

BOX 251, ENTRY 1093, PHILIPPINE ARCHIVE COLLECTION
RECORD GROUP 407, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, COLLEGE PARK, MD

File: 381 Bk. 2
Title: Enemy Defensive Plans, Priority Mission
Origin: Hqs., North Luzon, USAFIP
Dates: 29 Sep '43
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Searched No PAP

HEADQUARTERS, USAFIP
NORTH LUZON

September 29, 1943

SUBJECT: ENEMY DEFENSIVE PLANS: PRIORITY MISSION.
TO : C. O., 14th INF.

1. PROBABLE DEFENSIVE PLANS OF ENEMY - The enemy's defensive plans for Luzon will in all probability be as follows:

a. Important and provable landing places such as Lingayen, Gulf, Nasugbu, Batangas,; Tayabas Bay, etc. heavily garrisoned and if they have the equipment, heavily fortified.

b. Good landing beaches, however, of less importance than above, lightly garrisoned or patrolled.

c. Stationed at strategical points behind the above mentioned defenses will be local reserves, as highly mobile as the Japs can make them ready to move to a threatened point within their area.

d. Behind all the above, there will be still larger general reserves.

e. The units outlines in a, b, c, are expected to detect landings, defeat if possible the landing effort, and at least retard the landing effort and limit the beachhead. The success with which these units can carry out their mission depends primarily on their ability to move RAPIDLY the local reserve mentioned under c.

f. The mission of the large general reserve will, of course, be to counter attack established beachheads and destroy them. Again the success of these units depends directly on their ability to move RAPIDLY.

2. From the foregoing, it is evident that the guerilla forces primary mission on "M DAY" is to prevent in every possible way the movement of enemy local and general reserves. First priority on "M DAY" should therefore, be given to destroying completely enemy lines of communications, i.e. roads, bridges, railroads, telephones lines, etc.

3. On various occasions, I have heard remarks such as this, "If we destroy that bridge it will retard the progress of our own troops". Here and now I wish to wipe out any such line of reasoning. The advantage of preventing the enemy from moving reserves and supplies far outweighs the disadvantage of retarding the movement of our troops. The most critical period of landing on a hostile defended shore is about the first twelve hours or during the time required to establish a beachhead. Regardless whether you believe the enemy will use a certain bridge or road, destroy it.

4. Subsequent missions may be carried out after the primary mission of destroying lines of communications is accomplished.

5. Ref. see also Plans for Action ..., USFIP. N.L. dated July 15, 1943.

By order of C.O., USFIP, N.L.

SGD: 1122

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NORTH LUZON

September 29, 1943

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 - d. Behind all the above, there will be still larger general reserves.
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By order of C.O., USFIP, N.L.

(SGD) 1122
(TYP) 1122

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/rch

JAMES H. HILL
Capt, Inf