

FILE : 500-41

TITLE : VOLCKMANN'S GUERRILLA

ORIGIN : HQ, USAFIP NORTH LUZON, CAMP SPENCER

DATE: 1943 to 1945

AUTHENTICITY: A TRUE COPY SIGNED

SOURCE: LIVING CLAIMS PROJECT "J"

EXTRACTED BY _____ DATE _____ MICROFILMED _____ DATE _____

(NOT IMPORTANT)

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PA

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 883028

VOLCKMANN

INCLOSURE: - (H)

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

5 September 1945

SUBJECT: 12th Infantry, P.A.

TO : WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

1. That after the fall of Bataan Lt Cols Martin Moses and Arthur K. Noble, US Army, escaped to Northern Luzon and in September 1942 assumed command of guerrilla units then operating in North Luzon from a headquarters in Benguet. While in Benguet, Lt Col Moses authorized a battalion under Captain Rufino Baldwin to be known as the 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry, PA. That in November 1942 Lt Cols Moses and Noble left Benguet and moved their headquarters somewhere in Apayao in January 1943. At this time, Lt Col Moses contacted GHQ, SWPA, via a radio operated by Major Ralph Praeger and was authorized to organize the 12th Infantry, PA. I do not know whether this designation was ever applied by Lt Col Moses to any unit. However, it is known that Lt Col Moses at some time between November 1942 and January 1943 gave some sort of official recognition to a unit known as the "Ifugao Battalion" under Lt Col Gregorio Manalo, and a unit in Kalinga under Ali Al Raschid (rank unknown).

2. Sometime after February 1943, the enemy conducted mopping up operations in the Apayao-Kalinga area for the purpose of capturing Lt Cols Moses and Noble and destroying their radio. This operation culminated in the capture of Moses and Noble on or about 1 June 1943 and the subsequent destruction of the radio.

3. I understand that between November 1942 and January 1943, Lt Cols Moses and Noble made certain inductions, commissions and promotions in the field, (authority unknown) and that these actions were subsequently approved by SWPA by radio. I saw a copy of an order (copy attached) by Lt Cols Moses and Noble promoting Gregorio Manalo to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel subject to approval at a later date.

4. Upon the capture of Lt Cols Moses and Noble, I, then a Major, next senior officer in North Luzon, assumed command of the guerrilla forces in North Luzon. Due to the fact that no official authorization existed for certain units authorized by Lt Cols Moses and Noble, the authoriza-


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Authority

883078

INCLOSURE: - (4)

tion given to Lt Cols Moses and Noble to form the 12th Infantry was used to cover other units that had previously been authorized by Lt Cols Moses and Noble, and was later used to cover certain units authorized by me. However, the use of the designation of "12th Infantry (PA)" was later dropped, and units carrying that designation were redesignated as part of the 66th Infantry (PA). Remnants of the battalion formerly under Manalo which were left in Ifugao after he departed for Manila were subsequently picked up by units of this command and are at present in these units.



RUSSELL W. VOLCKMANN
Colonel, Infantry, AUS
Commanding

1 Incl.

1 - extract copy of SO No 23, Hq Guerilla Forces in North Luzon, Dtd 23 December 1942.

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

19 March 1946

SUBJECT: Corrections, Additions and Comments
on History of Guerrilla Movement in
North Luzon

TO : Commander-in-Chief, APPAC
Attention: AC of S, G-2
(Thru Channels)

EXTRACT

14TH INFANTRY AND COORDINATED COMMAND - 1942 (NAKAR)

The principal error in this section is the mention of co-ordinated North Luzon command which was never exercised nor attempted to be exercised by any commanding officer of the 14th Infantry. The 14th Infantry (PA) was organized principally from troops who had retreated from Baguio over the mountains in December, 1941, under the command of Lt Cols Bonnett, Moses and Noble and had been disbanded at Aritao upon receipt of a false report that Highway No. 5 was blocked by the enemy at Baleta Pass. This error was later discovered but only a small number of the troops were recovered in time to accompany Lt Cols Bonnett, Moses and Noble to Bataan. Among the troops left behind was Major (then Captain) Manuel P. Enriquez, who immediately started organizing them. Shortly afterwards Lt Col (then Major) Warner arrived on the scene. Warner had been Provost Marshal at Camp John Hay at the outbreak of the war and was not a very good officer, being quite addicted to liquor. During the opening days of the war he had continuously neglected his duties and had been drunk most of the time. When orders were received to evacuate Baguio he was in a drunken stupor and could not accompany the main body from Baguio. He sobered up the next day and followed and arrived at Aritao. Here Enriquez, doubtless believing that there would be an advantage in having an American officer in command, requested Warner to assume command of the forces being organized. Later, Lt Colonel (then Captain) Nakar arrived from the west. These three, Enriquez, Warner and

Nakar, formed a sort of a team in the organization of the 14th Infantry. Enriquez did the organizing, Nakar harrassed the Japs attempting to enter the Cagayan Valley from the south while Warner's contribution seems to have been limited to consuming a quart of whiskey a day. Thru a radio at Bayombong, contact was established with Corregidor and the 14th Infantry was authorized and organized. Though there was a contact of sorts between Warner and Col Horan in Bontoc, Warner never acknowledged Horan's authority.

Following the fall of Bataan, the enemy entered the Cagayan Valley in force and forced the 14th Infantry to split into two parts; one group under the command of Enriquez moved westward into western Nueva Vizcaya and eastern Benguet. The rest of the unit under Warner and Nakar moved eastward into eastern Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela. At this point, Warner sent a radiogram to Corregidor requesting for a cruiser to come to Palanan to pick him up, and he then deserted his command and proceeded to Palanan to await the boat. General Wainwright, however, is reported to have sent back a reply to the effect that there was no cruiser available nor would there be one available and for Warner "to get the hell back to his command". Warner then returned to the Cagayan Valley and later surrendered when contacted by Col. Calicuka, representative of General Wainwright. During Warner's absence, Nakar had been joined by Major (then Captain) Robert Arnold who had come southward from Col. Horan and had been assigned to the 14th Infantry on orders from Corregidor. Nakar and Arnold continued to operate a radio and, after the fall of Corregidor, made contact with Australia. At this time, according to statements of Arnold, that portion of the 14th Infantry under the command of Nakar was designated as the 14th Infantry (AUS) and all of the officers and men were inducted into the Army of the United States via radio and were assigned AUS serial numbers. During this period other units in North Luzon, seeking to establish contact with the outside, sent some messages to Nakar which they requested he transmit for them to higher headquarters. Nakar's transmission of some of such messages is evidently the reason for the assumption that he was exercising some sort of coordinated command in North Luzon. In late 1942, Nakar was captured, the radio was destroyed and Arnold assumed command of the remnants of the eastern branch of the 14th Infantry. This unit did not prosper and its numbers steadily declined until when Arnold was contacted by HQ, USAFIP, North Luzon, in late 1944, its strength amounted to about the strength of one company, which was merged with the western branch of the 14th Infantry at that time.

The western portion of the 14th Infantry continued to carry on in a fairly successful manner inspite of the difficult living conditions and food and built up a fairly strong organization. However, following the enemy mopping up operation in 1942, Enriquez deserted his command and traveled with a few other officers to the vicinity of Tuba, Mt. Province, where in April 1942, upon representations from his wife, he voluntarily surrendered to the enemy.

Upon Enriquez' surrender Lt Col (then Major) Romulo A. Manriquez, next senior officer, assumed the command of the 14th Infantry and continued to organize and develop the regiment until it was almost full strength. This western branch of the 14th Infantry maintained contact with and accepted the command of HQ, USAFIP, North Luzon, from the time of its organization. In late 1944, Manriquez' agents established contact with Major Arnold in eastern Isabela. To avoid the delicate situation arising out of the fact that Major Arnold outranked Manriquez as commanding officer of the 14th Infantry, Major Arnold was transferred to take command of the newly organized 15th Infantry in Ilocos Norte.

BARNETT History

REORGANIZATION
2nd INF DIV (PA)
GUERRILLA AFFAIRS SECTION
CAMP SPENCER

21 November 1945

SUBJECT: Date of Organization, the Units In-
volved, their Organization, the ac-
tivities of Units Involved in Resis-
tance Movement in Mt Province and
Ilocos Coast until those Units Came
under Direct Control of Colonel
R. W. VOLCKMANN

TO : G.O., USAFIP, NL

1. The guerrilla resistance movement in Mt Province began with General Order No. 1, dated Jan 15, 1942, copy inclosed herewith (Inclosure No. 1) in which Lt Col JOHN P HORAN assumed command of all troops in North Luzon. He was the ranking officer of both US Army and Philippine Army troops in North Luzon. It was clearly understood at that time that all Philippine Army units which included PC units were called into the USAFFE, which included US Army troops in the Far East as well as Philippine Scouts. It is not known if a formal induction of Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary was required to be in the USAFFE but it is known that all Philippine Constabulary units available or that could be contacted by Col HORAN were formally inducted into the USAFFE by units and the volunteers, reservists and previously uninducted trainees, were inducted into the USAFFE. Immediately after Jan 15, 1942 (Jan 16 to 20) Col HORAN inducted into the United States Army approximately twenty (20) Americans or US citizens (1 Chinese and 2 mestizos) and tentatively commissioned nearly all of them. Following this, he authorized the calling to arms Philippine Army trainees, reservists and finally volunteers for whom arms were available. The American citizens inducted by Col HORAN were all immediately assigned to the Philippine Scouts. The Filipino trainees and reservists were organized into units under either the American officers tentatively commissioned by Col HORAN or Philippine Army officers. The assignment of these American officers is shown in the true copy of the inclosed schedules (Inclosures Nos. 3 and 4), and indicates the expansion of the 43rd Infantry from the original Camp John Hay command. The PC companies remained as separate units but it

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was understood that they were duly inducted into the USAFFE as well. It is believed the reason for this was that Col HORAN did not previously have the authority to commit them to action against the enemy when the enemy approached the Provincial boundary which they were to defend.

2. The foregoing indicates the organizational policies followed until the authorization of the formation of the 121st Infantry, PA.

3. The following policies were laid down by Col HORAN and, as far as the undersigned is aware, these were never revoked:

a. Harass and destroy the enemy and his installations at every opportunity.

b. Eliminate collaborators, fifth-columnists and Pro-Japs.

c. Maintain our unit up to the strength of arms available and train them religiously.

d. See that the police functions of the respective areas were maintained by doing everything possible to check looting, lawlessness, and assisting the enemy.

4. Combat activities varied in these sectors according to the character of the units, the initiative of the different commanders, and the presence of the enemy. Almost immediately following Col HORAN's assumption of command in North Luzon, he contacted and assumed control of all units on the Ilocos Coast. The only active one until that time being the unit under the command of Col WALTER CUSHING and Lt ROBERT ARNOLD. Prior to Col HORAN's assumption of command WALTER CUSHING, Lt ROBERT ARNOLD and the thirty (30) American E/M under Lt ARNOLD had ambushed the enemy at Candon, Ilocos Sur and CUSHING had already staged two other ambushes in Ilocos Sur with a group of his own employees. Ambushes, raids and demolition along the Ilocos Coast continued in both Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur as well as in Abra. The heavy fighting about the end of Jan, 1942 occurred along Hwy No. 11 north of Baguio. At the same time the enemy attempted to push up Hwy No. 4 from BAGABAG until stopped by Captain GITTERS at Ibulao Gate. The Japanese who drove up Hwy No. 4 to Bontoc from the Ilocos Coast were stopped by the Philippine Constabulary command of Captain MANALO in the vicinity of Mt.

- 3 -

PULOG. The enemy then retreated back to Bayombong from the Kiangnan area and from Bontoc retreated back to Hwy No. 11 to the vicinity of Baguio. This campaign occurred from Jan 25 until Feb 14, 1942. The Philippine Scout units immediately followed the enemy and recommenced harrassing activities in the vicinity of Baguio on Hwy No. 3 in Ilocos Sur and on the Kennon Road. The undersigned with the Philippine Scouts under his command and some attached Philippine Army personnel was in command in one of the units pursuing the retreating enemy (down Hwy #4 towards Tagudin, Ilocos Sur). In the vicinity of Tagudin, a major ambush was effected and Gen HARA, at that time Japanese Administrative Commander in North Luzon, with several of his staff, was killed.

5. Under the direction of Capt G SCHOLEY, several ambushes were staged on Hwy No. 11 and the Baguio-Itogon road in which the following American Officers took part: Capt ARNOLD, Lt KLUGE, Lt GROVE and Lt NICHOLSON.

6. On April 8th, 1942, the 121st Inf, PA was authorized with Col JOHN P HORAN as CO. I understand the strength of the 43rd Infantry was reduced to a battalion, and was referred to as the Provisional Battalion, 43rd Inf, with Major GITTERS as CO, but also under the command of Col HORAN. The Provincial companies of the Philippine Constabulary remained as separate units under their respective Provincial Commanders (excepting the Ilocos Sur company which was wiped out opposing the enemy landing at Vigan on Dec. 10th, 1941) but all those units were under the command of Col HORAN as well. Col HORAN did try to exercise control of the 14th Infantry, commanded by Lt-Col WARNER, operating in Nueva Vizcaya and the Cagayan Valley, but WARNER's insubordination and the distance to WARNER's Hq made his efforts unsuccessful.

7. With the authorization of the formation of the 121st Infantry, most of the American officers tentatively commissioned by Col HORAN (and practically all of these commissions were duly approved by USAFFE Hq., copy of radiogram citing S.O. 55, Par. 7 dated February 23, 1942 herewith attached (Inclosure No. 2 of Exhibit "M")) were immediately transferred to the 121st Infantry. The American officers were assigned as both Bn and Company commanders and available American E/M, viz., platoon of 1st AW Co. under Lt ARNOLD, were assigned to the regiment as well -- the usual policy of USAFFE Hq both prior and

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subsequent to the outbreak of the War. Efforts were redoubled immediately to bring assigned area commands to strength, and overstrength if arms were available, and prepare for the next enemy drive into North Luzon.

8. Immediately following the fall of Bataan, the enemy began to concentrate for a drive into the Mountain Province. A battalion strength of the enemy drove up Hwy No. 4 from the Ilocos Coast, another battalion up Hwy No. 44 from Baguio towards Bontoc, and any enemy force of approximately a regiment strength drove east from Bangued on Hwy No. 6. It was evident the enemy was well aware of the presence of the 121st INF in the vicinity of LUBUAGAN. Resistance offered the enemy in a brilliant nine days delaying action along Hwy No. 6 in ABRA and as far as BALBALAN by the units under the command of Major WALTER CUSHING, was especially bitter. However, the steady advance of the enemy, in spite of heavy harassing casualties, forced the evacuation of BATONG BULAY by the Regimental CP and the abandoning of the transmitter thereat. The enemy were still some two days march from LUBUAGAN when Gen WAINWRIGHT surrendered at Corregidor. Col HORAN, after being contacted by Col GALBRAITH (the latter delivered Gen WAINWRIGHT's surrender order) and a few days more delay, finally surrendered to the enemy at BONTOC on May 18th, 1942.

9. In the latter part of September 1945, the undersigned had the privilege of an interview with Col HORAN, following his release from concentration in MANCHURIA and took the opportunity of confirming several points which he believed to be true, but was unable to have first hand knowledge of until that time. These points are as follows:

a. Col HORAN neither surrendered nor disbanded the 121st Infantry when he surrendered himself; he dispersed it and confidentially advised those of his officers whom he could contact both before and after his own surrender to carry on and be prepared to strike when the time was ripe for a blow.

b. No order of revocation was ever issued by Col HORAN on the policies as enumerated in Par 3, above.

c. Also Col HORAN did not, to the knowledge of the undersigned issue orders to any officer of

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his command to surrender. The undersigned received no such orders and he is also aware that Col HORAN did not permit Major CUSHING to surrender. Col HORAN did not explain why that was done but it seems to have been motivated by a desire to comply with the orders of his Commanding General (by surrendering himself and those few officers and men willing to surrender with him) and to, since the war was by no means over, save his command in order that it might be ready to strike a blow later when conditions were more favorable.

10. A negligible number of officers and men, and very few arms, were surrendered with Col. HORAN. Major WALTER CUSHING immediately assumed command of the regiment, issued a "no surrender" order; and also issued orders to lie low for a few weeks and see if the enemy contemplated any large scale punitive expeditions against the unsundered units. Major CUSHING, sometime in June, 1942, turned over the command to the 121st Inf to Captain WILLIAM G PERHAM, so that he could act as a Liaison officer to other units in Manila and south. Captain PERHAM continued in command until his capture on Jan 4th, 1943.

11. Throughout June, July, and August 1942 activity was limited principally to organizing, training, and arms collecting. The activity of the enemy was confined to propaganda and espionage. Then, in the latter part of August, 1942, the expected enemy raids started in guerrilla occupied areas and the situation soon developed so that it was necessary for the units to start fighting or give up altogether. In September, 1942, the guerrilla offensive started and continued for approximately two months. The enemy brought in heavy reinforcements and our units were driven to cover in the latter half of November and December, 1942. Many of our men surrendered voluntarily to the enemy, intimidated by threats of massacre, or induced to do so by collaborating public officials. From November 15, 1942 until June 30th, 1943 morale in North Luzon may be said to have reached its lowest ebb.

12. Lieut-Cols MOSES and NOBLE, respective COs of the 12th and 13th Infantry Regiments, PA, escaped from Bataan and, after crossing the Central Plain, reached North Luzon the latter part of May, 1942. After a few weeks of observing the situation, hearing of Col HORAN's surrender,

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and establishing the fact that they were the ranking unsur-rendered officers in North Luzon, Col MOSES assumed command of all USAFFE units in North Luzon; that is, he established the USAFIP, North Luzon command. Liaison with the 121st Infantry was in effect (through the undersigned, who was still in LA Union at the time) but messages were delayed as the Regimental CP of the 121st Infantry was in Abra while the USAFIP, NL Hq was east of Baguio. However, the greater part of the 121st Infantry was able to take part in the October, 1942 offensive ordered by Col MOSES. The subsequent orders of USAFIP, NL Hq (issued February 10th, 1943) calling for more effort being directed towards the gathering of intelligence information, and limiting action with the enemy to that necessary for defense were promptly complied with. It was during this phase of operations that Cois MOSES and NOBLE were captured (June 1st, 1943) and Col R W VOLCKMANN assumed command.

G. M. Barnett
G. M. BARNETT
Colonel, Inf, AUS
Guerrilla Affairs Officer

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

25 November 1945

C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that Major RALPH PRAEGER commanded, I believe, Troop C of the 26th Cavalry (PS) from the outbreak of the war, December 8, 1941, until his capture sometime in June 1943.

I further certify that Major RALPH PRAEGER with Troop "C", 26th Cavalry (PS) accompanied a column of troops commanded by then Lieut Colonel JOHN P. HORAN in its march from BAGUIO. I further certify that this march started on December 21st, 1941.

I further certify that when the column of troops under the command of Col HORAN reached the barrio of DAYAKA, KAYAPA, NUEVA VIZCAYA, Major PRAEGER received permission from Col JOHN P HORAN to leave his (HORAN's) command and proceed with his (PRAEGER's) troops to, as I remember, PALANAN, ~~ISABELA~~ ISABELA.

I further certify that I later heard that Major PRAEGER with his command proceeded to Highway No. 5 and with his men raided the airfield in TUGUEGARAO which was in Japanese hands and destroyed several planes; that he later raided the airfield at APARRI and also destroyed several planes. I further certify that I personally heard announcements over the San Francisco radio in 1942 regarding the TUGUEGARAO raid under taken by Major PRAEGER and his men.


I further certify that I believe that Major PRAEGER's command in early 1942 was in contact with Colonel EVERETT WARNER who commanded the 14th Infantry (PA). I don't know whether Major PRAEGER was under Colonel WARNER's command.

I further certify that after Colonel WARNER surrendered in about June 1942 that Major PRAEGER was again heard of in KABUGAO, APAYAO. I further certify that on or about June 7, 1942 to about April 19, 1944 that I was the Chief of the Intelligence Section, USAFIP, NL, and in this capacity learned about Major PRAEGER being in APAYAO and his capture in about June 1943.

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I further certify that I learned from one of the men of Colonels MOSES and NOBLE that it was thru Major PRAGER's radio transmitter that Colonel MOSES was able to establish contact with Headquarters, SWPA in February and March 1943;

I further certify that I believe that additional data regarding Major PRAGER and his command can be ascertained from Colonel JOHN P. HORAN and Colonel DONALD D. BLACKBURN who are both now in the United States.



PARKER CALVERT
Colonel, Infantry, AUS

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

27 November 1945

C E R T I F I C A T E

1. This is to certify that on or about November 5th, 1943, that I authorized the organization of and organized the Headquarters Platoon of the 1st District, USFIP, NL, another designation of which was Headquarters Platoon, 66th Infantry (Composite) under authority granted me by Par. 5.c, General Order No. 4, Headquarters, USFIP, NL dated October 8, 1943, a copy of which is attached hereto.

2. The Headquarters Platoon, 1st District, USFIP, NL, until its inactivation was composed of a medical section, an ordnance section, a message center section and a headquarters section.

3. The original order creating the Headquarters Platoon, 1st District, USFIP, NL can not be found at this time, hence this certificate.



PARKER CALVERT
Colonel, Infantry, AUS
Inf Comdr, USAFIP, NL

- 1 Incl.
C.O. No. 4, Headquarters, USFIP, North Luzon
dated October 8, 1943

EXHIBIT "CC"

HEADQUARTERS U. S. F. NORTH LUZON
IN THE FIELD

February 10, 1943

SUBJECT: Orders from MacArthur
TO: All Guerrilla Leaders

1. General policy of USFIPS in PI is to limit hostilities and contact with enemy to minimum amount necessary for safety. Concentration of perfecting organization and on development of intelligence net, reporting promptly names of superior officers, and other items of military of military intelligence.

2. Offensive activities are premature and will only result in increased enemy pressure and probable retaliation against innocent people. Therefore, until ammunitions and supplies can be sent, which will take some months your missions as intelligence units can be currently of the utmost value.

3. "Nothing is surer than our ultimate victory. I cannot just tell when it will happen but you can be assured that it is inevitable. Keep your courage and patience. An Almighty God will guide us to success."

(SIGNED) 777

(SIGNED) 666

TRUE COPY
16 Nov 45/Sa-

NOTE:

666 is the code name of Colonel MARTIN MOSES

777 is the code name of Colonel ARTHUR K NOBLE

TRUE COPY:

Pala Cabot
PARKER CALVERT
COLONEL, INF, AUS
Infantry Commander

Exhibit "PP"
(44)

HEADQUARTERS USFIP
North Luzon

March 20, 1943

SUBJECT: Supplementary Instructions
TO : All Guerilla Leaders

1. Send your men out to all barrios in your territory and search for a "ham" or amateur radio operator who is capable of constructing a transmitter that will carry 300-400 miles. Try and get him all the spare parts you can to construct the transmitter as well as a power unit and generator. Induct him into the U.S. Army. Place set on highest mountain in your vicinity. You are authorized to sign vouchers for all materials necessary to build this set. Also procure one regular commercial battery radio set in order to receive short wave messages. Make every effort to get this in operation by May 1st. A special secret messenger will arrive at your Headquarters prior to May 1st giving you the proper call letters, frequency and hour of daily contact.

2. Orders from Gen. MacArthur are definitely to "lay low" and gather information. This is imperative.

3. Send your men out to various places in all provinces nearby as well as your own; to Manila; to the Pacific (East) Coast; to Lingayen Gulf and the China Sea. If possible send men in the provinces around and south of Manila such as Bulacan, Bataan, Zambales, Rizal, Laguna, Batangas, Cavite, Tayabas and the Bicol Peninsula. Have your men question all travellers, peddlers and municipal officers about Jap troops as follows:

- a. Every town or barrio now permanently garrisoned by Japs.
- b. Number of Japs in that town or barrio.
- c. Find out regiment or division that belong to.
- d. Find out name of commanding officer of Japs.
- e. Do Japs have tanks, artillery pieces, airplanes, ammunition, supply or food dumps nearby.
- f. How many trucks do Japs have at that place.
- g. Do the Japs have a radio transmitter there?
- h. Are telephone and telegraph lines working to and from that place.
- i. Have Japs dug fox holes or entrenched at that place.
- j. Condition of roads running to the place

Exhibit "QQ"

(45)

- 2 -

4. The following information desired from the seacoast (both China Sea and Pacific Ocean) but particularly Lingayen Gulf, Subic Bay, Manila and Batangas Bay.

- a. What seacoast towns are occupied permanently by Japs the number and CO of Japs there?
- b. Amount and kind of Jap shipping that enters and leaves the port. Cargo, Transport or war vessels.
- c. Have any Jap troops landed or embarked the past three months. How many? Their destination or where they arrived from.
- d. Do Japs have motor boats patrolling the coast line?
- e. Any Jap seaplanes or submarines observed and when?
- f. Have Japs prepared barricades or fox holes along beach?
- g. Any big guns along the beach, the number and where located.

5. The following information is desired from the vicinity of Manila.

- a. Number of Japs in and around Manila and their places.
- b. Names of high ranking Japanese officers and their unit number.
- c. Number and type of Jap airplanes at Neilson Airport and Nichols Field.
- d. Jap activity around Port Area, Cavite and Manila Bay.
- e. Number and place of tanks, armored cars or trucks.
- f. Where is Jap Headquarters in Manila?
- g. Where are Jap "Military Zone" in Manila?
- h. Are there any Japs in Ft. Wm. MacKinley?
- i. General conditions in Manila; food supply, attitude of people, how many are gone pro-Jap, any secret organizations formed, whereabouts of Gen. Roxas, large number of Jap troops entering or leaving Manila Bay when, where destination and date.

6. The following information required relative to American and British Civilian Concentration camps at Camp Holmes Trinidad Benguet and University of Santo Tomas, Manila.

Exhibit "RQ"
(46)

- 3 -

- a. Number of people concentrated there.
- b. Food conditions - where do they receive food - how much.
- c. Are they given any money by Japs to buy food?
- d. Do they have sufficient clothing - are they warmly dressed?
- e. Get names of those who have died and how many.
- f. Are people above 50 yrs of age released?
- g. (Note) Have agents try and contact people who have been released and question them about condition in the camp.
- h. Are civilian concentrated any other place besides Camp Nichols Holmes, Trinidad and University of Santo Tomas, Manila?
- i. Are camps sanitary, clean and do they have medicine and doctors available?
- j. Have any Americans been taken out of the Philippines?

7. Following information is desired from the following provinces: Zambales, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, Pampanga, Bulacan, Tayabas, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay and Sorsogon, relative to guerilla units that are opposing the Japanese.

- a. Where is the guerilla unit located?
- b. How many men do they have?
- c. Who is their leader?
- d. How many arms and how much ammunition do they have?
- e. Do they have a radio transmitter and where is it located?
- f. Are they part of a larger unit or are they independent?

8. The following information is requested from all American civilian or Army, on the Island of Luzon.

- a. Complete first and last name.
- b. Occupation and where they are located.
- c. If in the Army their Army Serial Number and organization.
- d. Do they belong to any guerilla unit?

9. Information is also desired as to the whereabouts and activities of any of the following listed American Officers last heard of around in the mountains West of Fort Stotsenburg, Pampanga.

Exhibit "QQ"
(47)

- 4 -

Col. Merrill
Lt.-Col. Calyer
Lt.-Col. Thorpe
Capt. Lage
Capt. Barker

Capt. Crane
Lt. Ramsey
Lt. Maguire

60 American in mountains west of Florida
Blanca, Pampanga

10. From the foregoing it will be observed that your mission now is:

- a. To construct transmitter 300-400 miles radius.
- b. Get enemy information from your and neighboring provinces and seacoast.
- c. Get enemy information from Lingayen Gulf, Manila Bay and Batangas Bay.
- d. Get enemy information from Manila.
- e. Get information about concentration camps at Camp Holmes and University of Sante Tomas.
- f. Get information about other guerilla units in southern provinces of Luzon
- g. Get information about Americans on Island of Luzon.
- h. Get information about given list of Americans in Zambales Mountains.

You are hereby authorized to induct as privates in the U.S. Armed Forces two (2) civilians of your own selection who are intelligent, smart and have Jap passes. In addition to your own men, these men can be sent by bus or train to the Bicol Peninsula of Manila for the purpose of gathering the information listed above. In addition, it is necessary that you send your own men two or three in a group in civilian clothes and without arms, out to get this necessary information even by boat, across mountains or in enemy occupied territory. Each guerilla leader will at once send out to gather information at least three-fourths of his units. Try and pick out men who are from the Bicol Peninsula, or Batangas or Cavite, or Manila or at least those who have relatives there. Send patrols to Palanan, Casiguran, Balera, Infanta, Antimonan, Mauban, on the East Coast - to Agoo, Aringay, Damortis, Bauang and San Fernando on the West Coast. Send men all over the Island of Luzon to get the information listed herein. Make every attempt to get this information back to this Headquarters by May 1st. We need information particularly from the Bicol Peninsula, the provinces south of Manila and Manila. Make lists of the information we need from this letter and give it to your patrols. Make sure your

Exhibit "QR"
(48)

- 5 -

your arms and ammunition are well hidden. We have direct authority from Australia to act as we think best and without any restraint. All our inductions have been approved by MacArthur.

11. It will only be a short time until we will be able to really do something. Our staff is about ready to come and you will be surprised (as well the Japs) as to its directions and strength.

Regards

(SGD) M & N

A TRUE COPY:

(SGD) M-2
Captain, Inf., U.S.A.
Executive Officer

A TRUE COPY:

Arthur K. Noble
ARTHUR K. NOBLE
2nd Lt., Inf., PA

NOTE:

M is the code name of Colonel MARTIN MOSES
N is the code name of Colonel ARTHUR K NOBLE
M-2 is believed to be the code name of Captain MANALO

Exhibit "QQ"
(49)

HEADQUARTERS USMIP
NORTH LUZON

June 15, 1943.

SUBJECT: Misc. Instructions.

TO : All Guerrilla Leaders. (Make copies and forward to Adjacent Units)

1. Ref. Gen. Policy, dated 10 Feb. and Supp. Instr., dated 20 March.

a. With the exceptions as listed herein the intr. and orders contained in the above mentioned Ref. will continue in force.

b. Until further orders the following information will not be sent from one unit Hq. to another.

(1) Par. 7 Supp. Instr. (No information will be given concerning guerrilla units. This information should be collected by unit leaders, kept in a safe place but not forwarded until called for.)

(2) Par. 8 Supp. Instr. (No information concerning Americans, civilian or Army, will be forwarded. This information should be collected, kept in a safe place but not forwarded until called for.)

(3) Par. 9 Supp. Instr. (Same as (2) above)

2. For the information of all concerned, it is believed that all codes to date have fallen into the hands of the Japs. In this connection, unit leaders should safeguard records in such a manner that they will not fall into enemy hands even though your Hq. is raided. Many civilians who were helping our cause have suffered due to records falling into the hands of the Japs.

3. Promotions, enlisted men - In order to comply with Par. 1. above, unit commanders will make promotions within their commands as they deem necessary stating on such promotions, "Subject to approval by higher Hq." Unit commanders are cautioned to use good judgment and discretion in the number of NCOs. They carry in their organizations.

4. Promotions of Officers - In order to comply with Par. 1 above, unit leaders will inform their officers that although they may be deserving of promotions it is dangerous to communicate such matters at the present time. The work of those deserving will not be overlooked when the proper time comes, and I will do everything in my power to see that these promotions are dated back to the proper time.

5. Each unit Hqs. will make every effort to exchange information with adjacent units at frequent intervals.

6. Let me urge each and every officer and man not to be discouraged due to any recent events. These unfortunate happenings should only make us all the more determined to carry out our mission and do our part in assisting in that ultimate VICTORY which is sure to be ours in the near future.

7. Ref. Supp. Instr., dated 20 March 43.

a. Information required by the following par. is still lacking: Par. 4, par. 5, and par. 3 as pertaining to the areas south of Manila.

b. In general more information is desired concerning all sea coast.

c. Unit leaders are also cautioned that it is important to report changes in information that they have submitted in previous reports.

8. Unit commanders are reminded that although gathering information is our main mission at present, plans for active operations against enemy communications, supply dumps, and ambushing are not to be neglected. Due to slow communications, commanders will not wait on orders from higher Hq., but will commence action when I has assured himself that aid has reached the Philippines.

BY ORDER OF THE C.O. USMIP, NORTH LUZON:

WE COPY:


 R. W. VEICHMANN
 Major U. S. Army
 Commanding

 R. W. VEICHMANN
 Major U. S. Army
 Commanding

EXHIBIT "14"

(50)

HEADQUARTERS
1st DISTRICT, USFIP, NL
In the Field

November 7, 1943

SUBJECT: Financial Regulations
TO: All Battalion Commanders

1. Battalion commanders are hereby authorized to issue receipts for cash, foodstuffs and other articles necessary for the supply and subsistence of troops under their command and of themselves and for the carrying on of necessary activities. They are authorized to delegate this authority to officers and men of their commands.
2. All battalion commanders are hereby charged with the responsibility that receipts are issued and cash expended by their command only for proper purposes and that proper records are kept regarding same. By "proper" is meant expenditures for the purposes outlined in Par. 1 above and of which examples are given in Pars. 5 and 8 below.
3. All receipts issued will bear a serial number, and a record will be kept by serial numbers of all receipts issued, showing the date of issue, purpose of issue, amount of issue and initials of person to whom issued. This record may be kept either in the form of duplicate receipts or a record book. It is suggested that either blocks or prefix letters (to be placed before the serial number) be assigned to sub-units authorized to issue receipts. All receipts issued will bear the proper letterhead of the organization issuing the receipt.
4. Each battalion commander will keep in a safe place a record of all persons whom he has authorized to issue receipts together with a sample of each such person's official signature.
5. A monthly record, or records, of all cash received and expended will be kept. Food, Tobacco & Matches, Soap, Medical Supplies, Quartermaster Supplies, Toilet Articles for M, Personal Items for Officers, Administration and Military Mission Expenses will each be treated as separate items.
6. Battalion commanders will be prepared to furnish this hqrs. upon request a report of the monthly expense (cash plus receipts) of maintaining their units.
7. A receipt will be given upon request to any person from whom cash, food or other articles is obtained or commandeered. In cases where an agreement as to price cannot be reached, the receipt will state both the offered and the asked price. Battalion commanders will remind all men of their commands that forcibly taking food, cash or other articles without giving a receipt, signed by an authorized person, is looting--punishable during wartime by death.
8. When sufficient cash is available, without hindering military activities, battalion commanders may make cash advances to members of their commands, not to exceed Twenty Pesos (\$20.00) for each month of service since the man was last regularly paid. In each such case a witnessed receipt will be obtained from the man authorizing the

Exhibit "85" (55)

a witnessed receipt will be obtained from the man authorizing the Finance Officer, USAFIP, to make a corresponding deduction from the man's accrued pay. Each receipt will also contain a statement as to when the man was last regularly paid.

9. Such records will be kept as will enable officers to be properly billed for subsistence and other items not furnished to officers by the U.S. Army. They should be charged with a pro-rata share of general cash and receipt expenses in which they share the proceeds plus for such cash or receipt purchases made for them as individuals.

(Signed) 115
(Typed) 115
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

(Signed) 1213
(Typed) 1213
Adjutant

Distribution:

C.O., USAFIP, NL
C.O., Each Bn.
File

A TRUE COPY:

Parker Calvert
PARKER CALVERT
Colonel, Infantry, AUS
Infantry Commander, USAFIP, NL

NOTE:

115 is the code name of Colonel PARKER CALVERT
1213 is the code name of Colonel ARTHUR P MURPHY

HEADQUARTERS
1st DISTRICT, USFIP, NL
in the Field

November 7, 1943

SUBJECT: Reports
TO : All Battalion Commanders

1. The following information and instructions regarding reports are hereby issued for the guidance of all concerned:

2. STRENGTH REPORTS: Each battalion commander will submit to this area monthly a report showing his strength in personnel, arms and ammunitions as of the close of the previous month. Such reports will be submitted only in code or verbally through a trusted messenger and will be submitted as early in the month as possible. These reports will cover the following:

- A. Personnel
1. Total officers in bn. Number available for duty
 2. Total men in Bn. Number available for duty
 3. Gains in personnel available for duty, classified as follows:
 - a. Enlistments
 - b. DS, sick, confined, etc to duty; other cases
 4. Losses in personnel available for duty, classified as follows:
 - a. Natural and accidental deaths
 - b. Killed by enemy
 - c. Captured
 - d. Surrendered
 - e. Sick
 - f. On DS
 - g. Other Cases
- B. Arms and munitions
1. Number of each of the following available for duty:
 - a. Rifles
 - b. Rounds of 30 cal ammunition
 - c. Pistols and revolvers
 - d. Automatic rifles
 - e. Machine guns
 - f. Shotguns and other irregular weapons
 - g. Hand grenades
 - h. Sticks of ynamite
 - i. Feet of fuse
 - j. Ordinary blasting caps
 - k. Electric blasting caps
 2. General explanation of gains in above since last report
 3. General explanation of losses in above since last report.

3. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS: The procedure hãthertofore governing on these reports will continue, one copy being sent to C.O., USFIP., NL and one copy being sent to me in my capacity as Chief, Intell., Sect., USFIP, NL.


4. SPY LISTS, CIVILIAN AND PC BLACK LISTS: Same as Par 3 above.

/s/t/ 113
Commanding.

OFFICIAL:

/s/t/ 1213
Adjutant.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:
DAL/if 15 Nov 45


DEMETRIO A. LUIS,
Capt., Inf., (PA),
Regimental Adjutant.

NOTE:

113 is the code name of Colonel Parker Calvert
1213 is the code name of Colonel Arthur P Murphy

Exhibit "rr"

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
IN THE PHILIPPINES

In the field, Philippines
19 September 1943

Capt. Barnett,

I am assuming responsibility for an attempt to start some offensive action against the Japs, generally in the Mountain Provinces and the lowlands adjacent thereto. I would like for you and your men to help us out on this project. Unless something is done soon the Japs are going to try to root all of us out and thereby put an end to all guerilla activities. I believe that if all of us beat the Japs to the punch by some offensive action that this will lessen the Jap's enthusiasm to come and look for our forces.

Col. Naker, Major Enriquez, Major Calvert, Lt. Baldwin, Lt. Gushing and their forces are with us on the plan. All of the American civilians in this vicinity (all miners) are also with us.

Here is the plan - To start sniping operations on the Kennon Road, Maguilian Road, Mountain Trail, the main road leading to the Ilocos Provinces, the Cagayan Valley road, and the roads in the eastern part of Pangasinan. It is planned that these sniping operations be continuous day and night. The idea is to knock over not only Japs but also trucks, telephone lines, bridges, ammunition dumps, gasoline dumps, food dumps, and the like and also known fifth columnists and spies. Our ammunition must not be wasted because we must have a considerable quantity left for use when our reinforcements arrive. Sniping parties should be limited to a few men in each party with instructions to shoot like Hell, and then clear out to new location. Trucks and autos should be burned where possible. That is the plan in brief and I hope you will join in with the rest of us. The starting date for everybody is October 15th. The date was put well enough in advance to allow everybody to get all set.

Unit commanders such as yourself will have the greatest freedom of action in the detailed planning for the operations and all Commanders are expected to use their initiative and judgment in order to make the plan a success. I would like for you and your troops to take care of the Maguilian Road and the Main Road that goes toward the Ilocos Provinces. Also any other road in your territory that is in use by the Japs. We'll leave

-2-

it up to you as to how far north your operations should extend. We'll back you up on whatever you do, so therefore use plenty of initiative. Send me a letter acknowledging receipt of this note and also any good ideas of yours that will make the operations a success.

I do not rely too much on the runner that Gen Brougher is out of prison camp. If you have any correct information on this matter please let me know. Send your letter to me to the same place you sent the message sometimes ago. Your messengers will know the place. They spent the night with us.

Good luck and best wishes.

MARTIN MOSES (Sgtd)
Lt. Col., Inf., USA

A TRUE COPY
DJR/

NOTE: The above letter is a copy of the original signed by Lt Col Moses and which was received by me on or about October 1, 1942.

A TRUE COPY:

S. M. Barnett AS No-890367
SERGEANT M. BARNETT
Colonel, Infantry, AUS
Guerrilla Affairs Officer,
USAFIP, NL

F. Parker Calvert
FARKER CALVERT
Colonel, Infantry, AUS
Inf Comdr, USAFIP, NL

EXHIBIT "XV"

(Con'td)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE OF RECOGNITION</u>	<u>DATE OF INACTIVATION, REDESIGNATION OR REORGANIZATION</u>
Provisional Battalion 43rd Infantry (PS)	December 8, 1941	* about January 15, 1942.
1st and 2nd Battalions, 43rd Infantry, (PS)	January 15, 1942	* June 1, 1942.
Detachment, 43rd In- fantry (PS)	April 14, 1942	* Nov 5, 1943 ⁴
1st Battalion, 43rd In- fantry (PS)	November 5, 1943	* January 3, 1945
1st Battalion, 66th In- fantry (PA)	January 3, 1945	
2nd Battalion, 11th In- fantry (PA)	July 12, 1942	* January 3, 1945
2nd Battalion, 66th In- fantry (PA)	January 3, 1945	
Headquarters Company, 12th Infantry, (PA)	September 30, 1942	* June 12, 1943
Company "M", 12th Infantry (PA)	June 18, 1943	*** October 8, 1943
3rd Battalion, 12th In- fantry (PA)	October 8, 1943	* January 3, 1945
3rd Battalion, 66th In- fantry (PA)	January 3, 1945	
Fish's Unit (Part of 2nd PC Regiment)	August 1943	** July 17, 1943
French's Unit (Part of the 11th Infantry, PA)	September 1942	** April 1943
Ali Al Raschid's Unit	June 1942	** April 1943
HQ & HQ CO, USAFIP, ML	January 1, 1943	* February 1, 1944

"Exhibit yy"

(Con'td)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DATE OF RECOGNITION</u>	<u>DATE OF INACTIVATION, REDESIGNATION OR REORGANIZATION</u>
1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (PA)	February 1, 1944	June 3, 1944
1st Battalion, 11th Infantry (PA)	June 3, 1944	Jan 17, 1945 32
3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry (PA)	June 28, 1944	
Hq Battalion, 11th Infantry (PA)	August 7, 1944	
1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (PA)	August 7, 1944	Jan. 17, 1945
2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry (PA)	January 17, 1945	
2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry (PA)	August 20, 1944	23 October 1944
15th Infantry (PA)	October 14, 1944	
Headquarters & Headquarters Battalion, 12th Infantry (PA)	February 25, 1944	Nov 19, 1944
Headquarters Battalion, USAFIP, NL	19 November 1944	
Headquarters & Service Company, 12th Inf (PA)	19 November 1944	3 Jan 1945
Headquarters & Service Company, 66th Inf (PA)	3 January 1945	
Headquarters Detachment Headquarters Battalion, GHQ, USAFIP, NL	29 November 1944	
Troop "C", 26th Cavalry (PS)	December 8, 1941	June 1943
Headquarters Platoon, 1st District, USAFIP, NL	November 5, 1943	April 21, 1944

11
 Exhibit 22

(Cont'd)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DATE OF RECOGNITION</u>	<u>DATE OF INACTIVATION, REDESIGNATION OR REORGANIZATION</u>
Headquarters, Second-Third Districts, USAFIP, NL	29 August 1944 **	Inactivated 3 December 1944
Headquarters, Second District, USAFIP, NL	29 August 1944 **	Inactivated 3 December 1944
Headquarters, Third District, USAFIP, NL	29 August 1944 **	Inactivated 3 December 1944
Headquarters, Fourth-Seventh Districts	7 August 1944 *	16 February 1945
Medical Company, 66th Infantry (Comp)	7 October 1944 *	3 January 1945
Medical Company, 66th Infantry (PA)	3 January 1945	
Hospital Company, 1st District, USAFIP, NL	7 October 1944	
Headquarters, USAFIP, NL Dispensary	19 October 1944 *	13 December 1944
Headquarters, Hospital Company, USAFIP, NL	13 December 1944	
Hospital Company, 2nd District, USAFIP, NL	7 October 1944 *	26 December 1944
1st Hospital Company, 2nd District, USAFIP, NL	26 December 1944	
Hospital Company, 3rd District, USAFIP, NL	7 October 1944 *	26 December 1944
2nd Hospital Company, 2nd District, USAFIP, NL	26 December 1944	
Hospital Company, 3rd District, USAFIP, NL	26 December 1944	
Hospital Company, 4th District, USAFIP, NL	7 October 1944	

(Cont'd)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DATE OF RECOGNITION</u>	<u>DATE OF INACTIVATION, REDESIGNATION OR REORGANIZATION</u>
Hospital Company, 7th District, USAFIP, NL	7 October 1944	
Hospital Company, 5th District, USAFIP, NL	7 October 1944	
Headquarters, Fifth District, USFIP, NL (USAFIP NL)	4 November 1944	
1st 81 MM Platoon, 66th Infantry (Comp)	5 December 1944	* 3 Jan 1945
2nd 81 MM Platoon, 66th Infantry (Comp)	5 December 1944	* 3 Jan 1945
1st MG Platoon (50 Caliber)	5 December 1944	* 3 Jan 1945
2nd MG Platoon (50 Caliber)	5 December 1944	* 3 Jan 1945
Heavy Weapons Company, 66th Infantry (PA)	3 January 1945	

c. Recognition is hereby extended to the following named officers as having commanded "UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, NORTH LUZON" during the periods indicated:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
Colonel JOHN P HORAN	December 24, 1941 to May 16, 1942 (both incl)
Colonel MARTIN MOSES	July 12, 1942 to May 30, 1943 (both incl)
Colonel RUSSELL W VOLCKMANN	June 1, 1943 to November 14, 1945 (both incl)

2. a. The recognition extended to component parts of "UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, NORTH LUZON" as a (Philippine Army) (Regular) component part of

"EXHIBIT" YY 6

the command indicated in Paragraph 1-b above, entitles the living officers and enlisted men thereof or the beneficiaries of dead officers and enlisted men thereof to such rights as are or may be prescribed by laws of the (United States of America) (Commonwealth of the Philippines).

b. The recognition extended to the component parts of "UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, NORTH LUZON" entitles civilians having bona-fide claims against the organization to payment of same under the provisions of existing orders or such orders as may be duly prescribed.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STYER:

(Note: ** - indicates date of inactivation)
* - indicates date of redesignation)
*** - indicates date of reorganization)

HEADQUARTERS USFIP
NORTH LUZON

October 6, 1945

G.O. NO. 4

1. Sub-province Benguet, Mt. Province, is hereby designated 1st District, USFIP, NORTH LUZON.

2. 113 is hereby placed in command of the 1st District, USFIP, N.L.

3. The following units are hereby assigned to the 1st District, USFIP, NORTH LUZON:

a. 43rd Infantry; 11th Infantry (now in Benguet under 336); 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry.

b. All other units now in the 1st District, with the exception of individuals belonging to units with Hqs outside of Benguet who may reside within said area by Special arrangement with the Commanding Officer, 1st District. Any sub-unit or individual within the 1st District, that is not in contact with their unit Hqs 1st District on attaching a unit or individual will then contact Unit Hqs concerned and notify them of their action. If agreeable between Hqs concerned these units or individuals may either be transferred or attached. In the event agreeable arrangements cannot be agreed to by District Hqs, the matter with all data will be submitted to HQS, North Luzon, for orders.

c. The Commanding Officer, 1st District, will organize all forces of the 1st District, North Luzon, into such personnel as he deems advisable.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
USFIP, NORTH

/s/
/t/
R. W. Volckmann
R. W. VOLCKMANN
Major, Infantry
Commanding

A TRUE COPY:
31 Oct 45 /ir

[Signature]
LUCIANO A. LOPEZ
Capt., Inf., PA,
Regimental Adj

Note: 113 is the code name of Major
Parker Calvert.
336 is the code name ~~of 2nd Lt. Calixto~~ *of 2nd Lt. Calixto*
Flanera *Parker Calvert*

Inclosure No. 1
to Exhibit "CC"

PARKER CALVERT
Col, Inf, AUS (51)

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
APO 442

5 April 1945

AG 384 A-2

SUBJECT: Recognized Guerrilla Units.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters subject and file as above dated 26 March 1945.
2. Inclosed herewith is supplement No. 1 to inclosure to above reference letter, additional recognized units.
3. The classification of above reference letter has been removed.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KRUEGER:

/s/ W. A. Mixtacki,
/t/ W. A. MIXTACKI,
Major, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl:
Incl 1 - Supplement # 1 to list of
Recognized Guerrilla Units

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" All Corps & Div,
USAFIP, NL.

TRUE COPY:



MANUEL P BIDES
Captain, Inf, PA
Asst Adj General

EXHIBIT "00"

500-41

HEADQUARTERS
USAFIP NORTH LUZON
CAMP SPENCER

SUBJECT: Corrections, Additions and Comments
on History of Guerrilla Movement in
North Luzon

TO : Commander-in-Chief, APPAG
Attention: AC of S, G-2
(Thru Channels)

EXTRACT

14TH INFANTRY AND COORDINATED COMMAND - 1942 (NAKAR)

The principal error in this section is the mention of co-ordinated North Luzon command which was never exercised nor attempted to be exercised by any commanding officer of the 14th Infantry. The 14th Infantry (PA) was organized principally from troops who had retreated from Baguio over the mountains in December, 1941, under the command of Lt Col. Bennett, Moses and Noble and had been disbanded at Aritao upon receipt of a false report that Highway No. 5 was blocked by the enemy at Balete Pass. This error was later discovered but only a small number of the troops were recovered in time to accompany Lt Col. Bennett, Moses and Noble to Bataan. Among the troops left behind was Major (then Captain) Manuel P. Enriquez, who immediately started organizing them. Shortly afterwards Lt Col (then Major) Warner arrived on the scene. Warner had been Provost Marshal at Camp John Hay at the outbreak of the war and was not a very good officer, being quite addicted to liquor. During the opening days of the war he had continuously neglected his duties and had been drunk most of the time. When orders were received to evacuate Baguio he was in a drunken stupor and could not accompany the main body from Baguio. He sobered up the next day and followed and arrived at Aritao. Here Enriquez, doubtless believing that there would be an advantage in having an American officer in command, requested Warner to assume command of the forces being organized. Later, Lt Colonel (then Captain) Nakar arrived from the west. These three, Enriquez, Warner and

Incl #7

Nakar, formed a sort of a team in the organization of the 14th Infantry. Enriquez did the organizing, Nakar harrassed the Japs attempting to enter the Cagayan Valley from the south while Warner's contribution seems to have been limited to consuming a quart of whiskey a day. Thru a radio at Bayombong, contact was established with Corregidor and the 14th Infantry was authorized and organized. Though there was a contact of sorts between Warner and Col Moran in Sontoc, Warner never acknowledged Moran's authority.

Following the fall of Bataan, the enemy entered the Cagayan Valley in force and forced the 14th Infantry to split into two parts; one group under the command of Enriquez moved westward into western Nueva Vizcaya and eastern Benguet. The rest of the unit under Warner and Nakar moved eastward into eastern Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela. At this point, Warner sent a radiogram to Corregidor requesting for a cruiser to come to Palanan to pick him up, and he then deserted his command and proceeded to Palanan to await the boat. General Wainwright, however, is reported to have sent back a reply to the effect that there was no cruiser available nor would there be one available and for Warner "to get the hell back to his command". Warner then returned to the Cagayan Valley and later surrendered when contacted by Col. Calicuka, representative of General Wainwright. During Warner's absence, Nakar had been joined by Major (then Captain) Robert Arnold who had come southward from Col. Moran and had been assigned to the 14th Infantry on orders from Corregidor. Nakar and Arnold continued to operate a radio and, after the fall of Corregidor, made contact with Australia. At this time, according to statements of Arnold, that portion of the 14th Infantry under the command of Nakar was designated as the 14th Infantry (AUS) and all of the officers and men were inducted into the Army of the United States via radio and were assigned AUS serial numbers. During this period other units in North Luzon, seeking to establish contact with the outside, sent some messages to Nakar which they requested he transmit for them to higher headquarters. Nakar's transmission of some of such messages is evidently the reason for the assumption that he was exercising some sort of coordinated command in North Luzon. In late 1942, Nakar was captured, the radio was destroyed and Arnold assumed command of the remnants of the eastern branch of the 14th Infantry. This unit did not prosper and its numbers steadily declined until when Arnold was contacted by HQ, USAFIP, North Luzon, in late 1944, its strength amounted to about the strength of one company, which was merged with the western branch of the 14th Infantry at that time.

The western portion of the 14th Infantry continued to carry on in a fairly successful manner inspite of the difficult living conditions and food and built up a fairly strong organization. However, following the enemy mopping up operation in 1942, Enriquez deserted his command and traveled with a few other officers to the vicinity of Tuba, Mt. Province, where in April 1942, upon representations from his wife, he voluntarily surrendered to the enemy.

Upon Enriquez' surrender Lt Col (then Major) Romulo A. Manriquez, next senior officer, assumed the command of the 14th Infantry and continued to organize and develop the regiment until it was almost full strength. This western branch of the 14th Infantry maintained contact with and accepted the command of HQ, USAFIP, North Luzon, from the time of its organization. In late 1944, Manriquez' agents established contact with Major Arnold in eastern Isabela. To avoid the delicate situation arising out of the fact that Major Arnold outranked Manriquez as commanding officer of the 14th Infantry, Major Arnold was transferred to take command of the newly organized 15th Infantry in Ilocos Norte.