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Authority NND 933026

HEADQUARTERS USFIP

HEADQUARTERS NORTH VIETNAM ARMY

10/19/53

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY.

TO : ALL UNIT LEADERS. *CHANGING - Copies to adjacent units -*

1. Due to the fact that many units now have officers and men that have had little or no experience in guerilla warfare, the following instructions are published as a guide to insure the maximum success against the enemy when the proper time comes.

2. WHEN TO STATIONARY ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY. Due to the slowness of communications between this HQ. and subordinate HQ., unit leaders will not wait on orders from higher HQ. to commence action. As soon as a unit leader has satisfied himself that reinforcements have landed on Luam (Be cautious about rumors) put your unit to action. Notify adjacent units that you are doing same.

3. TYPE OF ACTION DESIRED. (1) Enemy communications, i.e. roads, railroads, bridges, telephone lines should be quickly and thoroughly destroyed. If you have an important bridge in your area, after destroying same, leave a strong detachment of men under a reliable officer or NCO to prevent the enemy from repairing same, or at least harass the enemy while they are repairing same. (2) Supply dumps (amm., food, medicine etc.) should be raided and destroyed. (3) Enemy supply trains that move within your area should be ambushed and destroyed. (4) Rear installations (command posts, truck parks etc.) should be continuously raided and destroyed when possible. (5) Troop movements should be ambushed and the greatest possible loss inflicted on the enemy. Unit leaders, without delay, should select places within their area to ambush.

4. USE OF ARMS AND AMM. It will be noted that the majority of missions listed in #3 above, requires few and in many cases no arms or amm. In carrying out many of the above missions, only a small percentage of the detachment need be armed. The few armed men cover the unarmed men as they are working at their position. I want to caution unit leaders not to underestimate the amount of successful work that can be accomplished without arms and amm.

5. NIGHT OPERATIONS. From past observations, there is a great lack of understanding on the part of both officers and men on the proper methods of carrying out a successful night attack. The basic element in night operations is surprise. If you can not surprise the enemy in a night attack there is little value in making an attack under the cover of darkness. It is a basic principle of night operations that the attacking force does not fire. They close silently on the enemy and destroy him with the bayonet. We can therefore, make effective night attacks with the majority of our men armed with the bolo or spear. Let me again emphasize, in the night attack, THE ENEMY'S FIRE FORCE DOES NOT FIRE. No one can fire aimed fire at night, therefore if you allow your men to fire, they are not only wasting amm., endangering their own lives, but are destroying the most important element of the attack, SURPRISE. From the foregoing it goes then without saying that every officer, NCO and man that is to take part in a night attack must thoroughly instructed in exactly what he is to do.

6. Plan NOW. Do not wait until the last minute to lay plans for action. The success of your unit will depend directly on how thorough you have laid plans in your area and how thorough you have instructed your subordinate officers and men.

7. NUMBER INIG P.C. (JAP). Unit leaders should at once begin finding ways to the P.C. (JAP) through their friends that are not in the P.C. Make these men P.C. understand that the best way they can serve their country when the time comes is to join on the side and join our forces. Instruct them to formulate plans and they will carry out this action.

8. BEST REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK TO YOU ALL.

32 BY ORDER OF C.O. NORTH VIETNAM ARMY

UNITED STATES ARMY
NORTH AFRICA

Oct. 30, 1943

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY.
TO: ALL UNIT LEADERS.

1. Due to the fact that many units now have officers and men that have had little or no experience in guerilla warfare, the following instructions are published as a guide to insure the maximum success against the enemy when the proper time comes.

2. WHEN TO START YOUR ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY. Due to the slowness of communications between this Hq. and subordinate Hqs. unit leaders will not wait for orders from higher Hq. to commence action. As soon as a unit leader has satisfied himself that reinforcements have landed on lunch (be cautious about rumors) put your unit into action. Notify adjacent units that you are doing same.

3. TYPE OF OPERATIONS. (1) Destroy communications, i.e., roads, railroads, bridges, telephone lines should be quickly and thoroughly destroyed. If you have an important bridge in your area, after destroying same, leave a strong detachment of men under a reliable officer or NCO to prevent the enemy from repairing same or at least to harass the enemy while they are repairing same. (2) Supply dumps (amm., food, fuel, gasoline etc) should be raided and destroyed. (3) Industries (mines that move within your area should be ambushed and destroyed. (4) Rear installations (depot and depot truck parts, etc.) should be continuously raided and destroyed if possible. (5) Troops moving with should be ambushed and the greatest possible loss inflicted on the enemy. Unit leaders, without delay, should select places within their area to ambush.

4. USE OF AMMUNITION. It will be noted that the majority of missions listed in part 3 above, requires few and many cases no arms and amm. In carrying out many of the above missions, only a small percentage of the detachment need to be armed. The few armed men cover the unarmed men as they are working at their mission. I want to caution unit leaders not to underestimate the amount of successful work that can be accomplished without arms and amm.

5. NIGHT OPERATIONS. From past observations, there is a great lack of understanding on the part of both officers and men on the proper methods of carrying out a successful night attack. The basic element in night operations is surprise. If you can not surprise and enemy in a night attack, there is little value in making the attack under the cover of the darkness. It is a basic principle of night operations that the attacking force does not fire. They close silently on the enemy and destroy him with the bayonet. We can therefore make effective night attacks with the majority of our men armed with the bolo or spear. Let me again emphasize, in the night attack the attacking force does not fire. No one can fire aimed fire at night, therefore, if you allow your men to fire, they are not only wasting amm., endangering their own comrades, but are destroying the most important element of the attack, SURPRISE.

From the foregoing, it goes then without saying that every officer and man that is taking part in a night attack must thoroughly instruct in exactly what he is to do.

6. PLAN NOW. Do not wait until the last minute to lay out for action. The success of your unit will depend directly on how thorough you have laid plans within your area and how thorough you have instructed your subordinate officers and men.

7. DOMESTIC PC (Jap). Unit leaders should at once be finding inroads into the P.C. (Jap) through their friends that now in the P.C. make these men in the P.C. understand that the way they can serve their country when the time comes is to join on the side and join our forces. Insist that they understand on how they will carry out this action.

8. VERY IMPORTANT AND GOOD LUCK TO ALL.

USFIP

ON

OCT 30, 1943.

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST
TO : ALL UNIT LEADERS.

THE ENEMY.

1. Due to the fact that many units now have officers and men that have had little or no experience in guerrilla warfare, the following instructions are published as a guide to insure the maximum success against the enemy.

2. WHEN TO START OPEN ACTION. Due to the slowness of communications between this Hq. and subordinate units, unit leaders will not wait for orders from higher Hq. to commence action. As soon as a unit leader has satisfied himself that reinforcements have landed on Luzon (be cautious about rumors) put your unit into action. Notify adjacent units that you are doing same.

3. TYPE OF ACTION. (1) Enemy communications, i.e., roads, railroad, telephone lines should be quickly and thoroughly destroyed. If you have a strong detachment of men under a reliable officer or NCO to prevent the enemy from repairing same, or at least to harass the enemy while repairing same, supply dumps (amm., food, etc.) should be raided and destroyed. (2) Enemy Supply Trains that move within your area should be ambushed and destroyed. (3) Rear installations (command posts, truck parks etc.) should be continuously raided and destroyed when possible. (4) Troop movements should be ambushed and the maximum possible loss inflicted on the enemy. Unit leaders, without delay, should select places with their own arms.

4. UNARMED MEN AND AMM. It will be noted that the missions listed in para. 3 above, require the use of arms. Only a small percentage of the detachment need to be armed. The few armed men cover the unarmed men as they are working at their mission. I want to caution unit leaders not to underestimate the amount of successful work that can be accomplished without arms and amm.

5. NIGHT OPERATIONS. From past observations, there is a great lack of misunderstanding on the part of both officers and men on the proper methods of carrying out a successful night attack. The basic element in night operations is surprise. If you can not surprise the enemy in a night attack there is little value in making the attack under the cover of darkness. It is a basic principle of night operations that the attacking force does not fire. They close silently on the enemy and destroy him with the bayonet. We can therefore make effective night attacks with the majority of our men armed with the bolo or spear. Let me again emphasize, in the night attack, THE ATTACKING FORCE DOES NOT FIRE. No one can fire aimed fire at night, therefore, if you allow your men to fire, they are not only wasting amm., endangering their own comrades, but are destroying the most important element of the attack, SURPRISE. From the foregoing, it goes then without saying that every officer, NCO and man that is to take part in a night attack must thoroughly instruct in exactly what he is to do.

6. PLAN NOW. Do not wait until the last minute to lay plans for action. The success of your unit will depend directly on how thorough you have laid plans within your area and how thorough you have instructed your subordinate officers and men.

7. UNDERMINING PC (JAP). Unit leaders should at once begin finding inroads into the P.C. (JAP) through their friends that are now in the P.C. Make these men in the P.C. understand that the best way they can save their country when the time comes, is to turn on the Japs and join our forces. Instruct them to formulate plans on how they will carry out this action.

8. BEST REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK TO YOU ALL.

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BY ORDER OF C.O., USFIP, NORTH LUZON.

(SGD) 1122

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 933078

HEADQUARTERS, USFIP
NORTH LUZON

/rch.

Oct 30, 1945

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY.

TO : ALL UNIT LEADERS. (CHANUYAN.-Copies to adjacent units.)

1. Due to the fact that many unit now have officers and men that have had little or no experience in guerilla (page torn), the following instructions are published as a guide to insure the maximum success against the enemy when the proper time comes.

2. WHEN TO START OPEN ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY. Due to the slowness of communications between this Hq. and subordinate Hq., unit leaders will not wait on orders from higher Hq. to commence action. As soon as a unit leader has satisfied himself that reinforcements have landed on Luzon (Be cautious about rumors) put your unit into action. Notify adjacent units that you are doing same.

3. TYPE OF ACTION DESIRED. (1) Enemy communications, i.e. roads, railroads, bridges, telephone lines should be quickly and thoroughly destroyed. If you have an important bridge in your area, after destroying same, leave a strong detachment of (page torn) under a reliable officer or NCO to prevent the enemy from repairing same, or at least to harass the enemy while they are repairing same. (2) Supply dumps(amm., food, gasoline etc.) should be raided and destroyed. (3) Enemy Supply Trains that move with (page torn) your area should be ambushed and destroyed. (4) Rear installations (command posts; truck parks etc.) should be continuously raided and destroyed when possible. (5) Troop movements should be ambushed and the greatest possible loss inflicted on the enemy. Unit leaders, without delay, should select places within their area to ambush.

4. USE OF ARMS AND AMN. It will be noted that the majority of missions lists in (page torn) above, requires few and in many cases no arms or amn. In carrying out many of the above missions, only a small percentage of the detachment need be armed. The few armed men cover the unarmed men as they are working at their mission. I want to caution unit leaders not to underestimate the amount of successful or that can be accomplished without arms and amn.

5. NIGHT OPERATIONS. From past observations, there is a great lack of understand-on the part of both officers and men on the proper methods of carrying out a successful night attack. The basic element in night operations is surprise. If you can not surprise the enemy in an night attack there is little value in making the attack under the cover of darkness. It is a basic principle of night operations (page torn) attacking force does not fire. They close silently on the enemy and destroy him with the bayonet. We can therefore, make effective night attacks with the majority of our men armed with the bolo or spear. Let me again emphasize, in the night attack, THE ATTACKING FORCE DOES NOT FIRE. No one can fire aimed fire at night, therefore if you allow your men to fire, they are not only waisting amn., endangering their own comrades, but are destroying the most important element of the attack, SURPRISE. From the foregoing, it goes then without saying that every officer, NCO and man that is to the part in an night attack must thoroughly instructed in exactly what he is to Hq.

6. Plan NOW. Do not wait until that last minute to lay plans for action. (page torn) success of your unit will depend directly on how thorough you have laid plans your area and how thorough you have instructed your subordinate officers and men.

7. UNDER INIG P.C. (JAP). Unit leaders should at once begin finding the P.C. (JAP) through their friends that are now in the P.C. Make these men P.C. understand that the best way they can serve their country when the time comes is to turn on the Japs and join our forces. Instruct them to formulate plans on (page torn) they will carry out this action.

8. BEST REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK TO YOU ALL.

BY ORDER OF C.O. USFIP, NORTH LUZON
(SIGNED.) 1122
(TYPED.) 1122

Certified True Copy:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 883078

HEADQUARTERS, USFIP
NORTH LUZON

Oct. 30, 1943

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY.
TO : ALL UNIT LEADERS.

1. Due to the fact that many units now have officers and men that have had little or no experience in guerilla warfare, the following instructions are published as a guide to insure the maximum success against the enemy when the proper time comes.

2. WHEN TO START OPEN ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY. Due to the slowness of communications between this Hq. and subordinate Hqs. unit leaders will not wait for orders from higher Hq. to commence action. As soon as a unit leader has satisfied himself that reinforcements have landed on Luzon (Be cautious about rumors) put your unit into action. Notify adjacent units that you are doing same.

3. TYPE OF ACTION DESIRED. (1) Enemy communications, i.e. roads, railroads, bridges, telephone lines should be quickly and thoroughly destroyed. If you have an important bridge in your area after destroying same, leave a strong detachment of men under a reliable officer or NCO to prevent the enemy from repairing same or at least to harass the enemy while they are repairing same.

(2) Supply dumps (ammunitions, food supply, gasoline etc) should be raided and destroyed.

(3) Enemy supply trains that move within your area should be ambushed and destroyed.

(4) Rear installations (Command Post, truck parts, etc.) should be continuously raided (page torn) destroyed while possible.

(5) Troop movements should be ambushed and the greatest possible loss inflicted on the enemy. Unit leaders, without delay, should select places within their area to ambush.

4. USE OF ARMS AND AMM. It will be noted that the majority of missions listed in part 3 above, requires few and in many cases no arms and amm. In carrying out many of the above missions, only a small percentage of the detachment need to be armed. The few armed men cover the unarmed men as they are working at their mission. I want to caution unit leaders not to under estimate the amount of successful work that can be accomplished without arms and amms.

5. NIGHT OPERATIONS. From past observations, there is a great lack of misunderstanding on the part of both officers and men on the proper methods of carrying out a successful night attack. The basic element in night operations is surprise. If you can not surprise and enemy in a night attack, there is little value in making the attack under the cover of the darkness. It is a basic principle of night operations that the attacking force does not fire. They close silently on the enemy and destroy him with the bayonet. We can therefore make effective night attacks with the majority of our men arm with the bolo or spear. Let me again emphasize, in the night attack THE ATTACKING FORCE DOES NOT FIRE. No one can fire aimed fire at night, therefore, if you allow your men to fire, they are not of wasting amms., endangering their own comrades, but are destroying the most important element of the attack, SURPRISE. From the foregoing, it goes then without saying that enemy officer NCO and men that is taking part in a night attack must thoroughly instruct in exactly what he is to do.

(over)

6. PLAN NOW. Do not wait until the last minute to lay plans for action. The success of your unit will depend directly on how thorough you have laid plans within your area and how thoroughly have instructed your subordinate officers and men.

7. UNDERMINING PC (Jap). Unit leaders should at once (page-torn) way they can serve their country when the time comes is to (page torn) on the Japs and join our forces. Instruct them to forwarding plans on how they will carry out this action.

8. BEST REGARD AND GOOD LUCK TO YOU ALL.

BY ORDER OF C. O., USAFIP, NORTH LUZON.

(SGD.) 1122

Certified True Copy:

JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 933076