the most tragic American death that I have heard of was the case of the Young family in CAMARINES SUR. Mrs. Young was beloved to death by a housewoman and Mr. Young died a few months later from Pneumonia. It is alleged that doctors refused to help Mr. Young. Mr. and Mrs. Youngs little girl was being well cared for by a Spanish family in NAGA at the time of my departure from the BIGOLS.

(Note: The above statements are facts based on personal contacts with Americans living in the mountains and on contacts with twenty or more Guerrilla Leaders from RIZAL to SORSOGON. This is not a detailed account.

/s/ Russell D. Barros
/c/ RUSSELL D. BARROS, O-298071
Lt. Col., GAC, AUS.

Incls:

Four copies of letters received by Lt. Col. Barros from Japanese Commanders asking him to surrender.

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EON Executive No. 5800.2
22 Sept 1989

ADDRESS TO THE HIDING AMERICANS

At the end of last year, we have delivered to you the letter advising you of the true aims of the Imperial Japanese Army and to surrender to our troops, but falsely believing that the American aid will come, you have not done it, and instead you continue to oppose us. You must know that such thing will endanger your own lives.

WHETHER your judgment is right or not, and whether you think erroneously of the Imperial Army or not, you shall know by detecting from our messenger.

It was on January of last year that we proclaimed thus, in order that you surrender and appear to our forces:

"ALL enemy aliens must register in order that they will be kept safe in Concentration Places, and those who failed to do or not under the custody of the Imperial Army will be considered as hostile and are punishable by extreme penalties."

THEREFORE, your actions are naturally considered in the wordings of the proclamation; but if you appear before us we will guarantee your lives and give the privilege of being kept under our protection.

It is but lamenting that you, who considered yourselves as a civilized people, do not comprehend these magnanimous and benovolent acts of BUSHIDO.

We do not need to beg for your surrender, but when you oppose us, you must understand that you are doing it with the price of your lives.

It is plain and self-explanatory that which one is better for you: to surrender at once or to be caught after you have rejected our advice.

WE reiterate here that if you really love peace and aspire for happiness it will be better to appear to this corps with our messenger.

Sgd S. KITAZOKI

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE
OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL

Certified true copy:

/s/ Russell D. Barros
/t/ RUSSELL D. BARROS
Lt. Col., GAC

November 15th 1942

To All American Friends

Gentlemen;

This is to advice to all Americans, combatants or non-combatants still hiding in the mountains by escaping from the real situation now prevails in this part of world believing the false propoganda from the State, and still hoping the useless resistance of the U.S. Army said to be coming to this part of the world. It is your non-value dream or said to be dreaming an Air-Castle in the mountains.

Your hide-out is said to be the cause of you own misunderstanding toward the Imperial Japanese force, that you will be treated by severe punishment whenever you appeared to the Japanese Authorities. It is very funny to heard. But may be it is natural to you party.

In every part of this Islands the peace and order have been already recovered. The people begun it reconstruction to their new Development.

We wish to suggest on this last opportunity that you must present together with your friends, civilian or non-civilian to this office, handling the matters concerning the enemy nationals, to register if they are combatants and to proceeds to the concentration camps as per the provisions of the Administrative Proclamation.

We believe that you will trust our real intention toward the enemy nationals and come to our hands to cooperate for our sincere endeavor to keep the peace and order in this place. We will save your life whenever you presents to this office.

But it is regretable to say, if fail to do so, we shall not pay any consideration to the disposal and might prosecute with deadly punishment.

You must remember that the peace and order in this part of Islands is coming normal day-by-day. The Army is pushing the clean-up campaign toward the mountains. You must take the best means to dispose yourselves on this occasion. It is to remind you again that we have twenty six hundred years of history of Bushido. We are glad to receive you with best justifiable whenever you appear to this office, therefore, it is entirely depend your decision.

Hoping to see you, We remain,

Japanese Military Police
Antipolo, Rizal

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: ND 88 3078

Antipolo, Rizal
April 5, 1943

Mr. & Mrs. Renfrew
Mr. J. Connors
Capt. Lechridge
Capt. Godwin
Lt. Barros
Gentlemen:

Mr. Crawford and Mr. Crosby have returned from their visit to your camp and have advised me that you still do not wish to come in from the mountains. In their opinion the probable reason that you do not choose to come in is that you do not wish to be subjected to questioning or detention; or to be asked questions, the answers to which you may not be able to verify. Also the doubt exists in your minds as to the happening between the time of your leaving the mountains until your arrival in Santo Tomas.

In view of the above and the fact that the Japanese Military Administration is desirous that all Americans place themselves in concentration, we, the Japanese Military Authorities, agree that you will be allowed to go with Mr. Crawford and Mr. Crosby direct from the mountains to Santo Tomas without any questioning or detention on the way, provided:-

- (1) That you will place yourselves in the custody of Mr. Crawford and Mr. Crosby and go with them direct to Santo Tomas.
- (2) That you bring in all your firearms and ammunition and surrender them.
- (3) That upon arrival at Santo Tomas, those of you who are civilians will register as civilian internees subject to the same rules and regulations as those already interned.
- (4) That those of you who are military men will register at Santo Tomas and await transfer from Santo Tomas, without detention or questioning on the way, directly to a Military Concentration Camp.

We also guarantee that after being placed in concentration that you will not be subjected to any questionings regarding your life since Jan 1, 1942 and that you will not be removed from the concentration Camp for any reason regarding your time spent out of concentration since Jan. 1, 1942. We also guarantee that none of you will be required to go on speaking tours.

Note: The above letter was signed by the Japanese Military Commander at Antipolo, Rizal. The last paragraph and signature was lost.

/s/ R. D. B.
/s/ R. D. B.

OFFICE OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES
INFANTA DETACHMENT
INFANTA, LA GUNA

May 16, 1943

TO ALL AMERICANS WHO HAVE NOT SURRENDERED:

The dawn of a new era has flourished in the world today. The Axis Powers are winning the game of war. We urges all of you to surrender with good conditions to know and understand the following briefs which are hereby promulgated:

- 1.-Australia and India are invaded by Japan. It won't take long and the invasion shall be a success.
- 2.-In America more than 60,000 democrats are against the government today.
- 3.- The promised reinforcements of America which shall have arrived last January, February, March and April are all in vain. None of that sort have been heard nor come to your aid.
- 4.- Premier Tokyo, arrived in Manila and had made an announcement that the Philippines shall be an Independent Nation within the end of this year.
5. - Many Americans hiding in the mountains had surrendered and witnessed, heard and believed that Japan shall not fail the Philippines here promised independence in the shortest possible time. You are only the Americans left in the mountains hiding and patriotically believed of false propaganda.
6. - It may pleased you to know that Mr. HENRY GIXDE RENFREW, MRS. RUTH RENFREW, CAPT. (USAFFE), ALBERT K. GODWIN, CAPT. (USAFFE), A.L. LOCKRIDGE, and Mr. JOHN CONNERS had already surrendered to the conditions that they shall not be detained nor questioned. They were all brought immediately to Manila, under the custody of Engineers P.B. CRAWFORD and R. W. GROSEX. They are enjoying their life as a free man in Manila nowadays.
7. - Last May 2, 1943, an American Officer by the name of EDITH CODAY, surrendered in Infanta. He was given medical attention due to his illness since he came from Corregidor. He was treated well and given the best food in town. He was not tortured nor harmed but was taken cared of and given the best of care and forced. He was brought to Manila immediately knowingly that he was in good health.
8. - Surrender now, and you'll find yourself in comforts. You will not be harmed nor tortured. The Japanese Military Administration promised you to give a job in collaboration with your career.

9. - Please surrendered, we cannot assure of your fate if we go to the mountains and look for you. You might die earlier than your expectation. Probably, you could help more to your country if you surrender.

10. - All of you are given this conditions. If you'll surrender, you shall not be detained nor questioned. You shall be brought immediately to Manila.

11. If you shall surrender we shall be forced to go to all your hiding places which we know and bad fate may all be with you. Please surrender, we shall be very sorry and especially your family and love ones knowing that you died of sickness or shot to death because of an absurd belief of hiding in the mountains.

12. - I shall reiterate, SURRENDER; and you will not be detained nor questioned but shall be brought immediately to Manila and be free.

(SGD) R. ANKIRU
CAPTAIN
Detachment Commander
Imperial Japanese Forces
Infanta Detachment
Infanta, Laguna

EXTENDED SOJOURN IN THE PHIL ISLANDS; RUSSELL D BARROS, LT COL, 91st AHC (PS) ASGND 91st PA REGT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 88-3678

EXTENDED SOJOURN IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; BY LT. COL. RUSSELL D. BARRON.

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Authority: NND 88-3078