

EVACUEE REPORTS:

WORCESTER,

FREDERICK L.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION GENERAL STAFF

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20 AUG. 75



APO 500  
3 July 44

Philippine Evacuee Report #168b

Subject : NEGROS and MINDANAO  
From : Frederick Leas WORCESTER, Lieutenant Commander USNR

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Name : Frederick Leas Worcester  
Occupation : General Manager, Philippines Desiccated  
Coconut Corporation. Plantation owner.  
Service : Commissioned United States Navy Reserve  
about 1934. Called to active service  
in Manila 1 December 1941. Served in  
the Visayan Islands on an intelligence  
mission. Escaped into the mountains  
after the surrender 10 May 1942 and  
served with the guerrilla until evacu-  
ated in 1944.  
In PI : From 1900 to 1913 and from 1922 to 1944.

Interrogated by G-2 GHQ SWPA

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Commander Worcester has submitted a detailed report on his experiences in Mindanao and Negros. The following notes embody minor identifications and additional comments not included in the primary report.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 1 Dec 41 - Called to active duty.
- Dec 41 - Head of censorship organization handling all PI overseas radio, radio telephone, and cable communications.
- Jan-Feb 42 - Served on coding board on Corregidor.
- 20 Feb 42 - Sent to Visayan Islands on intelligence mission. Subsequently served in Mindanao with Andres SORIANO, Insular Treasurer, under orders of General SUTHERLAND, and later with General Manuel ROXAS under orders of General WAINWRIGHT.
- 10 May 42 - Did not surrender.
- May-Dec 42 - Kept moving in Bukidnon Province until, having heard of Col FERTIG's operations, proceeded to Misamis Occidental to join his organization.
- 26 Jan 43 - Joined Col Fertig. Served first as G-2 10th MD and then also as Deputy Chief of Staff.
- 13 Apr 43 - Started making independent missions for CO 10th MD.
- 26 Nov 43 - In Negros, acting as observer in 7th MD at the request of Lt Col ABCRDE, who made all 7th MD records available.

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- 7 Feb 44 - Proceeded to Australia on request of Lt Col Abcede to act in the temporary capacity of liaison officer to GHQ.  
15 Feb 44 - Arrived in Australia.
- \* \* \*

**GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION IN NEGROS** : Since most of the fighting has taken place in the northern sectors of Negros, Col Abcede has begun a rotation policy for his men by periodically exchanging men between the north and the south. There is a certain amount of jealousy between the north and the south and some red tape has interfered with the smooth operation of this policy, though some have actually been exchanged.

There has been some talk of forming a new division in Negros Oriental. This area has never been integrated into the organization because of the GADOR faction. If the division is created, Lt Col AUSEJO will be made division commander.

Major REYES, the District G-2 officer, has been making an inspection of the G-2 offices around Negros. His visits have been unwarned and he has been travelling incognito. He is trying to improve the set-up and the general collection of intelligence. Colonel Abcede is anxious that this organization be improved as rapidly and as much as possible and is doing all he can in this respect. GHQ instructions and guidance in this matter will receive all possible attention. NOLAN is the Division G-2. He went to the law school in the University of the Philippine Islands, but did not finish. He is reported to have a good organization, located in north Negros.

**TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION** : There are no motor boats at the disposal of the Negros command. Sail boats are the only means of water transportation.

The Japanese have placed PC spies along the west coast of Cebu to attempt to prevent the exchange of information and supplies between Cebu and Negros.

**LT COL TRANO** : Regimental CO, former PC officer of the better type. Has an unusual reputation for honesty. He is not aggressive and not very young.

**GALVAS** : Graduate of the Philippine Military Academy before Col Abcede, taken prisoner on Mindanao at time of surrender. He was a Captain then. The Japanese released him and appointed him an inspector in the BC. He escaped from Cebu with 31 men and came to Negros in September 1943.

**DE ASIS** : Located in the Amblan area at Tanjay. Reported to have ordered his men to shoot Gador on sight.

**TEVES** : There are two brothers named Teves in guerrilla activities in Central Negros, one of them being with Gador.

Guerrilla Agents In Manila

URLARTE and THUNDERBIRD planned to take a small Dutch radio set into Manila and hide it on a truck. Contact was to be made in February 1944. Commander Worcester seemed to think that if contact had not been indicated by this time that something had gone wrong.

At the time these men were in Headquarters 7th MD, in December 1943, there was a radio mechanic there who seemed a little queer. The guerrillas finally threw him out and he surrendered to the Japanese in Bacolod. It appears that the Japanese took

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him away in a plane. He would be able to identify several of the agents who had returned to Headquarters at the end of the year, including Uriarte, Thunderbird and NENE.

URIARTE : Good man, trustworthy and carries a pass issued by the Japanese. Recently went to Manila.

THUNDERBIRD : Number one man of VILLAMOR's Manila men. Recently returned to Manila with a radio.

NENE : Intelligent.

SUGAR MILLS : The guerrillas had established small sugar mills on the south coast of Negros by January 1944. The sugar was brown and coarse but insured a small supply for the Army. One mill in south Negros is now producing about 300 gantas per day. Col Abcede was carefully watching the production of the mills and when one of them was engaged in speculative dealings, he sent his men to appropriate the entire stock. Abcede is seriously trying to stop all profiteering. Attempts are being made to establish similar mills in north Negros.

COTTON : Has not been grown by the Japanese in large quantities, so far as is known, as the guerrillas interfered a great deal in the production. They shot the Japanese guards and specialists working in the fields. The Japanese had difficulty persuading the Filipinos to work in the cotton fields, and eventually had to force them.

FINANCE : Emergency currency is being soaked away against the time the Commonwealth will redeem it. The people have more money than they know what to do with. There is nothing to spend the money on, and speculation is widespread. Nothing is being done to keep the money in circulation, and little taxes are collected. Expenses are paid by the printing press.

BOWLER : Reserve officer, now with 10th MD. Is an able man and gets out with his men.

HEDGES : Was manager of the Kolambugan Lumber Company in Lanao. This is known to the Lanao Moros, and they have a feeling against him for being placed above them in command.

MONTALVAN : Believed to be the G-2 of the 10th MD. Is a good man for the job and one of the best available.

McGEE : Old man. Joined guerrillas under PENDATUN in Bukidnon. Was wounded in last war and now wears aluminum plate in skull which should be changed periodically. Believed that failure to change this plate is having a bad effect.

HIFE : Was taken prisoner on Luzon, and later released by the Japanese. Worcester knew of nothing suspicious about him but never gave him any important information.

LAEANG : Was secretary to GUINGONA when he was commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu. He is a good man and knows how to keep his mouth shut.

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REPORT ON 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT

10 January 1944

By: F. L. Worcester  
Lt. Comdr. USNR

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February 20th, 1944

FROM : Lt. Comdr. F. L. Worcester, USNR  
TO : Chief Philippine Regional Section - A. I. S.  
SUBJECT : Delay in Reporting to GHQ

1. Lt. Col. Abcede of Negros instructed me to report to you immediately after my arrival in Australia.
2. I am now confined in U. S. Navy Mobile Hospital No. 9 and present indications are that I shall not be released for a period of three weeks or more.
3. Report on the 7th Military District is attached, hereto, for your information.
4. I shall report to you in person as soon as it is possible for me to do so.

*F. L. Worcester*

F. L. Worcester

Lt. Comdr. USNR

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In the Field  
Free Negros  
Jan. 10th, 1944.

REPORT ON 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT

Early Guerrilla Activities in Negros. From the time of the surrender of our forces in Negros up to the end of July 1942 the general situation was not only confused and unsatisfactory in that some of the disbanded soldiers joined forces with the lawless element of the civilian population in a campaign of looting and extortion, in the course of which quite a number of people were killed. This resulted in the formation of certain small groups which were in the first instance primarily concerned with the protection of their own areas from further depredations, and the idea of using these troops in guerilla operations against the Japanese followed in the natural course of events.

In Negros Oriental there were four independent groups of this nature which were led by Lt. B. Vitoria who had come up from Mindanao, Ridad and Jornales who were Silliman students, and a Sgt. David Cirilio of the Philippine Constabulary. The advantages of getting these people together being obvious, Mr. Roy Bell of the Silliman Institute, on July 31st, called Lt. Vitoria to the camp which he had established at Malabo, and plans with this end in view were discussed. It was felt that if the new organization was to prosper, the services of a senior officer would be required, and word was subsequently sent to Lt. Col. Ausejo. He came to Malabo on October 14th, agreed to take over, and the formal organization of guerilla forces in Negros Oriental began at that time.

In northern Negros Capt. Mata, who had not surrendered, began at an early date to gather the men of the battalion which he had commanded, and in Negros Occidental Capt. Abcede was doing exactly the same thing with the members of his own battalion.

As a general rule command of the early guerilla organization was determined not on the basis of rank, but by a combination of the two factors of personal leadership and the number of rifles which any given individual could round up.

On both points Capt. Abcede was out in front in Negros. He even had

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between five and six hundred rifles under his command; he first engaged the Japanese at Buenavista on August 3rd, 1942; and his active operations against the enemy have continued up to the present time. Capt. Mata ran him a close second, while Lt. Col. Ausejo's organization was handicapped by lack of arms and never compared in strength or activity with the other two.

Command of 7th Military District: The expanding guerilla organizations of Lt. Col. Peralta and Col. Fertig met in Negros and Peralta emerged with Abcede and Mata as a part of his 4th Philippine Corps, while Fertig absorbed Ausejo's organization. Each one wanted the whole of the island of Negros or failing that, to have his man designated as commanding officer of the 7th District. This situation was met by giving temporary command to Maj. Villamor; presumably he supported Abcede as his successor; and in July 1943 Abcede was made acting District Commander.

Present Military Organization in Negros. The former dividing line which followed provincial boundaries has been abandoned, and the three original organizations have been combined to form the 72nd Division, which is composed of the 74th Inf. Regt. in the north, the 76th in Central Negros and the 75th in the south. The Division Commander is Lt. Col. Mata and regimental commanders are Majors Baolagon, Bormales and Domizado. The former two are P. M. A. graduates.

D. H. Q. Staff. Lt. Col. Abcede has as members of his staff Maj. B. M. Vitoria who is serving as Adjutant General and G-1; Maj. R. R. Reyes, G-2; Lt. Col. P. A. Ausejo, G-3; Maj. B. Hollero, G-4; and Capt. L. Masias, Judge Advocate.

No Chief of Staff or Executive officer has as yet been designated.

I have met all of the above officers with the exception of Maj. Reyes, and am very favorably impressed with them.

It is evident that Abcede has surrounded himself with the ablest officers whom he could find. Also he consults with them and is not afraid to delegate authority to them, the result being that he has a staff which functions normally, and he has found no necessity to try to build up a  
one man show.

Division Inspector. An inspector is kept in the field, and staff officers are likewise required to make periodic inspection trips.

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Strength. The authorized strength of the 7th District is 1,000 officers and 12,000 men. Actual strength as of Nov. 30th 1943 was 786 officers and 8,082 men.

As contrasted with the one division in Negros having 8,868 officers and men, an approximately equal number of men in Mindanao emerged as four divisions after organization had been completed.

Armament. The armament of the 72nd Division consists of something over 1,400 rifles and two machine guns.

Military Policies. Abcede does not labor under the delusion which is somewhat too common among Filipino officers and is reflected in the saying, "Just give us the arms and WE will drive the Japs out." He is well aware of the limitations of his own organization and says, perfectly clearly, that the Japanese can do anything they want in Negros if they decide to bring sufficient force to bear to carry out their plans.

The mistake made in Panay, Cebu and Mindanao in the matter of attacking strong enemy positions has not been committed in Negros.

In general the policy is one of the seeking the proper balance between a sufficient amount of action to keep up the morale of officers, men and loyal civilians - and over-aggressiveness which might force the enemy to strong retaliatory measures.

Offensive action is confined to sniping, ambushing and sabotage, while in defense the policy is one of resistance, dispersal if necessary, and quick reassembly.

In the latter connection Abcede, who is not without a sense of humor says, "This is a hit and run war. The Japs hit and we run." He can afford this little joke since his own bravery is beyond question, and since the record shows that the hit and run game has been much more expensive for the enemy than for his own forces.

Measures Taken To Protect Present Organization. 1. Dispersal of  
DHQ Offices: District Headquarters is back in the mountains at a distance from the coast which it requires a fast courier six hours to cover. No civilians may enter this area, and the number of officers who may do so is strictly limited. Station WBA is near headquarters. This location has been used since November, and a move to a different district will probably be made in the near future.

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The G-1 and G-3 CP's are beyond the end of the provincial road in southwestern Negros. The G-4 office is four hours further up the coast, while the G-2 section is in an entirely different area. In each instance there is a completely prepared reserve location back in the mountains to which an immediate move will be made in the event of an attack.

2. Warning Service, has received the attention which it merits under the conditions at present prevailing in Negros, and the speed and efficiency with which it ordinarily operates has been demonstrated to me on several occasions.

3. Secrecy Discipline. With the pro-Jap element in certain areas running as high as 70%, and with an estimated 40% of the total population of Negros under enemy control to a greater or lesser degree, the situation with reference to enemy agents is really bad and presents a serious problem. The BC's who are being brought into the province in increasing numbers furnish a further complicating factor, and the necessity for using large numbers of civilians at harvest time makes the entry of enemy agents an easy matter.

Under these circumstances special measures for the security of information have been called for, and they have been carried to a point where place names have been changed and practically all officers travel under aliases.

Col. Abcede is well aware of the fact that one of the defects of his own people is a tendency to talk too much and, while the greatest emphasis has been placed on secrecy discipline, he is not yet satisfied with the results achieved.

4. Food Reserves. Actually the greater part of the organization in the 7th District is maintaining itself in the mountains or at inland points where only limited amounts of food are produced, and the only portion of the coast really remaining under the control of our forces is that in southwestern Negros. The food problem therefore presented itself at an early stage of the game, and it has been one difficult of solution particularly since normal imports of grain from Mindanao have been cut off.

Abcede's goal has been a six month's reserve for his entire force.

When the Japanese occupied Tolong in the early part of December just



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prior to the beginning of the rice harvest in that area, that appeared to be a very serious matter. Fortunately they left after a few days and some 3,000 civilians were at once put into the fields. Though the enemy has frightened them off twice by having ships come in as though preparing for a landing, the harvest will soon be completed, and this will place the goal within sight.

The transportation alone of a sufficient amount of palay to feed 8,000 men for six months (say 60,000 cavanes) is no small problem and if that is solved and the grain is safely stored, a job of the utmost importance will have been completed.

In the measures taken to protect his central organization, in the matter of building up a large food reserve, and in the disposition of his forces, Abcede's policies have been dictated by sound common sense and he has placed himself in a strong position.

In recent months enemy garrisons strength in Negros has averaged around 3,000 men, and the fact that this figure has on two occasions been increased to 5,000 or more has not disturbed Abcede or caused him serious inconvenience. A materially larger force will be required and a well planned and costly mountain campaign will be necessary before any serious damage is done to his organization.

Development of Intelligence Service. Much emphasis has been placed on this point in the 7th District and there are at the present time 22 officers and 272 enlisted men on duty in the district intelligence organization.

Agents have been placed in all important enemy occupied areas and towns.

Weather stations have been set up at Hinobaan, Silay and Cadiz, and a crew is now putting in a new station at Sojoton Pt.

G-2 periodic Reports, which are comprehensive and well prepared, give some indication of the results achieved.

Counter-espionage activities seem neither very strong nor effective, and the weakness arises from the fact that the District has progressed perhaps too far from early guerrilla measures, and has been lean-



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ing over backwards in the matter of the treatment accorded to suspects. In view of the very large number of enemy agents who are paid all the way from \$1 per day for ignorant "peones" up to a reported \$50 to \$100 daily for top operatives, the penalty for being caught, which at present consists in a tour in an internment camp followed by a trial in which there is a good chance for acquittal, does not seem to be a sufficient deterrent.

Radio Communications. My understanding is that no radio equipment for the 7th District has been sent from Australia. If that is correct the communication system which has been worked out is creditable.

The first set in Negros which succeeded in contacting The United States was damaged at the time Headquarters at Malabo was burned. It was moved to the Zamboaguita area but has not as yet been put back into commission.

Subsequently the A.I.B. turned over to Abcede one of its sets which is now at station WBA, and furnishes the only equipment with which Abcede can reach Australia directly.

Locally made sets have been placed in operation close to three of the watcher stations.

For internal communications locally built sets are at Division HQ which also serves the 74th Regt.; at the Regimental HQ of the 75th and 76th; and there is also one station in the East Negros Sector. The District Commander is therefore in constant touch with his division and regimental commanders, and he also makes contact twice daily with the A.I.B. station EDA.

The defects of the present communications set-up are:

1. If station WBA is knocked out the only means of communicating with KAZ would through EDA.
2. There is a shortage of batteries and two of the locally built sets will soon be off the air.
3. No alcohol is being manufactured from tuba and there will be an acute fuel shortage unless this situation is corrected.
4. Abcede is unwilling simply to remain at his headquarters and does a lot of moving around, the result being that he is sometimes out of radio contact for days at a time. He should have a really good portable set to carry along with him on his inspection trips.
5. There is no watcher station at the southern end of Negros.

Also unless Col. Fertig put in a station without my knowledge, there

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is none across the way in Mindanao, and this means that the strait between the two, which is quite an important waterway, is not kept under proper observation.

A map of Negros showing present and proposed radio stations is enclosed. Memorandum covering radio equipment and supplies, representing the maximum for which the 7th District hopes, is likewise enclosed.

Pay Scale and Allowances

1. Officers: All officers receive exactly the same pay and allowances. Base pay is \$75 per month, and there is an allowance of \$25 per month for legal wife (if living); \$15 for the first child; \$10 for the second child; \$5 for the third; and \$5 for each succeeding child. Actual travelling expense is allowed. The food allowance for both officers and men is .40 per day.

2. NCOs and EM. Tabulation of pay and allowances for non-coms and enlisted men follows:

	Monthly Pay	Allowances for wife and children.						
Master Sgt.	\$40	\$15	-	8	-	3	-	2
1st Sgt.	30	12	-	8	-	3	-	2
Corp	20	8	-	3	-	2	-	1
Pvt 1st Class	17	8	-	3	-	2	-	1
Pvt 2nd Class	15	8	-	3	-	2	-	1

No expansion of Present Force Contemplated. Abeode is not at the present time planning any increase in the size of his force.

Men contracting malaria are sent to their homes when that is possible, since in the large majority of cases no treatment of any sort can be given, and without treatment they are useless in the field. The training of replacements must therefore continue.

American EM in 7th MD. Seven American enlisted men escaped from the Japanese at Bacolod, and others who drifted in from different islands brought the total number in Negros to eleven. One recent arrival from Panay has not joined up, but the remaining ten are on duty with our forces.

The policy followed with reference to these men has been a sensible one and has worked out satisfactorily. All of them were made sergeants and were first given not desk jobs but duty with troops. After being kept under observation for a period of four months, four were commissioned and

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the two most promising of these are now attached to HQ as liaison officers. The remaining two officers and six sergeants are with combat units in the north.

Lt. Col. Abeede seems well pleased with this group as a whole and says that certain individuals have rendered exceptionally good service.

As for the men, the three whom I have met are most appreciative of the treatment which they have received from senior officers. All three likewise report having had difficulties with individuals among the junior Filipino officers. One would like to get out of this country when it is possible to do so, one is undecided on this point, and one is definite in his statement that he would prefer to remain in Negros and see the show through here. All three have malaria.

General Service School. There is no lack of manpower for replacements in the present guerilla organization, or for expansion if that action is decided upon at some later date, but there is a shortage of properly trained officers.

With a view to improving this condition a general service school providing a six weeks course for twenty officers, twenty applicants for commissions, and twenty enlisted men was placed in operation in April 1945.

While there are several PMA graduates on duty in Negros these men are needed in the field, and Abeede would like very much to have four American officers for instructors in this school.

Rotation of Officers and Men. In recent months practically all of the fighting has been in the north section and, with view to keeping up the tone of the organization as a whole, the policy of rotating officers and men in combat zones is being followed.

Records. The statement that the records of the 7th District are in general in excellent condition will be borne out by the detailed reports forwarded to HQ.

It has been necessary in the past to burn some records as on the occasion when the Japanese attacked HQ at Malabo, but none have been compromised.

Records are not allowed to accumulate in the offices where current files only are maintained, but are transferred as promptly as possible to a hidden storehouse where they are placed in bamboo tubes.

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A guard detail of one officer and three men is maintained at this building.

Morale. The problem in the 7th District at the present time is not to build up fighting spirit, but to keep ill-advised offensive action in check. The morale of both officers and men is good.

Health Conditions. Malaria is presenting an increasingly serious problem and it is estimated that 40% of the men in the 76th Regiment are now infected. Conditions in the 74th and 75th are less bad, but this is obviously a matter which requires careful attention.

In view of the extent of the malarial districts in the mountains of Negros, effective control measures are out of the question, and there is no present prospect of being able to equip the men with mosquito nets.

At the base hospital at Dumawan experiments are being conducted with dita bark which has now been successfully reduced to pill form, but the most effective dosage for the various different types of malaria has not yet been worked out and treatment with dita extracts which has proved effective in some cases, will doubtless remain on a hit or miss basis.

Abcede side-stepped my inquiry as to what priority he had given to his requests for quinine, and it was only recently that I discovered, to my great surprise, that no medicines have been sent to the 7th District during the six months which have passed since Abcede was designated as acting District Commander.

The incidence of malaria is now so high as to weaken Abcede's forces to a serious extent, and the minimum initial requirements would be for a sufficient amount of quinine (both in pill form and in solution for intravenous injections), atabrine, and salvarsan to treat 2,000 cases.

Civil Government. Maj. Villamore and Abcede were responsible for the appointment of Montelibano as governor of Negros. Montelibano was formerly mayor of Bacolod and resigned from that position because of differences of opinion with President Queson. He is a strong man and has a large following.

Because of the difficulties of communication, Negros has been divided into 7 districts, and deputy governors for each district have been appointed by Montelibano.

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In all areas under the control of our forces town mayors, consejales and tenientes de barrio are discharging their duties in a manner which has been on the whole satisfactory.

The court of first instance is not functioning, but J.P. courts are in operation.

Relations with Civilians. The necessity of retaining the cooperation of the civilians in "Free Negros" is both understood and fully appreciated, and relations between the army and the civil population are on the whole satisfactory. Governor Montelibano has been particularly helpful in maintaining this relationship.

Morale of Civilians. After the panic which attended the Japanese attack on Misamis Occidental, it came as a surprise to see the people of Zamboangita moving out in orderly and almost leisurely fashion where an enemy force was moving towards the town and was burning barrios only five kilometers away. The answer was that these people all had places to which they could go; they had brought to town with them only the barest necessities which could easily be moved; and they trusted the warning service to get them started in time. While the morale of the people in Free Negros is good, there are special factors which will contribute towards its decline in the months to come.

Aside from the intensive Japanese propoganda campaign and the growing discouragement of the people who have not seen so much as one American ship or plane for a period of twenty months, the Japanese are using in Negros three additional weapons which are not available to them in all parts of the Philippines. They are:

1. Food. The importation of rice and the control of crops in the occupied areas has placed the Japanese in a position where they can offer food to people who are growing increasingly hungry and who are troubled by inflation which in certain areas has carried the price of rice up to ₱50 to ₱75 per cavan.
2. Terror. In Panay the Japanese instituted a reign of terror in Guimaras and the southeastern portion of the island in which an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 civilians - men, women and children were killed, and it seems quite possible that a similar policy will be

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pursued here. The declaration of a "bandit zone" contained a clear statement that the properties of civilians remaining in specified areas would be confiscated, and the people themselves would be simply killed off. In view of what is known already to have happened in Panay this terror propoganda has been quite successful, and will be much more so if it is actually put into effect.

3. Quinine. The Japanese have been quick to realize the value of quinine as a propoganda weapon, and to use it. The results are that civilians who are infected with malaria can take the chance of dying in the mountains, or move into enemy controlled areas where they know they can get all the quinine they need at minimum prices.

The answer is that taking all things into consideration the civilians in Free Negros are really in a hard position, and it is only reasonable to suppose that so long as the present general situation continues, they will go over to the Japanese side in increasing numbers.

Mountain Campaign. The problem set forth in the preceding paragraph is one of Abcede's troubles since the loss of civilian support would be fatal, - and strong enemy offensive action may soon be another.

The campaign to clear the guerillas out of the mountains was originally scheduled to begin on Dec. 1st, 1943. Beginning at that time several barrios were burned; Zamboanguita, Si. Jan and Tolong were occupied; and then the Japanese, having met nothing in the way of opposition, withdrew.

Jan. 1st, 1944 was the next date set for the big push, then Jan. 10th, and finally Feb. 1st.

It is reported that General Ronch has arrived from Manila to take charge of the mountain campaign; the occupation of Sipalay and very recently again of Siaton has given greater control of the southwest coast; and plane and patrol activity is increasing.

If the mountain campaign materializes and is prosecuted vigorously by a strong force the only thing which can save Abcede's organization will be the reserve of food which he has built up - and that will last for a <sup>92</sup> period not exceeding six months.

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Currency. Emergency currency is being issued under the jurisdiction of the Negros Emergency Currency Board of which Montelibano is chairman, and the provincial Treasurer and provincial Auditor are members.

As in Mindanao there is an extreme shortage of bills of small denomination resulting from the fact that there is an insufficient supply of suitable paper, and this is a matter of great inconvenience.

Abcede has no responsibility for currency issued beyond the amount required for his own organization, and it is understood this is at present limited to a maximum of \$1,000,000 per month.

The Japanese have recently put out bills which for the first time have borne serial numbers, but these bills are freely exchanged for the emergency currency certificates on a basis of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 1.

Capture of Americans. On Nov. 24th, the Japanese raided Maj. Bell's camp and while he and the members of his family were so fortunate as to be able to escape, Rev. and Mrs. Alvin Scott and their son Lawrence were captured.

In a second raid on Nov. 27th, Dr. and Mrs. James Chapman, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Gluas, Mrs. Jean Lowry and her young son Billy were taken.

Early reports from intelligence agents in Zamboanga were to the effect that these people were being held in one of the buildings of the Billman Institute, and that they had not been maltreated by the Japanese.

Industrial and Agricultural Exploitation. Prior to the surrender nothing effective seems to have been done by our forces in Negros in the matter of disabling manufacturing plants and destroying stocks which would be useful to the enemy, and the result is that this island has turned out to be of more value to the Japanese than many of the others.

1. Sugar Centrals. The manufacture of sugar is not possible since there has been no replanting of the cane fields, and the hacenderos are growing only enough for seed purposes for use at such time as a new start can be made.

There are, however, large stocks of sugar on hand, the greater part of which has fallen into the hands of the Japanese. Figures as to total exports are not available, but it is known that even now 200,000 piculs



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have been concentrated at Bais alone.

Alcohol is being manufactured from sugar at the Talisay Milling Co., and at the Manapla, Lopes and Bais Centrals. 500,000 liters are known to have been shipped thus far, and this is only a small part of what can be made before existing stocks of sugar are exhausted.

The cellulose factory in the Tabacelera Central at Bais is likewise in operation.

2. Mines. The Japanese have had the manganese mine on Siquijor Island in production for some months.

They have now occupied Sipalay on the southwest coast of Negros and are making an investigation at the San Remigio copper mine. This is, however, an undeveloped property and it seems improbable that they will be able to do anything with it.

3. Sawmills. In Mindanao the writer called the attention of Lt. Col. Humber and of Gen. Fort to the fact that the manager of the Kolombugan Lumber Co. was unwilling to take any action in the matter of the destruction of the mill and stocks of lumber on hand exceeding 10,000,000 b.f., and that no preparations with this end in view had been made by the army. Gen Fort issued the necessary instructions to Capt. (later Lt. Col.) Morgan, and at the proper time a thorough job was done.

In Negros no one seems to have been sufficiently interested to have similar preparations made at Fabrica, and the Insular Lumber Co. mill, together with stocks on hand doubtless exceeding those at Kolombugan, fell into the hands of the Japanese undamaged. The building of launches and small boats was at once begun, and the mill was kept in operation up to Sept. 1943 at which time it was sabotaged by company employees.

4. Cotton. In spite of propoganda, crop loans, and guarantees against loss the cotton production program in Negros has thus far been a failure. This has been due to lack of interest on the part of the hacenderos and to climatic conditions which are somewhat unfavorable. The only planting of any importance has been done at La Carlota.

5. Copra. is purchased at a price of \$7.50 per M kilos for resaca, and is being milled at Cebu.



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6. Rice. The Japanese are buying all the rice which they can get their hands on in areas under their direct control, and this gives them an added hold over the people since they can subsequently withhold rice from those who are not "cooperating" to their satisfaction, or give it out free to those whom they wish to attract.

In Free Negroes rice is simply stolen by their foraging patrols when that proves possible, while in intermediate zones our agents openly compete with theirs for the purchase of the disposable surplus.

Food Situation. In order to meet the food requirements of the army, the original plan was that the army would call upon the civil government for the food which it needed, and the government in turn would take the responsibility of obtaining it from the people. Since this arrangement proved cumbersome and unsatisfactory it was discarded, and the army is now going directly to the people for its requirements.

At present the army is taking 30% of the corn and 50% of rice grown in areas under its control at prices which are fixed by the army but are maintained at reasonable levels. It is specifically provided that a sufficient amount of grain must be left with the producer for seed purposes and to meet the requirements of his own family.

In the past these percentages have sometimes been exceeded; while there has been no well grounded complaint as to prices, payment has been slow; and a sufficient amount of grain has not always been left with the farmer. Special efforts have been made to correct these mistakes, and the purchase of the rice produced in December and January was well handled. That does not, however, solve the principal problem which arises from the fact that military activities have curtailed production, and the imports which have been necessary even in normal times have been cut off.

The rice paddies in southern Negroes are not irrigated and produce only one crop per year. The corn crop due in February will be short because of excessive rainfall, and no more food of any importance can be expected until July.

While <sup>no</sup> one has starved in Negroes as yet, a large percentage of the people are undernourished and famine conditions will prevail in certain

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areas by May and June.

The efforts of the civil government and of the army to get the people to plant camotes, cassava and other root crops have to a large extent failed primarily since this new departure is contrary to "costumbre".

The plain answer is that Negros is not at the present time producing enough food to feed its own people, and unless this situation is corrected the results will be extremely serious.

Future Deliveries of Supplies. The suggestion has been made to Abcede that in radio messages referring to the delivery of supplies, contact points be referred to by number rather than by name, and that as a further precaution the days of the month be reversed, - the 31st referring to the first day of each month, the 30th to the second day etc.

Memorandum in this connection is attached as enclosure No. 3.

Copy of this memorandum has been furnished to Abcede.

This arrangement is, of course, subject to your approval.

Philippine Army Air Corps Unit (A.I.B.). When Lt. Col. Edwin Andrews heard of my arrival in Negros, he at once issued to me a courteous invitation to pay him a visit at what I understood to be Philippine Army Air Corps H. Q. Lt. Col. Andrews did not, at that time, know that my connection with the 10th District had been terminated, and he was well aware of the fact that my views did not coincide with his on certain phases of the Pindatum matter. The invitation was one which I was pleased to accept, and it was not until after my arrival that I found the P. A. A. designation to be a blind, and that the organization was actually a branch of the A.I.B.

It would have been a matter of great interest to me to check over A.I.B. files but, being without authority to make such an examination, no such proposal was made and it has, in consequence, been necessary for me to form my opinions of A.I.B. operations on the basis of external indications rather than on the much sounder one of actual performance.

The camp serving as the present base of operations is one-half hour walk from the beach. There is at this camp a small "Dutch" transmitter and receiver which maintains contact with KAZ, WBA and EPA-1.

The main station is three hours further back in the mountains, and a third reserve location has been prepared.

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The A.I.B. has a radio station of its own in north Negros, and three sets are in operation on other islands.

I have met a large majority of the twenty-four principal agents, and they constitute the best group of young Filipinos which I have seen since the war began.

In view of the type of men employed, the specialized training which they received under Maj. Villanore, and the scope of their operations, I am quite willing to venture the opinion that this branch of the A.I.B. is the best source of intelligence information which you have in the Philippines today.

Lt. Col. Andrews has cooperated with me in every way possible under existing conditions, and it has been advantageous to me to be able to check with him and with his agents not only specific points but particularly certain generalities (army relations with civilians, with civil government, morale etc.) appearing in this report.

Andrews has asked if I thought him correct in forwarding reports from agents just as they are received, and without comment, and the suggestion has been made to him that he also prepare monthly reports reviewing important developments during the period under review and containing his evaluation of the data submitted by agents.

No copies of radio communications with GHQ are retained except for those containing specific authorization in financial matters.

It would greatly facilitate the work of the A.I.B., and likewise of Abcede's intelligence agents, if the funds required for use in enemy occupied territory could be furnished either in Japanese currency or in Philippine bills of large denomination.

Andrews has special qualifications for the position which he now holds in that he is a handwriting expert, and has had previous training in intelligence work. His opinion of Abcede is very high, and he is cooperating to the fullest possible extent with him.

Independent Units. The only two independent units which have been operating in Negros are those led by a civilian named Margarito Gemillan, known locally as "Puring's", and by "Maj. General" Gabriel R. Gador.

"Puring's" unit which is armed with three machine guns, a few auto-



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matic weapons, and an estimated 75 rifles has not as yet shown any disposition to join Abcede's forces, and personal grudges have developed between members of this band and our troops in adjoining areas. "Puring" has, up to the present time, been unwilling to shift his small force to other territory, and the friction which now exists would make its absorption into the 72nd Division difficult. "Puring" is, however, running very short of ammunition and this fact should furnish a satisfactory solution of this problem. If that does not prove to be the case, the difficulty is not in any event of material importance in view of the small size of the force, and "Puring's" inability to expand it. The present policy is to ignore this band, but not to permit interference of any sort from it.

While Lt. Col. Gador's organization has also been a small one, that problem has been much more serious in that it has involved the ranking P.A. officer who has been making any pretext of resistance to the Japanese.

Gador remained in the mountains after the surrender and displayed no interest in early guerilla activities in Negros. In September, however, he began to gather a group of men, and to evolve rather large ideas. Having heard that Lt. Col. Fertig, whom he ranked, had made himself a Brigadier General, he followed the advice of his G-2, Luis Dionaldo, took for himself the rank of Major General and, on January 27th, 1943 issued General Order No. 1 assuming command of all USAFFE forces in the Philippines. At that time he controlled less than thirty rifles.

The forces in Negros Oriental under the command of Lt. Col. Ausejo had, in the meantime, joined Fertig's organization, and friction between Gador's men and Ausejo's soon developed. Lt. Col. Fertig was advised of this situation and Mr. Bell, who was then acting as his director of civil affairs, went to see Gador with the result that he was detained for five days and was publicly ridiculed. At that point the problem in so far as it concerned the 10th District was left to solve itself with the result that it became worse rather than better. Gador increased his following and surrounded himself with a large group of officers many of whom were, in the early stages, convinced of the justice of his claims.



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Couriers of Ausejo and Abcede were intercepted, officers and men were disarmed, and finally there were armed encounters involving the death of a limited number of men on both sides.

It would, of course, have been an easy matter simply to eliminate Gador at any time, and it is due only to the restraining influence first of Ausejo, later of Villamore, and finally of Abcede that this was not done.

After his appointment as acting district commander, Villamore tried to draw Gador into the organization, and made him his executive officer. Shortly thereafter the Japanese landed at Tolong, which was nearly one hundred kilometers away from the place where IHQ was then located, and Gador promptly took off in the middle of the night, and returned to his own area. He was relieved of his duties.

Subsequently, abuses of the civilian population in the Tanjay region and the growing realization on the part of Gador's officers that they had perhaps been misled, brought about a decline in his power and popularity. Some officers shifted their allegiance to Abcede, and were, in consequence, threatened with the death penalty for desertion. This did not have the desired effect, and more came over.

With this indication of growing weakness, Abcede began to strengthen his forces in the vicinity of the territory controlled by Gador, and this had the effect which had been hoped for.

On Dec. 7th advice reached IHQ that Gador, accompanied by three officers only had left Negros by banca enroute to Cebu. There was no armed encounter, and not a shot was fired.

Many of Gador's men have now come over, bringing their rifles with them, and his officers are reporting to IHQ with the hope of being taken into Abcede's organization.

The Gador problem has, therefore, finally been settled, and the solution seems the best one which could possibly have been found.

Lt. Col. Morgan's Trip to Visayas. In June 1943 Lt. Col. Morgan, who had with him a group of fifty or more armed men, landed on the island of Siquijor. After looking the situation over he issued general orders promoting Maj. Benito Cunanan, the C.O. of the 4th Provisional Battalion, 75th Inf., 7th M.D. to the rank of Lt. Colonel.

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Morgan next issued special orders designating Gumanan as Commanding Officer of the 8th Military District.

Both orders were signed "By Command of Brigadier General W. W. Fertig".

With this small matter disposed of, Morgan proceeded to Negros where he announced that he planned to make a tour of the inland to acquaint himself with the local situation with a view to settling command problems in the 7th district. This he was not permitted to do and, prior to his departing for Mindanao, he was required by Villamore to revoke the orders issued to Gumanan.

Internal Difficulties - Contrast between 10th and 7th Districts.

Since being designated as commanding officer of the 10th District, Col. Fertig has had trouble of a rather serious nature with Lt. Col. McLish, a division commander, who has maintained a large degree of independence which has brought about confusion on numerous occasions; with Maj. Pindatun who requested that his regiment be released and permitted to operate independently; and with Maj. (Lt. Col.) Andrews who requested transfer to Negros. Maj. Lisena, a regimental commander, led a mutiny lasting over four months. Maj. Jaldon, a regimental commander, made a truce with the Japanese without authorization from headquarters. Maj. Cabili, the former assemblyman for Lanao, has become very antagonistic, and his assistance in Lanao hence cannot be counted upon. Col. Fertig's Adjutant General has been placed on inactive duty; his Deputy Chief of Staff requested to be relieved of his duties, which request was granted, and his Chief of Staff over whom no real control of any sort had ever been maintained, finally attempted a palace revolution.

While the 7th District is much smaller than the 10th in point of size, there is little difference in the number of men in the military establishments of the two.

Since being designated as acting commander of the 7th District, Lt. Col. Abcede has had no similar difficulties with any of the senior officers serving under him with the exception of a Maj. MacLanshan. This officer has become openly Anti-Filipino and should in my opinion be gotten out of the country. Abcede made no complaint against him, and the criticism of his actions and attitude came from other sources including reputable American residents of Negros.

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Relations between the 7th and other Districts. 6th. In the past Abcede and Peralta have worked quite closely together. That is no longer true since radio contact with Panay was lost in October and there is no communication between the two Districts at the present time. As a matter of fact very little is known as to present conditions in the 6th District, but it is believed that Peralta's organization has been rather badly knocked about. If that proves to be the case, the results may not be entirely bad since Peralta was getting quite "important" even as far as Abcede was concerned. At such time as he has completed his re-organization and resumed his normal contacts, he can again expect to get good cooperation from Abcede if he wants it.

8th. Penton always pursued a very independent course of action, was secretive as to his operations, and did not apparently desire contacts of any sort outside of Cebu.

Since Cushing has succeeded to the command, this situation has been completely changed and Cebu and Negros are now working closely together. Intelligence information is exchanged almost daily, and there is a tentative agreement that if the Japanese succeed in placing Cushing in a hopeless position, instead of disbanding his men and going out of action, he will if possible, shift his base of operations to Negros and carry on the fight here.

In view of the great difficulty which Abcede has had in building up a food reserve for his own organization, his offer to take care of Cushing and his men in any emergency which may arise is extremely generous and serves as an excellent illustration of the type of cooperation which should obtain between all Districts - but often does not. The 10th is a case in point.

10th. 1. Banca Traffic. Without advice to Abcede, Col. Fertig closed down all banca traffic between Mindanao and Negros. This was done presumably with the intention of controlling the entry of enemy operatives. The result has been a serious food shortage in the Zamboanguita area, which has never been self sustaining in the matter of food, and has depended upon imports from northwestern Mindanao. By the latter part of November 1945 the food reserve for the troops stationed



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at Zamboaguita had been completely exhausted, and civilians were paying as much as P1 per ganta for corn though fifty miles away there was a large exportable surplus which was selling locally at one fifth of that price. With the headquarters of the 10th District transferred to Agusan, and with no forces of any importance operating around Dipolog and Katipunan, there would seem to be no good reason for continuing such drastic control of transportation, and the recommendation was made to Abcede that he refer this matter to Col. Fertig by radio, and request at least a temporary lifting of present restrictions. The outcome is not known.

2. Morgan. The actions of Lt. Col. Morgan on the occasion of his visit to Negros did not contribute to a better understanding between the 7th and 10th Districts.

3. Andrews. Prior to the departure of Maj. Villanore for the south, Col. Fertig frequently requested information from the A.I.B., and also used its station for relaying traffic to Ingeniero in Bohol. When he discovered that Andrews had been left in charge of this organization, there was a noticeable change in both the number and tone of his communications, - and they have now stopped entirely.

4. Abcede. is aware of the fact that Fertig opposed his appointment as district commander, but he understands that it was only natural under the circumstances for him to back Ausejo. Abcede is, however, resentful of the unwillingness to let bygones be bygones, and of the fact that unpleasant statements concerning both him and his district continue to emanate from Mindanao.

5. Villanore. Very definite anti-Villanore propoganda was put out in Mindanao and both the nature and the source of the propoganda are known to me. An agent of the A.I.B. picked up these stories not in Mindanao but from officers returning to Bohol from the 10th District, and made a report upon this matter. Villanore was, quite naturally, offended and this has doubtless influenced his attitude towards the 10th District.

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The answer is that relations between the 10th and 7th Districts are not satisfactory and, to the best of my knowledge, the fault in that

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matter does not rest with the 7th.

Radio contact with the 10th District was lost on Dec. 23rd. It is not known if Col. Fertig's stations are off the air, or if the contact is one which he feels it is not worth his while to maintain.

Inter District Politics. Since his designation as commanding officer of the 10th District, Col. Fertig has not confined his attention to Mindanao, but has continued to interest himself in the Visayas.

In the recent past Ingenero and Cangleon have been designated as area commanders for Bohol and Leyte respectively. Since both of these officers had been backed by Fertig, it may be presumed that they will remain in his camp.

Col. Fertig has not, however, been equally successful in other quarters, and the result has been a campaign the purpose of which is sufficiently obvious. Derogatory statements have been made concerning Penton, Cushing and the 8th District; Villamor, Abcede and the 7th; and Feralta and the 6th.

The most recent occasion on which propoganda of this nature is reported to have been put out was at meetings in Agusan during November 1943 attended by Fertig, Ingenero, Cangleon and assemblyman Lopez and Gov. Abellano of Cebu.

Over a period of months enough discreditable statements have found their way back to the people concerned to arouse open resentment, and the result has been a division in the districts with Mindanao, Leyte and Bohol ranged against Cebu, Negros and Panay.

This may appear to be a matter of small moment, but when Cushing is fighting with his back to the wall in Cebu and is hindered rather than helped by Ingenero who is at the same time boasting about the supplies which he has received, - and when Abcede, who may be facing a major campaign, has never received ammunition or even medicines during the six months which have passed since he was made acting district commander, it is not unnatural that both men should worry for fear the campaign of misrepresentation has been carried beyond the Philippines, and has been in some measure successful.

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Major Cushing. It has come as a most unusual experience to hear the ranking officers of one district expressing open admiration of work done elsewhere, and it has been a pleasure to find that in Negros Maj. Cushing is very highly thought of.

While the feeling here is that the general policy pursued in both the 6th and 8th Districts was over-aggressive and hence forced the Japanese to take decisive action which has proved damaging in both cases, this does not alter the fact that the fighting spirit and the military accomplishments of the troops in the 8th District are much admired.

The co-command in Cebu worked out in such a way that Fenton remained at his headquarters and handled all administrative details while Cushing spent almost his entire time in the field.

It is generally conceded that Cushing must be credited with accounting for more Japanese than any other commander of guerilla forces in this country.

No one seems to blame Cushing for the excessive number of executions in Cebu, and the belief held by Filipinos in general is that responsibility for this mistake rests exclusively with Fenton.

Fenton, who was quite probably mentally unbalanced, was killed by his own men in September. His organization had already been put practically out of action and Cushing was in Negros at the time. He remained here for over two months during which time he was seriously ill with malaria and with a series of abscesses, and then returned to Cebu.

On Dec. 20th Abcede broadcast orders for all members of the Cebu organization who were in Negros to rejoin their commander. Cushing court-martialed and executed Lt. Col. Estrella who had killed Fenton and seized command, reorganized his force, went into action once more, and he is now being attacked heavily by the Japanese.

The feeling here is that Maj. Cushing deserves a citation as much as anyone who has been connected with guerilla activities in the Philippines.

Major H. R. Bell. Maj. Bell furnished the leadership of the earliest guerilla activities in Negros Oriental: he was the first man in the district to establish radio contact with the United States, and also took

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to Mindanao and placed in operation Col. Fertig's first radio equipment; he next served as Director of Civil affairs for the province; and is now acting as chairman of the Research Board for the 7th District.

In these various capacities he has travelled all over the island of Negros, and has made one trip to Mindanao, and one to Cebu in the course of which his banca was shelled by a Japanese vessel.

On June 19th, 1943 Major Bell's camp was burned by an enemy patrol, and he had a narrow escape. On Nov. 24th, at a time when he was confined to his bed by malaria, the Japanese burned his second camp, and on this occasion he was shot in the leg.

Maj. Bell commands the respect of all loyal elements on the island, to work which he has done is widely known and appreciated, and the hope has been expressed in several different quarters that he will receive some special recognition for the service which he has rendered.

Ausejo. Lt. Col. Ausejo is about fourteen years older than Abcede and has had some twenty-four years service. In the circumstances it was not an easy matter for him to step aside, but once the decision was reached to give command of the 7th District to Abcede, he accepted that situation without complaint, and he has not merely obeyed orders but has contributed his share towards the satisfactory general situation which obtains at this time.

Major Cruz, or "Dr. Suylan" as he is known locally, expects to be returning to the United States.

His mission is believed to have been primarily to check on the present condition of President Quason's political fences. It appears that he has found them in a state of disrepair, and his report will be that in any free and uncontrolled election after the war, Manuel Roxas would win in a walk.

He will also report that the Filipinos are more interested in the return of our forces than in independence.

Montelibano. There has always been a certain amount of jealousy between the two provinces in Negros, and it would be difficult if not impossible to find any one man who could keep both of them entirely satisfied. In Montelibano's case some of the people in Negros Oriental feel that they are being neglected, but even though this is true it,



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probably results primarily from the fact that the governor is fifteen days away in point of time.

In any event the advantages of having one governor for the whole island seem to outweigh the disadvantages which would result from having two, and the great benefit in the present set up is found in the extent to which Montelibano and the provincial officials are cooperating with our forces.

As illustrations of this point, Montelibano has obtained over \$100,000 in Japanese currency for the use of Aboede's intelligence agents and the A.I.B.; he has likewise obtained quite a large amount of Japanese quinine which was most urgently needed; he has reorganized the volunteer guards; working through loyal puppet officials he has obtained food for our forces from areas under direct Japanese control; he has sought at all times to maintain good relations between the civil population and the army etc.

Montelibano's position and reputation in Negros is becoming similar to that of Confesor in Panay, but whereas there has been considerable friction between Confesor and Peralta, nothing of this sort has developed in the 7th District.

Villanore. Prior to my arrival in Negros I had been influenced by statements made concerning Villanore, and it has been necessary for me to revise my views on various points.

While my personal views are not of importance, facts are, and if issue cannot be taken with the following statements, the facts will speak for themselves:

1. Villanore was responsible for the unification of the forces of Ausejo, Mata and Aboede.
2. Villanore was partially responsible for the choice of Montelibano as Governor, and this has worked out most satisfactorily.
3. Villanore set up the local branch of the A.I.B. which has developed into one of the most important sources of intelligence information which you have in this country.
4. Villanore was responsible for the designation of Aboede as District commander, and the wisdom of this choice has been proven



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by the results achieved.

Abcede. Lt. Col. Abcede was born at Olongapo; and his father, who was working for the Navy as a machinist, died there in 1932. As a boy Abcede acted as a caddie on the Olongapo golf course, and later served as mess attendant. He was early brought under American influence, and is quite "American" in many of his ideas and reactions.

Abcede is young, energetic and aggressive. He is a well trained and competent officer. He has surrounded himself with the ablest officers whom he could find. He organized his own force in the early days of guerilla activities, led it himself, and in one capacity or another has been fighting the Japanese ever since.

He has kept himself quite free of "politics" and has the fullest cooperation from the commanding officer of Cebu, also from Governor Montelibano and provincial officials, and from the A.I.B.

He has travelled in every part of his district; keeps in close personal touch with his organization; commands the respect of his officers and men; and finally he is a disciplinarian who deals directly and decisively with troubles as they arise.

It is thanks in large measure to these qualities that the 7th District, which has had its full share of troubles in the past, has emerged as a closely knit and well controlled military organization which, under increasingly heavy enemy pressure, has grown in strength and unity, and which, judged either as a military set-up or as a guerilla fighting unit, is, in my opinion, the soundest organization which you have in the Philippines today.

*F. L. Worcester.*

F. L. Worcester

Lt. Comdr. USNR.

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UNITED STATES SURGEON IN THE PHILIPPINES  
SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

OP-1  
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RADIO EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES

1. At least two (2) - Complete "DUTCH" transmitters with communications type receivers, gasoline-engine driven power plants, antennae, spare tubes and parts; similar to the equipment of NBA.
2. At least five (5) - Complete storage battery-powered transmitters with communications type receivers, batteries, battery chargers, antennae, spare tubes, parts and battery testers, similar to the equipment of PAAC (Major VILLAMOR'S).
3. At least one (1) - Complete portable dry battery-powered transmitters with receivers, batteries, antennae, packs, spare tubes, batteries and parts for each Sub-Sector, or Battalion Headquarters.

SIGNAL SUPPLIES

1. Any available quantity of -
  - a. Lineman's Pouch, leather
  - b. Lineman's Pliers, TL
  - c. Lineman's Knife, TL-29
  - d. Message Center Clocks
  - e. Pocket Watches
  - f. Flashlights, TL-122-A
  - g. Batteries, BA-30
  - h. Flashlight Bulbs, PR-6
  - i. Message Blank Books
  - j. Friction Tape, 3/4"
  - k. Rubber Tape, 3/4"
  - l. Sulphuric Acid
  - m. Assortment of metallized resistors; paper, mica and electrolytic condensers suitable for transmitter construction.
  - n. Assortment of metal tubes and sockets, like 6L6, 6F6, etc. suitable for making small portable transmitters.
2. At least one (1) - copy each of Signal Corps Manual, TM 2280-5 and JANP
3. At least five (5) - Prismatic Compass with case
4. At least five (5) - Field Glass with case
5. At least one (1) - Set Tester and Tube Analyser
6. At least five (5) - Voltmeter, 0-3-15-150V., 0-3-15-30A., D.C.
7. At least five (5) - Sets, assorted socket wrenches, long-nosed pliers, screw-drivers, soldering iron and resin-core solder.

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JOSE G. SALAZAR  
Major, GAC  
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G2W

Place names taken from Coast & Geodetic Survey Chart No. 4718 published December, 1936 and re-issued June, 1939.

CONTACT POINTS

1. Bonbonon Pt.
2. Sisten Pt.
3. Giligson Pt.
4. Molocenan
5. Mansalongon
6. Nagtalaye
7. Tolong Vieje
8. Telong
9. Camilan Pt.
10. Bassy
11. Balatong Pt.
12. Kulipapa
13. Deog Pt.
14. Asia
15. Jinobarn
16. Gatmon Pt.
17. Camponnes Bay
18. Danjagan Is.



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Also reverse days of the month beginning month with the 31st. Example  
Example " Contact Point 10 May 27th " would refer to " Bassy - May 9th ".

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REPORT ON 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT

10 January 1944

By: F. L. Worcester  
Lt. Comdr. USNR

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February 20th, 1944

FROM : Lt. Comdr. F. L. Worcester, USNR  
TO : Chief Philippine Regional Section - A. I. B.  
SUBJECT : Delay in Reporting to GHQ

1. Lt. Col. Abeede of Negros instructed me to report to you immediately after my arrival in Australia.
2. I am now confined in U. S. Navy Mobile Hospital No. 9 and present indications are that I shall not be released for a period of three weeks or more.
3. Report on the 7th Military District is attached, hereto, for your information.
4. I shall report to you in person as soon as it is possible for me to do so.

*F. L. Worcester*

F. L. Worcester

Lt. Comdr. USNR

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In the Field  
Free Negros  
Jan. 10th, 1964.

REPORT ON 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT

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Early Guerilla Activities in Negros. From the time of the surrender of our forces in Negros up to the end of July 1942 the general situation was not only confused and unsatisfactory in that some of the disbanded soldiers joined forces with the lawless element of the civilian population in a campaign of looting and extortion, in the course of which quite a number of people were killed. This resulted in the formation of certain small groups which were in the first instance primarily concerned with the protection of their own areas from further depredations, and the idea of using these troops in guerilla operations against the Japanese followed in the natural course of events.

In Negros Oriental there were four independent groups of this nature which were led by Lt. B. Vitoria who had come up from Mindanao, Ridad and Jornales who were Silliman students, and a Sgt. David Cirilio of the Philippine Constabulary. The advantages of getting these people together being obvious, Mr. Roy Bell of the Silliman Institute, on July 31st, called Lt. Vitoria to the camp which he had established at Malabo, and plans with this end in view were discussed. It was felt that if the new organization was to prosper, the services of a senior officer would be required, and word was subsequently sent to Lt. Col. Ausejo. He came to Malabo on October 14th, agreed to take over, and the formal organization of guerilla forces in Negros Oriental began at that time.

In northern Negros Capt. Mata, who had not surrendered, began at an early date to gather the men of the battalion which he had commanded, and in Negros Occidental Capt. Abeede was doing exactly the same thing with the members of his own battalion.

As a general rule command of the early guerilla organization was determined not on the basis of rank, but by a combination of the two factors of personal leadership and the number of rifles which any given individual could round up.

On both points Capt. Abeede was out in front in Negros. He soon had

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between five and six hundred rifles under his command; he first engaged the Japanese at Buenavista on August 3rd, 1942; and his active operations against the enemy have continued up to the present time. Capt. Mata ran him a close second, while Lt. Col. Ausejo's organization was handicapped by lack of arms and never compared in strength or activity with the other two.

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Command of 7th Military District: The expanding guerilla organizations of Lt. Col. Peralta and Col. Fertig met in Negros and Peralta emerged with Abcede and Mata as a part of his 4th Philippine Corps, while Fertig absorbed Ausejo's organization. Each one wanted the whole of the island of Negros or failing that, to have his man designated as commanding officer of the 7th District. This situation was met by giving temporary command to Maj. Villamor; presumably he supported Abcede as his successor; and in July 1943 Abcede was made acting District Commander.

Present Military Organization in Negros. The former dividing line which followed provincial boundaries has been abandoned, and the three original organizations have been combined to form the 72nd Division, which is composed of the 74th Inf. Regt. in the north, the 76th in Central Negros and the 75th in the south. The Division Commander is Lt. Col. Mata and regimental commanders are Majors Baclagon, Bornaes and Domínguez. The former two are P. M. A. graduates.

D. H. Q. Staff. Lt. Col. Abcede has as members of his staff Maj. B. H. Vitoria who is serving as Adjutant General and G-1; Maj. R. R. Reyes, G-2; Lt. Col. P. A. Ausejo, G-3; Maj. B. Hollero, G-4; and Capt. L. Masias, Judge Advocate.

No Chief of Staff or Executive officer has as yet been designated.

I have met all of the above officers with the exception of Maj. Reyes, and am very favorably impressed with them.

It is evident that Abcede has surrounded himself with the ablest officers whom he could find. Also he consults with them and is not afraid to delegate authority to them, the result being that he has a staff which functions normally, and he has found no necessity to try to build up a one man show.

Division Inspector. An inspector is kept in the field, and staff officers are likewise required to make periodic inspection trips.

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Strength. The authorized strength of the 7th District is 1,000 officers and 12,000 men. Actual strength as of Nov. 30th 1943 was 786 officers and 8,082 men.

As contrasted with the one division in Negros having 8,888 officers and men, an approximately equal number of men in Mindanao emerged as four divisions after organization had been completed.

Armament. The armament of the 72nd Division consists of something over 1,400 rifles and two machine guns.

Military Policies. Abcede does not labor under the delusion which is somewhat too common among Filipino officers and is reflected in the saying, "Just give us the arms and WE will drive the Japs out." He is well aware of the limitations of his own organization and says, perfectly clearly, that the Japanese can do anything they want in Negros if they decide to bring sufficient force to bear to carry out their plans.

The mistake made in Panay, Cebu and Mindanao in the matter of attacking strong enemy positions has not been committed in Negros.

In general the policy is one of the seeking the proper balance between a sufficient amount of action to keep up the morale of officers, men and loyal civilians - and over-aggressiveness which might force the enemy to strong retaliatory measures.

Offensive action is confined to sniping, ambushing and sabotage, while in defense the policy is one of resistance, dispersal if necessary, and quick reassembly.

In the latter connection Abcede, who is not without a sense of humor says, "This is a hit and run war. The Japs hit and we run." He can afford this little joke since his own bravery is beyond question, and since the record shows that the hit and run game has been much more expensive for the enemy than for his own forces.

Measures Taken To Protect Present Organization. 1. Dispersal of DHQ Offices: District Headquarters is back in the mountains at a distance from the coast which it requires a fast courier six hours to cover. No civilians may enter this area, and the number of officers who may do so is strictly limited. Station WBA is near headquarters. This location has been used since November, and a move to a different district will probably be made in the near future.

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The G-1 and G-3 CP's are beyond the end of the provincial road in southwestern Negros. The G-4 office is four hours further up the coast, while the G-2 section is in an entirely different area. In each instance there is a completely prepared reserve location back in the mountains to which an immediate move will be made in the event of an attack.

2. Warning Service, has received the attention which it merits under the conditions at present prevailing in Negros, and the speed and efficiency with which it ordinarily operates has been demonstrated to me on several occasions.

3. Secrecy Discipline. With the pro-Jap element in certain areas running as high as 70%, and with an estimated 40% of the total population of Negros under enemy control to a greater or lesser degree, the situation with reference to enemy agents is really bad and presents a serious problem. The BC's who are being brought into the province in increasing numbers furnish a further complicating factor, and the necessity for using large numbers of civilians at harvest time makes the entry of enemy agents an easy matter.

Under these circumstances special measures for the security of information have been called for, and they have been carried to a point where place names have been changed and practically all officers travel under aliases.

Col. Abcede is well aware of the fact that one of the defects of his own people is a tendency to talk too much and, while the greatest emphasis has been placed on secrecy discipline, he is not yet satisfied with the results achieved.

4. Food Reserves. Actually the greater part of the organization in the 7th District is maintaining itself in the mountains or at inland points where only limited amounts of food are produced, and the only portion of the coast really remaining under the control of our forces is that in southwestern Negros. The food problem therefore presented itself at an early stage of the game, and it has been one difficult of solution particularly since normal imports of grain from Mindanao have been cut off.

Abcede's goal has been a six month's reserve for his entire force.

When the Japanese occupied Tolong in the early part of December just

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prior to the beginning of the rice harvest in that area, that appeared to be a very serious matter. Fortunately they left after a few days and some 3,000 civilians were at once put into the fields. Though the enemy has frightened them off twice by having ships come in as though preparing for a landing, the harvest will soon be completed, and this will place the goal within sight.

The transportation alone of a sufficient amount of paddy to feed 3,000 men for six months (say 50,000 cavanes) is no small problem and if that is solved and the grain is safely stored, a job of the utmost importance will have been completed.

In the measures taken to protect his central organization, in the matter of building up a large food reserve, and in the disposition of his forces, Abcede's policies have been dictated by sound common sense and he has placed himself in a strong position.

In recent months enemy garrisons strength in Negros has averaged around 3,000 men, and the fact that this figure has on two occasions been increased to 5,000 or more has not disturbed Abcede or caused him serious inconvenience. A materially larger force will be required and a well planned and costly mountain campaign will be necessary before any serious damage is done to his organization.

Development of Intelligence Service. Much emphasis has been placed on this point in the 7th District and there are at the present time 22 officers and 272 enlisted men on duty in the district intelligence organization.

Agents have been placed in all important enemy occupied areas and towns.

Watcher stations have been set up at Hinobaan, Silay and Cadiz, and a crew is now putting in a new station at Sojoton Pt.

G-2 periodic Reports, which are comprehensive and well prepared, give some indication of the results achieved.

Counter-espionage activities seem neither very strong nor effective, and the weakness arises from the fact that the District has progressed perhaps a trifle ~~later~~ <sup>later</sup> from early guerrilla measures, and has been less-

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ing over backward in the matter of the treatment accorded to suspects.

In view of the very large number of enemy agents who are paid all the way from \$1 per day for ignorant "peones" up to a reported \$50 to \$100 daily for top operatives, the penalty for being caught, which at present consists in a tour in an internment camp followed by a trial in which there is a good chance for acquittal, does not seem to be a sufficient deterrent.

Radio Communications. My understanding is that no radio equipment for the 7th District has been sent from Australia. If that is correct the communication system which has been worked out is creditable.

The first set in Negros which succeeded in contacting the United States was damaged at the time Headquarters at Kalabo was burned. It was moved to the Zamboaguita area but has not as yet been put back into commission.

Subsequently the A.I.B. turned over to Abeode one of its sets which is now at station WBA, and furnishes the only equipment with which Abeode can reach Australia directly.

Locally made sets have been placed in operation close to three of the watcher stations.

For internal communications locally built sets are at Division HQ which also serves the 74th Regt.; at the Regimental HQ of the 75th and 76th; and there is also one station in the East Negros Sector. The District commander is therefore in constant touch with his division and regimental commanders, and he also makes contact twice daily with the A.I.B. station EDA.

The defects of the present communications set-up are:

1. If station WBA is knocked out the only means of communicating with KAE would be through EDA.
2. There is a shortage of batteries and two of the locally built sets will soon be off the air.
3. No alcohol is being manufactured from tuba and there will be an acute fuel shortage unless this situation is corrected.
4. Abeode is unwilling simply to remain at his headquarters and does a lot of moving around, the result being that he is sometimes out of radio contact for days at a time. He should have a really good portable set to carry along with him on his inspection trips.
5. There is no watcher station at the southern end of Negros. Also unless Col. Fertig put in a station without my knowledge, there

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is none across the way in Mindanao, and this means that the strait between the two, which is quite an important waterway, is not kept under proper observation.

A map of Negros showing present and proposed radio stations is enclosed. Memorandum covering radio equipment and supplies, representing the maximum for which the 7th District hopes, is likewise enclosed.

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Pay Scale and Allowances

1. Officers: All officers receive exactly the same pay and allowances. Base pay is \$75 per month, and there is an allowance of \$25 per month for legal wife (if living); \$15 for the first child; \$10 for the second child; \$5 for the third; and \$5 for each succeeding child. Actual travelling expense is allowed. The food allowance for both officers and men is .40 per day.

2. NOOs and EM. Tabulation of pay and allowances for non-coms and enlisted men follows:

	Monthly Pay	Allowances for wife and children.						
Master Sgt.	\$40	\$15	-	8	-	3	-	2
1st Sgt.	30	12	-	8	-	3	-	2
Corp	20	8	-	3	-	2	-	1
Pvt 1st Class	17	8	-	3	-	2	-	1
Pvt 2nd Class	15	8	-	3	-	2	-	1

No expansion of Present Force Contemplated. Aboede is not at the present time planning any increase in the size of his force.

Men contracting malaria are sent to their homes when that is possible, since in the large majority of cases no treatment of any sort can be given, and without treatment they are useless in the field. The training of replacements must therefore continue.

American EM in 7th MD. Seven American enlisted men escaped from the Japanese at Bacolod, and others who drifted in from different islands brought the total number in Negros to eleven. One recent arrival from Pansy has not joined up, but the remaining ten are on duty with our forces.

The policy followed with reference to these men has been a sensible one and has worked out satisfactorily. All of them were made sergeants and were first given ~~not~~ desk jobs but duty with troops. After being kept under observation for a period of four months, four were commissioned and

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the two most promising of these are now attached to DHQ as liaison officers. The remaining two officers and six sergeants are with combat units in the north.

Lt. Col. Abeede seems well pleased with this group as a whole and says that certain individuals have rendered exceptionally good service.

As for the men, the three whom I have met are most appreciative of the treatment which they have received from senior officers. All three likewise report having had difficulties with individuals among the junior Filipino officers. One would like to get out of this country when it is possible to do so, one is undecided on this point; and one is definite in his statement that he would prefer to remain in Negros and see the show through here. All three have malaria.

General Service School. There is no lack of manpower for replacements in the present guerilla organization, or for expansion if that action is decided upon at some later date, but there is a shortage of properly trained officers.

With a view to improving this condition a general service school providing a six weeks course for twenty officers, twenty applicants for commissions, and twenty enlisted men was placed in operation in April 1945.

While there are several PMA graduates on duty in Negros these men are needed in the field, and Abeede would like very much to have four American officers for instructors in this school.

Rotation of Officers and Men. In recent months practically all of the fighting has been in the north section and, with view to keeping up the tone of the organization as a whole, the policy of rotating officers and men in combat zones is being followed.

Records. The statement that the records of the 7th District are in general in excellent condition will be borne out by the detailed reports forwarded to GHQ.

It has been necessary in the past to burn some records as on the occasion when the Japanese attacked HQ at Malabo, but none have been compromised.

Records are not allowed to accumulate in the offices where current files only are maintained, but are transferred as promptly as possible to a hidden storehouse where they are placed in bamboo tubes.

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A guard detail of one officer and three men is maintained at this building.

Morale. The problem in the 7th District at the present time is not to build up fighting spirit, but to keep ill-advised offensive action in check. The morale of both officers and men is good.

Health Conditions. Malaria is presenting an increasingly serious problem and it is estimated that 40% of the men in the 76th Regiment are now infected. Conditions in the 74th and 75th are less bad, but this is obviously a matter which requires careful attention.

In view of the extent of the malarial districts in the mountains of Negros, effective control measures are out of the question, and there is no present prospect of being able to equip the men with mosquito nets.

At the base hospital at Bunawan experiments are being conducted with dita bark which has now been successfully reduced to pill form, but the most effective dosage for the various different types of malaria has not yet been worked out and treatment with dita extracts which has proved effective in some cases, will doubtless remain on a hit or miss basis.

Abeede side-stepped my inquiry as to what priority he had given to his requests for quinine, and it was only recently that I discovered, to my great surprise, that no medicines have been sent to the 7th District during the six months which have passed since Abeede was designated as acting District Commander.

The incidence of malaria is now so high as to weaken Abeede's forces to a serious extent, and the minimum initial requirements would be for a sufficient amount of quinine (both in pill form and in solution for intravenous injections), atabrine, and salvarsan to treat 2,000 cases.

Civil Government. Maj. Villamor and Abeede were responsible for the appointment of Montelibano as governor of Negros. Montelibano was formerly mayor of Bacolod and resigned from that position because of differences of opinion with President Queson. He is a strong man and has a large following.

Because of the difficulties of communication, Negros has been divided into 7 districts, and deputy governors for each district have been appointed by Montelibano.

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In all areas under the control of our forces town mayors, concejales and tenientes de barrio are discharging their duties in a manner which has been on the whole satisfactory.

The court of first instance is not functioning, but J.P. courts are in operation.

Relations with Civilians. The necessity of retaining the cooperation of the civilians in "Free Negros" is both understood and fully appreciated, and relations between the army and the civil population are on the whole satisfactory. Governor Montelibano has been particularly helpful in maintaining this relationship.

Morale of Civilians. After the panic which attended the Japanese attack on Misamis Occidental, it came as a surprise to see the people of Zamboanguita moving out in orderly and almost leisurely fashion where an enemy force was moving towards the town and was burning barrios only five kilometers away. The answer was that these people all had places to which they could go; they had brought to town with them only the barest necessities which could easily be moved; and they trusted the warning service to get them started in time. While the morale of the people in Free Negros is good, there are special factors which will contribute towards its decline in the months to come.

Aside from the intensive Japanese propaganda campaign and the growing discouragement of the people who have not seen so much as one American ship or plane for a period of twenty months, the Japanese are using in Negros three additional weapons which are not available to them in all parts of the Philippines. They are:

1. Food. The importation of rice and the control of crops in the occupied areas has placed the Japanese in a position where they can offer food to people who are growing increasingly hungry and who are troubled by inflation which in certain areas has carried the price of rice up to \$50 to \$75 per cavan.
2. Terror. In Panay the Japanese instituted a reign of terror in Guimaras and the southeastern portion of the island in which an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 civilians - men, women and children were killed, <sup>et</sup> and it seems quite possible that a similar policy will be



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pursued here. The declaration of a "bandit zone" contained a clear statement that the properties of civilians remaining in specified areas would be confiscated, and the people themselves would be simply killed off. In view of what is known already to have happened in Panay this terror propoganda has been quite successful, and will be much more so if it is actually put into effect.

3. Quinine. The Japanese have been quick to realize the value of quinine as a propoganda weapon, and to use it. The results are that civilians who are infected with malaria can take the chance of dying in the mountains, or move into enemy controlled areas where they know they can get all the quinine they need at minimum prices.

The answer is that taking all things into consideration the civilians in Free Negros are really in a hard position, and it is only reasonable to suppose that so long as the present general situation continues, they will go over to the Japanese side in increasing numbers.

Mountain Campaign. The problem set forth in the preceding paragraph is one of Abcede's troubles since the loss of civilian support would be fatal, - and strong enemy offensive action may soon be another.

The campaign to clear the guerillas out of the mountains was originally scheduled to begin on Dec. 1st, 1943. Beginning at that time several barrios were burned; Zamboanguita, Siaton and Tolong were occupied; and then the Japanese, having met nothing in the way of opposition, withdrew.

Jan. 1st, 1944 was the next date set for the big push, then Jan. 10th, and finally Feb. 1st.

It is reported that General Konoh has arrived from Manila to take charge of the mountain campaign; the occupation of Sipalay and very recently again of Siaton has given greater control of the southwest coast; and plane and patrol activity is increasing.

If the mountain campaign materializes and is prosecuted vigorously by a strong force the only thing which can save Abcede's organization will be the reserve of food which he has built up - and that will last for a period not exceeding six months.

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Currency. Emergency currency is being issued under the jurisdiction of the Negros Emergency Currency Board of which Montelibano is chairman, and the provincial Treasurer and provincial Auditor are members.

As in Mindanao there is an extreme shortage of bills of small denomination resulting from the fact that there is an insufficient supply of suitable paper, and this is a matter of great inconvenience.

Abeede has no responsibility for currency issued beyond the amount required for his own organization, and it is understood this is at present limited to a maximum of ₱1,000,000 per month.

The Japanese have recently put out bills which for the first time have borne serial numbers, but these bills are freely exchanged for the emergency currency certificates on a basis of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 1.

Capture of Americans. On Nov. 24th, the Japanese raided Maj. Bell's camp and while he and the members of his family were so fortunate as to be able to escape, Rev. and Mrs. Alvin Scott and their son Lawrence were captured.

In a second raid on Nov. 27th, Dr. and Mrs. James Chapman, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Gluns, Mrs. Jean Lowry and her young son Billy were taken.

Early reports from intelligence agents in Dumagete were to the effect that these people were being held in one of the buildings of the Silliman Institute, and that they had not been maltreated by the Japanese.

Industrial and Agricultural Exploitation. Prior to the surrender nothing effective seems to have been done by our forces in Negros in the matter of disabling manufacturing plants and destroying stocks which would be useful to the enemy, and the result is that this island has turned out to be of more value to the Japanese than many of the others.

1. Sugar Centrals. The manufacture of sugar is not possible since there has been no replanting of the cane fields, and the hacenderos are growing only enough for seed purposes for use at such time as a new start can be made.

There are, however, large stocks of sugar on hand, the greater part of which has fallen into the hands of the Japanese. Figures as to total exports are not available, but it is known that even now 300,000 piculs



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have been concentrated at Bais alone.

Alcohol is being manufactured from sugar at the Talisay Milling Co., and at the Manapla, Lopez and Bais Centrals. 500,000 liters are known to have been shipped thus far, and this is only a small part of what can be made before existing stocks of sugar are exhausted.

The cellulose factory in the Tabaselera Central at Bais is likewise in operation.

2. Mines. The Japanese have had the manganese mine on Siquijor Island in production for some months.

They have now occupied Sipalay on the southwest coast of Negros and are making an investigation at the San Remigio copper mine. This is, however, an undeveloped property and it seems improbable that they will be able to do anything with it.

3. Sawmills. In Mindanao the writer called the attention of Lt. Col. Humber and of Gen. Fort to the fact that the manager of the Kolombugan Lumber Co. was unwilling to take any action in the matter of the destruction of the mill and stocks of lumber on hand exceeding 10,000,000 b.f., and that no preparations with this end in view had been made by the army. Gen Fort issued the necessary instructions to Capt. (later Lt. Col.) Morgan, and at the proper time a thorough job was done.

In Negros no one seems to have been sufficiently interested to have similar preparations made at Fabrica, and the Insular Lumber Co. mill, together with stocks on hand doubtless exceeding those at Kolombugan, fell into the hands of the Japanese undamaged. The building of launches and small boats was at once begun, and the mill was kept in operation up to Sept. 1943 at which time it was sabotaged by company employees.

4. Cotton. In spite of propoganda, crop loans, and guarantees against loss the cotton production program in Negros has thus far been a failure. This has been due to lack of interest on the part of the hacienderos and to climatic conditions which are somewhat unfavorable. The only planting of any importance has been done at La Carlota.

5. Copra. is purchased at a price of ₱7.50 per M kilos for rescada, and is being milled at Cebu.

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6. Rice. The Japanese are buying all the rice which they can get their hands on in areas under their direct control, and this gives them an added hold over the people since they can subsequently withhold rice from those who are not "cooperating" to their satisfaction, or give it out free to those whom they wish to attract.

In Free Negroes rice is simply stolen by their foraging patrols when that proves possible, while in intermediate zones our agents openly compete with theirs for the purchase of the disposable surplus.

Food Situation. In order to meet the food requirements of the army, the original plan was that the army would call upon the civil government for the food which it needed, and the government in turn would take the responsibility of obtaining it from the people. Since this arrangement proved cumbersome and unsatisfactory it was discarded, and the army is now going directly to the people for its requirements.

At present the army is taking 30% of the corn and 50% of rice grown in areas under its control at prices which are fixed by the army but are maintained at reasonable levels. It is specifically provided that a sufficient amount of grain must be left with the producer for seed purposes and to meet the requirements of his own family.

In the past these percentages have sometimes been exceeded; while there has been no well grounded complaint as to prices, payment has been slow; and a sufficient amount of grain has not always been left with the farmer. Special efforts have been made to correct these mistakes, and the purchase of the rice produced in December and January was well handled. That does not, however, solve the principal problem which arises from the fact that military activities have curtailed production, and the imports which have been necessary even in normal times have been cut off.

The rice paddies in southern Negroes are not irrigated and produce only one crop per year. The corn crop due in February will be short because of excessive rainfall, and no more food of any importance can be expected until July.

While no one has starved in Negroes as yet, a large percentage of the people are undernourished and famine conditions will prevail in certain



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areas by May and June.

The efforts of the civil government and of the army to get the people to plant manioc, cassava and other root crops have to a large extent failed primarily since this new departure is contrary to "costumbre".

The plain answer is that Negros is not at the present time producing enough food to feed its own people, and unless this situation is corrected the results will be extremely serious.

Future Deliveries of Supplies. The suggestion has been made to Abcede that in radio messages referring to the delivery of supplies, contact points be referred to by number rather than by name, and that as a further precaution the days of the month be reversed, - the 31st referring to the first day of each month, the 30th to the second day etc.

Memorandum in this connection is attached as enclosure No. 3.

Copy of this memorandum has been furnished to Abcede.

This arrangement is, of course, subject to your approval.

Philippine Army Air Corps Unit (A.I.B.). When Lt. Col. Edwin Andrews heard of my arrival in Negros, he at once issued to me a courteous invitation to pay him a visit at what I understood to be Philippine Army Air Corps H. Q. Lt. Col. Andrews did not, at that time, know that my connection with the 10th District had been terminated, and he was well aware of the fact that my views did not coincide with his on certain phases of the Pindatun matter. The invitation was one which I was pleased to accept, and it was not until after my arrival that I found the P. A. A. designation to be a blind, and that the organization was actually a branch of the A.I.B.

It would have been a matter of great interest to me to check over A.I.B. files but, being without authority to make such an examination, no such proposal was made and it has, in consequence, been necessary for me to form my opinions of A.I.B. operations on the basis of external indications rather than on the much sounder one of actual performance.

The camp serving as the present base of operations is one-half hour walk from the beach. There is at this camp a small "Dutch" transmitter and receiver which maintains contact with KAG, WBA and HBA-1.

The main station is three hours further back in the mountains, and a third reserve location has been prepared.

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The A.I.S. has a radio station of its own in north Negros, and three sets are in operation on other islands.

I have met a large majority of the twenty-four principal agents, and they constitute the best group of young Filipinos which I have seen since the war began.

In view of the type of men employed, the specialized training which they received under Maj. Villanore, and the scope of their operations, I am quite willing to venture the opinion that this branch of the A.I.S. is the best source of intelligence information which you have in the Philippines today.

Lt. Col. Andrews has cooperated with me in every way possible under existing conditions, and it has been advantageous to me to be able to check with him and with his agents not only specific points but particularly certain generalities (army relations with civilians, with civil government, morale etc.) appearing in this report.

Andrews has asked if I thought him correct in forwarding reports from agents just as they are received, and without comment, and the suggestion has been made to him that he also prepare monthly reports reviewing important developments during the period under review and containing his evaluation of the data submitted by agents.

No copies of radio communications with GHQ are retained except for those containing specific authorization in financial matters.

It would greatly facilitate the work of the A.I.S., and likewise of Abcede's intelligence agents, if the funds required for use in enemy occupied territory could be furnished either in Japanese currency or in Philippine bills of large denomination.

Andrews has special qualifications for the position which he now holds in that he is a handwriting expert, and has had previous training in intelligence work. His opinion of Abcede is very high, and he is cooperating to the fullest possible extent with him.

Independent Units. The only two independent units which have been operating in Negros are those led by a civilian named Margarito Gemillan, known locally as "Puring's", and by "Maj. General" Gabriel R. Gador.

"Puring's" unit which is armed with three machine guns, a few auto-

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natic weapons, and an estimated 75 rifles has not as yet shown any disposition to join Abcede's forces, and personal grudges have developed between members of this band and our troops in adjoining areas. "Puring" has, up to the present time, been unwilling to shift his small force to other territory, and the friction which now exists would make its absorption into the 72nd Division difficult. "Puring" is, however, running very short of ammunition and this fact should furnish a satisfactory solution of this problem. If that does not prove to be the case, the difficulty is not in any event of material importance in view of the small size of the force, and "Puring's" inability to expand it. The present policy is to ignore this band, but not to permit interference of any sort from it.

While Lt. Col. Gador's organization has also been a small one, that problem has been much more serious in that it has involved the ranking P.A. officer who has been making any pretext of resistance to the Japanese.

Gador remained in the mountains after the surrender and displayed no interest in early guerilla activities in Negros. In September, however, he began to gather a group of men, and to evolve rather large ideas. Having heard that Lt. Col. Fertig, whom he ranked, had made himself a Brigadier General, he followed the advice of his G-2, Luis Diconaldo, took for himself the rank of Major General and, on January 27th, 1943 issued General Order No. 1 assuming command of all USAFFE forces in the Philippines. At that time he controlled less than thirty rifles.

The forces in Negros Oriental under the command of Lt. Col. Ausejo had, in the meantime, joined Fertig's organization, and friction between Gador's men and Ausejo's soon developed. Lt. Col. Fertig was advised of this situation and Mr. Bell, who was then acting on his director of civil affairs, went to see Gador with the result that he was detained for five days and was publicly ridiculed. At that point the problem in so far as it concerned the 10th District was left to solve itself with the result that it became worse rather than better. Gador increased his following and surrounded himself with a large group of officers many of whom were, in the early stages, convinced of the justice of his claims.

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Couriers of Ausejo and Abcede were intercepted, officers and men were disarmed, and finally there were armed encounters involving the death of a limited number of men on both sides.

It would, of course, have been an easy matter simply to eliminate Gador at any time, and it is due only to the restraining influence first of Ausejo, later of Villamore, and finally of Abcede that this was not done.

After his appointment as acting district commander, Villamore tried to draw Gador into the organization, and made him his executive officer. Shortly thereafter the Japanese landed at Tolong, which was nearly one hundred kilometers away from the place where DHQ was then located, and Gador promptly took off in the middle of the night, and returned to his own area. He was relieved of his duties.

Subsequently, abuses of the civilian population in the Tanjay region and the growing realization on the part of Gador's officers that they had perhaps been misled, brought about a decline in his power and popularity. Some officers shifted their allegiance to Abcede, and were, in consequence, threatened with the death penalty for desertion. This did not have the desired effect, and more came over.

With this indication of growing weakness, Abcede began to straighten his forces in the vicinity of the territory controlled by Gador, and this had the effect which had been hoped for.

On Dec. 7th advice reached DHQ that Gador, accompanied by three officers only had left Negros by banca enroute to Cebu. There was no armed encounter, and not a shot was fired.

Many of Gador's men have now come over, bringing their rifles with them, and his officers are reporting to DHQ with the hope of being taken into Abcede's organization.

The Gador problem has, therefore, finally been settled, and the solution seems the best one which could possibly have been found.

Lt. Col. Morgan's Trip to Visayas. In June 1943 Lt. Col. Morgan, who had with him a group of fifty or more armed men, landed on the island of Siquijor. After looking the situation over he issued general orders promoting Maj. Benito Cuzman, the S.O. of the 4th Provisional Battalion, 75th Inf., 7th M.D. to the rank of Lt. Colonel.

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Morgan next issued special orders designating Cunanan as Commanding Officer of the 8th Military District.

Both orders were signed "By Command of Brigadier General W. W. Fertig".

With this small matter disposed of, Morgan proceeded to Negros where he announced that he planned to make a tour of the inland to acquaint himself with the local situation with a view to settling command problems in the 7th district. This he was not permitted to do and, prior to his departing for Mindanao, he was required by Villamor to revoke the orders issued to Cunanan.

Internal Difficulties - Contrast between 10th and 7th Districts.

Since being designated as commanding officer of the 10th District, Col. Fertig has had trouble of a rather serious nature with Lt. Col. McLish, a division commander, who has maintained a large degree of independence which has brought about confusion on numerous occasions; with Maj. Pindatun who requested that his regiment be released and permitted to operate independently; and with Maj. (Lt. Col.) Andrews who requested transfer to Negros. Maj. Linena, a regimental commander, led a mutiny lasting over four months. Maj. Jaldon, a regimental commander, made a truce with the Japanese without authorization from headquarters. Maj. Cabili, the former assemblyman for Lanao, has become very antagonistic, and his assistance in Lanao hence cannot be counted upon. Col. Fertig's Adjutant General has been placed on inactive duty; his Deputy Chief of Staff requested to be relieved of his duties, which request was granted, and his Chief of Staff over whom no real control of any sort had ever been maintained, finally attempted a palace revolution.

While the 7th District is much smaller than the 10th in point of size, there is little difference in the number of men in the military establishments of the two.

Since being designated as acting commander of the 7th District, Lt. Col. Abeede has had no similar difficulties with any of the senior officers serving under him with the exception of a Maj. MacLenahan. This officer has been openly AntieFilipino and should in my opinion be gotten out of the country. Abeede made no complaint against him, and the criticism of his actions and attitude came from other sources including reputable American residents of Negros.

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Relations between the 7th and other Districts. 6th. In the past Abcede and Peralta have worked quite closely together. That is no longer true since radio contact with Panay was lost in October and there is no communication between the two Districts at the present time. As a matter of fact very little is known as to present conditions in the 6th District, but it is believed that Peralta's organization has been rather badly knocked about. If that proves to be the case, the results may not be entirely bad since Peralta was getting quite "important" even as far as Abcede was concerned. At such time as he has completed his re-organization and resumed his normal contacts, he can again expect to get good cooperation from Abcede if he wants it.

8th. Fenton always pursued a very independent course of action, was secretive as to his operations, and did not apparently desire contacts of any sort outside of Cebu.

Since Cushing has succeeded to the command, this situation has been completely changed and Cebu and Negros are now working closely together. Intelligence information is exchanged almost daily, and there is a tentative agreement that if the Japanese succeed in placing Cushing in a hopeless position, instead of disbanding his men and going out of action, he will if possible, shift his base of operations to Negros and carry on the fight here.

In view of the great difficulty which Abcede has had in building up a food reserve for his own organization, his offer to take care of Cushing and his men in any emergency which may arise is extremely generous and serves as an excellent illustration of the type of cooperation which should obtain between all Districts - but often does not. The 10th is a case in point.

10th. 1. Banca Traffic. Without advice to Abcede, Col. Fertig closed down all banca traffic between Mindanao and Negros. This was done presumably with the intention of controlling the entry of enemy operatives. The result has been a serious food shortage in the Zamboanguita area, which has never been self sustaining in the matter of food, and has depended upon imports from northwestern Mindanao. By the latter part of November 1945 the food reserve for the troops stationed



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at Zamboaguita had been completely exhausted, and civilians were paying as much as ₱1 per ganta for corn though fifty miles away there was a large exportable surplus which was selling locally at one fifth of that price. With the headquarters of the 10th District transferred to Agusan, and with no forces of any importance operating around Dipolog and Katipunan, there would seem to be no good reason for continuing such drastic control of transportation, and the recommendation was made to Abcede that he refer this matter to Col. Fertig by radio, and request at least a temporary lifting of present restrictions. The outcome is not known.



2. Morgan. The actions of Lt. Col. Morgan on the occasion of his visit to Negros did not contribute to a better understanding between the 7th and 10th Districts.

3. Andrews. Prior to the departure of Maj. Villamore for the south, Col. Fertig frequently requested information from the A.I.B., and also used its station for relaying traffic to Ingenero in Bohol. When he discovered that Andrews had been left in charge of this organization, there was a noticeable change in both the number and tone of his communications, and they have now stopped entirely.

4. Abcede. is aware of the fact that Fertig opposed his appointment as district commander, but he understands that it was only natural under the circumstances for him to back Ausejo. Abcede is, however, resentful of the unwillingness to let bygones be bygones, and of the fact that unpleasant statements concerning both him and his district continue to emanate from Mindanao.

5. Villamore. Very definite anti-Villamore propoganda was put out in Mindanao and both the nature and the source of the propoganda are known to me. An agent of the A.I.B. picked up these stories not in Mindanao but from officers returning to Bohol from the 10th District, and made a report upon this matter. Villamore was, quite naturally, offended and this has doubtless influenced his attitude towards the 10th District.

The answer is that relations between the 10th and 7th Districts are not satisfactory and, to the best of my knowledge, the fault is that

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matter does not rest with the 7th.

Radio contact with the 10th District was lost on Dec. 23rd. It is not known if Col. Fertig's stations are off the air, or if the contact is one which he feels it is not worth his while to maintain.

Inter District Politics. Since his designation as commanding officer of the 10th District, Col. Fertig has not confined his attention to Mindanao, but has continued to interest himself in the Visayas.

In the recent past Inginero and Cangleon have been designated as area commanders for Bohol and Leyte respectively. Since both of these officers had been backed by Fertig, it may be presumed that they will remain in his camp.

Col. Fertig has not, however, been equally successful in other quarters, and the result has been a campaign the purpose of which is sufficiently obvious. Derogatory statements have been made concerning Fenton, Cushing and the 8th District; Villamor, Abcede and the 7th; and Feralta and the 6th.

The most recent occasion on which propoganda of this nature is reported to have been put out was at meetings in Agusan during November 1943 attended by Fertig, Inginero, Cangleon and assemblyman Lopez and Gov. Abellano of Cebu.

Over a period of months enough discreditable statements have found their way back to the people concerned to arouse open resentment, and the result has been a division in the districts with Mindanao, Leyte and Bohol ranged against Cebu, Negros and Panay.

This may appear to be a matter of small moment, but when Cushing is fighting with his back to the wall in Cebu and is hindered rather than helped by Inginero who is at the same time boasting about the supplies which he has received, - and when Abcede, who may be facing a major campaign, has never received ammunition or even medicines during the six months which have passed since he was made acting district commander, it is not unnatural that both men should worry for fear the campaign of misrepresentation has been carried beyond the Philippines, and has been in some measure successful.

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Major Cushing. It has come as a most unusual experience to hear the ranking officers of one district expressing open admiration of work done elsewhere, and it has been a pleasure to find that in Negros Maj. Cushing is very highly thought of.

While the feeling here is that the general policy pursued in both the 6th and 8th Districts was over-aggressive and hence forced the Japanese to take decisive action which has proved damaging in both cases, this does not alter the fact that the fighting spirit and the military accomplishments of the troops in the 8th District are much admired.

The co-command in Cebu worked out in such a way that Fenton remained at his headquarters and handled all administrative details while Cushing spent almost his entire time in the field.

It is generally conceded that Cushing must be credited with accounting for more Japanese than any other commander of guerilla forces in this country.

No one seems to blame Cushing for the excessive number of executions in Cebu, and the belief held by Filipinos in general is that responsibility for this mistake rests exclusively with Fenton.

Fenton, who was quite probably mentally unbalanced, was killed by his own men in September. His organization had already been put practically out of action and Cushing was in Negros at the time. He remained here for over two months during which time he was seriously ill with malaria and with a series of abscesses, and then returned to Cebu.

On Dec. 20th Abcede broadcast orders for all members of the Cebu organization who were in Negros to rejoin their commander. Cushing court-martialed and executed Lt. Col. Estrella who had killed Fenton and seized command, reorganized his force, went into action once more, and he is now being attacked heavily by the Japanese.

The feeling here is that Maj. Cushing deserves a citation as much as anyone who has been connected with guerilla activities in the Philippines.

Major H. R. Bell. Maj. Bell furnished the leadership of the earliest guerilla activities in Negros Oriental: he was the first man in the district to establish radio contact with the United States, and also took

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to Mindanao and placed in operation Col. Fertig's first radio equipment; he next served as Director of Civil affairs for the province; and is now acting as chairman of the Research Board for the 7th District.

In these various capacities he has travelled all over the island of Negros, and has made one trip to Mindanao, and one to Cebu in the course of which his banca was shelled by a Japanese vessel.

On June 19th, 1945 Major Bell's camp was burned by an enemy patrol, and he had a narrow escape. On Nov. 24th, at a time when he was confined to his bed by malaria, the Japanese burned his second camp, and on this occasion he was shot in the leg.

Maj. Bell commands the respect of all loyal elements on the Island, to work which he has done is widely known and appreciated, and the hope has been expressed in several different quarters that he will receive some special recognition for the service which he has rendered.

Ausejo. Lt. Col. Ausejo is about fourteen years older than Abcede and has had some twenty-four years service. In the circumstances it was not an easy matter for him to step aside, but once the decision was reached to give command of the 7th District to Abcede, he accepted that situation without complaint, and he has not merely obeyed orders but has contributed his share towards the satisfactory general situation which obtains at this time.

Major Cruz. or "Dr. Suylan" as he is known locally, expects to be returning to the United States.

His mission is believed to have been primarily to check on the present condition of President Quezon's political fences. It appears that he has found them in a state of disrepair, and his report will be that in any free and uncontrolled election after the war, Manuel Roxas would win in a walk.

He will also report that the Filipinos are more interested in the return of our forces than in independence.

Montelibano. There has always been a certain amount of jealousy between the two provinces in Negros, and it would be difficult if not impossible to find any one man who could keep both of them entirely satisfied. In Montelibano's case some of the people in Negros Oriental feel that they are being neglected, but even though this is true it.



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probably results primarily from the fact that the governor is fifteen days away in point of time.

In any event the advantages of having one governor for the whole island seem to outweigh the disadvantages which would result from having two, and the great benefit in the present set up is found in the extent to which Montelibano and the provincial officials are cooperating with our forces.

As illustrations of this point, Montelibano has obtained over P100,000 in Japanese currency for the use of Abeede's intelligence agents and the A.I.B.; he has likewise obtained quite a large amount of Japanese quinine which was most urgently needed; he has reorganized the volunteer guards; working through loyal puppet officials he has obtained food for our forces from areas under direct Japanese control; he has sought at all times to maintain good relations between the civil population and the army etc.

Montelibano's position and reputation in Negros is becoming similar to that of Confesor in Panay, but whereas there has been considerable friction between Confesor and Peralta, nothing of this sort has developed in the 7th District.

Villamore. Prior to my arrival in Negros I had been influenced by statements made concerning Villamore, and it has been necessary for me to revise my views on various points.

While my personal views are not of importance, facts are, and if issue cannot be taken with the following statements, the facts will speak for themselves:

1. Villamore was responsible for the unification of the forces of Ausejo, Mata and Abeede.
2. Villamore was partially responsible for the choice of Montelibano as Governor, and this has worked out most satisfactorily.
3. Villamore set up the local branch of the A.I.B. which has developed into one of the most important sources of intelligence information which you have in this country.
4. Villamore was responsible for the designation of Abeede as District commander, and the wisdom of this choice has been proven

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by the results achieved.

Abeede. Lt. Col. Abeede was born at Olongapo, and his father, who was working for the Navy as a machinist, died there in 1932. As a boy Abeede acted as a caddie on the Olongapo golf course, and later served as mess attendant. He was early brought under American influence, and is quite "American" in many of his ideas and reactions.

Abeede is young, energetic and aggressive. He is a well trained and competent officer. He has surrounded himself with the ablest officers whom he could find. He organized his own force in the early days of guerilla activities, led it himself, and in one capacity or another has been fighting the Japanese ever since.

He has kept himself quite free of "politics" and has the fullest cooperation from the commanding officer of Cebu, also from Governor Montelibano and provincial officials, and from the A.I.B.

He has travelled in every part of his district; keeps in close personal touch with his organization; commands the respect of his officers and men; and finally he is a disciplinarian who deals directly and decisively with troubles as they arise.

It is thanks in large measure to these qualities that the 7th District, which has had its full share of troubles in the past, has emerged as a closely knit and well controlled military organization which, under increasingly heavy enemy pressure, has grown in strength and unity, and which, judged either as a military set-up or as a guerilla fighting unit, is, in my opinion, the soundest organization which you have in the Philippines today.

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*F. L. Worcester*  
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UNIFIED HEADQUARTERS IN THE PHILIPPINES  
SIGNAL BATTALION HEADQUARTERS  
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RADIO EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES

1. At least two (2) - Complete "DUTCH" transmitters with communications type receivers, gasoline-engine driven power plants, antennae, spare tubes and parts; similar to the equipment of WBA.
2. At least five (5)- Complete storage battery-powered transmitters with communications type receivers, batteries, battery chargers, antennae, spare tubes, parts and battery testers, similar to the equipment of PAAC (Major VILLAMOR'S).
3. At least one (1) - Complete portable dry battery-powered transmitters with receivers, batteries, antennae, packs, spare tubes, batteries and parts for each Sub-Sector, or Battalion Headquarters.

SIGNAL SUPPLIES

1. Any available quantity of -
  - a. Lineman's Pouch, leather
  - b. Lineman's Pliers, TL-
  - c. Lineman's Knife, TL-29
  - d. Message Center Clocks
  - e. Pocket Watches
  - f. Flashlights, TL-122-A
  - g. Batteries, BA-50
  - h. Flashlights Bulbs, PR-6
  - i. Message Blank Books
  - j. Friction Tape, 3/4"
  - k. Rubber Tape, 3/4"
  - l. Sulphuric Acid
  - m. Assortment of metallized resistors, paper, mica and electrolytic condensers suitable for transmitter construction.
  - n. Assortment of metal tubes and sockets, like 6L6, 6F6, etc. suitable for making small portable transmitters.
2. At least one (1) - copy each of Signal Corps Manual, TM 2260-5 and JANP
3. At least five (5)- Prismatic Compass with case
4. At least five (5)- Field Glass with case
5. At least one (1) - Set Tester and Tube Analyser
6. At least five (5)- Voltmeter, 0-5-15-150V., 0-5-15-30A., D.C.
7. At least five (5)- Sets, assorted socket wrenches, long-nosed pliers, screw-drivers, soldering iron and rosin-core solder.

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JOSE G. SALAZAR  
Major, CAC  
7 MD 80

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Secret  
G.W.

Place names taken from Coast & Geodetic Survey Chart No. 4728 published December, 1936 and re-issued June, 1939.

CONTACT POINTS

1. Bostonon Pt.
2. Siston Pt.
3. Giligaon Pt.
4. Moloconan
5. Manalongon
6. Nagbalaye
7. Tolong Viejo
8. Tolong
9. Camilan Pt.
10. Bussy
11. Balatong Pt.
12. Kulipapa
13. Doog Pt.
14. Asia
15. Jinhuan
16. Catmon Pt.
17. Camomanes Bay
18. Danjagan Is.



Also reverse days of the month beginning month with the 31st. Example  
Example " Contact Point 10 May 27th " would refer to " Bussy - May 5th ".

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