

INTELLIGENCE

COVERAGE

JUNE - JULY 1943

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G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK SHEET

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From	To	Date	Remarks
C/S	Director AIB.	28 June 43	<p>The Study by the Chief, Philippine Regional Section of 24th June regarding Philippine intelligence coverage is approved as a guide for future development subject to further study and discussion of its detail during the process of execution.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>R.K.S.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">) ----- (</p>

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G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK SHEET

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From	To	Date	Remarks
G-2 GHQ	Chief of Staff	28 June/43	<p style="text-align: center;">- <u>New P.R.S. Plan</u> -</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Attached dated 24 June 1943 is a plan for Philippine Intelligence coverage prepared by Colonel Whitney.2. This plan covers the establishment of secret parties, certain coast watcher stations and a secret intelligence net. It differs in some degree from Colonel Whitney's plan of 10th June (First Phase), relative to secret parties and coast watcher stations in Southern Luzon, and also from the Communications Plan developed by Major McMicking and the Signal Corps, dated 10th March.3. Slight changes in disposition from Colonel Whitney's plan of 10th June are not of great importance and current information may require other changes from time to time. Changes from the McMicking Communications Plan mainly relate to the abandonment of the large control station planned for channelling of guerilla communications in Mindanao. This particular Mindanao central station was considered of doubtful expediency at the time in view of possible enemy attack on Mindanao. Such an attack is already indicated by messages received yesterday.4. Colonel Whitney's proposed establishment of secret intelligence parties at Manila, Cebu City and Davao seems sound as these are the three points of greatest strategic importance.5. He also proposes to install coast watchers at Cape Bolinao, Northwest Mindoro, Apo West Pass, Romblon and Northwest Samar, and farther south, near Zamboanga, at the Balabac Strait and at Tinaca Point, Davao.6. There is some doubt about the necessity of establishing a coast watcher party on Apo West Pass in view of the normal traffic routes that carry shipping through that passage close to present coast watchers established on the west coast of Panay. I doubt whether it is necessary to establish coast watchers in the vicinity of Zamboanga City as a party has been sent, as you know, to the Sulu Archipelago, with orders to establish coast watchers to cover the Basilan Strait from Basilan Island. A coast watcher post now exists on Tinaca Point, Davao. It would not appear necessary to duplicate this installation, at least until Chas. M. Smith returns and we have an opportunity to talk the matter over with him.

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G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK SHEET



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From	To	Date	Remarks
			<p>7. More important considerations relate to the establishment of a secret net. Such a net is of vital importance as guerilla nets may at any time be wiped out. I believe maintaining the secrecy of these new stations is of paramount importance. This means that traffic must be reduced to the minimum. The heavy traffic of coast watcher reporting should, I believe, be carried through the guerilla nets in every case possible, arrangements being made for a shift-over to the secret net, if conditions require. Traffic from the secret intelligence parties will probably have to come over the secret net. I believe it will be as difficult to keep these stations secret from our own guerilla forces as from the enemy. This may require that the parties establish themselves secretly and not as military establishments, as suggested by Colonel Whitney. It may further be found impossible to set up a secret, independent station in Panay, due to Peralta's extensive organization. The same considerations may apply to Negros and it further may be wise to establish a secret station in Palawan, rather than two in Mindoro.</p> <p>8. It is recognized that the use of this secret net for coast watcher reports was intended to facilitate Naval assistance, but I believe they would recognize that the reserve secret net is of as much importance to them as to the Army.</p> <p>9. In general, I concur with the objectives sought by Colonel Whitney, subject to the above comments regarding the current use of the secret net. I still feel that the establishment of Colonel Whitney's First Phase in Southern Luzon should be considered as of high priority, and that it may not be necessary to accomplish all the rest of the plan coincidentally. I have in mind the fact that these secret net stations should, if possible, be fitted with steam or other generators in order to cut down the necessity of the supply of gasoline or fuel oil chargers. Steam driven chargers are still in the process of experimentation and time will be required for their manufacture.</p> <p>1 Incl Plan prepared by Col. Whitney.</p>

V.S.M.S.
[Signature]

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G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK SHEET

G-2

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From	To	Date	Remarks
P.R.S.	C. of S. Coor: G-2	2 July 43	<p>1. I have just conferred at length with Captain McCOLLUM of the Navy in re intelligence coverage of the Philippines. He is in full accord with the plan outlined in my study of 24 June, and has given me assurances of full cooperation and assistance. Says the Admiral, who was rather cool to the whole idea at first, is now enthusiastic and has given the green light on all assistance the Navy can give.</p> <p>2. Captain McCOLLUM suggested modification of the plan only to the extent of adding a coast watcher party to cover the SURIGAO STRAIGHT and another for SIBUTU PASSAGE. I told him that your approval was subject to such modification in detail as experience or subsequent conferences while in the process of execution indicated as advisable. He has asked that we initiate a request for assistance - - believes it might well be predicated on study of 24 June in reference.</p> <p>3. Captain McCOLLUM suggests two courses of action:</p> <p><u>a.</u> Provided we can get full priority against the British and Dutch for awhile, Navy to provide two (2) subs a month to accommodate nine (9) men each and as much equipment as can be unloaded at destination in a maximum of three (3) hours. Points out that they do not like to remain surfaced for a longer period.</p> <p><u>b.</u> Says he will recommend that to establish the positions indicated in the plan, the NAUTILUS (cargo sub) be sent here from the Pacific. Could handle all men and equipment on one (1) trip. Believes there is good chance of getting approval of this assignment from the Fleet Commander-in-Chief.</p> <p>4. The objections of the last-mentioned procedure (<u>b</u>) are two fold:</p> <p><u>a.</u> We will not have full technical equipment required under the plan before November or December. Consequently, to rely on one (1) trip of the NAUTILUS to do the whole job would unduly delay the initial phases.</p> <p><u>b.</u> By using the NAUTILUS on one (1) trip, we would be risking the very cream of the available manpower and technical equipment it would take many months to replace, on one sub.</p>

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G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK SHEET

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From	To	Date	Remarks
			<p>5. My recommendation would be middle of the road, i.e.:</p> <p>a. Get what priority is feasible on present available subs and proceed to cover the LUZON area.</p> <p>b. Get the NAUTILUS assignment for two trips in November and December - - one to the VIZAYAN ISLANDS and the second to MINDANAO - - putting ashore not only our intelligence parties destined for each area, but also about 200 tons of equipment and supplies for our District Commanders as well. This would give them a real break - - might prove ample to maintain resistance for the duration.</p> <p>6. I am satisfied from the indications received from Captain McCOLLUM that we can get the necessary transport assistance to permit us to secure the full coverage planned by the end of the year - - the northern part by September.</p> <p>7. Shall I proceed further along the lines recommended in paragraph 5 hereof, or along modified lines, or shall the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, carry the matter forward. I suggest in either event the advisability of full collaboration with Captain McCOLLUM who will have to defend the matter before higher Naval authorities.</p> <p>8. Request instructions.</p> <p>(1) <i>Concur in memorandum TP-5</i></p> <p>(2) <i>Concur but. Whiting proceed with preliminary negotiations with Capt. McCollum, keeping G-2 informed.</i></p> <p><i>Van S. W. S.</i></p> <p><i>CW. C. W.</i></p> <p><i>Approved</i></p> <p><i>[Signature]</i></p>



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P.R.S. C. of S. 3 July 43
Coor: G-2

1. Herewith is letter to the Commander, Allied Naval Forces, prepared for signature of the Chief of Staff. I have gone over this letter with Captain McCOLLUM, Navy, who has indicated his approval of same.
2. While with Captain McCOLLUM, he advised me he had discussed the attached plan with the submarine commodore, who is in full accord with same.

C. W.

1 Incl:
Ltr. and attached plan
for Intell. Coverage.

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5 July 1943

SUBJECT: Philippine Intelligence Project
TO : Commander, Allied Naval Forces

1. Herewith referred is a study and plan for Philippine intelligence coverage of 24 June 1943, prepared by the Chief, Philippine Regional Section, Allied Intelligence Bureau, which has been approved by this headquarters, subject to such modification in detail as may be deemed appropriate while the same is in process of execution.

2. It is urgently desired that execution of this project be completed by the year end, if at all possible, and to such end this headquarters has taken the necessary action to have trained personnel and necessary equipment in this area to meet the requirements thereof North of 12° N. Lat. by the end of August - - personnel and equipment to meet the remaining requirements by November.

3. To move this personnel and equipment forward into the positions indicated, submarine transportation offers the only practical means. Naval assistance is, therefore, essential to give effect to that phase of the project.

4. Personnel and equipment required in positions indicated North of 12° N. Lat. can be moved forward by operational submarines as heretofore, extending any temporary priority deemed necessary and appropriate.

5. If a submarine of the NAUTILUS class could be secured to make a trip into the VISAYAN ISLANDS in November and to MINDANAO in December, not only could complete and timely execution of this entire project be effected, but simultaneous delivery could be made of a substantial quantity of vitally needed equipment and supplies to our forces conducting guerilla operations in those same areas, which would, in turn, render much more probable their ability to maintain their positions until such time as direct offensive operations are possible.

6. Your comment in the premises is requested.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff

1 Incl:
Philippine Intelligence Coverage

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P.R.S. Col. Van S. 24 June 43
Merle-Smith

1. Herewith is an intelligence plan addressed to the Chief of Staff on which I would appreciate your comments, if you find your views substantially at variance with mine. My purpose in submitting this at this time is not only to have a definite objective to shoot at, but, more important, something concrete to sell to the Navy. Heretofore our action has been more or less haphazard primarily because we lacked the "tools" to work with. Now the situation is much more favorable. We have everything we need in sight and lack only forward transport facility. We have no chance of getting that until we have a definite plan ourselves from which we can at least estimate the details of our transport requirements.

2. The situation in the Philippines presents few difficulties to be overcome in planning intelligence coverage, hence I have endeavored to retain the utmost simplicity, avoiding thereby the pitfalls of complexity that so often makes complex a problem that otherwise would be simple.

3. As always, I will value your views.

C. W.

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ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

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24 June 1943



SUBJECT: Philippine Intelligence Coverage

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TO : Chief of Staff

Coordination: G-2

1. To facilitate the development of Philippine intelligence coverage, it is recommended that the plan herein outlined be adopted as a basic guide. It is purposely designed for both simplicity and flexibility, to afford economy in the employment of personnel and equipment, adequate coverage of the main sources of enemy information, security in the servicing of information once obtained and ready adjustability to meet new conditions and requirements as the military situation develops. Its principle point of variance from other similar plans, heretofore under consideration, lies in the discard of the conventional requirement of interior net control in favor of complete decentralization of the several elements that make up the intelligence system. The reason for this is obvious. The areas concerned are under enemy occupation. A system under interior net control is, as a result, always vulnerable to enemy action. Fall of the main control point destroys the entire system - - fall of a single element threatens the destruction of the main control point. There is no possible justification for taking this risk in this situation - - no purpose to be served by so doing.

2. The plan discounts existing guerilla intelligence systems, but is so designed that it can implement or be implemented by such systems or carry the whole load, however, fortune favors the guerilla action. It does however, for purposes of security, envisage complete separation from, with not so much as liaison with, guerilla activity. Furthermore, it is designed in such a way that strategic points can be reinforced from time to time as the situation requires, and there is little danger of the complete breakdown of retransmission service, regardless of the extent of the enemy occupation or his efforts to overcome it.

3. Roughly the plan provides for:

- a. Secret intelligence activity within the three important enemy held seaport centers of population, i.e. Manila, Cebu and Davao.
- b. Observation of the vital lines of sea communication, i.e. Verde Island Passage, San Bernardino Strait, Apo East and West Passes, Lingayen Gulf, Basilan Strait and Balabac Strait.
- c. The means to transmit information, once acquired, to GHQ.

With respect to a above, it is proposed to send officers, equipped with low powered radio units, into the seaports named, (eight to Manila, two to Cebu and four to Davao), whose responsibility it will be to develop interior intelligence sources from among the loyal citizenry and take such other means for securing information on enemy intention and movement as the local situation may permit.

With respect to b above, it is proposed to establish coast watcher parties consisting of one (1) officer and two (2) non-commissioned officers, similarly equipped with low powered radio units, at the points indicated on the attached plan, whose responsibility it will be to report to this headquarters and/or friendly submarine commanders all enemy sea movement observed.

With respect to c above, it is proposed to establish mobile retransmission stations at the approximate positions indicated on the attached plan. The sole function of such retransmission stations to be one of service - - to service or retransmit all messages from secret operatives and coast watcher parties to this headquarters. It is proposed that these retransmission

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stations be equipped with 100 watt radio units and staffed by a well armed military detachment consisting of two (2) officers and four (4) non-commissioned officers; that the stations themselves, for security purposes, be widely dispersed and carefully concealed in heretofore unexplored areas and operated only intermittently in accord with pre-arranged schedule, maintaining at all times sufficient mobility to permit of periodic change of position when not required to stand by for retransmission; that on its initial establishment each such station be supplied with normal replacements for one year - - that food for personnel be provided only in sufficient quantity as necessary to supplement that to be obtained from wild game and other food sources of the country itself; that the position of each station be plotted by geographical coordinates against the time that the dropping of supplies from the air becomes possible. For the purposes of morale, it is proposed that the military detachments to staff these retransmission stations shall enter into their initial positions and function thereafter as such, maintaining secrecy as to position only, for station security.

Personnel Requirements

4. To meet the initial personnel requirements of this program would necessitate the employment for a, fourteen (14) officers; for b, eight (8) officers and sixteen (16) non-commissioned officers; for c, twenty (20) officers and forty (40) non-commissioned officers, or a total of forty-two (42) officers and fifty-six (56) non-commissioned officers. All personnel to be fully trained and carefully selected and to hold grades from Lieut. Colonel down to, but not below, Technical Sergeant.

Personnel requirements can be met without modification of existing approved plans for bringing Filipino personnel to this area.

Technical Equipment

5. Technical equipment now on approved requisition is ample to cover the full initial requirements of this program.

General

6. The plan as drawn is in modification of my memorandum of 10 June 1943, Subject "Luzon Intelligence Coverage," outlining a proposed first phase of the operation, only to the extent that ROMBLON ISLAND is substituted for SAN TEODORA, Mindoro, as an improved position over the latter, and the N. W. corner of SAMAR is substituted for SAN JOSE, SORSOGON, for observation of SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT for reasons of security. In all other respects it is designed to implement the plan outlined in said memorandum.

7. Its underlying objective is complete coverage of the strategical centers and points where most information on enemy intention and movement is available and provision for a line of radio communication to this headquarters so strong as to defy his best efforts to disrupt it.

8. Retransmission facilities as planned would be ample to service any traffic reasonably to be anticipated, regardless of increase in the other elements in the system a developing situation might require. While not especially designed to implement existing guerilla intelligence facilities, the system would not only do^{so} but also would provide a positive means of evaluating information from guerilla sources. It is inherent in the plan that every element of the system be distinctly separate from every other element to avoid further compromise should the enemy succeed in overcoming any one position - - to reach as far as possible that proverbial degree of security under which "the right hand does not know what the left is doing."

9. Examination of the situation within the Philippines discloses no great difficulty that cannot be overcome to reach our objective, if we avail ourselves of certain factors present which are very much in our favor, i.e. terrain and a potentially loyal populace. This plan envisages their proper employment - - terrain for the dual purpose of observing enemy sea movement and to protect our vital lines of radio communication - - loyal populace to

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develop information obtainable through no other source. To avoid the obvious danger of elements of the system planned being overcome by the enemy in detail, it is essential that once its development has been initiated, it be prosecuted to completion as vigorously as the circumstances will permit.

10. The great difficulty to be overcome in the execution of this, or with any other plan for Philippine intelligence coverage, lies in the limitation upon forward transport facility to move personnel and equipment into position. The Navy, for the time being, holds the key to the only possible early solution. However, as for some time, it will be primarily a Navy show, the latter deriving the major benefit from the results of the operation through the immediate information thereby provided on enemy naval movements, it is possible the Navy will be amenable to utilizing its available facilities to meet the transport requirements, even at the expense of immediate operations - - this on the broad theory that once the program is in effect the benefits will far outweigh the operational delays its inauguration may have occasioned. This seems a reasonable view, and I believe that little difficulty should be experienced in obtaining full naval cooperation in the matter if the same is put up to them in full detail.

11. Accordingly, if the plan herein outlined meets with your approval, I will hold preliminary discussions concerning the same with Captain A. H. McCollum, U.S. Navy, Intelligence Officer, Allied Naval Forces, who I know is deeply interested in the detailed information the system in contemplation would provide.

COURTNEY WHITNEY
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Philippine
Regional Section




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
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PHILIPPINE ISLANDS



PLAN OF INTELLIGENCE

- Secret Intelligence
- Coast Watcher Party
- Retransmission Station
- G.H.Q. Control



Cape Bolinao

Lingayen Gulf

LUZON

Manila

Verde Island Passage

MINDORO

APC East Pass
APC West Pass

ROMBLON ID.

MARBATE

Santo Domingo Strait

SAMAR

PANAY

LEYTE

CEBU

Cebu City

BOHOL

NEGROS

MINDANAO

Davao

Basilan Strait

Balabac Strait


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PHILIPPINE ISLANDS



PLAN OF INTELLIGENCE

-  Secret Intelligence
-  Coast Watcher Party
-  Retransmission Station
-  G.H.Q. Control

