

RG-16: WHITNEY PAPERS

PERSONAL FILES

GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN  
THE PHILIPPINES

CORRESPONDENCE, 1943

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This paper  
has 2 and more  
attachments.

.S. C. of S. 15 July 43  
Coor: G-2

1. I have considered the attached comments of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and have appended hereto a revised organizational plan (Tab "C") which incorporates most of his ideas. I believe that his idea of limiting enrollment in the "AVENGER" unit to men after definite selections for Philippine service is fundamentally sound, although this is at variance with the principle employed in the organization of "COMMANDO," "RANGER," and "SPECIAL SERVICE" units and may later prove unwise in practice. The incentive to maintain a high standard of service in the units last mentioned is derived from the summary relief from the unit of any who show any disqualifying tendency. The revision suggested could be accomplished by having the men filtered through a replacement (Tab "C") unit rather than another AVENGER unit as in the first plan submitted (Tab "B").

2. I am also in agreement with his idea that the school staff could just as well remain under my Section, A.I.E., as at present. I believe, however, that for effective administrative - - possibly later operational - - control, the 978th Signal Service Company should be a component of the proposed Force. The men of this unit will be for the most part technically trained Filipinos who, under my agreement with General AIKEN, are to be available to us for any type of Philippine service at any time. The unit itself is designed and intended for ultimate Philippine service. For the most part, its personnel will be exclusively devoted to signal communication in the Philippines or here incident to our intelligence operations, cryptographic or instructional work. It would seem, therefore, convenient to tie it into the administrative control of the proposed force - - otherwise, it would have to be a special unit administered by USAFFE headquarters direct. However, this is a relatively unimportant point and the main purpose of the proposed organization would be little affected whether it is a component of the force or remains a loose end for USAFFE to tie up in some other manner.

3. With respect to the entire group of selected Filipinos to be brought in, I feel very strongly that with unit leadership under Filipinos, an overall command under American direction is essential to secure maximum results. I have talked to the regiments, screened them, and personally selected these men, each one of whom has volunteered to me for extra hazardous service. They know just what I expect of them while in training and thereafter. I must keep the closest watch and control over them from the moment they arrive until the moment they depart on assigned missions, and this can be much more effectively done through a command rather than an administrative relationship.

4. With respect to G-2 comment on plans for future employment of Filipinos in other than the intelligence services, I believe we should remain conscious

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of potentialities even though so far removed as to be beyond the sphere of present planning. I looked over the two Filipino regiments in the United States rather carefully and entertain strong doubt that they will ever qualify as such for combat service. However, a hand picked battalion - - possibly two - - could be selected that would measure up to the standards of almost any other unit of comparable size for Philippine operations. It is probable that a trained reserve of this character will be required. From it could be drawn a small unit (company, platoon or squad) for attachment to each division conducting Philippine operations, for advanced infiltration, guides, interpreters or other similar services. I merely scan these potentialities without losing my grip on the task with which I am immediately charged - - but propose an organizational structure capable of the necessary expansion to embrace such services at the appropriate time. I believe we should now view Filipino manpower in relation to its potential value as well as its present usefulness - - to permit us to fully realize on that value when the situation develops that permits us, in turn, to view it and act on it in terms of "present usefulness."

C. W.



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

9 July 1943



SUBJECT: Organizational Plan

TO : Chief of Staff

Coordination: G-2

1. Since return to me of my memorandum of 1 June 1943, attached (Tab "A"), with concurrence in principle but non concurrence with the plan of organization therein proposed, I have endeavored to find some solution that would meet with your approval. I hope that I have found it in the attached plan of organization (Tab "B") which I submit for consideration.

2. In the development of this plan, I have been guided by a desire to (a) find a medium for insuring high morale, (b) create a structure that could conduct any activity in which the utilization of selected Filipino manpower is required, and (c) provide for such Filipinos a Filipino organization, insofar as is possible, under Filipino leadership.

3. I have been influenced by the thought that present plans for Philippine intelligence coverage do not encompass the entire field of future activity for which the employment of selected Filipinos may be required - - that ultimately they will find employment for (a) armed reconnaissance in the Philippines, (b) landings in force to organize the people and secure airfields and beach heads in coordination with offensive operations, and (c) infiltration to flank enemy held positions.

4. I have been further influenced by the knowledge that United States Filipinos who volunteer for immediate Philippine service have two purposes to serve by so doing - - to avenge their dead and to liberate their living - - that such thought must be constantly before them, the very credo of their service if we are to secure maximum results from such service. It is precisely for such reason that I have suggested the term "AVENGER" as synonymous with Commando, Ranger, etc., but bearing at the same time the deeper purposeful significance to the individual.

5. As I have before stated, I am deeply concerned with the necessity of finding some adequate substitute for personal leadership in the intelligence operations soon to be undertaken - - some moral force that will encourage the individual to take that last step to his assigned objective that will make the difference between success and failure in the discharge of his mission. I believe this can best be done by placing him from the start under the psychological influence of Esprit de corps - - that membership in an organization such as that proposed would be conducive to Esprit de corps in its very highest form.

6. I have in mind that under the plan of organization herewith submitted, all Filipinos specially selected for Philippine service would, upon arrival in this area, be assigned to the 2nd Battalion for training - reassignment to the 1st Battalion to follow definite selection, after training, for one of the specialized sections in the 1st Battalion for which close observation has shown the individual best qualified, if qualified for specialized intelligence service at all. Resulting from this procedure, the 1st Battalion would ultimately have most of its personnel on detached service, maintaining only a reasonable replacement reserve, while the 2nd Battalion would have a relatively large reserve for any special missions, including combat, for which carefully selected, highly trained Filipinos might be desired.

7. Operational control of parties or individuals once despatched for Philippine Intelligence service, would vest as heretofore in the Allied Intelligence Bureau, but with the stage all set for the transfer of such control

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with the attending responsibility to the Force Commander should a developing situation require it.

8. The 978th Signal Service Company was activated under authority of the War Department on 1 July 1943. Its purpose is to facilitate Philippine signal communications. As its composition is to be partly American, and as its Filipino membership is to be drawn from sources apart from volunteers heretofore selected, while set up as a component of the Force for administrative control, it is kept separate and distinct from the "AVENGER" Battalions as are the Force Headquarters, the Headquarters Company and the Training Section.

9. The force has been set up as a "provisional" unit in view of my understanding that as such, specific War Department approval to its activation is not required. No T/O has been provided for, as the unusual conditions under which personnel are to be organized, trained and committed to missions render the restrictions of any T/O highly undesirable. The matter of unit strengths and grades should be left subject to the policy of the C-in-C as the operations develop. In this respect, the plan is similar to that under which the "N Special Unit" of the Australian Army functions.

10. The plan of organization is both simple and flexible, but believed workable. As a unit under USAFFE, adequate provision would be made for administrative control, providing at the same time a strong moral influence over its membership. I am satisfied that under such an influence lies our best hope that these men will reach individual and collective objectives.

11. I believe that we must realize in planning Philippine intelligence operations that the men we despatch will not only be under the constant fear of enemy apprehension, but will come under the sinister influence of many of their own people - - possibly members of their immediate families as well, - - who, having turned collaborationists, no longer seek liberation, no longer desire to avenge their dead. To counteract these influences, we can only find and develop a psychological force adequate to control the individual. I was gratified to hear the other day that the members of the Filipino parties we have heretofore despatched to the Philippines have voluntarily submitted themselves to a private "de or die" oath while enroute to their destinations. This is an expressive phase of Filipino character to be understood and encouraged, as in it he finds moral strength - - that strength requisite to meet and overcome the severe tests he will inevitably find ahead. It is just that strength I seek to develop through an organization in which he will have such pride of membership that he will take that last vital step, in reckless disregard of personal consequences, to contribute to it his full share of individual achievement.

12. For Filipino leadership of the "AVENGERS", if the principle of this plan be approved, I believe that VILLAMOR upon his return is the logical choice. For the time being, the undersigned should occupy the dual positions of Commander of the Force and Chief of this Section, A.I.B., for the purposes of control over the activity as a whole.


13. If the principle of this plan meets with your approval I will work up the details of activation with the assistance of G-3 for your further consideration.

COURTNEY WHITNEY,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Chief, Philippine  
Regional Section



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1 June, 1943.

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Organization for Philippine Activities.

TO : Chief of Staff.

Coordination: G-2.



1. In furtherance of the objectives of the Commander-in-Chief in respect to Philippine intelligence coverage, it is recommended that a "1st Special Philippine Scout Force" be activated. This force to be a reconnaissance unit attached to GHQ and the commander thereof to be charged with the responsibilities presently devolving upon the Chief, Philippine Regional Section, AIB and, generally, to conduct Philippine reconnaissance and intelligence activities or perform other assigned missions under the policies and directives of the Commander-in-Chief.

2. The reasons for this change in present procedure are manifold. In the first place, we can only achieve maximum results with agents we train and dispatch to the Philippines if we realize:

a. That each agent enters the Philippines with a high price on his head and a task ahead of him, the hazards of which find few counterparts in military history. He becomes instantly the object of merciless hunt by both enemy and many of his own people, as well.

b. That from the moment he departs we lose all measure of physical control and leadership over him and it is, therefore, necessary that the strongest possible spiritual tie be developed and maintained. In the development of such a tie that will permit us to effectively hold the individual to his charted course and command his explicit obedience, regardless of hazard or enemy efforts toward alienation, we must deal with and consider the souls rather than the bodies of men.

3. Granted the foregoing premise, examination of present procedure discloses that the men being dispatched to the Philippines currently are without clearly defined status. They are neither, strictly speaking, agents of this Section, AIB, nor of G-2; might possibly be generally described as agents of GHQ. Furthermore, the organization to which they legally belong is meaningless to them and can exert no possible influence over their future course of action. Thus, the indefinite nature of their status is neither conducive to high morale nor to disciplined movement and action, especially in the presence of the enemy. Certainly it provides no basis on which a strong spiritual bond can be created in replacement of and substitution for physical control and leadership.



4. On the other hand, each member of a command, such as that recommended for activation, would be moved and given moral strength by the knowledge that:

- a. Such command, expressly dedicated to the liberation of the Filipino people, upon successful operations by its widely separated units, would long live in Philippine history as the real spearhead of counter invasion.
- b. That operational success will be measured by the achievements of each individual -- such achievements being preserved in the organizational records of a permanent command of which he is an integral part.
- c. That those who survive will be the recipients of high honor by their people for duty well done -- those who fail to survive will achieve a measure of immortality (more than which the Oriental mind knows no greater reward.)
- d. That pride in the responsibilities and achievements of such a command would be conducive to that esprit de corps so essential to high morale and would provide the basis for the strong spiritual tie between commander and individual, essentially a necessary substitute for physical control and leadership, which the circumstances will not now and, by the very nature of the operations, never will permit.

5. I have in mind the development of an organization both simple and flexible, broken down into relatively small units of 4 - 6 men with a commissioned leader for each, provision being made for both air and naval attachments as available.

6. The principles herein stated involve psychological considerations most definitely applicable to the character of the Filipinos. The action recommended is designed to develop the underlying, if somewhat latent, strength and control the weakness in that character, and provide a spiritual or moral force that will help the individual to resolutely adhere to his duty, despite the stern reality that many who do so will not survive. It would, furthermore, provide the basis for sound administration, for which there is no adequate provision at the present time.

7. Once such a force is distributed to cover strategical points throughout the Philippines, a firm basis will be laid, not only to provide us with information on enemy activities, but to develop internal pressure, as and where required, to serve operational plans of counter invasion.

8. If the principles stated are approved, I shall prepare and submit, for your consideration, an organizational plan in detail.

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CW.  
COURTNEY WHITNEY,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Chief, Philippine Regional  
Section.



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2 March, 1943.



**SUBJECT:** Training of Philippine Parties.

**TO :** Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1. Reference is made to the attached check sheet from Lieut. Colonel Ind, forwarding a report on the training of the "Planet" Party as requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2. The suggested use of the Australian P. & R. T. School for training Philippine parties raises the major question of whether in the future training facilities are to be provided by AIB, or by the Northeastern Area, NEI and Philippine Sections separately.

3. It is considered that the best course, if agreement of all parties can be obtained, is that AIB should provide facilities such as accommodation, equipment, etc., leaving the selection of syllabus and actual training to be carried out by the three geographical sections independently.

4. Desiderata for the main intelligence school are:

- a. Proximity to the seacoast for training purposes.
- b. Isolation in the interest of security.
- c. Accessibility to the Regional section headquarters.
- d. Warm climate.

The school at Cairns satisfies a. and d. Its security is now less than originally, as a large number of troops moved into the area. It is inaccessible; for instance, it is three or four days' journey by train from Brisbane where the headquarters of the Philippine Section is at present stationed, whither Commander Feldt is proposing to move and where it is hoped the headquarters of the NEI Section will eventually be situated.

5. The Australian Army's P. & R.T. School is satisfactory, except from the point of view of security which is endangered by contact between trainees and the civilian population, particularly women.

6. It is considered that the possibility of moving the training establishment from Cairns to an isolated portion of the seacoast or an island near Brisbane should be investigated and, if a satisfactory site can be found, that the main AIB school available to all regional sections should be established there.

*[Signature]*  
C. G. ROBERTS, Col.  
Controller,  
Allied Intelligence Bureau.

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January 14, 1943



SUBJECT: Radio Communications - Philippines

TO : Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith

1. It would appear that the necessity for the establishment of an exclusive United States Signal Corps communication channel and system for handling Philippine radio traffic must receive early consideration. Therefore, this preliminary report is advanced with the idea of initiating discussions among the proper authorities.

2. At present this headquarters does not possess an exclusive channel or organization devoted to traffic to and from the Islands. Such an establishment has not been required, since only within the past month has the volume of traffic exceeded more than a few desultory messages. However, traffic is expanding very rapidly with the establishment of regular schedules with at least two Philippine stations and a further increase is anticipated as attempts are now being made to make the necessary contact with a third station. At least one other station, apparently located in the Islands, also has been monitored in Australia, although it has not been heard from in the past several weeks.

3. Our traffic now is handled through R.A.A.F. station KAZ at Darwin. A second channel for the limited use of very secret communications relating to this Bureau and its parties will probably be in operation shortly, utilizing A.I.B. stations only. This channel would not be available to guerrilla leaders.

4. Since our only activity outlet is through R.A.A.F. organization, there can not be any such thing as purely U.S. security, inasmuch as messages to the Philippines must be encoded in the R.A.A.F. code office by R.A.A.F. personnel. This is done at Brisbane for transmission to Darwin. If other codes are used for international transmission, the plain language content of our messages must also be known in the Darwin R.A.A.F. office where re-encoding would be accomplished. The disadvantages and dangers of such a system are obvious. *(Applicable to technical messages only - all communications are plain text)*

5. In addition to the undesirable security angle, the point is made that code traffic to and from the Islands is certain to increase rapidly within the next few months. Whether R.A.A.F. will be willing to take on added loads, when already a considerable portion of their time and staff are utilized handling purely U.S. business, is a question requiring an answer from R.A.A.F. In any event, it is inconceivable that with the promise of awakening activity in the Philippine Section, we should continue to use an Allied organization for

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the performance of a function so vital as communications.

6. Since this question is beyond the pale of A.I.B., except indirectly, a formal request for a U.S. establishment cannot be made from here. Nevertheless, should this come to pass, A.I.B. likely would immediately alter its present arrangements concerning its own secret stations and bring those dealing with the Philippines within the U.S. Signal Corps net.

ALLISON W. IND, Major  
Deputy Controller,  
Allied Intelligence Bureau.



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WASHINGTON, D.C.