PERSONAL FILES

MIS-X ACTIVITIES


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(POW)

1943-1945

Appendix 2 Page 2 Summary No. 260 25 February 1945

| SUBJECT | | PARAGRAFH |
|--|----------------------------------|--|
| B. Fields Rendered Unsafe (Possibly Ener | | ments |
| Barobo Gamot Bay Seaplane Base Tiring Lucena Field San Pablo Dossef Ranch C. Once Friendly Fields No | (Mindanao) " (Panay) (Luzon) " " | 43 44 45 46 47 48 Japanese Hands |
| Farm No. 8 (Bancase Ala River Buluan Bagulin | | ndanao) " " zon) |



Inserts G-lA G-lB

Map of Friendly Airfields (Two Sections)

PARAGRAPH

Appendix 2 Page 1 Summary No. 260 25 February 1945

FRIENDLY AIRFIELDS AND CRASH LANDING AREAS IN THE PHILIPPINES AS AT 22 FEBRUARY 1945

(Compiled by HIS-X, Allied Air Forces)

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Addendum: Friendly Fields

Mindanao

Farm No. 8 (Talakag) - 08° 15' N., 124° 35' E.

This field is again classed as friendly and has been operational as of 25 February 1945. The Jap column attacking this field which came down from Lumbia, the enemy-occupied Airdrome 25 km to the north, has now returned in the direction from which it came. Farm No. 8 has a rolled, dirt surface runway, 5100' x 150'. There is a wind sock at the north end, and markers both at the ends and the center. The altitude of the field is 1400'. Mountains rising about 600 ft. above the field lie to the W of the Cagayan River. Low level approach from all other directions can be made. The field is adjacent to the E side of the Talakag-Cagayan road. The river between Iligan and Lingait is a recommended check point.



Note to Unit Intelligence Officers: This information having been received too late to be noted on the attached map, it is necessary that it be posted thereon.



Appendix 2 Page 3 Summary No. 260 25 February 1945

Introduction

The last three weeks have seen many alterations in the list of friendly airfields and emergency landing areas within enemy-controlled areas in the Philippines. The whole pattern of enemy occupation in Luzon has undergone a complete change. A new list and a new map, have therefore become necessary. The previous list and map, appearing in Summary No. 257 and brought up to date by Summaries 258 and 259, should now be destroyed.

The information concerning the general pattern of enemy occupation has been obtained from all sources available. It is not intended to be a basis for operations but merely to give a broad picture of the areas where an evading airman, forced down, would run the risk of contacting the enemy. Since the picture is changing rapidly, it is suggested that intelligence officers keep the attached maps up to date by noting on this map the new information sent to them by radio or set forth in the Extracts from the GHQ Daily Philippine Message Sheet and in subsequent Summaries.

A. Friendly Fields and Landing Areas

Mindanao

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- 1. Farm No. 1 07° 57' N, 123° 45' E

 This field is located 10 km S.E. of barrio Lala, Lanao Province.

 It lies along a tributary of the Maranding River, about two miles inland from the S.E. shore of Panguil Bay. The length of the clearing, two miles, makes identification easy. It has a grass-covered runway, 7000' x 300', and is ready for all planes during all weather.
- 2. Farm No. 2 08° 08' N, 123° 27' E
 This field is located in the Dipalog River valley, 12 miles
 W'of Salug, Zamboanga Province. The runway, grass-covered
 and 6500' x 300', has been reported suitable for all planes
 during all weather. Suggested approach is from south.
- 3. Sindangan 08° 12' N, 123° 00' E
 This field is located near Sindangan, Zamboanga Province. It has a pre-war, sodded, black loam strip, reported to be 4000' x 600'. The field has not been used for years.
- 4. Junta 08° 10' N, 123° 48' E

 (It is requested that the name "Junta" be used for security reasons rather than the former designation of "Labo") This field is located three miles N.W. of the town of Misamis, Misamis Occ Province. The surface of the 5500' x 300' runway has been improved as has the drainage. The slippery appearance of the field is to be discounted. Both C-47s and Catalinas have landed on and taken off from the field. It has facilities for night landings. Runway lies N.E.—S.W.
- 5. Dipolog 08° 36' N, 123° 21' E
 This field is located adjacent to the beach at Dipolog, Zamboanga Province. The strip, 6000' x 200', is in excellent condition for wheels-down landings of all planes and is fully operational. The strip can be contacted by calling "Nick" on Channel "D" of VHF. There are repair facilities available.

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Appendix 2 Page 4 Summary No. 260 25 February 1945

- 6. <u>Iligan</u> 08° 13' N, 124° 12' E
 This field is located eight miles S of Iligan, Lanao Province.
 The grass-covered, dry-weather strip has been reported suitable for fighter planes only. Drainage would appear bad and location of a mountain at the end of the strip would make approaching difficult.
- 7. Dansalan 08° 01' N, 124° 17' E
 This field is located two miles W of Dansalan City, Ianao Province. The strip is reported to be 2700' x 125', with two high spots one third the distance from each end. The surface is said to be good. The wind direction is reported as either N or S. However, the field is designated as to be used only for emergency purposes.
- 8. Sital Silae Area 08° 10' N, 125° 13' E

 This is reported as flat, open terrain, suitable for crash landing, of a figuralle radiuse: Upon landing, is no immediate contact
 with sfriendly vforces is mades saithent should nove eastward across
 the Pulangi River.
- 9. Gingoog 08° 48' N, 125° 08' E
 This field is located along the S shore of Gingoog Bay, about three miles S.E. of Gingoog, Misamis Or Province. The pre-war, grass-covered, dry-weather strip of approximately 3000' x 150' runs N.E.-S.W. The strip is for emergency use only since it is overgrown with high grass. It lies in a rather heavily for-rested area, léading toward medium high hills to the S and W. A flight gap of 500' at each end of the field has been made by clearing the heavy trees.
- 10. Tuburan 10° 42' N, 123° 54' E

 This field has a coral-surfaced runway, 4500' x 150', in good condition. It is suitable for all type planes in all weather, and has been frequently used. Conspicuous turn-around areas at each end of the strip make identification easy. It is well protected by the mountains and guarded by the guerrillas.
- Sigui jor Island

 11. Sigui jor Village 09° 13' N, 123° 33' E

 The area along the beach near Sigui jor Village is coral and shallow for approximately 150' from shore. A P-51 pilot who crash-landed there on 14 January 1945 considers it satisfactory for crash-landing. There are no Japs on the island.
- Bohol

 12: Ubay 10° 03' N, 124° 28' E

 This field is located four miles W of Ubay, Bohol Island. The pre-war, coral, gravel and clay, all-weather strip is 4990' x 100'. The runway lies S.W.-N.E. Successful use of the runway has already been made.
 - 13. Carmen 09° 57' N, 124° 17' E

 This field is located in mountainous terrain at barrio Colonia, eight miles N of Carmen, Bohol Is. It has one pre-war clay and gravel strip. 3930' x 97.5'. The runway lies S.W.-N.E. and is unserviceable during wet weather. If choice exists, land at Ubay.
- Negros

 14. Tanjay (Manipis Field) 09° 30' N, 123° 08' E

 This field is located near the town of Tanjay, Negros Or. The field is V-shaped, each strip being 4592' x 656', and dry-weather

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Page 5 Summary No. 260 25 February 1945

surfaced. It has already been used for wheels-down landings.

- 15. Kabankalan 10° 00' N, 122° 50' E

 The strip, 1000 meters long, lies four miles from Kabankalan.

 It is now reported complete, with four movable smoke pots at the four corners, showing the extremities of the strip and the wind direction. Only good for dry weather landings.
- 16. La Castellana 10° 20' N, 123° 01' E
 Fifth Air Force reports that there is a flat area S of La Castellana which is in guerrilla hands and is suitable for emergency landings.
- 17. Aguisan (Binalbagan) 10° 10' N, 122° 52' E

 This field is reported (10 February) in friendly hands. The strip parallels the coast and is 300 to 400 yards inland. It is located between Aguisan River and Highway No. 1, being approximately 1 1/2 miles S of Binalbagan Town. The mouth of the Binalbagan River is two miles N.N.W. There is a single grass-covered runway, bearing N and S. Its condition is not known.
- 18. Daja 11° 34' N, 122° 18' E

 The field is located six miles S of Banga. It has a pre-war, souded ground, all-weather strip, 2038' x 162', and is reported as available for emergency use.
 - 19. Dingle 11° 00' N, 122° 40' E
 This field is located at Dingle, Iloilo Province. It is an uncompleted field used as a dummy by the Japanese. Has a dirt surface, dry-weather strip, 3280' x 328', and is believed to be overgrown.
 - 20. Dumarao 11º 16' N, 122º 41' E

 This field is located near Dumarao, Capiz Province. It is easily located from the air since it lies about 1/8th mile E of the railroad tracks in fairly open country. The strip, 5000' x 100', has a hard surface and a bed of solid rock packed with soil, and will take all planes during all weather. It is marked by bamboo poles placed along the sides of the strip. The strip lies N.E.-S.W., paralleling the prevailing winds.
 - 21. Lambuano 11° 03' N, 121° 29' E
 This field is located near Lambuano, Ilbilo Province. It has a pre-war strip, 2640' x 165', lying in a rice paddy. The strip may not now be distinguishable from the air.
 - 22. Sara 11° 14' N, 123° 01' E
 This field is located near Sara, Iloilo Province. It has a prewar, all weather strip, 4264' x 328', of which 3280' x 328' is
 surfaced with sod and decomposed granite.
 - 23. Tabung 11° 56! N, 1219 57' E
 This field is located at barrio of Caticlan, N.E. of the town of Buruanga, Capiz Province. It has a pre-war, natural sodded strip, 2310' x 165', which is soft in wet weather.
 - 24. Pilar 11° 28' N, 122° 59' E
 This field lies near Pilar, Capiz Province. It is a pre-war



Appendix 2 Page 6 Summary No. 260 25 February 1945

dry-weather strip, 4920' x 656'. It is reported satisfactory during good weather, but to be covered with two inches of mud during wet weather and of questionable use at that time.

25. Loctugan (Capiz) - 11° 30' N, 122° 45' E

This field is located near Loctugan, Capiz Province. The 2200' x 100' strip is reported satisfactory only for the lightest planes.

Tablas Island

26. Ferrol - 12° 21' N, 121° 56' E

This field is located five miles S.W. of the town of Odiongan on Tablas Island. There are two natural grass, all-weather strips: one is 2310' x 99' and the other 1500' x 99'.

Sibuvan Island

- 27. Magallanes 12° 29' N, 122° 31' E

 This field is located on Sibuyan Island and is also known as Magdiwang. It has a pre-war strip, 1500' x 192', suitable for emergency use only. Dangerous when dry and very dangerous when wet.
- 28. <u>Dulangan</u> 12° 30' N, 122° 31' E

 This dry-weather strip lies immediately N of Magallanes strip and is said to be superior to it. It is 2200' long.

Mindora

29. Calapan - 13° 25' N, 121° 12' E

This is a former all-weather airport with a sodded, sandy loam strip 2640' x 300', running N.W.-S.E. It is located on the isthmus of Calapan Pt and was reported in friendly hands on 4 February 1945.

Masbate Island

30. Aroroy - 12° 27% N, 123° 18' E

This field is located 2 1/2 miles W of Masbate Consolidated

Mining Co, Masbate Is. It has one pre-war, sodded, all
weather strip, 1920' x 300'.

Luzon

- 31. Bondoc 13° 36' 10" N, 122° 31' 02" E

 This is a wheels-down landing field in dry weather (wheels-up in wet), 3700' x 70'. Its long axis lies 50° W of N. This in wet), 3700' x 70'. Its long axis lies 50° W of N. This field is on a bearing of 310° from San Narciso (largest town on E coast of Bondoc Peninsula) and 6 1/2 minimum miles along an overgrown road from the town. The best approach is from an overgrown road from the town. The best approach is from the N.W. Medical facilities are available at strip.
- 32. Catanuan 13° 36' N, 122° 17' E

 Located at barrio Matandang Sabang, 2 1/2 miles N.W. of Catanuan. Its pre-war, all-weather strip is believed serviceable.

 It lies N.E.-S.W. and 2310' x 99' of its 2622' x 327' is macadam
 paved.

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- 33. Bukal 14° 31' N, 121° 23' E
 This is a light plane landing strip 1100' x 100'. The guerrillas report that the take-off is clear and that there is an
 acceptable approach. Border markers outline the strip. The
 name given above is tentative.
- 34. Mt Angelo 14° 49' N, 121° 22' E

 This field is located near the foot of Mt Angelo, Pampanga Province. Its natural, hard ground, clay and gravel strip is 1980'
 x 99'.
- 35. Akle Field 15° 03' N, 121° 04' E

 This is an L-5 strip located at 2.5 miles S and 60° W of Mt

 Lumot. It is in guerrilla hands and has been used for evacuation of personnel. Its dimensions are 800' x 60'. It has a hard surface and is marked with palm leaf arrow and American flag.
- 36. Gate. Lahuv Island 13° 55' N, 123° 49' E (Approx)
 A rescued airman and the guerrillas report a friendly cub strip on the S.W. coast of Lahuy Island about two miles N of Gato and adjacent to a gold mine. The strip is only about 1000' long.
- 37. Baliuag 14° 55! N, 120° 55! E (Approx)
 A cub strip, 984! x 328!, is reported at Baliuag, Bulacan.
 The runway lies N-S. The above coordinates have not definitely been ascertained to be correct.
- 38. Luna 16° 51' N, 120° 21' E

 This strip in La Union Province is now in use. It is 3900' x 200'. (Note: Luna, La Union Province is not to be confused with Luna, Mountain Province, where no strip is known to exist.)
- 39. Angaki 17° 10' N, 120° 40' E (Approx)
 This field is located 4-5 miles due E of Tirad Pt, which is a pointed peak above Tirad Pass in the Tirad Mountain Range on the eastern bank of the Abra River, directly opposite the barrio of Namepit, Ilocos Sur Province. The strip is 2100' x 450' and is being lengthened and improved.
- 40. Burgos Field 17° 20! N, 120° 30! E

 This is an emergency landing field at Burgos, Ilocos Sur

 Province. It has two 3000! x 900! criss-cross runways.

 One runway lies due E and the other along 2 60° azimuth.

 Photos show that the runways are rough but probably ser
 viceable. Guerrillas report no Jap activity in area. There
 is a large white arrow on the field.
- 41. Lagangilang 17° 34' 34" N, 120° 46' 27" E

 This field lies one mile E of the Abra River at the W foot of a thickly wooded mountain. The Baay River lies to the N, and the field is S.S.E. of Lagangilang, Abra Province. A report indicates that a wind cone near the N.E. corner of the field and panels will identify it. The strip is now 2000' x 150'.
- 42. Piddig 18° 10' N, 120° 45' 02" E
 This is an emergency landing field reported in the hands of



Appendix 2 Page 8 Summary No. 260 25 February 1945

the guerrillas. It is 950 meters by 145 meters at narrowest point. It lies 3.4 airline miles S.E. of Piddig Church.

B. Fields Rendered Unsafe By Japanese Movements (Possibly Enemy Controlled)

Mindanao

- 43. Barobo 08° 31' N, 126° 05' E Enemy movements as at 22 February make. this field unsafe. It is located between Bahi and Barobo, 7.5 miles to the W of Lianga Bay, Surigao Province. A convenient land-mark is the all-weather road from Lianga via Barobo which passes along the N boundary of the field. During periods of low ceiling, airmen can follow the road inland from Lianga Bay. The strip is not well levelled and has a high point on the N edge, 1000' from the W end of the field. The runway is 3000' x 225', lying almost due E and W. Landings are recommended to be made from W to E. The E end is said to be slippery during wet weather and is the narrow end of the field. Considerable improvement has been made in drainage, and a guerrilla report of 20 February states that the field is in excellent condition. It is necessary to buzz the runway before landing, and as soon as the airplane is recognized as friendly, a guard will light a fire to show wind direction.
- 44. Gamot Bay Seaplane Base 08° 32' N, 126° 11' E

 Enemy movements as at 22 February make this area unsafe. This
 lies due E of Barobo in Lianga, Sugigao Province. It is protected on the N by reefs, by Concesson Pt, and the islands of
 Cabgan and Cabao. The smooth area is two miles long by 280 to
 800 meters wide. It is probably free of coral heads. Four corners of the 3000' x 900' landing area marked with oil drums.
 Approach over W end of Cabgan Island and land toward shore on
 long axis of 135°. Taxi directly toward Malanipa house and
 three smudge fires at end of course. Deep water within 50 yards
 of shore.

Panay

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45. Tiring - 10° 50' N, 122° 30' E

Continued reports of nearby Japanese make use of this field inadvisable. It lies just N of Santa Barbara on the National Highway which is used as a taxiway to the strip. The Japs used this field. The guerrillas captured, lost, and recaptured the strip and are reported to have held it since 17 January 1945.

No further details concerning its serviceability are known.

Luzon

Lucena Field - 13° 56' N, 121° 37' E

This field was reported captured by the guerrillas on 4 February, but the Japanese are believed to be still in the area. It is located 1/2 mile W of the town of Lucena and two miles N of the Borth coast of Tayabas Bay, southern Luzon. Photo interpretation of 14 December 1944 shows two runways, N.W.-S.E., 3900' x 310' and N.E.-S.W., 2600' x 310'. They were surfaced with dirt and sod and both were then unserviceable. Their present condition is unknown.

Appendix 2 Page 9 Summary No. 260 25 February 1945

- 47. San Pablo 14° 06' N, 121° 26' E (Approx)

 Enemy withdrawal movements in the vicinity may have compromised the security of this field. It is an L-5 strip three miles E the security of this field. It is an L-5 strip three miles E of the town of San Pablo, Laguna Province, on a plateau at 5000' of the town of San Pablo, Laguna Province, on a plateau at 5000' elevation, on the N.W. slope of lit Cristobal. The strip is elevation, on the N.W. slope of lit Cristobal. The strip is white letter "H"; the strip itself is bordered by logs and it white letter "H"; the strip itself is bordered by logs and it is surrounded by coconut trees. There is a nipa shack in the N.W. corner.
- 48. Dossef Ranch 16° 55' 30" N, 121° 22' E

 This is an emergency landing field with a 3000' runway, located in Ifugao, Mountain Province. It lies 14.4 miles from Marasat In Ifugao, Mountain Province. It lies 14.4 miles from Marasat Ranch House on an azimuth of 270°. Enemy movement in the vicinity renders its use hazardous.

C. Once Friendly Fields Now Definitely in Japanese Hands

The following fields were formerly held by the guerrillas but are now in Japanese hands and must not be used.

Farm No. 8 (Talakag) - 08° 15' N, 124° 35' È (Mindanao)

Bancase

- 08° 58' N, 125° 30' E (Mindanao)

- 06° 17' N, 124° 44' E (Mindanao)

- 06° 42' N, 124° 47' E (Mindanao)

Buluan

Buluan

Bagulin - 16° 37' 45" N, 120° 30' 50" E (Luzon)

Borongan - 11° 36' N, 125° 26' E
This emergency strip on Samar has been deleted because its proximity to our own operational fields makes its use unnecessary.


Medellin, Cebu - 11° 08' N, 123° 59' E

This field has never been listed in these compilations as friendly, and is not available as a landing field. It is not now (22 February) and is not available as a landing field. It is not now (22 February) in friendly hands, and the proximity of the enemy has always made it unsafe.

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


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
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 260



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22 FEBRUARY 1945

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SUMM

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SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

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From DCS

Subject : Plan of Mission to aid Pows in Philippine


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Dete: 6 February 1944


- 1. The Commander in Chief has been consulted with regard to sending Lieutenant Rosenquist on this trip of the Narwhal.
- 2. It is believed advisable to delay his going into the Philippines in view of the current attention being paid to prisoners and the possibility that the man in question might be intercepted. Further, it is believed that he should go in not too far in advance of projected operations into Mindanao.
- 3. I will discuss this further with the Chief of Staff upon his return, and give you further information at that time.

/s/ R.J.M.





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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

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CHECK SHEET

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File No.:

Subject: Plan of Mission to aid POWs in Philippine


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
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Ce Whitney:

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
General WILLOUGHBY:

Suggested draft of directive to Colonel Fertig, re mission.

S.N.N.

I. Rosenquist.

Will act under your direction in the furtherance of such intelligence activities in the vicinity of DAVAO as you may direct. These activities however should not interfere with his primary mission.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

ROUTING SLIP

| | 1 |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| ROM | |
| | FOR: |
|): | Approval |
| Commander-in-Chief | Concurrence |
| Chief of Staff | Information |
| Deputy C/S | Initials |
| G-1 | Issue Orders |
| G-2 | Nec. Action |
| G-3 | Note & Return |
| G-4 | |
| Adjutant General | *Remark & Recommendation |
| Antiaircraft Officer | - Recommendation |
| Engineer Officer | - m |
| Signal Officer | Transmit |
| Surgeon Public Relations | |
| Public Relations | a: |
| Officer | _ Signature |
| Chief Regulating | |
| Officer | _ File |
| Hq Comdt | |
| Aides | |
| | |
| DC/S - AG - USAFFE | |
| Comdr. ALF | |
| Comdr. ANF | |
| Comdr. AAF | |
| | |

Ce Whitney:

Coler is in 10th MD. Letter attacked auswers little p Goden marked somer time ago.

This letter being forwarded.

Theo



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S.M.M.

I. Rosenquist.

Will act under your direction in the furtherance of such intelligence activities in the vicinity of DAVAO as you may direct. These activities however should not interfere with his primary mission.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

28 January 1944

SUBJECT: Mission of 1st Lt. H.A. Rosenquist (0-278037).

TO : Commanding Officer, 10th Military District, Philippine Islands.

l. Letter Order of ______ directs Lt. H. A. Rosenquist to Mindanao, Philippine Islands for the prime mission of establishing contact with American Prisoners of War at Davao Penal Colony, and any others which may be on the Island of Mindanao, to:

a. Assist in improving health conditions of Ps/W by furnishing needed medicines and vitamins.

b. Improve morale of personnel by the supplying of news bulletins,

c. Establish an intelligence system within the P/W camp (s) and to act as an outlet for intelligence information.

d. Prevent massacre of American Ps/W in the event of our landing on the Philippine Islands, by preparing ground work for mass evacuation when deemed advisable.

e. Obtain data on P/W personnel; a record of atrocities and out)

(marked/ 2. In addition to prime mission, this officer under your direction is to establish an intelligence coverage of enemy activities, installations and (see other Laureta's work in the direction, and acting as an outlet for it. Such intelpage) ligence to be routed thru Hq., 10th Military District, to GHQ, G-2 Section,

3. It is directed that the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District furnish Lt. Rosenquist: - such personnel and supplies as may be available; establish communication and transport facilities; also render such other assistance as may be necessary to accomplish this mission.

For the Commanding General:

Brig. General, U.S. Army A.C. of S., G-2

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20 Dec 43

To:

Chief of Staff

Subject: Expansion of MIS-X Activities.

1. MIX-X is now set up under Commander Allied Air Force under authority of letter this headquarters to Cmdr AAF, subject: MIS-X Activities in SWPA, dated August 24, 1943.

- Contact with American POW in Jap Camps was prepared by Lt. Col. S. M. Mellnik, himself an Escapee from Davao POW Camp. He states that the following proposals were discussed with Major General Sutherland in Washington, and that the latter's reactions were favorable: MIS-X should be expanded to carry out its initial mission of contact with POW as follows:
- a. One MIS-X officer, at present available in SWPA, to be sent to Mindanao to assist POW at Davao and to set up a POW intelligence Net.
- b. Contact to be established between G-2, GHQ, through MIS-X Brisbane, and POW on Luzon, for purposes of morale and to establish POW Intelligence Net.
- and b. above appear sound, and well worth the expense and effort required to put them in effect. Their approval is recommended.

/8/ Willoughby C.A.W.

To: G-2
Pencil: Approved, subject to volunteering for mission by Lt. Rosenquist.

Initialed: RKS

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SUMMARY

Development of contact with American POW in Jap Camps.

SECTION I: General Background.

- 1. Lt. Col. Mellnik's work with MIS-X, Washington, D. C.
- 2. Possibility of making contact with POW in Mindanao and Luzon.

SECTION II: Detailed study of Mindana POW situation.

- 1. POW camp, organization, work activities, extent of Jap surveillance.
- Proximity of guerilla organization, intelligence activity of this unit, tactical and intelligence possibilities of this unit; possible aid to POW.
- Conclusions: Desirable to send MIS-X officer to guerilla unit to assist POW and coordinate intelligence.
- 4. Recommendations in detail to carry out para. 3.

SECTION III: Detailed Study of Luzon POW situation.

- 1. POW camp, organization, work activities, channels of communication to Manila, intelligence possibilities.
- 2. Conclusions: Desirable to contact POW for morale and intelligence reasons.
- 3. Recommendation: That PRS of AIB contact POW.

APPENDIX: "A" - Memo to AC of S, G-2 from Lt. Col. Mellnik.

"B" - Map showing the POW camp in Mindanao.

"C" - Letter of instruction to Lt. Col. Englehart at Cabanatuan.



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STAFF STUDY FOR CHIEF OF STAFF.

SUBJECT: Development of contact with American POW in Japanese Camps.

SECTION I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

- 1. A memorandum to A. C. of S., G-2 was recently received from Lt. Col. Mellnik in regard to contacting American POW in Japanese camps (Appendix "A"). The problems involved, the bene fits to be gained, and the known desire of the C-in-C to aid these prisoners, has led to a G-2 Staff study of his memo and recommendations.
- 2. Briefly, Lt. Col. Mellnik, in his MIX-X work in Washington, D. C., was impressed with the value of MIS-X activities in European POW camps. The extent to which the camps were organized, the valuable information secured, the escape assistance provided, and the high morale effect on POW as a result of direct contact with their own forces. When he queried MIS-X as to its POW activity in the SWP, they replied there was none; that they had not been able to start work in this area, and would he present the features of MIX-S to GHQ, SWP, particularly the work it was doing in POW camps in Europe. He talked over the possibility of aiding POW in P.I. with MIS-X. One MIS-X officer, who was ordered to duty here, was tentatively slated for POW activity, when and if authorized. This was Lt. Rosenquist, MIS-X, on duty with 5th AAF in Brisbane.
- 3. Lt. Col. Mellnik contends that the problem of aiding the prisoners is one of making and maintaining contact with them. One camp is at the Davao Penal Colony in Mindanao, easily accessible to guerilla units, and lightly guarded. To this camp, the assistance can be substantial. The second camp is at Cabanatuan, in Luzon. This area is highly organized by the enemy. Contact with this camp, while difficult, will pay dividends, as the camp acts as a pool of POW labor, which covers important Luzon military installations.

SECTION II. Detailed Study of Davao Penal Colony POW Camp.

- 1. a. This camp is located 52 km northeast of Davao, and about 12 km from Davao Gulf. There is one second-class road to it from Davao, with numerous bridges. The camp is in the center of a jungle, and was originally built to house Fibipino convicts with 20 year sentences. The camp is the shape of a rectangle, one by two miles in dimension. (See map, Appendix B).
- b. It contains 2000 American POW, of whom 600 are officers. About 1000 go to work each day in the colony grounds. The camp also serves as a labor pool for outside work details for the Japs. These include:
 - 1) 20 men in the motor repair and truck drivers' pool in Davao City.

2) 30 men making salt on Davao Gulf.

3) 100 men on a Japanese abaca plantation.


4) variable number stevedoring in the Davao dock area.

The 1000 who work in the camp itself are divided into about 50 groups of various sizes, from 150 repairing the road to Davao, to three or four doing Jap K.P.

c. (1) The main American hospital is at the Davao Penal Colony. POW sick on outside work details are brought in to this camp. At infrequent intervals, outside work details are rotated. The camp is organized with an American Camp Headquarters, whose main duty is to fill the labor requisitions each day. The Camp Hq. normally assigns individuals to specific work details. Freedom of movement within the camp compound is not restricted. Visiting is frequent between hospital and camp.

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


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- Japs make no pretense of guarding the prisoners. The duty of the sentry is to supervise and direct the work. Such work details as logging, firewood gathering and abaca stripping, are all in the jungle. Under such circumstances, it is impossible for the sentry to exercise much surveillance. He merely counts noses at noon and prior to return to camp. The orchard and coffee picking details had no sentries, as those details were composed of old and sick officers, too weak to do much work, much less escape (McCoy & Mellnik escaped from the coffee detail) All POW are brought back to the prison compound at 6 p.m. each day. The compound is surrounded by barbed wire, with tall sentry towers placed at intervals.
- (3) The Jap garrison is not over 250. This includes mess and administrative personnel, outpost guards (Japs worried about guerillas), work detail guards, and an interior guard of the camp. There are seldom more than 50 sentries available to guard the 50 different work details.
- 2. a. 30 km north of the POW camp in the jungle is a cammunity of 5000 Filipinos who evacuated Davao City when the Japs invaded Mindanao. To protect themselves against Jap interference, they organized a guerilla unit under Major Laureta. Major Laureta was a Philippine Constabulary officer, and for two years prior to the war, was traffic control officer of Mindanao. At the outbreak of war he was in command of a P.C. battalion in Davao City. When Mindanao surrendered, he evacuated to the hills with part of his unit. This served as a nucleus for his present organization. It now numbers 1000 men and 150 rifles. He exercises absolute powers inhis area. Is extremely loyal and has effectively prevented Jap interference with community life in the area.
- (1) Major Laureta's unit is composed of men, natives of Davao City, between 18 and 25 years of age. He has established contacts in Davao City, has procured Jap passes for his men, and in April 1943, was quite active in getting information out of Davao which would keep him abreast of Jap activities affecting his area. His southern outpost at Lungagog, is 12 km from the POW camp at the Colony. The 12 km in between is guerilla territory guerilla patrols use it, the Japs stay in their outpost at Anabogan. Laureta's Headquarters is at Kapungagan, on the Libuganon River.
- (2) In the past few months he has established weekly courier contact with Col. Fertig's Headquarters, has had his unit inducted into the 10th Military District, and is now a member of U.S. forces in Mindanao. Travel time from Major Laureta to Col. Fertig's Headquarters is about 7 days by courier.
- (3) About 10 of Laureta's men are former inmates of the Davao Penal Colony. With Col. Fertig are the two Filipinos who assisted Colonel Mellnik's party in its escape. Two Americans who escaped at the same time are now unit commanders in the Agusan Province.
- 3. a. Col. Fertig has been quite busy in other areas in the past year, and has not had a competent officer to send to Laureta to assist in organization and intelligence. Considering the distance involved, and the location of Laureta's unit (it could not tactically assist Fertig in Occidental Misamis, Lanao or the Agusan) this organization is the last organized guerilla unit to get attention from the 10th MD.
- b. (1) It seems apparent that a force of 1000 rifles (which could be developed under Laureta) would be a distinct asset to us in the event of our landing in Mindanao. The unit is 3 days march from Davao City, and in a direction unprotected by the Japs (jungle).
- (2) This unit, so intimately familiar with Davao City, can likewise be utilized for intelligence purposes far beyond its present undirected scope of activities. Directed sabotage activity could easily be affected.
- (3) Its proximity to the POW camp and direct communication with the 10th MD, makes it the logical point of contact with the POW, and the place from which active assistance to POW may be initiated.



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- 4. 2. Considering Major Laureta's organization with a view to its suitability as a focal point for aid to American POW in Davao Penal Colony, the following is a discussion of what can be done:
- (1) Photogrpahic evidence of conditions in the camp. Col. Mellnik states that it is possible to get anything into the camp which can be carried.
- (2) Positive assistance to POW in the shape of vitamin pills, A and B-1 particularly. Mail and news bulletins will follow. The morale effect of contact with their own forces will be greater than any materiel benefits.
- (3) Data for the State Department re additional violations of the Geneva Convention rules. Data for the War Department re casualties, etc., as so many have died, and more will die, with no record of date of death or circumstances.
- (4) Establishment of an intelligence system within the camp (there are sufficient officers there). The POW outside work details will be a fruitful source of information. This should result in accurate intelligence of enemy activities in all areas in which POW labor is used.
- b. Laureta's intelligence system at present is directed towards local security. This is due to lack of experience in relative value of information and lack of contact with agencies who could use the information, rather than to lack of effort on his part. The fact that many of his men were residents of Davao, with friends and relatives there, makes his unit invaluable from an intelligence view-point. This means an intelligence coverage of the key city of Davao. Laureta's intelligence training is limited. He will need a directing hand.
- 2. That his force of 1000 men has kept intact for 18 months and his civil community enthusiastically supporting him, is good evidence of Laureta's organizational ability and honesty. His force, if equipped, would be a valuable asset in attacking the enemy from the rear in conjunction with our own forces. His men, familiar with the area, could likewise assist us by sabotaging bridges, power plants and railroads in conjunction with our own operations. His position on the Libuganon is impregnable. Jungle trails only lead into it. His area is well patrolled, and enemy intelligence is extremely limited.
- 5. a. The possibilities inherent in operating in Major Laureta's area: aid to POW, intelligence in Davao, organization for active support of our own troops, requires that an officer be sent into that area. MIS-X at Washington in conjunction with Lt. Col. Mellnik, tentatively selected Lt. Rosenquist. He has been in MIS-X for over a year, has served in the National Guard (Field Artillery) for ten years prior to that as 1st Sgt. Mellnik thinks Rosenquist can do the job. Rosenquist is now on duty at the 5th Air Force in Brisbane, on MIS-X work, and is willing to take over the job.
- b. The officers to direct establishment of POW intelligence system in the camp are Lt. Col. Memory Cain, 200th CA (NG), and Lt. Col. G.H. Stubbs, CAC, They are both trustworthy, active, intelligent, and their morale is high. There is on file at G-2 a recent letter to Lt. Col. Stubbs from his mother. This letter will establish the authenticity of our contact.
- c. The possibility of aiding the escape of POW was considered. From all reports, the POW are too weak to engage in a mass escape, while the escape of smaller units may invite drastic retaliation.
- 6. a. Recommend that 1st Lt. H.A. Rosenquist, MIS-X be authorized to proceed to Mindanao, P.I., and that Col. Fertig be directed to make arrangements for his trip to Major Laureta's headquarters.
- (1) That Lt. Rosenquist will work under G-2, GHQ.
 (2) That he be authorized to procure supplies from SWP or MIS-X agencies (vitamins, etc.) for this mission.

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b. His primary mission:

Make contact with POW at the Cavao Penal Colony.

(2) Furnish them such assistance in medicines and vitamins, mail, news bulletins, as transports facilities may permit.

(3) Investigate the possibility of assisting the escape of selected POW.

(4) Direct the establishment of an intelligence system within the camp and act as an outlet for it.

(5) Broaden the scope of Major Laureta's intelligence network to include coverage of military installations in Davao City.

(6) Investigate, and report to GHQ, what Laureta's unit, properly equipped, could do to:

a) Assist the American landings thru direct attack and sabotage of Jap installations in Davao.

b) Prevent the massacre of American POW in the Davao Penal Colony in the event of our landing in Mindanao.

(7) Recommend to this headquarters minimum supplies needed to accomplish b(6), (a) and (b).

c. His secondary mission will be:

(1) To act as Col. Fertig's liaison officer to Major Laureta. (2) Direct the procurement of such intelligence as the 10th MD may

desire.

SECTION III: Detailed study Cabanatuan POW Camp.

- 1. Cabanatuan is in the province of Nueva Ecija, in Central Luzon. It is about 100 km north of Manila. The POW camp is located 9 km east of the town of Cabanatuan. It is in the center of a rice growing area.
- a. The POW camp consists of a hospital area and the camp compound proper. Latest reports indicate a minimum of 6000 American POW at this camp about 1000 officers and 5000 enlisted men. The camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence. High sentry towers are located at strategic points, and the approches to the camp are quite open and guarded. The countryside is flat and low - a typically rice paddy area.
- b. The Jap guard consists of about 250 reservists, with about one yr of training. This unit furnishes the guards for outside work details, interior guard, administration and supply and the routine police duties of the camp.
- c. The interior administration of the POW camp is handled by an American Camp Hq. This Hqs coordinates roll calls, admissions to the hospital area, keeps records and initiates sanitary precautions. Its chief duty is to provide work details as called for by the Japs. The camp serves as a labor pool from which the Japs draw as occasion demands. As of Oct. 1942, the Japs had POW working parties in Bataan, Corregidor, Nichols Field, Clark Field, Ft. Mckinley, Nielson airport, dock area in Manila and a motor pool in Manila. As members of these working parties get sick, or the job is completed, the POW are returned to Cabanatuan. At infrequent intervals these working details are rotated. The POW cannot make use of what they see.
- d. Work details in and around the camp proper consists of routine police, repair of buildings and roads, and gathering firewood. The firewood detail of about 100 men goes out each day into the woods. This detail is the camp's only daily contact with the outside world. At noontime several caramettas arrive a at the scene of the woodcutting with items of food to sell. The Japs permit this sale - profiting thereby. These caramettas proved to be reliable channels of communication with Manila. Another channel was the American truck driver who took the Jap truck into Manila each week.
- 2. a. Communication from the POW camp at Cabanatuan to Manila is already in effect. Col. Watrous, Medical Corps, a former physician in Manila has a reliable channel, Maj. Cavender, formerly manager of the Manila hotel, and also has one. These channels are through to their friends in Manila, and are being used to supply currency and mail into the camp. Letters from internees in Santo



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Tomas were not infrequent. No attempt had been made by the POW as of Oct. 1942, to use these channels for military intelligence, as there was no definite outlet for it in Manila, and the need for currency was great. The channels were used by those who had personal friends in Manila or the civilian internment camp.

- b. The possibility of POW securing information of military value in Luzon appears excellent. The widely scattered working parties in important military areas cannot avoid seeing what is going on. This source of information should prove more reliable than the infrequent Filipino verbal reports which too after are colored. The state of mind of civilians, the supplies available to them and the conduct of the Japs in the area, will give us an indication of the civil support to be expected in the event of invasion.
- c. (1) It appears that aside from assistance to POW at Cabanatuan, which in view of the location of the camp will be limited to letters and news bulletins, contact with the POW will develop a prolific source of military intelligence in the most important island in the Philippines. There are about 1000 officers in this camp. Selected ones should be instructed to establish an intelligence agency to question returning members of outside work details, evaluate the information and, as occasion permits, expand the scope of intelligence activities.
- (2) The officers known to be in this camp, and with whom contact should be made are: Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart, CAC (formerly with G-2, Philipine Dept); Lt. Col. Saint, Corps of Engineers, Lt. Col. Watrous, Medical Corps, and Maj Howard Cavender. These officers are healthy with high morale, and have numerous contacts with the camp. G-2 has a letter to Maj. Erven Somerville (POW at Cabanatuan) from his wife. This letter will establish the authenticity of our contact.
- (3) To take advantage of the intelligence facilities available in the POW camp will require a channel of communication from GHQ to the Camp. The agency at present operating in Luzon is the Philippine Regional Section of AIB. The nature and extent of tis activities need not be commented on here. The initial contact will take time; subsequent contacts with the POW will be simplified, as the POW have a direct channel to Manila.
- 3. a. Recommend that P.R.S. of A.I.B. establish a channel of communication between G-2, GHQ, and the POW at the Cabanatuan Camp. The first letter to go in will contain:
- (1) A letter for Maj. Somerville at Cabanatuan to establish the authenticity of the contact.
- (2) A letter of instruction, reestablishment of a POW intelligence systme within the camp addressed to L. Col. E. Carl Englehart and Lt. Col. Saint Corps of Engineers, (See Appendiz C).

(3) A late news summary of world events.

C. A. W.

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4 December 1943

MEMORANDUM :

TO : A. C. of S., G-2, GHQ, SWPA.

- 2. In conversation with MIS-X at Washington, D.C., I found this section extremely active in assisting American POW in enemy hands. Among their many activities were: briefing air crews in escape procedure; methods of communicating with our forces in the event of capture; establishment of escape and intelligence channels. The activities of MIS-X has resulted in the planned escape of several hundred American POW, a continuous flow of military intelligence from the enemy area, and a highly organized POW unit in each of the enemy POW camps.
- 2. The 8000 American POW now concentrated in the Philippines have had no contact with American forces since their surrender. Conditions in these camps are deplorable, morale is extremely low, guerrilla units are active in all areas, and no action has been initiated to prevent the massecre of these POWs in the event our forces land in the camp areas.
- 3. The two main concentration areas for American PONs are Cabanatuan (6000) in the province of Nueva Ecija, and the Davao Penal Colony (2000), with about 15 smaller groups on working parties nearby.
- a. The Cabanatuan camp, located in the middle of Luzon, can be contacted through agents in Manila or guerrilla units operating in the area. The camp sends out working parties each day, members of which are permitted to buy items from the local people. The assistance to this camp will be limited to easily concealed mail, news bulletins, currency, etc. The effect on the morale of the POWs as a result of contact with their own forces will be very great. The camp should be directed to organize an intelligence system. The numerous working parties returning to Cabanatuan would be interrogated and a prolific source of accurate information within the occupied area thus made available. There are at least 500 officers in this camp, freedom of movement within the camp area is not restricted, and the camp can develop its own intelligence network throughout the working party areas of Luzon.

No attempt was made to obtain intelligence or interrogate incoming working parties while I was in this camp. This was due to our inability to send it out. We were able to keep a constant flow of messages to and from Manila; messages from internees at Santo Tomas University were frequent.

require that an agency of GHQ contact the camp itself through channels which already exist in AIB. Officers to be contacted at Cabanatuan are: Maj. Lerry Bosworth, CAC; Maj. R. D. Glassburn, CAC; Lt. Col. Saint, C.E.; Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart (former member of G-2, Hq. Philippine Department).

b. (1) The camp at the Davao Penal Colony presents a much easier problem. It is 52 km northeast of Davao, 12 km from the coast, and in the center of the jungle. About 30 km north of the colony there is a community of civilians who had evacuated from Davao when the Japs invaded that city. This community has organized a guerrilla unit under Maj. Laureta, a Constabulary officer who commanded an Infantry battalion during the Jap invasion. The guerrilla unit was organized to prevent Jap interference with the life of the community, and has succeeded to

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such an extent, that the Japs leave them severely alone. The unit consists of 150 rifles and 1000 men. They are extremely loyal and well organized. Travel time from Col. Fertig to Maj. Laureta is about 14 days. Maj. Laureta's unit is too far away to actively assist Col. Fertig in the north.

- (2) There are 2000 POW in the colony. About 800 go out to work each day. The American camp Headquarters assigns the members to specific work details. The POW work in the rice fields, orchards and in the jungle logging. There are few Jap guards, as the hazards of the jungle and physical weakness of the POW are deterrents to escape. Contact with the POW is a simple matter. There are about 600 officers in this camp.
- (3) In Maj. Laureta's organization there are at least ten men who were formerly civil prisoners in the colony. The two Filipinos who assisted our party to escape are in Mindanao and available. When our party spent ten days with Maj. Laureta, he indicated a strong desire to put himself and his unit under U. S. control. He is at present in contact with Col. Fertig's Headquarters and with civil prisoners in the colony.

He had already established numerous contacts with civilians in Davao City, had obtained several Jap passes to go into the city, and was collecting such intelligence as would enable him to keep abreast of Jap activities affecting his area. He has no radio transmitter or receiver. Laureta's outpost is 12 KM from the Peral Colony.

- 4. a. Assistance to the POW at the Colony can be more substantial than at Cabanatuan. It is easy to bring in relatively bulky objects into the camp. Vitamins, A and Bl particularly, mail, news bulletins can be taken in. A camera can be introduced and photographic evidence of conditions in camp secured. The range of activities and assistance will be limited by transport facilities and the ingenuity of the person concerned.
- b. (1) Intelligence of enemy activities, installations, conditions in Davao and the surrounding area can be secured by an organized group within the camp, as the camp furnishes the pool of truck drivers and motor repair men for the Jap motor pool in Davao. Other working details will cover different areas.
- (2) Intelligence, the type we want, can also be obtained through Maj. Laureta's agents within Davao proper.
- 5. Recommend that an officer be sent to Maj. Laureta to do the following:
 - a. Make contact with the POW at the Daval Penal Colony.
 b. Furnish them such assistance in medicines and vitamins,

mail, news bulletins, as transport facilities may permit.

- c. Direct the establishment of an intelligence system within the camp and act as an outlet for it.
 - d. Broaden the scope of Maj. Laureta's intelligence network.
 e. Formulate a plan of action for Maj. Laureta's unit to:

1) Assist the American landings through attack and sabotage of Jap installations in Davao.

- 2) Prevent the massacre of American POW in the Davao Penal Colony in the event of American landings in Mindanao.


 3) Secure such arms, munitions and sabotage materiel as will
- 3) Secure such arms, munitions and sabotage materiel as will enable it to fulfill its mission.

6. Officers to be contacted at the Penal Colony area: Lt. Col. M. Cain, CAC; Lt. Col. G.H. Stubbs, CAC; Lt. Comdr. Smith, USN, and Lt. Col. Nelson, Inf.

DECLUSION /8/ S. M. MELLINIK

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SUBJECT: Military Intelligence.

TO : Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart, CAC, and Lt. Col. Saint, CE, POW Camp, Cabanatuan.

- 1. It is directed that you establish an intelligence system within the POW camp to procure and evaluate information on:
 - a. Enemy activities throughout Luzon, to include:

1) Corregidor

- 2) Bataan
- 3) Clark Field
- 4) Nichols Field
- 5) Ft. McKinley
- 6) Manila
- 7) Nielson airport
- b. Conditions among civilians in populated areas to include:
 - 1) Status of food and other supplies available to civilians.

2) Their attitude towards the enemy.

- Degree of cooperation to be expected when U.S. forces arrive.
- c. Conditions existing in the POW camp to include:
 - 1) Violations of Geneva Convention rules.
 - 2) Roster of prisoners, alive and dead.
 - 3) Physical condition of POW.
- d. The Jap administration and guard unit to include:
 - 1) Number, state of training, unit and officers.
 - 2) Attitude towards POW, with trend if any.
 - 3) Attitude towards the war.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY, Brig. General, U. S. Army, A. C. of S., G-2


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
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MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS (DAMAGED)





ata outlined in attached check sheet was considered prior ats on paragraphs follows

se the we all want to extend our intelligence into La

6-2 de not remotely criticizing Phillip's "performance" of duty but points out the problem is operating independently in an area under the influence of Peralta. Peralta can be a better job of protecting his agents in Mindoro se cam: The cour of this matter is contained in this paragraph: Shall we con agent in an area looked after by a prilla leader.

Para. or He comment.

Para 5: Concur.

Leson data not germane to the 1st.

Same as tel above .

He wall be charged to do that.

No comment.

Local irigment on protection negled by radio stations

serves consideration.

f. Phillips was sent to develop featral Lunon when we know In view of Smith's current progress, broad mission in Lu. nothing of the erea. assigned initially to Phillips was ambitious.

E. He has asked for trained personnel provi

Para. 7: Conditions have changed since 31 May 194

Para.8: Current plan, pending approval, does the into account

Para. 9: ID commander are generally co sperating.

Mas merit in conjunction with Jurado.

b. Jurado is entirely actisfactory. Col. Hansano as co-ordinator is to beused initially with

mo's general value lies in his contacts and representative, previous acquaintance with with Jap units on lason. Saith is working in thedark towards them.

RS Check Sheet 18 Jay/44.

Re attached PRS check sheet:

1. Data outlined in attached check sheet was considered prior For convenience, comments on paragraphs follows

Para 2: Agree thes we all want to extend our intelligence into Lusent.

Para 3: G-2 do not remotely criticizing Phillip's "performance" of duty but points out the problem is operating independently in an area under the influence of Peralta. Peralta can do a better job of protecting his agents in Mindoro than we can: The crux of this matter is contained in this paragraph: Shall we con tirus am independent agent in an area looked after by a prilla leader.

Para. 41 No comment.

Para. 5: Concur.

in the season Para. 6: a. Luzon data not germane to the 1st. at decuesing Wise and Peralta.

He wall be charged to do that. 9

No comment.

Local juigment on protection dealed by radio stations

deserves consideration.

f. Phillips was sent to develop goatral Lumon when we knew In view of Smith's current progress, broad mission in Lunothing of the area. assigned initially to Phillips was ambitious.

g. He has asked for trained personal proviously.

Para. 7: Conditions have changed since 31 May 1943

Para.8: Current plan, pending approval, does this into account . Manzano.

Para. 9: MD commanders are generally co-operating.


Para 10: No comment.

Has merit in conjunction with Jurado.

Jurado is entirely astisfac ory.

c. Col. Mansano as co-ordinator is to beused initially with

Smith. Lengang's general value lies in his contacts and representative, previous acquaintance with auti-Jap units on Lazon. Smith is working in thedark towards them.



No comment.

G-2 Recommendations: Re para. 11-b: The plan to use Jurado has merit; Jurado's background looks good. Had G-2 been advised of conditions under a) and b) the PRS plan would certainly have been considered. I concur at once ins

a. Re-institution of Mindero position.

b. Employment of Jurado and "Americans". c. Preliginary understanding with Peralta on :

1) Localised Intelligence in Windoro.

11) Support of Jurado CHQ station.

Deloyment of Manzano, as Co-ordinator of the general Luzon enterprise, consisting of three general penetration axis, viz:


- South Luzon - Jurado - Central Luzon Abcede

- Bicolandia Manzano : Co-ordinator.

Chit with incl. mage fr Peralta #191,209,210,211,212,216.

0.4.W.






James G arbeit


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
Grand ar. + qua


Less angels


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


























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




















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City of Norfolk



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Danna M. Grant

Microfilm Camera Operator

SEPTEMBER 3, 1987

Date :

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