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TO OUR MISGUIDED BROTHERS IN THE P. C. (JAP) :

We are hailing with joy the news that our forces have opened a front against the Japs by successfully landing on Tarawa, makin and Abemama Islands in the Gilbert Group in the Central pacific and that already US planes are ranging over the Marshall Group and other Islands within a 11,000 mile radius. The ease with which these landings are made show clearly how Japan has over-extended herself and how incapable she is of extending against the over-increasing allied Military, Naval and air strength. More Jap ships every day find a grave in the waters of the South West Pacific, and Jap casualties on Bougainville have passed the 5,000 mark. In New Guinea tanks are now assisting the Australian advance. In China the Jap are finding the Chinese, now supported by the 14th Air Forces, a foe that xxxxxx be driven back. The Jap admit the bombing of Formosa by US planes. Tokyo radio admits that the Allies have 120 Divisions and 6,000 first line planes in the SW Pacific, 1500 planes in China, 1,000 US planes, 2,000 RAF planes, 20 US Divisions and 40 British Indian Divisions in India. (You see, Philippine radios are recon-ditiones, not only to keep you from hearing US and British news, but also Tokyo news). In Russia and Italy the Allies move steadily forward while Berlin has been bombed every night for a week, and blocks are masses of smoking ruins.

ARE WE BANDITS?

Today we want to discuss with you this "bandit" business. Your puppet leaders are saying that the P.C. (Jap) is not acting as a part of the Jap armed forces but is merely acting as a civilian police force and that when you chase, capture or kill us, you are not acting against soldiers but "bandits". If this preposition is true, your activities is justified. But let us see how far it is true.

Your Jap masters and your puppet leaders, claim that because we did not obey Gen. Wainwright's order to surrender we are no longer entitled to be called as soldiers. Turn back your memories to the circumstances of Gen. Wainwright's surrender order. Malinta Hill xxxx other Vital points on Corregidor had been taken. It was clearly xxxxxxxx for its brave defenders to resist any longer. The white xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and Gen. Wainwright tnedered to the Jap commander xxx of Corregidor and the other forts in xxxxxxxxxxxxxx x x xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx acting with his "bushido" sence of xxx this limited surrender and that unless Gen. xxx US forces in the Philippines, he would xxx on xx Corregidor and the other forts in Manila Bay unit I xxxxxxxxxxxxxx of the xxxxxx heroic defenders was dead. So Gen. Wainwright gave his order for the xxxxxx surrender of all forces in the Philippines. But Gen. Wainwright was not dumb. He knew that an order given under coercion does not have to be obeyed. Therefore in his formal order to surrender and in his speech over KZRH, he was very careful to accompany his order with the words, "I am forced to give this order". Unfortunately, with some units did not catch his meaning, but the majority of us saw it xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx order to carry on,. Futhermore Gen. Wainwright xxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

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JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

you go out? You know very well that they will be charged with and speedily arrested the alleged criminals, they will be charged with and speedily brought to trial before a judge of the Philippines for the crimes they are supposed to have committed. They will be confronted with the witnesses against them, and they will be given the benefit of counsel for making their defense. If they are found guilty they will be punished according to law, but it can not be proven that they are guilty of the specific crimes they are charged with, they will be set free without prejudice to go and do as they see fit. Is this what happens to the bandits you capture? You know very well that it is not. And if we are bandits, why do you refer to us by our military titles in your reports ? ? ?

So you can see that this business about your being xxxxxxxxxxxxxx police force acting against bandits is just so much baloney. YOU ARE A GROUP OF CIVILIANS AND SURRENDERED U.S. SOLDIERS ACTING AS MERCENARIES FOR THE JAP ARMY IN ITS WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Think for a moment what this means. If you are a civilian, in addition to committing reason against the commonwealth of the Philippines you are a nonbelligerent who is engaging in war. As such, you are not entitled to any of the privileges of a belligerent -- the right of surrender, etc. You would be better off if you actually joined the Jap Army! If you are a surrendered U.S. soldier, you are earning for yourself a traitor's death by violating your induction oath.

We will admit that, as happens in the best run armies (including the Jap), a few of our soldiers have committed unlawful acts. But a soldier who commits unlawful act is not subject during wartime to civil jurisdiction. He is subject only to the court-martial jurisdiction of his own army. And we exercise this jurisdiction in no uncertain manner. We do not let our offenders off with an oath of loyalty to Japan and a promise to work for the "new order" in East Asia. We shoot them! Do you think that if we have committed all the crimes that your Jap master say we have, we would have xxx enable to survive as long as we have? No, we would have xxxxxxxx oath a long time ago.

So come to an honest understanding xxx your self. If you xxx your Jap master so much that you are willing for them and share in their xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, join the Jap Army. But if you do not love the Japs xxx at once being their tools! Tell them that you are not going to do their dirty work any longer. "QUIT THE P.C. NOW"

- oOo -

We regret that some of your number are so rash as to violate your instructions about conduct when sent out for patrol alone and had to learn that we mean business at the cost of their lives. Normally we would hate to kill a brother Filipino, but a Filipino xxxxx willingly xx etc.

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JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

MESSAGE TO THE GUERRILLAS IN THE FIELD

In addressing to you the message I have been impelled by no other motive except to serve our country and to be of help to you and your families. Nobody knows better than I the hardships and privations you have suffered as I had suffered the same things. Nobody understand better than I the sorrows, worries and anxieties of your families and loved ones as I had witnessed the anguish and seen the tears of those who loved my soldiers on several occasions. I know that among you are true patriots whose sincere desire is to serve our country unselfishly. There are however, lawless elements which have given your organization a bad name.

But is staying in the mountains and endangering the civilian population by your presence and search for food the type of service your country demands? Are the tactically unimportant activities you are able to undertake sufficient to warrant the exposure of so many men to the ravages of the elements, diseases and insufficient food? For lack of medicine I know that most of you are sick of malaria, dysentery, exposure to extreme weather condition (Fasma), and other diseases. Now, may I ask, are all of these the best you could do for your country? In my humble opinion you can do better.

In order that you will appreciate what is said here let me tell you a few facts about my organization. When Bataan fell followed later by the surrender of Corregidor, I was in command of the 14th Infantry, operating, directly under GMR, in the Gagayan Valley and part of Pangasinan and the Mountain Province. For five months (illegible) the fall of Corregidor we suffered terrific blows from the mighty Japanese Imperial Forces. When, at last, they launched an all-out air and land campaign against us, in six weeks, my unit was smashed compelling me to surrender to them what remained of my battered unit on October 5, 1942. Since then I and my staff officers have been under protective military custody as prisoners of war by the benevolent Japanese Imperial Forces while most of my officers and enlisted men had been sent home after being indoctrinated on the real intention of Japan toward the Philippines. Instead of revenge, they treated us kindly. Instead of the sword, they gave our sick men medicine. My personal experience with them is enough testimony to the gallantry of Japanese Bushido. Japanese Army doctors treated me everytime I was sick. They even went to the extent of providing me and my officer cigarettes and other small necessities.

Some of you may call me pro-Japanese now because I am advising the guerrillas to surrender. This assumption is erroneous. It is unfair to me and unjust to the Japanese. First and foremost I am a Filipino with the welfare of the Philippines at heart. My life has been dedicated, in my humble way, to her service. If I advise you now to surrender it is because I know that small and ineffective resistance brings no tactical or decisive results. On the other hand, it has now become prejudicial to the best interests of the Filipino people whom the soldiers is supposed to serve and defend.

If to minimize the sufferings of the people on account of the (illegible) now that organized military resistance in the Philippines has been overcome, is to be called pro-Japanese; if to stop useless and unnecessary destruction of lives and property is to be called pro-Japanese; if to hasten the return to normal living as circumstances would allow is to be called pro-Japanese; if to prevent further mal-adjustment of the national economy is to be called pro-Japanese; if to suppress brigandage and maintain peace and order is to be called pro-Japanese; if to do all these things which I believe are for the salvation of the Filipino people is to be called pro-Japanese-- then, how can one now become a Filipino patriot without being called pro-Japanese? It would seem impossible if such be the case. Why? Because the Japanese Military Authorities, in all their official utterances, have consistently declared that they, too, are after the welfare of the Filipinos.

What then prompted them to do all these things to us and to many others whom they have captured? The answer is simple. From the very beginning of this war Japan has consistently stated that she never considered the Philippines as her enemy. In fact Premier General Tozjo declared that it is the desire of the Japanese Imperial Government to grant the Philippines her Independence subject, of course, to certain conditions. The Japanese Imperial Forces, acting under this directive, conducted operations here with as little damage to lives and property as was humanly possible consistent with the demands of war. If the Philippines now have gone far on the road to reconstruction and rehabilitation, it was primarily due to this magnanimous attitude of Japan for which act the Filipinos should be grateful. Such benevolent act is worthy of a (illegible) at and mighty Empire.

Now that you know all of these, what reasons could you still have in further staying in the mountains and out-of-the-way barriers? Undoubtedly, you will say that you are still fighting for your country. Well and good. But, can you defend the territory where you are now? Can you protect the civilian populations from the dangers and bezzards of a military campaign? Can you maintain even only the semblance of government functions within your theater of operation? Can you defend yourselves tactically from an attack without scampering in disorder? Can you prevent the failure of crops if our farmers are not allowed to plant their fields in regions where you operate?

If to all these questions and many more, your answers are that you can not, then you are no longer fighting for your country. On the contrary, I regret to say, you are fighting against your country because you are liable to cause unnecessary destruction of lives and property of your fellow countrymen. You may also cause famine indirectly by disturbing peace and order in the farms, thereby preventing our farmers from working in the fields. If famine comes, not only you but also your families and many others will perish. Remember that war is brutal but famine is horrible.

Now, if you are the responsible citizens whom I believe you are, your present responsibility is to help maintain peace had order. Prevent famine and destruction. It is your obligation to wipe out lawlessness and conserve personal sacrifice for the common welfare.

You can do all these things by surrendering yourselves to the Japanese Military Authorities. Do not be afraid of them. It is their policy not to kill anymore guerrillas who surrender. Even those who were captured alive had not been killed. Do not believe in false propaganda. In the early days brutalities might have happened; they do not allow it now. I have been personally assured by them of the safety of your lives provided you surrender within a reasonable period of time. They are willing to delay intensive operations against you in order to give you time to be appraised of the contents of this message.

However, if, after being given a chance to return to normal living, you still refuse to surrender, then prepare for the worst. Prepare for combat without quarters and be willing to die with a smile because you ask for it. As you do not wear any distinctive uniform, be prepared to share the responsibility for causing the death of innocent civilians. Be prepared to see your wives, children and others dear to you, harrassed and maltreated. Be prepared to see your homes burned and your property destroyed. Be prepared for them all because all these things may happen to you if you disturb peace in order. The Japanese Imperial Forces have the means and the will to do them. I am not trying to justify brutal and inhumane acts and the will duct of war. I am only stating what may happen to you who are considered outlaws by the Japanese Military Administration.

Now, think this over and decide that you should do the cause of your failure to surrender is fear of the (illegible) Imperial Forces, then do not be afraid anymore. (illegible) to them and you are safe. Make appointments with (illegible) Military Authorities through the barrio or town off (illegible) yourselves of this opportunity to be with your (illegible) Surrender now before it is too late. If you refuse and something happens to you, you have only yourselves to blame.

And to you, members of the families of guerrillas, I advise you to take a copy of this message to your guerrilla relatives if you really love them and want them to live once more with you. Do not fall else you may lose your loved ones.

DO IT NOW; TIME IS GOLD.

Manila, Philippines,
April 22, 1943.

(SIGNED.) Guillermo Naker
(TYPED.) GUILLERMO NAKAR
Brigadier General,
(14th Inf., PA) AUS.

Certified True Copy:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

TO OUR MISGUIDED BROTHERS IN THE P.C. (JAP):

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So you can see that this business about your being (not legible) police force acting against bandits is just so much baloney, YOU ARE A GROUP OF CIVILIANS AND SURRENDERED U.S. SOLDIERS ACTING AS MERCENARIES FOR THE JAP ARMY IN ITS WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES:

Think for a moment what this means. If you are a civilian, in addition to committing treason against the Commonwealth of the Philippines you are a nonbelligerent who is engaging in war. As such, you are not entitled to any of the privileges of a belligerent -- the right of surrender, etc. You would be better off if you actually joined the Jap Army! If you are a surrendered U.S. soldier, you are earning for yourself a traitor's death by violating your induction oath.

We will admit that, as happens in the best run armies (including the Jap), a few of our soldiers have committed unlawful acts. But a soldier who commits an unlawful act is not subject during wartime to civil jurisdiction. He is subject only to the court-martial jurisdiction of his own army. And we exercise this jurisdiction in no uncertain manner. We do not let our offenders off with an oath of Loyalty to Japan and a promise to work for the "new order" in East Asia. We shoot them! Do you think that if we have committed all the crimes that your Jap master says we have, we would have been able to survive as long as we have? No, we would have (not legible) a long time ago.

So come to an honest understanding to yourself. If you (not legible) your Jap (not legible) such that we are willing for them and share in their (not legible) joined the Jap Army. But if you do not desire love the Japs (not legible) once being their tools! Tell them that you are not going to do their dirty work any longer. "QUIT THE P.C. NOW".

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We regret that some of your number are so rash as to violate your instructions about conduct when sent out for patrol alone and had to learn that we mean business at the cost of their lives. Normally we would hate to kill a brother Filipino, but a Filipino who is willingly serving the Jap is in our opinion (all page torn.)

Certified True Copy:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

TO OUR MISGUIDED BROTHERS IN THE P.C. (JAP):

We were very gratified to hear of the large numbers of you that deserted in response to our letter. We also appreciate the manner in which many of you are following our instructions when you are sent out on patrol alone - particularly in regard to not maltreating the civilians. And we salute the courageous band of you that attacked the patrol of Japs at the Amburayan Bridge and killed nine of them.

However, there still seem to be some of you who are still under the hypnotic spell of your Jap masters - who continue to do their every bidding. It is in the hope of enlightening these of you and bringing xxxxxxxx into the path of honor and decency; that in this and subsequent letters we are going to discuss some matters frankly with you.

First, we would like to have you examine with us this "invulnerable position in Greater East Asia" that your Jap masters claim to have. Because she had secretly been making huge war preparations while she was talking peace to the world and because she struck suddenly and without a declaration of war, Japan was able to score huge successes in the first few months of the war before the forces of the United Nations could be assembled to stop her. Once these forces were assembled, Japan was stopped cold. Her drive toward India was stopped at the India-Burma border. Her drive toward Hawaii was stopped by her great defeat in the naval battle of Midway. Her drive toward Australia was stopped by another great defeat in the battle of the Coral Sea. Since that time Japan has not advanced on a single front. That is a well known fact of military science that when a xxxxxxxxxxxx abandon the offensive and to take up a defensive attitude, but has lost the war. Thus, when Germany was stopped at the battle of the Marne, she had lost World War I - even though it was four years more before she sued for peace. Likewise, though it may be many months more before Japan is forced to sue for peace, already she has lost all chances of winning the war..

Now let us examine what is happening along the frontiers of Japan's "invulnerable position." First, we will look at China. Japan is no more successful and holds no more territory in China than she did in December, 19xx. True, she is able to make drives into Chungking territory, but no sooner does she make a drive than she finds her supply lines so threatened that she has to withdraw. Then she xxxxxx in the Tribune "Japanese forces, having accomplished their xxxxxxxxx returned to their bases" Also, Japan now finds opposing her xxxxxxxthe 14th U.S. Army force, composed of the pick of American and Chinese fliers. The Japs call these men "Gen. Chenault's band of desperados", but this does not conceal the fact that for every one of these "desperados" they have shot down; they have nine Jap planes shot down in return.

In Burma we find Japan so worried about Admiral Mountbatten's coming combined land, sea and air offensive that she has hastily mobilized Burmese and Indian troops to assist in her defense of Burma.

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In Burma we find Japan so worried about Admiral Mountbatten's coming combined land, sea and air offensive that she has hastily mobilized Burmese and Indian troops to assist in her defense of Burma. (Illegible) strafed onto the island. Where was the Jap Navy all this time.

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In the north Pacific, after losing the Aleutian island of attack to the Americans, the Japs abandoned its sister island of Kiska without a fight. Shortly afterward American bombers based on Attu- began to bomb the Jap naval base at Paramushire and other island in the Kuril Island group of NORTHERN JAPAN! The Japs called their cowardly abandonment of Kiska, (Illegible) policy of maintaining the initiative" This is surely a new defect (Illegible) of "initiative" and one to which the Japs are entirely welcome! By this, they will still be "maintaining the initiative" when they for peace at any price!

Throughout the waters of the Pacific, numerous flotillas of (Illegible) submarines are silently patrolling, sinking Jap ships even within sight of the Japanese mainland! To date they have sunk 490 Jap ships even an of five Jap ships every week!

In Japan itself we see that all is not well. We read that the Cabinet is being re-organized--which means that some of Tosyo's fellow war criminals are getting cold feet! We read of numerous "extraordinary" sessions of the Imperial Diet--which means that unforeseen emergencies have arisen. We read of plans for increasing production of food and war materials--which means the Japan is beginning to feel the pinch war. We even read of measures being taken for the defense of the Japanese homeland!

Lastly, (Illegible) she is not a part of East Asia, she is closely connected (Illegible) welfare, we must examine the position of Japan's European (Illegible) Germany. Japan use to have two European allied but, alas, Italy has surrendered! The Japs tried to save face for a while by bragging about Mussolini's refugee government, but they have now given this up, and in his last speech Tosyo made no mention of Italy as an allied. Germany, we find, is hard pressed on three fronts. American and British forces are steadily forcing the Nazis (Illegible) up the Italian peninsula. In Russia the Reds have almost complete the expulsion of the Germans from the homeland, and they have agreed not to stop fighting until Germany surrenders unconditionally. In Germany itself the Germans are wishing that airplanes had never been invented as day after day American and RAF bombers unload tons of bombs on Nazi war factories and communication lines. The once famous (Illegible) is no more on the Russian and Italian fronts hardly a sing (Illegible) plane is to be seen. All the planes that Germany can produced needs for the unsuccessful effort of defending Germany itself.

At this rate Germany's collapse will come even before Japan's when this happens, all the troops, planes, and other war weapons now being used against Germany will be used against Japan (including probably those of Russia, for she will be only too glad to cast aside her neutrality, which is of value only to protect the rear while she is fighting Germany, and to (Illegible)

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt Inf

TO OUR LOYAL BROTHERS IN THE PC:

Everywhere, the Allied forces are coming around the turn into the final stretch that leads to VICTORY. Everywhere, the forces of the Axis are growing weaker in an ever increasing rate under the hammer-like blows of Allied land, sea and air power. Both Japan and Germany now admit that their entire efforts are (Torn out) exerted, not to achieve victory, but to stave off defeat.

FIRST, the Southwest Pacific; Gen. MacARTHUR'S forces took the limelight when they made a 400 mile jump around the Jap base at WENAK to land at Aitape, in THE NEW GUINEA, and at Hollandia, in Dutch New Guinea. Resistance at these points was quickly overpowered, and Allied planes are now using the airfields at these bases. Possession of the Hollandia air base gave the United Nations for the first time a base within bombing distance of the Philippines, it being within 1200 miles of Davao and 1800 miles of Manila. When, three weeks later, the Allied Forces moved 125 miles up the New Guinea coast and took the Jap airbase on Wake Island, they then shortened this bombing distance by that much. THE UNITED NATIONS CAN NOW SEND THEIR BOMBING PLANES OVER THE P.I. WHENEVER (TORN OUT): Japanese soldiers trapped in the Aitape and Hollandia areas are now surrendering by the hundreds. They are even surrendering to the natives. They are hungry. Madang and Alexsafen have fallen to the Australian troops advancing up the New Guinea coast to the southwest of Wewak. Rabaul, New Britain, is now "ghost base". The Japs have retreated from all of (Torn Out) into the area around this once powerful Jap base. Here, cut off from all aid and supplies and living on grass and the roots of trees, they cover in their air-raid shelters from the Allied bombers that raid them daily. The Allies do not need Rabaul any longer. The naval base at Soerabaja, (Torn out) was recently the target of a dawn to midnight raid by land and carrier based planes belonging to the three great Allied Pacific War (Torn Out) Southeast Asia, Gen. MacArthur's Southwest Pacific and Admiral Nimitz' Central Pacific Command.

Next, Burma: You have read in the Tribune all about the Jap's offensive into India. But did they tell you that that offensive was a desperate effort to look the advance of Gen. Stillwell's Chinese-American troops into Burma down the Ledo road and (Torn out) to the east by cutting their supply lines far to the north of (Torn Out) they told you that the Japs offensive has stopped cold far short of (Torn Out) supply lines? Have they told you that Gen. Stillwell has advanced further into Burma than the Japs advanced into India? That Myitkyina, Kamayeng and Mogaong vital ship base in Burma, have been surrounded by overland and air-borne troops (Torn out) they told you that the Chinese forces in Yunnan have started a big offensive toward the west from the Salween river in order to meet the Stillwell forces and the (Torn Out) forces meet, the Burma road will once more be open via the Ledo (Torn Out) off? Lastly, have they told you that their own supply line to their forces in India has now been cut by British-Indian troops and that their forces in this area are now reduced a ration of a handful of barley daily? In fact, the Tokyo press now disowns any intention to take Imphal because the defenses there are "too formidable" and admits that the Allies have air superiority in the area.

In China, the Japs, realizing that the Burma Road will soon again be open, are engaged in a desperate effort to take as much of China as they can as a "buffer" against the gigantic Chinese offensive that the opening of the road will bring. However, due to the Allied air superiority in China and the stubborn resistance of the Chinese troops they are having only indifferent success. Surrounding Loyang, whose fall was regarded by Chungking as "imminent" ten days ago, is still

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holding out. Chinese troops have now recaptured 60 miles of the Peiping to Hankow RR which had fallen into the Japs hands. The allies are now using heavy bombers in China. They have flown out to bomb Pratas Is. Only 300 miles NORTH-WEST OF LUZON! They now make Jap shipping impossible along the South China coast.

In the Central Pacific, the Marshall attolls still in Jap hands, Nauru, (Torn out) and Truk are being bombed regularly, and one more raid has been made against Tenian and Saipan in the Marianas. In the North Pacific, Shimushu and (Torn out) hire in the North Kurile Is. have been bombed frequently, and recently (Torn out) bomber to bomb Metoi, ONLY 400 MILES FROM THE JAP MAINLAND, without encountering any opposition!

In Europe the big invasion and opening of the second front is expected any time now. Meanwhile a big drive has been launched in Italy which has already taken Casino and smashed the powerful Gustav line to bits. The allied troops of seven nations are now smashing against the Hitler Line and forcing the Nazi to bring up reserve forces badly needed elsewhere. British and Italian based Allied planes continue their daily 3 to 4000 plane raids over Germany and the occupied countries only now they are concentrating on (Torn Out) communications in preparation for the invasion. (Torn out) countries are ever active, giving the Nazis no end of (Torn Out) divisions are required to keep "Peace and Order" in North Italy alone. The Jugo-Slav guerrilla forces under Gen. Tito, who are now being supplied and supported by Allied planes (Torn out) thatood six Nazi punitive expeditions of 300,000 men each and are still going strong. The Russians were successful in their drive to clear the Nazis out of the Crimes taking Sebastopol in 3 days and forcing the Nazis to undergo a "Dunkirk" trying to evacuate their forces to Rumania by boat. Russian planes are now paralyzing Nazi shipping in the Baltic-Sea while the Red troops are regr(Torn out) ions of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland have been given (Torn out) warning to get out of the war, or else, The United States discloses that it now has over 1200 fighting ships and the largest navy in the world. (It had 380 at the start of the war). Over ONE HUNDRED aircraft carriers have been launched in the past eighteen months! (Remember this whenever the Japs brag about sinking one or two).

So you see, the BIG DAY is almost here. Need we (Torn Out) all the more important for you to watch your conduct most carefully(Torn Out), we have a new order for you READ IT AND OBEY IT!!

WHENEVER A JAP PATRO ACCOMPANIED BY PC ENCOUNTERED A USFIP UNIT AND A FIRE FIGHT ENSUES, THE ACCOMPANYING PC WILL OPEN FIRE ON THE JAPS AND JOIN THE USFIP UNIT!

If you follow these instructions, our men will do their best not to fire at you.

Fraternally,
UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

E. F. FORSYTHE
Captain, Inf

/ops

Subject: General
MEMO : Lt-Col Conle, District Commander
: Northern Luzon, Provinces

You are hereby requested to report, gather or collect, verify or confirm thru your Commanding and Field Officers, and send all data and facts not mere observations to the Commander-in-Chief, USAFFE, Australia, thru the undersigned on or before Dec. 31, 1943, reinforcement on the following:

A- Obtain information on:

1. Military, Naval and Aerial plans and activities of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines and particularly in your district.

2. Political, Industrial commercial, financial, educational, religious, social and other non-military plans and activities of Japanese and Filipino leaders.

B. To establish a G-2 system in your sector.

1. To obtain information as outlined above.

2. Counter-espionage and to participate and spread the principles of passive resistance and simple sabotage.

C. Details on Military, Naval and Aerial information should contain the following items:

1. General plans and policies re defence of the Philippines.

2. Detailed plans and policies re defence in certain and particular areas.

3. Particulars re ground forces: (a) Garrisons, (b) Installations (c) Units (d) Unit Commanders (e) Armaments (f) Morale

(g) State of training (h) supplies (i) resources available to the forces (j) depots and (k) ammunition dumps.

4. Particulars re Naval forces: (a) Naval bases (b) dry docks (c) arsenals (d) prts being used by naval vessels, transports, supply ships, and its auxiliaries (e) mined areas including types and number of mines (f) extent and frequency and routes of shipping in the armes of the Philippines and names of vessels particularly warships (g) areas patrolled by the Navy and extent of naval patrolling (h) Types and amount of cargoes to and from the Philippines particular in your district if any, and (i) convoy systems and shipping movements.

5. Particulars re aerial and anti-aircraft forces: (a) airdromes used, including locations, sizes numbers of runways, number and sized of revetments (b) dummy airdromes, location and sizes of and other particulars, (c) installations, like depots, repair shops fuel and bomb dumps etc, (d) number of planes and specific types in each base, (e) unit and unit commanders, (f) location and number of radio direction finders, searchlights, Add batteries, including types and caliber of guns, location and other details re fighter commands, plotting and control rooms and other AA installations.

REMARKS FOR GUIDANCE.

1. Attempts should be made at all times to obtain the official Japanese Army designations of all enemy ground units. However, if this information is unobtainable, the following data should be procured: (a) Code name and number of each unit. *Most* Japanese Army unit are supplied with code names and numbers usually of four digets to denote the division and regiment, respectively. The numbers are more important than the names, (b) battles participated in by the troops and whether or not the speak Malay, Chinese, or any Filipino dislect (c) Towns and prefectures in Japan where the troops lived before joining the Army and (d) Names, first names, *very* important, of all unit commanders with rank of colonel or higher.

2. Extreme caution should be observed in obtaining the above required information as any noticeable attempt to do so will undoubtedly arouse suspicion.

(cont(s))

1. It is imperative that the customary practice of regarding vessels except those bristling with armaments as transports be immediately stopped. Japanese vessels have generally the following characteristics: (a) AIRCRAFT CARRIERS: flight deck cleared of all obstructions (b) BATTLESHIPS: length over 700 ft, extremely large pagoda-like upper structure gun turrets with heavy caliber guns, (c) HEAVY CRUISERS: Twin stacks with the rear one moving a definite slope, length about 500 other constructions details like battle ships but to lesser degree, (d) LIGHT CRUISER: Three or four stack length about 500 ft. with gun turret (e) DESTROYERS: Three or four stacks, length about 300 ft. very low in water, distinct weavy like bow. (f) SEAPLANES TENDER: Stack and super structure will rear, beams and other equipments for hoisting seaplanes on deck, (g) AUXILIARIES (Oiler, cargo, etc.) Same as seaplane tenders but fewer beams, (h) TRANSPORTS: Similar to passenger vessels, (i) HOSPITAL SHIPS: Similar to transports but painted green and white crosses.

The designs of airplanes such as bombers, fighter planes, etc. resemble mostly to U.S. planes. Data referred aerial can be obtained by being friendly to pilots and ground men and air bases and asking innocent questions. Offering drinks to Japanese officers and men might help a great deal in this particular.

All you reports must be addressed: The Commander-in-Chief, US-SAFPE, Australia, Thru Lt- Col CIC-12, The Chief Liaison Officer.

The undersigned requests you to send a copy of this memo in indorsement to all Commanding and Field Officers in your sector which is composed of the whole Cagayan Valley, and the Ilocos Provinces including Officers working directly under the undersigned will be properly instructed to notify the proper parties of the present set-up of the organization of your district.

You are hereby requested to keep the secret identity of the undersigned because of the dangers of his jobs. The identity of the undersigned must be kept secret even to the runner bringing this Memo and to your Staff Officers. It is understood that you are the Only ONE to know his identity.

All cooperatives working under the undersigned are identified by numbers such as SA-20-up and AZ-48, this Head Intelligence Officer in Luzon.

In sending your reports, particulars must be given emphasis on numbers of men every CO's and FO's, their respective armaments and monthly expenses and contributions from friend.

May God help us always.....V.....for victory
 Done at GHQ, Sierras, Philippines, Nov. 26, 1943.

(SGD,) CICOI", AIOI) &(")
 CIO-12, AI-1071902
 Lt-Col. Chief Liason
 Officer.

Certified True Copy:

JAMES H. HILL
 Capt, Inf

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
3RD BATTALION, 14TH INFANTRYSUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE REPORT
TO : G-2

1. This is to inform you that I do not submit my report regularly because there was one report which I submitted last month which was turned down. However, for the sake of information, I would like to report the contents of that reports.

Some reliable information reported to me that 33% of the total collection everyday in the Agno Ferry would be submitted to the organization for support. For this reason, I would like to know whether this is true or not. If this is true, I have nothing to say but if it is not true, I have something to say. I do not like that the organization if possible may accept any false report. (-2226-44)

2. Nothing could reported by me within this week. I fell sickly this week. I was not able to go out. I stayed most of the time at home. (3-4-44).

3. The Japs under Capt. Ohto went to Bantog, Asingan. They called for all the leaders of the N. A. in that place. They were asked some questions about the men at the age of 15 to 60. The enemies were looking for some men who went to Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya recently. Because some of the men or leaders did not tell the men whom they were looking for, they were maltreated and some were forced to drink much water. Some of them were suffering severely. (3-11-44).

4. Some of the members of the P. C. are taking advantages of having their arms. Sometimes, they take a walk at night. When they come to a N. A. rest house and they could see that the patrols were sleeping or lying down, these P. C. have to threaten the civilians or sometime slapped the N. A. patrols. Because the (Illegible) could not reason out, they remain silent and endure (Illegible) the P. C. So for there is one persons in (Illegible) Tayug, who is at present (Illegible) the P. C. are doing (Illegible).

5. In the barrio of Magallanes, Tayug some of the enemies went to this place. They went at night at about 10:00 o'clock. Some of the civilians were little bit scared because of their presence. Dogs howled and of course some of the civilians who did no know that they were there went out to see what was wrong in their premises. With great surprise they found the enemies going from one place to another just behind the houses of civilians. The enemies did nothing there. They simply passed the night. The next morning they went to the garrison. (3-25-44).

6. It was Thursday night at about 12:00 o'clock (Illegible) 1, 1944 when some of the enemies went patrolling in the barrio of Agno, Tayug, Pangasinan. There were six of them. When they were near Bitong they happened to see a civilian along the road. They approached him and asked some questions. Of course, (Illegible) civilian did not answered them because he could not understand (Illegible) them. When the enemies could not wait for the reply of the (Illegible), they took him, tied him and brought him with them. (Illegible) was tied under a big mango tree. He was released (Illegible) when his wife went to the enemies. So far no harm against the civilian. When all the N. A. leaders (Illegible) by the enemies and had their meeting. However, wanted (Illegible) would have to cooperate with them. (4-1-44).

7. I went to Dagupan April 3, 1944. In this town there were some of the enemies stationed to this place, during my stay within two days, nothing was done against the civilians. As usual, the enemies used to go from one place to another utilizing their cars and trucks. In the market three of them went marking. They bought eggplants and other foodstuffs needed by them. They took advantage of buying their needs at the lowest prices. Vendors did not like if possible the low prices they offered, but because they were afraid they simply gave although the prices were too low.

It was Thursday, 6th April when I was on my way home. In Mangaldan and San Jacinto no enemies were found. In Mansoag, there were a few of them stationed west of the market, I have seen that some of their trenches were destroyed. I learned from some people at the place, (Mansoag) that some civilians were called to do some work under the supervision of the enemies. I do believe that they were planning to move somewhere within the town. (4-8-44).

8. It was Sunday afternoon 9th April, when there were six Japs trucks going westward following the road leading to Asingen. The next morning (Monday) I have seen them loaded with drums probably with civilians. Some of them loaded with sawali and boxes. I did not know what were in the boxes. I do not know even where the trucks were going. As per information, the said trucks were going toward San Quintin, or in any other towns. (It was Thursday afternoon at about 4:00 o'clock when a Japs trucks with soldiers passed by. They came from the West. I did not know where they came from. I did not know even where they went. It was probable that the soldiers went to their garrison at Tayug. (4-15-44).

As per the letter of the Acting Major of this town to all the Presidents of the N. A. and to all the tenientes conceales, dated April 18, 1944 stated that every president should send four (4) (Illegible) work in Stotsenburg, Pampanga. According to the letter (Illegible) starts at the (Illegible). Any president (Illegible) That means that four of the leaders within his strict should be taken as laborers for Stotsenburg. However, these laborers should work there with in two weeks only. They will be compensated at ₱2.25 a day, free board and lodging. The work is about the landing airfield or the airport of the Japanese airplanes. (4-21-44).

(SGD.) 5-14-1113 (K-1118)

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt Inf

TO OUR COMRADES:

THIS is to acknowledge gratefully your timely advice to us regarding the recent developments of the times. We are even very proud to add that in several conversations with eye-witnesses to the several air-raids and bombings, a good number of those intrepid aviators are of our own blood and that they are fresh graduates of different schools of aviation in America. We have actually seen with our very eyes the numerous propaganda being shown around- the " I SHALL RETURN" packages of cigarettes and candies. Without any single doubt in our minds, we can say to ourselves that our longed-for salvation is at hand . In this feeling may we humbly re-iterate - torn - beck our one and only concern ever since - torn - Japanese bomb dropped in these isles of peace and contentment - torn - every additional day under the Japanese lage brings only hatred and discontentment against that action. Now that we see the end of this rule of slavery and tyranny, we are at once over-joyedyet philosophical.

LEST we forget the obvious with our excitement, it is the humble mission of this noteto remind our loyal friends and comrades in hinding of that simple yet wise saying:

"Be -torn- the cup and the lip,
There may yet be a slip..."

THIS bit of wisdom does not in anyway show a trace of doubt in our minds of our ultimate victory. Rather, to insure that to come, from flaws and shortcomings that may beset it, it is with a spirit of cooperation that we now humbly speak our opinion fearlessly, as we know we are dealing with men of honor and integrity, as we know , regarding that part of your warning wherein officials and employees of the government of the so-called Republic vacate their posts and surrender their arms if they have any:

AT the outset, the humble authors of this note do not possess any firearm. Without doubt this part of the warning is intended for the constabulary and armed policemen. It is for this reason that we believe the warning is chiefly intended for the constabulary, for this organization is about the only entity now that is allowed to possess firearms by the Japanese. It is that part of the warning which our officials and employees on your part to hear to what in utmost humility, we beg to say, as would a subordinate explain something to his superior.

Certified true copy:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

EXTRACT STAFF OFFICERS' FIELD MANUAL, Part One, Staff Data

3. Definition of Staff - The staff of a unit or organization consists of those officers specifically provided for the purpose of assisting the commander on exercising his command functions. Certain of these officers have no duties other than staff duties, while others have staff duties in addition to their primary functions as commanders of combat or service troops.

6. Staff authority - A. A staff officer, as such, has no authority to command. All policies, basic decisions, and plans, whether originating with the commander or with his subordinates, must be authorized by the commander before they are put into effect.

b. When the commander has decided upon a plan or policy, it is the duty of the staff officers of the general staff group to prepare and issue the orders or letters of instruction necessary to their execution and to follow up their execution. Where letters of instruction are issued, these staff officers will see that such orders as are necessary for a staff officer to issue an order in the name of the commander, responsibility for such an order remains with the commander even though he may not have seen the order as actually written or heard it as actually issued if given orally.

c. The staff officer must not only have a thorough knowledge of the will and policies of his commander, but he must also have a full, first-hand knowledge of and sympathetic acquaintance with subordinate commanders and their units in order to operate successfully. In general, a staff officer should be an active thoroughly posted assistant to the commander and an adviser and helper to subordinate commanders.

10. Staff organization. - a. Basis of organization. - x x x

(1) The duties of all commanders can be divided into four principal functional groups as follows:

- (a) Personnel
- (b) Military intelligence
- (c) Operations and training
- (d) Supply

(2) These four subdivisions, together with a coordination head, exist in the staffs of all units from the battalion to the general headquarters of the field forces. x x x

b. Organization of general staff group. - (2) Brigades, regiment, and battalion. - In the brigade, regiment and battalion, the general staff group as organized in the division is represented by the officers listed below. These officers, in so far as they perform the staff function of the general staff group in the higher echelons, are designated as S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 respectively. (S-1, S-2 etc., stand for staff first section, "Staff, second section." etc.)

- (a) Chief of staff by the executive officer.
- (b) Personnel section by the adjutant
- (c) Military intelligence section by the intelligence officer.
- (d) Operations and training section by the plans and training officer.

(e) Supply section by S-4

c. Organization of special staff group. - x x

(2) Brigades, regiments, and battalions. - The special staff of brigades, regiments and battalions included such or the following as belong to the unit.

- (a) Adjutant
- (b) Chaplain
- (c) Surgeon
- (d) Munitions officer
- (e) Personnel adjutant
- (f) Reconnaissance officer

Certified true copy:

JAMES H. HILL
 Capt, Inf

And the following officers who have special staff functions in addition to command duties:

- (g) Communication officer
- (h) Attached technical specialists

13. The chief of staff (or executive in Brigades and lower units). The chief of staff, or executive, is the principal assistant and advisor of the commander, he transmits the will of the commander to those who execute it and is the principal coordinating agency which insures to efficient functioning of the staff and of all troops of the commander performs the following specific duties:

- a. Formulates and announces policies for the general operation of the staff.
- b. Directs and coordinates the work of the four staff sections of the general staff group in all their relations with the special staff with the troops, and with each other.
- c. Keeps the commander informed of the enemy situation and of the situation of the command as to location, strength, morale, training, equipment, supply and general effectiveness.
- d. Prepares an estimate of the situation when called for when authorized to do so.
- e. Represents the commander during his temporary absence or when authorized to do so. In certain regiments and certain battalions the second in command is designated by Tables of organizations as executive and succeeds automatically to the command when the commander ceases to function.
- f. Obtains basic decisions from the commander and takes the following action:

- (1) Makes necessary decisions supplementary thereto and gives necessary instructions to the staff in furtherance of the basic decision of the commander.
- (2) Allots the detailed work of preparing plans and orders, obtains drafts of plans and orders from the four staff sections, and submits to the commander a completed plan developed from the section plans.

- g. Reviews and coordinates all instructions what are to be published to the command and assures himself that they are strictly in accord with policies and plans of the commander.
- h. By personal observation and through the four staff sections sees that the orders and instructions of the commander are executed.
- i. Makes a continuous study of the situation with a view to being prepared for future contingencies.
- j. Assembles the routine staff section reports and, after their approval by the commander, forwards copies to higher headquarters.

15. The personnel section.- In brigades, regiments and battalions, the personnel section is represented by the adjutants. It is charged with general section staff functions which relate to the personnel of the command as individuals and therefore is brought closely in contact with the following agencies: The adjutant General's Department, the Inspector General's Department, the chaplains, the Judge Advocate General's Department, the Medical Department, the Provost Marshal, and the Headquarters Commandant. It is charged specifically with the supervision of activities concerning - -

- a. Classification, reclassification, assignment, promotion, transfer, retirement, and discharge of all personnel.
- b. Replacement of personnel in accordance with priorities formulated by the operations and training section.
- c. Decorations, citations, honors, and awards.
- d. Leaves of absence and furloughs.
- e. Reward, discipline and punishment.

Certified true copy:

JAMES H. HILL
 Capt, Inf

SAMPLE S- 2 REPORT

Date _____ 19 _____

SUBJECT: S-2 Report on (give name of area)
TO : 1122

1. The following S-2 Report on the above area is hereby submitted for the period. _____ to _____.
2. JAP GARRISONS:
 - A- Jap garrison are located at the following places.
San Fernando, - - 300 (Infantry)
Aringey - - 50 (Cavalry)
(List here the location and sizes of ALL Jap garrisons; the area) (give branch and organization, where known)
 - B- My estimate of the total number of Japs in the area is. _____
 - C- The location of the barracks of all Japs garrisons listed above as one hundred or over is.
San Fernando - In High School and Provincial Capitol.
(Submit sketches where necessary, or refer to sketches previously submitted)
 - D- I submit the following regarding the state of training morale, etc, of the Japs troops in this area:
3. PC GARRISONS:
 - A- PC garrisons are located at the following places:
(List here the location and sizes of ALL PC garrisons in they are a, give designation of PC units, where known)
 - B- My estimate of the total number of PC in the area is: _____
 - C- The location of the barracks of all PC garrisons listed above as fifty or over is : (Submit sketches where necessary; or refer to sketches already submitted)
 - D- I submit the following regarding the state of training, morale, etc. of the PC in this area:
4. PHILIPPINE ARMY (JAP) GARRISONS:
 - A- Philippine Army (Jap) garrisons are located at the following places:
(List here the location, and sizes of ALL PA (Jap) garrisons in the area; give designation of PA units; where known)
 - B- My estimate of the total number of PA in the area is _____
 - C- The location of the barracks of all PA garrisons listed above as fifty or over is (Submit sketches where necessary; dr refer to sketches already submitted)
 - D- I submit the following regarding the state of training, morale, etc, of the PA in this area:
5. JAP SCOUT GARRISONS:
 - A- Jap Scout garrisons are located at the following places:
(List here the location and sizes of ALL Jap Scout garrisons in the area; give designation of Jap Scout units, where known)
 - B- My estimate of the total number of Jap Scout in the area, is _____
 - C- The location of the barracks of all Jap Scout garrison listed above as fifty or over is: (Submit sketches where necessary, or refer to sketches already submitted)
 - D- I submit the following regarding the state of training, morale, etc, of the Japs Scout in this area:
6. MILITARY EMPLOYEES: (Give exact or estimate number; what kind of arms issued to them)
7. Airfields and planes are located at the following places:
(Give location of fields and number of planes of each type at each field.)
8. Fuel, Munitions and Supply Dumps are located at the following places:
(Submit sketches where necessary, or refer to sketches previously submitted)
9. Motor vehicles are concentrated at the following places:
(List all concentrations over 10, giving numbers and types)
10. The following troops movements took place during the period covered by this report: (List all significant and large movements within, thru, into or out of the area)

(cont's)

11. The following activity took place at ports during the period covered. (List embarkation, debarkations, comgos, types of ships, etc.) (Omit this par. where no ports in area.)
12. Artillery pieces are located at the following places: (List locations, types, numbers and calibers; include AA guns)
13. The following Beach Defense preparations have been made: (List trenches, wire, mines, etc. Omit this par where there is no beach in area)
14. The following miscellaneous information regarding the area is submitted: (Describe all other objects of military importance)

Commanding

(Note) : In all cases in which the information given has not been observed and verified during the period for which the report is submitted, place in parenthesis after the info the date as of which it is known to be good)

REQUIREMENTS RE SKETCHES:

1. That it contains a title stating what kind of information is shown and the area covered.
2. That it contains a statement as of what date or dates the info show on the sketch is good.
3. That it contains the name of the Hq. submitting the sketch.
4. That, if part of a report, what report sketch is a part of is indicated.
5. That sketch is fairly complete in itself without unnecessary reference to accompanying report; i. e., that numbers and types of army troops, guns, etc. are shown.
6. That in large scale maps, prominent reference objects (main roads, railroads, plazas, etc.) are depicted and position of military objectives in relation to them is clearly shown.
7. That North-South arrows are shown on maps.
8. That map is as legible, neat and accurate as it is possible make same.

(not legible) Hq., 1122 G-2 (1113), dated April 1,
(not legible)

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

S-2 Page 2 (July 19, 1944)

of Mativided, San Nicolas and Umingan and other places in the province is indicative of their distrust.

Training - same as previously reported.

P.C. GARRISONS:

No change in arts, personnel, distribution and number.

PHILIPPINE ARMY:

Same

BEACH DEFENSE PREPARATIONS:

In the strengthening of the defense work going on in Bolinao as previously reported forced labor of civilians is being resorted to.

The following troop movements took place during the period covered by this report:

On July 17th railroad transportation along north bound route to La Union have been closed to civilian passengers. Cars filled with Jap soldiers have been seen in transit passing thru the province bound north.

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

The story about General Roxas and General Lim get our vote for the most colorful balatang cochero of the month. This tale has been much circulated in Manila as another of those "Where's a confidential and inside information." Many still believe in it as "genuine" and reliable. So wide is the circulation that it has even reached the provinces where the undersigned (not legible) it for the first time.

The popular version is as follows: For several days General Lim and Roxas have been missing. The Japanese authorities began to suspect something afoot. Where are these two ranking Filipino officers whose cooperation with the present government and to the Japanese Imperial Army could never be a matter just to be taken for granted? To be sure, least these people, were up for some dirty trick (the Japanese reasoned) let's send out a searching party. They did and they picked up (according to one version) Gen Lim in a small sailing cat bound for Visayas en route to contact an American submarine for Australia. Gen Roxas is still missing, although another version says he two was picked up. One version ends here, another says Gen. Lim was executed.

How true is this story & P.C. Inspector in vacation in the province who arrived from Manila 5 days ago said, Major Jelondoni told him about Gen. Lim being overtaken by Japs near Mindoro. Another informant on the same day however claims that a friend of his who is working as a secret agent in the Bureau of Investigation told him that the story is just a wild canard (balatang cochero) for Gen. Lim is the present head of the Bureau of Investigation, in other words his big boss. He is confined in the hospital due to slight illness.

/s/ 5-14-1113 (332-1116)
/t/ 5-14-1113 (332-1116)

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt Inf

June 30th F/3

contradicts himself. He was reported to have said in Alaminos that we must not wish for the coming of the Americans for that would make gun present money valueless for they will not certainly recognize this money. Then what would our sacrifices to earn be worth! But this same Shimada on June 27th said in Calasiao, "There are many who have been fearing that this military notes issued by the Imperial Army is merely waste paper and of no value at all. Those who so believe do not know that in International Law military notes issued by an occupation Army are recognized legal tender." One is tempted to asked what would happen to this same notes once the Hap military force that is sanctioning their issuance in the Philippines would be driven away.

At no time since the outbreak of the war has the morale of the Filipino people (with the possible exception of Laurel and his cohorts) been so excellent as it is now and it has been continuously on the upgrade. With news from Europe and Pacific so encouraging people are beginning to conjecture that it won't be long now. There will be an end to all this servility and pretended obeisance and obsequiousness. The Japs may yet find that the Filipinos have an exacting and that the long emouldering ashes of resentment will soon flare into a great conflagration.

Even the Tribunes according to the people, is becoming good reading. Not for what is actually printed in it but in what could be read between the lines.

Jap Captain in San Nicolas the other day told the Neighborhood officers that within two days the Jap garrisons will start another (page torn) of the mountains from Umingan while the garrison in Binabonnan will commence simultaneously similar operations starting from Posorrubio until they meet midway.

(page torn) temporary bridge (barrio Agno, Tayug on way to Asingan) already washed away. Bamboo rafts are now used to ferry across vehicles. Jap army trucks now take round about way thru Umingan as rafts could not carry trucks. Plaridel Bridge (Carmen) finished.

BPW repairing Calasiao concrete bridge blown up USAFFE:

5-14-1113 (H2-1118)

5-14-1113 (S2-1116)

5-14-1113 (3-114)

Certified True Copy:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

contradicts himself. He was reported to have said in Alaminos that we must not wish for the coming of the Americans for that would make our present money valueless for they will not certainly recognize that this money. Then what would our sacrifices to earn be worth! But this same Shimada on June 27th said in Calasiao, "There are many who have been fearing that this military notes issued by the Imperial Army is merely waste paper and of no value at all. Those who so believe do not know that in international law military notes issued by an occupation army are recognized legal tender." One is tempted to ask what would happen to this same notes once the Jap military force that is sanctioning their issuance in the Philippines would be driven away.

At no time since the outbreak of the war has the morale of the Filipino people (with the possible exception of Laurel and his cohorts) been so excellent as it is now and it has been continuously on the upgrade. With news from Europe and Pacific so encouraging people are beginning to conjecture that it won't be long now. There will be an end to all this servility and pretended obeisance and obsequiousness. The Japs may yet find that the Filipinos have an ax to grind and that the long smouldering ashes of resentment will soon flare into a great conflagration.

Even the Tribune, according to the people, is becoming good reading. Not for what is actually printed in it out in what could be read between the lines.

A smart girl once answered a question asked her why she reads the "brivities" and the "Home Front" columns in the Tribune which treats of announcements of birthdays, weddings and other personals, "I read them because they are the only items in the Tribunes of whose truth I can be very sure."

Jap Captain in San Nicolas the other day told the Neighborhood (not legible) that within two days the Jap garrisons will start another (not legible) from Umingan while the garrison in Binagunan (not legible) similar operations starting from Pozorrubio until (not legible)

Conditions of roads:

Agno river temporary bridge (barrio Agno Tayug on way to Asingen-) already washed away. Bamboo rafts are now use to ferry across vehicles. Jap army trucks now take round about way through Umingan as rafts could not carry trucks. Flaridel bridges (Carmen) finished. BFW repairing Calasiao concrete bridge blown up by USAFFE.

/s/ H2-1118
/t/ H2-1118
5-14-1113 (H2-1118)

5- 14-1113 (S2-1116)

/s/ S2-1116
/t/ S2-1116

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INSTRUCTIONS TO BE REMEMBERED
BY
ALL AGENTS AND FIELD AGENTS

1. Minus D-Day- Reports needed;
 - a. What points the enemy are rushing reserves to meet expected landing.
 - b. How they are being fooled by fients at point at which our forces will not actually land.
2. D-Day Intelligence.
 - a. In the area of operations, observe and report, on the movements of enemy tactical reserves, such as:
 1. Tanks
 2. Artillery
 3. Number of troops moving into positions.
 - b. In the immediate areas: Watch for and report.
 1. Direction and description of enemy movements.
 2. Concentrations of enemy troops, artillery, tanks and supplies.
 3. Full details of any new positions being prepared, with particular attention as to location of artillery, and machine gun emplacements flanks and depth of the position and type of fortifications.
 4. Bridges or roads prepared for destruction or being destroyed and any road or bridges being mined.
 - c. Movements and concentrations of all enemy troops and supply.
 1. All airfield activity and lack of activity.
 2. Positions being prepared, roads being mined or bridges or roads being prepared for destruction.
 3. All arrival of troops by sea, particularly at night.
 4. About success or failures of all allied air attacks upon bridges and roads and weather or not the enemy is succeeding in repairing them or not .
 5. Movements of all ranks and artillery.
 6. Coastal and Interior areas that are being evacuated.
3. After D-Day-Mission: When enemy is withdrawing from positions, watch for and report in.
 - a. What condition he is withdrawing.
 - b. What condition are his troops.
 - c. How much of his equipments, particularly tanks, artillery and motor vehicles he is withdrawing with.
 - d. Manner on which he is withdrawing. What routes he is using, what bridges and roads he is destroying enroute, and what formation and order he is withdrawing.
 - e. The new positions or areas into which he is going.
 - f. Where and when large numbers of troops leave the roads and takes to the hills.

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- occupatio (not legible) If so state the nationality predomina (not legible) of arrival if available also incl (not legible) this influx.
3. List of (not legible) rganization stating the aims (not legible) zation predominating character (not legible) political sympathies.
 4. List of hospitals (not legible) charitable institutions operated b (not legible) ious (not legible) ders, with complete date regardin (not legible) care (not legible).

III - Industry.

1. Restriction on Filipinos (not legible) ess. Specify the business enterpris (not legible) to Filipinos.
2. Industries introduced, extent (not legible) ess and respitiveness of the Filipinos (not legible).
3. Report on extent of Japanese fish (not legible) dustury in the Philippines.
4. Other industrial exploitations.

IV- Employments:

1. Restrictions on employment of Filipino on:
a. Government., b. Government corporation.,
c. Business., d. Recreational Enterprises,
e. Domestic, F. Other employment agencies.
2. Complete list of all Government Officials
3. Complete list of Manila Police
4. Complete list of Phil. Constabulary and Metropolitan Constabulary.
5. Complete list of Filipino civilians laborers with the Army and Navy.

V- Recreational Activities:

1. What clubs, cabarets, bars or other recreational places are held exclusive for Japanese Forces.
2. Are Officers and enlisted men allowed to frequent the same place?
3. What films are still shown in Manila Theaters? If still in operation. What American production are found to popular with both Japanese Army and Navy personnel?
4. Are the officers and men addicted to :
a. drinks, b. Gambling. c. Prostitution, d. races
e. atheletics, what kind?

VI- Released War Prisoners:

- A- Present general condition of ex-service men.
1. Report by percentage how many are still sympathetic to U. S. and her allies. Include complete list of Officers formerly with the U. S. or the Philippine Army with their ranks or higher covered by this.

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- (10) (not legible) Communications - condition of roads and (not legible) telephone, radio or telegraph statements means of conveyance or carriage (thru by train, bull cart, etc.)
 - (11) Officials Japanese Army designation of all group units of code names and numbers of units. (not legible) Japanese Army units are supplied with code names (not legible) numbers usually of four digits to denotes Division and Regiment in a Division which are known generally by the officers not always by the enlisted men. THE NUMBERS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE CODE.
 - (12) Battles participated on by the troops, and (not legible) they speak Malay, Chinese, or any Philippine dialect.
 - (13) Towns or districts in Japan where the troop (not legible) before joining the army.
- d. Particulars regarding aerial defenses.
- (1) Places and location of aerodrome.
 - (2) Number and types of airplanes.
 - (3) Size or capacity and number of hangars, repair shops, depots, fuel and bomb dumps, etc.
 - (4) Number of runways.
 - (5) Location and number of dummy hangars, airdromes or airplanes.
 - (6) Location and number of radio direction finders, searchlight batteries, AA guns (type and caliber) and other defensive installations.
 - (7) Particulars regarding ground crews and forces (See sub-par 4A, c).
- e. Particulars regarding naval act (not legible)
- (1) Number and types of war vessels seen in any port of entry.
 - (2) Number and size (tonnage) of commercial vessels used by the enemy.
 - (3) Amount of cargo loaded or unloaded, and (not legible) classification.
 - (4) Number and size or types of motor boats patrolling in any seacoast area.
 - (5) Extent and number of mines laid in a given area - types (contact or controlled).
 - (6) Places frequented by submarines or other war vessels
 - (7) Location and places of restricted areas.
 - (8) Location, number, type, caliber of coastal artillery.
 - (9) Degree and type of any coastal defensive installation.
 - (10) Particulars regarding ground forces (See sub-par. 4A c.)
5. The following miscellaneous information will be submitted and kept up-to-date by each command:
- A. Complete list of all Government Officials and their inclination.
 - B. Complete list of all PC with their ranks, status as ex-service man or volunteer, age, home address, where they were trained, places they are serving, and their detailed activities as pro or otherwise.
 - C. Complete list of Filipino civilian laborers in the Army and Navy.

- D. List of all civilian spies, pro-Japs, sympathizer or fifth-columnists, and the details as to their pro-Jap activities and position held other than PC.
- E. List of all ex-service men in the government service, and position held other than PC.
- F. Complete list of officers, enlisted men government officials and employees, and civilians selling information or contraband supplies or material private or (not legible) to the Japanese as a means of living to war (not legible)
- G. Names of service men invalidated due (not legible)
- H. Names of service men dead or unaccourage. (not legible)

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found out that my staffs have not been following my instructions for which I do not blame them but myself. They need more lecture for which I am going to give them. I found out too that Mr. 383-1113, a reserve officer at that, forgot my instructions as you will note in the report carried by Sgt. GOI-LOI re compliance of G.O. #3.

3. Sir, I hope that the preceding paragraph of this message will not hurt the feeling of the CO. I do not mean to discuss with him. I am only too glad that in the messages, now formalities are dispensed with. I know we can not do this in peacetime. I am taking these rare opportunities sir, in expressing my opinions as if you were near me so that I will learn. I am proud to tell the CO frankly sir that I have learned a lot since my dealings with you and I have been very much benefited. Sir, I can not find my Staff Offs Field Manual to refer to so I expected and hope to hear from you whether my procedure as herein clarified meets Army Regulations, or not.

4. The notorious Cacayan had been dispatched by the 3rd Bn under the "K" Company on orders from Pedro was will be noted in my previous report re dispatched spies and spy suspects. Small Pedro requests that he takes charge of the same gang. He loves his gang 8888888 love him too that he says if it could only be possible, he will take charge of the same outfit so that he can strengthen things out in Aritso. He is terribly mad about the Aritso bad rats and Japs especially now that his kindreds are again pressed.

5. Tom claims Geron was making a lot of robberies etc with your pistol so he dispatched him, and get your pistol and glass. Pascual never got hold of your things. This happened while I was still out last January. Small Pedro says he will take the necessary investigation.

6. Yes sir, it is true I have not personally sent messages to the Hq. weekly. What I mean is, this Bn had been sending messages to the Hq. weekly. If I do not write, it is my staff off's. I can not write weekly as explained in par.2 of this message. I am very glad sir we came from the same school where quibbling is not tolerated. I still carry on the same customs and tradition of our school. I do not make alibies. I take mistakes to the chin for correction.

7. Re the coded message that I sent in my previous message sir, I am sending it agsin as per request thus:

YABYA EENET TOWTM RMRRT NUNEP UMFYN WUTNT ODNBY EFG4I
EYIEI BPGDM CAOAI NUNOG LRSNS IDTEA RTEWO IAVTS OAHIE
OGNAI EIIET XXXXX NRRIB FLNSR RIBSS CSNNI QAAUT IIVEG
SGLAM RNANI CODOR MPRAM INPRY OPIAI HAFET NEATA NNNNS EL
ELAIS TLOPH ITDAM MEIBA ECDOP PGBIS RETLI HZOBZ TEHAN
XXXXX NEVSZ OCFTR SASAO NHAEO OMOES OLYDT RNL

typed in small letters

yoeya eenet towtm rurrtr nunep umfyn wutnt odnyv efg4i
eyiei bpgdm caoai nuuog lrans idtea rtewo ivats cibae
conai eiiet nrrib flnsr riess canni qaaut iiveg aglam
rnani codor mpren inpry opyai hafet neata nnsn elais
tloph itdan edop pgbis retli hzobz tehan nevcz meiba
ocftr sssao nhaeo omoes olydt rnl

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- occupation (not legible)
predominate (not legible)
also including (not legible)
3. List of (not legible)
the (not legible)
charecter (not legible)
 4. List of hospitals (not legible)
operating (not legible)
complete date regarding (not legible)

III- Industry:

1. Restriction on Filipinos (not legible)
Specify the business entered (Not legible)
Filipinos.
2. Industries introduced, extent (not legible)
and respectiveness of the Filipinos (not legible)
3. Report on extent of Japanese fish (not legible)
in the Philippines.
4. Other industrial exploitations.

IV- Employments:-

1. Restrictions on employment of Filipinos on:
a. Government., b. Government corporation.,
c. Business., d. Recreational Enterprises.,
e. Domestic, f. other employment agencies.
2. Complete list of all Government Officials
3. Complete list of Manila Police
4. Complete list of Phil. Constabulary and Metropolitan
Constabulary
5. Complete list of Filipino civilians laborers with
the Army and Navy.

V- Recreational Activities:

1. What clubs, cabarets, bars or other recreational
places are held exclusive for Japanese Forces.
2. Are Officers and enlisted men allowed to frequent
the same place?
3. What films are still shown in Manila Theaters? If still
in operation. What American production are found to
popular with both Japanese Army and Navy personal?
4. Are the Officers and Men addicted to:
a. drinks, b. Gambling. c. Prostitutions, d. races
e. athletics, what kind?

VI- Released War Prisoners:

- A- Present general condition of ex-service men.
 1. Report by percentage how many are still sympathetic
to U.S. and her allies. Include complete list of
Officers formerly with the U.S. or the Philippine
Army with their ranks or higher covered by this.

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Attempts sh (not legible)
 the official (not legible)
 ground unit (not legible)
 tainable (not legible)
 A. Code (not legible)

Army units are supplied with (not legible)
 of four digits to denote the di (not legible)
 vision are generally known by the (not legible)
 of the enlisted men. THE NUMBERS (not legible)
 THE CODE NAMES. C. Battles particular (not legible)
 and whether or not they are Malay, (not legible)
 pine dislect. D. Towns or district (not legible)
 troops lived before joining the armed (not legible)
 very essential) of all unit commanders (not legible)
 colonels or higher.

1. LUZON TRAVELS:

- A. By railroad
 1. Restrictions, on travel North (not legible) of Ma-nila.
 2. Papers required by travel and (not legible) obtained.
 - a. Military
 - b. Civil
 3. Inspections
 - a. Baggages
 - b. Personal
 - c. Papers and passes
 - d. How and where done
- B. By road North and South of Manila
 1. Restrictions, on horse drawn and other powered vehicles.
 2. Methods of inspections, where and how and when done.

11- RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES:

- A. Churches attendance
 1. Present policy of Military and Civil administration regarding churches attendance.
 2. Restriction imposed if any one.
 - a. Baptism
 - b. Funeral
 - c. Religious festivities
 - d. Town fiestas
 - e. Marriages etc.
 3. Had the present military and civil administration interview in any form regarding other church activities such as education, real estates, property ownership, etc.
- B. Religious Organization.
 1. Complete list of religious orders in the Philippines and the predominance of nationalities therein and the political sympathies of each.
 2. Had there been an influx of an order during the (not legible)

b. Munitions officer.- (1) The duties of the munitions officers are:

(a) Responsibility for the requisition, receipt, and distribution of ammunition (including pyrotechnics) and for keeping the ammunition records and reports.

(b) By frequent inspections to keep himself informed concerning the supply of ammunition throughout the unit.

2 In railway artillery units this officer is called the railway and ammunition officer and in addition to the above duties supervises the rail movements of his units.

d. Personnel Adjutant.- The duties of the personnel adjutant are --

(1) Responsibility for keeping the personnel records pertaining to all enlisted men of the unit.

(2) When directed by the commander, he acts as men of the division finance officer in the payment of troops.

(3) When the unit enters the combat zone, he becomes the custodian of all funds of subordinate combat units.

f. Reconnaissance officer.- The duties of the reconnaissance officer are --

(1) Reconnaissance for routes and positions.

(2) Organization and operation of observation posts.

(3) Performance of topographical operations necessary for establishing the unit in position.

c. Communication officer.- The duties of the communication officer are --

(1) Command of the communication section or platoon of the headquarters company of his unit. He is responsible for its technical training and functioning.

(2) Adviser of the commander and the staff on matters relating to signal communication, including the location of command posts.

(3) Establishment and operation of the signal communication system, including the message center, for which his unit commander is directly responsible.

f. Supply officer (in some organization the commander of the service troops also serves as S-4 and as the unit supply officer).- The duties of the supply officer are --

(1) Such of the duties regarding the procurement and distribution of supplies of all XXXX classes as pertain to the lower unit and are not specifically charged to some other staff officer.

(2) Keeping prescribed records regarding supplies and equipment of the unit.

g. Attached technical specialists.- The commanders of attached chemical warfare, artillery, Air Corps, or engineer troops act as tactical and technical advisers to the commander and staff on matters pertaining to their arm or service with duties similar to those of special staff of divisions and higher units.

22. Relations with subordinate units.- a. It is a fundamental principle of command that the commander of any military organization is in full control of all personnel assigned thereto, and xx is alone responsible to higher authority for the results obtained by his organization.

b. In accordance with this principle, special staff officers, although charged in the following paragraphs with certain duties and functions which apply to the unit as a whole, must remember, that these duties and functions are primarily the responsibility of unit commanders, and any directions or instructions issued subordinate his units must be transmitted through the proper channels of command and not directly from one special staff officer to the correspondingspecial staff officer in a subordinate staff unit.

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9. Staff visits.- In order to obtain information for his commander as to the situation or condition of the command or to observe the execution or orders or instructions previously issued, a staff officer should visit subordinate units. Such visits are made in the name of the commander as his duty delegated representative. When making such a visit, the staff officer conducts himself so as to promote cordial relations and cooperation between the staff and the troops. He first calls on the commander of the unit concerned, informs him of the purpose of the visit, request such assistance as is necessary, and before leaving reports to the commander of the unit concerned such facts as have been noted. He carefully avoids criticism or unauthorized interference with the responsibilities of the subordinate commander. If it appears that the superior commander wishes have been misunderstood, he furnished the subordinate commander such additional information as is necessary or in any other legitimate way does his utmost to assist the subordinate commander in comprehending the exact desires of his superior.

20. Records, reports, and maps.- a. Office of record.- The office of the adjutant general is the office of record for the headquarters. Each staff section keeps temporarily copies of such documents as are required in the transaction of its business.

b. Journals.- (See memo, this Hq, dated July 18, 1944)

c. Situation maps.- (2) In brigades and lower units, it is usually not necessary for each section to keep a separate situation map, but the data from each section are entered on one map usually kept under supervision of the unit executive.

d. Operations maps and circulation maps.- These maps, are prepared by the third and fourth sections, respectively, are issued when required.

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company, battery or detachment of the unit. The supply section is charged in general, with all supply arrangements. It keeps in constant touch with the operations and training section so as to keep informed of changed in the tactical or strategical situation which will necessitate changes in the supply arrangements or in the traffic circulation and control. It is responsible for the assurance of such supply arrangements as will officially accord the utmost freedom of action to the command. It is charged specifically with the supervision of activities concerning ..

- a. Procurement in the theater of operations, storage, and distribution of all supplies including ammunition and animals.
- b. Transportation by land and water, including the operation of such parts of embarkation and debarkation and necessary auxiliaries as lie in the theater of operations of the unit concerned, and the control of which is not held by the none of the interior.
- c. Highway circulation and control of traffic theersing circulation maps.
- d. Recommendations as to the new types of equipement with concurrence of operations and training section.
- e. Procurement of real estate, shelter and facilities, including their lessing, repair, maintenance, and disposition.
- f. Construction of facilities relating to supply, shelter, transportation, and hospitalization, but exclusive of fortifications.
- g. Preparations and distribution of administrative instructions and administrative orders pertaining to field operations.
- h. Hospitalization and evacuation of men and animals, including non-military agencies such as the Red Cross, or parts of such agencies, as may be wholly devoted to hospital and medical relief work.
- i. Utilities
- J. Assignment and movement of supply, technical, and labor troops not employed as combat troops. Orders for movements of these troops are issued or controlled by the operations and training section.
- k. Salvage and burial.
- l. Collection and disposition of captured animals and material.
- m. Property and responsibility and accountability
- n. Funds, and priority of expenditures of same.
- o. Tonnage
- p. Continual study of the situation so as to be ready to meet prospective or emergency changes with adequate supply arrangements.
- 24. Special staff of brigades, regiments, and battalions.- a.Chaplain,- surgeon.- The duties of the surgeon are.-
 - (1) Command of the medical department troops not assigned or attached to subordinate units.
 - (2) Technical adviser to the commander and the staff on all matters pertaining to the health and sanitation of the command or of occupied territory; the care and disposition of sick and injured; and the location and utilization of Medical Department troops; and the training of all troops in hygiene and first aid.
 - (3) Supply of medical, dental, and veterinary equipment and supplies.
 - (4) Operation of hospitals and other Medical Department establishments and of an evacuation service.
 - (5) Supervision, within limits prescribed by his commander, over the operations of elements of his service in subordinate units.
 - (6) Administration pertaining to casualty and other reports and records and personnel of the Medical Department.

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17. The military intelligence section.- In brigades and lower units the military intelligence section is represented by the intelligence officer. It is charged, in general, with the collection and evaluation of information concerning the enemy and the dissemination of the resulting military intelligence. Its primary function is to keep the commander and all others concerned informed regarding the enemy's situation and probable intentions. It maintains close liaison with the intelligence section of higher, lower, and adjacent units, with the air officer in arranging for aerial reconnaissance, and with the engineer in arranging for suitable maps. It performs the following specific duties:

- (a) Collects information concerning - -
- (1) Enemy's front line or nearest elements (identify and location)
 - (2) Enemy's strength, disposition, and movements.
 - (3) Enemy's supply and equipment (including supply system and installation)
 - (4) Enemy's operations.
 - (5) Enemy's casualties, including prisoners.
 - (6) Enemy's organization of the ground
 - (7) Enemy's knowledge of our situation.
 - (8) Terrain as it affects the enemy.
 - (9) Enemy's resources, characteristics of his people, and methods of combat (GHQ only)
- b. Evaluates the information obtained by critical and systematic analysis for the purpose of determining its probable accuracy, significance, and importance.
- c. Disseminates the military intelligence obtained to all concerned.
- d. Supervises and coordinates the training and activities of all intelligence personnel in agreement with operations and training section.
- e. Supervises radio intercept and goniometric activities. (Ordinarily not the duty of intelligence officers of units below the army, unless such units are acting independently.)
- f. Supervises and coordinates the measures necessary to prevent enemy agents from gaining information. (Ordinarily not the duty of xxxxx intelligence officers of units below an army corps, unless such units are acting independently.)
- g. Prepares rules for the regulation of the activities of observers, press correspondents, and civilians who may be attached to the unit.
- h. Determines the need for military maps and surveys for general military purposes; determines the general character of such maps as are to be produced; prepares schedules of distribution; supervises map reproduction and distribution.
- i. Supervises the preparation and use of codes and ciphers and the solution of enemy secret communication.
- k. Makes translations.
- l. Formulates plans for and coordinates and supervises the dissemination of information to the public.
- m. Insinuates necessary measures to combat enemy propaganda and prepares publicity material and arranges for its distribution among enemy troops and in enemy territory as directed by higher authority.
- n. Maintains liaison with other intelligence agencies of the government and duly accredited xxxxx foreign attaches and missions.
- o. Receives and conducts visitors. (To receive officials visiting headquarters for the purpose of conferring with the commander or with the chief of staff or deputy chief of staff).
18. The operations and training section.- In brigades and lower units, the operations and training section is represented by plans and training officer. It is charged, in general, with those functions of the staff which relate to organization, training, and operations. From the nature of its duties, it must maintain the closest cooperation and

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collaboration with the other staff sections. It confers directly with the commanders with the other staff, of all combat arms and technical units within the command, with the commanders of supporting units, and with the commanders of other units with which the command may be associated. One of its most important duties is to arrange the details for coordination of effort and employment in combat of the combined arms. To this end full use is made of the expert advice and assistance of the commanders of artillery, Air corps, and engineer troops, and of other special staff officers such as the signal or communication officer. When necessary these officers are called upon for plans, special maps, reports, or annexes to field orders. In this manner full advantage is taken of the detailed technical knowledge of these officers while at the same time causing their plans to harmonize with the general plan or action and the employment of the other arms and services. It performs the following specific duties:

- a. Prepares plans for, secures approval thereof, and supervises:
 - (1) Mobilization of the command.
 - (2) Organization and equipment of combat units.
 - (3) Training including --
 - (a) Selection of training sites.
 - (b) Preparation of training programs and orders.
 - (c) Organization and conduct of schools.
 - (d) Rendition of training reports and maintenance of records of training.
 - (4) Attachment of units for tactical operations.
 - (5) Movement of combat troops.
 - (6) Tactical dispositions of combat troops, including the allotment of quartering areas.
 - (7) Security measures, reconnaissance, and maintenance of lateral communication in combat.
 - (8) Liaison with adjacent units.
 - b. Keeps informed of and studies:
 - (1) Location, effective strength, and morale of combat troops.
 - (2) Needs for replacements and reinforcements.
 - (3) State of equipment and supplies.
 - (4) Enemy situation
 - (5) Adaptability of terrain to combat operations.
 - (6) Instructions, tactical plans, and field orders received from higher or adjacent units.
 - c. Prepares field orders and, when approved, is responsible for their timely delivery to the troops; prepares estimates of the situation and plans for combat when required.
 - d. Recommends priorities for the assignment of replacements and equipment.
 - e. Supervises the system of signal communication.
 - f. Keeps in touch by personal visits with the commanders of subordinate combat units, and with commanders of attached units and technical troops. Personally, or by means of an assistants, maintains direct observation of combat operations and troops movements.
 - g. Makes a continuous study of the situation in order to be prepared for contingencies that may arise and to recommend such changes in information or combat methods as may be necessary.
 - h. Keeps the diary of the unit.
19. The supply section.- In brigades, regiments, and battalions, the supply section is represented by S-4. In some organization there is a separate staff officer for S-4 duties, in other the duties of S-4 are performed by the unit supply officer who also commands the service

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- f. Sanitation, and sanitary punishment
- g. Headquarters arrangements.
- h. Military government
- i. Postal service
- j. Military police relations with military personnel and civilians.
- k. Location of straggler line and collecting points for stragglers and disposition of stragglers.
- l. The furnishing of information to the supply section as to the amount and location of shelter necessary for the command and for the activities under its supervision. Administration of quartering arms.
- M. Morale and welfare including religious, recreational, and welfare work, and nonmilitary agencies devoted to such work, except that all programs of time are arranged in agreement with the operations and training section.
- n. Reports concerning and the handling of prisoners of war and enemy, civilians. Questions concerning our prisoners of war in hands of enemy.
- o. Strength reports and graphs, casualty reports, station lists, and other personnel statistics. For the duties in this connection of the adjutant of brigades and lower units see paragraph 24 a (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10).
- 24. Special staff of brigades, regiments and battalions.-
 - a. Adjutant, chaplain, and surgeon.- These officers have duties similar to those outlined in paragraph 23a, g, and o.
- 23. a. Adjutant General.- The duties of the adjutant general are--
 - (a) The handling of all official correspondence, except that pertaining to combat orders and instructions, in accordance with regulations and approved policies. In cases for which no policy has been established, to initiate action to secure a policy covering such cases.
 - (2) Authentication and distribution of all orders and instructions, except those pertaining to combat operations.
 - (3) Maintenance of the office of record for the headquarters
 - (4) Operations, of the Army Postal Service.
 - (5) Operations, in accordance with approved policies, of activities at the headquarters pertaining to --
 - (a) The classification of all individuals joining the command, their subsequent assignment, reclassification, and reassignment, their promotion, transfer, retirement and discharge.
 - (b) Procurement and replacement of personnel.
 - (c) Decorations, citations, honors, and awards.
 - (d) Education, recreation, and welfare, exclusive of religious matters.
 - (e) Leaves of absence and furloughs.
 - (6) Custody of the records of all personnel belonging to the command which are not kept in some subordinate unit.
 - (7) Preparation and distribution of the station list.
 - (8) Preparation and submission of reports on strength, casualties, captured material, prisoners of war, and incidental returns.
 - (9) Supplying of blank forms, publications, and instructional matter furnished by the Adjutant General's Department.
 - (10) Operation of a general "follow-up" system for the headquarters as regards administrative matters, including recommendations and similar arrangements in headquarters of subordinate units.
- P. General regulations and routine administration which especially concern individuals, or outline not specifically assigned to another staff section.
- Q. Preparation of such parts of administrative orders or instructions as relate to the personnel section.

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Capt, Inf

2. Percenta (Illegible)
service (Illegible)
Name (Illegible)
(Illegible)
mit iis (Illegible)

- B- Non-participating service (Illegible)
 1. Names of service (Illegible)
but sympathetic to the (Illegible)
 2. Names of service men (Illegible)
of prison camps.
 3. Names of service men (Illegible)
their families.

- C- Financial Status, Means of Living (Illegible)
 1. List of professions, business (Illegible)
means of living entered to by (Illegible) and en-
listed men after their release (Illegible) to a-
verage weekly income.
 2. Complete list of officers and enlisted men
selling information to the Japanese as a means
of living.
 3. List of officers and enlisted men's families
made destitute due to the war.

(SGD) EDWIN P. RAMSEY
MAJOR, U. S. A.
Commanding

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt Inf

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