

FILE : 500-43

TITLE: HISTORIES OF DIFFERENT GUERRILLA UNITS

ORIGIN: 14TH INFANTRY AUS

DATE: 1942 to 1946

AUTHENTICITY: A TRUE COPY SIGNED

SOURCE: LIVING CLAIMS PROJECT "J"

EXTRACTED BY Robert DATE 16 May 47 MICROFILMED \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

D-2 C-4

Not Important to A92



*Wuqong*

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Authority *660353078*

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Authority *NND 83 3078*

AG-KJ  
3 November 1945  
LRF/arn

GINGAPPAO

WARTAG . . . . . ROUTINE

REQUEST THIS HEADQUARTERS BE ADVISED BY AIR MAIL OF NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM THE FOLLOWING ARMY SERIAL NUMBERS OR ANY OF THEM WERE ASSIGNED CLN OFFICERS OBOE EIGHT EIGHT EIGHT ZERO SEVEN ZERO TO OBOE EIGHT EIGHT EIGHT ONE SIX NINE INCLUSIVE SMOEN ENLISTED MEN ONE ZERO SIX TWO SIX ZERO ZERO ZERO TO ONE ZERO SIX TWO SIX NINE NINE NINE INCLUSIVE PD IF NO RECORD REQUEST ADVISE TO THAT EFFECT PD ( *2-19961* ) PROJECT JIG

OFFICIAL:

Approved by:

B. N. FITCH,  
Brigadier General, U.S. ARMY,  
Adjutant General.

H. S. KESSLER  
Lt Col AGD  
AG Rec Pers Div

Copies to:  
AG-KD (Return)

*5:20 Nov*

RESTRICTED

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*(10)*

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1945

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DEFERRED RESTRICTED

TOO 072336 Z

NA/CM

RECD 8 NOV 45 2000

AFWESPAC DIST

FROM WASHINGTON (AGPRD)

ACTION REC PER DIV

INFO G-1  
AG PERS

TO CINCPAC

FILE

CITE W 81795

REURAD G 19561 PROJECT J, NO RECORD ASN 0888070 TO 088169  
(INCLUSIVE HAVING BEEN ASSIGNED.)

WARTAG

AFPAC DIST: ACTION - CG AFWESPAC (REC PERS DIV)

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NOTE : THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MSG IS  
FORBIDDEN PER PARA 44 AND 49 AR 38065

Encl 3

(11)



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *WVDS 3078*

IN CLEAR  
ROUTINE

7 NOVEMBER 1945

FROM: WASHINGTON (SPXPE-R)

TO : CINCPAC

NR : 18717

Reured C 19961 no record of assignment to any individual of Army serial nr from 10 826 000 to 10 826 999 inclusive.

WITSELL

ACTION: CG AFWESPAC (REC PERS)

ROUTINE  
IN CLEAR

*Smel d*

(12)

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority U/DSS 3078



COPY

3. On 12 July 1942 a message from MacARTHUR TO NAKAR reads:  
12 July 1942  
CRS/jgm

G-1

ALL OFFICERS PHILIPPINE ARMY YOUR FORCE APPOINTED OFFICERS  
ARMY US IN PA GRADES NOW HELD EFFECTIVE ON DATE OF ACCEPTANCE  
STOP ALL THIRD LIEUTENANTS APPOINTED SECOND LIEUTENANTS STOP  
YOU MAY ENLIST ALL PA SOLDIERS YOUR FORCE IN ARMY US IN GRADES  
NOW HELD IN PA STOP ASSIGN SERIAL NUMBERS TO OFFICERS WITHIN  
BLOCK FROM EIGHT EIGHT EIGHT ZERO SEVEN ZERO TO EIGHT EIGHT  
EIGHT ONE SIX NINE AND TO ENLISTED MEN WITHIN BLOCK FROM ONE  
ZERO SIX TWO SIX ZERO ZERO ZERO TO ONE ZERO SIX TWO SIX NINE  
NINE STOP MAKE AND RETAIN CAREFULLY FOR RECORD A LIST OF ALL  
OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN SHOWING SERIAL NUMBER AND DATE OF  
ACCEPTANCE OR ENLISTMENT FOR EACH STOP MONTHLY PAY OFFICERS  
AS FOLLOWS CLN SECON LIEUTENANTS ONE FIVE ZERO DOLLARS FIRST  
LIEUTENANTS ONE SIX SIX DOLLARS SIX SIX CENTS CAPTAIN TWO  
HUNDRED DOLLARS MAJOR TWO FIFTY DOLLARS LIEUTEN NT COLONEL  
TWO NINE ONE DOLLARS SIX SIX CENTS COLONEL THREE THREE THREE  
DOLLARS THREE THREE CENTS STOP SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE AS  
FOLLOWS CLN LIEUTENANTS CAPTAINS AND MAJORS WITH DEPENDENTS  
ONE DOLLAR FORTY CENTS PER PAY COLONELS AND LIEUTENANTS COLONELS  
WITH DEPENDENTS TWO DOLLARS TEN CENTS PER DAY CMA OFFICERS  
WITHOUT DEPENDENTS SEVENTY CENTS PER DAY STOP FOLLOWING MONTHLY  
RENTAL ALLOWANCES TO OFFICERS WITH DEPENDENTS CLN SECOND LIEUTENANTS SIXTY  
DOLLARS FIRST LIEUTENANTS SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS CAPTAIN NINETY DOLLARS  
MAJOR ONE HUNDRED FIVE DOLLARS LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND COLONEL ONE HUNDRED  
TWENTY DOLLARS STOP NO RENTAL ALLOWANCES TO OFFICERS WITHOUT DEPENDENTS  
WHILE ON FIELD DUTY STOP PAY ENLISTED MEN PHILIPPINE SCOUTS SAME AS US  
ARMY EFFECTIVE JUNE TWENTY FOUR

MACARTHUR\*

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

GORDON H. SIMONS  
1st Lt FA

COPY

Manila, P.I.  
11 April 1946

CERTIFICATE

*June 42*  
The undersigned hereby certifies that beginning with March 1942 he was executive officer, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment (PA), and that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the following information is true and correct;

At time of Corraçidor's surrender, the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, was situated at Camp Enriquez, Mantambong, Nueva Viscaya. The battalion then comprised three companies of about 112 men each.

After the fall of Corraçidor, Major ENRIQUEZ, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, received General WAINWRIGHT'S order to surrender by telephone from 14th Infantry Regimental Headquarters. At the same time, a general order was received from Lieutenant Colonel GUILLEMO NAKAR, Commanding Officer, 14th Infantry Regiment, announcing that General WAINWRIGHT'S order was without effect because it had been issued under duress and because the 14th Infantry was a unit operating independently of General WAINWRIGHT'S command.

*July 42*  
Toward the latter part of May, another attempt was made by Lieutenant Colonel THEODORE KALAKUKA, special representative of General WAINWRIGHT, to effect the surrender of the 14th Infantry Regiment, but this attempt also failed.

After KALAKUKA departed an ultimatum was issued by the Commanding General, Japanese forces in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, that if the unit refused to surrender itself along with its arms within three days, an expedition would be launched against us.

Major ENRIQUEZ thereupon ordered his unit tactically dispersed. One company was sent to Benguet, another to Tayug, Pangasinan. The third company remained with the Battalion CP.

Because of the tactical situation and the lack of food, the men in the units sent to Benguet and Tayug were ordered to proceed home, without giving up their arms, and to await further orders. They were instructed to keep in touch with their officers.

*June 42*  
During the months of June the troops with the Battalion CP were constantly mobile, evading Jap patrols. A CP was established toward the end of June at Babadi, Mountain Province, from where it was convenient to maintain contact with the Battalion's units.

*5 July 42*  
On or about 5 July 1942, Lt MANUEL T. NERY and I were sent to Manila on an intelligence mission. At the time of my departure, there were about 100 men, including some 12 officers, at the CP in Babadi. In addition, there were three or four squads deployed at outposts near the CP on observation and security details.

*7 July 42*  
*17 July 42*  
We arrived in Manila on or about 7 July 1942. On or about the 17th of July a courier from ENRIQUEZ'S headquarters, Sergeant ENRIQUE TAYAG, arrived in Manila and informed us verbally that contact had been established with General MacARTHUR'S headquarters in Port Darwin, Australia, and that the entire 14th Infantry was "federalized," a term which was interpreted to mean appointment in the Army of the United States. He also brought oath of office blanks for Lieutenant NERI and the undersigned, which we completed and signed that same evening in the presence of Colonel JUAN MORAN. I was assigned an AUS serial number, but have forgotten it. I do remember being told by Sergeant TAYAG that officer's serial numbers were assigned from an authorized block on the basis of seniority. Sergeant TAYAG took the completed oaths of office with him, along with my reports on Jap activities in Manila, with the intention of turning them over to Major ENRIQUEZ.

*19 July 42*  
I do not know whether these documents were delivered because I was captured by the Japanese on 19 July 1942.

The undersigned had no direct knowledge at the time of his capture about the number and identity of men and officers enlisted or appointed in the AUS on authorization from General MacARTHUR.

*19 July 42*  
*Capt 43*  
I was interned in Fort Santiago from 19 July 1942 until 1 April 1943. Upon release I tried to contact Lieutenant Colonel ENRIQUEZ personally in Baguio about mid-April 1943, but could not do so because he was still in the mountains.

*July 42*  
*7th 42*  
Soon thereafter, however, he surrendered and was released immediately. I then contacted him and was told that all personnel of the 14th Infantry had been inducted in the AUS in July 1942.

Thereafter, and until February 1944, when the Japanese raided the HAGOCCO Store in Baguio, which was being used as a headquarters by remnants of the 14th Infantry personnel, I operated independently of that part of the 14th Infantry which came under the command of Lieutenant Colonel ENRIQUEZ. In February I joined the PGOG in the Bicol, and later became affiliated with Colonel ESCUDERO'S guerrilla organization, which I served until my return to military control.

*Edmundo Navarero*  
EDMUNDO NAVARERO  
Capt (PA) O-1698

HEADQUARTERS "B" COMPANY  
1ST BATTALION, 22ND INFANTRY (PA)  
Luna, La Union

3 April 1946

SUBJECT: Activities of "G" Co., 14th Inf., (AUS)

TO : CO, 14th Infantry (AUS)

1. The "G" Co., 14th Inf. (AUS) composed of remnants of the 91st Infantry (USAFPE) who fought at Sison and Pozorrubio, Pangasinan and was reorganized on December 28, 1941 at San Nicolas, Pangasinan. Its reorganization continued up to the time when the late Lt. Severino Antiporda, who was under orders of the late Major Manuel P. Enriquez (then CO, 2nd Bn. 14th Inf. (AUS), contacted my unit and handed me orders from the Bn. Comdr re operations against the enemy.

2. Plans for the operations to recapture Natividad, Tayug, and San Nicolas, Pangasinan were made. Lt. Gregorio Zipegen was to operate at Natividad, Lt. Antiporda at Tayug and for my Detachment was San Nicolas. The coordinated attack took place on 14 April 1942 at 0430 hrs. Lt. Antiporda and Sgt. Palma were killed. Food supplies and clothing that were captured were distributed to civilians and others were used by the soldiers. After this first raid, Lt. Zipegen and the men of the late Lt. Antiporda reported to the CP of the 2nd Bn at Nueva Viscaya while other enlisted men joined my outfit at San Nicolas.

3. Our troops were able to reoccupy Tayug, Pangasinan for around 15 days inspite of constant enemy counter attacks. On or about May 1, 1942, orders were received by me to report to Bn Hq at Ariteo, Nueva Viscaya. Capt. Miguel Acosta, CO, Army of the Agno, temporarily took command of my unit at San Nicolas and Sgt. Francisco Cesiano of the Tayug Detachment. During my absence the enemy launched a strong counter attack on or around May 10, 1942 at Tayug. Our troops who were short of ammunitons could not resist the enemy who were well equipped and superior in number. The Tayug Detachment retreated to San Nicolas and made another line of resistance thereat together with the San Nicolas Detachment but the enemy did not go further on their operations. No casualty was sustained in our side but three (3) Japs were killed.

4. Upon arrival from the BN CP on June 1, 1942, I reorganized my unit to its full strength as per orders from the Bn Cadr. My CP moved from Bo. Sta. Maria to Bo. Dalumpinas, San Nicolas, Pangasinan. Rigid training of the men particularly the civilian volunteers was conducted. Information of enemy strength in occupied towns, location of enemy supply and ammo depots together with their communication lines and enemy activities were furnished to Higher Hq through civilian Intelligence Agents and Informers.

5. Ambushing and harrasing the enemy still went on regardless of our hardships. On July 7, 1942 a combat patrol under Sgt. Francisco Cesiano encountered the enemy at the vicinity of Tayug. Two Japs were killed and one enlisted man on our side was

2  
Incl #4

killed. On July 12, 1942 rush order was received by me to report at CP 2nd Bn. situated at Bahadi, Pingkian, Nueva Vizcaya. Upon arrival thereat, the Bn Comdr showed me the radiogram from General McArthur giving an AUS status to the 14th Infantry. Another radiogram was shown to me that of Colonel Makar to GHO accepting the AUS status as of July 14, 1942. After my induction into the AUS at Bahadi together with the other personnel thereat, I was given authority to induct my BN into the AUS. This induction was made in July 25, 1942 at Dalumpines, San Nicolas, Pangasinan.

6. Lt. Silvestre Meines, the Ex.O. of the Co. was assigned to command the Detachment at Natividad, Pangasinan. His mission was to protect the Co. Hq from the enemy approaching via Natividad-San Nicolas road. Training of the men was compulsory and submittings of daily S-2 reports was required of him.

7. On the early part of September 1942, lay low orders was received from the Bn Comdr. This was due to intensive operations of the enemy against the hiding elements. Our activities were devoted to training and intelligence operations. Our reports were submitted to Bn CP thru special runners and messengers. Two of our runners, Pvts. Alberto Diza and Mariano Handoc were captured and killed by the enemy at Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya while delivering report to the Bn CP at Nueva Vizcaya on September 12, 1942.

8. The "G" Co. continued its mission until December 10, 1942 when the Co. CP was raided by Japs from Nueva Vizcaya with Constebulary men and spies. Slight resistance was encountered by the enemy. Pvts. Manuel Fontenilla and Calixto Boncato were captured and killed by the enemy. Enemy casualty was unknown. After the raid the men were dispersed and reorganization was made until February 1, 1943 when another contact was made with Hq, 14th Inf. At this contact the "G" Co. was redesignated to "H" Co., then to Hq, Serv. Co. and finally to Combat Co. up to the time the 14th Infantry was inactivated on November 15, 1945.

s/ Gregorio P. Montejo  
 t/ GREGORIO P. MONTEJO  
 Captain Inf. AUS  
 (Former CO, "G" Co., 14th Inf. (AUS))

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

*Richard Evans*  
 RICHARD EVANS  
 WOJG USA  
 OIC, Project "J" Section

/JEP



BRIEF HISTORY, 14TH INF AUS

The 14th Inf is a group of scattered troops of the USAFFE consolidated in Nueva Vizcaya province on or about the first week of January 1942.

Gathering what was left of the 1st Bn, 71st Inf, 71st Div, Capt Guillermo Nakar, Commanding Officer of the gallant battalion, withdrew toward Baguio pursued by an overwhelmingly superior enemy force. Finding Baguio already captured and occupied by the enemy, this intrepid warrior proceeded across the Cordillera mountains overcoming all odds and difficulties that are inevitably attendant on jungle trails, and arrived at Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, about January 8, 1942. Captain Nakar found that Capt Everret L Warner and Capt Manuel P Enriquez were already trying to organize stragglers from the 11th Division, 26th Cav (PS), the Headquarters of the 1st Military District who were unable to proceed to Bataan in view of the capture and occupation by the enemy of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and with a few civilian volunteers who were also mustered or inducted into the service of Major Everret Warner. These three gallant leaders undaunted by their being cut off from the USAFFE troops at Bataan, pooled their men together numbering about 800 and formed themselves into a unit which was temporarily designated 1st Provisional Guerilla Regiment by USAFFE HQ. Contact with USAFFE HQ was established by radio which was brought down from HQ, 1st Military District, Camp Henry T Allen, Baguio City by Sgt Jose Cabanero with the help of native cargadores.

This regiment as it will be seen later, was redesignated 14th Inf., USAFFE. The original set up was as follows:

Regimental Commander - - - Major Everret L. Warner  
 Ex CO and CO, Hq Bn - - - Lt Manuel P. Enriquez  
 Regt'l Adj & CO, 1st Bn - 1st Lt Warren A Hinton  
 CO, 2nd Bn. - - - - - Capt Guillermo Nakar

The location of the different Command Posts were as follows:

Regt'l CP & Radio Station -- Sto Domingo, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya  
 1st Bn - - - - - Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya  
 2nd Bn - - - - - Comon, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya

Radiographic contact was made with the General Headquarters of Gen MacArthur. Gen MacArthur's cognizance of the existence of the 1st Guerilla Regiment and the courageous and unique motives which gave its birth, resulted in the promotion of Capt Warner, Nakar and Enriquez to Major and the commission of Sgt Jose Cabanero to 3rd Lieutenant about the 3rd week of January 1942. The regiment was made to understand that its principal mission was to harass the enemy and gather enemy information but that it was to preserve its organization by discreetly avoiding direct contact with the enemy. In other words, its mission was combat intelligence. For this purpose the following assignments of sectors were made: Major Nakar and his battalion from Balate Pass to Bato Ferry; Headquarters and 1st Battalion - from Bato Ferry inclusive to Aparri. Itching for action, the 1st Bn on or about 13 January 1942, raided Tuguegarao, Cagayan. This raid was undertaken in conjunction with Capt Praeger's 26th Cav (PS), contingents of the 71st Inf, and few civilian volunteers among them was Francis A. Camp, later commissioned. The splendid results of this action were the killing of not less than 100 Japs, and the

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destruction on the ground of 3 Jap planes. General Headquarters, USAFFE, was so pleased with the results that it commended and decorated all the Officers and EM that participated in the raid. There were minor subsequent engagements of the troops but casualties inflicted on the enemy could not be determined in view of the lack of means of verification attendant on hit-and-run tactics. Enraged by these intermittent engagements and fervently desirous to exploit the rich sources of food supplies in the Cagayan Valley, the Japanese Imperial Forces made a determined effort to push thru and destroy the USAFFE forces thereat. This was about the 3rd week of January, 1942, and the 2nd Bn then under Major Nakar was occupying defensive positions from Bambang to Balete Pass. Then there were reports from Regimental Headquarters to the effect that the Japanese were coming to the Cagayan Valley in two columns, - one thru Highway No. 5 and the other thru the Baguio-Kiangan road. In the last week of January, minor contacts with the feelers of the advancing Japanese Columns up the San Jose-Balete Pass road were made by the outposts of the 2nd Battalion. At this time, there was an increase of aerial reconnaissance by the enemy. On or about the 25th of January, 1942, a message from Major Warner was received by Major Nakar, to proceed to Bayombong with all his troops to assume command of the regiment in view of the illness of both Major Warner and Major Enriquez. Major Nakar, seeing the great possibility of hitting the enemy hard from his vantage positions, requested deferment of the carrying out of the order. The order being repeated the next day was ignored by Major Nakar. A third order was received on or about the 27th in compliance of which Major Nakar pulled out his headquarters and men from San Fernando and all the position they occupied and proceeded to Bayombong, leaving only about a platoon under Lt. Januarie Longno to cover the withdrawal.

The 2nd Battalion troops arrived at Bayombong in the morning of the 28th and Major Guillermo Nakar immediately assumed command. A brief conference of the Regimental Staff developed to the issuance of an order to move the troops to Isabela. In view of the meagerness of the means of transportation, the available trucks and other vehicles shuttled the troops to Isabela. On the 29th of January, the advance party of the Jap column was engaged by Lt Longno and his men at Bambang, destroying one truck and one command car and killing 49 troops (Nips). While this engagement was taking place, the movement towards Jones continued. On the same day, Japanese reconnaissance planes flew over Bagabag where Nakar's troops were still in bivouac. The following day 7 planes bombed Bagabag and Bayombong, hitting the Home Economics Building and the market. Fortunately the troops were already far on their way toward Isabela having moved at night on 28th January 1942.

Upon arrival at Jones, Isabela, on or about 2 Feb 42, the regimental headquarters was established at Masaya where Lt Col Warner assumed command, putting back into operation the Radio Transmitter thereat. The 1st Battalion under Capt Minton encamped in Sinaungan, the 2nd Battalion under Major Nakar at Daligan. Radio contact with the USAFFE Headquarters was resumed upon which a message was received directing Lt Col Warner to cease the use of 1st Guerilla Regimenta and designate the unit as the 14th Inf. USAFFE.

Shortage of arms, ammunition, medicine and other supplies was beginning to affect the operations as well as the health of the regiment. In response to radiographic appeal for supplies, two planes dropped on 16 February 1942,

a box of medicine, 2 boxes of ammunition Cal 30, two pairs of shoes for Col Warner and Capt Minton and an envelope containing a CODE and other instructions. Telephone communication for intelligence purposes was established in the provinces of Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya and part of Cagayan under Lt Ambrocio operated and maintained with members of the Regiment and in some place s by volunteer guards.

The 1st Bn under Capt Minton which was mostly composed of civilian volunteers spent its time in training its men. The HQBN under Major Enriquez sent out a few combat reconnaissance patrols and guarded the Regtll OP. The 2nd Bn under Major Makar was busy harassing the enemy and maintaining telephone communication.

The following important events happened between February 19, 1942 to the fall of Bataan, April 9, 1942:

A. - HQBN under Major Manuel P Enriquez:

1. - Maintenance of radio contact with HQ Gen MacArthur and later with Gen Wainright and sending in important intelligence information gathered by the intelligence and combat patrols.
2. - Recapture of Bayombong and killing of Miyamoto, Japanese Military Administrator for Nueva Vizcaya province on the middle of March, 1942.
3. - Gathering of arms and ammunition from civilians.

B. - 1st Bn under Capt Minton:

1. - Training of Men;
2. - Collecting of arms and ammunition.
3. - Constructing an airstrip at Palacian, Jones, Isabela.

C. - 2ND BN under Major Guillermo Makar:

1. - Sending combat intelligence patrols .
2. - Capture of 5 Japs at San Luis, Gordon, Isabela by a patrol led by Lt Fermin Obina, Lt Bueno, and Acting Officer Ricardo Ambrocio, later on commissioned;
3. - Raids by the Men of Lt Januario Longne, Lt Mabunga and Lt Rosario between Aritao and Sta Fe on the following dates: 30 January 1942, 12 February 1942, 18 March 1942 and 7 June 1942.
4. - Second raid in Tuguegarao under Lts Obina, Dingcong, Reyes and 24 men on or about March 24, 1942. Result: Jap Guard House was burned, killed and wounded an undetermined number of Japs;

5. - Capture of 1 Jap soldier south of Aparri by Lt Francis A Camp in the last week of February 1942;
6. - The killing of the 6 Jap prisoners by Lt Col E Warner and Capt Minton for attempting to escape during the 1st week of March 1942;
7. - Collecting of arms and ammunitions from civilians.

**D. - Redesignation of Units, 14th Inf in the Middle of March 1942:**

1. - Regt'l Commander still Lt Col E L Warner;
2. - The 2nd Bn became the HQBN and Major G. Nakar became Regt'l Ex O and CO, HQBN.
3. - The HQBN of Major Enriquez became the 2nd Bn under Major Manuel P Enriquez;
4. - The 1st Bn under Capt Minton (no change);
5. - The Regimental GP moved to Usol, Jones, Isabel;
6. - The 2nd Bn under Major Enriquez moved to recaptured Bayambang, Nueva Vizcaya;

**E. - PROMOTIONS:**

As far as I can remember, the following officers were promoted by Radiogram:

Rank and Name	TO	Date	Authority
Major Everret L. Warner	: Lt Col	: February 1942	: Gen MacArthur
1st Lt Warren Minton	: Captain	: February 1942	: Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Tesoro Reyes	: 1st Lt	: 10 Feb 1942	: Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Januaric Longno	: 1st Lt	: 10 Feb 1942	: Gen MacArthur
3rd Lt Thomas Acop	: 1st Lt	: 10 Feb 1942	: Gen MacArthur
2nd Lt Fernin L Obina	: 1st Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Arturo Dingcong	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Eulogio Bueno	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Jose Cabanero	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Antonio Castro	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Enrique Cruz	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Benjamin Perdido	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Julian Perdiguero	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Alfonso Sta Ana	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Pedro Vea	: 2nd Lt	: 25 Mar 1942	: Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Froilan Norico	: 1st Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Froilan B Parado	: 1st Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Leandro Rosaffo	: 1st Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
2nd Lt Nemeriano Valdepenas	: 1st Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Lope Gabautan	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright

3rd Lt Vicente Carag	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Ulpiano Domingo	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Mariano Evangelista	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Alejandro Putad	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Flore Ramos	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Juan Sabalboro	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Antonio dela Cueva	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Rogelio Dieste	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Roman Licayan	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Juan Coma	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Pedro Mabunga	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Vicente Matias	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Gervacio Reyes	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Joel Senot	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Prescillano Velasco	: 2nd Lt	: 14 April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
3rd Lt Manuel T. Nery	: 1st Lt	: February 1942	: Gen MacArthur

**F. - Commissions:**

As far as I can remember, the following commissions were made by Radio:

Civ Dr. Celso Mesa	: 1st Lt DC	: April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
Civ Dr. Vicente Florida	: 1st Lt MO	: April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
Civ Dr. Miguel Castro	: 1st Lt MO	: April 1942	: Gen Wainwright
Civ Ricardo B. Ambrosio	: 3rd Lt	: 5 Mar 1942	: Gen MacArthur
Civ Leandro Rosario	: 2nd Lt	: 5 Mar 1942	: Gen MacArthur
Civ Francis A. Camp	: 2nd Lt	: March 1942	: Gen MacArthur
Sgt Harley F. Reib	: 2nd Lt	: March 1942	: Gen MacArthur

Capt Robert H Arnold, SO (USA) reported and was assigned with the 14th Inf as S-2 and Signal Officer on 10 April 1942.

As a result of the surrender of Bataan, Lt Col E L Warner, Capt Minton and some of the 1st Bn Officers and Men left on 12 April 1942 for Casiguran, Tayabas, after Col Warner had sent a radiogram requesting Gen Wainwright to send a destroyer to pick him up at Casiguran Bay. Gen Wainwright radioed back directing Col Warner to stay with his command. This message was sent by rush messengers to Casiguran but Col Warner, Capt Minton and other Americans had already boarded a reconditioned Jap launch with the intention to go to China.

Major Guillermo Makar was promoted Lt Col on or about 15 April 1942 and assigned CO 14th Inf by Gen Wainwright; Capt R H Arnold became the CO HQBN; 1st Lt Obina, Actg CO and Ex O, 1st Bn and Major Manuel P Enriquez, CO, 2nd Bn. 2nd Lt Arturo Dingoong was assigned Regimental Adjutant and was promoted 1st Lt on or about 25 April 1942 together with 1st Lt Edmundo Navarro, Ex O, 2nd Bn on same date by Gen Wainwright.

On the fall of Corregidor, no radiographic instructions were received from Gen Wainwright. Our Signal Off. Lt Jose Cabanero reported that the Radio Station at Corregidor stopped all of a sudden and was no longer on the air. Radio broadcasts from KGH, San Francisco, commented that the order of surrender of Gen Wainwright which was broadcasted did not sound like the natural voice of Gen Wainwright and further said that if it was Gen Wainwright, he was forced to do it or that he did it under duress. Jap planes dropped

surrender

surrender leaflets addressed to Lt Col Nakar. Lt Col Theodore Kalakuka was sent to contact Col Nakar in order to make him surrender but Col Nakar had already decided to continue the fight and never to surrender. At this time the HQBN, less one Company was in the Regt CP at Qimallabasa, Jones, Isabela with "A", "C", and 1/2 of "D" Company in around the surrounding berries of Jones. One Company of the HQBN under Capt Alfonso Baguno was in Cabagan, Isabela, the other half of the "D" Co. under Lt Francis A Camp was at Tuao, Gagayan, and "B" Company under Lt Januaric Longno was at San Fernando, Bambang Nueva Vizcaya. The whole of the 2nd Bn under Major Enriquez was spread out from Santiago, Isabela to Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya with headquarters near Bayombong.

In view of the scarcity of food, the lack of sufficient arms, ammunitions and medicine, and in order to easily hide the men and at the same time facilitate the gathering and relaying of enemy information for higher headquarters, Lt Col Nakar ordered that the Officers and Men not actually needed in the Regt CP, be tactically dispersed. Each Officer sent out was given a list of the men under him. The men were instructed to report secretly to their Officers at least thrice a week or as often as situation demands. The Officers were instructed to submit S-2 information at least three times a week to the nearest contact station. A series of contact station was already in operation in which a contact station did not know where the messages were coming from or where they were going to. All a Station knows is that it will only relay a message to the next station and nothing more.

On 13 May 1942, the Regt Staff, Radio Station, and around 70 EM and 10 Off moved upstream the Gagayan River and established its headquarters in a small clearing about 5 Kms from Donabato, Panappagan, Nueva Vizcaya on 15 May 1942.

The period from 15 May 1942 to 15 June 1942 was devoted to the setting up of the Radio transmitter and receiver under Lt Jose Cabanero with the help of Capt Arnold and Sgts Lebroje and Domingo. Officers who were assigned in the gathering of S-2 information were sent out to perfect the intelligence set up as well as the contact and relay station system. In the meantime the units under Lt Camp in the Gagayan and northern Isabela province and those under Major Enriquez and Lt Longno in the province of Nueva Vizcaya were destroying bridges and harassing the enemy who by this time had become too free and careless in their movements making him an easy prey to our small mobile patrols.

On 16 June 1942, the Radio transmitter set was set into operation and the delicate task of contacting a friendly station began. After long and careful deliberation on the procedure to be followed and the messages to be sent in order to deny an enemy station from knowing our real identity and location and at the same time positively determine that we are in contact with a friendly station, the following plan was put into action: Our station was given a call name which sounded like a Java word. It was to send a general call and upon contact with another station, it will ask for the time and then give a message asking the name of the wife of an officer whose ASN was so and so (This ASN was the SN of Capt Robert H Arnold, USA) It will further request that the word Mabuhay be broadcasted over station KGEL, San Francisco. In the last week of June 1942, contact was made by our Station and the above procedure was followed. The time given by the station was contacted pointed



Darwin, Australia as its location. However, we were still in doubt. But, about two days later, the name of the wife of Capt Arnold and the word MABUHAY was broadcasted over KGEI in the evening. This was followed by a Radio message from Gen MacArthur received on 29 June 1942 which partly read as follows:

"LT OOL NAKAR:

THE COURAGEOUS AND SPLENDED RESISTANCE MAINTAINED BY YOU AND YOUR COMMAND FILLS ME WITH PRIDE AND SATISFACTION STOP IT WILL BE MY PRIVILEGE TO SEE THAT YOU AND YOUR OFFICERS AND MEN ARE PROPERLY REWARDED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME STOP X X X X MY AFFECTION AND BEST WISHES

MacARTHUR"

In a radiogram, Col Nakar reported the strength of the regiment which was as far as I can remember ~~was~~ 62 officers and 960 enlisted men plus 5 Officers and 140 enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary who were attached.

In one of the first messages from Gen MacArthur the mission of the 14th Inf was specified and that was to obtain and transmit intelligence information to GHQ, SWPA. In order to accomplish this end, Col Nakar asked for \$5,000.00 to be spent solely for intelligence purposes. This request was approved by Gen MacArthur. On the strength of this authority, civilian S-2 agents were employed with salaries ranging from \$50.00 to \$150.00. However, these agents were never paid on account of the fact that no funds could be obtained locally. Intelligence coverage was expanded to include as far south as Manila and as far north as Aparri. S-2 reports were sent to Gen MacArthur covering all kinds of information about enemy movements, installations, concentrations as well as the kind of treatment the Filipino and American prisoners of War was receiving in the concentration Camp. The men and officers sent out for S-2 work also carried with them a mimeographed newspaper called the "SPIRIT OF BATAAN" and signed NATANGLAWIN (Hawk's Eye). This paper did not only serve as the only means by which the people were informed of the true happenings of the war but also warned the civil population from aiding the enemy in any form.

On 14 July 1942 a message from Gen MacArthur was received directing Col Nakar that he may induct the PA troops under his command into the Army of the United States effective 14 July 1942. This same radiogram contained the pay and allowances of US Army personnel from Pvt to Colonel. Same Radiogram also had the ASN Block for Officer and Enlisted Men to be assigned to the 14th Inf AUS which are as follows: - For Officers - O-888070 to O-888169; for Enlisted Men - 10626000 to 10626999. This was immediately circularized to the officers and men of the regiment (See incls 1) and the officers and men in the Regimental Command Post and vicinity were immediately inducted into the AUS and given ASN. Capt Fermin Obina and Lt Julian Perdegueros were delegated and sent out for the induction of the men and officers of the HQBN and 1st Bn while Major Manuel P. Enriquez was delegated to induct the 2nd Bn which was at that time spread out in Nueva Vizcaya and eastern Pangasinan. In view of the distance and the difficulties of transportation and communication the induction was slow and delayed specially in the units of the 2nd Bn. Col Nakar however, in order to be fair to all ordered that all induction be dated 14 July 1942. Because of this he sent a message to SWPA stating that

all officers and men were inducted into the AUS on 14 July 1942. Lists of all Officers and Enlisted Men inducted into the AUS with their ASN were kept in the Regimental GP together with the oaths of Office for Officers.

The present discrepancies in the assignment of ASN for Officers can be traced in this manner; In the first place the officers ASN as was first received by us had only two 8's or only 0-88070 - 0-88169. Take my case as an example, I was given ASN 0-88079 as a First Lieutenant and was recommended for promotion with the same ASN. When the correction was made to 888070, I was already promoted Captain and another seniority list was made. I was this time assigned ASN 888075. I was therefore using ASN 0-888075 until I was given an extract copy of my SO promoting me to Captain wherein my ASN was 0-888079. This is true with almost all the officers. The only thing to do now is to inform all the officers to use the first ASN given them adding one more 8 or to reassign serial numbers to officers whose serial numbers were not reported by radio to GHQ, SWPA.

In the last week of July 1942, a radiogram from GHQ, SWPA was received inquiring as to where personnel could be landed to contact the 14th Inf AUS. This message was answered requesting information as to how the personnel will be landed - by parachute from a plane or by submarine. Meanwhile a patrol was immediately sent to Casiguran, Tayabas to establish an outpost and a reception point to receive the personnel if they will be landed by submarine.

Radiogram was received promoting the following officers effective 2nd August 1942 to ranks as follows:

<u>TO BE MAJOR</u>	<u>TO BE 1ST LT</u>
Capt Robert H. Arnold	2nd Lt. Harley F. Hebb
<u>TO BE CAPTAIN</u>	2nd Lt Honorio Quines
1st Lt Fermin Obina	2nd Lt Julian Perdigueros
1st Lt Arturo Dingoog	2nd Lt Eulogio Bueno
1st Lt Tesoro Reyes	2nd Lt Francis A. Camp
1st Lt Januarie Longno	2nd Lt Benjamin Perido
1st Lt Juan Asuncion	2nd Lt Antonio Castro
	2nd Lt Jose Gabanero

The following civilians who were long serving the unit acting as officers were as far as I can remember commissioned 2nd Lt in the Army of the United States on or about 9 August 1942:

Hospicio Tabilangan  
 Mario Gonzales

One of the last messages received on 12 August 1942 from GHQ, SWPA before the Radio Station was dismantled due to the reports that the enemy had located the station and was sending patrols to capture it was one which asked for the order of battle of the Japanese Army in the Philippines. This message was never answered. The radio set, after SWPA was duly notified that contact will be resumed on the 27th or 28th of August 1942, was dismantled and together with complete set of records was placed in a big Galvanized Iron tank and buried in the ground near the edge of the forest. Two other sets of records were ciled

placed in small cans, and buried about 200 to 300 yards inside the forest.

Beginning the first of July 1942, the Japanese Imperial Army after it failed to get any results in inducing Col Nakar, surrender, launched the most intensive and systematic mopping up operations against the troops of Col Nakar in the Cagayan Valley. These operations were conducted by Infantry troops, planes, Japs and Filipino MP's and Ganaps and was marked with indiscriminate bombing, imprisonment of suspected persons, torture, and atrocities of the highest order. However, the Japs did not gain much headway in the gaining of correct information about the whereabouts of Col Nakar and his troops. In retaliation of the atrocities committed by the Japs and partly because of the increased obstacles to be overcome in the securing of valuable S-2 information, our patrols had to fight it out with the Japs resulting to more torture and brutalities and later on during the last week of July some civilians and Enlisted Men who had a little more knowledge than they should have concerning the 14th Inf AUS were captured. Lt Leandro Rosario one of the few officers who were able to visit Col Nakar in our Regt'l QP at Domabato, Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya surrendered to the Japs in Bayambang and was reported to have been very close to the Japs. These events lead to the dismantling of the radio station and the burying of the records as was previously mentioned. On or about 25 August 1942 approximately two companies of Japs occupied Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya. Two days before the arrival of the Japs however, Col Nakar issued orders that no fighting should be done in Pinappagan and that everybody should pretend to be civilians. Lt Jose Cabanero was left near the place where the radio and records were buried and I with Major Arnold, Lt Heib, two other American soldiers and around 35 MM about half of whom were sick of Malaria, encamped about 5 kilometers from our regimental QP. A day before the Japs arrived at Pinappagan, Col Nakar left for a barrio near Jones, Isabela. His intention was to watch the Japanese more closely in order to be able to determine what the Japs knew about Pinappagan and their plans. On 28 August 1942 the Japs left Pinappagan for Jones but returned two days later with a bigger force and with Lt Antonio Castro and another soldier by the name Colcol as prisoners. On the 15 of September our 2nd regimental QP was raided by the Japs guided by Colcol. Finding the Camp empty, the Japs burned all the shelters. My group moved out to another secret place known only to 2 or 3 civilians. But one of our contact men by the name of Del Rosario, a PC soldier, was captured without our knowledge and after he was tortured, he guided the Japs to our bivouac area on 14 Sept 42. Early on the morning of 15 Sept my camp was raided and after short encounter between the Japs and our men that covered our withdrawal, I and 2 of my soldiers who were sick were surrounded in a thick bush and taken prisoners. Sgts Pablo Villanobles and Mayoga who were too sick to run stayed behind and fired at the Japs until they were killed. Casualties on the side of the Japs could not be determined.

I was taken to the Jap garrison at Pinappagan and was investigated and tortured as I refused to give any information. Only the people of Pinappagan Major Arnold, and Colonels Warner and Kalakuka who later on visited me in my cell could tell how I was tortured as a result of my refusal to give out the secrets of the regiment. On 17 September 1942 Lt Leandro Rosario arrived at Pinappagan with Col Ide and a regiment of Japanese soldiers. Rosario delivered speeches telling the people that they should cooperate with the Japs and reveal the secrets of the 14th Inf.



An important fact here has to be mentioned as it was responsible for the capture of Col Nakar, the radio, the records, and the surrender of some of the officers and men. This fact was that Lt Rosario founded the town of Pinappagan and his words were very much respected by the people. However, the people tried hard to keep the secrets of the 14th Inf until Rosario and the Japs gave out an ultimatum that all will be killed if no one will tell the truth about the radio and Col Nakar. The people softened and with the squealing of an Aglipayan priest by the named of Castillo the radio was located and dugged out by Rosario and the Japs on or about the last week of September 1942. The capture of Col Nakar in a cave near Minuri, Jones, Isabela on 29 September by the Japs with the help of Sabalucag, chief of police of Jones) and 500 Ganaps followed. Lt Rosario once boasted to me in my prison cell that he was going to get a medal from the Emperor for the capture of Col Nakar and his radio. Lt Rosario and his co-spies who received medals for the capture of Col Nakar and the radio did wear their medals but they all disappeared before the US Army returned to the Philippines to give them a chance to assert that they were not spies, traitors nor collaborators.

The other two sets of records buried in the forest were according to reliable information also found by the Japs in one of their excavation patrols to our CP in which Colonels Warner and Kalakuka were present. The Japs in these excavation patrols used from 200 to 300 civilians with an equal number of Japs and with crowbars and sharpened sticks combed the vicinity of our old CP for buried records, supplies, equipment, and valuables. They did this for almost two weeks and at the end of this period, they got practically everything except the buried can where the radio tubes, crystals, codes, and other important parts of the radio set were placed. This can was later on accidentally dug out by civilians about 2 years after but the contents were already decayed.

On 23 October 1942, all the Japs in Pinappagan moved down to Jones, Isabela with all their prisoners namely: Lt-Colonels Warner and Kalakuka, lieutenants Seigler and Antonio Castro, the two soldiers who were captured with me, Judge Cataline Valbuena of Pinappagan who was our S-2 agent and who never squealed in spite of the severe torture he received from the Japs, and myself. Judge Valbuena and the two soldiers were bayoneted on the way 5 Km north of Pinappagan and before we reached Jones, LtcCastro and I were taken each by four Japs their rifles with fixed bayonets to the Cagayan River. When the Japs were about to bayonet me, I broke loose and ran. I heard four shots and then I dove to the river and swam with the current downstream. I successfully evaded the Jap and Gahap guards on the way and reported back to the camp of Major Arnold the following day 24 October 1942 at Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya. From 24 October 1942 to September 1944, Maj Arnold commanded the remnants of the 14th Inf, AUS who were hiding and had never surrendered between Jones, Isabela and Pinappagan, Nueva Vizcaya. This group consisted of 8 officers namely: Major Arnold, Lts Harley F Heib, Leonardo Galina, Gervacio Reyes, Enrique Cruz, Pedro Vea, Benjamin Aviles, myself and about 60 enlisted men. This group under Major Arnold was always busy evading the enemy. This was because in the rosters that the Japs were able to capture, they could tell that there were many more officers who were not yet accounted for including Major Arnold, Lt Heib, and Pvt Mangemelli all Americans. The enemy which sometimes reach as many as 800 Japs and Ganaps were always busy patrolling Jones and Pinappagan until August of

1944 when the last garrison of Japanese and BG soldiers was pulled out of Pinappagan. In this extended mopping up operations the Japs suffered much as many died of malaria and equipment and supplies were destroyed or lost especially when they have to cross the rivers during floods.

Units of the 14th Infantry under Lt Joaquin Duncan fought the Japs in the Mallig region of Isabela until the middle of 1945 when it had to suspend its operations due to lack of arms and ammunitions. Lt Francis A Camp in Cagayan also carried on the fight until he was captured sometimes in 1945. The 2nd Bn under Major Manuel P Enriquez continued defying the Japs in eastern Pangasinan and Nueva Viscaya. When Maj Enriquez surrendered to the Japs at Baguio on 15 April 1945, Capt Romulo A Manriquez who had joined the 2nd Bn and was at this time the Ex O, assumed command of the 2nd Bn. The 2nd Bn under Capt Manriquez (now a Lt-Colonel and studying at Fort Leavenworth) continued the fight and grew into a little less than a regiment so that when Col Russell W Volckmann organized the USAFIP, NL command, the 2nd Bn, 14th Inf, AUS became the 14th Inf, USAFIP, NL.

In January, 1944 Major Arnold received a message from Col Volckmann requesting him to report to Col Volckmann's Headquarters. Major Arnold, however, was not able to get out of Pinappagan due to the presence of large enemy troops still around Pinappagan and Jones. In the first week of October 1944 situation eased up and Maj Arnold seeing the need for more men, inducted around 40 men into the Army of the United States. These men were picked in recognition of their loyalty and the great sacrifice they had made for the preservation of the 14th Inf, AUS.

Sometimes in the middle of October, 1944 Maj Arnold left our unit in Pinappagan and Jones in order to confer with Col Volckmann as to who should command the 14th Inf. Maj Arnold's intention was to get back the command of the 14th Inf inasmuch as he was the most ranking officer left after Col Makar was captured. The outcome of the conference was however, the assignment of Maj Arnold as CO, 15th Inf, USAFIP, NL and the incorporation of the remnants of the 14th Inf, AUS which were under me at that time into the 14th Inf, USAFIP, NL on 28 October 1944. From hereon the activities of the remnants of the 14th Inf, AUS who had joined the 14th, 11th, 66th, and 15th Inf Regts of USAFIP, NL can be gathered in the battles that these regiments fought in the liberation of the Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Viscaya, Pangasinan and Ilocos provinces of Northern Luzon.

The 14th Inf, AUS lost its identity with the organization of the USAFIP, NL as the scattered officers and men could no longer be grouped together in view of the presence of spies and Japs, the need for immediate action, and in order to avoid friction among the different regiments to which officers and men of the 14th Inf AUS had joined. In my humble opinion the officers and men of the 14th Inf, AUS under Col Guillermo Makar had made a worthy contribution in the organization and successful operations of the various units of the USAFIP, NL command under Col Volckmann especially in the 14th, 11th, and 15th Infantry Regiments.

*Arturo Dingco*  
ARTURO DINGCO  
Captain, Inf, AUS  
0-888079

2nd Indorsement  
24 June 1945

GHQ USAFIP, North Luzon

To: C.G., AFPAC  
APO 500

1. The 14th Infantry, (PA) is one of the recognized regiments of this command. All records pertaining to this regiment are in the possession of the Hq of the regiment. Due to the fact that this headquarters is at present located in the vicinity of Kiangan behind the enemy lines, physical contact for the purpose of securing such records is not possible at this time. However, the 6th Division, now driving up Highway No. 4 toward Kiangan, should be able to make contact with this regiment in the near future.

2. This headquarters requests to be informed more specifically what records of the 14th Infantry (PA) are desired or whether it is merely your desire that a representative of Headquarters, Philippine Army, be allowed to go to the headquarters, 14th Infantry and examine same when this becomes feasible.

3. In order to save possible questions regarding the 14th Infantry, this headquarters wishes to give a few facts regarding the history of the 14th Infantry (PA).

*mkw*  
The 14th Infantry (PA) was originally organized in Cagayan Valley by Lt. Col. Warner in the early part of 1942. He was assisted in this work by Major Nekar and Major Manuel P. Enriquez. Following the fall of Bataan, the enemy re-entered Cagayan Valley in force and the 14th Infantry was split into two parts -- one battalion under Major Enriquez in the west and the balance of the regiment under Lt Col Werner and Major Nekar in the east. When General Wainwright issued his surrender order, Lt Col Werner surrendered along with some of his troops, and Major Nekar assumed command, assisted by Major Robert H. Arnold, AUS, who had joined the command. It was Nekar's unit which maintained radio communication with Australia following the fall of Corregidor and, so this headquarters understands, secured the induction of a number of soldiers under his immediate command into the Army of the United States. (It is known that some of the surviving Filipino officers have United States Army officer's serial numbers.) Later, Major Nekar was captured and his radio was destroyed, and Major Arnold assumed command of the remnants of his unit. Meanwhile, the branch in the west under Major Enriquez survived quite successfully -- in spite of the voluntary surrender of Major Enriquez in April,

*April 43*

1944  
1943. Major Romulo A. Manriquez assumed command of the western branch following Major Enriquez' surrender. Due to the lack of contact between the eastern and western branches of the 14th Infantry, the ties of command were severed following the capture of Major Nakar and the western branch of the 14th Infantry carried on and gradually organized itself as the entire 14th Infantry. Late in 1944, Major Manriquez established contact with Major Arnold, whose command had then been reduced to about the size of a company, in the vicinity of Jones, Isabels. As the western branch of the 14th Infantry had now expanded into practically a complete regiment, Arnold's men were transferred intact to Major Manriquez' command, and Major Arnold was transferred to take command of the newly organized 15th Infantry, (PA) which position he now holds with the rank of Lt. Colonel in this organization. Manriquez, now a Lt. Colonel in this organization, still commands the 14th Infantry. All records of the eastern branch of the 14th Infantry were turned over to Lt. Col. Manriquez upon Lt. Col. Arnold's transfer. Lt. Colonel Arnold can be contacted thru this headquarters for queries regarding the eastern branch of the 14th Infantry, (PA).

For the COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ Arthur Murphy  
/t/ ARTHUR MURPHY  
Lt Col, Infantry  
Chief of Staff

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

LEONARD R. FARBER  
Captain AGD

2nd Indorsement  
24 June 1945

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APO 500

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For the COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ Arthur Murphy  
/t/ ARTHUR MURPHY  
Lt Col, Infantry  
Chief of Staff

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

LEONARD R. FARBER  
Captain AGD

*at c*

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS  
15th Infantry, P.A.  
Luna, La Union

16 September 1945

SUBJECT: 14th Infantry  
TO : Lieut-Colonel PARKER CALVERT  
Infantry Commander, USAFIP, NL

1. In compliance to your query regarding certain facts of the 14th Infantry while I was connected with this organization, the following information is furnished:

2. In the early part of April 1942, I was assigned to the 14th Infantry, PA, by Headquarters, USFIP. At that time, Lieut.-Col. Everett Warner was the C.O. Lieut-Col. Guillermo Neker was the E.O. Lieut-Col. Warner however, had already left for Casiguran where he intended to get a boat so as to reach China. He was accompanied by Capt. George Scholey and Lieut. Nicolson as well as two chinamen. Col. Warner, however, is understood to have gotten off the boat at Palanan and later surrendered to the Japs. Capt Scholey, Lieut. Nicolson and the two chinamen were reported to have been captured by a Jap submarine off Aparri.

3. After Lieut.-Col. Warner had left his command, Lieut.-Col. Neker became the CO and I was made C.O. of the Headquarters Bn. After the fall of Corregidor, Col. Nekar was persuaded not to surrender but as an alternative disbanded all but about 200 of his 800 men and some of his approximately 80 officers. The Regt'l CP then moved up the Cagayan River from the vicinity of Jones to the vicinity of Pinaqqegan where radio contact was established with SWPA at the later part of June 1942. Soon after this, Gen. MacArthur in a radiogram to the C.O. 14th Infantry, PA, announced that, as a reward for not surrendering the unit, the 14th Infantry would be inducted into the AUS. About 200 men and 40 Officers were so inducted into the AUS in July 1942.

- 2 -

4. In September 1942, communication with SIFA was ended when a large Japanese force located our radio and CP, attacked us and captured the radio set. Col. Naker was not at the Regtl. CP at the time but he was captured shortly after. After that time, I assumed command of all soldiers and officers who were not yet disbanded or captured or killed. In June 1944, I heard of another branch of the 14th Infantry operating under Major Enriquez who was under Col. Volckmann. Contact was established as soon as possible. I understand that Major Enriquez, who had been C.O., 2nd Bn., 14th Infantry, PA, did not surrender until a later date and after the capture of Lieut.-Colonel Naker, claimed to have been the C.O. of the 14th Infantry, I do not know how many troops he had initially but I do know that most of his troops, except the Visayan soldiers numbering about 60, had been disbanded upon orders from Lieut.-Col. Naker immediately after the fall of Corregidor. Major Enriquez had been promoted to Major, PA, early in 1942 but he claimed that he should have assimilated the rank of Lieut.-Colonel because he had been G-2 for the 11th Division at the outbreak of the war and had only been a Captain.

5. Enclosed herewith are two letters from Lieut.-Col. Guillermo Naker after his surrender to the Japanese entreating his soldiers and officers to surrender.

/s/ R. H. Arnold  
/t/ R. H. ARNOLD  
Lieut.-Colonel, AUS, 15th Infantry, P. A.  
Commanding

As

Encls:

Two letters of Lieut.-Col. G. Naker

A TRUE COPY:

s/ Parker Calvert  
t/ PARKER CALVERT  
Lt Col, Infantry, AUS  
Infantry Commander, USAFIP, NL

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

*Richard Evans*  
RICHARD EVANS  
WCJG USA  
OIC, Project "J" Section

/JEP



DECLASSIFIED

Authority *AJVD353078*

*4 copies*

HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT  
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP, NL

23 April 1945

Msg. No. 409

SUBJECT: Information, Furnishing of  
TO : Commanding Officer, USAFIP, NL

1. In reference to a request from Major Arturo Dingcong, C.O., Headquarters Battalion, 14th Infantry, PA, I certify to the correctness of the following information:

2. To the best of my knowledge, the original 14th Infantry, PA, formerly under Lieut.- Colonel Guillermo Nakar, was federalized in June 1942 in accordance with a radio from SWPA. At that time, a considerable number of the officers and approximately 200 enlisted men were inducted into the AUS in accordance with radiogram received from SWPA, as mentioned above. Included in the above officers inducted into the AUS was 1st Lieut., Arturo Dingcong who was shortly after on August 2, 1942, promoted to the rank of Captain. Included also were 1st Lieuts. Heib, Galima, Aviles, and 2nd Lieuts. Vea, Cruz and Reyes. These officers were always directly or indirectly under my command and never surrendered or deserted. A roster of the enlisted men who were with me and who never deserted nor surrendered and who were inducted into the AUS can be furnished by Maj. Dingcong, 14th Infantry, PA.

s/ R. H. Arnold  
t/ R. H. ARNOLD  
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf.  
Commanding

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

*Arturo Dingcong*  
ARTURO DINGCONG  
Captain, Infantry, AUS

HEADQUARTERS 2ND MILITARY DISTRICT  
18TH INFANTRY, USAFIP, HL

23 April 1945

Reg. No. 409

SUBJECT: Information, Furnishing of  
TO : Commanding Officer, USAFIP, HL

1. In reference to a request from Major Arturo Dingoog, G.O., Headquarters Battalion, 14th Infantry, FA, I certify to the correctness of the following information:

2. To the best of my knowledge, the original 14th Infantry, FA, formerly under Lieut. - Colonel Guillermo Nakar, was federalized in June 1942 in accordance with a radio from SWEA. At that time, a considerable number of the officers and approximately 200 enlisted men were inducted into the AUS in accordance with radiogram received from SWEA, as mentioned above. Included in the above officers inducted into the AUS was 1st Lieut., Arturo Dingoog who was shortly after on August 2, 1942, promoted to the rank of Captain. Included also were 1st Lieuts. Heib, Galina, Aviles, and 2nd Lieuts. Vea, Cruz and Reyes. These officers were always directly or indirectly under my command and never surrendered or deserted. A roster of the enlisted men who were with me and who never deserted nor surrendered and who were inducted into the AUS can be furnished by Maj. Dingoog, 14th Infantry, FA.

s/ R. H. Arnold  
t/ R. H. ARNOLD  
Lieut.-Colonel, 18th Inf.  
Commanding

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

/s/ Arturo Dingoog  
/t/ ARTURO DINGOOG  
Captain, Infantry, AUS

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

*Gordon H. Simmons*  
GORDON H. SIMMONS  
1st Lt FA

HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT  
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP, EL

23 April 1945

Reg. No. 409

SUBJECT: Information, Furnishing of  
TO : Commanding Officer, USAFIP, EL

1. In reference to a request from Major Arturo Dingcong, C.O., Headquarters Battalion, 14th Infantry, PA, I certify to the correctness of the following information:

2. To the best of my knowledge, the original 14th Infantry, PA, formerly under Lieut. - Colonel Guillermo Makar, was federalized in June 1942 in accordance with a radio from SWPA. At that time, a considerable number of the officers and approximately 200 enlisted men were inducted into the AUS in accordance with radiogram received from SWPA, as mentioned above. Included in the above officers inducted into the AUS was 1st Lieut., Arturo Dingcong who was shortly after on August 2, 1942, promoted to the rank of Captain. Included also were 1st Lieuts. Reib, Galina, Aviles, and 2nd Lieuts. Yen, Cruz and Reyes. These officers were always directly or indirectly under my command and never surrendered or deserted. A roster of the enlisted men who were with me and who never deserted nor surrendered and who were inducted into the AUS can be furnished by Maj. Dingcong, 14th Infantry, PA.

s/ R. H. Arnold  
t/ R. H. ARNOLD  
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf.  
Commanding

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

/s/ Arturo Dingcong  
/t/ ARTURO DINGCONG  
Captain, Infantry, AUS

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

GORDON H. SIMONS  
1st Lt FA

A F F I D A V I T

DISTRICT OF CABANATUAN )  
NUEVA ECLJA PROVINCE ) SS  
PHILIPPINES )

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, an officer authorized by law to administer oaths, one Warren Arthur Minton, Captain, Cavalry, Army of the United States, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says:-

"I certify that I am Warren Arthur Minton, O-362251, Captain, Cavalry, Army of the United States, with residence in the United States at 219 West Nevada Street, El Paso, Texas;

That I desire to give this statement which covers my knowledge of the activities and plans of Lieut-Colonel Everett Leumen Warner, O-125572, Field Artillery, Army of the United States, and Commanding Officer Fourteenth Infantry, Philippine Army, USAFFE, to which Regiment I was assigned from Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) and served as Commanding Officer First Battalion, also as Adjutant;

That my reason for submitting this affidavit is that I desire to confirm the report of his activities that I know Lieut-Colonel Warner has written personally and truthfully, and to offset and overcome if possible certain misrepresentations that one United States Army officer and one or two Philippine Army officers, through envy perhaps or desire for each his own respective personal glory, have tried to make against Lieut-Colonel Warner, some of these misrepresentations having taken place directly within my knowledge and observation;

That I first became personally acquainted with Lieut-Colonel Warner while he was a Major Field Artillery and on detached service at Camp John Hay, P.I., from the Provisional Field Artillery Brigade, Philippine Scouts, Fort Stotsenburg. Our first meeting was at Lusod Saw-mill, Benguet, Mountain Province, December 26, 1941, upon the occasion of the ordered evacuation from Camp John Hay of our Forces; that at Lusod Saw-mill Major Warner received from Lieut-Colonel John P. Horan, late Commanding Officer at Camp John Hay, verbal orders to precede him (Colonel Horan with troops of the 43rd Infantry, P.S.) over the mountain trail to the east and when reaching Aritao, Nueva Viscaya Province, to inform him (Lieut-Colonel Horan) whether or not the road (National Route Number Five) was free of enemy troops to the south and whether there was transportation available to move him and the troops with him, south; that Major Warner carried out this mission endeavoring to keep contact with Lieut-Colonel Horan and that near Kayapa Lieut-Colonel Horan, about 60 kilometers behind Major Warner, without advising or warning Major Warner, turned and proceeded southeast through Imugen toward Belete Pass, and there to Road Five;

That Japanese forces at midnight December 28th, 1941, occupied San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and prevented all movement south of our Forces which Major Warner made effort to advise Lieut-Colonel Horan concerning, he (Major Warner) having reached Aritao early on the afternoon of December 29th, 1941;

That on January 1st, 1942, Lieut-Colonel Horan with a portion of his troops and two of his officer personnel, namely Captains Leo Glitter and Cameron Starnes, came north through Aritao and expressed to Captain Manuel P. Enriquez, 11th Division Staff, Philippine Army, that he did not desire Major Warner now to report to him (Colonel Horan) but to advise Major Warner to carry on with his work in charge of Philippine Army troops; that Lieut-Colonel Horan then moved north and spent the night of January 1st with us - Troop "C" 26th Cavalry, P.S., at Bambang - about twelve kilometers north of Major Warner's position, then moved north to Kiangan, Ifugao, Mountain Province;

That Major Warner meantime just prior to and upon arriving in Aritao on the afternoon of December 29, 1941, came upon several hundred cut-off troops-units of the Philippine Army, some of whom said that their commanding officers had disbanded them and directed them to proceed to their homes; that Major Warner after making effort to contact Lieut-Colonel Horan with the news of the Japanese occupation of San Jose to the south, took charge of the loose Philippine Army elements, ordering them to remain under himself until further definite information and orders could be obtained;

That in command of the advance party of my troop ("C" 26th Cavalry, P.S.) I preceded that troop over the trail just behind Major Warner's party, arrived in Aritao just behind him and met and talked with him in Aritao where I learned and could observe what he was doing; that I considered his efforts to be well worth while and of importance to the aid of both law, order and good morale of both soldiers and citizens in Nueva Vizcaya;

That Major Warner obtained and erected on or about January 9, 1942, a transmitting and receiving radio with which he contacted our High Command and reported the situation as it concerned those of our forces which to his knowledge were cut off from proceeding south and were now in proximity to him; that General MacArthur replied by radiogram dated January 13th authorizing Major Warner to operate support trenches in the hills, directing him to send information by every possible means and authorizing him to organize the troops to meet his needs; that shortly following, General MacArthur authorized Major Warner to sign chits for legitimate expenses for subsistence and other necessities for his troops; that later General MacArthur commended Major Warner for his energetic action in North Luzon and on February 12th by paragraph 4, Special Orders 22, promoted Major Warner to Lieut-Colonel;

That I joined Major Warner with a portion of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) and about 250 Filipinos (some already in the Philippine Army) under my command and Major Warner placed me in command of his Provisional First

Battalion where he had originally intended to place Major Ralph B. Praeger, Cavalry; that on February 14, 1942, with a strength of 1600 or over, Lieut-Colonel Warner's command was officially designated by General MacArthur - the Fourteenth Infantry, Philippine Army - with such Philippine Scouts and Americans as were with us, attached;

That I was the first American commissioned officer to join with Lieut-Colonel Warner - while he was still a Major - and as such we were much together in conference, on reconnaissance and in operations; that Lieut-Colonel Warner took me at all times into his confidence and that I believe I know better than anyone else his plans and purposes in all of his decisions and actions; that I remained with him through surrender of certain elements of the 14th Infantry not yet surrendered, this was from September 12 to December 6, 1942;

That short of ammunition, automatic and heavy weapons as we were, also individual equipment and medicine, Lieut-Colonel Warner inspired and held together the regiment when no officer therein, I believe, could have done so; that his attitude to both his troops and to the civilian population was one of always extreme fairness and that I believe he has the love and respect of all the right thinking officers, enlisted men and civilians who knew him; that I have heard Filipino Army officers tell him that Filipinos particularly liked him and I have heard his kindness praised by Spaniards and Filipinos alike;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner's policy was to keep up the morale of both the troops and the civilian population by assisting the people to preserve law and order through their own provincial and municipal officials without declaring martial law, and by letting them know that his troops were there to help and not to bring suffering to them; that he likewise strongly advised and encouraged the officials to remain in office and to thereby serve their people rather than to evacuate in the path of the incoming Japanese forces and thereby bring into power those who had not the interests of the citizens at heart first; that in some instances the Japanese Army permitted to remain or appointed to office certain citizens that Lieut-Colonel Warner had previously urged to serve, in other instances this was diametrically the opposite;

That first for Governor Quirino of Nueva Vizcaya, then later for Governor Visaya of Isabela and for Governor Adduro of Cagayan, Lieut-Colonel Warner, over the Regimental radio contacted President Manuel L. Quezon with respective problems of each and returned to these officials President Quezon's return reply or solution with authority to act; that emergency scrip currency, for one thing, was authorized, and that in another instance Lieut-Colonel Warner had a circuit judgeship, which was vacated by death in Isabela Province, refilled by Presidential appointment so that numerous prisoners in jail overlong awaiting trial could be properly tried and other cases on the docket disposed of legally and officially; that in addition, Lieut-Colonel Warner indicted into USAFFE such Constabulary elements as were within his contact, reinforced them where necessary and requested permission of our High Command that he be permitted to use the Constabulary in civil law enforcement where

possible and not in the battle-line unless necessary; that General MacArthur approved this and informed Lieut-Colonel Warner that such policy was in keeping with the plan of the High Command;

That it is evidenced that the civil population thought well of Lieut-Colonel Warner in that the Governing Commission of Nueva Vizcaya Province - the Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Third Member, officially named and recorded the adjacent valley (of the Addalam River) west, to the southern portion of the Gagayan River Valley, and called for a period of time the Kong Kong Valley - officially named this valley the Warner Valley; that Third Member Leandro Rosario verbally informed him that the province wished to make him a present of a strip of timberland in this valley, and stated that an official letter would come confirming all of this; that Japanese occupation, however, shortly after this, prevented completion of this plan and the ceremonies that were to take place concerning it;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner in his capacity as Regimental Commander frequently called meetings of provincial and municipal officials of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Gagayan Provinces to discuss with them matters of importance pertaining to the well-being of the people and the relationships of troops toward civilians and vice versa; that at such a meeting in March Lieut-Colonel Warner advised the increased planting of food in place of the large tobacco planting usually done, and advised that should Japanese occupation occur, the people to remain their homes and accept gracefully and without resistance the enemy's occupation provided that by such time our forces had not received additional help from the United States, nor have help near in sight;

That because of inability to send help in the form of ammunition, automatic weapons and medicines in the quantities requested, General MacArthur directed Lieut-Colonel Warner not to fight enemy forces that could overpower and destroy his own but to harass and to contact small patrols that could be overpowered; that in this same message General MacArthur told Lieut-Colonel Warner that his energetic action pleased him (General MacArthur) greatly and commended him (Lieut-Colonel Warner) and his entire command;

That unless he believed it to be of importance to the cause, Lieut-Colonel Warner after some earlier demonstrations of retaliation on towns and barrios by planes, made effort to guide harrassing missions to points not too near a community and that after the bombings of Bagabey and Bayombong by enemy planes in an effort to destroy our troops, Lieut-Colonel Warner and I made an extended reconnaissance of positions in wooded areas where we constructed our own camps and air-landing field; that, in all, the Regiment constructed four camps, two air-landing fields and a ship dock or pier in the Casiguran Bay - two of the camps, the air fields and dock construction being under my direct supervision; that the First Battalion under my command had the largest strength of personnel, reaching at one time 800 and over and this being my battalion I used soldier labor in hours that would not interfere with drill and military



training; that we planned and were soon to be ready on construction of good trails east from our positions over the Sierra Madre Mountains to the Casiguran Bay where, if help and supplies could come by boat, we could use my 300-pony pack train with pack carriers we had constructed for them;

That both Lieut-Colonel Warner and I believed that all of these installations and more that we had in mind would be of value to our forces when, if and as additional help came, and Lieut-Colonel Warner requested of our High Command numerous times that a plane come and land where we had prepared a suitable field and bring along a Staff officer to report on what we had accomplished so that our High Command could direct us whether to continue or not our program of expansion;

That upon completion of my Battalion's main camp near Sinuanguan Norte barrio (but hidden in a huge bamboo grove south of this place) and our first air-landing field in the barrio Palatian and Sinuanguan Sur area, Lieut-Colonel Warner backed my plan and suggestion to hold a review, competitive drill exhibition and field day and to invite the public, this we did on March 4, 1942 and the day proved highly successful. The review, drills and athletics were full of spirit, the camp was admired and the results of everything were highly favorable to the morale of both soldiers and citizens of whom there about 8000 present; that no Japanese planes flew overhead during the day though we could have hidden most of the crowd from view had they come;

That after the Tuguegarao attack of January 13th, in which I and my Philippine Scout troops participated as did all of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS), many Filipino Reservists not before able to report for duty, and volunteers, came to join us; that Lieut-Colonel Warner, wishing to gain results from the training of our Scouts, designated most of the recruit training to my Battalion; that we were obliged on March 15th, however, by direct order from higher authority, to discharge about 500 men after two months of the best training we were able to give them with our limited equipment and ammunition, and that upon discharging them we gave each a certificate attesting to his training;

That, as before mentioned, Lieut-Colonel Warner maintained contact between President Quezon and the Provincial Governments of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya Provinces;

That during activities and operations in north Luzon prior to the ordered surrender of our Forces we were able to recapture from the enemy certain loot in the form of dry-goods dress material and a truckload of salt; that this was all distributed to Filipino citizens who needed it; that, further, certain funds were taken from the enemy powers that were in Nueva Vizcaya and returned to Chinese merchants who had been forced to pay a weekly indemnity thereto; that it is believed Lieut-Colonel Warner will cover these items in his report;



That Lieut-Colonel Warner constantly impressed on his officers and men the necessity of reporting promptly worthwhile activity and news and the importance of making truthful and not exaggerated reports; that to facilitate news reaching our headquarters quickly from intelligence and combat patrols sent out, Lieut-Colonel Warner succeeded in procuring some carrier pigeons; that these were about ready to put into use when the surrender of our forces was ordered;

That as time went on without help coming, Lieut-Colonel Warner doubted the ability of our forces in Bataan to hold so that he and I made some plans together; that, in addition to the four-well hidden camps and the air field we had constructed in the south Cagayan River valley, we constructed near Casiguran a second air-landing field and in the Casiguran Bay a sizeable ship dock or pier. Had our forces been able to hold out or could we have avoided General Wainright's surrender order later, we would have constructed trails passable with pack animals over the Sierra Madre Mountains and connecting with Casiguran Bay;

That, further, Lieut-Colonel Warner planned to erect at suitable points transmitting and receiving radio sets and to establish through them direct contact with Hawaii and the United States; that, in addition, if Bataan surrendered, we planned to break up the larger groups into effective small groups and scatter them so that they could be fed because we realized that Bataan's surrender would bring the enemy in large numbers after us and into our subsistence routes; that, in addition, we planned to cover outlying territory and organize new harrassing groups, wherever this seemed advisable; we planned further to organize effective operating bases at certain points in the so-called "Unexplored Territory";

That activities of our patrols and military information was reported by our Headquarters to our High Command as it came and was evaluated;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner had some differences with Major Manuel P. Enriquez who up until March 1st, 1942, had been Colonel Warner's Executive Officer, these differences coming about because Enriquez had on several occasions sent his personnel messages on the radio against Lieut-Colonel Warner's orders; that Lieut-Colonel Warner at about this time designated Major Guillermo Nakar as his Executive Officer, and placed him in direct charge of the radio;

That on the night of April 10th General Jonathan M. Wainright, commanding USAFFE forces in the Philippines, notified Lieut-Colonel Warner that General King, April 9th, had surrendered our Forces in Bataan to enemy divisions and warned Lieut-Colonel Warner to be on the lookout for them (enemy divisions) now;

That about March 25th Lieut-Colonel Warner had received from General Wainright permission to be away from the Regiment for from fifteen to thirty days effective April 15th for the purpose of inspecting installations on the east coast (the dock in Casiguran Bay and air field nearby) and of making a reconnaissance in the unexplored territory; that permission had been asked and granted in this instance to place Major Nakar in

command of the Regiment during Lieut-Colonel Warner's trip; that Lieut-Colonel Warner had three times requested Major Nakar's promotion to Lieut-Colonel up to this time;

That despite Lieut-Colonel Warner's strict orders that official radio news be not made known outside the radio station it is believed that Major Nakar saw to it that certain civilian officials appeared at our Regimental Headquarters on the morning of April 11th, 1942, in connection with the radiogram from General Wainright concerning the surrender of General King in Bataan; that leading this civilian detail were Governor Visaya and Provincial Treasurer Juan Silvestre who was spokesman, also the Third Member, the Mayor of Jones and others; that the mission of this delegation proved to be to request Lieut-Colonel Warner with other Americans to hide out away from the Regiment; that at first Lieut-Colonel Warner and others of us respected the sincerity of such a suggestion or request and were inclined to honor it but later we became convinced that this was all part of a cheap, put-up political scheme of Major Nakar's to make it appear that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I with other Americans had deserted the Regiment while he (Nakar) proved to be the hero who stuck by, refused to obey the surrender order of both General Wainright and Lieut-Colonel Warner and built up a political prestige for himself by forcing the Japanese forces to capture him; that shortly after Nakar was captured (he had been promoted to Lieut-Colonel about April 15th) I personally saw and talked with him and he (Lieut-Colonel Nakar) proudly said to me, quote: "This has made me famous enough that I will be elected President of the Philippines." unquote; that it was Lieut-Colonel Warner who finally surrendered the regiment;

That returning to what happened within our Regiment after General Wainright warned Lieut-Colonel Warner to expect Japanese attention to be now turned toward us, the following is recorded: First, that Lieut-Colonel Warner immediately called a meeting of his Staff, his Battalion Commanders and their staffs, for the purpose of discussing his plans and to order the execution of them; that this meeting was called for ten o'clock A.M., April 11th, and Major Manuel P. Enriquez, commanding the Second Battalion, failed to appear or to be represented; that information reached Lieut-Colonel Warner about 15 days later in the person of Captain George T. Scholey from Colonel John P. Horn's Regiment, the 121st Infantry, that he (Scholey) had seen Major Enriquez while coming through Bayombong and that Enriquez was very excitedly engaged in disbanding and scattering his own troops. This was about April 12th;

That at the officers' meeting called for ten o'clock A.M., April 11th, Lieut-Colonel Warner brought to our attention two facts, namely: First, that any considerable movement of Japanese troops from the south toward us would cut off our food supplies. We now had approximately 1000 troops assigned and attached; that secondly, any effort on our part to make a stand as a Regiment would surely bring disastrous defeat because of our extremely small quantity of ammunition and limited automatic weapons, that we had no heavy weapons;

That almost before the meeting had closed, our patrols to the south informed us that 3000 Japanese troops were headed from the south, were now in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and would proceed north into Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela the following day.

That Lieut-Colonel Warner now met with Major Nekar and the following was decided upon -

1. That Captain Minton's - the First Battalion - would be moved east over the Sierra Madre Mountains and distributed in Casiguran and through the barrios on the Casiguran Bay and those north in Isabela Province near the east coast;
2. That the Headquarters troops under Major Nekar would occupy in small groups the outlying barrios in the far southern Cagayan Valley and west throughout the Warner (formerly Kong Kong) Valley of Nueva Vizcaya;
3. That the second battalion under Major Manuel P. Enriquez would occupy scattered positions in Nueva Vizcaya within reach of Bayombong, Balete Pass and far enough west on trail into Benguet Province to contact Baguio;
4. That all troops would remain under the orders of specified officers and non-commissioned officers;
5. That in the barrios the soldiers remaining would keep their arms hidden and would assist the farmers to grow food;
6. That the best-qualified officers and enlisted personnel for harassing contact would be selected from all groups and stationed at vantage points away from the barrios as much as possible;
7. That Lieut-Colonel Warner would take along with him all American personnel and would use such portions of the unexplored territory in Isabela Province as he considered advantageous.
8. That Major Nekar would make use of such unexplored territory in Tayabas Province as he needed, he having claimed experience in this territory while with the Philippine Constabulary;
9. That the Regimental radio would remain until further arrangements under Major Nekar's direction while Captain Minton and Lieut-Colonel Warner made an effort to acquire and erect a more portable set and, if possible, two sets. With these we could also establish contact between Battalions and Lieut-Colonel Warner wanted to arrange contact directly with the United States, Hawaii and Australia;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner sent a radiogram on April 11th to General Wainwright stating that now our food supply was endangered, that we were scattering troops to assist farmers, that our assembly point would be Jones, Isabela, that he (Lieut-Colonel Warner) was ordering the American in the Regiment to join with him and that he was going to make effort to join United or Allied forces elsewhere; that the wording of the telegram was aimed to mislead and to cover up from the local news-spreaders and gossipers - who would be sure to spread the contents of Lieut-Colonel Warner's message; that Lieut-Colonel Warner believed that General Wainwright would issue orders covering any change in the situation that he wished Lieut-Colonel Warner to make and that the understanding between Lieut-Colonel Warner and Major Nekar whom he left in charge of the radio

was that Major Nekar would forward to him any instructions from General Wainwright. Lieut-Colonel Warner told Major Nekar that he would notify him (Nekar) of his movements;

That on the morning of April 12 we began moving my Battalion to Pinappagan, all but two Americans with the Regiment accompanying Lieut-Colonel Warner and me there;

That on the morning of April 14th we started eastward over the Sierra Madre Mountains toward Casiguran; that already I had a detail of about 70 men there working on the ship dock and the air field, and that I reached there (Casiguran) on April 19th; that Lieut-Colonel Warner reached Calabgan on the lower Casiguran Bay the same date and established temporary headquarters in barrio Dipsadu, then at the school house at Dinalanan;

That on or about April 21st Captain George T. Scholey, 1st Lieut. Dean Nicholson (mining engineers commissioned), Sergeant Harkaway and two Chinese sergeants - all from Colonel John P. Horan's Regiment, the 121st Infantry - joined me in Casiguran; that these officers and men came of their own accord and not on the invitation of any of us;

That in Casiguran Captain Scholey's group helped us condition for travel a small launch formerly belonging to a nearby Japanese lumber concession.

That on April 23rd Scholey's group joined me with Corporal Quinley, Private John Rusch and Corporal Tiroo Umpahan of my Regiment on the launch and we went down the Casiguran Bay where on April 24th we picked up Lieut-Colonel Warner, Sergeant Coyle and Corporal Altamero at Dinalanan and set out for Palanan Bay arriving there at Sibang Island on the morning of April 26th; that Lieut-Colonel Warner instructed certain detachments of our troops to hike up the coast and join in Palanan, which they did, totalling about 35. Some others were sent back to Pinappagan with messages from Lieut-Colonel Warner to Lieut-Colonel Nekar (promoted about April 15th) giving him information to radio General Wainwright about our activities; that after this time we did not get any direct information from Lieut-Colonel Nekar though Lieut-Colonel Warner sent him a number of coded messages;

That around the Palanan area Lieut-Colonel Warner worked on ways and means of establishing power to operate one of the two radios we had available but were unable to get into operation due to lack of a generator sufficiently strong;

That we had a small radio receiving set (commercial) over which we heard some news though our batteries were weak and we had no way of recharging them;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner now detailed me in charge of a small group of Filipinos and Americans to cross over the Sierra Madres again to contact Lieut-Colonel Nekar with messages to General Wainwright and after they were

sent to get the generator from our Regimental radio in Lieut-Colonel Nekar's care, then to bring same back to use at a place in the Sierra Madres where we'd have water power available - also to bring back the broken Palanan post radio generator now reported to be in Ilagan on its way to Manila for repair;

That I left Lieut-Colonel Warner on my mission on May 5th and upon the surrender of Corregidor he got the information over the small commercial receiving set and sent it after me; that in the announcement of General Wainwright calling organizations outside of Corregidor he (General Wainwright) called for the surrender of Lieut-Colonel Nekar with our forces rather than for Lieut-Colonel Warner. This we learned later from Lieut-Colonel Kakakuka, General Wainwright's representative, was because Lieut-Colonel Nekar had previously informed General Wainwright that he (Nekar) did not know Lieut-Colonel Warner's whereabouts which was entirely untrue because Lieut-Colonel Nekar knew at all times what Lieut-Colonel Warner was doing and his location; that at Pinappagan where Lieut-Colonel Kakakuka was later hunting Lieut-Colonel Nekar, Nekar was hidden out in the town while his friends seemed only too anxious to start Lieut-Colonel Kakakuka after Lieut-Colonel Warner, telling him his location; that this is the beginning of where we discovered that instead of Lieut-Colonel Nekar cooperating with Lieut-Colonel Warner in carrying out a workable plan which would be to the best advantage of all concerned, Lieut-Colonel Nekar instead tried to make himself quite a hero in the eyes of the Filipinos and tried to make it appear that the Americans had deserted the Filipinos and that he (Nekar) had courageously remained by; that later on also Nekar tried to encourage certain Americans who contacted him to remain with him, then later became frightened and tried to get the Americans to leave him - the very plan and advise that Lieut-Colonel Warner had given him in April; that Lieut-Colonel Warner's only reason for himself and Americans leaving the Cagayan Valley was to save suffering by the people at the enemy's hands and because Lieut-Colonel Warner's maxim, i. e., "A live soldier is worth more to his country than a dead one or a prisoner", he tried to locate his troops so as to enable them to do something of value. He felt that from the beginning he had been unable to do much;

That now Japanese forces were heavily in the Cagayan Valley and in all the important towns such as Jones, Echague, Cuyan, Ilagan, with Japanese flag now flying in larger towns away from the main highways such as San Mariano, Isabela, etc;

That on my trip to contact Lieut-Colonel Nekar whom we still believed to be south of Jones I planned to detour the Japanese forces in Jones; that not far north of Jones however I came upon two small groups of troops of our Regiment who had remained behind with Lieut-Colonel Nekar; that each of these groups gave me information to the effect that Lieut-Colonel Nekar, had disbanded his troops and had gone to Mountain Province; that other Filipinos whom I inquired of, likewise verified this information as correct;

That near San Mariano I succeeded in getting only a small automobile generator sufficient to recharge dry cells but not to operate the radio transmitter;



That on my return I picked up the copy of General Wainwright's surrender order to Lieut-Colonel Nekar and Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka's personal letter to him from Filipinos entrusted to Colonel Kalakuka to deliver these to Lieut-Colonel Nekar; that these I brought back to Lieut-Colonel Warner returning to his headquarters at near barrio Dimatican on May 25th;

That by now Captain George Scholey and party in Palaan had purchased for ¥65.00 and were putting into condition for sailing at 35-foot boat with outrigger and Scholey planned to try to get away from Luzon thereby and if possible reach the Chinese coast, hiking inland in an effort to contact friendly forces; that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were invited to go along and concerning this we had a conference together with the following decisions: Lieut-Colonel Warner decided that he would remain in Luzon to do what he could in keeping radio contact with higher headquarters and in organizing effective harassing groups insofar as ammunition could be procured, that since I was anxious to try to reach the China coast he would entrust to me certain records that we wished to get to our lines and a full report of plans which he also hoped I could get to where it could reach our Headquarters in the Far East, that also was prepared for me to take along a request to our High Command from Lieut-Colonel Warner to remain out in an effort to carry out his plans;

That the boat was in readiness to leave Palanan on the morning of June 6th, stocked with provisions for seven men for about seventy days, when on the night of June 5th a messenger (one of our soldiers) arrived from Lieut-Colonel Theodore Kalakuka, QMC, (General Wainwright's representative sent out a Japanese order) in San Mariano, which messenger brought to me for Lieut-Colonel Warner and the rest of us General Wainwright's order to surrender; that along with this came an explanatory letter from Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka stating by refusing to surrender we would be subject to charges of desertion and that in addition Lieut-Colonel Warner's failure to surrender would prevent the Japanese Command from agreeing to the surrender terms and would open the way to possible mistreatment of our already surrendered troops; that Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka further stated that General Wainwright's surrender was authorized by Washington and that he (Kalakuka) had seen President Roosevelt's radiogram of authorization himself;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner, Captain Scholey and I all decided to drop our other plans and to obey the surrender order chiefly on account of the prisoners already surrendered; that up to this time we had all decided not to surrender at any cost;

That because Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka stated that personal illness would detain him a few days in San Mariano (about 5-days hike from us) he requested us to contact him there and I left on June 6th for San Mariano to inform Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka that Lieut-Colonel Warner Captain Scholey and the soldiers with them would be in San Mariano by June 14th; that on this date Lieut-Colonel Warner arrived with some troops, others having deserted after



being ordered by Lieut-Colonel Warner to accompany him to San Mariano where he would discuss surrender terms;

That in San Mariano Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka informed him that General Wainwright held him (Lieut-Colonel Warner) still in command of the 14th Infantry and responsible for the surrender of the unit; further, that General Wainwright meant it that he wanted Lieut-Colonel Warner to surrender; that Lieut-Colonel Warner before contacting Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka but hearing appeals over the radio for the surrender of Lieut-Colonel Nakar, had prepared and sent in code to Lieut-Colonel Nakar by a Filipino civilian - one Trinitario Pintang - a written message instructing Nakar not to surrender; that Pintang on his way to Lieut-Nakar in Pinappagan told Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka when they met in San Mariano that he had this message for Nakar and that Kalakuka said he would deliver it whereupon the Filipino turned it over; that Kalakuka then decoded the message and thereafter mistrusted Lieut-Colonel Warner's intention to surrender;

That the surrender was to take place in Echague - Japanese designated capital of Isabela and on the way there we were joined in San Antonio by Major Eugene C. Jacob, Medical Corps who had previously joined our Regiment and was on his way to join Lieut-Colonel Warner in Palanan;

That we surrendered in Echague to Japanese Colonel Yoshizawa on June 19th and were questioned, then detained with a Japanese horse-drawn Field Artillery unit at the former Second Isabela Cadre barracks in Echague until July 20th. Meantime the number of our Filipino officers and men surrendered was small and the Japanese commander desired to have more turn in; that Lieut-Colonel Warner offered to make an effort to get Lieut-Colonel Nakar and Major Enriquez with more men if permitted to try without Japanese soldier to contact them; that at first the Japanese authorities seemed to favor this but later declined; that meantime Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka was sent out again after these officers whom Lieut-Colonel Warner was required to send surrender orders in writing; that a note from Lieut-Colonel Warner by way of Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka to 1st Lieut-Leandro Rosario of Lieut-Colonel Warner's staff brought in Lieut. Rosario with about 200 officers and men, and Rosario on Lieut-Colonel Warner's advice surrendered;

That after this surrender Japanese Staff Lieutenant Sasaki told Lieut-Colonel Warner that he need not be longer concerned with Lieut-Colonel Nakar and Major Enriquez and their men surrendering - that Japanese troops would surely be successful in capturing them; that here Lieut-Colonel Warner asked that if possible they be given a chance to surrender if contacted, and that their lives be spared, which was promised;

That on July 19th we were put in trucks with Japanese troops and brought to Cabanatuan Prison Camp where we Americans were left and the Filipino soldiers with us were taken presumably to Camp O'Donnell;

That late in August Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were called to Japanese Headquarters at Prison Camp and thoroughly questioned as to all of

our movements since the outbreak of the war; that at the termination of the questioning Lieut-Colonel Warner was told that our radio was operating in communication with Australia, and that he and I would be taken out with Japanese forces to assist in capturing Lieut-Colonel Nakar and the radio;

That twice more Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were questioned and on September 12th, 1942, we were taken out of camp and taken again to Echague, Isabela; that here Lieut-Colonel Warner was held until October 9th as a hostage with the Japanese troops at the Cadre Barracks while I was taken by the Japanese Army military police into some of the barrios south of Jones, Isabela;

That sometime near the middle of September, I learned later, the Japanese located and captured the radio which at the time was buried in Pinappagan; that on or about September 28th or 29th on the information of a Filipino policeman of Jones, believed to be antagonistic to Lieut-Colonel Nakar, the Japanese forces captured Nakar in a cave in the Sierra Madre foothills near barrio Minuri, Isabela;

That I learned later Lieut-Colonel Warner was not ever permitted to see Lieut-Colonel Nakar but was sent south in the Cagayan Valley with Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka and Lieut Albert Ziegler who has been assisting him to bring back about 500 officers and men of the 14th Infantry who, learning that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were being held as hostages, voluntarily surrendered; that now Major Enriquez and his troops still remained out and Lieut-Colonels Warner and Kalakuka were taken to Bayombong it is believed to try to get them in; that both these officers however as well as Lieut-Ziegler separated from them at Jones and sent to Echague, were taken ill with cerebral malaria, Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka dying on October 31, 1942 in Bayombong and Lieut. Ziegler died November 8, 1942 Lieut-Colonel Warner got better and was returned to Cabanatuan Prison Camp December 6, 1942, after I had been returned about November 24th;

That after Lieut-Colonel Nakar was captured and brought to Jones, Isabela, on or about September 29th and later in Baguio I saw him and once had a slight opportunity to talk with him. It was at this time that what he said to me had in it a ring of insincerity and condemnation of Lieut-Colonel Warner, of me and the other Americans when as a matter of fact all of his actions bore out that we had done what we had agreed to do for the best interests for the service and of the Filipino People, whom we could do no better for under existing circumstances; that Lieut-Colonel Nakar tried his best later to rid himself of Americans who tried to remain with him after Lieut-Colonel Warner, the other Americans and I took up headquarters in the Palanan district;

That in Prison camp during Lieut-Colonel Warner, the other Americans and I took up considerable time and conversation trying to belittle and under-rate Lieut-Colonel Warner's efforts;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner held command of the 14th Infantry of which I commanded the 1st Battalion, until the Japanese accepted surrender officially."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority W/D 8 S 3078

(Signed) Warren Arthur Minton,  
(Typed ) WARREN ARTHUR MINTON,  
          Captain, Cavalry,  
          Commanding 1st Bn, 14th Infantry.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of September, 1942, at  
Military Prison Camp No. 1 of the Philippine Islands, Cabanatuan, Province  
of Nueva Ecija, P. I.

(Signed) Peter Koster,  
(Typed ) PETER KOSTER,  
          Major, JAGD,  
          Judge Advocate

A TRUE COPY:

/s/ GORDON H. SIMMONS  
1st Lt,           FA

C O P Y

DECLASSIFIED

DISTRICT OF CEBANATUAN )  
NUEVA ECILJA PROVINCE ) as  
PHILIPPINES )

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AVDS 3078

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, an officer authorized by law to administer oaths, one Warren Arthur Minton, Captain, Cavalry, Army of the United States, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says: -

"I certify that I am Warren Arthur Minton, O-362251, Captain, Cavalry, Army of the United States, with residence in the United States at 219 West Nevada Street, El Paso, Texas;

That I desire to give this statement which covers my knowledge of the activities and plans of Lieut-Colonel Everett Leuman Warner, O-125572, Field Artillery, Army of the United States, and Commanding Officer Fourteenth Infantry, Philippine Army, USAFFE, to which Regiment I was assigned from Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) and served as Commanding Officer First Battalion, also as Adjutant;

That my reason for submitting this affidavit is that I desire to confirm the report of his activities that I know Lieut-Colonel Warner has written personally and truthfully, and to offset and overcome if possible certain misrepresentations that one United States Army officer and one or two Philippine Army officers, through envy perhaps or desire for each his own respective personal glory, have tried to make against Lieut-Colonel Warner, some of these misrepresentations having taken place directly within my knowledge and observation;

That I first became personally acquainted with Lieut-Colonel Warner while he was a Major Field Artillery and on detached service at Camp John Hay, P.I., from the Provisional Field Artillery Brigade, Philippine Scouts, Fort Stotsenburg. Our first meeting was at Lused Saw-mill, Benguet, Mountain Province, December 26, 1941 upon the occasion of the planned evacuation from Camp John Hay of our Forces; that at Lused Saw-mill Major Warner received from Lieut-Colonel John P. Horen, late Commanding Officer at Camp John Hay, verbal orders to precede him (Colonel Horen with troops of the 43rd Infantry, P.S.) over mountain trail to the east and when reaching Ariteo, Nueva Viscaya Province, to inform

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him (Lieut-Colonel Horan) whether or not the road (Natio Route Number Five) was free of enemy troops to the south and whether there was transportation available to move him and the troops with him, south; that Major Warner carried out this mission endeavoring to keep contact with Lieut-Colonel Horan and that near Kayapa Lieut-Colonel Horan, about 60 kilometers behind Major Warner, without advising or warning Major Warner, turned and proceeded southeast through Imugan toward Belete Pass, and there to Road Five;

That Japanese forces at midnight December 28th, 1941, occupied San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and prevented all movement south of our Forces which Major Warner made effort to advise Lieut-Colonel Horan concerning, he (Major Warner) having reached Ar tao early on the afternoon of December 29th, 1941;

That on January 1st, 1942, Lieut-Colonel Horan with a portion of his troops and two of his officer personnel, namely Captains Leo Oltter and Cameron Starnes, came north through Ariteo and expressed to Captain Manuel P. Enriquez, 11th Division Staff, Philippine Army, that he did not desire Major Warner now to report to him (Colonel Horan) but to advise Major Warner to carry on with his work in charge of Philippine Army troops; that Lieut-Colonel Horan then moved north and spent the night of January 1st with us - Troop "C" 26th Cavalry, P.S., at Bambang - about twelve kilometers north of Major Warner's position, then moved north to Kiangan, Ifugao, Mountain Province;

That Major Warner meantime just prior to and upon arriving in Ariteo on the afternoon of December 29, 1941, came upon several hundred cut off troops-units of the Philippine Army, some of whom said that their commanding officers had disbanded them and directed them to proceed to their homes; that Major Warner after making effort to contact Lieut-Colonel Horan with the news of the Japanese occupation of San Jose to the south, took charge of the loose Philippine Army elements, ordering them to remain under himself until further definite information and orders could be obtained;

That in command of the advance party of my troop ("C" 26th Cavalry, P.S.) I proceeded that troop over the trail just behind Major Warner's party, arrived in Ariteo just behind him and met and talked with him in Ariteo where I learned and could observe what he was doing; that I considered his efforts to be well worth while and of importance to the aid of both law, order and good morale of both soldiers and citizens in Nueva Viscaya;

That Major Warner obtained and erected on or about January 9, 1942, a transmitting

and receiving radio with which he contacted our High Command and reported the situation as it concerned those of our forces which to his knowledge were cut off from proceeding south and were now in proximity to him; that General MacArthur replied by radiogram dated January 13th authorizing Major Warner to operate support trenches in the hills, directing him to send information by every possible means and authorizing him to organize the troops to meet his needs; that shortly following, General MacArthur authorized Major Warner to sign checks for legitimate expenses for subsistence and other necessities for his troops; that later General MacArthur commended Major Warner for his energetic action in north Luzon and on February 12th by paragraph 4, Special Orders 22, promoted Major Warner to Lieut-Colonel;

That I joined Major Warner with a portion of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS) and about 250 Filipinos (some already in the Philippine Army) under my command and Major Warner placed me in command of his Provisional First Battalion where he had originally intended to place Major Ralph B. Praeger, Cavalry; that on February 14, 1942, with a strength of 1600 or over, Lieut-Colonel Warner's command was officially designated by General MacArthur - the Fourteenth Infantry, Philippine Army - with such Philippine Scouts and Americans as were with us, attached;

That I was the first American commissioned officer to join with Lieut-Colonel Warner - while he was still a Major - and as such we were much together in conference, on reconnaissance and in operations; that Lieut-Colonel Warner took me at all times into his confidence and that I believe I know better than anyone else his plans and purposes in all of his decisions and actions; that I remained with him through surrender of certain elements of the 14th Infantry not yet surrendered, this was from September 12 to December 6, 1942;

That short of ammunition, automatic and heavy weapons as we were, also individual equipment and medicine, Lieut-Colonel Warner inspired and held together the regiment when no officer therein, I believe, could have done so; that his attitude to both his troops and to the civilian population was one of always extreme fairness and that I believe he has the love and respect of all the right thinking officers, enlisted men and civilians who knew him; that I have heard Philippine Army officers tell him that Filipinos



and receiving radio with which he contacted our High Command and reported the situation as it concerned those of our forces which to his knowledge were cut off from proceeding south and were now in proximity to him; that General MacArthur replied by radiogram dated January 13th authorizing Major Warner to operate support trenches in the hills, directing him to send information by every possible means and authorizing him to organize the troops to meet his needs; that shortly following, General MacArthur authorized Major Warner to sign checks for legitimate expenses for subsistence and other necessities for his troops; that later General MacArthur commended Major Warner for his energetic action in north Luzon and on February 12th by paragraph 4, Special Orders 22, promoted Major Warner to Lieut-Colonel;

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That short of ammunition, automatic and heavy weapons as we were, also individual equipment and medicine, Lieut-Colonel Warner inspired and held together the regiment when no officer therein, I believe, could have done so; that his attitude to both his troops and to the civilian population was one of always extreme fairness and that I believe he has the love and respect of all the right thinking officers, enlisted men and civilians who knew him; that I have heard Filipino Army officers tell him that Filipinos

particularly liked him and I have heard his ~~excellent~~ praise by Spaniards and Filipinos alike;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner's policy was to keep up the morale of both the troops and the civilian population by assisting the people to preserve law and order through their own provincial and municipal officials without declaring martial law, and by letting them know that his troops were there to help and not to bring suffering to them; that he likewise strongly advised and encouraged the officials to remain in office and to thereby serve their people rather than to evacuate in the path of the incoming Japanese forces and thereby bring into power those who had not the interests of the citizens at heart first; that in some instances the Japanese Army permitted to remain or appointed to office certain citizens that Lieut-Colonel Warner had previously urged to serve, in other instances this was diametrically the opposite;

That first for Governor Quirino of Nueva Viscaya, then later for Governor Visaya of Isabela and for Governor Addura of Cagayan, Lieut-Colonel Warner, over the Regimental radio contacted President Manuel L. Quezon with respective problems of each and returned to these officials President Quezon's return reply or solution with authority to act; that emergency script currency, for one thing, was authorized, and that in another instance Lieut-Colonel Warner had a circuit judgeship, which was vacated by death in Isabela Province, refilled by Presidential appointment so that numerous prisoners in jail overlong awaiting trial could be properly tried and other cases on the docket disposed of legally and officially; that in addition, Lieut-Colonel Warner indicted into USAFFE such Constabulary elements as were within his contact, reinforced them where necessary and requested permission of our High Command that he be permitted to use the Constabulary in civil law enforcement where possible and not in the battle-line unless necessary; that General MacArthur approved this and informed Lieut-Colonel Warner that such policy was in keeping with the plan of the High Command;

That it is evidenced that the civil population thought well of Lieut-Colonel Warner in that the Governing Commission of Nueva Viscaya Province - the Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Third Member, officially named and recorded the adjacent valley (of the Addalan River) west, to the southern portion of the Cagayan River Valley, and called for a period of time the Kong Kong Valley - officially named this valley the Warner Valley; that Third Member Leandro Rosario verbally informed him that the province wished to make him a present

of a strip of timberland in this valley, and stated that an official letter would come confirming all of this; that Japanese occupation, however, shortly after this, prevented completion of this plan and the ceremonies that were to take place concerning it;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner in his capacity as Regimental Commander frequently called meetings of provincial and municipal officials of Nueva Visaya, Isabela and Cagayan Provinces to discuss with them matters of importance pertaining to the well-being of the people and the relationships of troops toward civilians and vice versa; that at such a meeting in March Lieut-Colonel Warner advised the increased planting of food in place of the large tobacco planting usually done, and advised that should Japanese occupation occur; the people to remain in their homes and accept gracefully and without resistance the enemy's occupation provided that by such time our forces had not received additional help from the United States, nor have help near in sight;

That because of inability to send help in the form of ammunition, automatic weapons and medicines in the quantities requested, General MacArthur directed Lieut-Colonel Warner not to fight enemy forces that could overpower and destroy his own but to harass and to contact small patrols that could be overpowered; that in this same message General MacArthur told Lieut-Colonel Warner that his energetic action pleased him (General MacArthur) greatly and commended him (Lieut-Colonel Warner) and his entire command;

That unless he believed it to be of importance to the cause, Lieut-Colonel Warner after some earlier demonstrations of retaliation on towns and barrios by planes, made effort to guide harassing missions to points not too near a community and that after the bombings of Bagabag and Bayombong by enemy planes in an effort to destroy our troops, Lieut-Colonel Warner and I made an extended reconnaissance of positions in wooded areas where we constructed our own camps and air-landing field; that, in all, the Regiment constructed four camps, two air-landing fields and a ship dock or pier in the Casiguran Bay- two of the camps, the air fields and dock construction being under my direct supervision; that the First Battalion under my command had the largest strength of personnel, reaching at one time 800 and over and this being my battalion I used soldier labor in hours that would not interfere with drill and military training; that we planned and were soon to be ready on construction of good trails east from our positions over the Sierra Madre Mountains to the

Casiguran Bay where, help and supplies could come by that, we could use my 300-pony pack train with pack carriers we had constructed for them;

That both Lieut-Colonel Warner and I believed that all of these installations and more that we had in mind would be of value to our forces when, if, and as additional help came, and Lieut-Colonel Warner requested of our High Command numerous times that a plane come and land where we had prepared a suitable field and bring along a Staff officer to report on what we had accomplished so that our High Command could direct us whether to continue or not our program of expansion;

That upon completion of my Battalion's main camp near Sinuangan Norte barrio (but hidden in a huge bamboo grove south of this place) and our first air-landing field in the barrio Palatian and Sinuangan Sur area, Lieut-Colonel Warner backed my plan and suggestion to hold a review, competitive drill exhibition and field day and to invite the public, this we did on March 4, 1942 and the day proved highly successful. The review, drills and athletics were full of spirit, the camp was admired and the results of everything were highly favorable to the morale of both soldiers and citizens of whom there about 8000 present; that no Japanese planes flew overhead during the day though we could have hidden most of the crowd from view had they come;

That after the Tuguegarao attack of January 13th, in which I and my Philippine Scout troops participated as did all of Troop "C" 26th Cavalry (PS), many Filipino Reservists not before able to report for duty, and volunteers, came to join us; that Lieut-Colonel Warner, wishing to gain results from the training of our Scouts, designated most of the recruit training to my Battalion; that we were obliged on March 15th, however, by direct order from higher authority, to discharge about 500 men after two months of the best training we were able to give them with our limited equipment and ammunition, and that upon discharging them we gave each a certificate attesting to his training;

That, as before mentioned, Lieut-Colonel Warner maintained contact between President Queson and the Provincial Governments of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Viscaya Provinces;

That during activities and operations in north Luzon prior to the ordered surrender of our Forces we were able to recapture from the enemy certain loot in the form of dry-goods dress material and a truckload of salt; that this was all distributed to Filipino citizens who needed it; that, further, certain funds were taken from the enemy powers that were in

Casiguan Bay where, help and supplies could come by [redacted] that, we could use my 300-passenger pack train with pack carriers we had constructed for them;

That both Lieut-Colonel Warner and I believed that all of these installations and more that we had in mind would be of value to our forces when, if, and as additional help came, and Lieut-Colonel Warner requested of our High Command numerous times that a plane come and land where we had prepared a suitable field and bring along a Staff officer to report on what we had accomplished so that our High Command could direct us whether to continue or not our program of expansion;

That upon completion of my Battalion's main camp near Simunguan Norte barrio (but hidden in a huge bamboo grove south of this place) and our first air-landing field in the barrio Palatian and Simunguan Sur area, Lieut-Colonel Warner backed my plan and suggestion to hold a review, competitive drill exhibition and field day and to invite the public, this we did on March 4, 1942 and the day proved highly successful. The review, drills and athletics were full of spirit, the camp was admired and the results of everything were highly favorable to the morale of both soldiers and citizens of whom there about 8000 present; that no Japanese planes flew overhead during the day though we could have hidden most of the crowd from view had they come;

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That, as before mentioned, Lieut-Colonel Warner maintained contact between President Quezon and the Provincial Governments of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Viscaya Provinces;

That during activities and operations in north Luzon prior to the ordered surrender of our forces we were able to recapture from the enemy certain loot in the form of dry-goods, dress material and a truckload of salt; that this was all distributed to Filipino citizens who needed it; that, further, certain funds were taken from the enemy powers that were in



Nueva Viscaya and returned to Chinese merchants who had been forced to pay a weekly indemnity thereto; that it is believed Lieut-Colonel Warner will cover these items in his report;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner constantly impressed on his officers and men the necessity of reporting promptly worthwhile activity and news and the importance of making truthful and not exaggerated reports; that to facilitate news reaching our headquarters quickly from intelligence and combat patrols sent out, Lieut-Colonel Warner succeeded in procuring some carrier pigeons; that these were about ready to put into use when the surrender of our forces was ordered;

That as time went on without help coming, Lieut-Colonel Warner doubted the ability of our forces in Bataan to hold so that he and I made some plans together; that, in addition to the four well-hidden camps and the air field we had constructed in the south Cagayan River valley, we constructed near Casiguran a second air-landing field and in the Casiguran Bay a sissable ship dock or pier. Had our forces been able to hold out or could we have avoided General Wainwright's surrender order later, we would have constructed trails passable with pack animals over the Sierra Madre Mountains and connecting with Casiguran Bay;

That, further, Lieut-Colonel Warner planned to erect at suitable points transmitting and receiving radio sets and to establish through them direct contact with Hawaii and the United States; that, in addition, if Bataan surrendered, we planned to break up the larger groups into effective small groups and scatter them so that they could be fed because we realized that Bataan's surrender would bring the enemy in large numbers after us and into our subsistence routes; that, in addition, we planned to cover outlying territory and organize new harassing groups, wherever this seemed advisable; we planned further to organize effective operating bases at certain points in the so-called "Unexplored Territory";

That activities of our patrols and military information was reported by our Headquarters to our High Command as it came and was evaluated;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner had some differences with Major Manuel P. Enriquez who up until March 1st, 1942, had been Colonel Warner's Executive Officer, these differences coming about because Enriquez had on several occasions sent his personnel messages on the



radio against Lieut-Colonel Warner's orders that Lieut-Colonel Warner at about this time designated Major Guillen Nakar as his Executive Officer and placed him in direct charge of the radio;

That on the night of April 10th General Jonathan M. Wainright, commanding USAFFE forces in the Philippines, notified Lieut-Colonel Warner that General King, April 9th, had surrendered our Forces in Bataan to enemy divisions and warned Lieut-Colonel Warner to be on the lookout for them (enemy divisions) now;

That about March 25th Lieut-Colonel Warner had received from General Wainright permission to be away from the Regiment for from fifteen to thirty days effective April 15th for the purpose of inspecting installations on the east coast (the dock in Casiguran Bay and air field nearby) and of making a reconnaissance in the unexplored territory; that permission had been asked and granted in this instance to place Major Nakar in command of the Regiment during Lieut-Colonel Warner's trip; that Lieut-Colonel Warner had three times requested Major Nakar's promotion to Lieut-Colonel up to this time;

That despite Lieut-Colonel Warner's strict orders that official radio news be not made known outside the radio station it is believed that Major Nakar saw to it that certain civilian officials appeared at our Regimental Headquarters on the morning of April 11th, 1942, in connection with the radiogram from General Wainright concerning the surrender of General King in Bataan; that leading this civilian detail were Governor Visaya and Provincial Treasurer Juan Silvestre who was spokesman, also the Third Member, the Mayor of Jones and others; that the mission of this delegation proved to be to request Lieut-Colonel Warner with other Americans to hide out away from the Regiment; that at first Lieut-Colonel Warner and others of us respected the sincerity of such a suggestion or request and were inclined to honor it but later we became convinced that this was all part of a cheap, put-up political scheme of Major Nakar's to make it appear that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I with other Americans had deserted the Regiment while he (Nakar) proved to be the hero who stuck by, refused to obey the surrender order of both General Wainright and Lieut-Colonel Warner and built up a political prestige for himself by forcing the Japanese forces to capture him; that shortly after Nakar was captured (he had been promoted to Lieut-Colonel about April 15th) I personally saw and talked with him and he (Lieut-Colonel Nakar) proudly said to me, quote: "This has made me famous enough that I will be elected President of the

Philippines." unquote; it was Lieut-Colonel Warner who finally surrendered the regiment;

That returning to what happened within our Regiment after General Wainwright warned Lieut-Colonel Warner to expect Japanese attention to be now turned toward us, the following is recorded: First, that Lieut-Colonel Warner immediately called a meeting of his Staff, his Battalion Commanders and their staffs, for the purpose of discussing his plans and to order the execution of them; that this meeting was called for ten o'clock A.M., April 11th, and Major Manuel P. Enriquez, commanding the Second Battalion, failed to appear or to be represented; that information reached Lieut-Colonel Warner about 15 days later in the person of Captain George T. Scholey from Colonel John P. Moran's Regiment, the 121st Infantry, that he (Scholey) had seen Major Enriquez while coming through Bayombong and that Enriquez was very excitedly engaged in disbanding and scattering his own troops. This was about April 12th;

That at the officers' meeting called for ten o'clock A.M., April 11th, Lieut-Colonel Warner brought to our attention two facts, namely: First, that any considerable movement of Japanese troops from the south toward us would cut off our food supplies. We now had approximately 1000 troops assigned and attached; that secondly, any effort on our part to make a stand as a Regiment would surely bring disastrous defeat because of our extremely small quantity of ammunition and limited automatic weapons, that we had no heavy weapons;

That almost before the meeting had closed, our patrols to the south informed us that 3000 Japanese troops were headed from the south, were now in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and would proceed north into Nueva Viscaya and Isabela the following day;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner now met with Major Nakar and the following was decided upon -

1. That Captain Hinton's - the First Battalion - would be moved east over the Sierra Madre Mountains and distributed in Casiguran and through the barriers on the Casiguran Bay and those north in Isabela Province near the east coast;
2. That the Headquarters troops under Major Nakar would occupy in small groups the outlying barriers in the far southern Cagayan Valley and west throughout the Warner (formerly Kong Kong) Valley of Nueva Viscaya;
3. That the second battalion under Major Manuel P. Enriquez would occupy scattered

positions in Nueva Viscaya within reach of Bayambang, Belaga Pass and far enough west on trail into Benguet Province to contact Baguio;

4. That all troops would remain under the orders of specified officers and non-commissioned officers;

5. That in the barrios the soldiers remaining would keep their arms hidden and would assist the farmers to grow food;

6. That the best-qualified officers and enlisted personnel for harassing contact would be selected from all groups and stationed at vantage points away from the barrios as much as possible;

7. That Lieut-Colonel Warner would take along with him all American personnel and would use such portions of the unexplored territory in Isabela Province as he considered advantageous.

8. That Major Makar would make use of such unexplored territory in Tayabas Province as he needed, he having claimed experience in this territory while with the Philippine Constabulary;

9. That the Regimental radio would remain until further arrangements under Major Makar's direction while Captain Winton and Lieut-Colonel Warner made an effort to acquire and erect a more portable set and, if possible, two sets. With these we could also establish contact between Battalions and Lieut-Colonel Warner wanted to arrange contact directly with the United States, Hawaii and Australia;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner sent a radiogram on April 11th to General Wainwright stating that now our food supply was endangered, that we were scattering troops to assist farmers, that our assembly point would be Jones, Isabela, that he (Lieut-Colonel Warner) was ordering the American in the Regiment to join with him and that he was going to make effort to join United or Allied forces elsewhere; that the wording of the telegram was aimed to mislead and to cover up from the local news-spreaders and gossipers - who would be sure to spread the contents of Lieut-Colonel Warner's message; that Lieut-Colonel Warner believed that General Wainwright would issue orders covering any change in the situation that he wished Lieut-Colonel Warner to make and that the understanding between Lieut-Colonel Warner and Major Makar whom he left in charge of the radio was that Major Makar would forward to him any instructions from General Wainwright. Lieut-Colonel Warner told Major Makar that he would

ify him (Nakar) of ... vements;

That on the morning of April 12 we began ... ion to Pinappagan, all but two Americans with the Regiment accompanying Lieut-Colonel Warner and me there;

That on the morning of April 14th we started eastward over the Sierra Madre Mountains toward Casiguran; that already I had a detail of about 70 men there working on the ship dock and the air field, and that I reached there (Casiguran) on April 19th; that Lieut-Colonel Warner reached Calabgan on the lower Casiguran Bay the same date and established temporary quarters in barrio Dipsadu, then at the school house at Dinalanan;

That on or about April 21st Captain George T. Scholey, 1st Lieut. Dean Nicholson (mining engineers commissioned), Sergeant Harkaway and two Chinese sergeants - all from Colonel John Moran's Regiment, the 121st Infantry - joined me in Casiguran; that these officers and men came of their own accord and not on the invitation of any of us;

That in Casiguran Captain Scholey's group helped us condition for travel a small launch early belonging to a nearby Japanese lumber concession.

That on April 23rd Scholey's group joined me with Corporal Quinley, Private John Rusch and Corporal Tiro Upehan of my Regiment on the launch and we went down the Casiguran Bay

on April 24th we picked up Lieut-Colonel Warner, Sergeant Coyle and Corporal Altamero and set out for Palanan Bay arriving there at Sibang Island on the morning of April 25th; that Lieut-Colonel Warner instructed certain detachments of our troops to hike west and join in Palanan, which they did, totalling about 35. Some others were

sent to Pinappagan with messages from Lieut-Colonel Warner to Lieut-Colonel Nakar (about April 15th) giving him information to radio General Wainwright about our situation; that after this time we did not get any direct information from Lieut-Colonel Warner until he sent him a number of coded messages;

around the Palanan area Lieut-Colonel Warner worked on ways and means of establishing to operate one of the two radios we had available but were unable to get into the area due to lack of a generator sufficiently strong;

and a small radio receiving set (Commercial) over which we heard some news but the batteries were weak and we had no way of recharging them;

Lieut-Colonel Warner now detailed me in charge of a small group of Filipinos and

Americans to cross over Sierra Madre again to contact Lieut-Colonel Baker with messages to General Wainwright and after they were sent to get the generator from our Regimental radio in Lieut-Colonel Baker's care, then to bring same back to use at a place in the Sierra Madre where we'd have water power available - also to bring back the broken Palanan post radio generator now reported to be in Ilagan on its way to Manila for repair;

That I left Lieut-Colonel Warner on my mission on May 5th and upon the surrender of Corregidor he got the information over the small commercial receiving set and sent it after me; that in the announcement of General Wainwright calling organizations outside of Corregidor he (General Wainwright) called for the surrender of Lieut-Colonel Baker with our forces rather than for Lieut-Colonel Warner. This we learned later from Lieut-Colonel Kakakula, General Wainwright's representative, was because Lieut-Colonel Baker had previously informed General Wainwright that he (Baker) did not know Lieut-Colonel Warner's whereabouts - which was entirely untrue because Lieut-Colonel Baker knew at all times what Lieut-Colonel Warner was doing and his location; that at Pinappagan where Lieut-Colonel Kakakula was later hunting Lieut-Colonel Baker, Baker was hidden out in the town while his friends seemed only too anxious to start Lieut-Colonel Kakakula after Lieut-Colonel Warner, telling him his location; that this is the beginning of where we discovered that instead of Lieut-Colonel Baker cooperating with Lieut-Colonel Warner in carrying out a workable plan which would be to the best advantage of all concerned, Lieut-Colonel Baker instead tried to make himself quite a hero in the eyes of the Filipinos and tried to make it appear that the Americans has deserted the Filipinos and that he (Baker) had courageously remained by; that later on also Baker tried to encourage certain Americans who contacted him to remain with him, then later became frightened and tried to get the Americans to leave him - the very plan and advice that Lieut-Colonel Warner had given him in April; that Lieut-Colonel Warner's only reason for himself and Americans leaving the Cagayan Valley was to save suffering by the people at the enemy's hands and because Lieut-Colonel Warner's maxim, i. e., "A live soldier is worth more to his country than a dead one or a prisoner", he tried to locate his troops so as to enable them to do something of value. He felt that from the beginning he had been unable to do much;

That now Japanese forces were heavily in the Cagayan Valley and in all the important towns such as Jones, Bohague, Cuayan, Ilagan, with Japanese flag now flying in larger



towns away from the main highways such as San Mariano, Isabels, etc.;

That on my trip to contact Lieut-Colonel Nakar whom we still believed to be south of Jones I planned to detour the Japanese forces in Jones; that not far north of Jones however I came upon two small groups of troops of our Regiment who had remained behind with Lieut-Colonel Nakar; that each of these groups gave me information to the effect that Lieut-Colonel Nakar had disbanded his troops and had gone to Mountain Province; that other Filipinos whom I inquired of, likewise verified this information as correct;

That near San Mariano I succeeded in getting only a small automobile generator sufficient to recharge dry cells but not to operate the radio transmitter;

That on my return I picked up the copy of General Wainwright's surrender order to Lieut-Colonel Nakar and Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka's personal letter to him from Filipinos entrusted to Colonel Kalakuka to deliver these to Lieut-Colonel Nakar; that these I brought back to Lieut-Colonel Warner returning to his headquarters at near barrio Dimatigan on May 25th;

That by now Captain George Scholey and party in Palaan had purchased for \$65.00 and were putting into condition for sailing a 35-foot boat with outrigger and Scholey planned to try to get away from Luzon thereby and if possible reach the Chinese coast, hiking inland in an effort to contact friendly forces; that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were invited to go along and concerning this we had a conference together with the following decisions: Lieut-Colonel Warner decided that he would remain in Luzon to do what he could in keeping radio contact with higher headquarters and in organizing effective harassing groups insofar as ammunition could be procured, that since I was anxious to try to reach the China coast he would entrust to me certain records that we wished to get to our lines and a full report of plans which he also hoped I could get to where it could reach our Headquarters in the Far East, that also was prepared for me to take along a request to our High Command from Lieut-Colonel Warner to remain out in an effort to carry out his plans;

That the boat was in readiness to leave Palanan on the morning of June 6th, stocked with provisions for seven men for about seventy days, when on the night of June 5th a messenger (one of our soldiers) arrived from Lieut-Colonel Theodore Kalakuka, GMC, (General Wainwright's representative sent out on Japanese order) in San Mariano, which messenger brought me for Lieut-Colonel Warner and the rest of us General Wainwright's order to surrender



that along with an explanatory letter from Lieut-Colonel Warner's failure to surrender would prevent the Japanese Command from agreeing to the surrender terms and would open the way to possible mistreatment of our already surrendered troops; that Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka further stated that General Wainwright's surrender was authorized by Washington and that he (Kalakuka) had seen President Roosevelt's radiogram of authorization himself;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner, Captain Scholey and I all decided to drop our other plans and to obey the surrender order chiefly on account of the prisoners already surrendered; that up to this time we had all decided not to surrender at any cost;

That because Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka stated that personal illness would detain him a few days in San Mariano (about 5-days hike from us) he requested us to contact him there and left on June 6th for San Mariano to inform Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka that Lieut-Colonel Warner, Captain Scholey and the soldiers with them would be in San Mariano by June 14th; that on this date Lieut-Colonel Warner arrived with some troops, others having deserted after being ordered by Lieut-Colonel Warner to accompany him to San Mariano where he would discuss surrender terms;

That in San Mariano Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka informed him that General Wainwright (Lieut-Colonel Warner) still in command of the 14th Infantry and responsible for the surrender of the unit; further, that General Wainwright meant it that he wanted Lieut-Colonel Warner to surrender; that Lieut-Colonel Warner before contacting Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka but hearing appeals over the radio for the surrender of Lieut-Colonel Makar, had prepared and sent in code to Lieut-Colonel Makar by a Filipino civilian - one Trinitario Pintang a written message instructing Makar not to surrender; that Pintang on his way to Lieut-Colonel Makar in Pinappagan told Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka when they met in San Mariano that he had this message for Makar and that Kalakuka said he would deliver it whereupon the Filipino turned it over; that Kalakuka then decoded the message and thereafter mistrusted Lieut-Colonel Warner's intention to surrender;

That the surrender was to take place in Echague - Japanese designated capital and on the way there we were joined in San Antonio by Major Eugene C. Jacobs, who had previously joined our Regiment and was on his way to join Lieut-Colonel

FALGOUT;

That we surrendered in Echague to Japanese Colonel Yoshizawa on June 19th and were questioned, then detained with a Japanese horse-drawn Field Artillery unit at the former Second Isabela Cadre barracks in Echague until July 20th. Meantime the number of our Filipino officers and men surrendered was small and the Japanese commander desired to have more turn in; that Lieut-Colonel Warner offered to make an effort to get Lieut-Colonel Nakar and Major Enriquez with more men if permitted to try without Japanese soldiers to contact them; that at first the Japanese authorities seemed to favor this but later declined; that meantime Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka was sent out again after these officers whom Lieut-Colonel Warner was required to send surrender orders in writing; that a note from Lieut-Colonel Warner by way of Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka to 1st Lieut. Leandro Rosario of Lieut-Colonel Warner's staff brought in Lieut. Rosario with about 200 officers and men, and Rosario on Lieut-Colonel Warner's advice surrendered;

That after this surrender Japanese Staff Lieutenant Sasaki told Lieut-Colonel Warner that he need not be longer concerned with Lieut-Colonel Nakar and Major Enriquez and their men surrendering - that Japanese troops would surely be successful in capturing them; that here Lieut-Colonel Warner asked that if possible they be given a chance to surrender if contacted, and that their lives be spared, which was promised;

That on July 19th we were put in trucks with Japanese troops and brought to Cabanatuan Prison Camp where we Americans were left and the Filipino soldiers with us were taken presumably to Camp O'Donnell;

That late in August Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were called to Japanese Headquarters at Prison Camp and thoroughly questioned as to all of our movements since the outbreak of the war; that at the termination of the questioning Lieut-Colonel Warner was told that our radio was operating in communication with Australia, and that he and I would be taken out with Japanese forces to assist in capturing Lieut-Colonel Nakar and the radio;

That twice more Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were questioned and on September 12th, 1942,

we taken out of camp and taken again to Echague, Isabela; that here Lieut-Colonel Warner was held until October 9th as a hostage with the Japanese troops at the Cadre barr-

... taken by the Japanese Army military police into some of the barrios south

Jones, Isabela;

That sometime near the middle of September, I learned later, the Japanese located and captured the radio which at the time was buried in Panappagan; that on or about September 28th or 29th on the information of a Filipino policeman of Jones, believed to be antagonistic to Lieut-Colonel Nakar, the Japanese forces captured Nakar in a cave in the Sierra Madre foothills near barrio Mimuri Isabela;

That I learned later Lieut-Colonel Warner was not ever permitted to see Lieut-Colonel Nakar but was sent south in the Cagayan Valley with Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka and Lieut Albert Ziegler who has been assisting him to bring back about 500 officers and men of the 14th Infantry who, learning that Lieut-Colonel Warner and I were being held as hostages, voluntarily surrendered; that now Major Enriquez and his troops still remained out and Lieut-Colonels Warner and Kalakuka were taken to Bayombong it is believed to try to get them in; that both these officers however as well as Lieut Ziegler separated from them at Jones and sent to Echague, were taken ill with cerebral malaria, Lieut-Colonel Kalakuka dying on October 31, 1942 in Bayombong and Lieut. Ziegler died November 8, 1942 Lieut-Colonel Warner got better and was returned to Cabanatuan Prison Camp December 6, 1942, after I had been returned about November 24th;

That after Lieut-Colonel Nakar was captured and brought to Jones, Isabela, on or about September 29th and later in Baguio I saw him and once had a slight opportunity to talk with him. It was at this time that what he said to me had in it a ring of insincerity and condemnation of Lieut-Colonel Warner, of me and the other Americans when as a matter of fact all of his actions bore out that we had done what we had agreed to do for the best interests for the service and of the Filipino People, whom we could do no better for under existing circumstances; that Lieut-Colonel Nakar tried his best later to rid himself of Americans who tried to remain with him after Lieut-Colonel Warner, the other Americans and I took up headquarters in the Palanan district;

That in Prison camp during Lieut-Colonel Warner, the other Americans and I took up considerable time and conversation trying to belittle and under-rate Lieut-Colonel Warner's efforts;

That Lieut-Colonel Warner held command of the 14th Infantry of which I commanded the Battalion, until the Japanese accepted surrender officially."

(Signed) Warren Arthur Minton,  
(Typed) WARREN ARTHUR MINTON,  
Captain, Cavalry,  
Commanding 1st Bn, 14th Infantry.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of September, 1942, at Military  
Prison Camp No. 1 of the Philippine Islands, Cabaatuan, Province of Nueva Ecija, P. I.

(Signed) Peter Koster,  
(Typed) PETER KOSTER,  
Major, JAGD,  
Judge Advocate

A TRUE COPY:

GORDON H. SIMMONS  
1st Lt, FA

BRIEF HISTORY

"C" Co. 14th Infantry

On the early part of Jan. 1942, when the 3rd Bn. , 12th Infantry, USAFFE, which was assigned at Ilagan, Malalam sector, left for the Central Plain, some men who were then sick were left at San Pablo, and Cabagan, Isabela. The under- signed who was called to active duty was ordered to stay behind and to take charge of all military personnel left. He established his CP at Cabagan, Isabela and these men were near this place. During the same month some members of the 11th Inf. and 12th Inf. , 11 Div. , PA. , reported to him as they claimed to have been separated from their respective units. He reorganized these men into a skeletonized company. On the middle part of Jan. 1942, the 14th Inf. , PA, was organized at Jones, Isabela. <sup>?</sup> by Lt. Col. E. Warner and Major Guillermo Nakar. The unit which was then recently organized at Cabagan, Isabela was then incorporated into the 14th Inf. by order of Lt. Col. E. Warner the ranking officer then in the Cagayan Valley. It was designated as "C" Co. 2nd Bn. 14th Inf. and Major Guillermo Nakar was assigned as the Bn. Commander and at the same time executive officer of the 14th Inf. From then roster of troops including activities made by this unit were submitted monthly to the Regtl. Headquarters at Osol, Jones, Isabela. The company was assigned at northern Isabela and southern Cagayan Prov. as its sectors. The CP was located. One platoon under Sgt. Eliseo Alonzo was assigned at Sta. Maria-Mallig road junction as an advance outpost. One platoon under St. Gregorio Taguba minus one squad was assigned at San Pablo Ferry along the Isabela-Cagayan road. A squad of this platoon was assigned at Ballacayo bridge as an outguard. A platoon under St. Timoteo Reyes was assigned at Sta. Maria Ferry as a support while the CP was then at Gabaldon School in Cabagan, Isabela. Reconnaissance and combat patrol were sent frequently around the vicinities of Tuguegarao, Cagayan to gather intelligence information regarding the enemy situation in these places and to intercept any enemy patrol found. *long range!*

Between March and April, 1942, the platoon under St. Timoteo Reyes was sent to Tagga, Gosi, Tuguegarao, Cagayan under the direct command of Lt. Ulpiano Domingo to intercept any enemy patrol who frequented that place to foraged food. The first squad under Cpl. Augusto Paraggua was intercepted and the platoon engaged the enemy. Casualties inflicted upon the enemy were five killed and some wounded while one escaped to Tuguegarao who brought the news regarding the attack. Their car was captured and burned while their flag was captured.

*Ind 20*

No casualty whatsoever was inflicted on our side. After the fight Lt. Domingo and his men went to rest at their bivouack area, but after two hours five trucks load of Japanese soldiers were sighted by the outpost coming from Tuguegarao moving southward. The platoon, deployed for defense but later withdrew because of the superiority in numbers and arms of the enemy. The enemy reach as far as Tagga then returned to Tuguegarao.

On the early part of April, 1942, an order was received from the Regt'l Hq. at Jones, to enlist new men to fill up existing vacancies and to put the men under training for two weeks. Reservist, ex-service men and volunteers who volunteered for service were then called and enlisted and inducted into the 14th Inf. induction being conducted in front of the CP. The full strength of the company there was 120 men including 7 attached unassigned and 3 drivers. All men were then put under training with the exception of those who were assigned as outpost at Sta. Maria, San Pablo, Isabela. Instructors were selected among the regular, EM of the unit and Lt. Domingo supervises the training of the men.

On 12, Mar. 1942, 1st Lt. Vicente Florida, MC, was sent Headquarters to conduct physical examination of the members of "G" Co., 14th Inf, to find their physical fitness for military service. Physical examination was being conducted from 12 Mar. 1942 to 10 April, 1942 and all men were found physical fit for military service. On the same date an intelligence combat patrol under Lt. Arturo Dingoong, Regimental Adjutant, sent out by Headquarters to northern Isabela and southern Cagayan on reconnaissance mission, arrived at the CP at Cabagan. One squad under 1st Sgt. Monico Caldite and Timoteo Reyes was attached to him as his guides. This patrol proceeded to Marocoro, Albago and barriros south of Tuguegarao to gather intelligence information regarding enemy situation in those places while a platoon under Lt. Domingo and Sgt. Taguba was sent to Inga, Enrile, Cagayan as support in case the patrol of Lt. Dingoong is to be attacked. On the later part of March, 1942 these patrols returned to Cabagan and the squad attached to Lt. Dingoong was detached and rejoined the unit.

On the first week of April 1942 the patrol under Lt. Dingoong again returned to Alibago and Marocoro to attack the enemy from that point while two platoons under Lt. Domingo and 1st Sgt. Monico Caldite, Sgts. Timoteo Reyes and Taguba were sent to Tagga to intercept the enemy in case they made a southward movements. Two days later these patrols returned to Cabagan and the patrol under Lt. Dingoong were recalled to Jones, Isabela.

When the news of ~~the~~ capitulation of Bataan was received order from RHQ was received to concentrate men at Cabagan leaving only enough outpost at Santa Maria and San Pablo for security purposes. After the fall of Bataan, order was received that Major



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Guillermo Nakar was promoted to Lt. Col. and assumed command of the 14th Inf. On 10 May 1942, order was received to disperse the men for tactical reason and standby for any order of reorganization. Order was also received that Natonin, Bontoc was the next assembly area. The men were then divided into groups each group under its own leader with the instructions that each group leader will report to the company once a month at such place designated. This was made to evade detection by the enemy who were then pouring into Isabela at that time. Arms, ammunition and equipments were sent to Massipi, Gabagan, Isabela to be hidden while records were sent to San Juan, Cabagan and Santol, Tumauni Isabela to be buried. On July 14 an order was received from RHQ to reorganize the men and to induct them into the service of the 14th Inf, AUS. Messages were then sent to every group leaders to gather their men and report to the CP then around Cubag, Cabagan and Siggud San Pablo, Isabela. Men who reported were immediately inducted. Because of the precarious situation of the CP at those places due to its proximity to the enemy garrison at Cabagan proper the CP was transferred to Santol Mt. Prov. on 27, July 1942. Arms and equipment including men were transferred to that place. Lt. Domingo with two platoons were ordered to stay behind to demolish, destroy and sink all boats found along the river from Sta. Maria, and Tumauni, Isabela. The undersigned established his CP at Santol, Mt. Prov. near the boundary of Mt. Prov. and Isabela while Lt. Domingo established his CP at Andarayan, Tumauni, Isabela. Communications between these two CPs were made thru the use of runners and reports have received from him regarding the progress of his mission. The undersigned continued inducting men at Santol until 22 July 1942 when all the men were supposed to have reported. Some men were inducted at Jones by inducting officer, some at Siggud and the rest at Santol. On 28 July 1942 a complete reorganization of the company was made. The primary mission then of the unit was to bolster up the morale of the civilian population and not to lose on the return of the Allied Forces. Majority of the men then were assigned with Lt. Domingo at Andarayan, busy demolishing and sinking barges along the river and cutting enemy line of communications. The rest of the men were sent out in group patrol their own sectors to raise the morale of the civilians and to tell them not to believe enemy propagandas, leaving only enough men at the CP at Santol for security purposes. Group leaders were instructed to send to the CP their itinerary of travel and the progress of their mission. This unit was also alerted to stand by for any order to assemble at Natonin, Bontoc.

Because of the shortage of arms and ammunition, the undersigned sent 1st Sgt. Monico Caldito, Sgt. Mariano, Pfc. Pedro Aguillo and Jaime Salud, on 14 Aug. 1942 to Sisk, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, to recover the arms and ammunition supposedly abandoned by the Air Craft Warning Service, USA in that place.

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On that early part of Sept. 1942 1st Lt. Vicente Florida MC, was sent to the north to be attached to the unit. He reported to the undersigned at Dalena, San Pablo, Isabela, while he was on mission with some of his men. Lt. Florida was instructed to report to Lt. Domingo at Andarayan where majority of the men were assigned. On the same month a boat owned by the enemy of 22 passengers capacity, coming from Aparri, Cagayan was intercepted at Bulu, Tumauni, Isabela. The crew and passengers were able to escape but the cargoes were confiscated while the boat was sunk. On the first week of Oct. 1942, Lts. Domingo, Florida and their men with one American Sgt. by the name Colt and in conjunction with Bolomen under Martin Ponce and Nemesio Albabl, attacked the garrison at Tumauni. Casualties inflicted upon the enemy could not be ascertained at the time because of the heavy reinforcement they received and the withdrawal of our troops. Sgt Colt was killed in this encounter.

On the second week of Oct. 1942, the above mentioned officers with their men again attacked the enemy garrison at Cabagan, Isabela killing eleven Japs including the sentinel on post and capturing one rifle. The barrio Lt. of Bayabo, Tumauni, Isabela who was then acting as guide received a thru bullet wound on the left wrist and was treated by Lt. Florida who was then acting as the Medical Officer.

On Oct. 1942 at about 0300 hours, the temporary CP of Lt. Domingo Andarayan was raided by the enemy of about one hundred men including some Filipino spies. Lt. Domingo and his men engaged the enemy but later withdrew because of the superiority in number and arms of the enemy. Lt. Florida with Pvt. Mariano Miguel were captured in this encounter. Pvt. Miguel was able to escape but Lt. Florida was taken prisoner and tortured for two days for not telling the whereabouts of the undersigned and the rest of his men. Lt. Florida was able to escape the second day and rejoined Lt. Domingo at Capa Bahagan the third day.

After this encounter the enemy made an intensified mopping operations in northern Isabela and southern Cagayan Prov. for the remnants of the forces that have been recently attacked at Andarayan. A gemmal mopping operation against the 14th Inf. was also in progress in Isabela. The situation of the CP then at Santol, Mt. Prov. was so precarious due to the enemy pressure, there was no alternative but to surrender to the enemy. The undersigned with one of his men surrendered to the enemy at Cabagan on 29 Oct. 1942. The rest of his men who refused to surrender were then advised to evade the enemy as much as possible and to continue the assigned mission.

On Oct. 1942 contact was made between 1st Sgt. Caldito and the undersigned when a report from him was received thru a traveler, reporting the following: That on 31 Aug. 1942 he and his party arrived at Sick, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte and immediately

made a search for the arms and ammunitions they were supposed to recover. On Dec. 1942 another report was received from him regarding the following; That during the course of their search if Pfc. Pedro Aguillo was captured by the enemy on Oct. 1942 and was subsequently executed at Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. On the later part of Oct. 1942 they were able to locate the arms and ammunitions which were then under the hands of an unassigned band of USAFFE soldiers separated from their respective units. In order to be able to take possession of these arms and ammunitions he organized these band and convinced them to proceed to their sector at Isabela. But the enemy had then closed all ways from Ilocos Norte to Cagayan and Mt. Province, so that they could not be able to rejoin the unit at Isabela immediately. Contacting Gov. Ablan of Ilocos Norte on the latter part of Nov. 1942, he attached himself for the meantime until they could be able to rejoin the unit at Isabela. His unit was then designated as a Security Patrol in the Bacarra-Pasquin sector. On the later part of the same month they occupied Pasquin, Ilocos Norte which was recently abandoned by the enemy. They had then exclusive control of the main water supply of the enemy at Laog, Ilocos Norte, where they were concentrated. They cut the main water pipe line at the ~~Dalmet~~ Spring, Pasquin by demolishing the reservoir. On the early part of Dec. 1942, he captured an enemy motor boat anchored at Nabungan part, Pasquin. The 10-man crew offered slight resistance but were annihilated. One of them was captured and taken prisoner which was delivered later to Gov. Ablan. All the cargoes which will last for one month was confiscated while the boat was sunk.

On the same month the undersigned sent him a note regarding his surrender. Instruction was also given to him to evade the enemy as much as possible and to join any unit in the field he contacts and continue the mission as the unit then in Isabela was disorganized.

On the month of March 1943, a verbal report was again received from him that on 18 Dec. 1942, his unit was again attacked while they were busy demolishing the Bangsirit Bridge north of Bacarra. That while they were trying to evade the heavy mopping operation of the enemy in Ilocos Norte on Jan. and Feb. 1943, they tried to leave Ilocos Norte for Isabela trying to take the Bangui-Langungan-Apayao trail but was again attacked at Caparispisan where Sgt. Mariano Firmo was killed. They returned back to Pasquin and tried to take again the Solana-Apayao trail but was captured with his men at Sitio Mubrub, Pasquin, Ilocos Norte, on 15 Mar. 1943 with all the arms and ammunitions. One of his men was killed in this encounter.

Done at Cagayan, Isabela, Philippines, this 10th day of April, 1950.

*Alfonso Baguin*  
ALFONSO BAGUIN O-888889  
Capt. Inf. AUS  
Commanding

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