

INTELLIGENCE

COVERAGE,

LUZON

JUNE 1943

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Mil. Int. Section, Gen. Staff

10 June 1943.

TO:	FOR:
✓ Commander in Chief _____	Approved <u>✓</u>
✓ Chief of Staff _____	Concurrence _____
Deputy Chief of Staff _____	Information _____
G-1 _____	Initials _____
G-2 _____	Issue Orders _____
G-3 _____	Nec. Action _____
G-4 _____	Signature _____
Adjutant General _____	Return to G-2 _____
A.A. Officer _____	File _____
Engineer Officer _____	Comment _____
Signal Officer _____	Circulate _____
Public Relations _____	_____
Aides _____	_____
Geog. Section _____	_____
Translator Sec. _____	_____
A.I.B. _____	_____

*Philippine Reg. Section A.I.B.*

*Careful study for forward  
planning for secret intelligence  
net. I fully concur.*

*W.S.M.S.*  




*Mark*

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

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10 June, 1943.

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Luzon Intelligence Coverage.

TO : Chief of Staff.

Coordination: G-2.

1. This study is intended largely for self-orientation if the planning of this agency is guided by underlying principles at variance with existing policies and directives, and to develop and evaluate the several means available for the accomplishment of its mission.

2. Its mission, generally speaking, is; (a) to obtain full intelligence coverage of the Philippines, and (b) to assist, insofar as is practicable, guerilla units continuing to maintain organized resistance to the enemy.

3. Its objectives must, for the time being, be limited in character, due to forward transportation limitations, and can therefore only be reached through pre-determined priorities of movement. As unsound planning may nullify the entire effort, such priorities should be determined only after careful analysis of all geographical and strategical considerations involved.

4. All enemy movement affecting the Philippines flows either through or adjacent to the Island of Luzon. All enemy military, economic and political activity in the Philippines is responsive to decisions made by or closely coordinated with the high command with headquarters in the city of Manila on the Island of Luzon. As a consequence, the root or source of all information on enemy intentions or movement is on that Island, or in close proximity thereto. It follows then, as an elementary proposition, that development of intelligence coverage of the Island of Luzon should be our primary consideration and main effort.

5. Granting the soundness of the foregoing undebatable premise, determination of priorities of movement to positions on the Island of Luzon should be guided by the basic principles following:

- a. That the only positive way of gaining access to enemy intentions lies through gaining access to the enemy himself, i.e. by having the enemy high command and its responsible subordinates under constant surveillance by secret agents, either voluntary or paid.
- b. That information on enemy ship, supply and large scale troop movements can best be obtained by close observation of lanes and passages, both land and sea, through which such movements must flow.

6. Application of the foregoing principles to the area involved suggests the following objectives in the initial phase of this effort under priorities as indicated:

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Landing Point</u>	<u>Area of Responsibility</u>
No.1	Calungpang Point, Cavite	Manila, Manila Bay and adjacent areas.
No.2	Capones Point, Zambales	Zambales South coastal area, Subic Bay, Manila, Manila Bay and adjacent areas.
No.3	San Jose, Sorsogon	San Bernardino Strait, Ticao Pass, Albay Gulf and adjacent areas.
No.4	Cape Bolinao, Zambales	North Zambales coastal area, Lingsayen Gulf and adjacent land areas.

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<u>Priority</u>	<u>Landing Point</u>	<u>Area of Responsibility</u>
No.5	San Teodoro, Mindoro (approximated 30 miles due south of Batangas -- 30 miles due east of Calapan).	Batangas (Port) and Verde Island Passage with South Batangas Province and Northern Mindoro.
No.6	Cape Calavite, Mindoro.	Verde Island Passage, Mindoro Strait, Lubang Island and adjacent areas.

7. Analysis of means available to reach the foregoing limited objectives discloses three distinct possibilities worthy of consideration.

First: Proceed under present plan to bring Filipinos to Brisbane from the United States, put them through a course of appropriate and rigorous training, and thereafter, as forward transportation by air, surface or submarine becomes available, dispatch parties composed of highly selected men to assume areas of responsibility at the positions indicated in accordance with the priorities established; each of such parties to maintain direct communication with this headquarters.

Advantages:

a. There are available to us 408 Filipinos in the two Filipino regiments on the West Coast, hand picked from those who volunteered for extra hazardous service. These men have much better than average intelligence and have lost, through travel and residence abroad, much of the provincialism to which most Filipinos are subject. An inherent adventurous spirit is more or less attested by their departure from the Philippines to live abroad in the first instance. Furthermore, these men, having seen nothing of the war, are not on the defensive but, on the other hand, have volunteered to forego relative ease and security to enter hazardous service from pure desire to assist in the liberation of their people. Hence the spirit underlying their offer of service is distinctly self-sacrificial -- a spirit that would undoubtedly find its reflection in the results of their effort.

Disadvantages:

- a. Limitations on forward transportation.
- b. Difficulty in assimilation due, in some cases, to long absence from the Philippines.
- c. Difficulty in accounting for movements since start of war if intercepted by the enemy.

Second: Organize and direct intelligence activity from a base in Pangy or Negros, with a view to training selected men from that locality for dispatch to the positions indicated.

Advantages:

- a. Elimination of all of the disadvantages enumerated under First possibility.

Disadvantages:

- a. Has none of the advantages enumerated under the First possibility.
- b. Danger of divided loyalties due to guerilla and other political influences present in Philippines.
- c. Danger that whole intelligence system would collapse if the enemy succeeded in overcoming guerilla resistance in the area concerned.

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Third: Establish an Army Command on the Island of Mindanao to organize and direct all resistance to the enemy throughout the Philippines and develop an intelligence net with provision for filtering and evaluating all information transmitted to this headquarters.

Advantages:

- a. Same as Second possibility.
- b. Would put vitality into policy of C. in C. with respect to guerilla aid, secure some semblance of coordinated effort, and prolong resistance to enemy, unless such action in itself provoked more determined enemy counter measures.
- c. Would provide means of filtering and evaluation of information for the benefit of this headquarters.
- d. Would permit on-the-ground decisions on many matters on which this headquarters is without factual basis for intelligent action.

Disadvantages:

- a. Has none of the advantages of First possibility.
- b. Would still have transportation difficulties in getting parties into forward positions.
- c. Danger of divided loyalties due to guerilla and other political influences.
- d. Danger of whole intelligence system collapsing in face of determined enemy counter action.

8. Critical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the various possibilities outlined and the evaluation of one against the other, clearly indicates that the course now charted is the correct one and should be prosecuted as vigorously as the circumstances will permit.

9. As the entire success of this effort rests upon the individual once he has been dispatched into forward position and given an area of responsibility for intelligence coverage, the vital importance of selection and training cannot be over-estimated. To assure any degree of success, the initial phase should be governed by the following basic considerations.

- a. Due to the extreme importance of the positions indicated and the increased hazard involved, only the highest type of men who are available to us should be selected to occupy the same.
- b. Individuals so selected (on the basis of qualifications) must be given a commissioned or non-commissioned grade fully commensurate with their responsibilities and detachment from physical control and leadership -- this to:

1. Inculcate in him a real sense of responsibility predicated upon tangible evidence of our confidence in him.
2. Give him a feeling of authority.
3. Provide him with a substantial financial stake in the success of his mission and his unswerving adherence to duty. (Provision being made for the demotion or discharge of any who fail to measure up to the standards of service required.)

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Note: To me this is a matter of extreme importance. In the parties to be dispatched, we will require technicians to operate and maintain and, if necessary, defend the radio control station, and others to develop enemy information under the most difficult conditions. All must be experts. All must exercise individual initiative, judgment and resourcefulness. All will be under the constant threat of death in its most violent and painful form. To send a private soldier on a mission of that nature is but to violate the old rule

against sending "a boy to do a man's job." If we deem him qualified to undertake the mission in the first place, we should clothe him with the dignity of a grade commensurate with the heavy responsibilities he is to assume. Only in that manner may we expect the individual effort essentially requisite to success.

- c. As to all areas of responsibility under the first phase, effort should be made to secure overlapping coverage of vital points, with the membership of one party unknown to that of another -- with the location of radio control stations unknown to the membership of any other party than that to which it pertains.
  1. To provide the means for confirmation of vital information.
  2. To provide a check on the activities of each party in vital areas.
  3. To avoid compromise of other elements in the system upon the interception of any one element.
- d. That each party leader should be in direct communication with and be responsible only to this headquarters.

10. This study embraces only some of the general considerations involved in sound planning of these operations. Its purpose is, as before stated, self-orientation. The difficulties ahead should not be minimized, nor should they be exaggerated. The mission can be accomplished through the employment of those means now available or reasonably to be expected in the not too distant future.

It should be observed that the positions indicated are tentative only, as detailed advance planning must be subservient to the military situation at the time that execution is possible. Furthermore, dependant upon the same controlling factor, location of the radio control station of each party may either be on the mainland itself or, if conditions do not so permit, at some other more secure point where weak signals can be fed into it for transmission on -- the important consideration being that each party is a separate and complete unit maintaining direct contact with GHQ through its own facilities, regardless of the dispersal that security may require.

I am informed by the Navy (O.N.I.) that delivery of a party to Calumpang Point, Cavite, or adjacent thereto (1st priority on the list of objectives) by submarine is feasible.

11. Instructions are requested where revision or re-orientation at this stage is desired.

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COURTNEY WHITNEY,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Chief, Philippine  
Regional Section.



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