

BEGIN

TELECONS

JUNE 1950-  
APRIL 1951

# TELECONS

JUNE - JULY 1950

(W)



TELECONFERENCE

PARTICIPATING HQS : WASHINGTON AND CINCPAC

NR : 252330Z JUNE 50 TT 3417

25 June 1950

PRESENT TOKYO

MAJ GEN E. M. ALMOND	C/S F&C
MAJ GEN C. A. WILLOUGHBY	G-2 F&C
MAJ GEN G. L. EBEL	G-4 F&C
BRIG. GEN E. K. WRIGHT	G-3 F&C

PRESENT WASHINGTON

GEN HAISLIP	VIC& C/S
LT GEN RIDGWAY	DC/S
MAJ GEN BOLTS	G-3
BRIG GEN MOORE	SOB
COL J. F. HOWELL	G-3
COL M F GILCHRIST	G-3

CLASSIFICATION: T O P S E C R E T

SUBJECT : KOREAN SITUATION

DA-1

Where is General Roberts now?

END DA-1

F&C ITEM 1, REUR DA-1

Roberts is on High Seas enroute to the U. S. aboard USNS Sultan. ETA San Francisco 4 July.

END ITEM 1

DA-2 TOP SECRET

Following for your information in two parts:

Part 1:

Subject is possible courses of military action as result of Korean situation.

1. At State - Defense meeting Sunday morning the following possible courses of military action open to us in current Korean crisis were discussed and will be taken up with the President later today.

a. CINCPAC Be authorized to send to Korea any military equipment recommended by U. S. Mission to Korea (AMIK), regardless of current programs.

b. That U. S. Military Advisors remain with South Korean Forces as long as they are with an effective combat unit.

c. To extend CINCPAC's area of responsibility in this emergency to assume operational control of all U. S. Military activities in Korea.

d. To employ forces from CINCPAC's command (principally Navy and Air) to establish protective zone to include the area: Seoul-Kimpo Air Base-Inchon for the purpose of assuring safe evacuation from Korea of U. S. nationals. Such action seeks, in addition, to gain time for reaction to political measures now before United Nations. (See State message to Muccio info to CINCPAC).

e. In event Security Council UN calls on member nations to take direct action in Korea, to authorize and direct you to employ forces of your command,

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DA-2 (Cont'd)

plus units from Seventh Fleet, to stabilize the combat situation including if feasible the restoration of original boundaries at 38 degree parallel.

2. Above tentative considerations are forwarded for your info and as basis for planning.

3. The substance this message will be closely held and disseminated to minimum your staff planners.

Part 2:

State Department has concurred in authorizing you to send survey group from your staff to South Korea at once to consult with AMIK and to report soonest estimates of the minimum amounts and types of aid within your capability of supplying, even including the possible use of military forces of your command, which would insure retention and control of the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area.  
END DA-2

F3C ITEM 3, REUR DA-2

Lines of action are clear and plans will be initiated at once.

Reference sending survey group to Korea in connection with the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area. This will require air cover to protect landing and departure. Can be dispatched without delay. Request early decision on authority to implement.

END ITEM 3

DA-3

Foregoing matters are not to be regarded as decisions.

END DA-3

DA-8

Decision on survey group (F3C Item 3) will be sent soonest.

END DA-8

F3C ITEM 2, For G-2

North Korean invasion estimated to be a major effort against South Korea.

Reports indicate that North Korea employed an estimated four divisions with about 70 tanks, and all or elements of three border constabulary brigades in principal attacks along the 38th parallel, and an amphibious attack on the South Korean east coast. Intermittent air attacks by three or four planes were made on Kimpo Airfield.

North Korean line of contact from west to east as of 260730 I reported as follows: Ongjin Peninsula, (855-1674) to (870-1685); from Tonjin (960-1667), Selmar-Ri (995-690) Songu-Ri (1015-1676) - Todae-Ri (1047-1681). Beachhead established along general line (1190-1668) - Sinsung-Ni (1195-1630) - Saechok (1209-1631). Third Border Constabulary Brigade on Ongjin Peninsula; an estimated division located general area Chotan (970-1685), possibly 1st Division; an estimated division located general area Songu-Ri (1015-1676), possibly 3rd Division; an estimated division located general area Chunchon (1070-1682), possibly 2d Division; an estimated unidentified division and elements 1st Border Constabulary Brigade located general area Utan (1144-1695) - Chumunjin (1177-1685); elements of 1st Border Constabulary Brigade reported in beachhead area.



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PSC ITEM 2 (Cont'd)

South Korean Army elements defending from west to east as previously reported except 2d Division moved into position east of 7th Division within Uijongbu-Pochon Corridor.

South Korean GHQ and Armed Forces reported by KMAC to be directing operations creditably. Initial impetus of enemy attack reported to have been slowed. Morale very good.

Tank obstacles, 57mm anti-tank guns reported now in position against the principal threat 17 miles north of Seoul. Demolitions prepared. Ongjin bridge fell intact in enemy hands yesterday. Fourteen to twenty North Korean tanks reported destroyed north of Uijongbu (1005-1665). First unconfirmed report of Russian military participation came from F-6 source alleging three Russian soldiers emerging from disabled tank. Little activity reported during night 25-26 June, however, it is expected that attack will be resumed.

\*\* (Correction: - Todae-Ri (1047-1688) - Chunchon (1070-1682) - Wondae-Ri (1119-1697) Ruyon-Dong (1157-1681). Beachhead etc....)

Last G-2 item 261000 IDST.

From G-2 (Telephone call from Korea 0910)

1. Chun Chon not taken by NK forces as originally reported. Several tanks penetrated city. Army and Police now counterattacking.

2. North of Uijongbu NK tanks and troops reportedly moving north. Evaluation at the Tokyo end difficult. We report all latest items.

Women and children dependents of U. S. nationals totalling some 600 persons will load out of Inchon under air cover and Naval escort on two freighters at approximately 1200 today on decision of American Ambassador, Korea.

Loading of freighters will be covered by fighter planes of Far East Air Force during loading and lightening operations at Inchon. Freighter ships will be met off Inchon by two destroyers of NAVF and escorted to Sasebo or Kokuru on Kyushu.

3. Korea has requested supplies and equipment as follows:

a. Ten days of 105mm M3, 81mm mortar, 60mm mortar, carbine caliber 30. Eighth Army has been directed to load and ship expeditiously ammunition requested except that M3 105mm not available here, therefore M2 A1, M4 is being substituted. Info indicated 10 days of supply on hand at start of operation. Resupply action will occur before 10 days expire.

b. Separate message 26 June from Embassy Korea requested 10 aircraft F-51s with bombs and bazookas be delivered to Taegu where Korean pilots waiting. In addition requested 36-howitzers 105mm, 30 AT guns 57mm, and 36 howitzers 155mm. With respect to aircraft, Korea has been informed that 10 will be made available at Itazuke Japan to be flown off by Korean pilots who will be brought from Kampo by air by FEAF if Seoul agrees and can provide the pilots. As to artillery available serviceable pieces in stock of calibers requested will be shipped deck loaded on ammunition ships mentioned in a above

END ITEM 2



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DA-4

Now meeting with President are JCS and State. This telecon is to let you know current thinking here. And that the situation is regarded of great consequence.

END DA-4

Re (No corrections: original reads Today-RI (1047-1681) correction (1047-1688) which figure is correct?)

Re FEC ITEM 7,

Re FEC Item 1 your query re Today-RI coordinates (1047-1688)

END FEC 7

DA-5

Have you received Muccio's Nr 944 asking for ten F-51s and artillery?

END DA-5

FEC ITEM 4

Our part 3 of FEC Item 2 answers DA-5.

END ITEM 4

DA-6

Fine Job. Your info being passed to President now. Have you anything further?

END DA-6

FEC ITEM 5

What is estimate on General Keating's earliest arrival?

END FEC ITEM 5

DA-7, Re FEC 5

Keating due to sail 25 July.

END DA-7

FEC ITEM 6

Willoughby asks in view of coverage this telecon do you still desire telecon slated tonight 10 p.m.?

END ITEM 6

DA-9, Re FEC 6

Yes, may have important decisions for you.

END DA-9

(DA)

Nothing further here. Many thanks and goodnight.

FEC ITEM 8

Nothing further come over and join the fight. We are delighted with your lines of action and this aid should turn the trick. Best wishes to you and your group. Thank you. Ned.

END ITEM 8





TELECONFERENCE

PARTICIPATING HQS : WASHINGTON AND CINCPAC

NR : 300740Z JUNE 50 TT 3444

30 June, 1950

PRESENT TOKYO

PRESENT WASHINGTON

G/A DOUGLAS MacARTHUR	CINCPAC	GEN J. LAWTON COLLINS	C/S
MAJ GEN E. M. ALMOND	C/S FEC	LT GEN A. M. GRUENTHER	OCSA
MAJ GEN A. P. FOX	DEP C/S SCAP	LT GEN T. D. LARKIN	G-4
MAJ GEN C. A. WILLOUGHBY	G-2 FEC	MAJ GEN A. R. BOLLING	G-2
MAJ GEN G. L. BERLE	G-4 FEC	MAJ GEN CHARLES L. BOLTE	G-3
BRIG GEN E. K. WRIGHT	G-3 FEC	BRIG GEN JAMES E. MOORE	SGS
BRIG GEN G. I. BACK	SIGO FEC	BRIG GEN C. SCHUYLER, Jr	G-3
LT COL J. H. CHILES	SGS FEC	MR DEAN RUSK	STATE
		MR N W BOND	STATE

CLASSIFICATION : T O P S E C R E T

SUBJECT : KOREAN SITUATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: STATE  
 JCS-CCS DECLASSIFICATION  
 WORKING GROUP  
 DATE: 6 Jan 75

DA-1

Authorization proposed in your C 56942 will require Presidential decision which will take several hours for consideration. Meanwhile, you are authorized in accordance with paragraph 2B JCS 84681 to move one RCT immediately to Fusan base area. This will be amplified in our telecon scheduled for 300800Z.  
 END DA-1

\* FEC ITEM 1

Your authorization, while establishing basic principle that US Ground Combat Troops may be used in Korea does not give sufficient latitude for efficient operation in present situation, it does not satisfy the basic requirements contained in my message C 56942. Time is of the essence and a clear cut decision without delay is imperative.  
 END ITEM 1

DA-2

I was present at White House Conference late afternoon June 29 when decision was made by President to authorize action covered in JCS 84681. Tenor of discussion clearly indicated to me that the President would wish carefully to consider with his top advisors before authorizing introduction of American combat forces into battle area. Will not authorization given you in DA-1 permit initiation of movement, prior to completion of this movement, we should be able to obtain definite decision on your proposal. Does this meet your requirement for the present?  
 END DA-2

[See also  
 KOREA FILE No. 1,  
 RG-6, Box 2]

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TELECONFERENCE

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DA-3

Did F3AF carry on any operation North of the 38th parallel after receipt of JCS 84681? If so, what were the results?

General Church in message A-10 recommended aerial bombardment on troop concentration along North bank of Han River in Seoul area. Was this attack delivered and if so, with what results?

Are any bridges remaining over Han River in Seoul area?

F3C ITEM 3, R3UR DA-3

F3AF made strikes on North Korean airfields North of 38th degree. Reported results good on field near Pyongyang but no detailed reports of strikes yet received.

F3AF made B-26 strikes along North bank of Han River at 1100 and 1450. Results not reported other than little indication of enemy activity West of Seoul. This not substantiated by later report following.

Three railroad bridges still remain over Han South of Seoul. They are being covered with wooden planking for vehicle use and covered by artillery direct fire.

DA-4

Have Reds any facilities for transporting any heavy equipment across Han River?

END DA-4

F3C ITEM 4, R3UR DA-4

Yes. Ferry and barge services and planking of RR bridges vicinity Seoul. Bridge repairs by North Koreans reported.

END ITEM 4

DA-5

Press dispatch just received reports break through across Han East of Seoul. Have you any confirmation?

END DA-5

F3C ITEM 5, R3UR DA-5

Yes.

END ITEM 5

DA-6

In part one of your last situation report CX 56923 reference made to unconfirmed report that Soviet officers are with North Korean Forces in Seoul and some Chinese and Soviet troops employed. Have you received any confirmation of these reports?

END DA-6

F3C ITEM 2, R3UR DA-6

Reports probably true but no definite proof or confirmation. Yak pilot interrogated Thursday afternoon reports Russian colonel as Air Base Commander assisted by some 15 lower rank Soviet personnel.

END ITEM 2





**TELECONFERENCE**

**NR : 300740Z JUN 50 TT 3444 (Cont'd)**

**DA-7**

What is your latest information on results of US Naval operation in Korean waters?

**END DA-7**

**FSC ITEM 6, RSUR DA-7**

U.S. Naval operations in Korea waters not of positive nature to date. Cruiser Juneau and Destroyer De Haven on East coast near 38th parallel, destroyers Mansfield and Swenson proceeding up Korean West coast. Generally report lack of floating targets.

**END ITEM 6**

**DA-8**

What is your estimate as to time until RCT can be in action in Suwan area?

Do you contemplate moving it by air?

Can you move heavy equipment and artillery into that area by air?

**END DA-8**

**FSC ITEM 7, RSUR DA-8**

Not feasible to make such an estimate until full extent of breakthrough at Han River is determinable. In any event movement by air would be impossible in view of lack of security of Suwan airhead.

**END ITEM 7**

**\* DA-9, Ref FSC 1**

I will proceed immediately through Secretary of Army to request Presidential approval your proposal to move RCT into forward combat area. Will advise you soon as possible, perhaps within half hour.

**END DA-9**

**DA-10**

Your recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to further build up.

**END DA-10**

**FSC ITEM 8, RSUR DA-10**

Acknowledged. Is there anything further now?

**END ITEM 8**

**DA-11**

Everyone here delighted your prompt action in personally securing first hand view of situation. Congratulations and best wishes. We all have full confidence in you and your command. Nothing further here.

**END DA-11**





TELECONFERENCE

PARTICIPATING HQS : WASHINGTON AND CINCPAC

NR : 270217 Z JUNE 50 TT 3426

27 June, 1950

PRESENT TOKYO

PRESENT WASHINGTON

G/A DOUGLAS MacARTHUR	CINCPAC	SEC PACS	USA
VICE ADM C. T. JOY	COMNAVPAC	SEC FINLETTER	AF
MAJ GEN S. M. AIMOND	C/S PAC	SEC McCONNEL	USAF
MAJ GEN C. A. VILLOUGHBY	G-2 PAC	GEN BRADLEY	JCS
MAJ GEN G. L. SCHARLE	G-4 PAC	GEN COLLINS	C/S
MAJ GEN W. A. BLIDENLINDEN	G-1 PAC	GEN VANDENBERG	C/S AF
MAJ GEN D. O. HICKEY	DC/S	ADM SHERMAN	CNO
MAJ GEN A. P. FOX	DC/S SCAP	GEN HALSLIP	VICE C/S
BRIG GEN E. K. WRIGHT	G-3 PAC	GEN RIDGWAY	DC/S
BRIG GEN G. I. BACK	SIGO PAC	GEN BOLTE	G-3
COL L. J. FORTIER	G-2 PAC	GEN IRWIN	G-2
LT COL J. H. CHILES	SGS PAC	MR BOND	STATE
MAJ GEN S. S. PARTRIDGE	A/CG FEAF		

CLASSIFICATION : T O P S E C R E T

SUBJECT : KOREAN SITUATION

DA-1

President has directed that instructions be issued as follows:

All restrictions on employment of FECOM Navy and Air Forces are removed. They will offer ballast possible support to South Korean Forces so as to permit these forces to reform.

Purpose of above action is to support SK forces in accordance with resolution of United Nations approved 25 June.

In addition 7th Fleet will take station so as to prevent invasion of Formosa and to insure that Formosa not be used as base of operations against Chinese mainland.

Detailed instructions reference Navy and Air Forces follows:

All restrictions which have previously prevented the full utilization of the U. S. Far East Air Forces to support and assist the defense of the South Korean territory are lifted for operations below the 38th parallel. All North Korean tanks, guns, military columns and other military targets south of the 38th parallel are cleared for attack by U. S. Air Forces. The purpose is to clear South Korea of

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NR : 270217 Z JUNE 50 TT 3426 (Cont'd)

DA-1 (Cont'd)

North Korean military forces. Similarly Naval Forces may be used without restriction in coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea South of 38th parallel against forces engaged in aggression against South Korea.

END DA-1

DA-2

Imperative that you use every method available to you to advise Amb. Muccio, Korean Military leaders and Korean Civilian officials of these decisions as they relate to Korea.

END DA-2

DA-3

What is your latest information summary of military situation in Korea?

END DA-3

FEC ITEM 1

Summary situation since 270145I last report CX 56812 Chief KMAG quotation North Koreans have capability to take Seoul within 24 hr., i.e. Tuesday/Wednesday. South Korean C/S takes attitude that the fall of Seoul is fall of South Korea. Latest info to 10 a.m. Tokyo time: piece meal entry into action north of Seoul by South Korean Third and Fifth Divisions, has not succeeded in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy main effort for the past two days with intent to seize the capital city of Seoul. Tanks entering suburbs of Seoul. Government transferred to South and communication with part of KMAG opened at Taegu.

South Korean units unable to resist determined northern offensive. -South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is possible.

END ITEM 1

DA-4

What means of communication do you have now with Korea?

END DA-4

FEC ITEM 2, REUR DA-4

Communications now available as follows:

- a. Manual telegraph circuit GHQ-KMAG. KMAG located Taegu.
- b. Voice telephone via submarine cable GHQ-Washington commercial exchange Seoul. No local communication beyond Washington exchange in Seoul.
- c. Voice telephone via submarine cable GHQ to Kinpo airfield.
- d. Voice telephone via submarine cable GHQ to Pusan.
- e. KMAG has destroyed all cipher material.
- f. In addition to above official circuits, amateur manual CW radio circuit

Tokyo-Pusan.

END ITEM 2

FEC ITEM 12, Re FEC ITEM 2 para a

KMAG reports its location as Seoul rather than Taegu as previously reported.

END ITEM 12



TELECONFERENCE

NR : 270217 Z JUNE 50 TT 3426 (Cont'd)

DA-5 FROM JCS TO CINCPAC, CINCPAC INFO CINCEUR, CINCPACFLT, COMNAVFOR, COM 7th FLT:

1. Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa is being called on to cease all sea and air offensives against mainland.

2. Seventh Fleet is hereby assigned to operational control CINCPAC for employment in following task hereby assigned CINCPAC: by Naval and Air action prevent any attack on Formosa, or any sea or air offensives from Formosa against mainland of China. Anchorages in Formosa authorized to be used connection this task.

3. CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT support and reinforce CINCPAC as necessary and practicable in performing tasks herein and those previously assigned.

END DA-5

DA-6

Has your survey party arrived in Korea and, if so, where are they?

END DA-6

FAC ITEM 3, REUR DA-6

Survey group now designated Advance Command Group will arrive Suwon-30 miles south of Kimpo-approximately 1800 today.

END ITEM 3

DA-7

What is status of evacuation of dependents?

END DA-7

FAC ITEM 7, REUR DA-7

Status of dependents and other non-combatant personnel.

682 dependents departed Incheon 1715I hours 26 June - ETA Fukuoka 26 June.

203 civilian employee's air evacuated from Kimpo to Itazuke morning 27 June.

104 dependents scheduled depart Pusan morning 27 June - departure not yet confirmed.

250 dependents to be air evacuated from Kimpo 1330I.

313 non-combatant to be air lifted from Suwon beginning after 1500I 27 June.

275 males moving to Pusan by motor for evacuation;

125 additional personnel not dependents to be evacuated from Pusan later.

Re our rad CX 56802 we are utilizing commercial transportation at Government expense to clear backlog here.

END ITEM 7

DA-8

Have you succeeded in getting any ammunition or supplies to Korean forces?

END DA-8

FAC ITEM 5, REUR DA-8

First ship-loading ammunition and additional artillery pieces will be ready to sail from Yokohama late this afternoon. Can arrive Pusan in three days.

Ten aircraft P-51 have been turned over to Korean pilots at Itazuke Air Base Japan.

Airlift of ammo and supplies critically needed will be provided in view of the existing fluid situation when suitable landing location can be determined.

END ITEM 5

TELECONFERENCE

NR : 270217 Z JUN 50 TT 3426 (Cont'd)

FAC ITEM 4

Desire to interview Vice Adm. Struble before he joins 7th Fleet.

END ITEM 4

DA-9, Re FAC ITEM 4

Struble left today for Tokyo and intends report GPO.

END DA-9

FAC ITEM 6

What publicity is being released in Washington regarding missions and directives enunciated above by the President?

END ITEM 6

DA-10, Re FAC ITEM 6

No publicity from Washington for the present. It is recognized that your action under DA-2 may result in leaks from Korea but no official release to press should be made by you until further instructions.

END DA-10

DA-11

Secretary Defense requests your G-2 estimate as to next most likely threat from Soviet.

END DA-11

FAC ITEM 9, REUR DA-11

Information completely lacking as to any Soviet intent. In view of military action directed by you, it is believed most probable that retaliatory Soviet action may be taken against Japan or South Korea.

It is speculative that North Korean assault is linked with overall SE Asia Communist operations.

END ITEM 9

DA-12

Have you seen text or press summary of United Nations resolution adopted Sunday afternoon?

END DA-12

FAC ITEM 10, REUR DA-12

Yes.

END ITEM 10

FAC ITEM 8

Revival of fighting spirit of South Korean Army and people essential in this situation. This can only be accomplished thru general publicity. Consequently we suggest immediate publicity of main features from Washington. Information is certain to leak in next 24 hours and exaggerated speculation thereon can do untold damage.

Request reply.

END ITEM 8

DA-13, Re FAC ITEM 8

Our understanding release will be made in Washington within next twelve hours.



TELECONFERENCE

NR : 270217 Z JUN 50 TT 3426 (Cont'd)

DA-13 (Cont'd)

Will keep you advised. Meanwhile proceed with action as indicated in this telecon.

END DA-13

DA-16, Re PAC ITEM 8

We are checking further with State reference publicity. There will be some delay pending consultation.

END DA-16

PAC ITEM 11

Request Seventh Fleet be diverted to Buckner Bay.

END ITEM 11

DA-15, Re PAC ITEM 11

JCS directive contained in DA-5 assigned 7th Fleet to your operational control. You should therefore issue necessary orders.

END DA-15

PAC ITEM 13

In view of latest reports suggest cancellation telecon with Irwin proposed for 10 p.m. local time (271200Z).

END ITEM 13

DA-14, Re PAC ITEM 13

Concur.

END DA-14

Nothing further here. You?

DA-17

Nothing further. Will keep you informed on development here. Many thanks.

END DA-17

Thank you and good night.





**TELECONFERENCE**

**PARTICIPATING HQS : WASHINGTON AND CINCPAC**

**NR : UAPCN V UAPCN 260355Z JUNE 50 TT 3418**

**26 June 1950**

**PRESENT TOKYO**

**PRESENT WASHINGTON**

<b>G/A DOUGLAS MacARTHUR</b>	<b>CINCPAC</b>	<b>MR PAGE</b>	<b>OSA</b>
<b>VICE ADM C. T. JOY</b>	<b>COMNAVPAC</b>	<b>MR FINLETTER</b>	<b>S AF</b>
<b>MAJ GEN S. M. ALMOND</b>	<b>C/S PAC</b>	<b>MR McCONE</b>	<b>US/AF</b>
<b>MAJ GEN S. B. PARTRIDGE</b>	<b>ACT'G CG F&amp;AP</b>	<b>GEN J LAWTON COLLINS</b>	<b>C/S</b>
<b>MAJ GEN C. A. WILLOUGHBY</b>	<b>G-2 PAC</b>	<b>GEN VANDENBERG</b>	<b>AF</b>
<b>MAJ GEN G. L. EBERLE</b>	<b>G-4 PAC</b>	<b>ADM SHERMAN</b>	<b>CNO</b>
<b>BRIG GEN L. K. WRIGHT</b>	<b>G-3 PAC</b>	<b>LT GEN RIDGWAY</b>	<b>DSP C/S</b>
<b>BRIG GEN G I BACK</b>	<b>SIG O PAC</b>	<b>LT GEN LARKIN</b>	<b>G-4</b>
		<b>MAJ GEN BOLTE</b>	<b>G-3</b>
		<b>MAJ GEN IRWIN</b>	<b>G-2</b>
		<b>BRIG GEN MOORE</b>	<b>SOB</b>

**CLASSIFICATION : T O P S E C R E T**

**SUBJECT : KOREAN SITUATION**

**DA-1**

**At conference this evening following was decided:**

- 1. CINCPAC authorized to dispatch survey party to Korea for purposes outlined in DA-2 earlier telecon this date.**
- 2. CINCPAC authorized to send any ammunition and equipment to Korea he deems necessary to prevent loss of Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area with appropriate air and Naval cover to insure safe arrival.**
- 3. PACOM authorized to take such action by air and navy as necessary to prevent overrunning of Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area in order to insure safe evacuation U.S. dependents and such other U.S. non-combatants as determined by USAMB Korea.**
- 4. The 7th Fleet ordered to proceed immediately to Sasebo and report COMNAVPAC for operational control.**
- 5. Efforts being made to return Gen Roberts to Korea as soon as he can be picked up.**

**Do you need any further instructions at this time?**

**END DA-1**

**PAC ITEM 1, REUR DA-1:**

**No.**

**END ITEM 1**

**DECLASSIFIED BY:  
JCS-CCS DECLASSIFICATION  
WORKING GROUP**

**DATE. 6 Jun 75**

**-w-**

**TELECONFERENCE**

**NR** : USPCN V UAPCN 260355Z JUNE 50 TT 3418 (Cont'd)

**DA-2**

While foregoing decisions are geared to protection of dependents and non-combatants further high level decisions may be expected as military and political situations develop. State has advised US Ambassador Korea that KNAG personnel should remain with Korean forces to insure continued and effective South Korean resistance.

**END DA-2**

**DA-3**

What is latest information on tank column North of Seoul?

**END DA-3**

**PSC ITEM 2, REUR DA-3:**

No new definite information since last report but Ambassador and Col. Wright acting chief KNAG report increased steadiness of South Korean troops in that area. Chunchon retaken.

**END ITEM 2**

**DA-4**

What if any information is available on present location and direction of movement of forces landed in vicinity of Pohang?

**END DA-4**

**PSC ITEM 3, REUR DA-4**

Initial report on Pohang now discounted. Landing vicinity Kangnung now locally contained.

South Korean Forces on Ongjin Peninsula assumed offensive attacking in direction of Haeju.

**END ITEM 3**

**DA-5**

We suggest cancellation of scheduled 1200Z telecon unless you deem one advisable.

**END DA-5**

**PSC ITEM 4, REUR DA-5**

Concur.

**END ITEM 4**



**DA-6**

Nothing further here. Do you have anything further? If not good night and many thanks.

**END DA-6**

**PSC ITEM 5, REUR DA-6**

Nothing further here. Good night. And many thanks to you.

**END ITEM 5**

~~TOP SECRET~~



TELECONFERENCE

PARTICIPATING HQS : WASHINGTON AND CINCPAC

NR : 252330Z JUNE 50 TT 3417

25 June 1950

PRESENT TOKYO

MAJ GEN E. H. ALMOND C/S F3C  
MAJ GEN C. A. WILLOUGHBY G-2 F3C  
MAJ GEN G. L. BRISLE G-4 F3C  
BRIG. GEN E. K. FRIGHT G-3 F3C

PRESENT WASHINGTON

GEN HAINSLIP VICS C/S  
LT GEN RIDGWAY DC/S  
MAJ GEN BOLTE G-3  
BRIG GEN MOORE SCS  
COL J. F. HOELL G-3  
COL H F GILCHRIST G-3

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

SUBJECT : KOREAN SITUATION

DA-1

Where is General Roberts now?  
END DA-1

F3C ITEM 1, RJNR DA-1

Roberts is on High Seas enroute to the U. S. aboard USNS Sultan. ETA San Francisco 4 July.  
END ITEM 1

DA-2 TOP SECRET

Following for your information in two parts:

Part 1:

Subject is possible courses of military action as result of Korean situation.

1. At State - Defense meeting Sunday morning the following possible courses of military action open to us in current Korean crisis were discussed and will be taken up with the President later today.

a. CINCPAC is authorized to send to Korea any military equipment recommended by U. S. Mission to Korea (AMIK), regardless of current programs.

b. That U. S. Military Advisers remain with South Korean Forces as long as they are with an effective combat unit.

c. To extend CINCPAC's area of responsibility in this emergency to assume operational control of all U. S. Military activities in Korea.

d. To employ forces from CINCPAC's command (principally Navy and Air) to establish protective zone to include the area: Seoul-Kimpo Air Base-Inchon for the purpose of assuring safe evacuation from Korea of U. S. nationals. Such action seeks, in addition, to gain time for reaction to political measures now before United Nations. (See State message to MacCie info to CINCPAC).

e. In event Security Council UN calls on member nations to take direct action in Korea, to authorize and direct you to employ forces of your command,



TELECONFERENCE

NR : 252330Z JUNE 50 TT 3417 (Cont'd)

DA-4

Now meeting with President are JCS and State. This telecon is to let you know current thinking here. And that the situation is regarded of great consequence.

END DA-4

\*\* (Re correction: original reads Today-RI (1047-1681) correction (1047-1688) which figure is correct?)

\*\* FSC ITEM 7,

Re FSC Item 1 your query re Today-RI coordinates (1047-1688)

END FSC 7

DA-5

Have you received Muccio's Mr 944 asking for ten P-51s and artillery?

END DA-5

FSC ITEM 4

Our part 3 of FSC Item 2 answers DA-5.

END ITEM 4

DA-6

Fine Job. Your info being passed to President now. Have you anything further?

END DA-6

FSC ITEM 5

What is estimate on General Keating's earliest arrival?

END FSC ITEM 5

DA-7, Re FSC 5

Keating due to sail 25 July.

END DA-7

FSC ITEM 6

Willoughby asks in view of coverage this telecon do you still desire telecon slated tonight 10 p.m?

END ITEM 6

DA-9, Re FSC 6

Yes, may have important decisions for you.

END DA-9

(DA)

Nothing further here. Many thanks and goodnight.

FSC ITEM 8

Nothing further come over and join the fight. We are delighted with your lines of action and this aid should turn the trick. Best wishes to you and your group. Thank you. Ned.

END ITEM 8



TALS CONFERENCE



NR. : 252330 z JUN 50 TT 3417 (Cont'd)

FSC ITEM 2 (Cont'd)

South Korean Army elements defending from west to east as previously reported except 2d Division moved into position east of 7th Division within Uijongbu-Pochon Corridor.

South Korean HQ and Armed Forces reported by KMAC to be directing operations creditably. Initial impetus of enemy attack reported to have been slowed. Morale very good.

Tank obstacles, 57mm anti-tank guns reported now in position against the principal threat 17 miles north of Seoul. Demolitions prepared. Ongjin bridge fell intact in enemy hands yesterday. Fourteen to twenty North Korean tanks reported destroyed north of Uijongbu (1005-1665). First unconfirmed report of Russian military participation came from F-6 source alleging three Russian soldiers emerging from disabled tank. Little activity reported during night 25-26 June, however, it is expected that attack will be resumed.

\*\* (Correction: - Todae-Ri (1047-1688) - Chunchon (1070-1682) - Wondae-Ri (1119-1697) Rayon-Dong (1157-1681). Beachhead etc....)

Last G-2 item 261000 IDST.

From G-2 (Telephone call from Korea 0910)

1. Chun Chon not taken by NK forces as originally reported. Several tanks penetrated city. Army and Police now counterattacking.

2. North of Uijongbu NK tanks and troops reportedly moving north. Evaluation at the Tokyo end difficult. We report all latest items.

Women and children dependents of U. S. nationals totalling some 600 persons will load out of Inchon under air cover and Naval escort on two freighters at approximately 1200 today on decision of American Ambassador, Korea.

Loading of freighters will be covered by fighter planes of Far East Air Force during loading and lightening operations at Inchon. Freighter ships will be met off Inchon by two destroyers of NAVSTA and escorted to Sasebo or Kokuru on Kyushu.

3. Korea has requested supplies and equipment as follows:

a. Ten days of 105mm M3, 81mm mortar, 60mm mortar, carbine caliber 30. Eighth Army has been directed to load and ship expeditiously ammunition requested except that M3 105mm not available here, therefore M2 A1, M4 is being substituted. Info indicated 10 days of supply on hand at start of operation. Resupply action will occur before 10 days expire.

b. Separate message 26 June from Embassy Korea requested 10 aircraft F-51s with bombs and bazookas be delivered to Taegu where Korean pilots waiting. In addition requested 36-howitzers 105mm, 30 AT guns 57mm, and 36 howitzers 155mm. With respect to aircraft, Korea has been informed that 10 will be made available at Itazake Japan to be flown off by Korean pilots who will be brought from Kampo by air by FSAF if Seoul agrees and can provide the pilots. As to artillery available serviceable pieces in stock of calibers requested will be shipped deck loaded on ammunition ships mentioned in a above

END ITEM 2

TALSCONFERENCES

NR : 252330Z JUNE 50 TT 3417 (Cont'd)

DA-2 (Cont'd)

plus units from Seventh Fleet, to stabilize the combat situation including if feasible the restoration of original boundaries at 38 degree parallel.

2. Above tentative considerations are forwarded for your info and as basis for planning.

3. The substance this message will be closely held and disseminated to minimum your staff planners.

Part 2:

State Department has concurred in authorizing you to send survey group from your staff to South Korea at once to consult with AMIK and to report soonest estimates of the minimum amounts and types of aid within your capability of supplying, even including the possible use of military forces of your command, which would insure retention and control of the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area.

END DA-2

FEC ITEM 3, REUR DA-2

Lines of action are clear and plans will be initiated at once.

Reference sending survey group to Korea in connection with the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area. This will require air cover to protect landing and departure. Can be dispatched without delay. Request early decision on authority to implement.

END ITEM 3

DA-3

Foregoing matters are not to be regarded as decisions.

END DA-3

DA-8

Decision on survey group (FEC Item 3) will be sent soonest.

END DA-8

FEC ITEM 2, For G-2

North Korean invasion estimated to be a major effort against South Korea.

Reports indicate that North Korea employed an estimated four divisions with about 70 tanks, and all or elements of three border constabulary brigades in principal attacks along the 38th parallel, and an amphibious attack on the South Korean east coast. Intermittent air attacks by three or four planes were made on Kimpo Airfield.

North Korean line of contact from west to east as of 260730 I reported as follows: Ongjin Peninsula, (855-1674) to (870-1685); from Tonjin (960-1667), Solmar-Ri (995-690) Songu-Ri (1015-1676) - Todae-Ri (1047-1681). Beachhead established along general line (1190-1668) - Singung-Ni (1195-1630) - Sanchok (1209-1631). Third Border Constabulary Brigade on Ongjin Peninsula; an estimated division located general area Chotan (970-1685), possibly 1st Division; an estimated division located general area Songu-Ri (1015-1676), possibly 3rd Division; an estimated division located general area Chunchon (1070-1682), possibly 2d Division; an estimated unidentified division and elements 1st Border Constabulary Brigade located general area Utan (1144-1695) - Chumunjin (1177-1685); elements of 1st Border Constabulary Brigade reported in beachhead area.



[16 JUL 46]

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DECLASSIFIED PER AR 380-5 +  
JCS ltr of 9 Jul 73

TELECONFERENCE



TT 6579

06280015Z (Washington) 06282300Z (Tokyo)

Present in Washington:

Colonel A. R. Ginsburg, OSW

Present in Tokyo:

Major General Whitlock  
Brigadier General Eastwood

SUBJECT: Secretary of War's Personal Letter

GHQ SENDS:

GHQ Item 1: Request for this conference is to discuss the Secretary of War's personal letter to General MacArthur dated 17 June 1946 wherein he requests comments on logistical difficulties of operations in this theater during the war, be submitted by 10 July.

GHQ Item 2: No logistical history as such has been compiled here. To prepare such a history or report which would have any value or accuracy would require tremendous research of files and records which have not, as yet, been examined and segregated with this use in view. We are now gathering data for the complete overall report of campaigns, but with the limited personnel available for this purpose, it will be many months, possibly a year, before this report will present a comprehensive and accurate history

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from which to form and state reliable conclusions and highlights. General MacArthur himself, owing to the press of current affairs, has not as yet been able to attempt the slightest historical review of his campaigns.

GHQ Item 3: To prepare data with which to form conclusions on which to base remarks as requested, which would in effect amount to basic historical authority, within the time allowed is impossible. Stating general conclusions without benefit of reliable compilation of data would be little better than stating opinions of various officers entertaining bias due to interest, and which later might prove partially or wholly unsupported by factual records.

GHQ Item 4: What we are trying to say is that the problem presented to us appears to be insurmountable and beyond the scope of accomplishment within any predictable time. Our "pick and shovel" talent is turning over so fast these days and, in addition, has been so depleted in number, that we are having difficulty keeping up. We shouldn't like to submit plausible but nevertheless unreliable remarks, which might later prove to be completely wrong. Have we made ourselves clear, and do you understand how we are looking at the picture, and can you give us any helpful suggestions?



WAR SENDS:

War Item 1: The report of the Secretary will cover the complete supply picture, including procurement, distribution and performance of materiel.

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The idea is to give the facts, discuss the effects of shortages and deficiencies of quality on the planning and execution of campaigns in the earlier stages and the effect of material superiority in the final phases. It would appear to me that the outstanding contribution of the theater was its ability to extemporize and use minimum supplies to maximum advantage. That view would be very helpful. Examples of improvisation that you might care to mention or elaborate upon that come to my mind are the omission of the J-2 and K-1 operations to prepare for Leyte, the necessity for doubling the forces for the K-2 operation when the Japs rushed down reinforcement, and the operations in the Lingayan Gulf. In other words, by operating efficiently along interior lines, using to the maximum the facilities available and in taking military risks along logistic lines, the operations proved successful.

Examples of contrast such as between the quantity and quality of material available for Buna and Leyte ought to be helpful. A direct quotation from General MacArthur on the effect of weapons and equipment in general, or a single item such as the DUKW, a fuse, a bomb or a plane would be helpful. Something about the apparent superiority of the "Zero" in the early stages and its final elimination from the skies might be worth comment.

The Secretary's thesis is not repeat not to belittle the achievement of the fighting man in any way, but to emphasize the importance of supply and its influence on military decisions. Upon publication, the report will probably be a document of significance for those interested in industrial information and guidance rather than those who have a general interest in things military.

War Item 2: Reference your items 2, 3 and 4, understand you perfectly.

3 ~~SECRET~~

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Please refer to our Item 1. Does that make the problem any clearer? Could a few general statements be furnished along the lines indicated in our Item 1? The Secretary wants to finish the report by the end of July. Data along these lines are available from ETO. A brief general summary of a couple of hundred words along the lines indicated would suffice. As an alumnus of the theater with some knowledge of its achievements, I feel we are overlooking a good opportunity if we do not repeat not get some data along the lines indicated.

GHQ SENDS:

GHQ Item 5: From what you say, the report is to be a most comprehensive document. One feature having a considerable bearing is the form or general nature of the report, and its purpose. Is it to be a report giving factual data in tabular or statistical form in the body of the report or as inclosures or annexes? Is it to be a narrative report couched in general terms with or without supporting data in documentary form? Is it proposed to cover each campaign, or operation specifically and in chronological order, or to treat the whole period -- 1942-1945 -- as a general subject?

WAR SENDS:

War Item 3: Regarding your item 5, report will be a narrative couched in general terms without supporting data in documentary form. Not necessary to cover each campaign. A summary along the lines indicated in our item 1, with three or four specific examples of improvisation, a few examples of performance of material, good or bad. Also an estimate of the logistical

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support given the theater during the various phases or as a whole, in General MacArthur's own words, are a few of the suggestions offered.

Have you any further questions or any more material to send?

GHQ SENDS:

GHQ Item 6: Nothing further, Bob. Many thanks for your very helpful comments. Good night.

WAR SENDS:

War Item 4: Will furnish Secretary transcript of our conference and will follow up if he desires. Many thanks. Regards, and my best to Captain Ginsburgh.



<sup>5</sup>  
~~SECRET~~